Search/PHP web runtimes (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)
● Story

PHP web runtimes (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)

On October 21, 2026, the PHP project released emergency fixes for two critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in the PHP core runtime, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 and collectively named PHP2Shell. Both are rated 9.2 (Critical) under CVSS v4.0, and both allow an unauthenticated attacker to run code on a vulnerable server. The fixed releases are PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35. Patching is the only complete fix, and you should upgrade PHP as your first priority. But patching a fleet takes time: you need to inventory where PHP runs, schedule maintenance windows and test applications against the new builds. This post shows you how to use AWS Web Application Firewall ( AWS WAF ) to help reduce exposure to the confirmed attack paths during that window.…

CVEs
2
Highest CVSS
9.8
In KEV
0
Sources
23
Connections
72 relationships
How new PHP vulnerabilities threaten home users | Kaspersky official blog
Yesterday, two critical vulnerabilities were disclosed in PHP, the scripting language used by many websites and online services: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 . Attackers can exploit them to remotely execute commands on any server running PHP, with no authentication required. The exploit has been dubbed PHP2Shell. The PHP security team announced an upcoming emergency update on October 20 and released patches fixing the vulnerabilities the following day. We’ve already covered the technical details of these vulnerabilities and explained what companies and server administrators should do . You may have safely skipped that news because you don’t run any servers — but unfortunately, the issue is not limited to businesses. Nearly 70% of websites run on PHP, including services we use every day: wikis, online stores, smart devices with web interfaces, home network-attached storage (NAS), smart-home controllers, and much more. Today, we explain how these vulnerabilities could affect you personally and what you can do to reduce the risks. How the vulnerabilities can affect home users Account and personal-data theft The vulnerability allows an attacker to steal authentication tokens from server memory. These tokens essentially act like electronic passes — telling a website that the user has already signed in. As a result, an attacker may be able to access someone else’s account without entering a password or two-factor authentication code, putting messages, documents, delivery addresses, order histories, and other confidential information at risk. Loss of files on home devices If you have network-attached storage (NAS) or a video surveillance system at home that uses a vulnerable PHP version, it may also be at risk. Depending on what level of access they gain, attackers could potentially copy, delete or encrypt files they can access. Malware infection If an attacker gains access to a vulnerable website, they can use it in virtually any way they want: trick visitors into downloading a malicious file or clicking on a phishing link, display dangerous instructions, replace payment forms or login pages with malicious ones — the list goes on and on. As a result, someone visiting a legitimate website could not only lose access to their account, but also lose money or accidentally infect their device with malware. Below are examples of services directly affected by the vulnerabilities. Which services are affected by the PHP vulnerabilities Jeedom Jeedom is a smart-home platform that lets users control lighting, sensors, heating, blinds and home IoT devices. Attackers could abuse this in many ways: they could disable the alarm, track when the homeowner is away, access video from the door intercom, and more. The developers confirmed that the new vulnerability affects their application, and have already released an emergency update — Jeedom 4.6.2. Users need to run the update twice for it to work. The developers say a fully fixed version for home users will be released in the coming days. Websites we use every day As mentioned above, PHP is used by roughly 70% of websites. This doesn’t mean every one of them is vulnerable: it depends on the PHP version in use and whether the site owners have already updated it. Many government websites in Europe have already suspended operations because of the new vulnerability. Unfortunately, a website may still be vulnerable even if it appears to be working normally. An attacker could potentially take control of any legitimate website whose server hasn’t been patched yet. They could fake payment or login pages, host malicious files, or persuade users to download an “urgent update” that is actually malware. Ordinary users have no reliable way to check whether such instructions or files are safe, so be sure to use reliable anti-phishing and antivirus protection . If you suspect that your data may have been stolen, check the active sessions in your account settings. If you spot suspicious activity or devices you don’t recognize, sign out of all active sessions and change your password. Use a password manager   — it can generate a truly strong, unique password that you won’t have to memorize yourself. Computer games Bad news for gamers: some video games whose servers use PHP are also at risk. If you don’t want attackers to get hold of your accounts, be sure to update the passwords for your gaming platforms, stores and accounts. To buy time for updates, some developers temporarily took their services offline. Final Fantasy XIV , Pokemon Champions , games from Bandai Namco Entertainment, Uma Musume: Pretty Derby , Granblue Fantasy , Shadowverse: Worlds Beyond, and many others went into emergency maintenance. Nintendo Switch Online and the GOG and Steam stores were also affected . Unfortunately, there’ve also been more drastic consequences. Yesterday, the developers of World Quest announced that the game would shut down permanently after 15 years: it relied on outdated infrastructure that would have been extremely difficult and costly to fix. For the same reason, the mobile game Please Save My Pandemonium! shut down after more than ten years of operation. Home network-attached storage (NAS) “Home clouds” have become popular in recent years for good reason: many users prefer to keep backups of their data at home rather than online. A number of companies make NAS devices, and at least three — QNAP, Synology and ASUSTOR — have said the vulnerabilities affect their products. An update has also been released for Unraid , an operating system for home servers, network storage and media servers. QNAP The manufacturer confirmed that the vulnerabilities affect several versions of its NAS operating systems — QTS and QuTS hero — as well as applications including QuMagie , Note Station 3 and certain versions of QVR Surveillance . A successful attack could put photos, documents, notes and camera recordings at risk. At the time of publication of this blogpost, QNAP is still preparing updates, so the main priority is to temporarily disconnect NAS from the internet. QNAP recommends disabling port forwarding on the router — to prevent NAS from automatically opening ports — and allowing access to the management panel only from the home network or  through a VPN . Synology Both vulnerabilities have been officially confirmed in PHP packages 7.3, 7.4, and 8.0–8.4, as well as in Mail Station and Synology Calendar . Fixes have already been released for PHP, starting from version 7.4, as well as for Mail Station and Synology Calendar . PHP 7.3 won’t be fixed. The company separately notes that the PHP component built into its operating system cannot be reached from outside the device, so the risk of attack is very low. ASUSTOR ASUSTOR also officially confirmed both vulnerabilities , and immediately removed PHP 7, 7.3, 7.4, and 8.1 packages from App Central. The company recommends immediately backing up your data, removing older PHP packages, and using PHP 8.3 or 8.4. Unraid In today’s operating-system update , PHP was upgraded to version 8.4.27 with fixes for the vulnerabilities. The developers recommend that all users update to Unraid 7.3.4. Containers with their own PHP installation must be updated separately: the new PHP version in the operating system doesn’t replace PHP inside containers. At the time of publication, we haven’t found public confirmation from other major manufacturers (such as TerraMaster, UGREEN, Buffalo, or Western Digital) that their devices are affected by these vulnerabilities — only user discussions on forums. But the fact that only some NAS manufacturers have confirmed the problem so far doesn’t guarantee that your devices are safe — especially if they’re fairly old or come from a lesser-known or defunct manufacturer. In that case, first disconnect the devices from the internet while keeping them accessible only on the local network, and then investigate whether they’re vulnerable. Nextcloud cloud storage Nextcloud is a free, open-source platform for creating your own cloud storage, serving as an alternative to Google Drive, Dropbox, and Microsoft OneDrive. It lets you store and synchronize files across devices, share them with other users, and work with documents, photos, calendars and contacts. The data can be stored on your own server or NAS rather than on a third-party company’s servers. If you store important data in Nextcloud, check how your cloud instance is configured. If you use Nextcloud All-in-One , update to version 14.4.1 where the vulnerability has already been fixed. If your Nextcloud installation is configured differently, you need to update PHP yourself on the device or server. How to protect your devices and data Use phishing and malware protection . Our security solution  automatically blocks phishing pages and malware, even when attackers place them on legitimate websites. Keep an eye on updates . If you have network-attached storage, a smart-home system, a home server, a media server, or any other device with a web interface, first check the manufacturer’s website and install all available updates. If no update is available yet, temporarily disable internet access to the device. Use strong passwords . Most people reuse the same password, or variations of it, across multiple websites. If an attacker finds one of those passwords on a vulnerable server, they may be able to compromise your other accounts as well. We recommend generating and storing strong, unique passwords in Kaspersky Password Manager so you don’t have to remember your credentials yourself. Be sure to enable two-factor authentication on all important accounts — ideally using one-time codes generated by the same password manager . Keep an offline backup of important files. Don’t rely on cloud storage alone — make sure you keep a backup of all important documents on both a hard drive and an external device. For more information on how to make backups properly, see our article The internet remembers not quite everything . What other risks can your home devices face? Read our articles: Trojan TV, or the new risks of malicious proxies Ransomware now taking aim at personal backups Is your TV box renting out your network? Is your router secretly working for foreign intelligence? Three common attacks on Linux in homes How to secure your smart home
kaspersky.comOct 22, 2026extracted
PHP2Shell exploit bypasses protections designed to stop remote code execution
