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A Cautionary Tale About Data Breach Claims, Verification and Carhartt
You're not going to believe this, but turns out you can't always take criminals at their word. Actually, I'll walk that back a bit as it may not even be the cybercrime guys who got this wrong, but it all starts here: 🚨Cyber Alert ‼️ 🇺🇸US - 𝗖𝗮𝗿𝗵𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘁 ShinyHunters hacking group claims to have compromised Carhartt and allegedly stolen more than 50 GB of compressed data containing millions of customer records, employee information, customer metadata, loyalty-related information, and… pic.twitter.com/BvzsEQS54l — Hackmanac (@H4ckmanac) August 13, 2026 My usual Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) workflow after a breach emerges is to run our open source Email Address Extractor tool over the corpus of data, get a count of the unique addresses then drop it into the processing pipeline. Having a count helps prioritise: it's roughly the same effort to process a breach with 10M addresses in it as it is 100k addresses, but we obviously reach 100x more people with the larger corpus so that goes first. So, following the release of the Carhartt data above, I ran the tool and got 24,876,077 addresses. That's a biggy, let's dive in. One of the first things I do when analysing a breach is look for news and industry commentary. Once you get through all the results for class actions ( ugh ), you usually find various other services and news sites reporting on the incident. One such example (which I won't name, because they're wrong) cited a very similar number to my initial pass, which at face value, reinforced my thinking. But here's where it all takes a turn because, inevitably, this is where the other analysts stopped... I've been using OpenClaw pretty extensively this year to help with a number of tasks, including breach analysis. Here's how I normally begin (timestamps are AEST and yes, I called it "PwnedClaw"): [24/08/2026 17:30] Troy Hunt: Let's look at the ShinyHunters Carhartt breach. I'm seeing nearly 25M unique email addresses so it's very large, tell me about what they do. [24/08/2026 17:30] PwnedClaw: Carhartt is an American workwear brand founded in 1889, headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan. They make rugged, durable clothing primarily for tradespeople and outdoor workers: heavy-duty jackets, bibs, coveralls, work pants, boots, and accessories. Think construction workers, farmers, hunters. They've also crossed over into streetwear/fashion in recent years (particularly through Carhartt WIP, their Work In Progress line), which massively expanded their demographic beyond blue-collar workers into urban fashion, skateboarding, and hip-hop culture. That crossover likely explains a 25M email count — they're not just selling to contractors anymore, they're a mainstream lifestyle brand. Strong US base but significant global presence, especially in Europe where WIP is huge. For HIBP context: broad demographic mix (blue-collar workers + fashion/streetwear), real names, physical addresses, and purchase history are likely present given it's a retail breach. Want me to pull the tracker entry for current status? Ok, cool, nothing too revolutionary there. Let's start analysing the data, and the first thing I do is begin with the report of our open source Email Address Extractor tool, which lists every file an address was found in, and then how many unique ones are in there: [24/08/2026 17:32] Troy Hunt: Let's start looking at data, and we'll begin with the email extractor report at "\scratch\Carhartt\Carhartt.txt.report.txt" [24/08/2026 17:32] PwnedClaw: Interesting. The data is from Databricks (their analytics/data lakehouse platform) and follows the TPC-DS benchmark schema (tpcds_sf1000) — that's a standard retail analytics benchmark format. The "sf1000" means scale factor 1000, which is massive. Key observations: • All emails are in customer_chunk_XXXX.csv files, numbered 0000-0599+, so ~600 chunks • Each chunk has ~19,300 unique emails, remarkably uniform distribution • ~600 chunks × ~19,300 = ~11.6M from this directory alone — but you said ~25M total, so there are likely more directories The TPC-DS schema is telling — it means this was Carhartt's customer analytics warehouse in Databricks, not their production transactional database. TPC-DS models: customer demographics, store sales, web sales, catalog sales, dates, etc. So the data likely includes purchase history and behavioral analytics on top of PII. Want me to look at an actual chunk file to see what columns are present? Think of it as using the AI to distil large volumes of information down into something much more workable. In this case, I gave it four of the files in question and let the analysis run: [24/08/2026 17:33] PwnedClaw: The columns from the TPC-DS customer table: • c_customer_sk / c_customer_id — internal IDs • c_current_cdemo_sk — customer demographic key (links to demo table with age/gender/education/marital status/income band) • c_current_hdemo_sk — household demographic key • c_current_addr_sk — current address key (links to full address table) • c_first_shipto_date_sk / c_first_sales_date_sk — date of first purchase/shipment • c_salutation — Mr/Mrs/Miss/Sir etc. • c_first_name / c_last_name • c_preferred_cust_flag — loyalty/preferred customer flag • c_birth_day / c_birth_month / c_birth_year — full DOB • c_birth_country • c_login — empty in the samples • c_email_address • c_last_review_date_sk / c_last_review_date So: full name, email, DOB, salutation, birth country, preferred customer status, first purchase date. Address is a foreign key here (in a separate address table that's presumably also in the dump). Notable: c_login appears empty — so no passwords in this table. DOB is split across three columns which is a bit unusual but all three are there. Birth year goes back to 1949 in the sample, so this spans a wide age range. Want me to check how many rows have DOB fully populated, and whether there are other tables in the dump (address, demographics) in what you have locally? I'll save you from all the to-and-fro of my questions and PwnedClaw's responses, here's where it gets interesting and where AI plays a genuinely valuable role: [24/08/2026 17:41] PwnedClaw: TLD anomaly worth flagging: • 4M .edu and 3.9M .org is extremely high for a retail brand. That's likely noise from the TPC-DS synthetic data generation mixed with real records, or it could indicate Carhartt ran promotions targeting institutions. Worth sanity checking a sample of those. Want me to pull 20 random .edu and .org samples to see if they look real or synthetic? Huh, yeah, that feels odd. Let's drill down further, and just a quick caveat: I'm highly confident that all the data I'm about to show is fabricated and that I'm not inadvertently putting someone else's PII on display here. [24/08/2026 17:47] Troy Hunt: Give me some examples of what you consider synthetic addresses [24/08/2026 17:48] PwnedClaw: From the earlier sample: Clearly synthetic (TPC-DS generated): • [email protected] — random hex-like domain • [email protected] — 3-char alphanumeric • [email protected] — single character domain • [email protected] — single character domain • [email protected] — random alphanumeric • [email protected] — random consonant string • [email protected] — starts with digit, mixed • [email protected] — random alphanumeric • [email protected] — short random alphanumeric The pattern is consistent: real-looking Firstname.Lastname local part (from TPC-DS customer name generation) grafted onto a completely random/gibberish domain. The local parts look plausible but the domains have no vowel patterns, random digit insertion, or are implausibly short (single characters). The tell: TPC-DS generates customer emails by concatenating real name fields with random domain strings. So you get [email protected] — Sally Smith is plausible, but no .edu institution has that domain. Want me to build a filter that identifies synthetic domains specifically (gibberish detection) and get a precise real vs synthetic split? Oh yeah, that's definitely junk. It was enough for me to start trawling through the data myself, old-school, like I used to, well, before earlier this year! And that's where I found data like this: c_customer_sk,c_customer_id,c_current_cdemo_sk,c_current_hdemo_sk,c_current_addr_sk,c_first_shipto_date_sk,c_first_sales_date_sk,c_salutation,c_first_name,c_last_name,c_preferred_cust_flag,c_birth_day,c_birth_month,c_birth_year,c_birth_country,c_login,c_email_address,c_last_review_date_sk,c_last_review_date 11270429,AAAAAAAANBJPLKAA,1423814,7001,19788,2451033,2451003,Miss,Marina,Tucker,Y,13,3,1968,BENIN,,[email protected],2452499,2452499 It's the same sort of .edu pattern but not on a .edu TLD. First name, last name, random domain name. And "Benin"?! I'll save you Googling it like I had to, it's a small country in West Africa and if I'm guessing, not a major Carhartt market. [24/08/2026 17:51] Troy Hunt: Yeah, something smells here, there are screwy domains in addresses like this too: [email protected] [24/08/2026 17:52] PwnedClaw: That's a much bigger problem than I initially thought. The frequency analysis confirms it: • 54.8% of addresses (13.6M) are at domains appearing 100+ times — these are real • 45.2% (11.25M) are at domains appearing fewer than 100 times — and 8.4M of those contain digits So the synthetic pattern isn't confined to .edu/.org at all — it's throughout .com and everything else too. [email protected] is the same TPC-DS generation, just with .com slapped on. The 32% figure I gave you earlier was a significant undercount. The real split looks closer to: • ~13.6M real addresses (domains with 100+ occurrences) • ~11.25M synthetic (single-use gibberish domains across all TLDs) That's roughly 45% junk across the whole corpus, not 32%. For HIBP the headline number would be around 13-14M rather than 24.8M. Want me to produce a clean filtered list of just the real addresses for an accurate count? And the more I probed, the more it all unravelled: [24/08/2026 17:53] Troy Hunt: I want you to get a distinct list of all domains with a count next to each one showing how many addresses are on it. This is starting to smell bad. [24/08/2026 17:54] PwnedClaw: Done. 10.35M unique domains written to: scratch/Carhartt/domain-counts.txt Format is countdomain, sorted by count descending. So the top of the file is gmail.com (http://gmail.com/) at 7M+, and the long tail is all the single-occurrence gibberish. Your HIBP domain dataset should make it very obvious where the cliff edge is between known-real and never-seen-before. [24/08/2026 17:58] Troy Hunt: There's an extraordinary long tail of domains with only 1 address. Also look at the country of birth next to the add addresses; places like Myanmar, Latvia and PNG are just really odd in terms of likelihood. [24/08/2026 17:58] PwnedClaw: That country distribution is damning. Here's what's wrong with it: 97.6% of domains appear exactly once — that's not a long tail, that's a signature. Real breach data from a retail company would have thousands of addresses on corporate domains, hundreds on ISP domains, a natural power law. Instead you have 10.1M singleton domains. That's pure TPC-DS generation. The birth country data is the other nail in the coffin. Look at what's in those 4 chunk files: • Venezuela, Nicaragua, Qatar, Montenegro, Lesotho, Gambia, Norfolks Island, Réunion, Comoros, Western Sahara, Palau... • United States appears only 407 times — tied with Canada, both dwarfed by places like Antigua and Barbuda and Lesotho • The distribution across 211 countries is essentially uniform — ~380-420 per country That's textbook TPC-DS. It generates customer records with birth countries sampled uniformly from the full ISO country list. No real Carhartt customer database would have more customers born in Montenegro than the United States. Bottom line: What you have here looks like real Carhartt customer records (the carharttdonotship.com, carhartt.com domains, the 70% HIBP hit rate on freemail addresses) that were stored in Databricks alongside TPC-DS benchmark data that was run against the same schema. ShinyHunters grabbed the whole Databricks dump without distinguishing real customer data from the benchmark test data sitting in the same tables. The real customer data is in there, but it's heavily contaminated with synthetic TPC-DS records. Your domain frequency analysis from HIBP will be the cleanest way to separate them. Annoying AI sentence structure aside ("that's not [one thing], that's [this other thing]"), this is just gold. And PwnedClaw gives ShinyHunters a bit of a free pass too: these guys just grabbed and published everything without realising there was a bunch of synthetic data in there. But there's one more smoking gun: [24/08/2026 18:02] Troy Hunt: Also look at the distribution of birth year - there are way too many people with early 1900's entries, got any stats on that? [24/08/2026 18:03] PwnedClaw: Birth year stats are conclusive. The distribution runs 1924-1992 and is perfectly flat — roughly 1,050-1,194 per year, every single year without exception. That's not population data, that's a random number generator with a fixed range. A real Carhartt customer base would be heavily weighted 1965-1995, almost nothing pre-1950, and the pre-1924/post-1992 cutoffs wouldn't exist at all. Instead you get mathematically uniform coverage of 69 years. TPC-DS again. Here's the full picture of what we now have as synthetic indicators — every single one points the same direction: | Signal | Finding | | ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | | Domain singletons | 97.6% of domains appear exactly once | | Synthetic TLDs | 32% of addresses on .edu/.org with gibberish domains | | Gibberish .com domains | e.g. [email protected] | | Firstname.Lastname pattern | 50.4% — should be ~10-15% in real retail data | | Birth country distribution | Perfectly uniform across all 211 ISO countries, US = 407 records | | Birth year distribution | Perfectly flat 1924-1992, ~1,100/year | | carharttdonotship.com | Proves real Carhartt data IS present | | 70% HIBP hit rate on freemail | Proves real records are mixed in | The conclusion is pretty solid: this is a real Carhartt Databricks breach, but the TPC-DS benchmark data was co-located in the same schema and ShinyHunters (and every aggregator after them) grabbed it all without knowing what they were looking at. It would have been so easy just to dump this all into HIBP, put out social posts with a big headline number and be done with it, but it'd also be completely wrong. And