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CVE-2026-98432 - Linux kernel IPv4 TCP use-after-free Issue
CVE-2026-98432 - Linux kernel IPv4 TCP use-after-free Issue Bulletin ID: 2026-160-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 10/30/2026 22:15 PM PDT Summary: AWS is aware of CVE-2026-98432, a memory issue in the Linux kernel IPv4 TCP handshake path affecting kernel versions 4.4 and later. Under specific conditions, a remote, unauthenticated third party could send crafted IPv4 TCP packets to an affected listener, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution. We will update this bulletin as more information becomes available. Current Mitigation Status: Amazon Linux Amazon Linux 2 and Amazon Linux 2023 kernel packages for the resolution of CVE-2026-98432 are available. Customers should update their kernel packages and reboot. Kernel versions kernel-4.14, kernel-5.10, kernel-5.15, kernel-5.4, kernel-6.1, kernel-6.12, & kernel-6.18: Updated in ALAS2023-2026-3251 (version 6.18.56-125.164). Available now. All kernels above: Updated in ALAS2023-2026-3335. Available now. To update: Amazon EC2 Customers running self-managed Linux instances on Amazon EC2 are responsible for updating the kernel on those instances. If you run Amazon Linux, update the kernel package as described above. If you run another Linux distribution, follow your distribution's guidance for applying the fix when it becomes available. After updating the kernel, a reboot is required for the fix to take effect. A kernel update and reboot is the only complete remediation for this issue. AWS Web Application Firewall, Application Load Balancer, Classic Load Balancer, TLS Listeners on Network Load Balancer, Cloud Front, API Gateway The customers using above services don't receive TCP connections from untrusted sources directly when following best practices. AWS is applying updates to the underlying infrastructure of these services and no immediate customer action is required if you are using these services. We still recommend customers update their self managed instances behind these services with in the next 30 days. Network Load Balancer (TCP Listeners) and Amazon Global Accelerator Customers running environments on Linux platform should update their platform version once updated platform versions with the patched kernel are available. Amazon EKS Amazon EKS has released updated EKS-optimized Amazon Linux 2023 AMIs for Kubernetes version 1.33 and later (release v20261026) that address this issue. Customers using managed node groups, self-managed nodes, or Karpenter with these AMIs should update their nodes to v20261026 or later. We expect to complete the global release of the updated Auto Mode AMI by November 06, 2026. No customer action is required for Auto Mode. Amazon EKS Auto Mode will automatically replace existing nodes with an updated AMI that includes the patched kernel, subject to NodePool disruption budgets. Amazon ECS Customers running Amazon ECS on EC2 instances should update the kernel on their container instances as described above and reboot. For customers using AWS Fargate & ECS Managed Instance, AWS is applying updates to the underlying infrastructure. No customer action is required for Fargate & ECS Managed Instance tasks. Bottlerocket Updated Bottlerocket AMIs with the patched kernel are expected to be available beginning November 02, 2026. We recommend customers update to the latest Bottlerocket AMI when available. AWS Lambda Lambda workloads are not affected by this issue CVE-2026-98432 requires an actor to send a specially crafted network packet to a publicly reachable IPv4 TCP port on an affected host. Lambda functions do not expose public IPv4 TCP ports, so there is no path for an external party to reach your function's execution environment with the type of traffic needed to trigger this issue. No action is required on your part. As a defense-in-depth measure, we are proactively applying the kernel patch to the Lambda service infrastructure. Amazon Lightsail Customers running self-managed Linux instances on Amazon Lightsail are responsible for updating the kernel on those instances. If you run Amazon Linux, update the kernel package as described above. If you run another Linux distribution, follow your distribution's guidance for applying the fix when it becomes available. After updating the kernel, a reboot is required for the fix to take effect. A kernel update and reboot is the only complete remediation for this issue. VPC Endpoints (PrivateLink) Customers running environments on Linux platform should update their platform version once updated platform versions with the patched kernel are available. VPC Lattice Customers running Layer 4 targets (SRE, SNE) environments on Linux platform should update their platform version once updated platform versions with the patched kernel are available. RDS / Aurora RDS / Aurora customers need to make sure that the database ports are not exposed from the internet. Neptune Neptune customers need to make sure that the database ports are not exposed from the internet. Interim step for customers who cannot update immediately Disable MPTCP by setting the kernel parameter net.mptcp.enabled=0, or set GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0 for applications built with Go 1.24 or later. This step reduces the conditions for running code on a host, but it does not resolve the issue. Updating the kernel and rebooting, or applying a livepatch, resolves the issue Customers can disable IP Options to mitigate this with an IP tables rule. An example is provided below: References: Please email [email protected] with any security questions or concerns.
