Search/api[.]ipify[.]org
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api[.]ipify[.]org

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DOMAIN
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News extraction
First seen
Oct 14, 2025
Last seen
Oct 30, 2026
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Iran-Linked Handala Hack Tied to HEAVYGRAM Telegram Backdoor That Can Steal Passwords
The Iran-linked "hacktivist" persona known as Handala Hack has been attributed to a Telegram-based surveillance backdoor called HEAVYGRAM and a Delphi-based utility known as CRUDEEXCLUDE. "HEAVYGRAM offers builtin commands supporting remote command execution, system, network and process information discovery, data and Telegram session files exfiltration, screenshot capture, DLL sideloading, file cleanup, and persistence via Windows autorun registry keys," Group-IB said. On the other hand, CRUDEEXCLUDE is a Delphi-based Windows utility employed to prepare environments for the deployment of subsequent stages such as HEAVYGRAM. First observed in late July 2024, the malware is often disguised as a legitimate application with a graphical user interface (GUI), and configures Microsoft Defender exclusion paths for defense evasion. The findings build upon an alert the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) first issued in March 2026 and again earlier this week, in which it accused Iranian cyber actors acting on behalf of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) of targeting Iranian dissidents, journalists opposed to Iran, and other opposition groups to conduct intelligence collection, leak data, and inflict reputational harm against targets of interest. It's worth noting the U.K. National Cyber Security Center is tracking the same malware family under the moniker CHOSEN BRICK, describing it as a flexible tool that can be used to "support a range of potential operational outcomes." The attacks typically involve the use of social engineering via messaging platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram to communicate with targets under the pretext of offering technical support or posing as trusted contacts, and then deliver malware dressed up as a seemingly harmless installer to trigger the infection. These applications masquerade as legitimate applications like Pictory, KeePass, and Telegram, and contain the second-stage implant. Handala Hack, which came into being shortly after the October 7, 2023, armed attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups targeting southern Israel, is assessed to be an online persona operated by Void Manticore (aka Banished Kitten, Red Sandstorm, and Storm-0842), a threat actor affiliated with Iran's MOIS. It has a history of conducting destructive wiping attacks and hack and leak operations. In an alert issued last September, the Canadian Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) called out the threat actor for targeting and doxxing five Iran International journalists, including one from the country, as part of a hack and leak operation. According to Group-IB, HEAVYGRAM was first detected in the wild in September 2023. Once launched, the malware prevents Defender from scanning the paths staging the malicious payloads and executes PowerShell code to set up persistence for the next-stage implant via the Windows Registry. A notable aspect of the Python-based malware is its use of Telegram for command-and-control (C2), allowing it to list running programs, take screenshots, capture web browser data, upload/download files, turn on the microphone, copy Telegram and WhatsApp data, steal saved passwords, download additional malware, and delete files. Incoming messages from the Telegram bot are parsed based on a prefix delimiter system - Prefix @@, to execute arbitrary system commands via os.popen Prefix **, to write the message body to C:\ProgramData\ur.txt Prefix ##, to enable a backdoor command suite that supports the following capabilities - - runexe - Start an arbitrary process on the host - whois - Retrieve the host's public IP address via api.ipify[.]org - runtro - Execute a secondary trojan payload - cht - Dynamically update the C2 Telegram bot token and operator user ID - regtro - Install the trojan payload into Windows autorun Registry keys - reg - Install the main malware executable into Windows autorun registry keys - dt - Exfiltrate Telegram Desktop application data "Attachments received through the Telegram bot are handled based on filename pattern matching," Group-IB said. "The persistent implant handles C2 communication via two functions: send_initial_message – transmits an initial connection beacon containing the full computer domain name of the compromised host, [and] send_health_msg – a background thread that sends a heartbeat message every 24 hours with the host’s domain name, confirming that the implant remains active." HEAVYGRAM has been found to be delivered through four methods: WSF/VBS scripts, VBScripts and HTML Application (HTA) files, executables with embedded archives, and CRUDEEXCLUDE containing embedded archives. CRUDEEXCLUDE was first documented by Google in December 2025 as being used to set up staging directories for housing HEAVYGRAM and another specified malware family named SHADEGENES while masquerading as legitimate applications like Pictory and Telegram. Further review of the Telegram infrastructure has revealed two main setups: one where C2 relies on a single Telegram bot and group, and another where one bot handles check-ins while a secondary bot manages logging and stage polling with a group. "The newly identified samples demonstrate a flexible, multi-stage infection chain in which operators combine tailored social engineering, application masquerading, defense evasion and persistent access to compromise targets of interest," Group-IB said. "The extensive use of Telegram across operations is particularly notable, providing operators with a natively encrypted command-and-control channel that has low setup, maintenance and rotation cost."
1 shared
Sep 18, 2026
NightEagle targets Russian companies
Over the past year, our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) has investigated several incidents involving the NightEagle group (APT-Q-95). This group has been active since at least 2023 and originally focused on organizations in Asia. We have now identified attacks by the group targeting businesses in Russia. This post examines both known and new tools NightEagle used in its latest campaign. Initial access In most incidents, the attackers used compromised valid credentials to gain access to corporate VPNs. VPN connections originated from IP addresses in the Russian segment linked to Cloudflare WARP tunnels, as well as from IP addresses associated with European virtual infrastructure providers. GhostContainer on Microsoft Exchange Both during the initial access stage and as the attack progressed, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It incorporates components from several open-source projects, including the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, an exploit for the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability, and the GhostWebShell class from the ysoserial utility. All of these components are publicly available on GitHub. We were unable to determine the exact method the attackers used to deliver the backdoor to Microsoft Exchange servers. We believe with a high degree of confidence that they applied a technique already familiar to us : extracting the cryptographic keys used by Microsoft Exchange from the ASP.NET configuration, overwriting the VIEWSTATE framework parameter, and injecting a payload into it, which then launched the GhostContainer backdoor in memory. The backdoor is a .NET assembly containing three classes that implement its core functionality: Stub : processes C2 commands delivered to the infected system through the x-owa-urlpostdata headers and evades detection by the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Windows Event Log mechanisms by overwriting addresses in amsi.dll and ntdll.dll . App_Web_843e75cf5b63 : accepts the fakePath and fakePageName parameters and creates virtual paths that redirect requests to the App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 class. App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 : implements network traffic redirection (proxying) and socket forwarding functionality. Kaspersky products detect the GhostContainer backdoor as Trojan.MSIL.GhostContainer.gen. GhostContainer samples identified by the Similarity technology from Kaspersky Threat Analysis Traffic redirection Once the attackers gain sufficient privileges during an attack, they leverage RDP to move laterally within the internal network segment. To do this, they download and run tools for tunneling and redirecting network traffic. The attackers used GitHub repositories to host their archived tools. The names of the repositories and archives were disguised to look legitimate: https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/js-webpack.zip https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/jsonp-pack.zip https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack/releases/download/main/resource-pack.zip One of the repositories used for storing network tools The files contained within the archives were also given names mimicking known legitimate software, though unrelated to the archive names: adobe_32.exe ; AdobeSync.exe ; trueconf.exe ; 1cbroker.exe ; 1c-office-plugin.exe ; trueconf-broker.exe . Across the incidents we investigated, we found two tools that the attackers combined for traffic tunneling. Microsoft dev tunnels This is a legitimate Microsoft mechanism that allows local web services to be published for internet access on *.