Researchers have developed a new exploit that shows how even Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) on an x86-64 server cannot stop the PHP2Shell vulnerability. VulnCheck, which made it available to only the company’s Initial Access Intelligence customers, also warned that threat actors are using AI to find even more ways to attack. The team told us that it’s a “significant advance” because up until now, ASLR has been a major barrier to exploiting PHP2Shell on real-world servers. They don't expect that to hold, though. “Adversaries are clearly spending time (and tokens) on this bug,” Spencer McIntyre, director of exploit development at VulnCheck, told The Register. The PHP2Shell mess grew even bigger on Thursday amid reports of attackers abusing the security flaws days before they were disclosed and UK government websites proactively going dark. Vulncheck's exploit targets CVE-2026-109618, a critical, out-of-memory corruption bug that leads to remote code execution (RCE) in PHP, and part of the PHP2Shell pair alongside CVE-2026-109619. The PHP Foundation officially disclosed and issued patches for both on Wednesday. Overnight, VulnCheck researchers developed what they believe is the first known exploit to achieve remote code execution on ASLR-enabled x86-64 systems with PHP's recommended production configuration. ASLR is a built-in defense against memory-corruption bugs – like PHP2Shell – that randomly arranges memory locations of a program's key data areas. By scrambling these components live, in memory every time a program runs, ASLR prevents an attacker trying to achieve RCE from correctly guessing the target memory address – and thus prevents them from executing malicious code. While VulnCheck has seen “hundreds” of PHP2Shell proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub, “very few contain legitimate, working exploits,” McIntyre told us, adding that this is largely due to ASLR. “There's a significant difference between demonstrating a vulnerability and developing an exploit that can overcome the security protections found in real-world environments,” McIntyre said. “One of the biggest obstacles has been ASLR, a protection designed to make memory corruption vulnerabilities much harder to exploit.” The threat hunters’ new technique, we’re told, bypasses ASLR. It uses a confirmed memory leak chained into RCE on PHP 8.4.26, and they claim it works on x86-64 platforms even with ASLR enabled and PHP’s recommended display_errors=off production configuration. “We haven't identified another public or commercial exploit that achieves this under the same conditions,” McIntyre said. “Developing this capability was far from trivial, but it demonstrates that a major barrier to exploiting PHP2Shell on production-configured systems can be overcome.” VulnCheck says it also works on ARM64, but the RCE is not currently functional on ARM-based systems. This should be a wake-up call to all organizations that, especially now in the era of AI bug hunting and exploit development, “the technical difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability shouldn't be confused with protection against it,” McIntyre said. “Organizations running vulnerable versions of PHP should prioritize patching rather than assume existing memory protections or configuration changes will stop an attack.” ®
theregister.comOct 22, 2026extracted
PHP2Shell puts dozens of UK government services out of service
The PHP2Shell security fiasco has forced 32 UK government services offline and left another four partially unavailable as Whitehall scrambles to patch the critical vulnerabilities wreaking havoc across the web. The figures were disclosed in the House of Lords on Thursday, where tech minister Baroness Lloyd of Effra outlined the disruption following the discovery of two critical flaws in PHP. "Currently, the information I have is that 32 government services are unavailable and four are partially unavailable," Lloyd told peers. "That has resulted largely from precautionary measures taken to protect systems while security updates and mitigations are applied." "We are working very carefully with departments to restore the services safely and securely following that remediation activity," she added. Whitehall has not published a full list of affected services, although the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) is among those known to have taken their websites offline, rather inconveniently with next week's Budget looming. Peers also raised reports of disruption affecting the DVLA and police services. Britain isn't alone in pulling the plug. Government websites in Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands have also been taken offline as a precaution, along with Australia's own cybersecurity agency website. Across the Atlantic, the NSA has urged organizations to patch or disconnect vulnerable systems, although the US government has not publicly confirmed any website shutdowns. PHP2Shell comprises two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, that could allow unauthenticated attackers to execute code on vulnerable servers. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) warned organizations to patch immediately or consider pulling affected systems offline until they could be fixed. "The NCSC was briefed by OpenAI last week on this potential specific vulnerability and has been working to ensure that disclosure happened in a co-ordinated way with vendors, so there was sufficient preparation to protect customers," Lloyd said. Security firm Calif found one of the PHP bugs using OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol model, while Google's Wiz separately uncovered both flaws with the help of AI tools. OpenAI then dug into the vulnerabilities itself and worked with vendors and government agencies to get the word out. The government established a cross-departmental incident response operation before public disclosure, Lloyd said. The NCSC also sent 50,000 warnings to businesses and other organizations. The disruption has spread beyond central government. Liberal Democrat peer Baroness Ludford pointed to several councils whose services had reportedly been taken offline, including Edinburgh, Oxford, Bristol, Lambeth, and Barnet. She questioned why central government and local authorities remain outside the statutory duties proposed under the government's Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which returns to the Lords on Monday. "We are not currently aware of any confirmed compromise of central government systems resulting from these vulnerabilities," Lloyd told peers, later extending that assessment to the wider UK public sector. AWS says attackers were exploiting the flaws four days before they were publicly disclosed, while Cloudflare has since recorded millions of attempts to weaponize them. ®
theregister.comOct 22, 2026extracted
PHP, OpenAI scopre una falla che mette al rischio fino al 70% dei siti a livello globale
Una vulnerabilità nel codice di PHP, uno dei linguaggi di programmazione più utilizzati sul web, sta provocando un’allerta internazionale, con la messa in crisi di tantissimi siti web e una corsa agli aggiornamenti di sicurezza. Con l’apporto di GPT-5.6 Sol di OpenAI la startup di cybersecurity Calif.io ha individuato una falla nel linguaggio PHP, utilizzato da gran parte dei siti web mondiali. Dopo la comunicazione e la scoperta di altre falle collegate , numerosi siti a livello globale, tanti in Europa di carattere governativo – sono rimasti irraggiungibili. In poche ore, Pubbliche Amministrazioni e operatori digitali sono dovuti intervenire rapidamente per proteggere i propri sistemi, anche rendendo temporaneamente offline i servizi. “ Le vulnerabilità, identificate con i codici CVE-2026-109618 e CVE-2026-109619 , potrebbero consentire agli aggressori di eseguire in remoto codice dannoso sui server vulnerabili senza autenticazione “, ha sottolineato l’ Enisa . Gli sviluppatori di PHP hanno poi pubblicato aggiornamenti di sicurezza urgenti, invitando tutti gli utenti ad applicarli immediatamente. Nel frattempo, diverse aziende tecnologiche hanno segnalato tentativi di sfruttamento delle vulnerabilità, alimentando i timori di una rapida diffusione degli attacchi. La NSA e autorità cyber di diversi Paesi hanno chiesto di applicare immediatamente la patch . L’importanza dell’AI nella scoperta L’aspetto più preoccupante, sottolinea la Reuters , è che le falle erano rimaste nascoste nel codice per anni. Secondo alcuni analisti, per più di un decennio. Senza l’ impiego dell’AI la scoperta non sarebbe mai avvenuta. E il problema è che PHP è alla base di una parte molto grande del web. Lo sfruttano, direttamente o indirettament,e piattaforme come WordPress, Drupal, Joomla e Magento , ma anche servizi di hosting, pannelli di controllo e numerosi software. Oltre alla patch , gli stessi sviluppatori di PHP hanno successivamente creato un gruppo di lavoro insieme a Calif.io, OpenAI, Google e altri soggetti per sviluppare una soluzione. Le minacce potenziali si moltiplicano Secondo gli analisti di Wiz , citati da The Information , le vulnerabilità potrebbero mettere a rischio fino al 70% dei siti web mondiali. Bisogna per questo applicare gli aggiornamenti rapidamenti. Gli esperti le hanno addiritturadefinite “ le vulnerabilità più gravi mai scoperte dall’AI, se non tra le più gravi nella storia del software ”. La priorità immediata per aziende, Pubbliche Amministrazioni e gestori di siti è quindi verificare rapidamente la versione di PHP utilizzata. In caso non si trattasse dell’ultima, dovranno quindi installare gli aggiornamenti messi a disposizione dagli sviluppatori. In caso contrario i pericoli possono moltiplicarsi. Le falle potrebbero infatti consentire, in determinate configurazioni, attacchi di Remote Code Execution. Un criminale informatico potrebbe cioè eseguire codice a distanza sul server compromesso, con la possibilità di installare malware, accedere ai database o intervenire sui file del sistema. Seguici anche sul nostro canale WhatsApp Vai al sito di Cybersecurity Italia. L'articolo PHP, OpenAI scopre una falla che mette al rischio fino al 70% dei siti a livello globale sembra essere il primo su CyberSecurity Italia .
cybersecitalia.itOct 22, 2026extracted
Hackers pile on PHP2Shell as AWS reveals attacks began before disclosure
Attackers are hammering servers with millions of attempts to exploit the critical PHP2Shell vulnerabilities, with Amazon revealing that someone was already going after the flaws four days before they were publicly disclosed. Cloudflare says it has recorded a staggering increase in attacks targeting the two vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, since details began circulating earlier this week. According to Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince, the company spotted thousands of exploitation attempts in the 10 hours before the vulnerabilities were publicly announced. That figure jumped to tens of thousands within 45 minutes of disclosure, hundreds of thousands within two hours, and has since climbed into the millions. And the attackers aren't simply recycling the same exploit. Cloudflare said it has seen miscreants tweaking their payloads in an attempt to sneak past its web application firewall (WAF) protections, apparently using feedback from blocked requests to work out what might get through. Security outfit Hadrian also sounded the alarm on October 21, reporting that PHP2Shell was being "exploited in the wild at scale." "Most of the attacks we observe abuse PHP's session upload-progress path, and we expect more exploit paths to appear before and after the fix ships," the company warned. More worrying, some attackers appear to have started before the vulnerabilities were even public knowledge. Amazon Threat Intelligence says it detected an attempt to exploit PHP2Shell on October 17, four days before patches were released. The activity was picked up by MadPot, Amazon's network of honeypots designed to lure attackers and record what they get up to. "While the vulnerability was under embargo, the targeting of a honeypot from an anonymized IP address suggests the activity was conducted by a threat actor, though it remains unclear how the actor acquired exploit information prior to disclosure," Amazon said. The retail and cloud giant said it detected multiple proof-of-concept exploits on October 21, with the earliest appearing around 0200 UTC, some 12 hours before the patches were released. Over the following six hours, further attempts arrived from different anonymized infrastructure, using a variety of payloads. Amazon reckons this points to multiple attackers rather than a single group. Whether any of those attempts would have worked against real-world systems remains unclear. The findings add another layer to an already messy disclosure. As The Register reported on Wednesday, the PHP Foundation has accused supply-chain security vendor Chainguard of putting websites at risk by publishing patched PHP builds before the agreed disclosure deadline. However, Amazon's October 17 detection suggests at least one cybercrim was already trying to exploit the bugs days before that incident. The vulnerabilities themselves are particularly nasty. Both carry a critical 9.2 severity rating and affect PHP's handling of memory, potentially allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute malicious code on vulnerable servers. Unlike flaws in individual plugins or applications, these bugs affect the PHP runtime itself, putting a potentially enormous number of websites at risk regardless of which content management system they use. Cloudflare says it has deployed WAF protections across its free and paid plans, although it has stressed that these are no substitute for patching. With attackers already trying their luck before the fixes were available, admins may have more than just a patching backlog to worry about. Amazon is advising organizations to investigate suspicious activity dating back to at least October 17, rather than assuming their systems were safe until the vulnerabilities became public. ®
