Search/US: FCC Bans Foreign-Made Routers Over National Security Concerns
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US: FCC Bans Foreign-Made Routers Over National Security Concerns

FCC bans foreign-made routers from US market over ‘unacceptable risk’ The Federal Communications Commission has banned all consumer routers produced outside of the U.S. from being imported unless their manufacturers obtain an exemption due to what the agency called an “unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.” Most routers used by American consumers are manufactured outside of the U.S. so the ban could have a significant impact. The new rule follows a similar FCC ban on foreign-made drones that was issued in December. The ban applies only to future imports, meaning that Americans who already own foreign-made devices can keep using products they already have in their homes. To be exempt from the ban, router companies…

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FCC Bans New Routers Made Outside the US Over National Security Risks
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) this week added all consumer-grade routers produced in foreign countries to its Covered List, banning their use in the US. The decision was based on a White House-convened Executive Branch interagency body’s determination (PDF) that all routers made abroad pose a threat to national security. “Compromised routers can enable in-depth network surveillance, data exfiltration, botnet attacks, and unauthorized access to US government or American businesses’ networks. The United States must have secure and trusted routers,” the determination reads. According to the document, because most of the routers used in American homes today are produced outside of the US, this market domination “creates unacceptable economic, national security, and cybersecurity risks.” The determination also mentions attacks by state-sponsored groups such as Flax Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, and Volt Typhoon, which targeted critical communications, energy, transportation, and water infrastructure in the US. “Routers in the United States must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with potential built-in backdoors to American homes, businesses, critical infrastructure, and emergency services,” the assessment reads. Based on this determination and on President Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy, the FCC updated its Covered List with all routers made abroad, pointing out that devices that are currently in use within Americans’ houses are not impacted. “New devices on the Covered List, such as foreign-made consumer-grade routers, are prohibited from receiving FCC authorization and are therefore prohibited from being imported for use or sale in the U.S. This update to the Covered List does not prohibit the import, sale, or use of any existing device models the FCC previously authorized,” the FCC announced (PDF). Furthermore, certain router models may be exempt from the ban if they are specifically approved by the Department of War (DoW) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Per the determination, the DoW or the DHS should notify the FCC that the respective router models have received Conditional Approval (PDF) and do not pose unacceptable risks to national security, and they will continue to receive FCC equipment authorizations. Supply chain vulnerabilities that could disrupt the US critical infrastructure, economy, and national defense, and severe cybersecurity risks leading to critical infrastructure disruptions or direct harm to US persons are considered unacceptable threats. Related: DoE Publishes 5-Year Energy Security Plan Related: 3 Men Charged With Conspiring to Smuggle US Artificial Intelligence to China
securityweek.comMar 25, 2026extracted
US: FCC Bans Foreign-Made Routers Over National Security Concerns
The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has banned the import and sale of all “consumer-grade” internet routers produced in a foreign country, citing “an unacceptable risk” to the national security of the US. The ban, announced in an FCC public notice on March 23, means that all such routers made in foreign countries – not just a few select Chinese vendors – are now placed on the FCC’s covered list. The only exceptions include routers that have been granted a conditional approval by the US Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At the time of writing, the list of exceptions only includes drone systems and online surveillance systems. The agency highlighted that foreign-made routers “were directly implicated” in the Volt, Flax and Salt Typhoon cyber-attacks which targeted critical American communications, energy, transportation and water infrastructure. Consumer Routers Under Fire While the public notice sounds like a blanket ban of all foreign-made routers in the US, the FCC specifically banned “consumer-grade routers” as defined in NIST Internal Report 8425A, which refers to ones “intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer.” Existing Wi-Fi and wired routers currently in use may continue operating without restriction. Futher, companies that have previously secured FCC radio authorization for specific foreign-manufactured networking equipment are permitted to maintain imports of those approved models. However, since nearly all consumer-grade routers are produced outside the US, the FCC’s action effectively prohibits the import of the majority of future consumer router models. Shane Barney, CISO at Keeper Security, warned that focusing solely on country-of-origin risks oversimplifying a much broader security challenge. “In enterprise environments, routers and network devices are seen not just as connectivity tools, but as high-value control points that sit outside traditional security oversight. That risk is often compounded through weak governance rather than manufacturing geography,” he said. “Network infrastructure is frequently under-managed, lacks consistent patching and operates without integration into modern identity and access management frameworks. This creates an ideal foothold for attackers seeking persistent, low-visibility access into corporate environments.” For instance, in the Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon cyber-attacks, Chinese state-backed hackers primarily exploited vulnerabilities in Cisco and Netgear routers which were susceptible because their manufacturers had discontinued security updates for those specific, end-of-life models. US firm Netgear is understood to manufacture its routers in locations like Taiwan and Vietnam, meaning the firm will likely be heavily affected by the ban. Two major Chinese router makers, Huawei and ZTE, were placed on agency’s covered list in 2021. Another Chinese provider, TP-Link, is still widely used in the US. The company has taken recent steps to reduce its association with China, including a 2022 corporate restructuring that separated it from its Chinese parent entity. In 2024, the company established a global headquarters in California. TP-Link sued US firm Netgear in November 2025 for suggesting that TP-Link had been infiltrated by the Chinese government.
infosecurity-magazine.comMar 25, 2026extracted
FCC bans foreign-made routers from US market over ‘unacceptable risk’
FCC bans foreign-made routers from US market over ‘unacceptable risk’ The Federal Communications Commission has banned all consumer routers produced outside of the U.S. from being imported unless their manufacturers obtain an exemption due to what the agency called an “unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.” Most routers used by American consumers are manufactured outside of the U.S. so the ban could have a significant impact. The new rule follows a similar FCC ban on foreign-made drones that was issued in December. The ban applies only to future imports, meaning that Americans who already own foreign-made devices can keep using products they already have in their homes. To be exempt from the ban, router companies will have to receive a “specific determination” from the Department of Homeland Security or Department of War saying their products do not pose security risks. In a statement, a spokesperson for TP-Link — a router company founded in China that is now headquartered in California — said “virtually all routers are made outside the United States, including those produced by U.S.-based companies like TP-Link, which manufactures its products in Vietnam.” “It appears that the entire router industry will be impacted by the FCC’s announcement concerning new devices not previously authorized by the FCC,” they said. The interagency committee proposing the ban found that American consumers’ reliance on foreign-made routers introduces supply chain vulnerabilities that could threaten the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure and defense posture while also creating “severe cybersecurity risk,” the FCC said in a National Security Determination (NSD) on March 20. Compromised routers can facilitate network surveillance, data exfiltration, botnet attacks, and unauthorized network access, the FCC said. “Unsecure and foreign-produced routers are prime targets for attackers and have been used in multiple recent cyberattacks to enable hackers to gain access to networks and use them as launching pads to compromise critical infrastructure,” the NSD said. They “are enabling hackers to create massive networks that can be leveraged to carry out password spraying, unauthorized network access, and act as proxies for espionage.” State-sponsored hackers behind the Salt Typhoon attacks used compromised foreign-manufactured routers to “jump to embed and gain long term access to certain networks and pivot to others depending on their target,” the NSD said. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also has called routers an “attack-vector of choice,” the NSD said, citing a September 2025 agency advisory that detailed the threat. In September 2024, the FBI, Cyber National Mission Force and National Security Agency published a joint cybersecurity assessment that said hackers have used foreign-made routers to create botnets used for malicious activity, including distributed denial-of-service attacks. The FCC also pointed to an October 2024 announcement from Microsoft that the company had found that compromised, foreign-produced routers were used to mount password spray attacks against its customers. In February, Texas sued TP-Link Systems for allegedly facilitating hacks of consumers’ devices by the Chinese Communist Party even as it marketed itself as having strong security and privacy protections. “TP-Link is confident in the security of our supply chain and we welcome this evaluation of the entire industry,” the company said in response to the FCC notice. American-made routers have also proven vulnerable to hacks. In January 2024, the Department of Justice said that Cisco and NetGear routers that were no longer supported with security patches and other software updates were used by the Volt Typhoon hackers. Suzanne Smalley is a reporter covering digital privacy, surveillance technologies and cybersecurity policy for The Record. She was previously a cybersecurity reporter at CyberScoop. Earlier in her career Suzanne covered the Boston Police Department for the Boston Globe and two presidential campaign cycles for Newsweek. She lives in Washington with her husband and three children.
