ipapi[.]co

Over the past year, our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) has investigated several incidents involving the NightEagle group (APT-Q-95). This group has been active since at least 2023 and originally focused on organizations in Asia. We have now identified attacks by the group targeting businesses in Russia. This post examines both known and new tools NightEagle used in its latest campaign. Initial access In most incidents, the attackers used compromised valid credentials to gain access to corporate VPNs. VPN connections originated from IP addresses in the Russian segment linked to Cloudflare WARP tunnels, as well as from IP addresses associated with European virtual infrastructure providers. GhostContainer on Microsoft Exchange Both during the initial access stage and as the attack progressed, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It incorporates components from several open-source projects, including the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, an exploit for the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability, and the GhostWebShell class from the ysoserial utility. All of these components are publicly available on GitHub. We were unable to determine the exact method the attackers used to deliver the backdoor to Microsoft Exchange servers. We believe with a high degree of confidence that they applied a technique already familiar to us : extracting the cryptographic keys used by Microsoft Exchange from the ASP.NET configuration, overwriting the VIEWSTATE framework parameter, and injecting a payload into it, which then launched the GhostContainer backdoor in memory. The backdoor is a .NET assembly containing three classes that implement its core functionality: Stub : processes C2 commands delivered to the infected system through the x-owa-urlpostdata headers and evades detection by the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Windows Event Log mechanisms by overwriting addresses in amsi.dll and ntdll.dll . App_Web_843e75cf5b63 : accepts the fakePath and fakePageName parameters and creates virtual paths that redirect requests to the App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 class. App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 : implements network traffic redirection (proxying) and socket forwarding functionality. Kaspersky products detect the GhostContainer backdoor as Trojan.MSIL.GhostContainer.gen. GhostContainer samples identified by the Similarity technology from Kaspersky Threat Analysis Traffic redirection Once the attackers gain sufficient privileges during an attack, they leverage RDP to move laterally within the internal network segment. To do this, they download and run tools for tunneling and redirecting network traffic. The attackers used GitHub repositories to host their archived tools. The names of the repositories and archives were disguised to look legitimate: https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/js-webpack.zip https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/jsonp-pack.zip https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack/releases/download/main/resource-pack.zip One of the repositories used for storing network tools The files contained within the archives were also given names mimicking known legitimate software, though unrelated to the archive names: adobe_32.exe ; AdobeSync.exe ; trueconf.exe ; 1cbroker.exe ; 1c-office-plugin.exe ; trueconf-broker.exe . Across the incidents we investigated, we found two tools that the attackers combined for traffic tunneling. Microsoft dev tunnels This is a legitimate Microsoft mechanism that allows local web services to be published for internet access on *.*.devtunnels.ms domains. The attackers used this tunneling capability to expose port 3389 (RDP) on the compromised system. Execution graph of adobe_32.exe in Kaspersky Research Sandbox rdp2tcp This is a publicly available tool for tunneling TCP traffic over an established RDP connection. It includes a server component that runs on the target system and a client component that runs on the attacker’s side. When virtual channels are opened and closed, corresponding events with IDs 132 (channel opened) and 148 (channel closed) are logged in the Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational.evtx Windows log. These events contain the names of the channels (such as XPSRD, cliprdr, Microsoft::Windows::RDS::DisplayControl, and