theregister.comOct 22, 2026extracted
PHP2Shell è allarme PHP! Due falle critiche aprono la strada agli hacker nei server web di tutto il mondo
Il 20 ottobre 2026, il team di sicurezza di PHP ha pubblicato un avviso preliminare relativo a un rilascio di emergenza imminente, volto a risolvere due vulnerabilità critiche (entrambe con un punteggio CVSS di 9.2 ). Le patch sono state rilasciate mercoledì 21 ottobre 2026. Il rilascio è stato accelerato dopo che informazioni sulle vulnerabilità sono trapelate pubblicamente. In un post su Hacker News, un utente ha segnalato due falle di esecuzione di codice remoto (RCE) in PHP, che presumibilmente interessavano tutte le versioni a partire dalla 5.4.0. Le vulnerabilità in questione sono CVE-2026-109618 e CVE-2026-109619 . Al momento della pubblicazione, erano riservate ma non divulgate. Poco dopo la comparsa dell’articolo, i ricercprendilo hanno confermato l’esistenza delle vulnerabilità. Insieme ai dettagli trapelati, è apparso online un exploit ufficiosamente soprannominato PHP2Shell . Un video dimostrativo trapelato mostra l’ exploit in azione su server web che utilizzano WordPress, MediaWiki, phpBB, Magento, Joomla, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal e WHMCS , che alimentano molti siti web moderni. L’autenticità della demo e il comportamento esatto dell’exploit non sono stati confermati in modo indipendente al momento della pubblicazione. Secondo il ricercatore che ha pubblicato il PoC , le vulnerabilità sono legate alla gestione del tipo multipart/form-data insieme al meccanismo di caricamento dell’avanzamento della sessione.  Le vulnerabilità si trovano nel core di PHP e rientrano nelle categorie Use-After-Free e corruzione della memoria . Ciò significa che le falle non possono essere corrette tramite codice applicativo: la soluzione è possibile solo aggiornando PHP sul server. L’attacco funziona senza autenticazione: un utente malintenzionato con accesso di rete a un’applicazione PHP può eseguire codice arbitrario per conto del processo PHP senza richiedere autorizzazione. Gli avvisi di sicurezza pubblicati da PHP il 21 ottobre confermano queste informazioni. Le vulnerabilità interessano le versioni 5, 6, 7 e 8 di PHP . Al momento della pubblicazione, sono supportate le versioni dalla 8.2 alla 8.5 . Le versioni precedenti, tra cui PHP 8.1, 8.0, 7.x e 5.x, hanno raggiunto la fine del ciclo di vita. Tuttavia, data l’elevata gravità delle vulnerabilità, sono state rilasciate patch di backport anche per le versioni 7.4, 8.0 e 8.1. Nel frattempo, il ricercatore di sicurezza informatica Kirill Firsov ha pubblicato un video con la dimostrazione dell’exploit PHP2Shell. S econdo i suoi dati, gli autori dell’exploit e del video sono i ricercatori lcfr_hax e calif_io. Nel video, PHP2Shell esegue codice su server di test con WordPress, MediaWiki, phpBB, Magento, Joomla, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal e WHMCS. Inoltre, i giornalisti di Ars Technica menzionano un rapporto non confermato sul problema PHP2Shell apparso in rete, di cui non sono riusciti a trovare l’originale. Gli esperti di Sansec si aspettano che attacchi su larga scala alle nuove vulnerabilità di PHP possano iniziare già 15 minuti dopo il rilascio delle patch. Inoltre, gli amministratori sono invitati a prepararsi in anticipo per l’aggiornamento dagli esperti delle aziende Wordfence e Huntress , che hanno già emesso avvertimenti separati su PHP2Shell. Si consiglia agli amministratori di preparare in anticipo un elenco di applicazioni PHP e server, di creare backup dei siti e dei database e di pianificare l’aggiornamento immediatamente dopo il rilascio delle patch. Raccomandiamo vivamente agli amministratori responsabili dei server web PHP accessibili pubblicamente di adottare le seguenti misure prima del rilascio della patch: Eseguire un inventario di tutti i sistemi che utilizzano PHP nell’infrastruttura (inclusi server web, pannelli di controllo, software di terze parti, ecc.). Disabilitare l’avanzamento del caricamento:session.upload_progress.enabled = Offcon l’aiuto diflag_amministratore_phpnei pool PHP-FPM. Bloccare le richieste multipart sui server nginx e Apache. Si consiglia di isolare temporaneamente le applicazioni PHP esposte a Internet fino al rilascio delle correzioni. Assicurarsi che la patch sia pronta per l’installazione immediata non appena viene pubblicata. Pianificare la migrazione al ramo PHP corrente per i server con versioni non supportate (8.1 e precedenti). L'articolo PHP2Shell è allarme PHP! Due falle critiche aprono la strada agli hacker nei server web di tutto il mondo proviene da Red Hot Cyber .
redhotcyber.comOct 22, 2026extracted
Using AWS WAF to apply mitigations for PHP2Shell RCE vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)
October 22, 2026: We updated this post to add the AWS WAF PHP application managed rule group. Version 2.3 of the rule group adds the PHP2Shell_BODY rule for CVE-2026-109619, and AWS made it the default version. On October 21, 2026, the PHP project released emergency fixes for two critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in the PHP core runtime, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 and collectively named PHP2Shell. Both are rated 9.2 (Critical) under CVSS v4.0, and both allow an unauthenticated attacker to run code on a vulnerable server. The fixed releases are PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35. Patching is the only complete fix, and you should upgrade PHP as your first priority. But patching a fleet takes time: you need to inventory where PHP runs, schedule maintenance windows and test applications against the new builds. This post shows you how to use AWS Web Application Firewall ( AWS WAF ) to help reduce your exposure during that window. The simplest step is an AWS managed rule. AWS released version 2.3 of the AWS WAF PHP application managed rule group, which adds the PHP2Shell_BODY rule for CVE-2026-109619. AWS also promoted version 2.3 to the default version globally. If your protection pack (web ACL) already uses this rule group at the default version, the rule is already active. This post shows you how to confirm that and how to add the rule group if you don’t use it yet. It also covers the custom rules that still add defense in depth. It also explains where AWS WAF protection ends, so you don’t develop a false sense of safety. For how Amazon threat intelligence detected PHP2Shell exploitation before public disclosure, see Amazon Threat Intelligence identifies PHP2Shell exploitation prior to public disclosure in MadPot . For AWS service status and the AWS WAF rule that AWS recommends, see AWS Security Bulletin 2026-143-AWS . IMPORTANT: Patching is the only complete fix, and you should upgrade PHP as your first priority. The vulnerabilities in brief Both PHP2Shell vulnerabilities are unauthenticated RCE issues rooted in how PHP handles multipart/form-data request processing (the request format browsers use for file uploads) before your application code runs, which is why the AWS WAF rules in this post focus on multipart traffic, request body size, and the session upload progress field. At a high level, CVE-2026-109618 corrupts memory when PHP runs out of memory mid-request, and CVE-2026-109619 lets one request leave behind stale data that a later request on the same worker process reuses. For the root-cause analysis, affected versions, and PHP’s own guidance, see the official PHP advisories and release announcement: CVE-2026-109618 (out-of-memory corruption) – PHP advisory GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w CVE-2026-109619 (stale global state) – PHP advisory GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp PHP security release announcement, October 21, 2026 Where AWS WAF fits in your response AWS WAF is a defense-in-depth control in this situation, not a replacement for the PHP upgrade. The PHP advisories are explicit: updating to a patched release is the only complete mitigation. One of the two vulnerabilities is largely outside the reach of any web application firewall, as explained later. Treat the managed rules and the custom rules in this post as mitigating controls that help reduce exposure while you patch, then remove them or keep them as supporting controls after you’ve patched. AWS WAF inspects HTTP requests at the edge. It doesn’t parse the internal structure of a multipart body, and it has no visibility into PHP worker memory or server-side configuration. The following table maps each attack element to whether AWS WAF can help mitigate it. Attack element AWS WAF coverage Request patterns that match CVE-2026-109619 Yes. The PHP2Shell_BODY rule in the PHP application managed rule group, version 2.3 or later. Session upload progress field in a multipart POST ( PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS , the form field that turns on PHP’s upload-tracking feature) Yes. The custom rule in this post blocks requests that carry that field. Multipart upload path ( multipart/form-data , the request type used for file uploads and the entry point for both vulnerabilities) Yes, if the application has no legitimate multipart uploads. Block multipart/form-data. Out-of-memory condition from an oversized body Partial. Cap the request body size with the Core rule set SizeRestrictions_BODY rule or a custom rule. Neither catches header amplification (many small part headers that cost far more memory to represent than their size on the wire) that stays under the cap. Repeated attempts against the same worker (the reused PHP process that handles many requests) Partial. A rate-based rule reduces the volume an exploit needs, but it doesn’t stop a single successful request. fatal_error_backtraces producer (a PHP 8.5 setting that stores crash-trace state across a request) No. This is a server configuration setting ( fatal_error_backtraces=0 ). Invalid or deprecated INI diagnostics as a consumer (warnings PHP raises when applying bad configuration settings) No. This path runs server-side, not over client HTTP. Where an application does not accept multipart uploads, an edge rule that blocks multipart/form-data removes the multipart out-of-memory path that works against any application, plus the session-upload-progress trigger, which is a defense-in-depth control during the patch window. If your application does use multipart uploads, AWS WAF reduces risk but does not close the vulnerability, because header amplification (a few kilobytes of part headers that expand into far more memory inside PHP) stays within size limits and the firewall cannot parse the headers inside individual body parts. In that case, prioritize the PHP upgrade and apply the server-side mitigations described later. Start with the AWS WAF PHP application managed rule group The PHP application managed rule group ( AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet ) contains rules that block request patterns associated with the exploitation of vulnerabilities specific to PHP. Version 2.3, released on October 21, 