New Dell System Update flaw lets hackers gain root privileges

A maximum severity security vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines has been exploited as a zero-day by a suspected China-nexus threat cluster dubbed UNC6201 since mid-2024, according to a new report from Google Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). The activity involves the exploitation of CVE-2026-22769 (CVSS score: 10.0), a case of hard-coded credentials affecting versions prior to 6.0.3.1 HF1. Other products, including RecoverPoint Classic, are not vulnerable to the flaw. "This is considered critical as an unauthenticated remote attacker with knowledge of the hardcoded credential could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access to the underlying operating system and root-level persistence," Dell said in a bulletin released Tuesday. The issue impacts the following products - RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Version 5.3 SP4 P1 - Migrate from RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines 5.3 SP4 P1 to 6.0 SP3, and then upgrade to 6.0.3.1 HF1 RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Versions 6.0, 6.0 SP1, 6.0 SP1 P1, 6.0 SP1 P2, 6.0 SP2, 6.0 SP2 P1, 6.0 SP3, and 6.0 SP3 P1 - Upgrade to 6.0.3.1 HF1 RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Versions 5.3 SP4, 5.3 SP3, 5.3 SP2, and earlier - Upgrade to version 5.3 SP4 P1 or a 6.x version, and then apply the necessary remediation "Dell recommends that RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines be deployed within a trusted, access-controlled internal network protected by appropriate firewalls and network segmentation," it noted. "RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines is not intended for use on untrusted or public networks." "We are aware of less than a dozen impacted organizations, but because the full scale of this campaign is unknown, we recommend that organizations previously targeted by BRICKSTORM look out for GRIMBOLT in their environments," Rich Reece, Manager, Mandiant Consulting at Google Cloud, told The Hacker News via email. Mandiant said it discovered CVE-2026-22769 earlier this year while investigating multiple Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines within an unspecified victim's environment. "The actor is likely still active in unpatched and remediated environments, and because exploitation has been occurring since mid-2024, they have had significant time to establish persistence and carry out long-term espionage," Reece said. "We anticipate additional companies will find active or historic compromises as they begin hunting using the new IOCs/YARA rules we published." Per Google, the hard-coded credential relates to an "admin" user for the Apache Tomcat Manager instance that could be used authenticate to the Dell RecoverPoint Tomcat Manager, upload a web shell named SLAYSTYLE via the "/manager/text/deploy" endpoint, and execute commands as root on the appliance to drop the BRICKSTORM backdoor and its newer version dubbed GRIMBOLT. "This is a C# backdoor compiled using native ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation, making it harder to reverse engineer," Mandiant's Charles Carmakal added. Google told The Hacker News that the activity has targeted organizations across North America, with GRIMBOLT incorporating features to better evade detection and minimize forensic traces on infected hosts. "GRIMBOLT is even better at blending in with the system's own native files," it added. UNC6201 is also assessed to share overlaps with UNC5221, another China-nexus espionage cluster known for its exploitation of virtualization technologies and Ivanti zero-day vulnerabilities to distribute web shells and malware families like BEEFLUSH, BRICKSTORM, and ZIPLINE. Despite the tactical similarities, the two clusters are assessed to be distinct at this stage. It's worth noting that the use of BRICKSTORM has also been linked by CrowdStrike to a third China-aligned adversary tracked as Warp Panda (aka Clay Typhoon and Storm-2416) in attacks aimed at U.S. entities. A noteworthy aspect of the latest set of attacks revolves around UNC6201's reliance on temporary virtual network interfaces – referred to as "Ghost NICs" – to pivot from compromised virtual machines into internal or SaaS environments, and then delete those NICs to cover up the tracks in an effort to impede investigation efforts. "Consistent with the earlier BRICKSTORM campaign, UNC6201 continues to target appliances that typically lack traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) agents to remain undetected for long periods," Google said. Exactly how initial access is obtained remains unclear, but like UNC5221, it's also known to target edge appliances to break into target networks. An analysis of the compromised VMware vCenter appliances has also uncovered iptable commands executed by means of the web shell to perform the following set of actions - Monitor incoming traffic on port 443 for a specific HEX string Add the source IP address of that traffic to a list and if the IP address is on the list and connects to port 10443, the connection is ACCEPTED Silently redirect subsequent traffic to port 443 to port 10443 for the next 300 seconds (five minutes) if the IP is on the approved list Furthermore, the threat actor has been found replacing old BRICKSTORM binaries with GRIMBOLT in September 2025. While GRIMBOLT also provides a remote shell capability and uses the same command-and-control (C2) as BRICKSTORM, it's not known what prompted the shift to the harder-to-detect malware, and whether it was a planned transition or a response to public disclosures about BRICKSTORM. "Nation-state threat actors continue targeting systems that don't commonly support EDR