others) used by the RemoteFX module, which extends the capabilities of the RDP protocol. When the rdp2tcp tool is used, events with IDs 132 and 148 will contain the channel name rdp2tcp or other random alphanumeric combinations chosen by the attackers. Creation event for a channel named rdp2tcp (server component startup) The combination of Microsoft dev tunnels and rdp2tcp allows the attackers to maintain network access by using legitimate services without opening additional suspicious ports. The attackers also used the atexec utility from the Impacket toolkit to create scheduled tasks on target systems. These tasks enabled network port forwarding through standard Windows functionality: netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=443 connectaddress=10.0.12.101 connectport=445 Lateral movement To obtain elevated privileges and move laterally through the network, NightEagle exploited various vulnerabilities in Active Directory. The attackers used previously established tunnels to connect to internal infrastructure systems. In one incident, they exploited a well-known RDP implementation vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep). They used the vulnerable mechanism to create a local account on the system and add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups. Contents of a system memory dump showing artifacts of the CVE-2019-0708 exploit The attackers also requested Kerberos tickets with a non-standard combination of flags ( Forwardable , Proxiable , Renewable ) and attempted to replicate the Domain-Password object from the Active Directory database to impersonate the domain controller (a technique known as DCSync) after obtaining an account with sufficient privileges. Through these methods, the attackers establish persistence in the infrastructure, obtain password hashes for domain accounts, use long-lived Kerberos tickets to gain legitimate access to target resources, and ultimately compromise domain controllers and the victim’s entire Active Directory infrastructure. Takeaways To expand the geographic scope of its targets, NightEagle is updating its methods and adopting new techniques for persistence and lateral movement. Despite the group’s efforts to stay hidden, timely detection of anomalies combined with a comprehensive approach to infrastructure protection can significantly hinder the attackers from achieving their goals. Since the attackers rely on known legitimate tools and infrastructure vulnerabilities, well-configured monitoring can help detect NightEagle’s presence on the network. Detection by Kaspersky solutions Kaspersky solutions reliably identify the malicious activity described above at various stages of the attack. We showed examples above of how Kaspersky Threat Analysis detects samples of the GhostContainer backdoor and the tunneling utility. This toolkit also includes the analytical solution Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE), which helps SOC analysts and incident responders determine which APT groups malware can be attributed to. The solution uses a proprietary comparison method that measures the similarity between analyzed samples of suspicious files and known malicious samples in Kaspersky’s collection. The backdoor we discovered showed similarity to previously analyzed GhostContainer samples and a connection to the NightEagle APT group: Backdoor analysis with KTAE However, detection scenarios for this kind of attacks are not limited to file analysis. Deploying a backdoor on a target host produces numerous characteristic artifacts, which allow Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert to alert users to anomalies in the infrastructure in a timely manner. This malicious activity is detected by the following rules, available in the repository: Initial detection of the malicious signature occurs through the generic_ransomware_related_detection rule, based on EPP module events Detection of a malicious DLL’s .NET assembly being loaded via PowerShell: suspicious_assembly_loading_into_powershell_via_reflection Activity of tunneling and traffic redirection tools: detection_of_access_to_tunnel_domains_dns Use of tools from the Impacket toolkit, such as atexec: impacket_possible_activity attempt_to_download_hacktool_or_risktool_by_non_browser credentials_dumping_tools_file_artifacts_creation Attempts to replicate an Active Directory database object to impersonate a domain controller: potential_dcsync_via_startupparameters Process tree in KEDR Expert Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) detects this malicious activity in network traffic. For example, the Exploit.CVE-2019-0708.TCP.C&C signature allows detecting attempts to exploit the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability. Alert card for the BlueKeep vulnerability exploitation Beyond this activity, KATA also detects other NightEagle actions in network traffic, such as the following: Traffic redirection and tunneling variations Attacks on Active Directory (DCSync, attempts to compromise AD CS, and others) Lateral movement across the network Indicators of compromise 1dcafb7f8448683281106b06dd22409a AdobeSync.exe 1f3034b706c78b35d8e34044e68c693a adobe_32.exe 3ecd1cd627d0340c92901a478a7caad8 631fb131a56caf4ca0f287ed73e876ab App_Web_Container_1.dll 4aa9fb1bf9223dfcdac920759bc7a3c7 1c-office-plugin.exe, 1cbroker.exe, trueconf.exe https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack

In our previous analysis of the malicious RenPy campaigns, we identified a multi-stage loader deployed as part of the infection chain. Further threat hunting has since shown that the same loader, which we track as PavinLoader , is being used across several different campaigns, including ClickFix attacks and fake software downloads.  Despite differences in how these campaigns reach victims, we found several common elements. These include multi-stage infection chains involving heavily obfuscated and trojanized .NET DLLs; abuse of MSBuild, .csproj , and .bat files to execute them; and EtherHiding to retrieve the command-and-control (C2) domain.  What an attack looks like The campaigns don’t all start the same way. A victim might encounter a fake CAPTCHA that tells them to run a command, download what appears to be legitimate software, or install a malicious game. What happens next is much more consistent. PavinLoader uses legitimate Windows tools alongside malicious .NET files to run several stages of malware. It also uses EtherHiding, a technique that uses a blockchain to hide information about its infrastructure, to find the server from which it should retrieve additional malware. In the RenPy campaign we analyzed, that process ultimately led to Amatera Stealer , malware designed to steal information from an infected computer. We also observed PavinLoader infections delivering additional malware. PavinLoader appears across multiple campaigns We have identified PavinLoader in several campaign clusters:  Malicious RenPy campaigns, as analyzed in our earlier blog post Several ClickFix campaigns, including recent activity from the operator(s) covered in our previous analysis Fake software campaigns that used Dropbox to download PavinLoader.  The loader’s use across multiple campaigns raises the possibility that PavinLoader is offered as a Loader-as-a-Service. We also found several artifacts that support this possibility, although they are not enough to confirm it. One specific artifact on VirusTotal is shared by more than 200 files associated with PavinLoader, suggesting it may be a compilation artifact of the build process. We also found a PowerShell script uploaded to VirusTotal containing comments such as EDIT HERE and REPLACE with a real direct link to your .bat . The associated BAT file contains the string Automated builder helper . However, we haven’t found a build panel or sales channels that would confirm PavinLoader is being offered commercially. The PowerShell script . Click to enlarge Part of the BAT file . Click to enlarge   Although PavinLoader has changed over time, the campaigns we analyzed share several characteristics: Inno Setup or MSI installers generated with different builders that run the .bat and/or .csproj files Trojanized .NET DLLs, including DotNetZip, Nancy, Renci.SshNet, and OpenXML. In most of the cases analyzed, the inserted malicious methods follow a TwoWords or TwoWordsNumber naming pattern, such as DefaultEvaluator5 , and FallbackFactory5 A common obfuscation technique used across the .NET DLLs A naming convention based on two random words, such as  GollopDevest , UnbrandRunover , and PavinWide , for DLL names, functions, strings, C2 paths, and other artifacts EtherHiding to obtain the C2 domain, followed by HTTP requests using paths such as assets/{two random words}.json to retrieve subsequent stages. C2 domains commonly use the .lat , .icu , .shop , and .cfd top-level domains MSBuild mechanisms for loading and executing code from DLLs, including property functions such as [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load(...) and UsingTask Recurring filename patterns such as name_4characters.cmd/bat/msi/exe —for example, prefetch_9a59.cmd , telemetry_55db.cmd , and bootstrap_64be.cmd —or random nine-character names such as aegZpQ4C7.bat . We also observed short names including Small.msi , small.bat , and small.cmd PavinLoader consists of several .NET DLLs, and in the cases analyzed we identified the following stages:  Loader DLL : A trojanized DLL—such as the Nancy one analyzed in our previous RenPy article—or a custom DLL. It performs anti-forensics and anti-analysis operations, changes network settings needed for the next operations, and loads the EtherHiding Loader EtherHiding Loader DLL : Obtains the C2 through EtherHiding and downloads the next stages from it  Anti-Analysis DLL : Performs extensive anti-analysis checks to detect virtualized environments.  PE Loader DLL : Loads the final PE payload. Intermediate payloads can vary depending on the campaign configuration. First, we’ll look at some of the methods used to distribute the initial PavinLoader stages. We’ll then return to the RenPy loader campaign we analyzed in our previous article to examine the loader’s later stages.  Technical analysis The rest of this article takes a closer look at how PavinLoader is distributed and how each stage of the loader works. How PavinLoader is delivered We have observed PavinLoader being delivered through several ClickFix campaigns. In particular, we detected that the ClickFix cluster analyzed in a previous article has recently started using PavinLoader. Abuse of MSBuild and the use of .csproj and .bat files remain common across the infection chains we observed. We covered one example in our previous RenPy analysis. Here, we’ll look at several other distribution methods.  The ClickFix Cloudflare page associated with this campaign . Click to enlarge   As we saw in our previous analysis of these ClickFix campaigns, the associated PowerShell scripts change frequently. We found several versions in this activity, including both obfuscated and unobfuscated scripts. The PowerShell script associated with the ClickFix campaign. Click to enlarge In this example, the downloaded MSI from the Cloudflare bucket is called Installer_57be78.msi.  MSI content . Click to enlarge The package contains: prefetch_2f76.exe : The legitimate MSBuild executable prefetch_2f76.csproj : Used to execute the Loader DLL through UsingTask DotNetZip.dll : The Loader DLL The .csproj file is executed with: "C:\Users\{USER}\AppData\Local\Logitech\Device Configuration Helper\prefetch_2f76.exe" /nologo "C:\Users\{USER}\AppData\Local\Logitech\Device Configuration Helper\prefetch_2f76.csproj" /nr:false The Loader DLL is a trojanized version of DotNetZip and is executed using the UsingTask element. “UsingTask” used to execute the DLL . Click to enlarge The malicious method inserted in the trojanized DLL. Click to enlarge.  Unlike the RenPy example discussed in our previous article, the EtherHiding Loader is extracted from the DLL itself. An embedded resource is used as an index to extract bytes directly from the DLL, rather than obtaining those indexes from the .csproj file. We detected another campaign that uses BAT files containing fake BUILD VERIFICATION REPORT comments, apparently intended to make analysis and detection more difficult. In this case, the MSI CustomAction executes the BAT script with: cmd.exe /c C:\Users\{USER}\AppData\Local\Conexant\lite_bootstrap_2.1.7\updater_8219.cmd /launched Fake comments inserted in the updater_8219.cmd . Click to enlarge The obfuscated code appears below the fake comments. It concatenates multiple strings and uses indices generated through simple mathematical operations to reconstruct them. We found this type of obfuscation in most of the BAT files we analyzed. The obfuscated part of the .cmd file . Click to enlarge The BAT file locates conhost.exe and relaunches itself with: "C:\WINDOWS\System32\conhost.exe" --headless cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\{USER}\AppData\Local\Conexant\lite_bootstrap_2.1.7\updater_8219.cmd" /launched It then sets the MSBUILDENABLEALLPROPERTYFUNCTIONS=1 environment variable, locates MSBuild.exe , and executes it using the same file as input: "C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe" "C:\Users\{USER}\AppData\Local\Conexant\lite_bootstrap_2.1.7\updater_8219.cmd" In this case, the Loader DLL is reconstructed by concatenating and decoding four Base64-encoded variables. Part of the CMD file showing the loading process. Click to enlarge The Loader DLL has a random name and appears to be an older version because it does not contain the custom bytecode and encrypted strings in its resources. As in the RenPy campaign analyzed previously, this stage retrieves the EtherHiding Loader stored between a Build-... marker in the CMD file through the _vezr environment variable, then decodes it using XOR with a 32-byte key. The extracted Loader DLL. Click to enlarge Having looked at several methods used to distribute PavinLoader’s first two stages, we will now return to the RenPy infection chain from our previous analysis and examine the loader itself in more detail. Analyzing PavinLoader The .NET DLLs associated with PavinLoader are heavily obfuscated using control-flow flattening, custom bytecode, indirect calls through calli / ldftn , string encryption with different algorithms, API hashing and delegates, redundant methods, and junk code and strings. We did not identify a known obfuscator associated with the samples, so to the best of our knowledge, PavinLoader uses a custom obfuscator. Because fully deobfuscating the samples would be complex, we used a hybrid approach combining dynamic analysis with method invocation through reflection. We identified important methods based on their imports and parameters, invoked them, and analyzed the resulting output. This approach does not provide complete coverage of the execution flow, but it allowed us to identify the loader’s core functionality and extract its intermediate stages. Because different functions frequently share the same names, we use metadata tokens to identify methods throughout the analysis. Nancy trojanized DLL: Loader DLL  We covered this stage in detail in our previous blog post, so we’ll provide only an overview here. In most of the cases analyzed, the Loader DLL is a trojanized legitimate DLL. The malicious method typically uses a {RandomWord} or {RandomWord_Number} naming convention. The DLL contains a resource associated with the custom bytecode interpreted by the main method, two resources containing encrypted strings, and, in some cases, additional resources used as an index for extracting the next stage. Other resources appear to be decoys designed to slow analysis. In the samples we analyzed, this DLL typically: Decrypts strings from resources using multi-key XOR Resolves APIs using API hashing and GetDelegateForFunctionPointer() Changes network settings, including disabling TLS certificate validation and setting the default system proxy Performs an anti-analysis timing check using CreateEventW() , GetTickCount() , and WaitForSingleObject() Performs anti-forensics operations Loads the EtherHiding Loader either by extracting it from a marker inside .csproj or BAT files, or by using a resource as an index to retrieve bytes directly from the DLL GollopDevest: EtherHiding Loader  The EtherHiding Loader has two main functions: obtaining the C2 domain through EtherHiding, and downloading and loading subsequent stages from that C2. Class 0x02000762 is responsible for decrypting strings associated with blockchain and network communication. The strings are decrypted by 0x060027BD as follows:  Function 0x060027BB initializes the S-box using the XOR of the master key activeValues and the Base64-decoded optionsCollection string Function 0x060027BE takes childSyncObject as input and returns index bytes using XOR and permutations based on header values encoded in the first two characters of the string Function 0x060027B9 returns the decrypted string using the indexes and the previously generated S-box This was the only class we found with encryption parameters encoded in this format. For the remaining strings, we identified functions that returned decrypted data based on their parameter signatures—for example, methods returning strings or bytes—and invoked them through reflection. This allowed us to recover more than 1,300 strings. Part of the decrypted strings . Click to enlarge   Among them were strings associated with AMSI and ETW patching: AmsiScanString System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils+AmsiNativeMethods ntdll EtwEventWrite NtQueryInformationProcess