2026, adds the PHP2Shell_BODY rule. The rule inspects the request body for requests that match CVE-2026-109619, and its default action is Block. The AWS WAF documentation describes the rule group as containing a virtual patch for CVE-2026-109619 that helps protect your application until you patch it. The rule group uses 100 web ACL capacity units (WCUs). Like the other AWS managed baseline and use-case rule groups, it has no charge beyond standard AWS WAF pricing. What you need to do depends on how your web ACL uses the rule group: You use the default version. AWS moved the default version to Version_2.3 , so PHP2Shell_BODY is already evaluating your traffic. Confirm that you haven’t overridden the whole rule group to Count, and review your AWS WAF logs for matches. You pin a static version. Your web ACL doesn’t have PHP2Shell_BODY until you change the version to Version_2.3 . AWS recommends that you keep static versions as close as you can to the latest version. You don’t use the rule group yet. Add it to the web ACL in front of each PHP workload, as shown in the following example. To see the current default version and the version that a web ACL uses, run the following commands. Both are read-only. aws wafv2 list-available-managed-rule-group-versions \ --vendor-name AWS --name AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet --scope REGIONAL aws wafv2 get-web-acl --name <web-acl-name> --id <web-acl-id> --scope REGIONAL \ --query "WebACL.Rules[?Statement.ManagedRuleGroupStatement.Name=='AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet']" For web ACLs associated with Amazon CloudFront, use --scope CLOUDFRONT and the US East (N. Virginia) Region. A rule without a Version field uses the default version. The following rule adds the rule group at the default version. The RuleActionOverrides entry sets PHP2Shell_BODY to Count so you can review its matches before it blocks. Remove the override when you’re satisfied. Given how quickly exploitation followed disclosure, measure that review period in hours, not days. To pin the rule group instead, add "Version": "Version_2.3" to the ManagedRuleGroupStatement . { "Name": "AWS-AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet", "Priority": 0, "Statement": { "ManagedRuleGroupStatement": { "VendorName": "AWS", "Name": "AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet", "RuleActionOverrides": [ { "Name": "PHP2Shell_BODY", "ActionToUse": { "Count": {} } } ] } }, "OverrideAction": { "None": {} }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "AWS-AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet" } } If PHP2Shell_BODY matches legitimate requests, keep the rule in Count and add a label-based exception after the rule group. The rule group adds the label awswaf:managed:aws:php-app:PHP2Shell_Body to requests that match the rule, and the following rule blocks those requests everywhere except one path. Requests to the excluded path aren’t protected by this rule, so keep the exception as narrow as you can and patch that application first. Labels are case sensitive: confirm the label name in the rule group’s available labels (the DescribeManagedRuleGroup API) before you deploy. For the full pattern, see Creating exceptions in the AWS WAF best practices guide . { "Name": "PHP2Shell-Body-Exception", "Priority": 1, "Action": { "Block": {} }, "Statement": { "AndStatement": { "Statements": [ { "LabelMatchStatement": { "Scope": "LABEL", "Key": "awswaf:managed:aws:php-app:PHP2Shell_Body" } }, { "NotStatement": { "Statement": { "ByteMatchStatement": { "FieldToMatch": { "UriPath": {} }, "PositionalConstraint": "STARTS_WITH", "SearchString": "/path/to/legitimate-upload", "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ] } } } } ] } }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "PHP2ShellBodyException" } } You can also return a web ACL to Version_2.2 while you tune, but that version doesn’t include PHP2Shell_BODY . Treat a rollback as removing the CVE-2026-109619 protection, and prefer the Count override and exception. Two limits apply to the managed rule. First, PHP2Shell_BODY inspects the request body only up to the web ACL body inspection limit. That limit is 8 KB on Application Load Balancer and AWS AppSync. On AWS services such as CloudFront and Amazon API Gateway it is 16 KB by default and up to 64 KB. The rule uses the Continue option for content beyond that limit, so pair it with a body size rule. Second, the PHP application rule group doesn’t target CVE-2026-109618. For that CVE, AWS recommends the SizeRestrictions_BODY rule in the Core rule set ( AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet ), which blocks request bodies over 8 KB (8,192 bytes). If you set that rule to Count because of upload paths, use a label-based exception scoped to those paths instead. That keeps the rule in Block everywhere else. Additional WAF Rules to consider The managed rule groups cover two of the rules in this section. PHP2Shell_BODY in the PHP application rule group covers CVE-2026-109619. That is the same CVE as the custom rule from the security bulletin. SizeRestrictions_BODY in the Core rule set caps request bodies at 8 KB for CVE-2026-109618. No AWS managed rule group blocks all multipart requests or rate-limits POST requests, so those two rules remain custom. Use them where they fit your application. The following rules are in AWS WAF JSON format. Add each one to the protection pack (web ACL) associated with the CloudFront distribution, Application Load Balancer, or API Gateway stage in front of your PHP workloads. Adjust the priorities to fit your web ACL. The AWS WAF best practices guide describes a recommended rule order, with managed rule groups before the label-based exceptions that depend on them. IMPORTANT: Before you change anything, turn on AWS WAF logging so you can see what each rule matches. Start every rule in Count mode, confirm it doesn’t match legitimate traffic, then switch to Block. Request body inspection limits AWS WAF inspects a bounded portion of the request body. On Application Load Balancer and AWS AppSync, the limit is a fixed 8 KB. For CloudFront, API Gateway, Amazon Cognito, App Runner, and Verified Access, the default limit is 16 KB, and you can raise it to 32, 48, or 64 KB through the web ACL AssociationConfig , as shown in the following example. Any part of the body beyond the inspection limit counts as oversize. Choose the limit that fits the rules you deploy, because a body size rule can only enforce a cap up to the inspected size. aws wafv2 update-web-acl ... --association-config \ 'RequestBody={CLOUDFRONT={DefaultSizeInspectionLimit=KB_64}}' Custom rule for CVE-2026-109619 (if you can’t use the managed rule group) Use this custom rule from the AWS security bulletin if you would prefer to use a custom rule instead of a managed rule group. It targets CVE-2026-109619 and blocks a request only when all three conditions in its AndStatement are true at once: The method is exactly POST , matched on the HTTP method with no transformation. A PHP session identifier is present (the nested OrStatement , so either sub-condition satisfies this leg): PHPSESSID appears as a cookie key (exact match on the key, scanning all cookies), or PHPSESSID appears anywhere in the request body (contains match). The body contains PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS , the form field that activates PHP’s session upload progress feature. Pair the rule with session.upload_progress.enabled=0 on the server, which turns the feature off. This is the rule from the AWS security bulletin with the action set to Count. Change it to Block after you confirm it doesn’t match legitimate traffic. { "Name": "PHP2Shell", "Priority": 0, "Statement": { "AndStatement": { "Statements": [ { "ByteMatchStatement": { "SearchString": "POST", "FieldToMatch": { "Method": {} }, "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ], "PositionalConstraint": "EXACTLY" } }, { "OrStatement": { "Statements": [ { "ByteMatchStatement": { "SearchString": "PHPSESSID", "FieldToMatch": { "Cookies": { "MatchPattern": { "All": {} }, "MatchScope": "KEY", "OversizeHandling": "CONTINUE" } }, "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ], "PositionalConstraint": "EXACTLY" } }, { "ByteMatchStatement": { "SearchString": "PHPSESSID", "FieldToMatch": { "Body": { "OversizeHandling": "CONTINUE" } }, "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ], "PositionalConstraint": "CONTAINS" } } ] } }, { "ByteMatchStatement": { "SearchString": "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS", "FieldToMatch": { "Body": { "OversizeHandling": "CONTINUE" } }, "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ], "PositionalConstraint": "CONTAINS" } } ] } }, "Action": { "Count": {} }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "PHP2Shell" } } Block multipart requests when the application has no uploads NOTE: This rule, in Block mode, breaks applications that require file uploads. If your application doesn’t require file uploads, blocking removes the multipart out-of-memory path that works against any application for both CVEs at the edge. AWS WAF inspects a single named header in full, with no 8 KB header limit, so matching the Content-Type header is reliable. { "Name": "Block-Multipart-FormData", "Priority": 1, "Action": { "Count": {} }, "Statement": { "ByteMatchStatement": { "FieldToMatch": { "SingleHeader": { "Name": "content-type" } }, "PositionalConstraint": "CONTAINS", "SearchString": "multipart/form-data", "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "LOWERCASE" } ] } }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "PHP2ShellBlockMultipart" } } Cap the request body size Capping body size reduces the out-of-memory condition behind CVE-2026-109618 and the stale state it can leave behind. It also covers request bodies larger than the inspection limit, which body-inspecting rules such as PHP2Shell_BODY evaluate only in part. If you use the Core rule set, its SizeRestrictions_BODY rule blocks bodies over 8 KB by default. The AWS security bulletin recommends that rule for CVE-2026-109618. Use the following custom rule when you need a different threshold or don’t use the Core rule set. It uses OversizeHandling: MATCH with a size constraint so that any body larger than the threshold is blocked, including bodies that exceed the inspection limit. To enforce a cap of N bytes, the web ACL body inspection limit must be at least N. Note that you can’t cap the numeric Content-Length with a size constraint, because the constraint measures the length of the header value string, not the number it contains. If your application has legitimate large uploads, scope this rule to non-upload paths with an AndStatement on the URI path, or it will break those uploads. { "Name": "Block-Oversize-Body", "Priority": 2, "Action": { "Count": {} }, "Statement": { "SizeConstraintStatement": { "FieldToMatch": { "Body": { "OversizeHandling": "MATCH" } }, "ComparisonOperator": "GT", "Size": 8192, "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ] } }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "PHP2ShellBlockOversizeBody" } } NOTE: If a specific managed rule breaks legitimate traffic, override that rule to Count rather than disabling the whole group. Rate-limit repeated attempts A rate-based rule on POST requests limits how many requests one IP address can send. That lowers the chance of triggering either vulnerability through volume. It also makes the stale-state path harder, because that path needs a producer request and a consumer request to land on the same worker. Set the limit from your normal per-IP POST rate; 100 requests per 60 seconds is a starting point. This rule complements a server setting of pm.max_requests=1 , which recycles the worker on each request. { "Name": "RateLimit-Posts", "Priority": 3, "Action": { "Count": {} }, "Statement": { "RateBasedStatement": { "Limit": 100, "EvaluationWindowSec": 60, "AggregateKeyType": "IP", "ScopeDownStatement": { "ByteMatchStatement": { "FieldToMatch": { "Method": {} }, "PositionalConstraint": "EXACTLY", "SearchString": "POST", "TextTransformations": [ { "Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE" } ] } } } }, "VisibilityConfig": { "SampledRequestsEnabled": true, "CloudWatchMetricsEnabled": true, "MetricName": "PHP2ShellRateLimitPosts" } } Server-side mitigations that complement AWS WAF These host and runtime changes address the parts of CVE-2026-109619 that sit below the HTTP layer a WAF inspects, so they fall outside its scope by design. Apply them alongside the AWS WAF rules as the host and runtime layer of your defense. Upgrade PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35. This is the only complete fix. PHP 8.1 and earlier are no longer supported upstream, so check with your distribution or long-term support vendor for a backported fix, or plan a move to a supported branch. Address CVE-2026-109618 at the PHP level. Set memory_limit=-1 so applications cannot override it, and keep post_max_size low (8M where the application accepts no uploads, 32M where it does). Enforce memory bounds through container or cgroup limits, never through RLIMIT_AS or RLIMIT_DATA , which trigger the vulnerable out-of-memory path. Set fatal_error_backtraces=0 on PHP 8.5 and restart every worker. This disables the setting that stores crash-trace state across a request, one of the confirmed ways the vulnerability is triggered. Set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 and restart every worker. This turns off the upload-tracking feature that’s the other confirmed trigger, and is prudent to keep off even after patching. Prefer php.ini , FPM pool, or server startup configuration over per-request INI overrides (settings applied per request through .htaccess , php_value , or FastCGI PHP_VALUE) . Remove obsolete directives so they don’t raise diagnostic warnings. Eliminate fatal errors and execution timeouts on attacker-reachable routes, including upload, import, error-page, shutdown, serialization, and extension paths. Set pm.max_requests=1 if performance allows , so each worker process is recycled after one request, which breaks the link between the request that plants stale data and a later request that would reuse it. Turn on error logging ( log_errors=On , a working error_log , error_reporting=E_ALL ) and review your Apache, FPM, or proxy logs for repeated warnings, deprecations, fatal errors, and timeouts on attacker-controlled routes. The absence of errors is not proof of safety. Getting started Complete the following steps to get started: Inventory where PHP runs and which versions and server APIs (mod_php, FPM, FrankenPHP, LSAPI) are in use. Identify any public endpoint that accepts a request body. Check the web ACL in front of each PHP workload. If it uses the PHP application rule group at the default version, PHP2Shell_BODY is already active. If it pins a static version, change it to Version_2.3 . Add the PHP application rule group and the Core rule set where they’re missing. Then decide whether each application uses multipart uploads, which determines whether you can add the rule that blocks multipart requests. Add the applicable custom rules in Count mode. Raise the body inspection limit on CloudFront or API Gateway if a rule needs it. Watch the sampled requests and Amazon CloudWatch metrics for each rule. Confirm that legitimate uploads and large JSON POSTs aren’t matched. Switch the rules to Block after the metrics are clean. Test the custom rules with a benign multipart/form-data POST, an oversized body, and a POST request that has a PHPSESSID cookie and PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS in the body. After you switch to Block, expect a 403 response and the matching rule metric. In parallel, apply the PHP upgrade and the configuration mitigations. Remove or retain the AWS WAF rules as supporting controls after your fleet is patched. Conclusion The PHP2Shell vulnerabilities—CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619—are unauthenticated RCE vulnerabilities that reach PHP before your application code runs. AWS WAF gives you a way to help narrow the attack surface during the patch window. Turn on the PHP application managed rule group at version 2.3 or later and the Core rule set. Then add the custom controls that fit your application: block multipart requests where no uploads are expected, cap request body size, and rate-limit repeated attempts. These mitigating controls can help reduce exposure, but they don’t close the vulnerabilities. Upgrade PHP to a fixed release, apply the server configuration changes, and treat AWS WAF as the edge layer that supports those fixes rather than the fix itself. To learn more, see the PHP application managed rule group and the AWS Managed Rules changelog , managed rule group versioning , the web ACL body inspection limit , oversize request component handling , and the AWS re:Post article on handling oversize HTTP request bodies . For tuning and exceptions, see the AWS WAF best practices guide . For the vulnerability details, see the PHP advisories GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w and GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp , and the PHP session upload progress manual . Alex Waddell Alex Waddell is a Principal Solutions Architect at AWS specializing in security within the Worldwide Specialist Organization, based in Scotland. Alex has been working in the security domain since 1999 and joined AWS in 2021 to work with customers across EMEA on cloud security architecture, identity, threat detection and application security. When he is not working, Alex enjoys spending time sampling rum from around the world (Alex is one of those rarely found Scottish people that doesn’t like whisky), walking his dogs in the local forest trails and traveling. Lawton Pittenger Lawton is a Worldwide Security Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS, based in New York City. He specializes in helping customers design and implement effective network security controls. At AWS, he works with customers at scale and collaborates closely with service teams to drive continuous improvement in security services based on customer needs and feedback. Outside of work, his interests include skateboarding, snowboarding, and spending time in nature. Ian Olson Ian is a Senior Security Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS. He helps customers automate security services to safeguard against threats like DDoS and web exploitations. Through intelligent automation, he delivers security solutions tailored to organizations of any scale. When he’s not working, Ian enjoys spending quality time with his two young children.
aws.amazon.comOct 22, 2026extracted
PHP blames supply chain security biz Chainguard for putting huge chunks of the web at risk
PHP developers have accused software supply chain security shop Chainguard of effectively revealing critical bugs in the open-source scripting language ahead of a planned official disclosure. On Wednesday, just hours after releasing emergency patches for the two bugs collectively called PHP2shell, PHP maintainers published a blog about how the vulnerabilities were found and fixed. They credited researchers at Calif, OpenAI, and Wiz with finding the security holes between August and September. All three companies have said they used AI models to find the vulnerabilities, which are now tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, and can allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute code on servers running PHP. This is especially serious because PHP powers huge chunks of the public web. It also adds a dose of irony to the “leak and disrupted disclosure” part of the blog, which blames Chainguard - a company that aims to secure software supply chains by hardening open source code - for the messy disclosure. The trouble, according to PHP developers, started on Tuesday around 15:00 UTC, when “two CVE IDs began circulating on online forums and social media,” along with incorrect information about the release time and CVSS severity rating. At that point, no technical details leaked. The rumors, however, prompted PHP maintainers to warn people in advance about the critical flaws, and move the planned disclosure forward a day, from Thursday to Wednesday. “Distributors were still packaging the fix, so releasing immediately would have left many users without an easy way to update,” the PHP Foundation blog says. “Moving the release forward by one day was the best compromise between acting quickly, giving people time to prepare, and making sure everyone had a simple update path when the vulnerabilities were disclosed.” A couple of hours later, Calif “mistakenly” published a video showing a proof-of-concept exploit and “additional, though limited” information about the bugs, we’re told. “Mitigation advice we started providing to a few critical infrastructure providers around Oct 20th 23:00 UTC, may have leaked as well,” the PHP blog says, but it does not name these providers. And then it throws Chainguard under the bus: “On October 21st at 07:41 UTC, more than six hours before the coordinated release, Chainguard unilaterally broke the embargo and published built images containing the fix. Like other distributors, Chainguard had received the patch in advance so its users could update the moment the vulnerabilities were disclosed. Any attacker could now study the fix in binary form while every other PHP user was still waiting for the release. This disregarded weeks of work by many parties toward a coordinated disclosure.” Chainguard CEO: 'We made the call' Chainguard CEO Dan Lorenc spoke with The Register on Wednesday, and while he doesn’t dispute the timeline, said his company "didn't leak." “These things are messy,” Lorenc said. Chainguard learned “something was coming in PHP” on Friday from one of the researchers that found the bugs, Lorenc told us. Later that night, using his company’s AI harness and a frontier model, the CEO and the Chainguard team independently found the same memory corruption vulnerabilities. All it took was a “basic prompt of ‘find bad vulnerabilities in PHP,’” Lorenc wrote in a subsequent LinkedIn post. On Saturday, Chainguard began working with the PHP maintainers, confirmed that some of its findings matched the bug reports, and helped test the patches. “The patches are crazy - this is not a simple vulnerability,” Lorenc told The Register. “It really did take them months to build a real, working patch for it. And then on Monday, the rumors started, and yesterday it just spiraled.” Some people published POCs on social media, other security vendors reported seeing real-world exploitation, and late Tuesday night Lorenc told us he decided to ship the fixes, and notified the PHP coordinated disclosure channel about his plans. “People were getting hit in advance” of the official PHP disclosure, “so we made the call to ship the fixes under that,” Lorenc said. “It's coordinated vulnerability disclosure, unless there's evidence of active exploits in the wild.” Also on Tuesday night, Chainguard published built artifacts and made them accessible to anyone, not just customers. “And then I woke up this morning and saw that this was all our fault,” Lorenc said. When asked if he would do anything differently, given the fallout from Chainguard’s early disclosure, Lorenc said no. “This process and policy is based on trying to coordinate as much as possible until shit hits the fan and people start weaponizing things,” he said. “It sucks, because we really are all on one team, and there's bad guys over there doing stuff.” Chainguard’s honeypots trapped IPs from China and Russia targeting the vulnerabilities on Wednesday, Lorenc added. “Just being told there's a vulnerability in a piece of software - even something as big as PHP - is enough to find it,” he told us. “I did that myself without any other knowledge on Friday." "I think this is kind of the new normal. People are able to build an exploit in hours without even knowing what the vulnerability is." What we know about the CVEs and how to exploit them While we still don’t know the scope of exploitation - or what will happen to vulnerable legacy systems that don’t have security fixes - threat hunters predict it’s going to be a doozy. “Successful exploitation could allow attackers to take control of affected servers, steal sensitive data, and deface the websites running on them,” Wiz