here's what's really worrying about watching other people do exactly this: headline numbers get misrepresented, victim organisations are unfairly reported on (news headlines with the HIBP number often follow quickly), I run the risk of attracting the ire of the company for inaccurate reporting, and the whole thing just becomes a mess. So, was Carhartt actually breached, and did ShinyHunters fabricate the data? Almost certainly "yes" and then, almost certainly "no", and both positions are supported by previous ShinyHunters form. These guys are approaching 100 breaches sitting on their Tor site (all of which I've reviewed), and I'm yet to see a single one with data they've fabricated. These guys have a track record of successfully gaining access to large orgs and dumping data that genuinely came from the claimed origin. Not to trivialise their criminal extortion campaigns, but misrepresenting the scope of their activities would be bad for business in the same way that not following through on threats and dumping data when they don't get payment would be. This presents an alternate theory PwnedClaw has already touched on: Carhartt simply had a bunch of test data sitting in their Databricks instance. Going back to the output of our tool, here are the largest files which we now know have junk data in them: Unique addresses per file: \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0309.csv: 19,402 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0589.csv: 19,372 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0568.csv: 19,362 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0460.csv: 19,360 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0263.csv: 19,358 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0584.csv: 19,358 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0350.csv: 19,357 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0264.csv: 19,356 \shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\tables\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer_chunk_0278.csv: 19,356 There were 600 of these files, then another 1,200 files with similar data in this common path: C:\ShinyHunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\20260801_033207\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer\chunk_0116.csv: 9,689 C:\ShinyHunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\20260801_033207\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer\chunk_0921.csv: 9,689 C:\ShinyHunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\20260801_033207\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer\chunk_1172.csv: 9,689 C:\ShinyHunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\20260801_033207\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer\chunk_0529.csv: 9,688 C:\ShinyHunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\shouldve_paid_the_ransom_carhartt_shinyhunters\databricks\databricks_dump\20260801_033207\samples\tpcds_sf1000\customer\chunk_0054.csv Once excluded, the unique address count plummeted to just 13,306,258 results. That's a 47% drop from the 24M+ number we started at... and it's still too high. I always eyeball the distinct list of email addresses after they're exported by our tooling. Call me old-fashioned, but I still reckon there are things I'll see with my experienced human eyes that the AI will miss (at least, for now). And it missed these: [25/08/2026 08:47] Troy Hunt: Back on Carhartt, we have a lot of instances like these where the same alias appears across 3 different versions of the domain. I'm writing this up in a blog post, help me explain to the readers what's going on here and why it's inflating the numbers: [unique alias]@carhartt.com [unique alias]@carhartt.mail.onmicrosoft.com [unique alias]@carhartt.onmicrosoft.com [25/08/2026 08:47] PwnedClaw: When someone creates an email account at a company like Carhartt, Microsoft 365 (which Carhartt uses for email) automatically creates the mailbox under multiple domain identities simultaneously: • carhartt.com (http://carhartt.com/) — the primary, human-facing domain (the one you'd put on a business card) • carhartt.onmicrosoft.com (http://carhartt.onmicrosoft.com/) — Microsoft's default domain, automatically assigned to every Microsoft 365 tenant, exists whether you want it or not • carhartt.mail.onmicrosoft.com (http://carhartt.mail.onmicrosoft.com/) — a routing domain Microsoft uses internally for mail flow All three resolve to the exact same person, the same inbox, the same [unique alias]. It's not three people — it's one person with three email addresses that all deliver to the same place. The inflation problem: when a breach dataset is exported or scraped, all three variants can appear as distinct rows because technically they are distinct email addresses, even though they represent a single individual. A naive deduplication (or none at all) counts [unique alias] three times instead of once. The fix HIBP applies is normalising to the primary domain and deduplicating on that — but it requires knowing which domains are Microsoft routing aliases, which isn't always obvious, and the breach data doesn't label them as such. I've previously removed these manually by regex'ing them out myself, but let's not repeat laborious tasks that can be automated away: [25/08/2026 15:39] Troy Hunt: Cool, delete all those from the file at "\scratch\Carhartt\Carhartt.txt" and we'll keep refining that until it's better sanitised. Tell me how many rows you remove as well. [25/08/2026 15:39] PwnedClaw: Done. Removed 5,736 rows, down from 13,306,258 to 13,300,522. Continuing the eyeballing work, another pattern emerges: [25/08/2026 15:41] Troy Hunt: I'm seeing a lot of addresses that begin with "deactivate-". How many are there and what can you tell me about this pattern? [25/08/2026 15:41] PwnedClaw: 288,982 of them. The pattern is clear: these are accounts that were deactivated in Carhartt's system (likely an e-commerce platform or loyalty/membership system), where instead of deleting the record, they prefixed the email address with deactivate- to mark it as inactive while preserving the row. It's a common soft-delete pattern — keeps the data for audit/history purposes but flags the account as no longer active. The implications for HIBP: • These are real email addresses that no longer exist in that form — deactivate-[unique alias]@carhartt.com is not a deliverable address • The real person's address is just [unique alias]@carhartt.com, which may already appear separately in the breach data • Notifying deactivate-* addresses would bounce or go nowhere Worth removing them, but worth checking first how many have a corresponding non-deactivated version in the file — if most do, they're pure duplicates and safe to drop. Want me to check that? [25/08/2026 15:42] Troy Hunt: How many already appear without that prefix? [25/08/2026 15:42] PwnedClaw: 285,808 of the 288,982 already have a non-prefixed version in the file — that's 99% pure duplicates. Only ~3,174 appear exclusively as deactivate- with no corresponding active address. [25/08/2026 15:43] Troy Hunt: Delete all the "deactivate-" prefixed addresses with corresponding active addresses, remove the prefix from the other ones and give me a new total count. [25/08/2026 15:43] PwnedClaw: Done. Removed 285,808 rows, renamed 3,174 rows, new total: 13,014,714. That's enough of human eyes, what else have we got? [25/08/2026 15:50] Troy Hunt: Review the remaining addresses - are there any remaining unusual patterns that frequently occurs? Small issues here and there don't matter, anything in the thousands or more? [25/08/2026 15:50] PwnedClaw: Two stand out: wctest.com — 48,787 rows Looks like a test domain used during development or QA. Not real customers. carharttdonotship.com — 32,514 rows The domain name says it all — this appears to be Carhartt's internal domain for flagging accounts they won't ship to (fraud, chargebacks, banned customers). Real people possibly, but deliberately excluded from Carhartt's operations and almost certainly not expecting breach notifications from their banned account email. Everything else looks like normal consumer email providers. Want to remove either or both of those? [25/08/2026 15:53] Troy Hunt: They also all seem to have "perftest" in the alias. Delete all these addresses. [25/08/2026 15:53] PwnedClaw: Done. Removed 48,787 rows, new total: 12,965,927. [25/08/2026 15:54] Troy Hunt: And the carharttdonotship.com addresses also have "perftest" in the aliases so let's drop all those too and give me a total remaining count. [25/08/2026 15:54] PwnedClaw: Done. Removed 32,514 rows, new total: 12,933,413. Not quite the 24M+ headline any more, that's almost half the addresses in the original corpus discarded because they don't represent actual people. Whilst nothing empirically bad would have happened if I'd loaded them all, the incident would have looked twice as bad as what it actually is (based on the raw numbers, at least), and when I later put out a tweet like this, the percentage of pre-existing addresses would have read way too low: New breach: Carhartt was the target of a ShinyHunters extortion campaign earlier this month. Data allegedly obtained from the company was later published, including 12.9M unique email addresses. 83% were already in @haveibeenpwned . Read more: https://t.co/Nfs0LT2Qto — Have I Been Pwned (@haveibeenpwned) August 25, 2026 But let's do one more AI-assisted sanity check, and I'm tending to ask this on each and every breach I process now: [25/08/2026 16:01] Troy Hunt: Based on the remaining email addresses alone, what can you see that gives you confidence this came from Carhartt? Explain with examples and equally, explain if there's any data that *disproves* Carhartt as the origin. [25/08/2026 16:01] PwnedClaw: Here's what the email addresses alone tell us: Evidence FOR Carhartt as the origin: • 15,057 @carhartt.com employee addresses — internal staff addresses don't end up in a dataset unless it came from Carhartt's own systems. You don't scrape these from the outside. • Hash-prefixed internal aliases like 004cab9722d948ae956d10ce31e7ed74[unique alias]@carhartt.com — that 32-character hex prefix before the surname is clearly a system-generated internal identifier, the kind of thing a CRM or e-commerce platform creates internally. Completely invisible externally. • carharttdonotship.com (now removed) — a domain that only makes sense if you're inside Carhartt's order management system. No external actor would know this domain exists, let alone have thousands of records under it. • wctest.com perftest data (now removed) — performance test data from what appears to be Carhartt's own WooCommerce implementation. Again, only accessible internally. • Demographically consistent — overwhelmingly US consumer email providers (Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, AOL, Comcast, sbcglobal, att.net (http://att.net/), verizon.net (http://verizon.net/)). Carhartt is a US workwear brand with a predominantly American customer base. The mix matches perfectly. Evidence AGAINST Carhartt as the sole/direct origin: • [unique alias]@state.mn.us — a government employee address. Plausible as a real Carhartt customer, but worth noting government addresses appearing in retail breach data is slightly unusual. • The sheer volume (12.9M) is large for a workwear retailer — possible the data aggregates multiple systems or years of records, or includes data from third-party partners like Ticketmaster-style fulfilment services. Overall the internal markers (employee addresses, hash aliases, internal test domains) are the smoking guns — those simply cannot come from anywhere other than Carhartt's own systems. [25/08/2026 16:14] Troy Hunt: Acknowledging the cases "for" and agreeing, I want to challenge both cases "against": Gov email addresses are *always* in data breaches. Even Ashley Madison (and similar). My wife tells me that Carhartt is not solely considered a "workwear retailer" and produces products that are worn well beyond just the building site. Review their website and see if your analysis needs revision: https://www.carhartt.com/ [25/08/2026 16:14] PwnedClaw: Withdrawn. 12.9M records is entirely plausible for Carhartt — they're a 130-year-old brand with massive mainstream appeal well beyond workwear. Streetwear culture adopted Carhartt heavily in the 90s and it's remained a genuine lifestyle brand since. The volume is consistent with a large, broad consumer base accumulated over many years of e-commerce. That objection doesn't hold up. Of course, anything AI says needs to be validated and in the cases above, that had already been done. I've included that transcript here anyway just to illustrate the due diligence involved in properly validating data, not just picking it up and chucking it in with a massive headline figure. But it does massively accelerate activities that were previously very manual: [26/08/2026 05:40] Troy Hunt: Looking at the final list of email addresses, what do the sub-addresses tell us about the origin? [26/08/2026 05:40] PwnedClaw: The sub-addresses are a goldmine for provenance. The dominant signal is clear: 1,072 +carhartt — people who tagged their address specifically when signing up at Carhartt. This is the single biggest tag and is an unambiguous origin marker. Combined with the typo variants (+carhart ×35, +carharrt ×14, +carhatt ×6, +carthartt ×4, +carh ×12) you've got ~1,150+ people who fingerprinted their Carhartt signup specifically. +paypal ×112, +pp ×10, +applepay ×8 — people who used PayPal/Apple Pay to check out at Carhartt, and tagged the email to that payment method. Strongly confirms this is a shopping/ecommerce dataset. +shopping ×28, +shop ×15, +orders ×9, +receipts ×4, +retail ×3 — generic purchase-tracking tags, consistent with an online store. +www.carhartt.com ×8, +carhartt.com ×8 — people who tagged the full domain. Explicit. +apple ×13 — likely Sign in with Apple or Apple Pay checkout. The picture is unambiguous: this is a legitimate Carhartt customer/order database, not a compiled list or credential stuffing corpus. People sub-addressed their emails at the point of purchase. That's about as strong a provenance signal as you can get. And so on and so forth. I don't need to labour the point with more examples, but let me come back around to the premise of this post: take headline numbers with a grain of salt unless you're confident in the processes of those making the claims. I'm fond of saying that whenever there are misleading statements made about breaches, "the truth is in the data", but you have to be willing to go and seek that truth out, even if it requires a significant investment in time.