therecord.mediaMar 24, 2026extracted
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Worm armed 42 GitHub repos by hiding a payload too big to fail
Some attacks take real skill. Others just need someone to leave a door open. This week has both. Exposed passwords, old bugs still getting exploited, and trusted software doing things it shouldn't. There's a strange mix of clever tricks and careless mistakes. Hackers are borrowing trust from familiar apps, websites, and AI tools. Some are using AI to speed things up. Others are leaving their own attack files exposed. Not exactly careful work. Different stories, familiar weak spots. Here's what showed up this week. The threats change every week. Subscribe, and we’ll alert you when each new ThreatsDay Bulletin is out. PHP2Shell attacks persist WordPress security company Wordefence said it's not aware of any WordPress site compromised through PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) as of October 28, 2026. "We continue to see PHP2Shell-related requests across the more than 5 million sites we protect," it said. "Those requests show ongoing scanning and exploitation attempts; they do not show whether an attempt succeeded. Our site-cleaning and incident response teams have not handled a WordPress compromise attributed to these vulnerabilities." 40,573 secrets exposed Hudson Rock's investigation into the FortiBleed credential harvesting campaign has uncovered 975 newly identified domains and 40,573 exposed secrets, including 37,076 local-user records and 1,576 Active Directory LDAP bind records. The data comes from newly obtained 1,703 FortiGate source files associated with 1,689 host identifiers. "The configuration material dates to around February 2026, earlier than the likely May/June material examined in the first investigation," Hudson Rock said. The latest discovery has been codenamed FortiBleed 2.0. Institutional DNS hijacked Threat actors have used domain shadowing to place illegal gambling content beneath legitimate school and government domains in two unrelated operations. "In both cases, an unauthorized party appears to have gained access to DNS administration and created records that the original domain owners may not have noticed," Infoblox said. "Because the resulting hostnames sat within established institutional namespaces, they provided especially useful infrastructure for search-engine optimization (SEO) and traffic acquisition." One cluster, linked to a threat actor called Hidden Hawk, has been found to add individual CNAME records that mapped institutional hostnames to gambling pages hosted largely on Cloudflare Pages. The second campaign exploiting an Indian government domain "delegated entire subzones to third-party authoritative nameservers and used a wildcard, allowing many hostnames to be managed outside the victim's DNS environment." Put differently, the unauthorized DNS access creates new institutional hostnames, which resolve to infrastructure serving illegal gambling doorway pages. The pages also leverage the established reputation of school and government namespaces to ensure that the malicious URLs show up prominently in search engine results. AI banking credential warning Bank of America is reminding customers not to share banking credentials with AI agents. In an email blast to customers titled "Protecting your finances in the AI World," the financial institution urged customers to never share their username and password with another person or an outside service, "including an AI-enabled tool or agent that offers to act on your behalf." Android tightens contact access Google has announced that an upcoming Android release will no longer be able to directly write to contacts with the WRITE_CONTACTS permission. "Instead, you can use the standard contact intents (ACTION_INSERT, ACTION_EDIT, and ACTION_INSERT_OR_EDIT)," Google said. "Currently, if your app needs to save even one contact, you might be requesting WRITE_CONTACTS. But that permission grants broad access, allowing an app to make widespread changes to contacts across the device in the background, even without user interaction. Most apps don’t need such broad permission." 26,400 live credentials exposed A scan of 7.25 million public repositories on Gitee, China's largest indigenous Git hosting platform, has uncovered 26,400 unique verified-live credentials, including an active organization-admin credential for a major enterprise AI platform and thousands of live cloud provider access keys, independent security researcher Ben Zimmermann said. Critical Fortinet fixes released Fortinet has released a "coordinated set of security updates for FortiOS, FortiManager, and FortiAnalyzer" to address critical and high-severity flaws that were flagged using an AI-assisted vulnerability discovery approach. Details of the issues are being kept under wraps until November 10, 2026. With Fortinet devices becoming a favorite target for attackers, it's essential that users move quickly to apply the fixes. Zero-permission token theft Details have emerged about a now-patched flaw in Microsoft Authenticator (CVE-2026-80097 aka AuthMask) that could be exploited by installing and running a malicious application on an affected Android device and convincing the user to complete an authentication flow in the app by claiming to be a trusted app and getting the corresponding tokens. The flaw could be exploited to take over work accounts without requiring additional permissions. "Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to obtain authentication tokens and access resources as the affected user," Microsoft said. According to Enclave, "an unprivileged Android app with zero permissions could impersonate any installed Microsoft first-party app and have the Microsoft Authenticator broker hand it that app's tokens. The setup is a device with Authenticator installed and one work account signed into it." 32 fake AI bots hunt secrets Attackers are disguising themselves as AI agents to steal credentials. Cequence said it has tracked a single actor running AI agent impersonation at scale by posing as about 32 different AI bots, including ChatGPT, Claude, and Perplexity, while searching for passwords, API keys, and cloud credentials. "The malicious scanner runs from a major cloud provider and rotates through about 32 AI bot identities, spanning crawlers and assistants from OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, Perplexity, and others," Will Glazier said. "It ignores web pages and requests files that commonly store secrets, including .env configuration files, cloud credential files, private SSH keys, and server environment data, working from a list of roughly 90 file paths. Each address sends a short burst of 50 to 190 requests in about eight seconds and then moves on. The scanner works through targets one at a time, around the clock, and first sends random nonsense paths to find websites that answer every request, a common scanning technique. It hit organizations in financial services, retail, telecommunications, energy, and software, and stayed active from at least late September through late October." China-linked network intrusion The U.S. Embassy in Fiji has revealed that hackers linked to China broke into a regional organization based in Suva between July and August 2026. "Hackers with links to China maintained access to the organization's network over several days," it said. The embassy did not name the threat actor. Nor did it disclose what data the attackers may have accessed. Camera software weaponized Attackers have been breaking into enterprise networks via camera management software, according to new research from security firm Huntress, which observed multiple incidents in September and October 2026 and traced them back to a compromised application. Source code artifacts point to a Korean company selling analog and IP cameras and digital and network video recorders. The activity abuses the legitimate "WpcMon.exe" binary to sideload DLLs that establish outbound connections to a remote server. "This activity demonstrates how attackers can blend malicious code with trusted Windows components to evade detection," Huntress said. 68 GB government data breach In a major operational security blunder, an unknown threat actor stole 68 GB from a Philippine government agency, maintained a detailed log of the transfer, then left that log open on the internet at 13.163.205[.]35:80. "The copy finished in under 24 minutes on September 6, 2026," Hunt.io said. "The transfer log records 27 SQL Server backups whose filenames correspond to the case-management systems of a Philippine overseas-employment and migrant-worker administration. Beside the log sat the operator's toolkit, a rebranded GodPotato build, a PowerShell stager, two payloads and a full Impacket environment." AI model data exfiltration concerns Canadian AI company Cohere has claimed that it caught Alibaba's Qwen3.8-Flash-Next model unsuccessfully attempting to send data to China from its evaluation sandbox as part of a prompt instructing the LLM to detect malicious file download and execution by monitoring for curl processes downloading bash scripts to /tmp followed by bash execution. "Asked to write a defensive detection rule, Qwen3.8-Flash-Next ignored instructions and inventoried the machine it was running on and then tried to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing," Cohere said. "We cannot answer whether this is deliberate or a leftover glitch from training." Cohere has also released a dataset containing the model trace and corresponding raw token IDs in connection with the behavior. "The exact output is not guaranteed all the time, and many trials may be required to reproduce the behavior," Cohere said, adding "there are similarly unexpected URLs that the model also tends to output, most containing aliyunc." However, the findings have also led to social media chatter that the company is resorting to geopolitical fearmongering and that they are an attempt to clamp down on open-weights models. Post-quantum migration roadmap The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released guidelines that detail the timelines for transitioning away