solutions, which makes it very hard for victim organizations to know they are compromised and significantly prolongs intrusion dwell times," Carmakal said. The disclosure comes as Dragos warned of attacks mounted by Chinese groups like Volt Typhoon (aka Voltzite) to compromise Sierra Wireless Airlink gateways located in electric and oil and gas sectors, followed by pivoting to engineering workstations to dump config and alarm data. The activity, according to the cybersecurity company, took place in July 2025. The hacking crew is said to acquire initial access from Sylvanite, which rapidly weaponizes edge device vulnerabilities before patches are applied and hands off access for deeper operational technology (OT) intrusions. "Voltzite moved beyond data exfiltration to direct manipulation of engineering workstations investigating what would trigger processes to stop," Dragos said. " This represents the removal of the last practical barrier between having access and causing physical consequences. Cellular gateways create unauthorized pathways into OT networks bypassing traditional security controls." Update The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), on February 18, 2026, added CVE-2026-22769 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply the patch by February 21, 2026. Update In a follow-up analysis published on March 5, 2026, Team Cymru shed more light on the C2 infrastructure associated with GRIMBOLT, using an X.509 certificate's subject field value for the IP address 149.248.11[.]71 – CN=WIN-DO6FVJH67FN – to uncover additional IP addresses using the same certificate: 140.82.18[.]134 and 66.42.111[.]219. "Analysis of these IP addresses revealed that they are also located on the same VPS provider (Vultr) due to their autonomous system number (ASN) being the same in their WHOIS records," security researcher Will Thomas said. "Furthermore, these two additional IP addresses both had the same 3389 (RDP) port open as well." "The overlap of a cryptographically identical X509 certificate, matching autonomous system (ASN) routing, and correlated open port profiles strongly indicates the use of cloned virtual machine images or an automated provisioning script by the threat actor on a single VPS provider, Vultr." (The story was updated after publication on March 6, 2026, with new insights from Team Cymru.)

On July 19–20, 2025, various security companies and national CERTs published alerts about active exploitation of on-premise SharePoint servers. According to the reports, observed attacks did not require authentication, allowed attackers to gain full control over the infected servers, and were performed using an exploit chain of two vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, publicly named “ToolShell”. Additionally, on the same dates, Microsoft released out-of-band security patches for the vulnerabilities CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, aimed at addressing the security bypasses of previously issued fixes for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706. The release of the new, “proper” updates has caused confusion about exactly which vulnerabilities attackers are exploiting and whether they are using zero-day exploits. Kaspersky products proactively detected and blocked malicious activity linked to these attacks, which allowed us to gather statistics about the timeframe and spread of this campaign. Our statistics show that widespread exploitation started on July 18, 2025, and attackers targeted servers across the world in Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Vietnam, and Zambia. Entities across multiple sectors were affected: government, finance, manufacturing, forestry, and agriculture. While analyzing all artifacts related to these attacks, which were detected by our products and public information provided by external researchers, we found a dump of a POST request that was claimed to contain the malicious payload used in these attacks. After performing our own analysis, we were able to confirm that this dump indeed contained the malicious payload detected by our technologies, and that sending this single request to an affected SharePoint installation was enough to execute the malicious payload there. Our analysis of the exploit showed that it did rely on vulnerabilities fixed under CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, but by changing just one byte in the request, we were able to bypass those fixes. In this post, we provide detailed information about CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771, and one related vulnerability. Since the exploit code is already published online, is very easy to use, and poses a significant risk, we encourage all organizations to install the necessary updates. The exploit Our research started with an analysis of a POST request dump associated with this wave of attacks on SharePoint servers. We can see that this POST request targets the “/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx” endpoint and embeds two parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. Looking at the code of ToolPane.aspx, we can see that this file itself does not contain much functionality and most of its code is located in the ToolPane class of the Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages namespace in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Looking at this class reveals the code that works with the two parameters present in the exploit. However, accessing this endpoint under normal conditions is not possible without bypassing authentication on the attacked SharePoint server. This is where the first Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 comes into play. CVE-2025-49706 This vulnerability is present in the method