researchers Sagi Tzadik, Shir Tamari, Nir Ohfeld, and Tomer Schwartz warned on Wednesday, adding the oft-quoted stat that PHP powers 70 percent of all websites in the world. “Every PHP version released in the last decade is affected by at least one of these vulnerabilities, going back to version 5.4,” the Wiz kids wrote. “Attackers can exploit them remotely, in some cases fairly easily. Immediate patching is strongly advised.” Both bugs are related to how PHP handles memory management and error handling, and both lead to remote code execution (RCE). They can cause a corrupted internal PHP state when a request ends unexpectedly, and then a later request can reuse that state, leading to memory disclosure or RCE. “Both are memory corruption vulnerabilities,” VulnCheck researcher Patrick Garrity explained. “If an attacker can shape the memory PHP trusts, they can potentially hijack what it does next, and in these cases that means remote code execution.” CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w) leads to RCE via out-of-memory corruption. “If a request reached PHP's memory_limit at exactly the wrong moment, PHP could leave partially initialized internal data behind and later treat it as valid, corrupting memory,” the project maintainer wrote. “On Apache with mod_php, an unauthenticated request can trigger this before any application code runs.” CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp) allows RCE via stale state. “A fatal error at the wrong point could leave internal state pointing to memory that belonged to a previous request,” according to the PGP Foundation. “A later request handled by the same worker could then use that freed memory. A use-after-free and worker crash were confirmed, and the reporter demonstrated remote code execution against a real-world application running on Apache with mod_php.”®
theregister.comOct 21, 2026extracted
Amazon Threat Intelligence identifies PHP2Shell exploitation prior to public disclosure in MadPot
Amazon Threat Intelligence identified a PHP2Shell exploitation attempt dating to Oct. 17, 2026, in MadPot telemetry, four days before public disclosure of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. The exploit attempt originated from an IP address associated with a commercial anonymization network. While the vulnerability was under embargo, the targeting of a honeypot from an anonymized IP address suggests the activity was conducted by a threat actor, though it remains unclear how the actor acquired exploit information prior to disclosure. The PHP embargo window was set to be lifted on 2026-10-21 1400 UTC. On the day of the release, Amazon Threat Intelligence identified multiple proof of concept exploits for the vulnerability, with the earliest around 2026-10-21 0200 UTC. Subsequently, from 2026-10-21 0200 UTC to 2026-10-21 0800 UTC, Amazon Threat Intelligence identified additional exploitation attempts of PHP2Shell targeting MadPot from additional anonymized infrastructure. The actual payloads and choices in anonymization infrastructure varied, suggesting these were multiple actors. Technical analysis is ongoing, and it’s unclear if any of these attempts would have succeeded in real-world systems. The actual release of the embargo window was 2026-10-21 1400 UTC. Once the embargo was lifted and the patch was released, additional proof-of-concept exploits appeared within hours, and we saw them used against our sensors almost immediately. PHP2Shell is now being broadly exploited in the wild. Two lessons from this event apply well beyond this one vulnerability: An embargo protects defenders only until someone else finds the same bug. Coordinated disclosure is still the right model. But defenders should not assume the public disclosure date is the earliest date of exploitation. With PHP2Shell, compromise may predate the advisory. The time from patch to working exploit is shrinking for structural reasons. In the past, most exploitation we observed came after a public proof of concept was released. A small number of capable actors built exploits, and everyone else waited for them. That dependency is weakening. AI-assisted analysis makes it cheaper to turn a patch diff or advisory into a working exploit. As a result, more actors can act within hours or even minutes once technical details of a vulnerability are disclosed. For security leaders, this changes several working assumptions: For critical vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, measure patch and mitigation timelines in hours. A 7-day or 30-day SLA assumes a delay that no longer exists. Start investigations from the earliest known exploitation, not from the disclosure date. For PHP2Shell, investigate from at least starting on October 17th. Invest in detections that don’t rely on a signature for a specific CVE. The first exploitation will often come before those signatures exist. How AWS helps protect customers AWS deploys multiple layers of protection to help safeguard customers. Our internal threat intelligence system automatically detected and restricted malicious scanning attempts targeting this vulnerability. We analyze over 200 billion events per minute and integrate threat intelligence from our MadPot honeypot network to identify and block known exploitation attempts in real time. Our honeypot system provides us with early detection of exploitation attempts, enabling rapid response and threat analysis. Immediate recommended actions Upgrade immediately to the fixed PHP versions. Upgrading is the only complete remediation for both CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. There are no configuration-only workarounds that fully address both issues. Consider blocking multi-part file uploads in PHP deployments that cannot be patched immediately, but determine how this would affect your application prior to deploying. Look for POST requests with the PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS string in form uploads. Review web server logs for suspicious activity. Check for unexpected process execution or file modification on web application servers. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) IP Address Observed Date 103.216.220.92 10/17/2026 31.223.184.166 10/21/2026 37.19.200.5 10/21/2026 134.209.159.64 10/21/2026 103.114.163.188 10/21/2026 95.217.98.37 10/21/2026 The identified IP addresses include shared anonymization infrastructure and are not exclusive to this threat activity. Organizations should investigate any observations involving these addresses as opposed to blocking. See how to use AWS Web Application Firewall to help reduce your exposure while you patch in our blog post Using AWS WAF to apply mitigations for PHP2Shell RCE vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) . If you have questions, start a new thread on AWS re:Post or reach out to AWS Support . CJ Moses CJ Moses is the CISO of Amazon Integrated Security. In his role, CJ leads security engineering and operations across Amazon. His mission is to enable Amazon businesses by making the benefits of security the path of least resistance. CJ joined Amazon in December 2007, holding various roles including Consumer CISO, and most recently AWS CISO, before becoming CISO of Amazon Integrated Security September of 2023. Prior to joining Amazon, CJ led the technical analysis of computer and network intrusion efforts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division. CJ also served as a Special Agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). CJ led several computer intrusion investigations seen as foundational to the security industry today. CJ holds degrees in Computer Science and Criminal Justice, and is an active SRO GT America GT2 race car driver.
aws.amazon.comOct 21, 2026extracted
Critical RCE vulnerabilities in PHP (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)
Vulnerability overview On October 20, 2026, the PHP security team published a preliminary notice regarding an upcoming emergency release that addresses two critical vulnerabilities (both rated 9.2 on the CVSS scale). The patches were released on Wednesday, October 21, 2026, at 14:00 UTC. The release was expedited after information about the vulnerabilities was leaked to the public before the scheduled embargo was lifted. In a post on Hacker News, a user reported two RCE vulnerabilities in PHP, allegedly affecting all versions starting with PHP 5.4.0. The vulnerabilities in question are CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Shortly after the post appeared, researchers confirmed the existence of the vulnerabilities. Along with the leak of details, an exploit unofficially named PHP2Shell appeared online. In the leaked demo video, the exploit is shown in action on web servers running WordPress, MediaWiki, phpBB, Magento, Joomla, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, and WHMCS — platforms that power many modern websites. The authenticity of the demonstration and the exact behavior of the exploit had not been independently verified at the time of publication. According to the researcher who published the PoC, the vulnerabilities are related to the handling of the multipart/form-data MIME type in conjunction with the session upload progress mechanism ( session.upload_progress ) in the PHP core and fall under the categories of use-after-free and memory corruption. This means that the flaws cannot be patched via application code, and the only possible fix is to update PHP on the server. The attack works without authentication: an attacker with network access to a PHP application can execute arbitrary code on behalf of the PHP process without needing to authenticate. Security advisories issued by PHP on October 21 confirm this information. The vulnerabilities affect PHP versions 5, 6, 7, and 8. As of this publication, branches from 8.2 to 8.5 are supported. Older branches, including PHP 8.1, 8.0, 7.x, and 5.x, have reached the end of their lifecycle; however, due to the critical severity of the vulnerabilities, backported patches have also been released for versions 7.4, 8.0, and 8.1. Sansec experts estimate that widespread exploitation could begin within 15 minutes of the update’s release. We strongly recommend that administrators responsible for publicly accessible PHP web servers take the following steps before the patch is available: Conduct an inventory of all PHP-based systems in the infrastructure (including web servers, control panels, third-party software, etc.). Disable upload-progress: set session.upload_progress.enabled = Off using the php_admin_flag in PHP-FPM pools. Block multipart requests on nginx and Apache servers. Consider temporarily isolating PHP applications that connect to the Internet until fixes are released. Ensure readiness to install the patch immediately upon its release. Plan to migrate servers running unsupported versions (8.1 and earlier) to the latest PHP branch. Detection by Kaspersky solutions Kaspersky solutions detect the described malicious activity at various stages of the attack. Possible detection scenarios are listed below. When an attempt is made to exploit these RCE vulnerabilities,  Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response promptly alerts the user to suspicious actions performed in the context of a web server, on both Linux and Windows machines. This activity is detected by the following rules: creating_windows_shell_from_a_web_servers_process ; possible_web_shell_creating_via_exploit ; spawning_process_from_webserver_more_filters_linux ; webserver_interpreter_execution_linux ; executable_file_in_www_folder . Detection of the PHP2Shell vulnerability exploit by KEDR Exploitation of the PHP2Shell vulnerability in network traffic is detected by Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) . This solution detects such activity with the following verdicts: Exploit.CVE-2026-109618.HTTP.C&C and Exploit.CVE-2026-109619.HTTP.C&C . Detection of the PHP2Shell vulnerability exploit by KATA Our Kaspersky Endpoint Security solution, now available as Kaspersky Next , also detects malicious post-exploitation activity using the Behavior Detection component , such as PDM:Exploit.Linux.Generic and PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic.