from quantum-vulnerable algorithms to quantum-resistant standards. "The report describes different use cases and says why one migration might take longer than another," said NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who heads the PQC standardization project. "We understand there's not one strategy that fits all use cases, and we want to help people handle their migration while staying abreast of what's changing." AI-powered ransomware operation exposed SOCRadar has uncovered the live workspace (i.e., open directory) of a threat actor tied to the n0n ransomware group, which exposed the operation's full workflow as of September 2026. The directory at 185.157.161[.]148 includes an AI coding agent configured with about 150 models to produce hundreds of attack scripts, with more than $7,216 in usage costs. "Entry points included a credential stuffing campaign against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices, exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM credentials, and compromised hosting management portals," SOCRadar said. At least 23 organizations across 14 countries are said to have been identified in the workspace, including a U.S. sports retailer, a cloud provider, a teachers’ union, a Venezuelan ISP, an Argentine ministry and a pharmaceutical subsidiary. Government AI access restricted The Swedish government has barred employees from accessing browser-based versions of ChatGPT or Claude on their work computers over security concerns relating to the processing of sensitive data. "Officials were concerned that entering sensitive information into these models without an agreement setting out how to protect and secure the data could lead to it being fed into the model and stored for training," Euro News reported. 42 repositories hijacked JFrog and SafeDep have uncovered a campaign in which threat actors hijacked third-party 42 GitHub repositories across 11 owners to deploy payload blobs large enough "to evade the GitHub search and API paths normally used to find this kind of compromise." JFrog said, "The repositories contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants and IDEs, plus 12.9 to 13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers that all decode to the same hidden CI-publisher payload." The activity is assessed to be related to a Miasma-family npm worm propagated under various packages ending with "testmetest." According to SafeDep, the worm "shares code with Miasma 'Phantom Gyp' from June 2026 and adds the token-revocation wiper from Mini Shai-Hulud. The malicious versions steal credentials, spread to other packages and repositories, and install a wiper that deletes the home directory when the victim revokes the stolen GitHub token." Unsuspecting developers who installed the packages had their data stolen and repositories compromised with malicious code to produce further malicious testmetest releases and run shellpanel workflows targeting cPanel systems through CVE-2026-41940, overlapping with a prior campaign detailed by Socket in July 2026. Android banking malware-as-a-service A new Android malware operation called MR ROBOT is targeting customers of Indian banks and transforming banking fraud into a subscription business, with cybercriminals renting customized banking trojans to steal OTPs, card details, UPI PINs and credentials while secretly forwarding calls to bypass security checks. "It is not a single-actor campaign but a rented crimeware platform: a master operator leases access to affiliates, who use a Telegram bot ('APK Shield) and a web control panel (v7.0) to build personalized banking trojans on demand and distribute them through fake Play-Store-style pages and messaging-app lures," CloudSEK said. The kit impersonates around 36 lure apps, including banks, utility providers, and government services. One affiliate is estimated to have intercepted 5407 text messages from 153 infected devices. MDM platforms abused for remote access Threat actors are abusing legitimate mobile device management (MDM) platforms, like Hexnode and Rippling, by using social engineering to enroll devices or install management agents, per Huntress. "Once established, MDM provides a trusted, privileged path for malicious activity, such as deploying rogue RMM tools and maintaining remote access," it said. Critical Gotenberg RCE exploited Threat actors are exploiting CVE-2026-42589 (CVSS score: 9.8), a critical remote code execution flaw in Gotenberg, to deliver a Go-based reverse shell called "cache_base." The flaw was patched in May 2026. According to VulnCheck, the activity originated from a residential Japanese IP address in early October 2026. "The execution flow is straightforward: acquire a lock, collect host information, connect to C2, register the victim, and open a shell," VulnCheck said. Over the past 30 days, the vulnerability has recorded 1,358 exploitation events from 128 unique source IP addresses. Discord discussions go public Discord has announced it will allow search engines to index discussions in Discoverable Servers and make them accessible on the web to users outside the platform without an account or invitation, starting mid-December 2026. "Discussions in Discoverable Servers will soon be easier to find when you search the web, so you can find the answer you're looking for and step straight into the conversation on Discord," it said. The changes apply only to Discoverable Servers and do not extend to private servers and direct messages. 800+ ransomware victims claimed The Gentlemen ransomware operation has claimed more than 800 victims across multiple regions and sectors, with most attacks targeting organizations in the U.S. and Europe. "The group supports multiple platforms, with ransomware variants targeting Windows, Linux, NAS, and BSD systems, allowing its affiliates to target a broad range of enterprise environments," Acronis said. "The group's operations include the use of EDR-killing tools. In a recent incident, a custom dropper was observed deploying vulnerable Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver [CVE-2025-70795] and Lenovo BootRepair.sys drivers to terminate security processes." AI model loading RCE risk Pillar Security has disclosed an arbitrary-code-execution vulnerability in Unsloth's core model-loading path (CVE-2026-93348, CVSS score: 8.6). It has been fixed in unsloth_zoo 2026.8.14. "An attacker-controlled model configuration could cause Python code to execute during loading," researcher Ariel Fogel said. "The affected code ran inside the model-loading process, with access to whatever that process could read, modify, or authenticate to. In an AI development environment, that can include proprietary datasets, model artifacts, Hugging Face tokens, and cloud credentials. Exploitation required an affected loading path to process an attacker-controlled configuration." Unauthenticated root-level RCE XBOW said it identified an unauthenticated, critical-severity remote code execution bug in a public web application belonging to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). "The vulnerable application was a resource/logistics calculator, not a voting machine or voter registration system," XBOW researcher Ariel Walter Garcia said. "The flaw allowed an unauthenticated attacker to execute code as root inside the backend container, with access to locally protected resources and outbound network connectivity, a privileged foothold reachable via a crafted unauthenticated web request." Session-hijacking RAT emerges A new remote access trojan called DarkCore comes with a dedicated browser that could let attackers access Gmail, WhatsApp, and MediaFire accounts using stolen sessions, while giving the impression that the activity is originating from the victim's own IP address. DarkCore was first advertised on cybercrime forums in August 2026. "The seller describes a browser that reuses those sessions to access work mailboxes, instant messaging apps, cloud storage and other services through the infected machine's IP address," BlackFog said. "The purpose is to make the access look like legitimate activity from the user." AI-powered malware framework Cisco Talos has disclosed details of a new AI-integrated command-and-control (C2) framework called NIK C2. The implant features surveillance, theft, lateral movement, and evasion capabilities, including credential dumping, RDP session hijacking, process hollowing, and a C2-driven screen lock ransomware module. "NIK C2 contains a Windows implant, using which, an actor can dump credentials, stream the victim's keystrokes to collect the targeted victim's sensitive data, and instruct an integrated AI model to analyze the harvested data, all within the compromised session," Talos said. "In this framework, the actor has abused the OpenAI Chat Completions application programming interface (API), which is an HTTP endpoint that enables ChatGPT-style conversations programmatically. In addition to the features that enable theft, an actor can also deploy desktop screen-locking ransomware via the NIK C2 implant onto the victim machine, leading to a ransom demand in Bitcoin or USDT cryptocurrencies." Three different versions of the malware have been identified to date since August 12, 2026. Talos said NIK C2 alters adversary tradecraft by collapsing collection and exploitation into a single continuous session. Malicious PDF delivers backdoor A phishing email using a FedEx tax invoice lure and containing a ZIP archive with a PDF has been observed triggering a multi-stage infection process to deliver a previously undocumented variant of the Sirius Backdoor. "The PDF abuses /OpenAction and /Launch objects to trigger an embedded Base64-encoded PowerShell command upon opening," Trellix said. "Execution relies on social engineering to trick the user into approving the PDF reader's security confirmation prompt. The PowerShell stager decrypts and reflectively loads a .NET assembly in memory. This loader performs process hollowing into legitimate Windows processes such as msbuild.exe, svchost.exe, etc., allowing the malware to operate under trusted process contexts." The final payload is SIRIUS, a Microsoft Visual C++ based backdoor