NtSetInformationThread VirtualProtect More than 100 URLs belonging to legitimate services are also decrypted and used to generate HTTP requests and network noise. We did not observe this behavior in every sample, suggesting it may be build-specific. The Server class ( 0x02000052 ) generates the X-Timestamp , X-Nonce , and X-Signature HTTP headers and makes requests used to retrieve subsequent stages. Two HTTP requests are made to synchronize parameters and obtain the payload, with HMAC used to validate the requests. Using reflection, we executed method 0x06000A77 to obtain the header values needed to retrieve the subsequent stages. The C2 domain is obtained by making an ETH RPC (Remote Procedure Call) to bsc-dataseed.binance.org with the following JSON-RPC body: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":" 0x328a1fadff154290f0ce1389a4e633698cdfdaa7 ","data":"0x06fdde03"},"latest"],"id":1783436775}  The next stages are downloaded from the resulting C2 domain. The XOR-encoded payload is stored in the JSON response under cache.content : {"type":"cache-binary","meta":{"version":"2.3.1","timestamp":"…","platform":"win32-x64"},"cache":{"id":"e2b69…"," content ":" 1c.. "}}  In this case, the C2 paths and XOR keys decrypted from this stage and the anti-analysis DLL are: Path   XOR key   Type/Function   /assets/ExponeAboard.json  QBBBfWow4lb  PavinWride .NET DLL, Anti-analysis   /assets/MailersKogasin.json  WjcsVTKmuoBRqe  GollopDevest .NET DLL, PE Loader  /assets/LanoseThrip.json  WwUX66Br  WPA.exe PE executable, Amatera Stealer  The next stage executed is the anti-analysis DLL.  PavinWride: Anti-analysis DLL  This DLL is responsible for performing several anti-analysis checks.  The anti-analysis DLL executes system calls in different ways:  Standard .NET Base Class Library (BCL) calls, including for registry and network operations Win32 P/Invoke calls, including GetCurrentThread , NtQueryInformationThread , NtQueryInformationProcess , and NtCurrentTeb Win32 APIs resolved through API hashing and a Process Environment Block (PEB) export table walk The function MenuItemService . ProcessDirectory ( 0x06000151 ) is the main method responsible for delegate caching and Win32 API resolution:   It checks if the delegate is already resolved using managerMap.TryGetValue()  If not, it calls ProcessDirectory (0x06000150) to obtain the HMODULE handle It calls ProcessDirectory (0x0600003A) that performs the PE export table walk and matches the hash. We detected that the same hashing output is obtained in several other methods (e.g., 0x06000039 , 0x0600003B , 0x0600004E ) It obtains the delegate with GetDelegateForFunctionPointer() and saves it in the dictionary Results of the API hashing script . Click to enlarge   We used the same reflection approach to get the strings.  Many strings are encrypted with the XOR key 4B729A1F5CE387D6 .  Part of decrypted strings. Click to enlarge   The loader obtains the system’s LCID using GetKeyboardLayoutList() and compares it against more than 17 languages, including Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Armenian. It also performs extensive system reconnaissance, including enumerating registry keys and calling Win32 APIs such as GetSystemFirmwareTable() and EnumSystemFirmwareTables() to identify virtualized environments. Category   Value   PCI vendor / device IDs   VEN_80EE , VEN_15AD , VEN_1AB8 , VEN_5853 , VEN_1AF4 , VEN_1234&DEV_111 , … SMBIOS/ACPI OEM IDs   VMWARE , VBOX , BOCHS , VRTUAL , MSFTVM , MSHYPR , Xen , Parall , BHYVE , AMAZON , Google ACPI table signatures   VBOX , BXPC , VMW , Xen , PRLS , AMZN , MICR BIOS/manufacturer/product strings   vmware , vmw , innotek , virtualbox , vbox , qemu , seabios , bochs , standard pc , kvm virtual machine , xen , hvm domu , parallels Strings associated with anti-analysis checks Part of the registry key enumeration . Click to enlarge We also observed decrypted references to APIs including GetCurrentProcess() , CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() , Process32First() , Process32Next() , and OpenMutex() , although we did not observe these functions being called during our execution flow. An HTTP request is also made to one of these services:  https://ipv4[.]ipleak[.]net/json/ https://get[.]geojs[.]io/v1/ip/geo[.]json https://ipapi[.]co/json/ https://api[.]ipapi[.]is/ https://ipinfo[.]io/json It also checks the returned data against 96 hosting or infrastructure providers