troyhunt.comAug 25, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: AI Goes Rogue, Metabase 0-Day, MCP Supply-Chain Attacks, and Router Backdoors
A lot of security problems still begin with someone doing a completely normal thing. Cloning a repo. Answering a call. Leaving a box exposed. Trusting the default. That pretty much covers the mood this week. Old bugs are back, supply chains are getting stranger, and some exploit paths are so short you wonder what was supposed to stop them in the first place. That’s only part of it. Here’s everything else that made the Monday recap. ⚡ Threat of the Week Anthropic's Model Attempts to Poison Open-Source Project — A new evaluation conducted by the U.K. AI Security Institute (AISI) found that AI models with access to the internet reached out into the real world to target individuals and organizations autonomously across 10 of the total of 122 runs. Of 19 such actions recorded, 17 originated from Anthropic's Mythos 5 and the remaining two involved OpenAI's GPT-5.6-Sol with cyber classifiers. In the most serious case, Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 spent 34 hours trying to get a malware dropper merged into a real open-source project and engaged in social engineering by creating fake online identities and using them to pressure the project's maintainer to approve the code. Ultimately, a human maintainer caught and refused to approve the malicious code. "These attempts were unsuccessful, and our investigations have not evidenced any resulting real-world harm," AISI said. But this is the first time we have seen risks around autonomy and deception manifest this clearly, without specific prompting, in the real-world." Ransomware Encryption Dropped 38%. Here's What Attackers Do Instead Data Encrypted for Impact fell from 21% to 13% of samples in one year. Meanwhile, Process Injection held #1 for the third straight year and sandbox evasion surged to #4. The Red Report 2026 ranks the top 10 ATT&CK techniques and the behaviors to hunt for each. Read the Report ➝ 🔔 Top News Metabase 0-Day Exploited in Attacks — Metabase warned that a maximum-severity security flaw impacting its business intelligence and data visualization software package has been exploited in the wild as a zero-day. The vulnerability (CVSS score: 10.0), which does not carry a CVE identifier, allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary SQL into the Metabase application database, enabling them to gain administrator access to the instance. Armed with the elevated access, the attacker can change the application configuration, steal stored credentials for the connected databases, read any data accessible through those connections, and export data. One of the companies that has been affected is Framework. New Interrupt Injection Attack Bypass Spectre v2 Defenses on Intel and AMD CPUs — A group of researchers demonstrated a way to bypass defenses for the Spectre vulnerability impacting modern CPUs. "The defenses work by wiping or isolating the processor's prediction machinery, removing anything an attacker might have planted," MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) said. "The catch [...] is that the wipe and the moment the predictions get used can't happen at the same instant. There is always a gap — sometimes only a handful of instructions wide. Anything that runs in that gap can dirty the machinery all over again. The researchers call this class of attack TONTOU." The study found a reliable way to get code into that gap using a technique called Interrupt Injection to ultimately pull secrets out of memory. New CSS Attacks Can Break Webmail Defenses — New research demonstrated at the Black Hat conference last week detailed attack chains spanning Microsoft Outlook, Gmail, Fastmail, Proton Mail, Yahoo Mail, and AOL Mail that can capture passwords, take over third-party accounts, leak tokens, hijack trusted UI actions, and manipulate AI tools that read email. "Trouble is you can create discrepancies between what the sanitizer thinks is safe and what the browser actually renders," PortSwigger said. "Some webmail clients go a step further by letting the browser parse the HTML and CSS first, then filtering the browser's interpreted output rather than the original source. Yet even this can be mutated into something malicious." UNC6671 Vishing Attacks Target Financial Firms — A recent wave of cyber attacks targeting financial services, private equity, and professional services has been attributed to a data extortion group known as UNC6671. The attacks employ voice phishing to target enterprise employees and trick them into visiting spoofed login portals where adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) infrastructure intercepts credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens. The threat actors then leverage the captured data to establish session persistence and deploy automated Python and PowerShell scripts for data exfiltration from enterprise cloud environments and SaaS applications, including Microsoft 365 and Okta. UNC6671 has diversified its operations across multiple extortion brands including Redact, Pink (aka CL-CRI-1147), Helix, and Falcon (aka CL-CRI-1182). UNC6671 was previously said to have operated under the BlackFile (aka CL-CRI-1116) brand, targeting organizations via vishing and SSO compromise, before it was retired on May 11, 2026. Chinese-Made Zbtlink Routers Ship With Backdoor — An analysis of firmware associated with Chinese router manufacturer Zbtlink has unearthed a factory-shipped backdoor that's designed to phone home and run commands received from the server. The backdoors are designed such that they start automatically and attempt to beacon to Chinese command-and-control (C2) infrastructure as often as every 35 seconds. The backdoor is implanted in at least 20 router models. In response to the findings, Zbtlink reiterated that the "remote management component" is used only for after-sales technical support and to "assist customers with device troubleshooting and configuration only upon their explicit request and authorization." The company also said it has never been used for unauthorized access. The company also said it's developing and releasing firmware updates to address the issue. ️🔥 Trending CVEs Bugs drop weekly, and the gap between a patch and an exploit is shrinking fast. These are the heavy hitters for the week: high-severity, widely used, or already being poked at in the wild. Check the list, patch what you have, and hit the ones marked urgent first — CVE-2026-34348, CVE-2026-18497 (stb TrueType), CVE-2026-63508, CVE-2026-56162, CVE-2026-65667, CVE-2026-50515, CVE-2026-62830, CVE-2026-59115, CVE-2026-50481 (Microsoft Windows), CVE-2026-64638 (WordPress), CVE-2026-64564 (Linux SCTP), CVE-2026-56181 (Microsoft Windows NAT), CVE-2026-63913 (Linux), CVE-2026-64561 (Linux kernel), CVE-2026-20303, CVE-2026-20304, CVE-2026-20310, CVE-2026-20267, CVE-2026-20272 (Cisco), CVE-2026-18830 (AWS AgentCore), CVE-2026-18236 (Google ADK), CVE-2026-64650, CVE-2026-64651 (Vercel), CVE-2026-41679, GHSA-x8hx-rhr2-9rf7 (Paperclip), CVE-2026-58073, CVE-2026-58072 (Veeam), CVE-2026-16498, CVE-2026-16496, CVE-2026-14869 (HashiCorp), CVE-2026-15307 (GeoDjango), CVE-2026-64531 (Linux kernel Open vSwitch), CVE-2026-18577, CVE-2026-18556 (N-able N‑central), CVE-2026-59774 (Gitea), CVE-2026-58048 (cPanel), CVE-2026-17583 (Thermo Fisher Scientific), CVE-2026-8496 (Alinto SOGo), CVE-2026-65400 (Apple macOS Tahoe, macOS Sequoia, and macOS Sonoma), CVE-2026-19137, CVE-2026-19149, CVE-2026-19154, CVE-2026-19157, CVE-2026-19170, CVE-2026-19172 (Google Chrome), CVE-2013-3821 (Oracle PeopleSoft), CVE-2025-8943 (Flowise), and an SQL injection in Metabase. 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Build a Security Strategy for AI-Speed Development → AI is pushing software delivery far beyond the pace traditional security programs were designed for. This session shows security leaders how to govern AI-built software, reduce risk without slowing teams down, and build controls that scale with machine-speed development. Benchmark Your AI Coding Risk Against 300 Security and Engineering Leaders → AI coding is bringing more unvetted open source into production and expanding remediation debt. This session gives security and engineering leaders peer benchmarks, a data-backed framework for measuring business impact, and a clear view of which governance models are actually reducing risk. Build a Security Operations Strategy for Machine-Speed Attacks → AI can now find vulnerabilities, generate exploits, and build attack paths at machine speed. This session gives security leaders a practical framework to assess AI threat readiness, improve attack-surface visibility, and accelerate investigation and remediation before existing processes become the bottleneck. 📰 Around the Cyber World New Shai-Hulud Version Weaponizes the MCP Registry — A new version of the Shai-Hulud worm spread through the open-source ecosystems is equipped to deliver the payload via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Registry. "While earlier iterations of Shai-Hulud tampered with local AI coding client configs, this marks the first time we observed a Shai-Hulud payload being delivered directly through the official Model Context Protocol (MCP) Registry (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io)," OX Security said. The attack works like this: the npm and PyPI package linked by the MCP server is completely clean, but opening or cloning the linked MCP server GitHub repository ("jUXTAPOSITION1/V.A.P.E") inside Claude Code or VS Code triggers the malware, leading to the collection of developer tokens, cloud credentials, and session keys. The worm spread through 440 unique npm packages. China Launches Review of Palo Alto Networks — China's Cyberspace Administration (CAC) has announced it's conducting a review of Palo Alto Networks' products. "In order to ensure the safe and stable operation of critical information infrastructure, prevent hidden risks of network security, and safeguard national security, in accordance with the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China and the Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China, the Network Security Review Office implements network security review of products sold by Palo Alto in China in accordance with the 'Network Security Review Measures,'" the CAC said. Papyrus Uses Fake Novel Reading Apps for Ad Fraud — A new mobile ad fraud scheme dubbed Papyrus has been observed leveraging a "cluster of novel-reading applications that monetize users' reading sessions by running hidden browser activity in the background," Integral Ad Science said. "While users believe they're simply reading a story, the apps are secretly using their phone to visit websites, generate clicks, and create fake engagement behind the scenes. The apps present themselves as entertainment products built around long-form fiction and serialized stories, but IAS observed them covertly navigating to web domains under the direction of command-and-control infrastructure." Papyrus is built around BootNova, an orchestration layer that controls hidden browser activity inside the app. When the app runs, BootNova contacts remote command-and-control infrastructure for configuration. The remote configuration can control enablement, timing, geographic targeting, retry behavior, the number of WebViews to run, destination URLs, and the interaction logic applied to those pages. Papyrus has been linked to more than 800 domains and nearly 8,000 unique hostnames. Estimated $30M Stolen in Violent Crypto Attacks in 2026 — An estimated $30 million is said to have been stolen in violent "wrench attacks" in 2026, according to Chainalysis. "Home invasions now account for 37% of incidents in 2026, up from 26% in 2023," it said. "Kidnappings have remained relatively stable year-over-year (YoY) in terms of share of total attacks." In contrast, annual value stolen in violent attacks peaked at $58 million in 2025. 26 Ransomware Attacks Per Day in July 2026 — According to Comparitech, July 2026 saw nearly 26 ransomware attacks per day, up from 22 per day in June. The number of ransomware attacks jumped from 668 in June to 799 in July. "The education sector saw a significant increase (up 44%), as did finance companies (up 71%), tech firms (up 62%), and businesses operating within the healthcare sector, e.g. pharmaceutical manufacturers and medical billing providers (up 46%)," Comparitech said. The most prolific groups were The Gentlemen (135), Qilin (125), DragonForce (41), INC (36), and CRPx0 (33). Device Code Phishing Evasion Techniques Detailed — Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said it identified four evasion techniques that are currently being used in device code phishing campaigns. This includes CAPTCHA gates, multi-step flows that go through multiple SaaS hosting platforms separating the initial link from the phishing content to evade URL reputation checks, blob URL delivery, and the use of Cyrillic characters in place of Latin letters, zero-width spaces, and strings inside tags to break content-based detection. From LLMJacking to Token Jacking — A growing number of security incidents involving AI token jacking have resulted in financial losses for victims. "The financial loss comes from criminals gaining access to API keys used by legitimate developers for access to popular AI platforms," Unit 42 said. "The unrelenting frenzy of AI adoption and soaring costs of model access are converging into an irresistible opportunity for cybercriminals. Premium pricing on scarce AI processing power means stolen access via tokens can generate a quick and easy profit for attackers. Complex, patchwork billing management and limitless scaling by default can lead to massive financial losses in short periods." ScarCruft Leverages RokRAT in New Attacks — Spear-phishing emails disguised as materials for actual academic events and seminars are being used to deliver RokRAT, a remote access trojan linked to a North Korean group known as ScarCruft. "Although the file was disguised as a PDF, it actually delivered a malicious ISO file through a cloud storage link," Genians said. "The ISO contained an executable disguised as a PDF document, using the '.pdf,' '.pif' extension to induce the user to run it. The attack loaded the shellcode payload into memory and injected a RokRAT variant into a process." Kimsuky Uses New Gomir Variant — Speaking of North Korean threat groups, the threat actor tracked as Kimsuky is said to have gained control of internet-facing servers through vulnerability exploitation and spear-phishing and deployed a new variant of a backdoor called Gomir, a Linux variant of the Windows-based GoBear backdoor. "Kimsuky developed Gomir variants with significantly altered C2 communication methods to evade detection, including leveraging Google Drive as a C2 channel and implementing a new custom protocol," ENKI said. In at least one case in December 2025, the threat actor has been found deploying HttpTroy, which is then used to install additional tools, including DWAgent and a proxy tool. Kimsuky has also been observed setting up local large language model (LLM) environments using Ollama, GPT4All, and Msty to augment its operations and target foreign diplomatic missions, as well as the military, security, and virtual asset sectors. The attacks have leveraged Git-based repositories as C2 and distribution channels for encrypted AsyncRAT payloads. The activity has been codenamed Operation GitPower, citing similarities with FlowerPower. Last year, the group was tied to campaigns that involved abusing OpenAI's ChatGPT to forge deepfake military ID cards in a spear-phishing campaign against South Korean defense-affiliated entities and other individuals focused on North Korean affairs, such as researchers, human rights activists, and journalists. Conclusion Maybe the real problem is not that security keeps failing in surprising ways. It’s that the “surprising” part usually disappears the moment someone shows how little it took. That’s worth remembering. Attackers do not need perfect conditions. They just need one assumption nobody checked, one shortcut nobody revisited, or one old weakness that quietly stayed useful.