*.devtunnels.ms domains. The attackers used this tunneling capability to expose port 3389 (RDP) on the compromised system. Execution graph of adobe_32.exe in Kaspersky Research Sandbox rdp2tcp This is a publicly available tool for tunneling TCP traffic over an established RDP connection. It includes a server component that runs on the target system and a client component that runs on the attacker’s side. When virtual channels are opened and closed, corresponding events with IDs 132 (channel opened) and 148 (channel closed) are logged in the Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational.evtx Windows log. These events contain the names of the channels (such as XPSRD, cliprdr, Microsoft::Windows::RDS::DisplayControl, and others) used by the RemoteFX module, which extends the capabilities of the RDP protocol. When the rdp2tcp tool is used, events with IDs 132 and 148 will contain the channel name rdp2tcp or other random alphanumeric combinations chosen by the attackers. Creation event for a channel named rdp2tcp (server component startup) The combination of Microsoft dev tunnels and rdp2tcp allows the attackers to maintain network access by using legitimate services without opening additional suspicious ports. The attackers also used the atexec utility from the Impacket toolkit to create scheduled tasks on target systems. These tasks enabled network port forwarding through standard Windows functionality: netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=443 connectaddress=10.0.12.101 connectport=445 Lateral movement To obtain elevated privileges and move laterally through the network, NightEagle exploited various vulnerabilities in Active Directory. The attackers used previously established tunnels to connect to internal infrastructure systems. In one incident, they exploited a well-known RDP implementation vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep). They used the vulnerable mechanism to create a local account on the system and add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups. Contents of a system memory dump showing artifacts of the CVE-2019-0708 exploit The attackers also requested Kerberos tickets with a non-standard combination of flags ( Forwardable , Proxiable , Renewable ) and attempted to replicate the Domain-Password object from the Active Directory database to impersonate the domain controller (a technique known as DCSync) after obtaining an account with sufficient privileges. Through these methods, the attackers establish persistence in the infrastructure, obtain password hashes for domain accounts, use long-lived Kerberos tickets to gain legitimate access to target resources, and ultimately compromise domain controllers and the victim’s entire Active Directory infrastructure. Takeaways To expand the geographic scope of its targets, NightEagle is updating its methods and adopting new techniques for persistence and lateral movement. Despite the group’s efforts to stay hidden, timely detection of anomalies combined with a comprehensive approach to infrastructure protection can significantly hinder the attackers from achieving their goals. Since the attackers rely on known legitimate tools and infrastructure vulnerabilities, well-configured monitoring can help detect NightEagle’s presence on the network. Detection by Kaspersky solutions Kaspersky solutions reliably identify the malicious activity described above at various stages of the attack. We showed examples above of how Kaspersky Threat Analysis detects samples of the GhostContainer backdoor and the tunneling utility. This toolkit also includes the analytical solution Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE), which helps SOC analysts and incident responders determine which APT groups malware can be attributed to. The solution uses a proprietary comparison method that measures the similarity between analyzed samples of suspicious files and known malicious samples in Kaspersky’s collection. The backdoor we discovered showed similarity to previously analyzed GhostContainer samples and a connection to the NightEagle APT group: Backdoor analysis with KTAE However, detection scenarios for this kind of attacks are not limited to file analysis. Deploying a backdoor on a target host produces numerous characteristic artifacts, which allow Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert to alert users to anomalies in the infrastructure in a timely manner. This malicious activity is detected by the following rules, available in the repository: Initial detection of the malicious signature occurs through the generic_ransomware_related_detection rule, based on EPP module events Detection of a malicious DLL’s .NET assembly being loaded via PowerShell: suspicious_assembly_loading_into_powershell_via_reflection Activity of tunneling and traffic redirection tools: detection_of_access_to_tunnel_domains_dns Use of tools from the Impacket toolkit, such as atexec: impacket_possible_activity attempt_to_download_hacktool_or_risktool_by_non_browser credentials_dumping_tools_file_artifacts_creation Attempts to replicate an Active Directory database object to impersonate a domain controller: potential_dcsync_via_startupparameters Process tree in KEDR Expert Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) detects this malicious activity in network traffic. For example, the Exploit.CVE-2019-0708.TCP.C&C signature allows detecting attempts to exploit the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability. Alert card for the BlueKeep vulnerability exploitation Beyond this activity, KATA also detects other NightEagle actions in network traffic, such as the following: Traffic redirection and tunneling variations Attacks on Active Directory (DCSync, attempts to compromise AD CS, and others) Lateral movement across the network Indicators of compromise 1dcafb7f8448683281106b06dd22409a AdobeSync.exe 1f3034b706c78b35d8e34044e68c693a adobe_32.exe 3ecd1cd627d0340c92901a478a7caad8 631fb131a56caf4ca0f287ed73e876ab App_Web_Container_1.dll 4aa9fb1bf9223dfcdac920759bc7a3c7 1c-office-plugin.exe, 1cbroker.exe, trueconf.exe https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack
1 shared
Sep 17, 2026
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Iran-Linked Handala Hack Tied to HEAVYGRAM Telegram Backdoor That Can Steal Passwords
The Iran-linked "hacktivist" persona known as Handala Hack has been attributed to a Telegram-based surveillance backdoor called HEAVYGRAM and a Delphi-based utility known as CRUDEEXCLUDE. "HEAVYGRAM offers builtin commands supporting remote command execution, system, network and process information discovery, data and Telegram session files exfiltration, screenshot capture, DLL sideloading, file cleanup, and persistence via Windows autorun registry keys," Group-IB said. On the other hand, CRUDEEXCLUDE is a Delphi-based Windows utility employed to prepare environments for the deployment of subsequent stages such as HEAVYGRAM. First observed in late July 2024, the malware is often disguised as a legitimate application with a graphical user interface (GUI), and configures Microsoft Defender exclusion paths for defense evasion. The findings build upon an alert the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) first issued in March 2026 and again earlier this week, in which it accused Iranian cyber actors acting on behalf of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) of targeting Iranian dissidents, journalists opposed to Iran, and other opposition groups to conduct intelligence collection, leak data, and inflict reputational harm against targets of interest. It's worth noting the U.K. National Cyber Security Center is tracking the same malware family under the moniker CHOSEN BRICK, describing it as a flexible tool that can be used to "support a range of potential operational outcomes." The attacks typically involve the use of social engineering via messaging platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram to communicate with targets under the pretext of offering technical support or posing as trusted contacts, and then deliver malware dressed up as a seemingly harmless installer to trigger the infection. These applications masquerade as legitimate applications like Pictory, KeePass, and Telegram, and contain the second-stage implant. Handala Hack, which came into being shortly after the October 7, 2023, armed attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups targeting southern Israel, is assessed to be an online persona operated by Void Manticore (aka Banished Kitten, Red Sandstorm, and Storm-0842), a threat actor affiliated with Iran's MOIS. It has a history of conducting destructive wiping attacks and hack and leak operations. In an alert issued last September, the Canadian Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) called out the threat actor for targeting and doxxing five Iran International journalists, including one from the country, as part of a hack and leak operation. According to Group-IB, HEAVYGRAM was first detected in the wild in September 2023. Once launched, the malware prevents Defender from scanning the paths staging the malicious payloads and executes PowerShell code to set up persistence for the next-stage implant via the Windows Registry. A notable aspect of the Python-based malware is its use of Telegram for command-and-control (C2), allowing it to list running programs, take screenshots, capture web browser data, upload/download files, turn on the microphone, copy Telegram and WhatsApp data, steal saved passwords, download additional malware, and delete files. Incoming messages from the Telegram bot are parsed based on a prefix delimiter system - Prefix @@, to execute arbitrary system commands via os.popen Prefix **, to write the message body to C:\ProgramData\ur.txt Prefix ##, to enable a backdoor command suite that supports the following capabilities - - runexe - Start an arbitrary process on the host - whois - Retrieve the host's public IP address via api.ipify[.]org - runtro - Execute a secondary trojan payload - cht - Dynamically update the C2 Telegram bot token and operator user ID - regtro - Install the trojan payload into Windows autorun Registry keys - reg - Install the main malware executable into Windows autorun registry keys - dt - Exfiltrate Telegram Desktop application data "Attachments received through the Telegram bot are handled based on filename pattern matching," Group-IB said. "The persistent implant handles C2 communication via two functions: send_initial_message – transmits an initial connection beacon containing the full computer domain name of the compromised host, [and] send_health_msg – a background thread that sends a heartbeat message every 24 hours with the host’s domain name, confirming that the implant remains active." HEAVYGRAM has been found to be delivered through four methods: WSF/VBS scripts, VBScripts and HTML Application (HTA) files, executables with embedded archives, and CRUDEEXCLUDE containing embedded archives. CRUDEEXCLUDE was first documented by Google in December 2025 as being used to set up staging directories for housing HEAVYGRAM and another specified malware family named SHADEGENES while masquerading as legitimate applications like Pictory and Telegram. Further review of the Telegram infrastructure has revealed two main setups: one where C2 relies on a single Telegram bot and group, and another where one bot handles check-ins while a secondary bot manages logging and stage polling with a group. "The newly identified samples demonstrate a flexible, multi-stage infection chain in which operators combine tailored social engineering, application masquerading, defense evasion and persistent access to compromise targets of interest," Group-IB said. "The extensive use of Telegram across operations is particularly notable, providing operators with a natively encrypted command-and-control channel that has low setup, maintenance and rotation cost."