and tests whether the region code is one of: RU , UA , BY , AM , KZ , KG , TJ , UZ , GE , AZ , or MD . Decrypted strings associated with providers . Click to enlarge If the anti-analysis checks pass, the next two stages are downloaded and decrypted using XOR keys. We patched SelectionScope.ProcessDirectory ( 0x06000014 ) to recover the C2 paths and XOR keys for those stages: /assets/MailersKogasin.json|WjcsVTKmuoBRqe|/assets/LanoseThrip.json|WwUX66Br GollopDevest: PE Loader DLL and Amatera Stealer The third DLL has the same name as the second, GollopDevest , but performs PE loading. Among its decrypted strings are: 'GollopMailers LDR DllBase VeneryCondole EdiyaFoully=0x{0:X} EdiyaStelae=0x{1:X}' 'GollopMailers LDR Flags missing IMAGE_DLL 0x{0:X8}' 'GollopMailers LDR SaranPisco invalid 0x{0:X}' 'GollopMailers LDR TlsIndex invalid {0}' 'GollopMailers LDR sanity exception: ' 'HIGHLOW relocation' 'Import DLL name' 'Import FunctusAurata' 'Import INT' 'Import descriptor' 'Import hint/name' 'Import thunk' 'LdrpHandleTlsData outside ntdll .text' 'LdrpReleaseTlsEntry outside ntdll .text' 'LoadConfig32' 'OK' 'PE headers' 'Required API resolve failed: type={0}, FreshBubals={1}, module=0x{2:X}' 'TLS32' 'TLS64' 'x86 disabled until ABI proof' ntdll.dll kernel32.dll LdrpInitializeTls "STATUS_SUCCESS" UNKNOWN(0x00000001) UNKNOWN(0x00000002) UNKNOWN(0x00000003) The ServerEditor.SortMemory method ( 0x06000014 ) checks the PE structure and flags before loading the payload. To confirm this behavior, we invoked the method through reflection using the downloaded WPA.exe file as input. The PE loaded successfully. The C++-compiled PE disguises itself as WPA.exe (Windows Performance Analyzer). We identified the payload as an obfuscated version of Amatera Stealer 4.2.3-alpha1 . It uses control-flow flattening, API hashing, anti-debugging checks, and opaque predicates to complicate analysis. We also detected use of the Heaven’s Gate technique, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolution through Google DNS, and raw sockets using \Device\Afd\Endpoint for network communication.  Part of the decrypted strings associated with Amatera . Click to enlarge After this stage executes, we also observed additional payloads being downloaded and run from C2 IP addresses. In some cases, WiX Burn bundles downloaded another payload associated with PavinLoader. In others, we detected HijackLoader. This gives the campaign operators the ability to deploy multiple payloads on a compromised machine. IOCs  SHA-256 hashes bdf313a019e025ebf58ccef4619444ee70e661bd444e0644ebeabd8f5caad14c  e3830f5747e3f46537d217124d80c9f3bb4d89f8d4f5138dce69ee54ea4fb6b9  a4f03272cf96732dc9f58bb466d16f358e7f50d46dba30526a9fbebfec11717b  bf04160dd1ce3571e0eb6d6dda1713c788797b5599399d4a93665a757eec376e  54fa8083c05334aa360256fbbb0ca901ce7e244a0359dd664cae78977371ec91  c1ea6d169565c70ac5d812e73483814929e9b3548ead6633595937e71a334adb  001337488c32d8610c2aef6f9330acca825f0afacd071bf6ebfc06b5a1a69f09  2837099af431e9afee76ce5e6ab5cb86bedce06e31c22be46250cb453cfdb978  252c5a3d150275013f52b4820097d7163ced4aa2f1be0fca032f8a5017673816  0c9c64b7383ec249bcf6271a4b73206d94de130ca401d16ab77fe01e5193a312  6700f62e1a3b33340cd678c388ecc8bac2e5943c0627df5d1b99b879c3ca42c9  IP addresses   93.152.224[.]75 : downloads PavinLoader  65.21.80[.]170 : downloads PavinLoader  195.63.142[.]49 : downloads PavinLoader  Domains   perfectverified[.]com : ClickFix  PavinLoader C2   catalyst-pro[.]lat  twigoamwu[.]cfd  trusaifi[.]cfd  stellar-minds[.]cfd  pinnacle-labs[.]lat  nexahub[.]lat  fimwoglea[.]shop  velodium[.]lat  rpcsecnoweb[.]pro  more-arpc[.]icu  echo-systems[.]cfd  kelemet[.]shop  zarwieciv[.]cfd  URLs   telegra[.]ph/Project-PySynth-06-28 : Amatera dead drop  Acknowledgements   Previous analysis of the loader: https://www.derp.ca/research/hellsuchecker-clickfix-etherhiding/#26-anti-sandbox-checks-and-a-nintendo-bypass (possible AI-generated content)  Possible related activity: https://cyberowi.pl/lumma-stealer-renpy-fitgirl-osmiowarstwowy-loader/   Possible related activity: https://medium.com/@djordje.brankovic/from-fake-captcha-to-in-memory-execution-unraveling-a-multi-stage-malware-chain-part-1-496c603f3641   Analysis of a forum user: https://forums.malwarebytes.com/topic/338102-solution-of-gollopdevestdll-renpy-loader-malware-from-malwarebytes-blog/   From reporting threats to removing them. 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