thehackernews.comAug 10, 2026extracted
New CSS Attacks Can Break Webmail Defenses to Steal Passwords and Tokens
New research shows content inside an email can escape its message boundary and interfere with the webmail interface. Across attack chains spanning Outlook, Gmail, Fastmail, Proton Mail, Yahoo Mail, and AOL Mail, the techniques can capture passwords, take over third-party accounts, leak tokens, hijack trusted UI actions, and manipulate AI tools that read email. PortSwigger researcher Gareth Heyes presented the work at Black Hat USA 2026. One Outlook/Firefox chain spoofs a Microsoft sign-in screen and captures the password a recipient types. A Yahoo/AOL paste race can expose a Medium email-login token and let an attacker sign in as the victim. A Gmail/Cowork chain can exfiltrate a Slack token after prompt injection and user interaction. The paper presents proof-of-concept research and does not report malicious exploitation. Public PoCs remain available as of August 8. The researcher said Fastmail fixed two CSS mutation bugs and a Proton Mail proxy bypass stopped working when he retested it, while Outlook label-jacking and Gmail's image-set() bypass still worked when the research was published on August 6. The paper does not state whether the full Outlook password-capture chain was fixed. For webmail providers, the paper recommends isolating HTML email in sandboxed iframes and tightly restricting CSS, custom attributes, select menus, and image requests. The research follows two paths: abuse HTML and CSS that webmail already allows, or create a discrepancy between what a sanitizer approves and what the browser or application ultimately creates. Both can cross the boundary between an untrusted message and its trusted interface. Outlook shows how the pieces can combine. Allowed label elements can trigger controls outside the message, while application JavaScript can turn sanitized custom attributes into new DOM nodes carrying CSS outside the sanitizer's allow list. A media-query parsing trick then gave the attacker arbitrary CSS. The chain disguises a select element as a password field, and Firefox resets its roughly one-second option-selection timer when the select moves offscreen, making capture real-time. Yahoo Mail and AOL Mail exposed a different route. In Firefox, pasted HTML could briefly retain active CSS before sanitization. In the Medium demonstration, the attacker initiates an email-login flow, the victim copies attacker-supplied CSS to the clipboard, and then pastes it into a Yahoo or AOL draft. The resulting requests reveal enough of the 12-character login token for the attacker's server to reconstruct it, which can then be used to sign in as the victim. The paper also introduces a click-based exfiltration technique for cases where Content Security Policy (CSP) blocks external resources. Given style injection and a numeric token rendered as text in the email, CSS can determine which digits occur and how often, hide non-matching links, and leave the matching link across the page. A victim click sends the digits and their frequency to the attacker's server. AI-connected email creates another route. Gmail's image-set() fallback could make an external request despite sanitization. Heyes and PortSwigger colleague Pete Hendy chained it to an indirect prompt-injection email processed by Anthropic's Claude Cowork through a connected Gmail connector. In the demonstrated setup, after the attacker triggered a Slack token confirmation email and the victim asked Cowork to process the emails, the injected instructions caused it to retrieve the token and place it in an HTML draft; viewing the draft leaked it. A Fastmail demonstration targeted OpenAI's Atlas AI browser. CSS pseudo-elements and opacity made the human see harmless text while the model read hidden instructions. When the user asked Atlas to translate the visible text, the hidden prompt caused it to open tabs and encode the victim's name in URL fragments. OpenAI is deprecating Atlas and says it is scheduled to stop working on August 9, 2026. Other findings include Fastmail "CSS hotwiring," which can redirect clicks into unintended and multi-step UI actions. An escaped-backslash Fastmail image-proxy bypass relies on an allow-listed user.fm domain to reveal when an email is viewed. Heyes separately demonstrated a Proton Mail vector that exposed the recipient's IP address. Proton's current tracker-protection documentation says the service is designed to hide a user's personal IP address and exact email-open time. The accompanying public repository contains PoCs for the disclosed techniques. The defensive guidance starts with strict isolation, then character allow lists for CSS validation, checks for CSS gadgets before allowing custom attributes, blocking select menus and dangerous selectors, and preventing attacker-controlled image requests and allow-listed domains.
thehackernews.comAug 8, 2026extracted
Phishing service spoofs RingCentral to steal Microsoft 365 accounts
The Greatness phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform has expanded from credential phishing to adversary-in-the-middle attacks and device-code phishing targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. The platform has been active since at least mid-2022, targeting Microsoft 365 users in the United States, Canada, the UK, Australia, and South Africa. It evolved over the years and now targets multiple platforms, including Microsoft 365, iCloud, Yahoo, and Google Workspace. Currently, it is sold for $289 per month to cybercriminals over a Telegram channel with thousands of subscribers. In a recent campaign observed by researchers at email security company ZeroBEC, Greatness operators abused the RingCentral communications platform to bypass email security filters on the recipient side. RingCentral is a communications platform used by businesses for services such as cloud calling, messaging, and voicemail. In the Greatness phishing activity, the attacker impersonated the platform by claiming their emails came from service@ringcentral[.]com, targeting actual users of the service. These emails used fake voicemail and performance-review notifications as lures to entice recipients to open them. Although the messages originated from an unknown IONOS mail server, failed SPF and DMARC checks, and had no DKIM signature, they were still accepted by the receiving systems because RingCentral was whitelisted. Moreover, the emails included a fraudulent banner claiming that the sender had been verified by the organization’s safe-sender list, which helped reduce suspicion at the human level. ZeroBEC explains that the tactic achieved a Spam Confidence Level (SCL) of -1 on Microsoft Exchange, allowing them to bypass the normal email filtering stages. Clicking the button embedded in those emails took victims to the Greatness infrastructure, where they were routed either through a Microsoft adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing flow that captured an MFA-approved authentication token or through a device-code phishing flow. Post-compromise, the attacker replayed Microsoft 365 authentication tokens from VPS and commercial VPN infrastructure to access the compromised accounts. They then enumerated Outlook mailboxes, Teams conversations, SharePoint sites, OneDrive files, contacts, calendars, and registered applications through Microsoft Graph, with access persisting for more than two weeks in some cases. It should be noted that RingCentral recently disclosed a data breach incident which was claimed by threat actor ShinyHunters. “This incident has affected data for a limited portion of RingCentral customers, and we are communicating with affected customers directly,” explained the company in a security bulletin published July 28. ZeroBEC comments that it’s likely that cybercriminals using Greatness got a list of valid targets, users of the RingCentral platform, from that incident, though a connection cannot be confidently made. The researchers recommend auditing safe-sender lists and replacing blanket domain exclusions with rules requiring valid email authentication. Also, hunt for Greatness infrastructure and suspicious MFA-approved Microsoft 365 sign-ins from hosting or VPN addresses. If compromise is suspected, administrators should revoke all access and refresh tokens, review OAuth consent, Microsoft Graph activity, and access to Microsoft 365 services. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comAug 4, 2026extracted
Greatness PhaaS Adds Device Code Phishing to Bypass MFA and Steal Tokens
The commercial phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) toolkit known as Greatness has become the latest crimeware solution to add support for device code phishing, a rapidly growing cyber threat that abuses the legitimate OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and seize control of user accounts. "Greatness supports AiTM [adversary-in-the-middle] credential and token theft, device code phishing, and OAuth consent abuse, all from the same operator panel and shared backend infrastructure," ZeroBEC said in a report shared with The Hacker News detailing the PhaaS kit's latest capabilities. "The platform now supports AiTM token theft, device code phishing, OAuth consent abuse, and multiple target platforms, including iCloud, Yahoo, and Google Workspace. This evolution reflects the broader trend of PhaaS platforms expanding from simple credential harvesting to integrated attack ecosystems." The phishing platform was first publicly documented by Cisco Talos in May 2023, highlighting how threat actors are incorporating it in their attacks to target Microsoft 365 business users since at least mid-2022. Designed as a way to lower the barrier of entry for cybercrime, access to Greatness is facilitated through a subscription available on its public-facing Telegram channel (@GreatnessPage) that has more than 3,250 subscribers and serves as a central hub for announcements and feature updates. Aspiring cybercriminals can obtain a subscription starting from $289 per month, up from the $120 per month figure reported back in January 2024. The subscription provides access to an operator that includes a dashboard with campaign statistics, domain configuration, CAPTCHA selection, and over 11 downloadable lure templates covering voicemail, document sharing, and QR codes, among others. Operator registration, license provisioning, and support are offered via a dedicated Telegram bot (@gr8managerbot), while licenses can be procured or renewed by sending a message to the "@greatnessmgr" account, the developer handle that oversees operator support and platform development. In a post shared in November 2025, the operators of the Telegram channel claim that Greatness keeps stolen cookies safe and secure via one-way hash protection and that the information can be extracted only by the customers with their Telegram account 2FA code - When you logged in with your telegram account and you insert 2FA in your side will create a token that only can access your logs so be sure only person can access is you as you see all info is hashed. Only way is accessing your telegram account so keep it safe and everything will be fine! The most important thing for any service user is privacy. We respect all users' privacy because we have been in this business for 8 years and prioritize everything to provide you the best experience. Unlike others, we are always honest with our customers. Those who purchase a subscription by providing their Telegram chat ID and a bot API token can access the panel through an "O365 Panel" login page that requires a user ID and a 9-character license key. Upon successful registration, customers are provisioned with a dashboard and an operator-specific domain in the format: "api-[token].[base-domain]." The dashboard is a one-stop shop that offers comprehensive campaign statistics, including the cookies captured and a heat map of victims. It also includes a links configuration page to select their phishing domain, CAPTCHA type, background theme, and the method for saving cookies, while the attachments section provides more than 11 downloadable and ready-to-use phishing lure templates that are packaged as ZIP files. "Observed templates include: AudioLogin, ChatAssistance, WindowsExplorer, Voicemail, OneDrive, QR, VideoPlayer, and additional variants," ZeroBEC said. "Each template contains pre-built HTML, PDF redirectors, SVGs, and letter templates, lowering the barrier to entry so operators do not need to build lures from scratch." Victims who end up interacting with a booby-trapped link embedded in the phishing email traverse through a five-stage redirect chain that implements anti-analysis protections, User-Agent fingerprinting, and a CAPTCHA gate, before taking them to the final destination, which can be either an AiTM proxy or a device code endpoint. The device code phishing branch is a new addition to Greatness, allowing cybercriminals to leverage the OAuth device authorization grant flow to silently obtain tokens without user interaction. "The first big shift was adversary-in-the-middle phishing, where a proxy site sits between the user and Microsoft and relays the login in real time to capture the session cookie," Trend Micro said in an analysis published late last month. "Device code phishing is the next step, and in some ways, it is cleaner for the attacker. There is no fake login site to build or to get blocked, and there is nothing visually wrong for the user to notice, because the page they enter their password on really is Microsoft. The only unusual thing is a short code and a plausible reason to enter it." Recent campaigns relying on the PhaaS kit have used spoofed RingCentral voicemail lures that bypass email gateways by taking advantage of safe sender exclusions and land on the victims' inbox despite failing SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks. This, in turn, exploits the fact that the target is a legitimate RingCentral customer. While threat actors have impersonated RingCentral in various phishing campaigns in the past, the latest set of attacks adds a new dimension. "The emails are not merely impersonating RingCentral; they are exploiting the trust configuration that exists because the target is an actual RingCentral customer," ZeroBEC said. "Any vendor breach that exposes a customer list simultaneously exposes which organizations are likely to have that vendor's domain on their safe sender lists. Defenders should treat vendor breach disclosures as a trigger to audit and tighten email exclusion rules for the affected vendor's domains." An analysis of post-compromise activity shows that harvested authentication tokens are replayed within minutes from dedicated proxy infrastructure, followed by enumerating various victim Microsoft 365 resources, such as Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, Exchange, OneDrive, contacts, calendars, and other registered applications, via the Microsoft Graph API. ZeroBEC said it observed one of the AiTM proxy IP addresses ("38.248.95[.]214") actively authenticating against a victim's Microsoft 365 account more than two weeks after the initial phishing campaign, indicating how the prolonged validity of the tokens can grant attackers continued access for extended periods. Other post-compromise actions recorded by Microsoft in conjunction with device code phishing attacks involve the threat actor registering new devices within minutes of the breach to generate a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for long-term persistence, and waiting several hours before setting up malicious inbox rules or exfiltrating sensitive email data to avoid immediate detection. The development comes as phishing continues to be the primary initial access vector, with attackers ramping up cascaded phishing campaigns, where the trust associated with a legitimate, compromised account is leveraged to launch hyper-personalized lures aimed at partners and third parties. Greatness is far from the only PhaaS kit to add device code phishing. In recent months, campaigns have combined Tycoon 2FA kit tradecraft with OAuth device code authorization flows despite a global law enforcement operation that disrupted 330 domains associated with the phishing service. "The device code phishing pages employ CAPTCHAs and use multi-hop redirect chains through legitimate infrastructure providers before the actual phishing page is shown," Okta said back in May 2026. "Recent device code phishing pages also employ similar anti-analysis techniques as Tycoon to attempt to deflect analysis." Device code phishing attacks can be prevented by blocking the authentication method at a global level in Conditional Access Policies. It's also advised to move to phishing-resistant MFA methods and teach employees to distrust unexpected codes. "If this flow is required in very specific use cases, those users/resources should be explicitly excluded from the policies," LevelBlue noted. "The permitted usage of this flow shall be continuously audited and revoked as soon as it's no longer necessary."