aws.amazon.comOct 31, 2026extracted
Anthropic: That Claude Code extension compromise… couldn't be us
Anthropic has denied allegations that a malicious version of the official Claude Code extension published to Cursor’s marketplace was linked to any kind of compromise of its own systems. The company was forced to issue a statement after prominent figures in the cybersecurity industry alleged that the extension, which infected up to 5,000 developers, was uploaded to Cursor’s marketplace following a breach at Claudemaker Towers. Felix Rieseberg, a member of Anthropic’s technical staff, Xeeted today: "We're working with Cursor on this incident, but it wasn’t a compromise of Anthropic's systems or employee laptops. "A malicious actor used access to Cursor's marketplace to publish a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension, which we didn't build or publish. The versions on our official channels are not affected, and this only impacts Cursor users." First spotted by EDR vendor Phorion, an unknown party pushed an update to Cursor's official Claude Code extension for Visual Studio Code that contained a persistent SSH backdoor written for Windows, macOS, and Linux. According to Cursor, the extension – version 2.1.313 – was available to download for around 11 hours between 0227 and 1335 PT (0927 and 2035 UTC) on Thursday. The vendors' analyses of the implant revealed that it collected information about the host machine and user, including usernames, configured Git emails, and public IP addresses, as well as attempting to open a reverse SSH tunnel. Crucially, Cursor echoed Phorion's assessment that the package contained a critical flaw. The script responsible for opening the SSH tunnel required admin rights on macOS and Windows to do so, and in the vast majority of cases it did not have these, resulting in failure. Regardless, the extension still forwards the collected host and user data to the attacker, as well as dropping the attacker's SSH key and installing the persistence mechanism, so developers must go threat hunting in case their instance allows for the SSH tunnel to be created successfully. Simply installing the latest version of the extension is not enough to clear the persistence mechanism, either. The full details of how to remediate the issue, and links to download scripts to wipe the infection, are laid out in Cursor's account of the situation. Aside from Rieseberg's statement today, neither Cursor nor Anthropic have commented on how the malicious package made its way to the official marketplace. Anthropic's position is that a malicious actor uploaded the tampered copy to Cursor, but the latter has not outlined how it reached the marketpplace. "[We] removed the malicious version from the marketplace immediately upon detection and blocked further distribution," Cursor said in the advisory. "We followed with a full shutdown of the VSCode Marketplace out of an abundance of caution." It also ran checks to confirm no other extensions were compromised in the same way, rotated its own keys before restoring the marketplace, and worked with a cloud hosting provider to block the connection to the attacker's server, it said. ®
theregister.comOct 30, 2026extracted
In the year AI re-wrote the infosec rulebook, it’s comforting to know crypto exchanges still have bad security
Crypto exchange Binance has paused trading after discovering unknown parties cracked one of its workers’ laptops and used it to make massive trades. Late on Thursday, US time, the company used its social media feeds to report “Our teams are aware of reports of a potential security issue and are actively investigating.” The exchange insisted “User funds are completely safe” and warned its customers “should remain cautious of scams and should not trust unofficial links, messages, or requests for account information.” The company soon froze $2.5 billion worth of assets and warned that the figure could go higher “as our teams work closely with law enforcement, issuers, blockchain intelligence firms and industry partners to trace and freeze additional assets.” To prevent the matter worsening, Binance halted all trading, deposits, and withdrawals. It also promised to cover any losses. About an hour ago at the time of writing, Binance posted an update on the incident that explains what it thinks went wrong. “Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions,” the post states. The company also hiked the amount it thinks is at risk to $6.3 billion and repeated its promise to cover any customer losses. The update also says Binance found no evidence of any wallet private key leak, suggesting that customers’ holdings remain secure. When they can use them again, as Binance is yet to resume trading. Binance hasn’t explained how attackers gained access to the engineer’s laptop. The scant details provided make it hard to rule out a successful phishing attack, or perhaps a supply chain attack on a package the developer used. Binance says it will spill once it knows exactly what happened. Cryptocurrency outfits have a long and inglorious history of falling victim to cyberattacks, perhaps starting with the 2011 raid on Mt Gox, to incidents allegedly perpetrated by nation-states, and, just last week, another situation possibly involving an AI-powered attacker. ®
theregister.comOct 30, 2026extracted
Suspected Chinese attackers built a custom PHP2Shell exploit and rooted 25 servers
Suspected Chinese attackers chained PHP2Shell with a Linux kernel privilege-escalation exploit to root 25 servers, including Palo Alto Networks firewalls linked to US government-affiliated organizations, according to Dream researchers. The snoops began exploiting these servers on October 23, targeting organizations across the US, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The attackers also honed in on US government-affiliated firewalls. “Within hours of compromising a US government-affiliated firewall, they had tunneled into the internal network, compromised a third server using the same PHP2Shell exploit, and launched a full Active Directory attack campaign - all through a chain that started with a single unauthenticated HTTPS request to a management interface that should never have been exposed to the internet,” the Israeli AI cybersecurity startup said in a report. Plus, the attackers “likely still” have persistent, remote access to compromised organizations’ networks, Dream noted. The attackers rooted the first US government-affiliated firewall on October 23, but the device crashed shortly afterward, possibly due to around 900 MB of exploit traffic. According to Dream, it remained unresponsive despite 240 automated checks over two hours. They successfully exploited the second firewall a day later, on October 24. The compromised firewalls ran vulnerable versions of