thehackernews.comSep 17, 2026extracted
16 Typosquatted RubyGems Packages Steal Browser Credentials and Crypto Wallets
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new typosquatting campaign targeting RubyGems users with a Windows-based information stealer. OpenSourceMalware, which discovered the activity on August 15, 2026, is tracking the threat under the moniker StubMaker. The complete list of packages published as part of the campaign is below - ubnuler ubnlder ri18nr reaker rakier orakw joxn ise18n ioe18n ie18u iai8n i1l8n i18om activesupmport brumdler brundlef "This new malware harvests browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, seed phrases, and Telegram data," security researcher Paul McCarty (aka 6mile) said. "All of the malicious RubyGems packages appear to be typosquats of popular Ruby dependencies, but rather than the clever SEO-fueled typosquats we've seen from other threat actors (e.g., events-channel imitating the popular Node.js events module), they're all clumsy typos." The 16 gems have been published by users named "mod8rz41mje" (aka Riley Miller) and "rbq95bwt6q" (aka Alex Davis). As of writing, the packages have been yanked from RubyGems. In at least two cases – brumdler and brundlef – the threat actor has been found to take advantage of a known RubyGems behavior that makes a namespace available for anyone to claim once all versions of a gem have been yanked. In both instances, the packages were originally published by "gemlewqqhu1" (aka Taylor Moore) before they were reclaimed by the aforementioned two accounts. Jenn Gile, co-founder of OpenSourceMalware, told The Hacker News that although the campaign was disrupted fairly early, it became more effective because of Ruby's "poor design choices" via package name reuse and an unvalidated author field. "When one of the malicious gems was yanked, the threat actor was able to spin up a new owner account and publish a new malicious version under the same package name," Gile said. "What should have been forever dead was revived to compromise more people." "The attacker assigned a different 'Author' name for each gem in an attempt to make them look unrelated, even though they all came from the same owner account. This is because the Author field is a totally unvalidated plaintext field. It doesn't have to match the Owner or anything else." The attack chain, at a high level, makes use of an "extconf.rb" hook to trigger the execution hook. Similar to npm's lifecycle hooks, "extconf.rb" is run automatically when a user installs a gem. The file is typically used to configure native extensions written in C, C++, or Rust that are bundled inside a Ruby package within the "ext/" directory and compiled during installation of the gem. In the case of StubMaker, the Ruby hook acts as a conduit to fetch a 22 MB Rust-based loader from a GitHub release, which, in turn, launches a Go-based stealer ("wincfg") payload embedded into it. The GitHub account ("github[.]com/bebraz1") is no longer accessible. The stealer, for its part, incorporates a DLL payload ("abe_payload.dll") that's used to extract credentials from Chromium-based web browsers (i.e., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, Yandex, Avast, AVG, and CCleaner Browser) by circumventing app-bound encryption (ABE) protections added by Google. It also collects extension data, browsing history, and payment card numbers; searches for cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases; extracts Telegram Desktop data; gathers system information; and makes an external request to "api.ipify[.]org" to obtain the victim's public IP address. Once the relevant data is captured, it's uploaded to Gofile in the form of a password-protected ZIP archive and the resulting download link is sent to the threat actor ("dresslee.com") over an unencrypted HTTP channel. "StubMaker doesn't build anything — it generates a Makefile with empty all, install, and clean targets, plus Unix and Windows stub scripts that do nothing but return success, so the extension phase reports a clean build while the real work (the platform beacon, the Windows loader fetch and execution) happens in the installer hook itself," McCarty explained. "The name points at that specific move: manufacturing a fake build toolchain to make a malicious install look like a routine one, rather than just describing another typosquatted RubyGems package." The disclosure coincides with the discovery of two software supply chain campaigns targeting npm - A cluster of 21 npm packages that typosquatted CLI binary names exposed by Google's scoped packages to deliver a minimal postinstall beacon. "The packages did not squat package names," SafeDep said. "They targeted the bin field, the part of package.json that defines executable command names. Every scoped package that declares a bin entry creates an unscoped name that anyone can register. None of the standard dependency confusion mitigations (scoped publishing, registry allowlists, lockfile pinning) cover this gap." A cluster of Baileys npm forks that engage in a variety of malicious behaviors: covertly make the installer's WhatsApp account follow channels the package author controls and inject the author's advertising URL into every image and video the bot sends. "Continuous monitoring of the npm registry records 4,250 package names that contain baileys and another 112 that contain libsignal-node," SafeDep said, adding the malicious behavior has been observed in 70 package names built on Baileys across 343 versions and 15 libsignal-node impersonators across 38 versions. Update The StubMaker campaign has also been observed targeting npm with a set of 37 packages that make use of a postinstall hook to retrieve the same GitHub-hosted Windows loader, which then unpacks a Go infostealer targeting browser credentials and sessions, payment-card data, cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases, Telegram data, and host information. "This was one threat actor running two typosquatting fronts against two package ecosystems, sharing a single payload and a single C2 backend," Gile said. As with the malicious RubyGems, the npm packages are typosquats of popular packages such as axios, chalk, commander, lodash, typescript, and react. None of the packages are available for download as of writing. The names of the typosquats are below - axois-http, axious-core chalk-core, chalk-lib, chalk-util, chalk-es comand, comander-cli, comanderjs, commandorjs, commandor-cli, commandor-core, comander-lib, commandor-lib, commander-lib loadashjs, lodash-lib, ladash-cli, lodahsjs, lodsh-cli, lodahs-cli, lodhash-cli typescirpt-cli, typscript-cli, typesript-cli, typscript-core, typescriptt-cli, typescrip-cli, typescipt-cli, tyepescript-cli, typescirpt-core, tyepescript-core, typesript-core, typescipt-core, typescriptt-core raectjs testingsmthb1g OpenHack, which also published details of the activity, said the packages were published on August 16, 2026. If any one of the packages was installed on a Windows machine during the time it was live, it's recommended to isolate the host, rotate credentials, and remove the malicious libraries. OpenSourceMalware has also flagged some key differences between the two campaigns - The gems use "extconf.rb," whereas the npm packages employ a postinstall hook to trigger the execution of the loader The Ruby installer decodes its loader URL from Base64, whereas the npm installer uses repeated-key XOR with a hard-coded key The gems were published during a two-day period, whereas the npm packages were uploaded to npm in an eight-minute window across five accounts "RubyGems' pattern was sequential and single-point-of-failure," Gile added. "One account gets caught, the operator adapts and returns. npm's pattern spread the same burst across multiple burner accounts simultaneously, so losing any one account wouldn’t have taken down the whole batch. However, in spite of the different approach, the npm packages were rapidly discovered and removed as a cohort." In a follow-up report published on August 20, 2026, CloudSEK said it identified three more npm packages mimicking the legitimate typescript library: typecript-cli*, typecript-core, and typescrit-cli. It's tracking the activity under the name BRIDGEHEAD. The packages also implement a Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) gate so that a developer running npm install inside the Linux environment is treated as a "bridge" to reach the underlying Windows machine and deploy the stealer malware. "The npm layer is loud, cheap and disposable: forty impersonation packages published to a public registry and withdrawn in since removed," security researcher Vikas Kundu said. "The payload layer is quiet and durable: one Rust executable on GitHub and one exfiltration route through a public file host, neither of which the npm takedown affected." "The WSL bridge narrows the target from developers in general to developers running that toolchain on Windows. That is a large and deliberately chosen group. A pure-Linux or macOS developer installing the same package is profiled and beaconed but receives no Windows payload; the gate simply does not open." (The story was updated after publication on August 19 and 21, 2026, to include the campaign's targeting of npm.)