thehackernews.comAug 4, 2026extracted
New Project CAV3RN module abuses Outlook calendar events for C2 and DNS AAAA records for configuration recovery
Introduction In June 2026, as part of our Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reporting service, we published extensive research on Project CAV3RN, a sophisticated modular framework used for cyberespionage activity against targets in Israel. We have been tracking this cluster since December 2025, and in late April 2026, we observed a major architectural shift: the developers moved from a three-component framework consisting of a downloader, executor, and uploader to a controller-based architecture with a dedicated WebSocket-enabled C2 communication component and a more extensible plugin system designed to support modular post-exploitation capabilities. Subsequently, Check Point Research publicly reported on the same controller-based architecture in July 2026. However, neither our previous research nor the subsequent public reporting covered the latest communication component analyzed in this report. Following our June 2026 publication, we identified a .NET Native AOT communication module that is apparently designed to replace the previous HTTP/WebSocket component. It exchanges commands and results through Outlook calendar events accessed via Microsoft Graph. If Microsoft Graph authentication or tenant validation fails, the module attempts to retrieve replacement connection settings through DNS AAAA responses. During the preparation of this report, additional public research covering this communication component became available. The research presented in our article is based on our independent analysis and includes several additional implementation details that complement the existing public reporting. Technical details The previously reported controller-based CAV3RN architecture separates C2 communication from command execution. The controller, uxtheme.dll, generates and maintains the seven-character Agent ID, manages the polling loop, processes built-in commands, and dispatches other tasks or commands to separate plugins. The previously used communication component, n-HTCommp.dll, retrieved commands and transmitted execution results over HTTP/WebSocket. The module performs the same communication role but uses Outlook calendar events accessed through Microsoft Graph. Similarly to the previous version, its get and send interface and use of the same controller-generated Agent ID suggest that it was designed to replace the previous communication component. However, because the corresponding updated controller was not recovered, this replacement role is assessed rather than directly observed. C2 communication module The communication module, AzureCommunication.dll, is a DLL compiled with .NET Native AOT, consistent with several other components of the Project CAV3RN framework that are publicly documented. Such a compilation method turns the managed application into native machine code and removes most of the metadata and intermediate language that normally make .NET assemblies straightforward to analyze. The module exposes its functionality through a single export named QueryInterface. We expect an updated controller to load the DLL, resolve this export, and pass it a null-terminated UTF-16 string. The accepted input format closely follows the interface used by the previously documented CAV3RN controller. The _;;_ delimiter separates the operation from its arguments, while _,_ separates the arguments. For get, the module only uses the first argument as the Agent ID. For send, it uses only the Agent ID and the result. In both cases, the additional legacy URL is ignored. It remains part of the interface for compatibility with the controller, even though the new module obtains its destination and credentials from its own Microsoft Graph configuration. Outlook calendar events as a C2 channel The DLL contains a complete default configuration, including the Microsoft Entra tenant ID, application credentials, target mailbox, DNS bootstrap host, and cryptographic keys required to establish communication. Before processing either get or send operation, the module looks for a relative file named logAzure.txt. Because the code supplies only a filename, Windows resolves it against the current working directory of the process hosting the DLL. If logAzure.txt exists, the module reads and deserializes it. If it is absent, the module builds the configuration from the hardcoded values and writes the complete object to disk with the following structure: Using the resulting configuration, the module creates a Microsoft Graph client and validates access by requesting the tenant’s organization record through a GET request to https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/organization. Attempting this request causes the Azure Identity library to obtain an OAuth application token: After successful authentication, the module includes the token in subsequent Graph requests using the Authorization: Bearer header. The module uses the default calendar of the configured mailbox as a dead-drop channel. Commands, heartbeats, and results all occupy the same fixed one-hour window 2050-05-13 22:00–23:00 UTC. Scheduling the events for 2050 makes them unlikely to appear in ordinary calendar views. The calendar event subject identifies each event’s purpose and associated Agent ID. Heartbeat and result subjects append the fixed suffix 1500 to this value; the suffix is not part of the Agent ID. Receiving a command For a get request, the module queries calendarView and filters the results by the Agent ID: If Graph returns one or more matches, the module selects the first returned event and requests its attachments: After obtaining the attachment response, the module deletes the calendar event: Our analysis found a consistent difference in capitalization between command and result attachments: Inbound command decryption Inbound commands use a combination of RSA and AES-GCM encryption. Once the attachments have been sorted and concatenated, the reconstructed encrypted command buffer begins with a 256-byte RSA-encrypted block containing the 32-byte AES key. The communication module decrypts this block with the RSA private key stored in its configuration, using RSA-OAEP with SHA-256. The following 12 bytes contain the AES-GCM nonce, while the final 16 bytes contain the authentication tag. Everything between the nonce and tag is ciphertext. The module uses the recovered AES key to decrypt and authenticate this ciphertext with AES-256-GCM. After RSA-OAEP-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM decryption, the 63-byte ciphertext produces {"cid": "alXBCzcDl8hBuNE", "type": "self", "cmd": "003_;;__,_"}. The cid field appears to serve as a unique command-correlation identifier. As described in a previous publication of the framework, when the operator sets the JSON type field to self, the controller routes the command to its internal handler rather than dispatching it to an external plugin. In this command, the cmd field contains 003_;;__,_, where command 003 instructs the controller to toggle debug logging. After decryption, the communication module returns the complete command to the external controller through QueryInterface. Sending command output For a send request, the controller passes the command output to the communication module. The module encrypts the output using a newly generated AES-256-GCM key and protects that key with the configured RSA public key. It then divides the encrypted payload into chunks of up to 10 MiB. To publish the result, the module creates a calendar event with the temporary subject d and attempts to add each encrypted chunk as a sequentially named attachment, such as File0.txt and File1.txt. After adding the attachments, it changes the subject to Boss Report ID: 1500, marking the event as a completed result. This process uses the following sequence of Microsoft Graph requests: Together, the uploaded attachments contain fragments of one encrypted result package: the RSA-encrypted AES key, AES-GCM nonce, encrypted command output, and authentication tag. Recovering outbound results requires the private key corresponding to the outbound public key. This private key is assessed to be held separately by the attacker. Heartbeat handling The module maintains a heartbeat event identified by the subject Boss update ID: 1500. The module searches the same fixed calendar window for a previous heartbeat associated with the agent. If one exists, the module deletes it and creates a replacement event with the temporary subject d through the following sequence of Microsoft Graph requests: Finally, it updates the newly created event through the following PATCH request, replacing the temporary subject d with Boss update ID: 1500. Heartbeat events use the same one-hour window in 2050 but contain no attachments. The following figure summarizes the module’s operational workflow. DNS AAAA configuration recovery mechanism When OAuth token acquisition or the subsequent GET /v1.0/organization validation request fails, the module attempts to retrieve replacement TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, and UserEmail values through actor-controlled AAAA responses. The module uses cloudlanecdn[.]com as its configuration-recovery domain. The domain is delegated to four actor-controlled authoritative nameservers, ns1 through ns4.cloudlanecdn[.]com, allowing the operator to generate different AAAA responses according to the Agent ID, configuration field, and fragment offset. The module submits the generated DNS queries through the operating system’s configured recursive resolver, which follows the domain’s delegation to one of the authoritative nameservers. The returned IPv6 address is treated as a 16-byte container for protocol data rather than as a network destination. For both get and send operations, the controller supplies the seven-character Agent ID as the first argument to QueryInterface. The communication module converts its UTF-8 bytes into two-character uppercase hexadecimal values. For example, SFmLgQZ becomes 53 46 6D 4C 67 51 5A, which the module concatenates as 53466D4C67515A. The hexadecimal identifier is then embedded in every recovery query. The module retrieves four Microsoft Graph configuration values in a fixed order, with each value assigned a numeric index: Determining the field length through .p. queries For each configuration value (TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, and UserEmail), the module first sends an AAAA query to determine the value’s total length: d. . .p. . In this format, is the uppercase hexadecimal representation of the Agent ID supplied by the controller. The identifies the requested configuration value according to the table above; for example, index 0 represents TenantId. The p marker indicates a length request, while contains the configured DNS recovery domain, cloudlanecdn[.]com. As an example, the following AAAA DNS query requests the length of the TenantId associated with Agent ID SFmLgQZ: The AAAA response 2001:24:1234:5678:9abc:def0:1122:3344 corresponds to the byte sequence 20 01 00 24 12 34 56 78 9A BC DE F0 11 22 33 44. The module discards the first two bytes and interprets the following two bytes, 00 24, as a big-endian field length. This produces the value 0x0024, or 36 bytes. The remaining 12 bytes are ignored. The initial 2001 group is not treated as a network destination or strictly validated as a protocol marker; it simply occupies the two bytes that the module discards. In the observed example, the same process produced a 36-byte TenantId, a 36-byte ClientId, a 40-byte ClientSecret, and a 28-byte UserEmail. The protocol itself supports other lengths because each value’s length is supplied dynamically by its .p. response. To illustrate this process, we reproduced the protocol in a controlled environment using a laboratory domain. Retrieving configuration data through .q. queries After obtaining the field length from the .p. response, the module allocates a buffer of exactly that size and initializes an offset to 0. It then requests the field data using the following format: d. . . .q. . The identifies the requested configuration value, while specifies where the fragment belongs in the output buffer. After checking for the sentinel address, the module discards the first two bytes of each normal .q. response and copies up to 14 of the remaining bytes. For the final response, it copies only the bytes required to reach the declared field length. Queries continue at 14-byte offsets until the declared field length has been recovered. The following figure shows the three .q. requests required to reconstruct a 36-byte TenantId. In our laboratory responses, the first two bytes appear as the IPv6 group 2001 and are discarded. The responses at offsets 0 and 14 each provide 14 bytes, while the response at offset 28 supplies the final eight bytes. Concatenating and decoding these fragments produces the complete TenantId, 6f9d2a41-8c73-4b56-a1e8-2d407c95f3ab, as shown in the example figure. The module repeats this procedure for ClientId, ClientSecret, and UserEmail. After reconstructing each value, it decodes the buffer as UTF-8, updates the corresponding configuration field, and writes the complete configuration to logAzure.txt. Once all four fields have been recovered, the module creates a new Graph client, repeats the /organization validation request, and resumes the original get or send operation if validation succeeds. The DNS recovery mechanism updates only the TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, and UserEmail fields. It does not replace the configured DNS recovery host, RSA public or private keys, offering limited rotation for updating the domain itself that is used within the DNS fallback mechanism. Failure handling and the sentinel AAAA response In this module, the hard-coded IPv6 address 2001:4998:44:3507::8000 acts as a failure sentinel. After resolving an AAAA query, the module converts the first returned address to a string and compares it with this value before extracting any bytes. If the values match, it raises an exception and does not interpret the response as either a field length or configuration data. The address belongs to Yahoo’s 2001:4998::/32 allocation. We could not determine why the developers selected it. The authoritative backend may return it for an unknown Agent ID, an unavailable field, an invalid index or offset, or an agent for which recovery is disabled. These conditions remain hypothetical because the backend was unavailable and the module handles every sentinel response in the same way. Infrastructure Historical DNS data shows that cloudlanecdn[.]com was registered on December 24, 2025. The domain initially used the Namecheap-operated nameservers dns1.registrar-servers.com and dns2.registrar-servers.com. On May 2, 2026, passive DNS first observed a transition from these vendor-managed nameservers to custom nameservers under cloudlanecdn[.]com. Although the domain was delegated to four nameserver hostnames, their shared IP addresses reveal logical redundancy rather than four independently hosted DNS servers. The shift from vendor‑managed DNS to custom in‑bailiwick authoritative nameservers aligns with the module’s DNS recovery design. The DNS timeline overlaps with this new module’s development. Passive DNS first recorded the custom delegation on May 2, after the controller-and-plugin architecture was observed in April and before the May 19 timestamp stored in the new module. Because the custom authoritative infrastructure supports the module’s recovery protocol, we assess with moderate confidence that the infrastructure and module were prepared as part of the same development cycle. Attribution In our previous report, we attributed Project CAV3RN to OilRig (APT34) with low confidence. Analysis of the newly identified module provides additional evidence supporting this link. Microsoft-hosted services for C2 Several OilRig malware strains have used Microsoft-hosted services for C2. RDAT malware exchanged commands and results through EWS email messages, and there are cases reported with the SC5k malware using Office 365 drafts, and OilCheck malware using Microsoft Graph to access Outlook drafts. CAV3RN uses the same class of service but stores commands and results in Outlook calendar events. Secondary recovery mechanism for cloud C2 ESET previously documented OilBooster, which retrieved a replacement OAuth refresh token from a likely compromised website after repeated failures communicating with Microsoft OneDrive. OilBooster used HTTP to recover a refresh token, whereas CAV3RN uses DNS AAAA records to recover four configuration fields. In both cases, the secondary mechanism restores access to the primary cloud C2 channel. Compromised regional infrastructure OilRig has previously used compromised infrastructure belonging to organizations in the regions it targets. Solar malware communicated through the compromised website of an Israeli human-resources company, while Whisper/Veaty malware used compromised Iraqi government Microsoft 365 mailboxes. The CAV3RN module similarly uses a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox belonging to an Israeli law firm. Based on the evidence discussed above, we retain our low-confidence assessment that Project CAV3RN is associated with OilRig. The new module shares several behavioral patterns with previously reported OilRig tooling, including the use of Microsoft-hosted services, attachment-based command exchange, and a secondary mechanism for restoring access to a cloud C2 channel. However, we identified no direct code reuse or infrastructure overlap. Conclusions The new module extends CAV3RN’s controller-and-plugin architecture with a Microsoft Graph-based communication transport. Its architectural continuity suggests that it was designed to replace the previous HTTP/WebSocket component with Outlook calendar events. If Graph authentication or validation fails, its DNS recovery protocol is designed to retrieve replacement connection settings. The framework changed repeatedly between December 2025 and May 2026, indicating that development remains active. We continue to track this activity. Indicators of compromise Additional IoCs are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at [email protected]. File hashes CAF021DDA726B8BA049C2AA395E505A1 AzureCommunication.dll C092B02FBC0FDF7EE9608DD016673806 NewProject.dll 29B2B8C5D99F05BFCDD0D8D976EB5678 AzureCommunication.dll