PostAuthenticateRequestHandler, in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. SharePoint requires Internet Information Services (IIS) to be configured in integrated mode. In this mode, the IIS and ASP.NET authentication stages are unified. As a result, the outcome of IIS authentication is not determined until the PostAuthenticateRequest stage, at which point both the ASP.NET and IIS authentication methods have been completed. Therefore, the PostAuthenticateRequestHandler method utilizes a series of flags to track potential authentication violations. A logic bug in this method enables an authentication bypass if the “Referrer” header of the HTTP request is equal to “/_layouts/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/14/SignOut.aspx”, or “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx” using case insensitive comparison. The code displayed in the image above handles the sign-out request and is also triggered when the sign-out page is specified as the referrer. When flag6 is set to false and flag7 is set to true, both conditional branches that could potentially throw an “Unauthorized Access” exception are bypassed. On July 8, 2025, Microsoft released an update that addressed this vulnerability by introducing additional checks to detect the usage of the “ToolPane.aspx” endpoint with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. The added check uses case insensitive comparison to verify if the requested path ends with “ToolPane.aspx”. Is it possible to bypass this check, say, by using a different endpoint? Our testing has shown that this check can be easily bypassed. CVE-2025-53771 We were able to successfully bypass the patch for vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 by adding just one byte to the exploit POST request. All that was required to bypass this patch was to add a “/” (slash) to the end of the requested “ToolPane.aspx” path. On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update that fixed this bypass as CVE-2025-53771. This fix replaces the “ToolPane.aspx” check to instead check whether the requested path is in the list of paths allowed for use with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. This allowlist includes the following paths: “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/15/1033/initstrings.js”, “/_layouts/15/init.js”, “/_layouts/15/theming.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/blank.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/WebResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/corev15.css”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/error.css”, “/_layouts/15/images/favicon.ico”, “/_layouts/15/1033/strings.js”, “/_layouts/15/core.js”, and it can contain additional paths added by the administrator. While testing the CVE-2025-49706 bypass with the July 8, 2025 updates installed on our SharePoint debugging stand, we noticed some strange behavior. Not only did the bypass of CVE-2025-49706 work, but the entire exploit chain did! But wait! Didn’t the attackers use an additional Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2025-49704, which was supposed to be fixed in the same update? To understand why the entire exploit chain worked in our case, let’s take a look at the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704 and how it was fixed. CVE-2025-49704 CVE-2025-49704 is an untrusted data deserialization vulnerability that exists due to improper validation of XML content. Looking at the exploit POST request, we can see that it contains two URL encoded parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. We can see how they are handled by examining the code of the method GetPartPreviewAndPropertiesFromMarkup in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. A quick analysis reveals that “MSOtlPn_Uri” is a page URL that might be pointing to an any file in the CONTROLTEMPLATES folder and the parameter “MSOtlPn_DWP” contains something known as WebPart markup. This markup contains special directives that can be used to execute safe controls on a server and has a format very similar to XML. While this “XML” included in the “MSOtlPn_DWP” parameter does not itself contain a vulnerability, it allows attackers to instantiate the ExcelDataSet control from Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll with CompressedDataTable property set to malicious payload and trigger its processing using DataTable property getter. Looking at the code of the ExcelDataSet’s DataTable property getter in Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll, we find the method GetObjectFromCompressedBase64String, responsible for deserialization of CompressedDataTable property contents. The data provided as Base64 string is decoded, unzipped, and passed to the BinarySerialization.Deserialize method from Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Attackers use this method to provide a malicious DataSet whose deserialized content is shown in the image above. It contains an XML with an element of dangerous type "System.Collections.Generic.List1[[System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper2[...], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089]]", which allows attackers to execute arbitrary methods with the help of the well-known ExpandedWrapper technique aimed at exploitation of unsafe XML deserialization in applications based on the .NET framework. In fact, this shouldn’t be possible, since BinarySerialization.Deserialize in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll uses a special XmlValidator designed to protect against this technique by checking the types of all elements present in the provided XML and ensuring that they are on the list of allowed types. However, the exploit bypasses this check by placing the ExpandedWrapper object into the