with extended remote access capabilities. AI reshapes ransomware economics A new analysis from Flare has revealed that threat actors are building a mixed AI toolkit, combining commercial models with local, open-weight, and jailbroken alternatives, as well as leaning on stolen AI credentials to shift costs to victims. "Where AI can help is with understanding systems, writing tools and troubleshooting. The threat actor still needs access, decisions and a way to obtain payment," Flare said. "If AI helps an affiliate write a working data-export script without hiring a specialist, the affiliate may avoid that specialist’s fee and the wait for their help. AI makes expertise cheaper to obtain only when the cost of using and checking its work is lower than the cost of the specialist help it replaces." Emerging data-extortion threat A recently observed cyber-extortion actor named ScarlettGroup is publicly advertising alleged data compromises and uses negotiation deadlines and threatened disclosures to pressure targeted organizations. The group's dark web site listing includes victims from technology, education, government, and entertainment sectors. "ScarlettGroup demonstrates characteristics associated with financially motivated data-extortion operations, including public victim claims, deadline-based pressure, and underground forum activity," Foresiet said. "Its dedicated leak-site infrastructure and structured disclosure mechanism indicate an organized approach to promoting alleged compromises and exerting reputational pressure." Infostealers evolve into RATs Following its disruption in June 2026 as part of Operation Endgame, StealC has returned four months later as Stadia. "This time it's not a stealer: it's a full remote access trojan," Varonis said. "The RAT's features include hidden desktop control, a live command shell, a file explorer, a process manager and an in-memory loader, with StealC's stealer welded on as one module among six. The actor behind Stadia is working hard to win back original StealC customers: every former StealC customer is offered a free month on the top ($900) tier." The development comes as Moonlock Lab revealed that the Icarus macOS stealer has similarly evolved from a smash-and-grab crypto and data stealer to a malware with remote-access capabilities. The new iteration is called ICMacOS. "The stealer is actively advertised on cybercrime forums by a Russian-speaking actor operating under the handle GlowComa, with feature updates regularly announced via Telegram," SOCRadar said. "GlowComa promotes ICMacOS alongside Icarus ClickFix, a companion panel designed to deliver payloads using malicious copy-and-paste terminal commands. The infection chain relies on initial dropper scripts to detect the host architecture and harvest administrator passwords using fake system dialogs before delivering the primary payload." Another macOS-focused stealer is Aokigahara, which goes beyond browsers, VPN clients, cryptocurrency wallets, FTP/SFTP clients, password managers, and email applications to also target AI applications and development tools. "The stealer collects authentication files, session data, and configuration files associated with Claude, ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, and other tools," Check Point said. "Stolen AI credentials could offer opportunities for monetization. Usable credentials or session tokens could enable unauthorized access to paid AI services or the resale of compromised accounts." That's the week's mess. Some attacks were clever, some were painfully simple, and a few attackers made life easier for the people investigating them. The common problem? Too much trust in things nobody was watching closely. AI is adding new tricks, but the old ones aren't going anywhere. Stolen credentials, weak access controls, and forgotten bugs still get plenty of work done. New tools, familiar mistakes. The useful part is knowing where those mistakes keep showing up. That's usually where the next problem starts.
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Oct 30, 2026
Attackers Exploit Third Arista VCO Zero-Day in Four Months
Networking solutions provider Arista Networks on Thursday rolled out patches for an exploited zero-day vulnerability in its centralized management tool VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO). The critical-severity security defect is tracked as CVE-2026-114625 (CVSS score of 9.9) and is described as a remotely exploitable SQL injection. “VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host,” Arista notes in its advisory. Successful exploitation could impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of both VCO and the data it manages. “On an affected system, any authenticated user can gain operator privileges and masquerade as a local ‘superuser operator’ user. This includes access to functionality that is intended for internal use only and which is not intended to be remotely accessible,” the company says. All VCO releases before versions 5.2.3.18, 6.1.3.10, and 6.4.2.12 are affected. Arista has already patched the hosted VCO deployments, but urges users to update their on-premises installations as soon as possible. “This issue was detected by Arista and is known to be actively exploited,” the company says. Arista notes that VCO deployments are exposed by default, and that attackers need access to the VCO web interface and a valid authenticated session, with the lowest built-in tenant role privileges. “There is no configuration that can prevent the exposure,” the company notes. Attacks have been observed originating from two IP addresses, 74.82.197.86 and 38.54.50.151. Administrators should block them, check logs for their presence, and investigate high-request rates, as well as requests with unusual URL-like path components, encoded characters, and references to local or internal services. “If compromise is suspected, operators should preserve VCO web access logs, backend application logs, system logs, database logs, and relevant file-system timestamps before remediation where operationally feasible,” Arista notes. Updating to a fixed VCO release is the recommended remediation action. Until the fixes are deployed, administrators should restrict access to the VCO interface, review recent admin activity, monitor for suspicious access, block outbound ports, and monitor for backdoor daemons and webshells. CVE-2026-114625 is the third exploited zero-day vulnerability Arista patches in VCO in four months, after CVE-2026-16812 in July and CVE-2026-93952 in September. Related: Atlassian Patches 75 Flaws in Data Center and Server Products Related: Signal Vulnerability Lets Malicious Callers Block Hang-Ups Related: Splunk, SolarWinds Release Fresh Security Updates Related: Cisco Patches 34 Vulnerabilities Across Multiple Products
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Oct 29, 2026
Microsoft releases emergency .NET patches for critical Brotli flaw
A vulnerability in Google’s Brotli data compression library, tracked as CVE-2026-111497 and dubbed Node2Shell, has led to security updates from Microsoft, the Node.js project and the maintainers of two Python packages. Node.js and the Python packages were patched last week, and Microsoft followed on October 25 with fixes for .NET, Visual Studio and PowerShell. Bun, Envoy and Istio have also been updated. Brotli is a popular choice for compressing data sent over the web, and its decoder is embedded in a long list of applications and libraries. Described as an out-of-bounds write, the bug impacts Brotli 1.0.3 through 1.2.0. Google gave it a CVSS v4 score of 9.2, which puts it in the critical category. Brotli versions 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1 contain the fix. The Node.js project said specially crafted input can push data beyond the limits of a buffer used by the decoder. The resulting memory corruption could cause the process to crash or leak memory contents, and could also allow an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code. Node.js credited the discovery to members of OpenAI Codex Security. According to OpenAI, the issue was uncovered during red-teaming work, after which the company notified the Brotli developers and the projects that rely on the library. OpenAI noted that the fix predates the disclosure. “This root cause issue was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn’t known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability and there was no more recent release of Brotli,” the AI company said. Code execution demonstrated on official Node.js image Imperva has shown that it can be exploited for code execution on the official Node.js 24.22.0 image for Linux arm64. Its researchers sent the malicious data both in a server response retrieved by the targeted application and in a request body processed by Express 5 or body-parser 2. “The proof did not succeed on every attempt. Our results establish code execution for the tested Linux arm64 build and application setups, and show how the fixed build handled the same inputs,” Imperva said. The security firm has not made its exploit public. Attacks only work if malicious Brotli data reaches the decoder, for instance through a library that unpacks compressed content on the application’s behalf. “Any application that passes attacker-controlled data to an affected Google Brotli decoder may be exposed. This includes compressed HTTP request bodies, responses fetched from untrusted servers, and compressed files,” OpenAI’s Patch the Planet initiative said in its advisory. No exploitation in the wild has been reported so far. A proof-of-concept exploit published on GitHub reportedly achieves code execution only against an intentionally weakened build, and some researchers argued the bug can only be used for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Microsoft products and Python packages affected Microsoft’s October 25 updates include .NET runtime versions 8.0.33, 9.0.22 and 10.0.14, along with .NET 11 Release Candidate 3. Visual Studio 2019, 2022 and 2026, as well as PowerShell 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, have also been updated. Microsoft has categorized CVE-2026-111497 as an elevation of privilege issue with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1. It rates the flaw critical for .NET and Visual Studio and important for PowerShell, and its exploitability assessment is “Exploitation More Likely.” In Python’s case, the vulnerable decoder is built into two PyPI packages, Brotli and brotlicffi. They have been patched with the release of versions 1.2.1 and 1.2.1.0, respectively. As more affected software emerged, researchers began referring to the flaw as HTTP2Shell and Broccoli2Shell. A public tracker of software that bundles its own copy of the Brotli decoder lists several projects that are still unpatched, including DuckDB, Apache Arrow, 7-Zip-zstd, p7zip and EDK II. Its maintainers say the list is incomplete, and that not every configuration of these projects necessarily exposes the vulnerable code. Applying the updates also requires restarting affected services and rebuilding container images on top of a patched base, since processes that are already running keep using the vulnerable code. Related: Mirai Botnet Operators Join PHP2Shell Attacks as ASLR Bypass Exploits Emerge Related: Attackers Exploit Third Arista VCO Zero-Day in Four Months Related: LiteLLM Compromised in Fresh Supply Chain Attack