securelist.comJul 21, 2026extracted
Forg365 PhaaS Targets Microsoft 365 with Device Code and AitM Session Theft
A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing lures that make use of legitimate email delivery infrastructure, such as Amazon Simple Email Service (Amazon SES) and Twilio SendGrid, to imitate a redirection chain that blends into regular email traffic before it ends in Forg365-controlled domains. "The panel exposes a mature operator workflow: accounts, links, invitations, OAuth app configuration, redirect links, SVG generation, campaign sending, SMTP profiles, SMTP rotation, AI email generation, token vaulting, account intelligence, keyword alerts, viewer links, and browser-extension support," ZeroBEC said. The email security company said the PhaaS kit is best understood as similar to the Kali365 (aka Octopi365 and Freedom365) and Sneaky 2FA ecosystem, reflecting the industrialization of the business model, which is now combining bringing together lure creation, delivery, evasion, token/session handling, and post-compromise operations under a subscription-based setup that allows even threat actors with little-to-no technical expertise to orchestrate phishing campaigns with minimal effort and at scale. Attack chains using Forg365 have been observed using business document-themed or remittance approval lures to trick recipients into clicking on malicious links. The sender domain uses Amazon SES for delivery, while the message body contains SendGrid-hosted images or tracking resources. Customers who successfully complete Telegram registration utilize an operator panel accessible over the clearnet ("logfriend[.]com/login"), from where they can generate lures, set up campaigns, and manage captured tokens. "Forg365 includes a device-auth phishing branch that presents a Microsoft-styled verification code page and pushes the victim into a legitimate Microsoft Authentication Broker sign-in flow," ZeroBEC explained. "The victim sees real Microsoft authentication surfaces, but the code authorizes an attacker-controlled session." For AitM phishing, the platform employs route tokens, session cookies, and traffic classification to determine whether to serve phishing content or a benign decoy. If a VPN connection is detected, the kit redirects to innocuous decoy content instead of exposing the phishing pages. A notable aspect of the Forg365 platform is that it offers an extension named ForgCookie for Chromium-based browsers like Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Brave that is designed for continued access to the compromised accounts. Described as an "automatic SSO cookie refresh for Microsoft services," the add-on acts as an intermediary between the token acquisition and browser access by cycling through the steps listed below - Requests account data from the Forg365 backend Calls the cookie-generation endpoint for a selected account Clears Microsoft session cookies Injects the generated refresh-token credential cookie into the Microsoft login domain Triggers a silent OAuth flow Captures resulting Microsoft cookies across Microsoft domains Forg365's extends beyond simple credential and token harvesting to facilitate a wide array of post-compromise actions, including monitoring for specific keywords in compromised email accounts and drafting a message response to a particular email thread using assistance from AI. "The result is a platform that lowers the skill threshold while increasing operational consistency. Less experienced affiliates can use prebuilt templates, while more capable operators can customize landing pages, rotate infrastructure, manage tokens, generate cookie material, and monitor compromised accounts," ZeroBEC said. The disclosure coincides with the discovery of various campaigns that have been found to employ phishing kits for credential theft - Sending fake Microsoft account activity alerts from a legitimate-but-compromised third-party SaaS sender account to direct users to Sneaky 2FA-style phishing pages to launch a redirection chain that leads to the final phishing host, but not before performing checks to decide whether the visitor is a real user. Using phishing emails that direct recipients to a website hosted on Canva, which then triggers the device code phishing flow to hijack Microsoft accounts using the Kali65 phishing kit. The kit supports over 33 different lures, a payout pipeline, and a desktop application called OctoLink Live (aka Kali365 Live) that abuses the stolen token to launch a Chromium browser session and open the victim's mailbox in OWA, OneDrive, SharePoint, or admin.microsoft.com. The platform also offers a tool known as OctoLink Sender to mass-send phishing emails from the breached account to other contacts, a technique called lateral phishing. Phishing campaigns using Kali365 have also distributed phishing pages impersonating Russia's MAX messenger, indicating an attempt to single out users in Russia. "A phishing operator who can convert MAX account takeovers into propagation has access to one of the largest installed messaging bases in the Russian-speaking world," Arctic Wolf said. Sending emails mimicking the IRS and Social Security Administration, alongside Adobe, Microsoft, DocuSign, and Dropbox, to deliver legitimate remote access software like ConnectWise ScreenConnect as part of phishing campaigns using a PhaaS kit called The Quarry that's developed, maintained, and sold by a lone operator named RockyBelling. The price of the kit ranges anywhere between $500 and $3,000. This includes tools like Rocky Gmail Sender (a bulk email tool), Rocky Email Sorter (to sort email addresses by domain across Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, and AOL), and VioletRAT. Sending SMS messages impersonating the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and UPS to trick victims into visiting a phishing page that prompts users to enter their personal and financial information under the pretext of a failed package delivery and scheduling a new delivery. "Underneath the deception, the kit captures data in real time," Censys said. "It opens a WebSocket back to its origin and streams the victim’s card data keystroke-by-keystroke, runs a server-side BIN lookup on the card number, and pushes routing decisions (retry, PIN prompt, OTP prompt, kill-switch) back into the victim's browser while they type." Using fake bid proposal workflows to take over Google accounts using a framework called Nyasher. The redirection chain incorporates a "press-and-hold" verification page to filter out automated scanners and bots, before navigating to a blob URL. "The final page displayed a Google sign-in interface but was not reachable as a normal hosted HTML document," ZeroBEC said. "It existed as a browser-created object URL." Using bogus Google Partners and Google Premier Partner enrollment workflows in phishing emails to redirect recipients to a fake Google sign-in page designed to capture credentials in real time as part of a campaign codenamed GPPStorm. Using a legacy email alias to target a user's inbox and launch a device code phishing flow that uses the EvilTokens kit. "The kit was reached through a Mailjet tracking link, then a compromised WordPress site, then a CAPTCHA interstitial, then the Cloudflare Workers host," ZeroBEC said. "Three live infrastructure hops between the email body and the kit, none of which is the kit itself." To counter these threats, it's recommended to block device code authentication unless it's required, review mailbox artifacts after device code events for any signs of unusual activity, audit mail-flow rules, and decommission legacy aliases that no longer correspond to active employees. "The campaign succeeded in reaching the inbox because the recipient organization still maintained an active forwarding relationship from a pre-acquisition namespace into a current mailbox," ZeroBEC noted. "The attacker used a still-resolvable historical identity to deliver mail that, from the SEG's point of view, looked like normal forwarded correspondence. From the user's point of view, the message landed in their working inbox with no visible cue that it had taken an indirect path." (The story was updated after publication on July 14, 2026, to correct a spelling error. An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of ZeroBEC.)
thehackernews.comJul 13, 2026extracted
Securing the inbox: Where identity, brand and security meet
Securing the inbox: Where identity, brand and security meet Getting a verified logo to appear next to your email has traditionally meant having to work with two separate entities. You have to work with a DMARC partner for setting up DMARC and BIMI, then use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to purchase a Mark Certificate, and this means having to source a trusted partner for both which delays the project unnecessarily. Red Sift and GlobalSign have now folded both halves into a single package. Red Sift’s OnDMARC handles the DMARC enforcement side, and GMO GlobalSign brings the PKI that sits beneath BIMI, its Verified Mark Certificates and Common Mark Certificates, the credentials that put a trusted logo in the inbox. One provider carries the whole path from certificate to activated BIMI. A standard that never had security built in Most people send and receive email all day without thinking about how little protection the protocol carried from its inception. That gap has turned into one of the busiest entry points for attackers, and the people who defend organizations are giving email a harder look. Rahul Powar, CEO at Red Sift, and Mike Boyle, VP for Identity Certificates and Digital Signing at GMO GlobalSign, laid out where things stand. Powar started at the root. “Email is unsurprisingly, a very old standard, and it doesn’t really have security built in,” he said. Over two decades it became the way companies reach customers, suppliers, and employees, and the weak spots grew into a real liability. Attacks moved from broad spam toward targeted spear phishing, and the slow uptake of the available protections turned into a material problem for organizations. Boyle described a habit that keeps email exposed: companies treat it as its own box. “They don’t typically adopt a sort of digital trust model,” he said. Email, in his account, “needs identity, because it’s one of the factors that offsets the attacks that are coming in. Email has evolved to a point now where it should be about trust and should also be about brand awareness of brand protection.” Attackers see one surface, defenders see silos The mailbox is often the opening move. Powar called email phishing and impersonation “probably one of the first, and frankly, easiest ways to get inside an organization,” the point where an attacker harvests credentials and sets up wider fraud. Verizon’s latest research points to an email component in most attacks seen in the wild. Security teams have long treated email, web monitoring, DNS hygiene, and PKI as separate boxes, “whereas from an attacker’s perspective, it’s really all infrastructure,” Powar said. His answer is “a more holistic, thought-through cybersecurity architecture that treats all of these attack surfaces in an integrated way.” Boyle agreed that the threat ignores org charts. Attackers go after the whole organization and hunt for the weak link, which “can typically be human or technology,” he said. AI lowers the barrier to entry Cheap, capable models have changed the economics of attack. “We’re living in a world where this industrialized intelligence is essentially available for anyone who wants it and knows what to do with it,” Powar said, which lets attackers operate at a scale they could not reach before. Language stops being a filter. They don’t even need to be native English language speakers, since the model carries the wording for them. Boyle sees the same force widening the attacker pool. AI “is literally opening the doors for anybody to use AI in that malicious sense,” he said, and the same tools can sit on defense, handling SOC analysis and filtering. AI can be both protection and harm if it’s used with the right tool set. For bad actors, the cost of entry is near zero. Powar’s counsel is to get the fundamentals right. “Everyone wants a silver bullet. I think it’s realistic to say there isn’t any silver bullet, but you ensure the basics of good hygiene,” he said. DMARC as table stakes, BIMI as the visible layer For sending domains, one control is now mandatory. Send to Google, Microsoft, or Yahoo without at least starting on DMARC with a policy of p=none and your mail is likely going to be rejected or quarantined. If you’re not doing DMARC and you’re on the internet with any scale today, you’re probably doing it wrong. BIMI, Brand Indicators for Message Identification, sits on top of DMARC and adds a verified logo in the inbox. The appeal cuts across departments. “For the first time, we’re seeing marketing teams and cybersecurity teams wanting to deploy these technologies together,” Powar said. Security gets a stronger posture, marketing gets higher open and CTR rates, and the recipient gets a recognizable mark of authenticity. Red Sift tracks global uptake at bimiradar.com, where adoption has climbed as more brands complete DMARC. Boyle cautioned that adoption stays concentrated among large enterprises that guard their brand most closely, with DMARC still well below where it should be across the wider market. Advice for a new CISO or security leader Powar’s starting point is to drop the idea of a tidy perimeter. The damaging attacks, he said, may never cross the network boundary, traveling from an attacker to a supplier, customer, or investor adjacent to the target. He places DMARC early in the stack, calling it “very important and is actually, as per the current architecture, the first line of defense.” Behind it sit account takeover detection and phishing simulation. His bottom line: “It’s important for CISOs or security leaders to recognize that these technologies are available, they’re practical, and they’re effective when deployed correctly.” Boyle added that enabling a control once is the start of the job. “DMARC needs to be continuously monitored,” he said, with brand and identity assurance attached to it. He closed with a line credited to Powar: attackers “need to get lucky one time, whereas a business needs to continuously be lucky or be prepared all of the time.”