list. Now, to find out why the exploit worked on our SharePoint debugging stand with the July 8, 2025 updates installed, let’s take a look at how this vulnerability was fixed. In this patch, Microsoft did not really fix the vulnerability but only mitigated it by adding the new AddExcelDataSetToSafeControls class to the Microsoft.SharePoint.Upgrade namespace. This class contains new code that modifies the web.config file and marks the Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet control as unsafe. Because SharePoint does not execute this code on its own after installing updates, the only way to achieve the security effect was to manually run a configuration upgrade using the SharePoint Products Configuration Wizard tool. Notably, the security guidance for CVE-2025-49704 does not mention the need for this step, which means at least some SharePoint administrators may skip it. Meanwhile, anyone who installed this update but did not manually perform a configuration upgrade remained vulnerable. CVE-2025-53770 On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update with a proper fix for the CVE-2025-49704 vulnerability. This patch introduces an updated XmlValidator that now properly validates element types in XML, preventing exploitation of this vulnerability without requiring a configuration upgrade and, more importantly, addressing the root cause and preventing exploitation of the same vulnerability through controls other than Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet. CVE-2020-1147 Readers familiar with previous SharePoint exploits might feel that the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770 and the exploit used by the attackers looks very familiar and very similar to the older .NET Framework, SharePoint Server, and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1147. In fact, if we compare the exploit for CVE-2020-1147 and an exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, we can see that they are almost identical. The only difference is that in the exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, the dangerous ExpandedWrapper object is placed in the list. This makes CVE-2025-53770 an updated fix for CVE-2020-1147. Conclusions Despite the fact that patches for the ToolShell vulnerabilities are now available for deployment, we assess that this chain of exploits will continue being used by attackers for a long time. We have been observing the same situation with other notorious vulnerabilities, such as ProxyLogon, PrintNightmare, or EternalBlue. While they have been known for years, many threat actors still continue leveraging them in their attacks to compromise unpatched systems. We expect the ToolShell vulnerabilities to follow the same fate, as they can be exploited with extremely low effort and allow full control over the vulnerable server. To stay better protected against threats like ToolShell, we as a community should learn lessons from previous events in the industry related to critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, the speed of applying security patches nowadays is the most important factor when it comes to fighting such vulnerabilities. Since public exploits for these dangerous vulnerabilities appear very soon after vulnerability announcements, it is paramount to install patches as soon as possible, as a gap of even a few hours can make a critical difference. At the same time, it is important to protect enterprise networks against zero-day exploits, which can be leveraged when there is no available public patch for vulnerabilities. In this regard, it is critical to equip machines with reliable cybersecurity solutions that have proven effective in combatting ToolShell attacks before they were publicly disclosed. Kaspersky Next with its Behaviour detection component proactively protects against exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is able to detect exploitation and the subsequent malicious activity. Kaspersky products detect the exploits and malware used in these attacks with the following verdicts: UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen ASP.Agent.* PowerShell.Agent.*

Attackers exploited a previously unknown flaw in Check Point's Security Management Server in a handful of targeted attacks on July 23, the company said. The flaw, CVE-2026-93616, allows an attacker who can access the server's web service to run scripts on it without logging in. Check Point released a fix on September 22 for the server that controls firewall policies for the Check Point gateways it manages. Separately, Check Point said attackers have been trying since September 12 to exploit a VPN flaw it fixed on September 9. The attempts, against a flaw tracked as CVE-2026-85102, have targeted customers of Spark, Check Point's firewall line for small businesses. When the fix came out, Check Point had no evidence the flaw was being exploited. CVE-2026-93616 is a path traversal bug in the management server's web service. The service does not properly limit which files and folders a request can reach. An attacker can use it to upload scripts to the server and then run them. Check Point rated it 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale in the CVE record for the flaw. Check Point's advisory does not name the targets of the July attacks or the attackers, nor does it say what the attackers did after exploiting the flaw. Management Server Versions and Fix Check Point numbers the Jumbo Hotfix updates for each release by "Take." Its LivePatch channel, which pushes urgent fixes, uses a separate set of take numbers. The CVE record lists these versions as affected: R82.20 with no Jumbo Hotfix installed R82.10 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 44 or below R82 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 