thehackernews.comAug 18, 2026extracted
Gremlin Stealer's Evolved Tactics: Hiding in Plain Sight With Resource Files
This article examines new obfuscation techniques the Gremlin stealer malware uses to conceal malicious payloads within embedded resources. We analyze a variant protected by a sophisticated commercial packing utility that employs instruction virtualization, transforming the original code into a custom, non-standard bytecode executed by a private virtual machine. Gremlin stealer siphons sensitive information from compromised systems and exfiltrates it to attacker‑controlled servers for potential publication or sale. It targets web browsers, system clipboard and local storage to exfiltrate sensitive information like: Payment card details Browser cookies Session tokens Cryptocurrency wallet data FTP and VPN credentials This threat has rapidly evolved, incorporating new anti-analysis safeguards into recent builds. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from Gremlin Stealer through our Network Security solutions and Cortex line of products, including: Cortex XDR and XSIAM Advanced WildFire Advanced Threat Prevention Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team. Using data from our internal threat intelligence, we identified a new Gremlin stealer variant. This variant exfiltrates stolen data to a newly deployed site at hxxp[:]194.87.92[.]109 as shown in Figure 1. At the time of discovery, VirusTotal showed zero detection for this new Gremlin site hxxp[:]194.87.92[.]109, its associated URLs or any retrieved artifacts. There were no block list entries, community reports or malicious categorizations as shown in Figure 2. After data theft, the malware bundles harvested artifacts into a ZIP archive, including: Browser cookies Session tokens Clipboard contents Cryptocurrency wallet data FTP and VPN credentials The malware names the file using the victim’s public IP address to identify the source, and then uploads it to the attacker-controlled site, as shown in Figure 3. In this section, we present a comparative analysis of older and newer Gremlin stealer variants, highlighting the key changes and describing our process for extracting the final-stage payloads. The latest iteration of the Gremlin stealer has an increased focus on stealth, specifically designed to evade static analysis tools. In this version, the malware authors have shifted the malicious payload into the .NET Resource section, masking it with XOR encoding to bypass signature-based detection and heuristic scanning. Figure 4 shows how the resource section appears as an opaque block of data, hiding strings and API calls that would otherwise trigger alerts. By applying a single-byte XOR decryption routine, we recovered the plain-text configuration. Figure 5 shows that this reveals the hard-coded command-and-control (C2) URLs and exfiltration paths. Gremlin stealer uses the resource section to mirror the tactics of several high-profile malware families that frequently use this area for payload obfuscation, including: Comparing past and present versions reveals a clear evolution in Gremlin stealer’s anti-analysis techniques. Legacy samples (shown in Figure 6) lacked obfuscation, leaving function exports and internal symbols intact. The current iteration implements a staged loading mechanism. Each critical function is decrypted and mapped into memory from the .NET resource section only when needed. This method forces analysts to perform dynamic debugging to observe any meaningful program behavior. Gremlin stealer’s evolution from a basic credential harvester to a modular toolkit is evident in several key architectural upgrades: Expanded target scope: Gremlin stealer includes a dedicated Discord token extraction module, which signifies a pivot toward targeting digital identity and social engineering. Active financial fraud: The latest variant shifts from passive data theft to active financial interference. This crypto clipper functionality continuously monitors the system clipboard for strings matching cryptocurrency wallet patterns. When it detects a match, the malware replaces the victim's address with the attacker’s wallet in real time, diverting funds during transactions. Advanced persistence: The WebSocket-based session hijacking module represents its most significant technical upgrade. This allows Gremlin stealer to hijack active, live browser sessions and bypass modern cookie protections by requesting the data directly from the running browser process. We uncovered an iteration of Gremlin stealer (SHA256 2172dae9a5a695e00e0e4609e7db0207d8566d225f7e815fada246ae995c0f9b) packed using a packing utility, as shown in Figure 7 below. Let’s discuss the obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques this variant uses. Imagine trying to cook in a kitchen where every can, box and spice jar has its label replaced with a random, short name like a, b, c, hf or ze. The malware authors applied this technique to the variant’s code. What it is: They replaced every meaningful name for a class, method or variable with a meaningless one. Why it's effective: It removes all context. A method originally named StealPasswordsFromChrome might become a(). A variable named decryptionKey might become b. This forces an analyst to manually trace every single function call to figure out its purpose, which is incredibly time-consuming. Example: In the file hf.cs, the main orchestrator class is named hf, and its primary methods are a, b and c. In bb.cs, the class for stealing browser data is BrowserCredentialStealer, but in the original obfuscated code, it was just bb. In this technique, malware authors made readable strings appear as gibberish. Instead of writing a word like password or a URL like hxxps://api[.]telegram[.]org directly in the code, the malware stores them encrypted. What it is: All important strings are hidden. The code only contains numbers that act as a key to a secret decoder function. When the program needs a string, it passes these numbers to the decoder, which then returns the real string. The decoder ring function: The secret decoder is the method _003CModule_003E.c(int, int, int). - It takes three integers as input - It uses these numbers to calculate an offset and a length - It opens an embedded resource file (named resource in the .csproj file) which contains all the encrypted strings - It seeks the calculated offset, reads the specified number of encrypted bytes and uses the third integer as a key to decrypt them - It returns the final, readable string Why it's effective: It completely hides the malware's intentions from static analysis. Analysts cannot simply search the code for suspicious keywords like Telegram, wallet.dat or api.ipify[.]org because they don't exist in plain text. Instead, analysts must either run the program in a debugger to see what strings are produced or reverse-engineer the decoder function. Example: A line like this from the original code: csharp // This is what the obfuscated code looks like string url = global::_003CModule_003E.c(18829, 2178, 23); When executed, the c() function would run its decoding operation, and the URL variable would then contain: csharp // This is the real value at runtime string url = "http://api.ipify.org/?format=json"; This technique makes the code's logic intentionally confusing, like turning a straight road into a maze of dead ends and pointless loops that all eventually lead to the same place. What it is: The decompiler output is filled with complex and nonsensical if-else statements, goto jumps and mathematical operations that don't actually affect the outcome. These are designed to confuse both human analysts and automated analysis tools. Why it's effective: It breaks the logical flow that a person would expect to see. It makes it hard to determine which path the code will actually take, even though in many cases, there's only one real path. This significantly increases the time and effort required for reverse engineering. Example: There are many switch statements and goto labels (e.g., IL_00c8, IL_0138) that create a tangled web of execution, even though the underlying logic is a simple sequence of await Task.Run(...). While the core architecture and exfiltration methods via private web panels or the Telegram Bot API remain consistent, this latest variant of Gremlin stealer represents an evolution into a more complex threat. By transitioning from a simple data exfiltration tool to a more advanced modular stealer, Gremlin now targets Chromium-based browsers. It uses memory-resident techniques to hijack active session tokens and sensitive data directly from running processes, rather than relying solely on static database files. This threat’s scope has broadened, as evidenced by a dedicated Discord token stealer. This module scans multiple paths and uses regex validation to compromise modern communication platforms. The malware’s author has also added a clipboard hijacker. This new monetization feature enables persistent financial fraud. It continuously monitors the clipboard, replacing cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products: The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the IoCs shared in this research. Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious. Advanced Threat Prevention has an inbuilt machine learning-based detection that can detect exploits in real time. Cortex XDR and XSIAM are designed to: - Prevent the execution of known malicious malware, and also prevent the execution of unknown malware using Behavioral Threat Protection and machine learning based on the Local Analysis module. - Protect against credential gathering tools and techniques using the new Credential Gathering Protection available from Cortex XDR 3.4. - Detect post-exploit activity, including credential-based attacks, with behavioral analytics, through Cortex XDR Pro. If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42) UK: +44.20.3743.3660 Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130 Asia: +65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Australia: +61.2.4062.7950 India: 00080005045107 SHA256 hashes of the Gremlin stealer samples analyzed for this article: 2172dae9a5a695e00e0e4609e7db0207d8566d225f7e815fada246ae995c0f9b 9aab30a3190301016c79f8a7f8edf45ec088ceecad39926cfcf3418145f3d614 971198ff86aeb42739ba9381923d0bc6f847a91553ec57ea6bae5becf80f8759 ab0fa760bd037a95c4dee431e649e0db860f7cdad6428895b9a399b6991bf3cd f76ba1a4650d8cafb6d3ff071688c5db6fd37e165050f03cece693826f51d346 a9f529a5cbc1f3ee80f785b22e0c472953e6cb226952218aecc7ab07ca328abd 691896c7be87e47f3e9ae914d76caaf026aaad0a1034e9f396c2354245215dc3 281b970f281dbea3c0e8cfc68b2e9939b253e5d3de52265b454d8f0f578768a2 9fda1ddb1acf8dd3685ec31b0b07110855832e3bed28a0f3b81c57fe7fe3ac20 d11938f14499de03d6a02b5e158782afd903460576e9227e0a15d960a2e9c02c 1bd0a200528c82c6488b4f48dd6dbc818d48782a2e25ccd22781c5718c3f62f5 URLs hxxp[:]194.87.92[.]109/i.php Gremlin Stealer: New Stealer on Sale in Underground Forum — Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks
unit42.paloaltonetworks.comMay 15, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: AI-Powered Phishing, Android Spying Tool, Linux Exploit, GitHub RCE & More
This week, the shadows moved faster than the patches. While most teams were still triaging last month’s alerts, attackers had already turned control panels into kill switches, kernels into open doors, and open-source pipelines into silent delivery systems. The game has shifted from breach to occupation. They’re living inside SaaS sessions, pushing code with trusted commits, and scaling operations like legitimate businesses — except their product is chaos. And the underground is getting uncomfortably professional. Here’s the full weekly cybersecurity recap: ⚡ Threat of the Week cPanel Flaw Comes Under Attack—A critical flaw in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM) has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-41940, could result in an authentication bypass and allow remote attackers to gain elevated control of the control panel. In some cases, the attacks have led to a complete wipe of entire websites and backups. Other attacks have deployed Mirai botnet variants and a ransomware strain called Sorry. Is Your Security Program Built on Compliance Theater or Measurable Maturity? If you can't measure your program's maturity, you can't improve it or defend its budget. The SANS Security Awareness & Culture Maturity Model™️ maps 5 stages of security culture development with concrete indicators, behavioral targets, and alignment to business risk priorities. Download Now — Free ➝ 🔔 Top News Cybercrime Groups Use Vishing for Data Theft and Extortion—Two cybercrime groups tracked as Cordial Spider and Snarky Spider are carrying out "rapid, high-impact attacks" operating almost within the confines of SaaS environments, while leaving minimal traces of their actions. The groups employ voice calls, text messages, and emails, directing targeted employees to phishing pages masquerading as their employer's legitimate single sign-on (SSO) page to capture credentials and provide attackers an entry point into systems, which they exploit for deeper access to victims' SaaS environments. The attacks also use the initial access hooks to remove and set up multi-factor authentication devices under their control and delete emails that would otherwise alert organizations of potential malicious activity. According to CrowdStrike, "These actors use vishing to bypass MFA and move laterally across entire SaaS ecosystems with a single authenticated session, masking their tracks through residential proxy networks to blend in as legitimate home user traffic. This is part of a larger trend of English-speaking ransomware crews that share similar playbooks but are branching off into their own distinct groups." Copy Fail Linux Flaw Exploited—The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-31431, a vulnerability impacting various Linux distributions, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation in the wild. It's described as a logic bug in the Linux kernel's authentication cryptographic template that allows an attacker to reliably trigger privilege escalation trivially by means of a 732-byte Python-based exploit. According to Theori and Xint, CVE-2026-31431 was the result of a series of unremarkable updates to the Linux kernel over the years, particularly one update from 2017 that was meant to speed up data encryption. As a result, all major Linux distributions from 2017 are impacted. What complicates matters is that Copy Fail works 100% of the time, unlike most local privilege escalation (LPE) bugs that tend to be probabilistic in nature. More worryingly, it leaves no traces on disk as exploitation occurs in memory and enables container escape from any pod in a Kubernetes cluster. TeamPCP's Supply Chain Attack Spree Continues—TeamPCP's extensive supply chain campaign continued last week, as the cybercriminal group compromised several packages across the npm, PyPI, and Packagist ecosystems in a "Mini Shai-Hulud" attack. TeamPCP has in recent months compromised the packages of several open source software projects, including Trivy, a security scanner maintained by Aqua Security, and KICS, a Checkmarx-developed tool for static code analysis. Amit Genkin, threat researcher at Upwind, said the latest string of attacks represents a shift, where they are not only more frequent but harder to detect because they weaponize legitimate CI/CD pipelines to push out poisoned versions under real identities, allowing the activity to blend in with normal development workflows. "Campaigns like Shai-Hulud take that further by using each compromised pipeline to spread to the next, turning credential theft into a scaling problem across environments," Genkin said. "For teams, the immediate priority is to check for the affected version and rotate any credentials tied to pipelines that may have run it, especially GitHub and cloud tokens. Longer term, this is a signal to reduce how broadly pipeline credentials are scoped and to add visibility into what's actually happening during installs and builds – because if you're relying on traditional scanning or known indicators, this type of activity is easy to miss." New Python Backdoor Enables Comprehensive Data Theft—A newly identified stealthy Python-based backdoor framework dubbed DEEP#DOOR provides attackers with persistent remote command execution and surveillance capabilities on Windows computers. Once active, the backdoor enables shell command execution, file manipulation, system and network reconnaissance, and surveillance operations such as keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, microphone and webcam access, and credentials and SSH key harvesting. Additionally, the malware can shift from data gathering to disruption and system manipulation, as it can overwrite the Master Boot Record, force system crashes, exhaust system resources by spawning numerous processes, and disable Microsoft Defender services. GitHub Flaw Leads to Remote Code Execution—Cybersecurity researchers from Wiz disclosed details of a critical security vulnerability impacting GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server (CVE-2026-3854, CVSS score: 8.7) that could allow an authenticated user to obtain remote code execution with a single "git push" command. The vulnerability was severe enough that Microsoft rolled out a patch within six days of responsible disclosure. On GitHub.com, it allowed remote code execution on shared storage nodes, and on GitHub Enterprise Server, it granted full server compromise, enabling unauthorized access to all hosted repositories and internal secrets. "Exploitation could expose the codebases of nearly all of the world's biggest enterprises, making this one of the most severe SaaS vulnerabilities ever found," a Wiz spokesperson told The Hacker News. VECT 2.0 Ransomware's Flawed Encryption Makes Data Recovery Impossible—VECT 2.0 ransomware has been found to wipe large files instead of merely encrypting them, making recovery impossible, even for the attackers. VECT 2.0 is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) program that first appeared in December 2025. The group quickly grabbed headlines after it announced on BreachForums that it was partnering with TeamPCP, the threat group behind several supply chain attacks, such as Trivy, Checkmarx KICS, LiteLLM, and Telnyx, in March and April 2026. VECT also announced a partnership with BreachForums itself, promising that every registered forum user will become an affiliate and be granted use of the ransomware, negotiation platform, and leak site for operations. Beazley Security, in an analysis of the ransomware, said the VECT 2.0 RaaS panel covers the "full operational lifecycle an affiliate needs from payload generation through to payout." 