securelist.comOct 21, 2026extracted
Related Stories
5
Analyzing Sharepoint Exploits (CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771), (Wed, Jul 23rd)
On July 19–20, 2025, various security companies and national CERTs published alerts about active exploitation of on-premise SharePoint servers. According to the reports, observed attacks did not require authentication, allowed attackers to gain full control over the infected servers, and were performed using an exploit chain of two vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, publicly named “ToolShell”. Additionally, on the same dates, Microsoft released out-of-band security patches for the vulnerabilities CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, aimed at addressing the security bypasses of previously issued fixes for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706. The release of the new, “proper” updates has caused confusion about exactly which vulnerabilities attackers are exploiting and whether they are using zero-day exploits. Kaspersky products proactively detected and blocked malicious activity linked to these attacks, which allowed us to gather statistics about the timeframe and spread of this campaign. Our statistics show that widespread exploitation started on July 18, 2025, and attackers targeted servers across the world in Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Vietnam, and Zambia. Entities across multiple sectors were affected: government, finance, manufacturing, forestry, and agriculture. While analyzing all artifacts related to these attacks, which were detected by our products and public information provided by external researchers, we found a dump of a POST request that was claimed to contain the malicious payload used in these attacks. After performing our own analysis, we were able to confirm that this dump indeed contained the malicious payload detected by our technologies, and that sending this single request to an affected SharePoint installation was enough to execute the malicious payload there. Our analysis of the exploit showed that it did rely on vulnerabilities fixed under CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, but by changing just one byte in the request, we were able to bypass those fixes. In this post, we provide detailed information about CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771, and one related vulnerability. Since the exploit code is already published online, is very easy to use, and poses a significant risk, we encourage all organizations to install the necessary updates. The exploit Our research started with an analysis of a POST request dump associated with this wave of attacks on SharePoint servers. We can see that this POST request targets the “/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx” endpoint and embeds two parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. Looking at the code of ToolPane.aspx, we can see that this file itself does not contain much functionality and most of its code is located in the ToolPane class of the Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages namespace in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Looking at this class reveals the code that works with the two parameters present in the exploit. However, accessing this endpoint under normal conditions is not possible without bypassing authentication on the attacked SharePoint server. This is where the first Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 comes into play. CVE-2025-49706 This vulnerability is present in the method PostAuthenticateRequestHandler, in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. SharePoint requires Internet Information Services (IIS) to be configured in integrated mode. In this mode, the IIS and ASP.NET authentication stages are unified. As a result, the outcome of IIS authentication is not determined until the PostAuthenticateRequest stage, at which point both the ASP.NET and IIS authentication methods have been completed. Therefore, the PostAuthenticateRequestHandler method utilizes a series of flags to track potential authentication violations. A logic bug in this method enables an authentication bypass if the “Referrer” header of the HTTP request is equal to “/_layouts/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/14/SignOut.aspx”, or “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx” using case insensitive comparison. The code displayed in the image above handles the sign-out request and is also triggered when the sign-out page is specified as the referrer. When flag6 is set to false and flag7 is set to true, both conditional branches that could potentially throw an “Unauthorized Access” exception are bypassed. On July 8, 2025, Microsoft released an update that addressed this vulnerability by introducing additional checks to detect the usage of the “ToolPane.aspx” endpoint with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. The added check uses case insensitive comparison to verify if the requested path ends with “ToolPane.aspx”. Is it possible to bypass this check, say, by using a different endpoint? Our testing has shown that this check can be easily bypassed. CVE-2025-53771 We were able to successfully bypass the patch for vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 by adding just one byte to the exploit POST request. All that was required to bypass this patch was to add a “/” (slash) to the end of the requested “ToolPane.aspx” path. On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update that fixed this bypass as CVE-2025-53771. This fix replaces the “ToolPane.aspx” check to instead check whether the requested path is in the list of paths allowed for use with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. This allowlist includes the following paths: “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/15/1033/initstrings.js”, “/_layouts/15/init.js”, “/_layouts/15/theming.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/blank.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/WebResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/corev15.css”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/error.css”, “/_layouts/15/images/favicon.ico”, “/_layouts/15/1033/strings.js”, “/_layouts/15/core.js”, and it can contain additional paths added by the administrator. While testing the CVE-2025-49706 bypass with the July 8, 2025 updates installed on our SharePoint debugging stand, we noticed some strange behavior. Not only did the bypass of CVE-2025-49706 work, but the entire exploit chain did! But wait! Didn’t the attackers use an additional Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2025-49704, which was supposed to be fixed in the same update? To understand why the entire exploit chain worked in our case, let’s take a look at the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704 and how it was fixed. CVE-2025-49704 CVE-2025-49704 is an untrusted data deserialization vulnerability that exists due to improper validation of XML content. Looking at the exploit POST request, we can see that it contains two URL encoded parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. We can see how they are handled by examining the code of the method GetPartPreviewAndPropertiesFromMarkup in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. A quick analysis reveals that “MSOtlPn_Uri” is a page URL that might be pointing to an any file in the CONTROLTEMPLATES folder and the parameter “MSOtlPn_DWP” contains something known as WebPart markup. This markup contains special directives that can be used to execute safe controls on a server and has a format very similar to XML. While this “XML” included in the “MSOtlPn_DWP” parameter does not itself contain a vulnerability, it allows attackers to instantiate the ExcelDataSet control from Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll with CompressedDataTable property set to malicious payload and trigger its processing using DataTable property getter. Looking at the code of the ExcelDataSet’s DataTable property getter in Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll, we find the method GetObjectFromCompressedBase64String, responsible for deserialization of CompressedDataTable property contents. The data provided as Base64 string is decoded, unzipped, and passed to the BinarySerialization.Deserialize method from Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Attackers use this method to provide a malicious DataSet whose deserialized content is shown in the image above. It contains an XML with an element of dangerous type "System.Collections.Generic.List1[[System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper2[...], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089]]", which allows attackers to execute arbitrary methods with the help of the well-known ExpandedWrapper technique aimed at exploitation of unsafe XML deserialization in applications based on the .NET framework. In fact, this shouldn’t be possible, since BinarySerialization.Deserialize in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll uses a special XmlValidator designed to protect against this technique by checking the types of all elements present in the provided XML and ensuring that they are on the list of allowed types. However, the exploit bypasses this check by placing the ExpandedWrapper object into the list. Now, to find out why the exploit worked on our SharePoint debugging stand with the July 8, 2025 updates installed, let’s take a look at how this vulnerability was fixed. In this patch, Microsoft did not really fix the vulnerability but only mitigated it by adding the new AddExcelDataSetToSafeControls class to the Microsoft.SharePoint.Upgrade namespace. This class contains new code that modifies the web.config file and marks the Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet control as unsafe. Because SharePoint does not execute this code on its own after installing updates, the only way to achieve the security effect was to manually run a configuration upgrade using the SharePoint Products Configuration Wizard tool. Notably, the security guidance for CVE-2025-49704 does not mention the need for this step, which means at least some SharePoint administrators may skip it. Meanwhile, anyone who installed this update but did not manually perform a configuration upgrade remained vulnerable. CVE-2025-53770 On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update with a proper fix for the CVE-2025-49704 vulnerability. This patch introduces an updated XmlValidator that now properly validates element types in XML, preventing exploitation of this vulnerability without requiring a configuration upgrade and, more importantly, addressing the root cause and preventing exploitation of the same vulnerability through controls other than Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet. CVE-2020-1147 Readers familiar with previous SharePoint exploits might feel that the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770 and the exploit used by the attackers looks very familiar and very similar to the older .NET Framework, SharePoint Server, and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1147. In fact, if we compare the exploit for CVE-2020-1147 and an exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, we can see that they are almost identical. The only difference is that in the exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, the dangerous ExpandedWrapper object is placed in the list. This makes CVE-2025-53770 an updated fix for CVE-2020-1147. Conclusions Despite the fact that patches for the ToolShell vulnerabilities are now available for deployment, we assess that this chain of exploits will continue being used by attackers for a long time. We have been observing the same situation with other notorious vulnerabilities, such as ProxyLogon, PrintNightmare, or EternalBlue. While they have been known for years, many threat actors still continue leveraging them in their attacks to compromise unpatched systems. We expect the ToolShell vulnerabilities to follow the same fate, as they can be exploited with extremely low effort and allow full control over the vulnerable server. To stay better protected against threats like ToolShell, we as a community should learn lessons from previous events in the industry related to critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, the speed of applying security patches nowadays is the most important factor when it comes to fighting such vulnerabilities. Since public exploits for these dangerous vulnerabilities appear very soon after vulnerability announcements, it is paramount to install patches as soon as possible, as a gap of even a few hours can make a critical difference. At the same time, it is important to protect enterprise networks against zero-day exploits, which can be leveraged when there is no available public patch for vulnerabilities. In this regard, it is critical to equip machines with reliable cybersecurity solutions that have proven effective in combatting ToolShell attacks before they were publicly disclosed. Kaspersky Next with its Behaviour detection component proactively protects against exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is able to detect exploitation and the subsequent malicious activity. Kaspersky products detect the exploits and malware used in these attacks with the following verdicts: UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen ASP.Agent.* PowerShell.Agent.*
20 shared
Jul 28, 2025
2026-013: Critical Vulnerability in F5 BIG-IP APM
History: 22/09/2026 --- v1.0 -- Initial publication Summary On 22 September 2026, F5 published an advisory addressing a critical vulnerability affecting its BIG-IP APM product. The vendor confirmed active exploitation in the wild [1]. CERT-EU recommends taking appropriate actions as soon as possible. Technical Details The vulnerability CVE-2026-94127, with a CVSS score of 9.8, is a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability and allow unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE) on the affected device [1]. Affected Products The vulnerability affects the following versions of BIG-IP APM if configured with an access policy and an OAuth profile on a virtual server [1]: 17.1.0 - 17.1.3 17.5.0 - 17.5.1 21.1.0 Recommendations CERT-EU recommends taking the following actions as soon as possible: Preserve forensic evidence. Apply the relevant hotfix. Check for signs of compromise (see the compromise assessment section). If any sign of compromise is detected, start the incident response process. Mitigation If patching cannot be applied immediately, F5 provides an iRule-based mitigation for the affected virtual server. To obtain it, F5 BIG-IP clients should contact the F5 support [1]. Compromise Assessment CERT-EU strongly advises to look for the following indicators of compromise provided by the vendor in its advisory [1]: At a high level, multiple OAuth authentication failures, followed by suspicious commands, shortly followed by a TMM SIGABRT is the combination that should lead to human review of the system. OAuth authentication failures: check /var/log/apm for repeated occurrences of the following, especially 10 or more from a single IP in a short window. err tmm1\[30975\]: 01990004:3: : Request UserInfo from Source ID (null) IP failed. Error Code (invalid\_token) Error Description (The access token is invalid.) - Increase of OAuth failure statistics. Run the following and look for an unexplained increase in total_failed : $ tmctl global_oauth_stat -s total_requests,total_userinfo_requests,total_failed - Audit log anomalies: if OAuth failures are observed, review /var/log/audit around those timestamps for suspicious commands. TMM core files: Presence of a TMM core file alone is not an indicator, but core files should be investigated. The vendor indicates that they have observed TMM entering a loop, which causes the SOD daemon to send a SIGABRT.
19 shared
Sep 25, 2026
Cisco warns of new SD-WAN zero-day exploited in attacks
Attackers are exploiting a new critical zero-day flaw in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, the system companies use to manage their Cisco SD-WAN networks, Cisco said in an advisory on September 30. The flaw, CVE-2026-76504, could allow a remote attacker with no login access to use the Manager's API as the admin user. Fixed releases are available, and there is no workaround. It carries a CVSS score of 9.8 out of 10. It sits in the part of the Manager's API that handles login sessions. The Manager mishandles URI encoding in an HTTP request. A crafted request can therefore bypass an authentication rule intended to restrict access to a single API endpoint. The attacker needs no credentials, only the ability to send that request to the Manager's API. Managers exposed to the internet are at risk of compromise, according to Cisco. By default, the admin user holds the netadmin role, which is allowed to perform all operations on the device. Cisco said its Product Security Incident Response Team "became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability" in September 2026. The flaw was found while Cisco's Technical Assistance Center (TAC) was handling a support case. The advisory does not say how many customers were attacked, when the attacks began, who carried them out, or what the attackers did with the access. Who Needs to Upgrade The flaw affects SD-WAN Manager regardless of how the system is configured. No other product is listed as affected. These are the first fixed releases for each release train: CVE-2026-76504 is separate from three Cisco SD-WAN flaws fixed earlier: CVE-2026-20182 in May, and CVE-2026-20245 and CVE-2026-20262 in June. A comparison of the advisories shows that the fixed releases for those flaws are all older than the ones in the table above. So a Manager last upgraded for the May or June fixes still needs this update. The table does not list the 20.10, 20.11, 20.13, 20.14, or 20.16 release trains, which Cisco's May advisory did list. The advisory also does not name Cisco SD-WAN Cloud-Pro or Cisco SD-WAN for Government (FedRAMP), two deployment types named in the May and June advisories. Cisco SD-WAN Cloud (Cisco Managed) is already fixed in release 20.15.605, and customers on it need to take no action. Until an on-prem Manager is upgraded, Cisco advises restricting access to it from unsecured networks such as the internet. Where internet access is required, only known, trusted hosts should be allowed in, and the control components should sit behind a firewall. Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Cloud Hosted environments already have this mitigation in place. The mitigation worked in a test environment, according to Cisco, which advises customers to assess its impact on their own networks before applying it. Cisco's SD-WAN hardening guide says administrative interfaces, such as ports 443, 22 and 830, should not be exposed directly to the internet. HTTPS access to the Manager should come only from a jump host or a management subnet. Checking for Signs of Compromise The signs of compromise Cisco describes involve j_security_check, the request path the Manager uses for session-based logins. In Cisco's example, one character of that path is URI-encoded, giving /%6a_security_check, where %6a stands for the letter j. Two log files are the places to look for j_security_check entries from unknown or unauthorized IP addresses: File: /var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log File: /var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log, in particular entries for users whose names start with viptela-reserved- Names starting with viptela-reserved- belong to reserved system service accounts. Any one character in the request can be encoded, so %6a is only an example. The same entries can also appear during normal operation, and each match has to be checked against normal activity to avoid false positives. To help determine whether a Manager has been compromised, customers can open a Severity 3 case with Cisco TAC and include CVE-2026-76504 in the title. Cisco asks them to run request admin-tech on the Manager first, so the output file can be reviewed. The advisory includes no detection rule and does not say whether upgrading removes an attacker who already has access. Cisco's advisories for the May flaw and the first June flaw said an update alone would not resolve a confirmed compromise. They told customers to collect the admin-tech file before upgrading. CVE-2026-76504 follows a series of Cisco SD-WAN flaws flagged as exploited this year. As of September 30, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog listed eight Cisco SD-WAN flaws added in 2026.