helpnetsecurity.comJul 6, 2026extracted
Provacy, la Corte Suprema Usa limita l’uso della geolocalizzazione per le Forze dell’Ordine
Nuove limitazioni alle Forze dell’Ordine negli Usa, dove la Corte Suprema ha stabilito che anche per i geofence warrant servirà un formale mandato di autorizzazione. La Corte Suprema degli Usa ha stabilito che le Forze dell’Ordine non potranno più ottenere liberamente i dati di geolocalizzazione degli utenti raccolti dalle aziende tecnologiche attraverso i mandati geofence. Si tratta di quei mandati che permettono alla Polizia di accedere ai giganteschi database delle Big Tech. Rafforzate, dunque, le tutele della privacy digitale. Con una decisione approvata a maggioranza (6 voti a 3), i giudici hanno riconosciuto un principio fondamentale. Quello secondo cui “ogni individuo ha una ragionevole aspettativa di privacy rispetto alle informazioni sulla posizione generate dal proprio telefono cellulare“. Conseguentemente, le autorità dovranno ottenere un regolare mandato di perquisizione la cui base giuridica deve fondarsi su una “probable cause“. Prima di chiedere l’accesso ai dati storici di localizzazione, ci dovrà dunque essere “un fondato motivo di ritenere che ci sia stato un reato“. Come funzionano i mandati geofence I mandati geofence, spiega TechCrunch, consentono agli investigatori di chiedere alle aziende tecnologiche di individuare tutti i dispositivi presenti in una determinata area geografica. Il tutto, all’interno di un preciso intervallo di tempo. Dopo aver delimitato un’area sospetta su una mappa, la Polizia può chiedere al giudice l’autorizzazione a ordinare alle piattaforme digitali di verificare quali utenti si trovassero in quel luogo. E per compiere questa operazione, si serve degli archivi dei dati di localizzazione. Il dibattito interno sulla privacy Questo tipo di strumento investigativo è stato a lungo criticato dalle organizzazioni per i diritti civili perché coinvolge inevitabilmente anche persone estranee ai fatti, raccogliendo dati di utenti innocenti. La Corte Suprema non ha comunque vietato del tutto l’utilizzo dei mandati geofence. Ha tuttavia chiarito che essi rientrano nelle tutele garantite dal Quarto Emendamento della Costituzione americana. Le autorità potranno quindi continuare a richiedere dati di localizzazione, ma solo dopo aver ottenuto un mandato specifico e dimostrato l’esistenza di elementi concreti che giustifichino la richiesta. La sentenza è nata dal caso Chatrie v. United States. Okello Chatrie, condannato per una rapina in banca, aveva contestato l’utilizzo durante il processo di prove raccolte attraverso un mandato geofence. Il motivo, secondo la difesa, era la violazione della Costituzione. Gli investigatori avrebbero infatti operato seguendo il “cercare prima e sviluppare i sospetti dopo“. Tutto il contrario. Ci sarebbe infatti stata l’inversione del tradizionale principio secondo cui “è necessario dimostrare un collegamento tra una persona e un reato prima di ottenere un mandato“. La Corte Suprema ha stabilito che la Corte d’Appello dovrà stabilire se il mandato utilizzato dagli investigatori fosse supportato da un sufficiente “probable cause” e quindi valido. Il possibile impatto sulle Big Tech La decisione potrebbe avere un impatto significativo sulle future indagini negli Usa.Negli ultimi anni alcune aziende, tra cui Google, hanno modificato la gestione dei dati di localizzazione conservandoli direttamente sui dispositivi degli utenti anziché sui propri server. Si è così limitata l possibilità di consegnarli alle autorità. Anche altre società come Microsoft, Uber e Yahoo ricevono regolarmente richieste di dati basate sui mandati geofence.
cybersecitalia.itJul 1, 2026extracted
Factoring RSA Keys with Many Zeros
Factoring RSA Keys with Many Zeros Interesting research on a new class of weak RSA keys: keys with lots of zeros. It turns out that these keys are out in the wild. The badkeys project is an open-source service that checks public keys for known vulnerabilities. While developing this tool, Hanno collected a massive number of real-world keys from public sources, including Certificate Transparency logs, internet-wide TLS and SSH scans, PGP keys, and many others. By searching this dataset for unexpectedly sparse RSA moduli, we uncovered a large number of keys in the wild with the patterns in Figure 1. Both patterns include several regularly spaced blocks of all zeros interleaved with seemingly random data. Pattern 1 appears in CT logs for certificates issued to several large organizations, including Yahoo and Verizon, and on some devices running NetApp software. Fortunately, these certificates have already expired, but we still shared our findings with these companies. We wanted to learn more about which product could be responsible for generating these keys, but we did not hear back. Pattern 2 appears on SSH hosts running the CompleteFTP software from EnterpriseDT. The underlying vulnerability affects RSA keys generated using versions 10.0.012.0.0 (Dec 2016Mar 2019) and DSA keys generated with v10.0.023.0.4 (Dec 2016Dec 2023). These vulnerabilities affect a small minority of hosts on the internet, but the more interesting takeaway is that independent cryptographic implementations failed in similar ways. More implementations may include the same bugs, and so it’s worth tailoring cryptanalytic algorithms for this particular type of failure. The article doesn’t speculate, but I will. This could be a deliberately designed backdoor, of the sort I wrote about back in 2013. I could imagine some government agency figuring out how to break this class of RSA keys, and then convincing different providers to hand them out to users.
schneier.comJun 29, 2026extracted
Bluekit phishing kit adopts browser-in-the-middle for login theft
The Bluekit phishing-as-a-service platform continues to evolve with nearly 70 new hostnames identified over the past week, and by adding browser-in-the-middle (BitM) capabilities for improved data theft. First documented in April by Varonis researchers, Bluekit provides an AI assistant that supports multiple large language models (Llama, GPT-4.1, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek) for drafting phishing emails. At the time, the phishing kit offered “customers” 40 distinct templates targeting popular online services such as Outlook, Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, ProtonMail, iCloud, GitHub, and Ledger. A new report from digital risk protection company Netcraft warns that Bluekit has switched from adversary-in-the-middle to a BitM mechanism that uses the open-source JavaScript library ‘rrweb’ to serialize the page’s DOM and stream it over a WebSocket connection to the victim. In a BitM attack, the victim interacts with a browser session controlled by the attacker, which loads the legitimate login page and relays requests and responses between the victim and the target service. Netcraft notes that rrweb itself is a legitimate project widely used for session replay and analytics, and its presence in a web environment should not be interpreted as an indicator of compromise without a larger context. Images, fonts, and CSS are fetched through the phishing infrastructure, while the victim’s inputs are forwarded back to the attacker’s browser. The researchers state that rrweb was chosen for its excellent visual fidelity, real-time interactivity, and bandwidth efficiency. However, some latency still exists, so any keyboard input and mouse click delays on the login pages should be considered as red flags. Authentication completes in the attacker's browser, granting them a valid session token and unlimited access to the victim’s account. The browser-in-the-middle attack method was first discovered by researchers at the University of Salento in 2021 and later adopted for malicious activity by threat actors. Before stealing the credentials, Bluekit uses a comprehensive victim qualification system to distinguish real targets from researchers or security crawlers. Anti-analysis systems in the latest Bluekit include: Randomized CSS filters to defeat screenshot-based detection. A large (>1 MB), frequently changing obfuscated JavaScript bundle. Custom CAPTCHA that may imitate Cloudflare or the target brand. Browser fingerprinting (RAM, CPU cores, screen resolution, language, headless browser detection, anti-fingerprinting extensions). WebRTC-based IP mismatch detection to identify users behind proxies or VPNs. Netcraft also reports that the live (5-second update interval) monitoring system Varonis previously documented is still available in BlueKit, allowing operators to monitor victims as they are entrapped in deceptive login sessions and track their actions after login. The researchers's report provides a set of indicators and signals that are associated with Bluekit but do not constitute indicators of compromise. These include CSS filter manipulation on top-level HTML elements with randomized values, an obfuscated JavaScript bundle that is rotated periodically, browser fingerprint checks, a WebSocket connection sending encrypted or binary data on login pages, and WebRTC IP mismatch detection on the landing page. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 25, 2026extracted
NY man charged after harassing college student with AI-generated nudes
A New York man faces cyberstalking charges after allegedly sharing AI-generated nude images and fabricated racist messages using fake social media profiles to harass a Georgia college student. 21-year-old Anthony Belford was arraigned June 10 after a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging him with one count of cyberstalking. Belford and the victim had attended the same college during the 2023-2024 academic year. After the victim transferred to a Georgia college in August 2024, Belford allegedly knew of the move and began targeting the victim there. According to court documents, between January and March 2025, the defendant created fake Instagram, LinkedIn, Reddit, X, Strava, and Yahoo accounts to impersonate the victim and distribute AI-generated nude images and spread false claims that the victim had made racist remarks about black students and anti-Muslim statements. Belford allegedly created a fake LinkedIn profile using an AI-generated nude image of the victim as its profile picture, and also used a spoofed Yahoo email account to send an AI-generated nude image of the victim to the victim's mother. The defendant allegedly targeted the victim while attending the same college in the 2023-2024 academic year, but continued doing it even after the victim transferred to a Georgia college in August 2024. "Belford allegedly waged a lengthy online campaign, hiding behind spoofed social media and email accounts to harass, intimidate, and cause substantial distress to his victim with racist messages and AI-generated nude images," said U.S. Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg. "Cyberstalking and other forms of online abuse, just like physical violence, can ruin lives and disrupt communities. Victims of such crimes should not suffer in silence, and we will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to hold the perpetrators of these crimes accountable using all available tools." The Justice Department added that federal law prohibits sharing or threatening to share intimate images (including AI-generated ones) without consent and urged victims to report violations to the FBI and to alert the Federal Trade Commission if online platforms fail to remove such content within 48 hours of a removal request. More information on how to protect yourself from cyberstalking attempts and stop the spread of images and videos shared online without consent is available on the FTC's Take It Down platform. In March, 22-year-old Jamarcus Mosley from Alabama also pleaded guilty to cyberstalking, extortion, and computer fraud charges after hacking into the social media accounts of hundreds of young women. The same month, 26-year-old Kyle Svara from Illinois also pleaded guilty to hacking nearly 600 women's Snapchat accounts to steal private nude photos that were later traded or sold online. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 19, 2026extracted
Cybersecurity Experts Urge US to Lift Ban on Anthropic's Frontier AI Models
Over 50 cybersecurity professionals have publicly requested the US government lift the ban on access to Mythos 5 and Fable 5, the latest frontier large language models (LLMs) released by AI company Anthropic. On June 12, Anthropic announced that the US government had issued an export control directive to suspend all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5, released just a few days earlier, by any foreign national. This decision prompted the AI company to suspend access to both models for all customers to ensure compliance with the directive. Fable 5 was presented by Anthropic as a general-access LLM powered by the same underlying frontier AI model as Mythos 5 – an upgrade from Claude Mythos Preview – but with additional guardrails, especially in areas like cybersecurity where the company said it “could be misused to cause serious damage.” The US government invoked “national security concerns” to explain its directive, which Anthropic believes originated from research that allegedly found a method of bypassing Fable 5’s guardrails. “We reviewed a demonstration of this specific technique being used to identify a small number of previously known, minor vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities all appear relatively simple and we have found that other publicly-available models are able to discover them as well without requiring a bypass,” stated Anthropic. The company denied the existence of a “universal jailbreak” for Fable 5. Cybersecurity Community Criticizes Fable, Mythos Ban Two days later, a group of 54 CISOs, cybersecurity practitioners and vendors signed an open letter addressed to Howard Lutnick, the US Secretary of Commerce, and Sean Cairncross, the US National Cyber Director. The group asked for the export control directives on Fable and Mythos to be lifted. They also called for the US government to “commit to an open, scientific and transparent process of handling AI risk assessments in the future.” While the signatories acknowledged that Anthropic’s latest models are “quite good at finding flaws and weaponizing exploits,” they argued they are not the only tools that can be used for this purpose. The ability to identify insecure code is a fundamental feature of any secure coding assistant and equivalent capabilities already exist across other models including OpenAI's GPT-5.5, Anthropic's Claude Opus and Sonnet, and Chinese models such as Kimi 2.7, the signatories noted. Additionally, they acknowledged Anthropic’s contribution to prevent Fable from “cyber offensive uses” and said the AI company is now addressing the research that likely prompted the US government’s decision. “To pull the best capabilities away from defenders without a good reason when our adversaries are rapidly advancing is dangerous,” they warned. The open letter also said the US government action has created market uncertainty and risked America’s AI leadership “without any real risk to justify it.” Signatories included Alex Stamos, chief product officer at Corridor and former chief security officer at Facebook and Yahoo, Joe Levy, CEO of Sophos, and Sandra McLeod, CISO at Zoom Communications. Their stance has been shared by other cybersecurity experts. Despite not having signed the open letter, William Wright, CEO of Closed Door Security, said that, while the US reaction “suggests that the worries around jailbreaking these models are real,” banning access to the model is the wrong approach. “Cutting off access to the model so abruptly will cause huge logistical problem, both within Anthropic and within any critical industry partners given access to the model. Rather than foster resilience, this move creates chaos,” he explained. He called the US government to work “transparently and with clear guiding principles” with AI and cybersecurity experts. Image credits: Nwz / jackpress / Shutterstock.com