🔥 Trending CVEs Bugs drop weekly, and the gap between a patch and an exploit is shrinking fast. These are the heavy hitters for the week: high-severity, widely used, or already being poked at in the wild. Check the list, patch what you have, and hit the ones marked urgent first — CVE-2026-41940 (cPanel and WebHost Manager), CVE-2026-31431 aka Copy Fail (Linux Kernel), CVE-2026-42208 (LiteLLM), CVE-2026-3854 (GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server), CVE-2026-32202 (Microsoft Windows Shell), CVE-2026-26268 (Cursor), CVE-2026-35414 (OpenSSH), CVE-2026-6770 (Mozilla Firefox and Tor Browser), CVE-2026-42167 (ProFTPD), CVE-2026-24908, CVE-2026-23627, CVE-2026-24487 (OpenEMR), CVE-2026-6807 (GRASSMARLIN), CVE-2026-7363, CVE-2026-7361, CVE-2026-7344, CVE-2026-7343 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-7322, CVE-2026-7323, CVE-2026-7324 (Mozilla Firefox), CVE-2026-6100 (CPython), CVE-2026-0204 (SonicWall), CVE-2026-35414 (OpenSSH), CVE-2026-42511 (FreeBSD), CVE-2026-40684, CVE-2026-40685, CVE-2026-40686, CVE-2026-40687 (Exim), CVE-2026-5402, CVE-2026-5403, CVE-2026-5405, CVE-2026-5656 (Wireshark), CVE-2026-42520, CVE-2026-42523, CVE-2026-42524 (Jenkins), CVE-2026-3008 (Notepad++), and CVE-2025-41658, CVE-2025-41659, CVE-2025-41660 (CODESYS). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Learn to Spot Attack Paths Your AppSec Tools Completely Miss → Modern attackers chain tiny flaws across code, pipelines, and cloud into major breaches — while your AppSec tools stay blind. Join this free webinar with Wiz and The Hacker News to uncover the top real-world attack paths and learn exactly how to spot, map, and stop them fast. Practical insights to prioritize real risks and strengthen your entire software lifecycle. How to Match AI Attack Speed with Autonomous Exposure Validation → Struggling with AI attacks moving faster than your team can respond? Join this free webinar from Picus Security & The Hacker News to discover Autonomous Exposure Validation – how to automatically find real risks, test attack paths, and fix them in minutes, not weeks. Practical, no-fluff insights to stay ahead without burnout. Grab your spot now. Learn Latest AI Threats + Practical Ways to Kill Initial Access → Modern attackers are slipping past traditional defenses with AI-powered phishing, encrypted malware, and stealthy “Patient Zero” tactics. Want to stay ahead? Join this free webinar with Zscaler and The Hacker News to uncover the latest threat trends and practical Zero Trust strategies that actually stop initial compromise — before it becomes a full-blown breach. No fluff, just real insights to protect your organization. 📰 Around the Cyber World OpenAI Debuts Advanced Account Security —OpenAI launched Advanced Account Security, a set of opt-in protections for ChatGPT users "designed for people at increased risk of digital attacks, as well as for those who want the strongest account protections available." As part of the new program, the new controls strengthen sign-in protections, tighten account recovery, reduce exposure from compromised sessions, and give users more visibility into account activity. OpenAI has also partnered with Yubico to link two physical security keys, YubiKey C Nano and YubiKey C NFC, to ChatGPT accounts. That said, users can use any other FIDO-compliant security key, or use software-based passkeys for phishing-resistant authentication. Over 8.8K Ransomware Attacks in 2025 —Fortinet said it recorded 7,831 confirmed ransomware victims globally in 2025, skyrocketing from approximately 1,600 identified victims in 2024. "Availability of crime service kits like WormGPT, FraudGPT, and BruteForceAI contributed to this 389% increase year-over-year (YoY)," Fortinet said. "The top three targeted sectors include manufacturing (1,284), business services (824), and retail (682). Geographic concentration includes the U.S. (3,381), Canada (374), and Germany (291)." KidsProtect Android Surveillance Tool Marketed on the Web —A new Android surveillance tool called KidsProtect is being openly advertised on the clear web that gives an operator near-total secret control of a victim’s phone. "It can't be removed without the attacker's permission," Certo said. "From a web-based dashboard, an operator can secretly record calls, stream live audio from the device’s microphone, track GPS location in real time, read SMS messages and notifications from apps including WhatsApp and Viber, log keystrokes, access contacts and photos, and remotely trigger the front and rear cameras." Assessed to be the work of a Greek-speaking developer, it's available on a subscription basis starting from $60, allowing anyone to buy it, rebrand it, and start selling it as their own. New KYCShadow Android Malware Detected —An Android malware masquerading as a bank KYC verification application is being distributed via WhatsApp and primarily targeting users in India. "The application operates as a multi-stage dropper that installs a secondary payload and establishes persistent command-and-control (C2) communication," CYFIRMA said. "It combines native code obfuscation, Firebase-based remote execution, VPN-based traffic manipulation, and WebView-based phishing to systematically harvest sensitive user data." Phishing Campaign Targets Pakistan Orgs —A highly targeted spear-phishing campaign targeting the Punjab Safe Cities Authority and PPIC3 in Pakistan has been found to use legitimate-sounding government infrastructure projects as lures to deliver malware. "The email carried two malicious attachments: a Word document with a VBA macro dropper and a PDF with a fake Adobe Reader lure, both delivering payloads from a BunnyCDN-hosted malicious infrastructure," Joe Security said. "The attack chain establishes persistent remote access by abusing Microsoft's legitimate VS Code tunnel service, with exfiltration notifications sent via a Discord webhook — a sophisticated technique designed to evade network-level detection." Calendly-Themed Phishing Attacks on the Rise —Multiple threat clusters are leveraging Calendly-themed phishing to fingerprint site visitors and steal credentials and other data. "Behind the shared Calendly branding sits a diverse set of phishing kits, including API-driven frameworks, real-time Socket.IO applications, fake CAPTCHA chains, and Telegram-based exfiltration," urlscan said. Fraud Campaigns GovTrapand FEMITBOT Exposed —Threat actors have been observed deploying sophisticated tactics, including fake government portals, SMS phishing, and lookalike domains, to drive financial fraud and credential harvesting as part of an effort called GovTrap. The government impersonation scam mimics official portals with high accuracy, with links to the fake sites distributed via SMS or email. The end goal is to trick users into entering their personal and financial information, or make non-existent payments that are transferred through money mule accounts. The collected payment card details are abused to facilitate fraudulent transactions. Another threat cluster has leveraged FEMITBOT, a malicious infrastructure that abuses Telegram Mini Apps to scale global fraud campaigns and Android malware delivery. "By leveraging Telegram's native features, threat actors create highly convincing fake platforms across crypto, financial services, AI, and streaming sectors," CTM360 said. "Built on a modular, template-driven architecture, FEMITBOT enables rapid deployment, brand impersonation, and campaign optimization using real-time tracking and analytics." New PowerShell Desktop Stealer Spotted —A Pastebin-hosted PowerShell script disguised as "Windows Telemetry Update" comes with capabilities to steal Telegram Desktop session data via Telegram bot API exfiltration. "The script collects host metadata, including username, hostname, and public IP via api.ipify[.]org, then checks for Telegram Desktop and Telegram Desktop Beta tdata directories," Flare said. "If found, it terminates the Telegram process to release file locks, archives session material into 'TEMP\diag.zip,' and uploads the archive to the attacker-controlled operator chat via the Telegram Bot API sendDocument endpoint." Surge in Teams Phishing in 2026 —eSentire said it has observed an increase in Microsoft Teams-based phishing since early 2026, in which threat actors impersonate IT support and help desk personnel to trick users into granting remote access to their devices. "These phishing attacks have often been linked to email bombing, followed by threat actors reaching out to users under the guise of providing assistance to resolve an issue," eSentire said. "The objective of the attack is to trick the user into granting remote access to their device, and once obtained, threat actors will attempt to exfiltrate data and execute additional payloads to establish persistence or deploy ransomware." New KarstoRAT Malware Enables Data Theft —First spotted in early 2026, KarstoRAT is capable of system reconnaissance, audio and webcam monitoring, screenshot capture, key logging, and token theft. It also enables threat actors to download and run additional payloads, which could point to it being used for post-compromise control on infected machines. "KarstoRAT uses a command-and-control (C2) server that has a diverse set of open ports and services, indicating that it has a multi-purpose infrastructure created for C2 communication and payload distribution," LevelBlue said. "Threat actors use a fake Blox Fruits (a popular Roblox game) virtual marketplace as a lure to trick players into downloading malware that will install KarstoRAT into their machines." ClickUp Discloses Email Address Exposure —ClickUp said its client-side feature flag configuration exposed personally identifiable information. This included 893 customer email addresses that were embedded in feature flag targeting rules, along with one flag that improperly referenced a customer’s API token. "The exposure was limited to 893 customer email addresses used in feature flag targeting rules to control which users see specific features during rollouts," it said. "If your email address was among those included in a feature flag configuration, you have been directly contacted." The incident did not expose any other data. Finnish Authorities Arrest Alleged Scattered Spider Member —Finnish authorities arrested 19-year-old Peter Stokes (aka Bouquet), a dual U.S.