126 or below R81.20 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 166 or below R81.10 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 190 or below (end of support) R81, R80.40, R80.30, R80.20, R80.10 and R80 (all end of support) Check Point's advisory lists R82.20 as affected without the "no Jumbo Hotfix" condition. On September 16, Check Point fixed a separate flaw in the management server, CVE-2026-91843, through LivePatch. That update was LivePatch Take 28, or Take 29 on R82.20, according to a summary of Check Point's advisory by France's CERT Santé. Check Point says those LivePatch takes do not fix CVE-2026-93616. CVE-2026-85103, a VPN certificate flaw that Check Point fixed on September 9, affected both gateways and management servers. On R82.10, R82, and R81.20, the new flaw's affected list goes one take higher than that flaw's. So a server updated only enough to be outside that September flaw's range is still affected by CVE-2026-93616. The fixed builds, and Check Point's guidance on mitigation, hunting and indicators of compromise, are in support article sk1000171. Administrators of management servers should: Check the server's release and Jumbo Hotfix take against the list above. Install the fix listed in sk1000171. Use the hunting guidance and indicators of compromise in sk1000171 to look for signs of an attack. Installing the fix does not show whether the server was attacked before. Check Point's advisory names only Security Management as affected and does not say what network access an attacker needs. The Hacker News has asked Check Point about other affected products, the fixed builds, and the July attacks. Spark Firewalls Targeted Through VPN Flaw CVE-2026-85102 is in the way Check Point gateways check certificates while a VPN connection is being set up. It may let an attacker who has not logged in run code on the gateway. Fixes have been out since September 9 and are in support article sk1000117. The affected products are Security Gateway and Spark firewalls, whether centrally or locally managed, on R81 and R81.10 (both end of support), R81.10.x, R81.20, R82, R82.00.x and R82.10. The Netherlands' National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) says the flaw applies when these products use Site-to-Site VPN or Remote Access VPN. Check Point said the attempts came from anonymizing infrastructure, including VPN services and proxies, and used certificates with these subjects: Certificate subject: CN=vpn,OU=users,O=global Certificate subject: CN=vpn-user,OU=users,O=global Certificate subject: CN=vpnuser,OU=users,O=global The list is not complete, and other subjects may be in use. Administrators should check logs for any unusual certificate-based Mobile Access login, not only those with these subjects. They should also check what suspicious Mobile Access users do after logging in, which often includes scanning internal ports and services. Check Point says customers who installed the September 9 fix are protected, but its advisory does not say whether any attempt succeeded. For gateways that cannot be patched yet, the NCSC lists a Check Point workaround for Site-to-Site VPN: turn off the implied VPN rules and allow UDP ports 500 and 4500 only from specific peer IP addresses. The workaround does not apply to locally managed Spark firewalls. Mitigation steps from Check Point are in sk1000117.

History: 22/09/2026 --- v1.0 -- Initial publication Summary On 22 September 2026, F5 published an advisory addressing a critical vulnerability affecting its BIG-IP APM product. The vendor confirmed active exploitation in the wild [1]. CERT-EU recommends taking appropriate actions as soon as possible. Technical Details The vulnerability CVE-2026-94127, with a CVSS score of 9.8, is a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability and allow unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE) on the affected device [1]. Affected Products The vulnerability affects the following versions of BIG-IP APM if configured with an access policy and an OAuth profile on a virtual server [1]: 17.1.0 - 17.1.3 17.5.0 - 17.5.1 21.1.0 Recommendations CERT-EU recommends taking the following actions as soon as possible: Preserve forensic evidence. Apply the relevant hotfix. Check for signs of compromise (see the compromise assessment section). If any sign of compromise is detected, start the incident response process. Mitigation If patching cannot be applied immediately, F5 provides an iRule-based mitigation for the affected virtual server. To obtain it, F5 BIG-IP clients should contact the F5 support [1]. Compromise Assessment CERT-EU strongly advises to look for the following indicators of compromise provided by the vendor in its advisory [1]: At a high level, multiple OAuth authentication failures, followed by suspicious commands, shortly followed by a TMM SIGABRT is the combination that should lead to human review of the system. OAuth authentication failures: check /var/log/apm for repeated occurrences of the following, especially 10 or more from a single IP in a short window. err tmm1\[30975\]: 01990004:3: : Request UserInfo from Source ID (null) IP failed. Error Code (invalid\_token) Error Description (The access token is invalid.) - Increase of OAuth failure statistics. Run the following and look for an unexplained increase in total_failed : $ tmctl global_oauth_stat -s total_requests,total_userinfo_requests,total_failed - Audit log anomalies: if OAuth failures are observed, review /var/log/audit around those timestamps for suspicious commands. TMM core files: Presence of a TMM core file alone is not an indicator, but core files should be investigated. The vendor indicates that they have observed TMM entering a loop, which causes the SOD daemon to send a SIGABRT.