4 shared
Oct 29, 2026
Analyzing Sharepoint Exploits (CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771), (Wed, Jul 23rd)
On July 19–20, 2025, various security companies and national CERTs published alerts about active exploitation of on-premise SharePoint servers. According to the reports, observed attacks did not require authentication, allowed attackers to gain full control over the infected servers, and were performed using an exploit chain of two vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, publicly named “ToolShell”. Additionally, on the same dates, Microsoft released out-of-band security patches for the vulnerabilities CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, aimed at addressing the security bypasses of previously issued fixes for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706. The release of the new, “proper” updates has caused confusion about exactly which vulnerabilities attackers are exploiting and whether they are using zero-day exploits. Kaspersky products proactively detected and blocked malicious activity linked to these attacks, which allowed us to gather statistics about the timeframe and spread of this campaign. Our statistics show that widespread exploitation started on July 18, 2025, and attackers targeted servers across the world in Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Vietnam, and Zambia. Entities across multiple sectors were affected: government, finance, manufacturing, forestry, and agriculture. While analyzing all artifacts related to these attacks, which were detected by our products and public information provided by external researchers, we found a dump of a POST request that was claimed to contain the malicious payload used in these attacks. After performing our own analysis, we were able to confirm that this dump indeed contained the malicious payload detected by our technologies, and that sending this single request to an affected SharePoint installation was enough to execute the malicious payload there. Our analysis of the exploit showed that it did rely on vulnerabilities fixed under CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, but by changing just one byte in the request, we were able to bypass those fixes. In this post, we provide detailed information about CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771, and one related vulnerability. Since the exploit code is already published online, is very easy to use, and poses a significant risk, we encourage all organizations to install the necessary updates. The exploit Our research started with an analysis of a POST request dump associated with this wave of attacks on SharePoint servers. We can see that this POST request targets the “/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx” endpoint and embeds two parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. Looking at the code of ToolPane.aspx, we can see that this file itself does not contain much functionality and most of its code is located in the ToolPane class of the Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages namespace in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Looking at this class reveals the code that works with the two parameters present in the exploit. However, accessing this endpoint under normal conditions is not possible without bypassing authentication on the attacked SharePoint server. This is where the first Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 comes into play. CVE-2025-49706 This vulnerability is present in the method PostAuthenticateRequestHandler, in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. SharePoint requires Internet Information Services (IIS) to be configured in integrated mode. In this mode, the IIS and ASP.NET authentication stages are unified. As a result, the outcome of IIS authentication is not determined until the PostAuthenticateRequest stage, at which point both the ASP.NET and IIS authentication methods have been completed. Therefore, the PostAuthenticateRequestHandler method utilizes a series of flags to track potential authentication violations. A logic bug in this method enables an authentication bypass if the “Referrer” header of the HTTP request is equal to “/_layouts/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/14/SignOut.aspx”, or “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx” using case insensitive comparison. The code displayed in the image above handles the sign-out request and is also triggered when the sign-out page is specified as the referrer. When flag6 is set to false and flag7 is set to true, both conditional branches that could potentially throw an “Unauthorized Access” exception are bypassed. On July 8, 2025, Microsoft released an update that addressed this vulnerability by introducing additional checks to detect the usage of the “ToolPane.aspx” endpoint with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. The added check uses case insensitive comparison to verify if the requested path ends with “ToolPane.aspx”. Is it possible to bypass this check, say, by using a different endpoint? Our testing has shown that this check can be easily bypassed. CVE-2025-53771 We were able to successfully bypass the patch for vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 by adding just one byte to the exploit POST request. All that was required to bypass this patch was to add a “/” (slash) to the end of the requested “ToolPane.aspx” path. On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update that fixed this bypass as CVE-2025-53771. This fix replaces the “ToolPane.aspx” check to instead check whether the requested path is in the list of paths allowed for use with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. This allowlist includes the following paths: “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/15/1033/initstrings.js”, “/_layouts/15/init.js”, “/_layouts/15/theming.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/blank.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/WebResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/corev15.css”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/error.css”, “/_layouts/15/images/favicon.ico”, “/_layouts/15/1033/strings.js”, “/_layouts/15/core.js”, and it can contain additional paths added by the administrator. While testing the CVE-2025-49706 bypass with the July 8, 2025 updates installed on our SharePoint debugging stand, we noticed some strange behavior. Not only did the bypass of CVE-2025-49706 work, but the entire exploit chain did! But wait! Didn’t the attackers use an additional Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2025-49704, which was supposed to be fixed in the same update? To understand why the entire exploit chain worked in our case, let’s take a look at the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704 and how it was fixed. CVE-2025-49704 CVE-2025-49704 is an untrusted data deserialization vulnerability that exists due to improper validation of XML content. Looking at the exploit POST request, we can see that it contains two URL encoded parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. We can see how they are handled by examining the code of the method GetPartPreviewAndPropertiesFromMarkup in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. A quick analysis reveals that “MSOtlPn_Uri” is a page URL that might be pointing to an any file in the CONTROLTEMPLATES folder and the parameter “MSOtlPn_DWP” contains something known as WebPart markup. This markup contains special directives that can be used to execute safe controls on a server and has a format very similar to XML. While this “XML” included in the “MSOtlPn_DWP” parameter does not itself contain a vulnerability, it allows attackers to instantiate the ExcelDataSet control from Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll with CompressedDataTable property set to malicious payload and trigger its processing using DataTable property getter. Looking at the code of the ExcelDataSet’s DataTable property getter in Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll, we find the method GetObjectFromCompressedBase64String, responsible for deserialization of CompressedDataTable property contents. The data provided as Base64 string is decoded, unzipped, and passed to the BinarySerialization.Deserialize method from Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Attackers use this method to provide a malicious DataSet whose deserialized content is shown in the image above. It contains an XML with an element of dangerous type "System.Collections.Generic.List1[[System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper2[...], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089]]", which allows attackers to execute arbitrary methods with the help of the well-known ExpandedWrapper technique aimed at exploitation of unsafe XML deserialization in applications based on the .NET framework. In