-Estonian citizen, as he tried to board a flight to Japan. U.S. prosecutors have charged him as a key member of the notorious Scattered Spider hacking group, and he faces multiple counts of wire fraud, conspiracy, and computer intrusion. New Attacks Linked to Versatile Werewolf —The threat actor known as Versatile Werewolf (aka HeartlessSoul) has been linked to campaigns targeting Russian state structures and aviation companies via phishing emails with malicious archive attachments and malvertising campaigns to deliver a JavaScript trojan. The end goal is to obtain confidential data, particularly geospatial information. Alternatively, the threat actor is known to distribute malicious code using the legitimate SourceForge platform through a project called GearUP. Versatile Werewolf is believed to be active since at least September 2025. Some of the attachments have exploded ZDI-CAN-25373 to trigger the infection chain. The malvertising campaign uses fake domains ("battleflight[.]pro") to deliver bogus installers for aviation-related software to launch the same trojan. "The initial infection involves executing PowerShell commands or scripts designed to download a JavaScript loader from C2 servers," Kaspersky said. "This loader, in turn, loads and executes the main JS-RAT and its modules in memory, among which we found tools for data collection and exfiltration, keyloggers, screen capture tools, UAC bypass tools, and other payloads." The company noted that the domain "battleflight[.]pro" resolves to an IP address that also hosts fake domains linked to the GOFFEE APT. "Both groups actively use PowerShell payloads to deliver and execute malicious modules," it added. "GOFFEE also targets the public sector, which suggests the possibility of joint or coordinated campaigns." Cisco Unveils Model Provenance Kit —Cisco unveiled a new open-source tool, named Model Provenance Kit, to help organizations address potential issues associated with the use of third-party AI models. "Much like a DNA test reveals biological origins, the Model Provenance Kit examines both metadata and the actual learned parameters of a model (like a unique genome that comprises a model), to assess whether models share a common origin and identify signs of modification," Cisco said. "This, combined with a constitution that defines provenance linkages, is an important step toward providing evidence-based assurance that the AI you deploy is what it says it is." Abuse of Hugging Face and ClawHub for Malware Delivery —Threat actors are abusing legitimate AI platforms like Hugging Face and ClawHub for malware delivery, once again demonstrating how trust in AI ecosystems are being exploited. Acronis said it identified more than 575 malicious skills across 13 developer accounts that target both Windows and macOS systems with trojans, cryptocurrency miners, and AMOS stealer, a macOS-focused infostealer. "On Hugging Face, attackers leverage repositories to host payloads and act as staging infrastructure within multistep infection chains, distributing malware disguised as legitimate applications," Acronis said. European Authorities Bust Cryptocurrency Fraud Ring —Albanian and Austrian authorities dismantled a cryptocurrency investment fraud ring that caused estimated losses of more than €50 million ($58.5 million) to victims worldwide. The operation, which took place over two years, resulted in the arrest of ten individuals, the search of multiple premises, and the seizure of 891,735 in cash, 443 computers, 238 mobile phones, six laptops, and multiple storage devices. "The criminal network, allegedly operating several call centres in Tirana, Albania, is believed to have caused significant financial damage, totalling at least €50 million," Europol said. "The call centres were professionally set up and organized, resembling legitimate business structures featuring a clear division of roles and hierarchical management." The criminal network is estimated to have involved up to 450 employees across various departments. The scheme involved luring victims to seemingly legitimate online investment platforms through deceptive advertisements on social media or web searches, and coaxing them into making investments under the promise of huge returns. Victims were then assigned retention agents, who masqueraded as investment advisors and used remote access software to gain full control of their devices. "The fraudsters feigned professional expertise and employed psychological pressure to persuade victims to make additional investments, falsely claiming they would be profitable," Europol said. "In truth, the funds were never invested but were instead channelled into an intricate international money-laundering scheme, ultimately disappearing into the hands of the criminal organisation." In some cases, the fraudsters reached out to the victims again and offered help with recovering their stolen funds, only to demand a €500 entry fee and defraud them a second time. Flaws in EnOcean's SmartServer —Two security flaws have been disclosed in EnOcean's SmartServer IoT platform that affect version 4.60.009 and prior. According to Claroty: "CVE-2026-20761 allows remote attackers to send malicious, crafted LON IP-852 messages that result in arbitrary command execution on devices. CVE-2026-22885 allows remote attackers to send malicious, crafted IP-852 messages that bypass ASLR memory protections and leak memory." Successful exploitation of the flaws results in attackers obtaining control over building management and building automation systems running affected versions of this platform and legacy i.LON devices. Patches have been released for both vulnerabilities. Google Announces Android Credential Manager Update —Google has announced a new update to Android's Credential Manager that allows apps to automatically verify a user's personal Gmail address without requiring one-time passwords (OTPs) or email verification links. "Google now issues a cryptographically verified email credential directly to Android devices," the company said. "For users, this completely removes the need to manually verify their email through external channels. For developers, the API securely delivers these verified user claims for any scenario, whether you are building an account creation flow, a recovery process, or a high-risk step-up authentication." Nearly 8.8K Secrets Leaked Online —According to Truffle Security, 8,792 verified, unique secrets have been leaked online through web-based development environments. The tokens were found across 22 million public projects hosted on Cloud Development Environments (CDEs) such as CodePen, CodeSandbox, JSFiddle, and StackBlitz. Is There More to the Xygeni Compromise? —Multiple connections have been found between the compromise of the Xygeni vulnerability scanner on GitHub and a proxy botnet of hacked ASUS and TP-Link routers. Some of the TP-Link consumer routers have been compromised with Microsocks to unroll them to a residential proxy network. "These routers were also running a custom command-and-control beacon that was named ShadowLink," Ctrl-Alt-Intel said. "When we analysed the ShadowLink protocol, we found it was identical, down to a shared authentication secret, to the backdoor planted in the Xygeni GitHub Action used for that supply chain attack." Brazilian Anti-DDoS Firm Behind DDoS Attacks on ISPs —Huge Networks, a Brazilian tech company that specializes in protecting networks from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, has been enabling a botnet responsible for massive DDoS attacks against other internet service providers (ISPs) in the country, according to KrebsOnSecurity. The company has since said the malicious activity resulted from an intrusion first detected in January 2026 and claimed it was likely the work of a competitor. Canonical Target of Sustained DDoS Attack —Canonical disclosed its web infrastructure came under a "sustained, cross-border attack," knocking Ubuntu servers offline for several hours. A pro-Iranian hacktivist group known as the Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq, aka 313 Team, claimed responsibility for the attack on Telegram. The websites have since become operational. Last month, the group also disrupted access to the decentralized social media platform Bluesky. New Phishing Kit Bluekit Detailed —A new phishing kit named Bluekit is offering more than 40 templates targeting popular services and includes basic artificial intelligence (AI)-powered features for generating campaign drafts. Available templates can be used to target email accounts (Outlook, Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, ProtonMail), cloud and enterprise services (iCloud and Zoho), developer platforms (GitHub), and cryptocurrency services (Ledger). What makes the kit stand out is the presence of an AI Assistant panel that supports multiple models, including Llama, GPT-4.1, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek, to help criminals draft phishing emails. It also has support for two-factor authentication, geolocation emulation, antibot cloaking, notifications, spoofing capabilities, voice cloning, and a mail sender. The development once again reinforces the broader trend of crimeware services integrating AI to streamline and scale their operations. Bluekit is the second kit to integrate AI features in as many months. In April 2026, Abnormal Security shed light on a cybercrime platform called ATHR that uses AI vishing agents, credential harvesting panels, and built-in phishing mailers to execute and scale telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) attacks. North Korea Calls U.S. Cyber Threat Claims a Fabrication — North Korea's foreign ministry rejected U.S. accusations that the country poses a cyber threat, stating the U.S. was spreading false information about a non-existent cyber threat from North Korea for political purposes, per Reuters. The ministry said it "would actively take all necessary measures for defending the interests of the state and protecting the rights and interests of its citizens in cyberspace." 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools Model Provenance Kit → It is a free open-source Python tool from Cisco AI Defense that helps identify if a machine learning model is based on a known base model (like Llama, Mistral, GPT, etc.). It analyzes architecture, tokenizer, and weights to quickly compare two models or check against a database of ~150 popular base models. AutoFyn → It is an open-source tool from SignalPilot Labs that runs Claude AI in self-improving loops to optimize measurable goals. Give it a GitHub repo, a clear task (like security hardening, bug fixing, or performance optimization), and a time budget — it works in sandboxed rounds, tracks progress with real evaluations, learns from failures, and delivers improved code via PRs. Disclaimer: This is strictly for research and learning. It hasn't been through a formal security audit, so don't just blindly drop it into production. Read the code, break it in a sandbox first, and make sure whatever you’re doing stays on the right side of the law. Conclusion Stay sharp out there. The pace of attacks is accelerating, and the margin for delay is shrinking. Patch what you can today, verify your supply chains, tighten SaaS access, and treat every “routine” login or pipeline run as potentially hostile. Small habits now will save major headaches later. Until next Monday. Keep your defenses tight and your eyes open. The threats won’t wait — neither should we. See you in the next recap.
thehackernews.comMay 4, 2026extracted
Researchers Expose TA585’s MonsterV2 Malware Capabilities and Attack Chain
Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a previously undocumented threat actor called TA585 that has been observed delivering an off-the-shelf malware called MonsterV2 via phishing campaigns. The Proofpoint Threat Research Team described the threat activity cluster as sophisticated, leveraging web injections and filtering checks as part of its attack chains. "TA585 is notable because it appears to own its entire attack chain with multiple delivery techniques," researchers Kyle Cucci, Tommy Madjar, and Selena Larson said. "Instead of leveraging other threat actors – like paying for distribution, buying access from initial access brokers, or using a third-party traffic delivery system – TA585 manages its own infrastructure, delivery, and malware installation." MonsterV2 is a remote access trojan (RAT), stealer, and loader, which Proofpoint first observed being advertised on criminal forums in February 2025. It's worth noting that MonsterV2 is also called Aurotun Stealer (a misspelling of "autorun") and has been previously distributed via CastleLoader (aka CastleBot). Phishing campaigns distributing the malware have been observed using U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) themed lures to trick users into clicking on fake URLs that direct to a PDF, which, in turn, links to a web page employing the ClickFix social engineering tactic to activate the infection by running a malicious command in the Windows Run dialog or PowerShell terminal. The PowerShell command is designed to execute a next-stage PowerShell script that deploys MonsterV2. Subsequent attack waves detected in April 2025 have resorted to malicious JavaScript injections on legitimate websites that serve fake CAPTCHA verification overlays to initiate the attack via ClickFix, ultimately leading to the delivery of the malware via a PowerShell command. Initial iterations of this campaign distributed Lumma Stealer, before TA585 switched to MonsterV2 in early 2025. Interestingly, the JavaScript inject and the associated infrastructure (intlspring[.]com) have also been linked to the distribution of Rhadamanthys Stealer. A third set of campaigns undertaken by TA585 has made use of email notifications from GitHub that are triggered when tagging GitHub users in bogus security notices that contain URLs leading to actor-controlled websites. Both the activity clusters – that revolve around web injects and phony GitHub alerts -- have been associated with CoreSecThree, which, according to PRODAFT, is a "sophisticated framework" that's known to be active since February 2022 and has been "consistently" used to propagate stealer malware. MonsterV2 is a full-featured malware that can steal sensitive data, act as a clipper by replacing cryptocurrency addresses in the infected systems' clipboard with threat actor-provided wallet addresses, establish remote control using Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC), receive and execute commands from an external server, and download additional payloads. The malware is sold by a Russian-speaking actor for $800 USD per month for the "Standard" edition, while the "Enterprise" version, which comes with stealer, loader, HVNC, and Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) support, costs $2,000 per month. A notable aspect of the stealer is that it avoids infecting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. MonsterV2 is typically packed using a C++ crypter called SonicCrypt, thereby allowing it to evade detection by running a series of anti-analysis checks prior to decrypting and loading the payload. Once launched, the malware decrypts and resolves the Windows API functions crucial to its functioning, in addition to elevating its privileges. It then proceeds to decode an embedded configuration to connect to the command-and-control (C2) server, as well as determine its next course of action based on the parameters set - anti_dbg, if set to True, the malware attempts to detect and evade debuggers in use anti_sandbox, if set to True, the malware attempts to detect sandboxes and execute some rudimentary anti-sandbox techniques aurotun (it's this misspelling that has given it the name Aurotun Stealer), if set to True, the malware attempts to set up persistence on the host priviledge_escalation, if set to True, the malware attempts to elevate its privileges If the malware successfully establishes contact with the C2 server, it sends basic system information and the system's geolocation by sending a request to "api.ipify[.]org." The response from the server contains the command to be executed on the host. Some of the supported features are listed below - Execute infostealer functionality and exfiltrate data to the server Execute an arbitrary command via cmd.exe or PowerShell Terminate, suspend, and resume target processes Establish an HVNC connection to the infected system Take screenshots of the desktop Start a keylogger Enumerate, manipulate, copy, and exfiltrate files Shut down or crash the system Download and execute next-stage payloads like StealC and Remcos RAT "This activity was not correlated with TA585, however. Notably, with StealC, the MonsterV2 payloads were configured to use the same C2 server as the dropped StealC payload," Proofpoint said. "TA585 is a unique threat actor with advanced capabilities for targeting and delivery. As the cybercrime threat landscape is constantly changing, TA585 has adopted effective strategies for filtering, delivery, and malware installation."
thehackernews.comOct 14, 2025extracted