18 shared
Oct 5, 2026
NetScaler zero-day exploitation escalates into mass attacks (CVE-2026-88771)
The public still doesn’t know who is abusing a critical Citrix vulnerability exploited as a zero-day weeks before disclosure, but we now know that the unknown digital intruders have used CVE-2026-88772 to break into government agencies, financial services firms, education organizations, and legal and professional services sectors across North America and Europe. And everyone agrees that the vendor took way too long to disclose the security holes. GreyNoise said it spotted an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-88771 against a Citrix NetScaler Gateway on September 24. Google researchers, meanwhile, said the CVE-2026-88772 campaign has been ongoing “since at least early September.” “Why Citrix took so long to disclose these vulnerabilities is a question only Citrix can answer,” Benjamin Harris, founder and CEO of exposure management firm watchTowr, told The Register. Citrix declined to answer The Register's questions about the scope of the attacks, and why it didn't alert the public about the CVEs under active exploitation until Sunday. “The vulnerabilities were discovered during incident response and forensic investigations at organizations already compromised, meaning both the exploitation and Citrix’s awareness of it predated public disclosure,” Harris said. “Citrix has a history of delaying the publication of vulnerabilities, even when they’re being exploited in the wild and affecting customers.” So if you use Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway appliances, and haven’t already applied the security updates, do that ASAP. But first, check your systems for signs of compromise, warns Mandiant Consulting CTO Charles Carmakal. “Given the active exploitation, NetScaler customers should prioritize examining their systems for compromise *before* upgrading/patching,” Carmakal said on LinkedIn. “If you find evidence of web shells or other malicious files, please preserve evidence and investigate the scope of the compromise. Patching alone may not eradicate the threat actor from your environment.” No attribution - yet Citrix disclosed eight CVEs on Sunday with the worst of the bunch – CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 – earning critical 9.5 CVSS scores. “Exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 on unmitigated NetScaler deployments has been observed,” the vendor said. CVE-2026-88771 can allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands remotely. CVE-2026-88772 is a memory overflow vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution or denial of service when DTLS is enabled, as it is by default on VPN virtual servers. But by the time Citrix issued security advisories and warned customers about the vulnerabilities, they were already under attack. “No attribution has been made public, and we have yet to identify a clear trend among targets by industry or organization size,” Harris said. “Historically, NetScaler vulnerabilities have been exploited by both state-sponsored groups and ransomware operators.” WatchTowr on Tuesday published a technical writeup about CVE-2026-88772, plus a detection artifact generator for Citrix users to determine if they are vulnerable and to help with remediation. Also on Tuesday, Google’s threat intel businesses provided additional details about the exploitation campaign’s targets and the attacker’s custom malware. “We have observed evidence that organizations in North America and Europe in the government, financial services, education, legal and professional services sectors were likely impacted by this exploitation campaign, which has been ongoing since at least early September,” Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant said in an advisory. Custom malware After analyzing the intruder’s post-exploit toolkit, the malware hunters found never-before-seen malware used to establish persistent root access and proxy traffic into internal corporate networks. The custom malware includes WHIPSHOT, a PHP web shell, and SLAPSHOT, a TCP tunneling tool written in Python. WHIPSHOT is disguised as a Debian package and hides Base64-encoded command-and-control payloads in native HTTP headers. It functions as an HTTP transport bridge for SLAPSHOT, which accepts commands from WHIPSHOT and forwards arbitrary TCP streams to internal hosts. Supported commands include: open, which establishes an outbound TCP socket to a target host and port. push, which writes data to an open session. pull, which polls and reads data from an open session socket. exch, which sends and receives command-and-control data to and from an open session socket. close, which terminates a specified network session. ping, which performs a basic health-check verification. “In at least one observed intrusion, the threat actor routed traffic through this proxy to manually conduct internal reconnaissance and credential theft,” the threat intel teams noted. Google did not immediately respond to The Register’s questions about the campaign, including how many exploitation attempts and successful intrusions its threat hunters observed. Its advisory notes that the Citrix campaign “underscores the continued targeting of edge devices to gain initial access to victim networks, a trend that GTIG has tracked across a range of threat actors.” Security and networking vulnerabilities accounted for about half of enterprise-related zero-days in 2025, according to Google’s count. Attackers love edge devices - application delivery controllers, VPN gateways, and firewalls - because they provide direct access from the open internet to corporate networks, allowing attackers to bypass endpoint detection tools and other security layers. NetScaler, in particular, is notoriously buggy. Attackers exploited another critical NetScaler vuln in March. A year earlier, Citrix disclosed multiple zero-days in the same product. ®
17 shared
Oct 5, 2026
USN-8900-1: Go Networking vulnerabilities
Welcome back to PWNED, the weekly column where we highlight some of the lowlights in corporate security. This week, we’ll talk about two scenarios, one that ended in tragedy and another that shows the power of a good defense over dedicated phishing attacks. Have a story about someone leaving a gaping hole in their network? Share it with us at [email protected]. Anonymity is available upon request. Both stories come courtesy of Dave Hatter, a cybersecurity and compliance consultant with Intrust IT. In his many years of experience with the company, Hatter has had to work for a variety of small companies that needed help with their security, whether they knew it or not. One time several years ago, the new CFO at a small construction company phoned Intrust and expressed interest in hiring them. However, the proposal was vetoed by the owner of the company, an older gentleman who thought his business was too small to interest hackers and that his existing, one-person IT staff was all he could afford. “We got a guy, my brother’s uncle’s cousin does my IT, don’t need you guys,” Hatter quotes the owner as saying. “We hear this all the time. Thanks for shopping. You’re too expensive.” Three weeks later, Hatter got a call from a local accountant friend who begged him to help a client who'd been hit with a ransomware attack. Hatter said he couldn’t really give more than general guidance, but would talk to the victim anyway. As soon as he called the number, Hatter realized that the ransomware victim was actually the same construction company that had turned down his services a few weeks earlier. The business had an old unpatched Windows server that contained all its most important data. There was a backup drive, but it was connected to the same server, so both devices were encrypted by the ransomware. “Their entire backup is this external drive, which, of course, is now encrypted,” Hatter said. “So, literally, they can't pay their employees. They don't know who owes them money.” Hatter could not help the company, and he never found out whether it paid the ransom. However, the org, which had been around for years, went out of business within months. This sad story shows the importance of having real backups that are off-site or in the cloud and patching whatever servers you have. You can never assume that your company is too small to be attacked because ransomware gangs want your money and they are just as happy to take on small businesses as large ones, which are likely to be harder targets. The other incident involved two companies in the landscaping and construction business. Somebody broke into an executive’s email account at company one and started sending phishing emails to company number two. The miscreants had also set up email filtering rules in the first company’s account so that the messages from the phishing campaign were routed to buried folders where the real-life account holder would never see them. The phishing mails took the form of RFPs (requests for proposal) – a perfect lure, because who wouldn't want new business? They were perfectly crafted, with no grammar errors or obvious tells, and the return address matched company one's. However, instead of attaching the RFP as a PDF or PowerPoint file, it had a button for the user to click to download it. “If I can get in your email and send out emails as you, the recipients, especially if they've interacted with me before, aren't going to have any guard up,” Hatter said. “Especially if there's no crazy language or crazy requests in there because they've got an email from me before.” Upon clicking the download button, the user was transported to a Microsoft 365 login screen that looked identical to the real one but was not on the microsoft.com domain. The user was then invited to put in their email address and password to gain access to the desired file. Because the user had 2FA, this fake page also asked them for their limited-time 2FA code. Behind the scenes, the threat actors were transmitting the login to Microsoft so that Microsoft itself would send an SMS message to the victim at company number two. Then the victim would pass along the one-time passcode via the fake login site. A classic man-in-the-middle attack. It worked, and the threat actors now had access to the Microsoft 365 account and email for the victim at company number two. This could've allowed them to do almost anything using that person’s email. If the victim had access to bank accounts or customer data, the attackers could have initiated password resets from the account, then conducted fraudulent money transfers, or stolen personal information. At the very least, they could've used the victim's account to phish other contacts. Fortunately, Hatter's client had installed a piece of software his company made called TarBot, which runs in the Microsoft 365 environment and uses Entra ID P2 to help customers identify suspicious logins. “It throws off a bunch of telemetry, statistics, metrics, whatever you want to call it, that allows our software to say, this is an anomalous login, revoke the token, and make the user log in again,” Hatter said. He said his company is not the only one to make apps like TarBot that detect suspicious logins. So the bad guys were kicked out after just a few minutes. But Hatter says the better way to stop these attacks is to use phishing-resistant MFA, such as hardware keys (like the YubiKey line) or passkeys. With today’s AI-assisted phishing, telltale signs such as bad grammar or obviously fake login pages are becoming few and far between. ®
17 shared
Oct 8, 2026