fact, this shouldn’t be possible, since BinarySerialization.Deserialize in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll uses a special XmlValidator designed to protect against this technique by checking the types of all elements present in the provided XML and ensuring that they are on the list of allowed types. However, the exploit bypasses this check by placing the ExpandedWrapper object into the list. Now, to find out why the exploit worked on our SharePoint debugging stand with the July 8, 2025 updates installed, let’s take a look at how this vulnerability was fixed. In this patch, Microsoft did not really fix the vulnerability but only mitigated it by adding the new AddExcelDataSetToSafeControls class to the Microsoft.SharePoint.Upgrade namespace. This class contains new code that modifies the web.config file and marks the Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet control as unsafe. Because SharePoint does not execute this code on its own after installing updates, the only way to achieve the security effect was to manually run a configuration upgrade using the SharePoint Products Configuration Wizard tool. Notably, the security guidance for CVE-2025-49704 does not mention the need for this step, which means at least some SharePoint administrators may skip it. Meanwhile, anyone who installed this update but did not manually perform a configuration upgrade remained vulnerable. CVE-2025-53770 On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update with a proper fix for the CVE-2025-49704 vulnerability. This patch introduces an updated XmlValidator that now properly validates element types in XML, preventing exploitation of this vulnerability without requiring a configuration upgrade and, more importantly, addressing the root cause and preventing exploitation of the same vulnerability through controls other than Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet. CVE-2020-1147 Readers familiar with previous SharePoint exploits might feel that the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770 and the exploit used by the attackers looks very familiar and very similar to the older .NET Framework, SharePoint Server, and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1147. In fact, if we compare the exploit for CVE-2020-1147 and an exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, we can see that they are almost identical. The only difference is that in the exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, the dangerous ExpandedWrapper object is placed in the list. This makes CVE-2025-53770 an updated fix for CVE-2020-1147. Conclusions Despite the fact that patches for the ToolShell vulnerabilities are now available for deployment, we assess that this chain of exploits will continue being used by attackers for a long time. We have been observing the same situation with other notorious vulnerabilities, such as ProxyLogon, PrintNightmare, or EternalBlue. While they have been known for years, many threat actors still continue leveraging them in their attacks to compromise unpatched systems. We expect the ToolShell vulnerabilities to follow the same fate, as they can be exploited with extremely low effort and allow full control over the vulnerable server. To stay better protected against threats like ToolShell, we as a community should learn lessons from previous events in the industry related to critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, the speed of applying security patches nowadays is the most important factor when it comes to fighting such vulnerabilities. Since public exploits for these dangerous vulnerabilities appear very soon after vulnerability announcements, it is paramount to install patches as soon as possible, as a gap of even a few hours can make a critical difference. At the same time, it is important to protect enterprise networks against zero-day exploits, which can be leveraged when there is no available public patch for vulnerabilities. In this regard, it is critical to equip machines with reliable cybersecurity solutions that have proven effective in combatting ToolShell attacks before they were publicly disclosed. Kaspersky Next with its Behaviour detection component proactively protects against exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is able to detect exploitation and the subsequent malicious activity. Kaspersky products detect the exploits and malware used in these attacks with the following verdicts: UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen ASP.Agent.* PowerShell.Agent.*
3 shared
Jul 28, 2025
US Tops Hit List as 396 SharePoint Systems Compromised Globally
On July 19–20, 2025, various security companies and national CERTs published alerts about active exploitation of on-premise SharePoint servers. According to the reports, observed attacks did not require authentication, allowed attackers to gain full control over the infected servers, and were performed using an exploit chain of two vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, publicly named “ToolShell”. Additionally, on the same dates, Microsoft released out-of-band security patches for the vulnerabilities CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, aimed at addressing the security bypasses of previously issued fixes for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706. The release of the new, “proper” updates has caused confusion about exactly which vulnerabilities attackers are exploiting and whether they are using zero-day exploits. Kaspersky products proactively detected and blocked malicious activity linked to these attacks, which allowed us to gather statistics about the timeframe and spread of this campaign. Our statistics show that widespread exploitation started on July 18, 2025, and attackers targeted servers across the world in Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Vietnam, and Zambia. Entities across multiple sectors were affected: government, finance, manufacturing, forestry, and agriculture. While analyzing all artifacts related to these attacks, which were detected by our products and public information provided by external researchers, we found a dump of a POST request that was claimed to contain the malicious payload used in these attacks. After performing our own analysis, we were able to confirm that this dump indeed contained the malicious payload detected by our technologies, and that sending this single request to an affected SharePoint installation was enough to execute the malicious payload there. Our analysis of the exploit showed that it did rely on vulnerabilities fixed under CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, but by changing just one byte in the request, we were able to bypass those fixes. In this post, we provide detailed information about CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771, and one related vulnerability. Since the exploit code is already published online, is very easy to use, and poses a significant risk, we encourage all organizations to install the necessary updates. The exploit Our research started with an analysis of a POST request dump associated with this wave of attacks on SharePoint servers. We can see that this POST request targets the “/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx” endpoint and embeds two parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. Looking at the code of ToolPane.aspx, we can see that this file itself does not contain much functionality and most of its code is located in the ToolPane class of the Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages namespace in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Looking at this class reveals the code that works with the two parameters present in the exploit. However, accessing this endpoint under normal conditions is not possible without bypassing authentication on the attacked SharePoint server. This is where the first Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 comes into play. CVE-2025-49706 This vulnerability is present in the method PostAuthenticateRequestHandler, in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. SharePoint requires Internet Information Services (IIS) to be configured in integrated mode. In this mode, the IIS and ASP.NET authentication stages are unified. As a result, the outcome of IIS authentication is not determined until the PostAuthenticateRequest stage, at which point both the ASP.NET and IIS authentication methods have been completed. Therefore, the PostAuthenticateRequestHandler method utilizes a series of flags to track potential authentication violations. A logic bug in this method enables an authentication bypass if the “Referrer” header of the HTTP request is equal to “/_layouts/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/14/SignOut.aspx”, or “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx” using case insensitive comparison. The code displayed in the image above handles the sign-out request and is also triggered when the sign-out page is specified as the referrer. When flag6 is set to false and flag7 is set to true, both conditional branches that could potentially throw an “Unauthorized Access” exception are bypassed. On July 8, 2025, Microsoft released an update that addressed this vulnerability by introducing additional checks to detect the usage of the “ToolPane.aspx” endpoint with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. The added check uses case insensitive comparison to verify if the requested path ends with “ToolPane.aspx”. Is it possible to bypass this check, say, by using a different endpoint? Our testing has shown that this check can be easily bypassed. CVE-2025-53771 We were able to successfully bypass the patch for vulnerability CVE-2025-49706 by adding just one byte to the exploit POST request. All that was required to bypass this patch was to add a “/” (slash) to the end of the requested “ToolPane.aspx” path. On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update that fixed this bypass as CVE-2025-53771. This fix replaces the “ToolPane.aspx” check to instead check whether the requested path is in the list of paths allowed for use with the sign-out page specified as the referrer. This allowlist includes the following paths: “/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx”, “/_layouts/15/1033/initstrings.js”, “/_layouts/15/init.js”, “/_layouts/15/theming.