Palo Alto Networks' PAN-OS. Dream said it had been working with the vendor to investigate the compromises, and Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 researchers independently verified the attacker's tooling and confirmed Dream's reported results. To break into the firewalls, the attackers built a custom exploit chain that includes PHP2Shell and a Fragnesia kernel flaw, and ran about 40 custom post-exploitation scripts once they were inside the targeted organizations. Total attack chain in under 15 minutes PHP2Shell, comprised of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, came to light early last week, along with fears that attackers would abuse the bugs to take down most of the internet. Despite “hundreds” of PHP2Shell proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub, the first reports of successful attacks didn’t start until Saturday. Both bugs have CVSS scores of 9.2 and can be exploited without authentication to run code on vulnerable PHP servers. The PHP2Shell exploit recovered by Dream was not a copy of any known public exploit. It “appears to have been independently developed and tailored specifically for the targeted firewall platform,” the researchers wrote. The attackers combined PHP2Shell with Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300), a high-severity local privilege-escalation vulnerability affecting the Linux kernel's XFRM ESP-in-TCP subsystem. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added this Linux kernel bug to its catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities on Wednesday. Both CISA and the FBI declined to comment. The miscreants developed a four-stage PHP2Shell exploit that allowed them to execute commands without authentication on vulnerable Palo Alto Networks firewalls. They then used Fragnesia to escalate their privileges and gain root access. The attackers targeted PAN-OS 12.1 and 12.2, which run PHP 8.0.30 with a high memory limit that enabled the exploit's memory-corruption stages. “The total chain - from unauthenticated HTTPS connection to persistent root webshell - completes in under 15 minutes,” the Dream team wrote. 4 steps to root Here’s how it works: First, they flood the servers with crafted multipart POST requests to corrupt PHP’s memory, and force a predictable memory layout. Then a second request forges the stale session ID length from the memory corruption part of the attack, forcing an out-of-bounds read and exposing the base address of libphp.so in the running process. The attackers then exhaust PHP's memory again to force mod_data=NULL, creating a stale reference they can forge in the final stage to execute commands as the nobody user. They use Fragnesia to escalate to root and plant a web shell in a publicly accessible directory on the firewall. After breaking in via the compromised firewalls, the attackers snooped around in Active Directory, stealing credentials and other sensitive information. With root access, the attackers also had the master key to decrypt the LDAP service account password, which they hardcoded into every subsequent script. They also enumerated every user and group in the domain via LDAP queries, and sprayed passwords against every user account. Attackers also tried to create backdoor AD accounts and attempted SAML signing key extraction - but Dream doesn’t know if these were successful. “The attack results - whether the password spray found valid credentials, whether the backdoor accounts were created, whether SAML keys were extracted - stayed on the management server's local filesystem and were not among the artifacts we recovered,” the researchers noted. AI tools in the attack The investigation also uncovered evidence that the attackers used AI tools, but noted that this was not a fully autonomous attack. The researchers found Anthropic's Claude Code installed, an AI-powered offensive security platform called aiscan configured with Chinese models DeepSeek and Kimi, and API keys for the FOFA reconnaissance service. FOFA is a Chinese internet asset search engine similar to Shodan. The attackers used it to identify about 19,000 internet-facing Palo Alto Networks firewalls worldwide. “The persistent tunnel into the US government organization is likely still running,” Dream warned. “And the attacker still has 19,000 fingerprinted targets they can revisit as they develop profiles for additional PAN-OS versions.”®
theregister.comOct 29, 2026extracted
Belgium's tax agency confirms cyberattack, pulls services offline
Belgium's finance and tax agency has pulled "several" digital services offline after a cyberattack on the organization. FOD Financiën confirmed the attack on Wednesday, saying that MyMinfin, the agency's main online tax portal, as well as other online services, are temporarily unavailable while they start the initial investigations. "This measure helps limit the risks and makes it possible to carry out the necessary technical interventions to ensure the security of our systems," it said in a public announcement. FOD Financiën added that "this has consequences for tax deadlines in the near future," referring to the October 31 extended deadline to submit tax filings for specific types of income, such as sole traders and earnings from foreign companies. The agency confirmed the deadline will be extended to November 16, by which time MyMinfin, the platform through which such filings would normally be submitted, should be back up and running. The detail offered up in the public statement reflects the early stage of the investigation; not much is known, although there is nothing to suggest data was compromised. "Data protection is a top priority for the FOD Financiën," it said. "At present, there are no indications that a data breach has occurred or that data has been compromised. This aspect is also being closely investigated and followed up. "In the meantime, a large part of our other applications remains available with full or partial functionality. We are closely monitoring the situation and doing everything we can to make the affected services available again as soon as possible." Spokesperson Francis Adyns told local news outlets that the attack was thwarted within hours, and that it was unable to gain access to applications or data. "The attack could not be sufficiently expanded within our environment to take over applications or gain access to data," he told Nieuwsblad. "Elements that were potentially infected were isolated. As a result, MyMinfin, Tax-on-web, and Biztax went offline, but the hacking was successfully stopped. "The various services must be restored in an isolated environment. This requires considerable time to realize, with the necessary caution to rule out new risks." ®
theregister.comOct 29, 2026extracted
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