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/blank.js”, “/ScriptResource.axd”, “/WebResource.axd”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/corev15.css”, “/_layouts/15/1033/styles/error.css”, “/_layouts/15/images/favicon.ico”, “/_layouts/15/1033/strings.js”, “/_layouts/15/core.js”, and it can contain additional paths added by the administrator. While testing the CVE-2025-49706 bypass with the July 8, 2025 updates installed on our SharePoint debugging stand, we noticed some strange behavior. Not only did the bypass of CVE-2025-49706 work, but the entire exploit chain did! But wait! Didn’t the attackers use an additional Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2025-49704, which was supposed to be fixed in the same update? To understand why the entire exploit chain worked in our case, let’s take a look at the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704 and how it was fixed. CVE-2025-49704 CVE-2025-49704 is an untrusted data deserialization vulnerability that exists due to improper validation of XML content. Looking at the exploit POST request, we can see that it contains two URL encoded parameters: “MSOtlPn_Uri” and “MSOtlPn_DWP”. We can see how they are handled by examining the code of the method GetPartPreviewAndPropertiesFromMarkup in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. A quick analysis reveals that “MSOtlPn_Uri” is a page URL that might be pointing to an any file in the CONTROLTEMPLATES folder and the parameter “MSOtlPn_DWP” contains something known as WebPart markup. This markup contains special directives that can be used to execute safe controls on a server and has a format very similar to XML. While this “XML” included in the “MSOtlPn_DWP” parameter does not itself contain a vulnerability, it allows attackers to instantiate the ExcelDataSet control from Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll with CompressedDataTable property set to malicious payload and trigger its processing using DataTable property getter. Looking at the code of the ExcelDataSet’s DataTable property getter in Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client.dll, we find the method GetObjectFromCompressedBase64String, responsible for deserialization of CompressedDataTable property contents. The data provided as Base64 string is decoded, unzipped, and passed to the BinarySerialization.Deserialize method from Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Attackers use this method to provide a malicious DataSet whose deserialized content is shown in the image above. It contains an XML with an element of dangerous type "System.Collections.Generic.List1[[System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper2[...], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089]]", which allows attackers to execute arbitrary methods with the help of the well-known ExpandedWrapper technique aimed at exploitation of unsafe XML deserialization in applications based on the .NET framework. In fact, this shouldn’t be possible, since BinarySerialization.Deserialize in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll uses a special XmlValidator designed to protect against this technique by checking the types of all elements present in the provided XML and ensuring that they are on the list of allowed types. However, the exploit bypasses this check by placing the ExpandedWrapper object into the list. Now, to find out why the exploit worked on our SharePoint debugging stand with the July 8, 2025 updates installed, let’s take a look at how this vulnerability was fixed. In this patch, Microsoft did not really fix the vulnerability but only mitigated it by adding the new AddExcelDataSetToSafeControls class to the Microsoft.SharePoint.Upgrade namespace. This class contains new code that modifies the web.config file and marks the Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet control as unsafe. Because SharePoint does not execute this code on its own after installing updates, the only way to achieve the security effect was to manually run a configuration upgrade using the SharePoint Products Configuration Wizard tool. Notably, the security guidance for CVE-2025-49704 does not mention the need for this step, which means at least some SharePoint administrators may skip it. Meanwhile, anyone who installed this update but did not manually perform a configuration upgrade remained vulnerable. CVE-2025-53770 On July 20, 2025, Microsoft released an update with a proper fix for the CVE-2025-49704 vulnerability. This patch introduces an updated XmlValidator that now properly validates element types in XML, preventing exploitation of this vulnerability without requiring a configuration upgrade and, more importantly, addressing the root cause and preventing exploitation of the same vulnerability through controls other than Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.ExcelDataSet. CVE-2020-1147 Readers familiar with previous SharePoint exploits might feel that the vulnerability CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770 and the exploit used by the attackers looks very familiar and very similar to the older .NET Framework, SharePoint Server, and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1147. In fact, if we compare the exploit for CVE-2020-1147 and an exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, we can see that they are almost identical. The only difference is that in the exploit for CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770, the dangerous ExpandedWrapper object is placed in the list. This makes CVE-2025-53770 an updated fix for CVE-2020-1147. Conclusions Despite the fact that patches for the ToolShell vulnerabilities are now available for deployment, we assess that this chain of exploits will continue being used by attackers for a long time. We have been observing the same situation with other notorious vulnerabilities, such as ProxyLogon, PrintNightmare, or EternalBlue. While they have been known for years, many threat actors still continue leveraging them in their attacks to compromise unpatched systems. We expect the ToolShell vulnerabilities to follow the same fate, as they can be exploited with extremely low effort and allow full control over the vulnerable server. To stay better protected against threats like ToolShell, we as a community should learn lessons from previous events in the industry related to critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, the speed of applying security patches nowadays is the most important factor when it comes to fighting such vulnerabilities. Since public exploits for these dangerous vulnerabilities appear very soon after vulnerability announcements, it is paramount to install patches as soon as possible, as a gap of even a few hours can make a critical difference. At the same time, it is important to protect enterprise networks against zero-day exploits, which can be leveraged when there is no available public patch for vulnerabilities. In this regard, it is critical to equip machines with reliable cybersecurity solutions that have proven effective in combatting ToolShell attacks before they were publicly disclosed. Kaspersky Next with its Behaviour detection component proactively protects against exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is able to detect exploitation and the subsequent malicious activity. Kaspersky products detect the exploits and malware used in these attacks with the following verdicts: UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Agent.gen ASP.Agent.* PowerShell.Agent.*
3 shared
Jul 31, 2025
US Tops Hit List as 396 SharePoint Systems Compromised Globally
Check Point Research (CPR) conducted a focused analysis of Storm-2603, a threat actor associated with recent ToolShell exploitations, together with other Chinese APT groups. Storm-2603 utilizes a custom malware Command and Control (C2) framework dubbed internally by the attacker as “ak47c2”. This framework includes at least two different types of clients: HTTP-based (dubbed by us “ak47http”) and DNS-based (dubbed by us “ak47dns”). Based on VirusTotal data, Storm-2603 likely targeted some organizations in Latin America throughout the first half of 2025, in parallel to attacking organizations in APAC. Some of the actor’s TTPs align with many other ransomware groups, and involve open-source tools such as PsExec and masscan. In addition, the threat actors use a custom tool that leverages the BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) technique to tamper with endpoint protections. Storm-2603 attacks involved multiple ransomware families, sometimes bundled together. Those are commonly deployed by abusing DLL hijacking. Check Point Research (CPR) has been closely monitoring the ongoing exploitation of a group of Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerabilities collectively referred to as “ToolShell.” These active attacks leverage four vulnerabilities—CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, and CVE-2025-53771—and are attributed to multiple China affiliated threat actors. Among the threat groups identified by Microsoft, two are known APTs: Linen Typhoon (aka APT27) and Violet Typhoon (aka APT31). Another group is a newly observed, previously undocumented cluster called Storm-2603. While Microsoft linked this cluster’s activity to potential ransomware deployment, it was unable to assess the group’s objectives. As part of our ongoing investigation into ToolShell and its associated risks, we launched a targeted effort to better understand and characterize the threat posed by Storm-2603. Throughout our analysis, we uncovered several files likely tied to Storm-2603 intrusions, offering new insights that correspond to Microsoft’s description of the group. In this publication, we provide an in-depth examination of Storm-2603’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), along with a technical breakdown of the ak47c2, a custom malware framework used in their attacks and their different ransomware payloads. Storm-2603 was first mentioned by Microsoft during investigations into a set of attacks on Microsoft SharePoint servers, known as the “ToolShell” campaign. While some activity was tied to known Chinese affiliated groups like Linen Typhoon (APT27) and Violet Typhoon (APT31), Storm-2603 appeared as a new, previously unreported actor. Microsoft linked the group to Lockbit and Warlock ransomware use. Figure 1 – Events associated with Storm-2603. Microsoft’s report provided only limited information about Storm-2603, including some of the TTPs associated with it, most of them quite generic. In addition, some of the reported indicators of compromise (IOCs) helped us uncover additional artifacts associated with previous Storm-2603 intrusions. One domain in particular, update.updatemicfosoft[.]com, linked to Storm-2603’s SharePoint exploitation, turned out to have been used in earlier campaigns dating back to March 2025. In those operations, it served as a C2 server for both DNS tunneling malware and an HTTP backdoor and was part of infrastructure used to deliver LockBit Black and Warlock/x2anylock ransomware. Our search for cases where the IOCs reported by Microsoft, revealed two incidents in which LockBit Black and WarLock ransomware variants were deployed together, in addition to multiple other tools, mostly open-source. In April 2025, a RAR archive named Evidencia.rar was uploaded to VirusTotal. The archive contains several artifacts likely extracted from compromised machines in a Storm-2603 case in a LATAM country. The artifacts in the archive provide a look at some of the open-source tools used by the actors in the intrusions which correlates with previous knowledge of the group: WinPcap – Captures and filters network traffic on Windows. PsExec – Executes commands on remote Windows systems. SharpHostInfo – Collects host and domain info on Windows environments. nxc – Exploits common vulnerabilities in network services. In addition to the open-source tools, the archive also contains the custom backdoor used by the group, as well as its unique ransomware payloads. dnsclient.exe – A custom backdoor utilized by Storm-2603 that communicates over DNS tunneling with update.updatemicfosoft[.]com, a domain associated with the group. See the next section for our analysis of the backdoor. 7z.exe & 7z.dll – Legitimate 7z executable side-loading malicious 7z.dll delivering X2anylock (aka Warlock), a ransomware used by Storm-2603. bbb.msi – An installer which uses clink_x86.exe to side-load clink_dll_x86.dll, leading to the execution of LockBit Black ransomware. Another MSI file uploaded to VirusTotal in April used a similar deployment method, starting with the MSI installer to launch multiple ransomware strains simultaneously: Figure 2 – MSI Multi-Ransomware Deployment. The MSI relies on the following files: MpCmdRun.exe & Mpclient.dll – Warlock Ransomware, deployed via DLL-hijacking. clink_x86.exe & clink_dll_x86.dll – LockBit Black ransomware, deployed via DLL-hijacking. z.exe & z.dll – x2anylock ransomware, deployed via DLL-hijacking. VMToolsEng.exe – Custom Antivirus Terminator. ServiceMouse.sys – Vulnerable driver used by VMToolsEng.exe for killing Antivirus processes. log.exe – A list of Antivirus processes to kill. msi.bat – Executes VMToolsEng.exe. 1.bat – Executes all the needed executables and the MSI. We attributed two custom backdoors to Storm-2306, both of which appear to be part of the framework named AK47 C2 based on the shared PDB path: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\work\tools\ak47c2\. When executed, the program immediately hides its console window, determines the host computer name (defaulting to unknown.local if that fails), and builds a DNS‑based command‑and‑control payload. It chooses a random five-character session ID, such as H4T14, and prefixes it with 1 for task requests or 2 for result uploads (e.g., 1H4T14 or 2H4T14). Each element, such as the task/result tag, a size flag (a for “all” when the entire message fits into one request), and the computer name, is XOR‑encoded with the ASCII key “VHBD@H”, converted to hexadecimal, and concatenated with dots before being prepended to the C2 domain update.micfosoft[.]com. This what the overall query looks like: DNS TXT and MG (a mail group member record type) record lookups (DnsQuery_A) are used to transmit and retrieve data. If the C2 server is unreachable, the client simply receives error 9003 (DNS_ERROR_RCODE_NAME_ERROR). Otherwise, the response text is decoded from hex, XOR‑decrypted, and parsed for the delimiter “:::”, which separates metadata from the actual command string. Commands run under cmd.exe /c 2>&1; a built‑in directive sleep n pauses execution for n seconds. For outputs larger than 0xFF bytes, the backdoor fragments data into 63‑byte sub‑segments. Each DNS query then follows: HttpClient backdoor has the pdb path C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\work\tools\ak47c2\httpclient-cpp\x64\Release\httpclient-cpp.pdb and uses plain HTTP instead of DNS for the C2. It is built as a 64‑bit console program that also immediately hides its window on launch. On start‑up, the malware gathers the host computer name (similar to the DNS version, it defaults to unknown.local), then builds a JSON object with the fields cmd, cmd_id, fqdn, result, and type. For a task request, the object looks like this: {"cmd":"","cmd_id":"","fqdn":" ","result":"","type":"task"} After the host executes a command, the result is sent back with type:”result”. Before transmission, the entire JSON blob is XOR‑encrypted with the ASCII key “VHBD@H”, converted to hexadecimal, and placed in the body of an HTTP POST to “/” with generic headers (Content‑Type: text/plain, Accept: */*). The C2 replies with a similarly encoded JSON where the cmd field contains the next command. The implant executes it via cmd.exe /c 2>&1 and returns the output. We identified that during these attacks, several types of ransomware were deployed simultaneously. One is regular LockBit Black, and the second uses the.x2anylock extension. This extension was later used by the Warlock ransomware operator, mentioned in Microsoft’s report on the SharePoint exploitation. The Warlock ransom note is usually saved as How to decrypt my data.txt and looks like this: Figure 3 – Warlock Group ransom note. The ransom notes for all ransomware strains deployed by Storm-2603 are named How to decrypt my data.log (x2anylock) or .README.txt (LockBit Black) and have the same short content: Your decrypt ID: [redacted] Tox ID Support: 3DCE[redacted] Email Support: [redacted]@proton.me,[redacted]@proton.me,[redacted]@proton.me You can contact us in email or qtox. This ransom note’s name How to decrypt my data.log appeared in a recent LinkedIn post by Huntress, describing the case where multiple ransomware families were deployed together against the same target. While not a new tactic, this approach is rarely observed among established ransomware groups. An important part of the infection package described earlier is called Antivirus Terminator. It is a custom command line tool abusing a third-party signed legitimate driver to kill processes. From what we can see, it’s been in the wild since at least late 2024. The tool requires administrative privileges on the infected machine. The screenshot below shows how the listing is displayed in the console when the tool is run without parameters: Figure 4 – Antivirus Terminator supported arguments when run without parameters. The tool first creates a service called ServiceMouse, where the path to the service binary file is ServiceMouse.sys from the package. Next, the tool communicates with the installed service via IO control code 0x99000050, which is responsible for killing processes. The tool also has more capabilities, like deleting files and uninstalling drivers, and these use different IO control codes (0x990000D0 and 0x990001D0). Figure 6 – Antivirus Terminator kills process using third-party driver. The supplied third-party driver is a legitimate and signed component of Antiy System In-Depth Analysis Toolkit, originally named AToolsKrnl64.sys. The toolkit was developed by Antiy Labs, a Chinese security vendor, and features a graphical user interface that allows users, among others, to interact with and manipulate processes. The ability to kill processes is the most important feature which is abused by threat actors in this particular case. Figure 7 – Antiy System In-Depth Analysis Tookit GUI. The following piece of code in the driver handles the IO control code 0x99000050 mentioned above: Figure 8 – IO control code processing in the Antiy driver. The second function is the piece of code responsible for killing a process with a given PID. In this report we analyze Storm-2603, a relatively new threat actor first mentioned by Microsoft during investigations into the “ToolShell” campaign targeting SharePoint servers. While some of the exploitation activity was tied to known Chinese APT groups, Storm-2603 stood out as a previously undocumented group linked to ransomware deployment. By examining infrastructure indicators shared in public reporting, we were able to connect this actor to earlier campaigns involving LockBit Black and Warlock/X2anylock ransomware, dating back to at least March 2025. These earlier attacks used similar infrastructure and tools, including DNS tunneling and HTTP-based backdoors. Interestingly, multiple ransomware variants were deployed in the same attack. This behavior, along with the overlap in techniques, helps us better understand how Storm-2603 operates “The Turkish Rat” Evolved Adwind in a Massive Ongoing Phishing Campaign Check Point Research Publications August 11, 2017 “The Next WannaCry” Vulnerability is Here Check Point Research Publications March 12, 2026 “Handala Hack” – Unveiling Group’s Modus Operandi SUBSCRIBE TO CYBER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS We value your privacy! BFSI uses cookies on this site. We use cookies to enable faster and easier experience for you. By continuing to visit this website you agree to our use of cookies.
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Aug 1, 2025