infosecurity-magazine.comJun 15, 2026extracted
Major US surveillance program poised to lapse after legislative deadlock
Major US surveillance program poised to lapse after legislative deadlock A controversial surveillance law is set to expire at midnight after a dizzying few weeks of failed efforts by Congress and the White House to renew it and prevent a loss of access to critical national security information. It is the first lapse of the spy program, known as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), since it was passed into law in 2008. It enables U.S. intelligence agencies to gather without a warrant the digital communications of foreigners overseas. Congressional lawmakers labored for months to strike a deal that would satisfy privacy and civil liberty advocates on both sides of the aisle, with the Senate closing in on legislation that was anticipated to gain bipartisan support. But negotiations were upended last week when President Donald Trump announced federal housing official Bill Pulte would serve as the acting director of national intelligence. Pulte, who has no military or intelligence experience, previously gained notoriety for targeting the president’s critics with mortgage fraud accusations and probes. The appointment enraged Democrats and blindsided Republicans. On Thursday, the House tried to pass another short-term extension, falling well short of the necessary votes before members left town on recess until June 23. The Senate also tried and failed to fast-track a renewal of Section 702 but failed. Trump eventually said he would nominate Jay Clayton to be the next permanent DNI. Clayton, a federal district judge in New York, previously chaired the Securities and Exchange Commission. The news was welcomed by key Democrats, including Sen. Mark Warner (VA), the ranking member on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “... While I am glad to see the president finally come to his senses, before the Senate can take up a FISA extension there needs to be a clear guarantee that Mr. Pulte will not serve as acting DNI,” he cautioned in a statement. The Intelligence panel has slated Clayton’s confirmation hearing for next week and Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) has publicly indicated he intends to move as fast as possible to confirm him. With a lapse imminent, the spy program won’t shut down completely. In March, an intelligence court approved the FISA program to continue for another year, likely meaning existing 702 orders would continue but the government could not seek any new ones. However, even that interpretation could be challenged in court. A key unanswered question is if major U.S. communications providers would stop complying with court orders under Section 702. For some telecommunications companies “it's not a huge push for them, I think they don't mind participating, as long as they get indemnification,” Warner, a former telecom executive, told reporters Thursday. “If the indemnification goes away? That's why we've always tried to not get into this territory of having it expire.” At the eleventh hour of the last FISA renewal push in 2024, two service providers informed the National Security Agency they would opt out of the program if it expired. “I don’t know,” Warner said when asked if any companies had indicated they wouldn’t comply this time around. Any such standoff would likely end up in court, as happened in 2008, after a judge ruled that Yahoo didn’t have to adhere to the law that preceded Section 702. The matter was eventually resolved in the government’s favor, but only after several months of legal wrangling. For now, the spy program, which provides more than half of the president’s daily intelligence briefing, will begin to roll up. Jon Darby, NSA’s former director of operations, lamented the outcome. Section 702 authority “underpins much of this nation's most important foreign intelligence. There are numerous safeguards in place to prevent its misuse and while it is a good idea to continually review and, if necessary, modify the safeguards, letting the authority lapse is irresponsible and dangerous,” he said. “We will have less insight into threats around the world such as Iran, China, Russia, and terrorists who may be targeting the World Cup,” he added. “The nation is less safe without FISA Section 702." Jake Laperruque, deputy director for the Center for Democracy and Technology’s Security and Surveillance Project, called the lapse “an inexcusable failure by Congressional leadership, a colossal own-goal that's occurred entirely because they refuse to allow votes on reform. And while the law is crystal clear in that ongoing operations don't change, this is an issue that needs to be addressed.” He accused the administration and lawmakers of “muzzling votes on reform and pushing an extension of the status quo that a strong bipartisan majority rejected, repeating the same failed plan over and over and hoping for a different result. It's time to get serious, and allow votes on reforms that we need to fix FISA, make it safe from abuse, and finally get this done.” Martin Matishak is the senior cybersecurity reporter for The Record. Prior to joining Recorded Future News in 2021, he spent more than five years at Politico, where he covered digital and national security developments across Capitol Hill, the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community. He previously was a reporter at The Hill, National Journal Group and Inside Washington Publishers.
therecord.mediaJun 12, 2026extracted
INTERPOL Operation Takes Down Sniper Dz Phishing Platform, Arrests Administrator
An INTERPOL-led operation last month resulted in the disruption of Sniper Dz, a decade-long phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform, Group-IB said Thursday. The effort, codenamed Operation Ramz, took place between October 2025 and February 2026, and saw authorities from 13 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region making 201 arrests. Included among them was Guedz, the primary developer and administrator of Sniper Dz, a PhaaS service that's said to have collected more than 45,000 victim records. The arrest was made by the Algerian National Police. Over the years, the platform rebranded itself as Joker Dz, Storm Dz, and Spam Dz. As part of Operation Ramz, the website used to offer PhaaS capabilities to other cybercriminals was taken down. Authorities also seized hardware containing phishing software and scripts. "Active since at least 2015, Sniper Dz evolved into a sophisticated criminal platform offering ready-made phishing kits, hosting infrastructure, and operational support to cybercriminals," the Singapore-headquartered cybersecurity company said. In the years since then, more than 20,000 unique domains associated with the PhaaS service have been identified. The toolkit primarily targeted 30 major global organizations, including PayPal, Facebook, Instagram, Yahoo, Netflix, and Steam, using 80 phishing templates deployed in five languages, including Arabic, English, French, Spanish, and Hebrew. Phishing campaigns using Sniper Dz singled out users of technology, social media, and streaming platforms across several geographies by impersonating popular brands and government entities using convincing imitation websites with the goal of harvesting credentials, personal information, and other sensitive data. "Beyond traditional credential theft, the platform also leveraged social engineering techniques that exploited the popularity and credibility of public figures across the Middle East and North Africa," Group-IB explained. "Threat actors created fake social media accounts impersonating well-known political personalities and used them to promote phishing links disguised as promotional offers or free internet access." Sniper Dz was the subject of a comprehensive analysis by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 in October 2024, which detailed the threat actor's use of a Telegram channel with more than 7,300 subscribers to share tutorial videos and the options it provides to host the phishing pages on its own infrastructure behind a proxy server. What made Sniper Dz stand out from the crowded PhaaS market is that it offered its entire infrastructure for free, making it easier for aspiring cybercriminals to pull off phishing campaigns at scale. The monetization avenues instead relied on credential theft and victim traffic. "Stolen credentials could be harvested through phishing campaigns, while users who did not yield credentials could still be redirected into carrier billing fraud, premium SMS subscriptions, browser notification abuse schemes, and other affiliate-driven scam campaigns," Group-IB said.
thehackernews.comJun 12, 2026extracted
Interpol Dismantles SniperDz Phishing-as-a-Service Platform
Cybersecurity firm Group-IB has revealed that a recent Interpol-led cybercrime law enforcement operation has led to the takedown of an established phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform and the arrest of its main operator developer. The crackdown, dubbed Operation Ramz, ran from October 2025 to February 2026 across 13 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The results, announced by Interpol at the end of May, included 201 arrests, 53 servers seized and 382 suspects and 3867 victims identified. A further set of almost 8000 pieces of data and intelligence was also disseminated among participating countries to initiate and support future investigations. On June 11, Group-IB, one Interpol’s main partners for this effort, revealed that the operation led to the takedown of SniperDz and the arrest of its primary developer in Algeria. SniperDz: A Global Phishing-as-a-Service Platform SniperDz is a PhaaS platform that has been running since at least 2015. Today, the cybercrime platform has a global reach and has sophisticated offerings, including ready-made phishing kits, infrastructure hosting and operational support to cybercriminals. In 2024, Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 said it had discovered over 140,000 phishing pages associated with SniperDz between 2023 and 2024 alone. The researchers noted that phishers can either host these phishing pages on SniperDz-owned infrastructure or download SniperDz phishing templates to host on their own servers. “Surprisingly, SniperDz PhaaS offers these services free of charge to phishers – perhaps because SniperDz also collects victim credentials stolen by phishers who use the platform to compensate for the cost of service,” the Unit 42 report said. Over the past nine years, Group-IB identified more than 20,000 unique domains associated with SniperDz that impersonated at least 30 major global organizations, including PayPal, Facebook, Instagram, Yahoo, Netflix and Steam. Group-IB’s investigations team identified 80 phishing templates deployed in five languages including Arabic, English, French, Spanish and Hebrew, targeting users of consumer, technology and payment platforms across multiple geographies. Typically, victims were lured to convincing imitation websites designed to harvest credentials, personal information and other sensitive data. Beyond traditional credential theft, the SniperDz platform also leveraged social engineering techniques that exploited the popularity and credibility of public figures across MENA. “Threat actors created fake social media accounts impersonating well-known political personalities and used them to promote phishing links disguised as promotional offers or free internet access,” Group-IB explained. SniperDz Showed Significant OpSec Failures The investigation revealed a significant operational security (OpSec) failure by the suspect, who published video tutorials to recruit and train affiliates. These inadvertently exposed administrative information and account credentials. These, combined with years of social media activity documenting the platform's evolution, affiliate recruitment efforts and the release of new phishing templates helped Group-IB investigators trace the suspect’s digital footprint and identify him. “A Telegram channel used to coordinate operations, which had more than 7,300 subscribers when Group-IB shared its findings with Interpol and a Facebook account followed by more than 19,000 users, provided additional evidence linking the suspect to the platform's activities between 2015 and 2025,” Group-IB added. Once the cybersecurity company handed over the collected information to Interpol, the law enforcement agency coordinated with the Algerian National Police to disrupt the SniperDz infrastructure and arrest the individual suspected to run the operation. According to Dmitry Volkov, CEO of Group-IB, this case was “a textbook example of why adversary-centric intelligence matters." "Disrupting cybercrime requires more than taking down phishing pages. It requires understanding the people, infrastructure and criminal ecosystems behind them,” he said. “By combining threat intelligence, attribution, and close collaboration with law enforcement, we were able to help identify the individual responsible for nearly a decade of phishing activity and contribute to bringing that operation to an end." Image credits: Dr David Sing / Tang Yan Song / Shutterstock.com
infosecurity-magazine.comJun 11, 2026extracted
Mustang Panda Linked to Updated FDMTP Backdoor in Asia-Pacific Espionage Campaign
An updated variant of the FDMTP backdoor has been observed in a months-long espionage campaign aimed at networks in the Asia-Pacific and Japan, with researchers linking the activity to the China-aligned group Mustang Panda. According to new analysis from Darktrace, multiple customer environments began making requests to attacker infrastructure impersonating well-known content delivery networks (CDNs) in late September 2025, with activity continuing through April 2026. Darktrace assessed with moderate confidence that the campaign aligns with publicly reported Mustang Panda tradecraft, though it notes the techniques are not unique to a single actor. The group, which Darktrace tracks as Twill Typhoon, is also known as Earth Preta, Stately Taurus, Bronze President and TA416. CDN Impersonation and DLL Sideloading Affected hosts retrieved legitimate executables, matching .config files and malicious DLLs from domains posing as Yahoo and Apple infrastructure. In one finance-sector case from April 2026, an endpoint pulled legitimate binaries such as vshost.exe and dfsvc.exe before fetching paired configuration and DLL components over an 11-day window. The sideloading chain relied on legitimate binaries loading malicious DLLs of the same name as their expected libraries. In a observed case, a malicious browser_host.dll was placed alongside the legitimate Sogou Pinyin input method binary biz_render.exe, allowing the payload to execute inside a trusted process. Decoded strings then loaded the .NET runtime in-process and pulled the next stage directly into memory as a managed assembly. Updated FDMTP and Modular Plugins The final-stage payload of the campaign is a heavily obfuscated .NET backdoor that Darktrace identifies as version 3.2.5.1 of FDMTP, a tool first documented by Trend Micro in 2024 as a Mustang Panda secondary control implant. Communication runs over custom TCP using the Duplex Message Transport Protocol (DMTP), with cluster-based resolution, token validation and a persistent message loop for remote tasking. Darktrace identified four loadable plugins in the framework: one for scheduled-task creation, one for registry persistence, one for loading and persisting the main framework, and one for remote file retrieval and process manipulation. Persistence is maintained through scheduled tasks and registry entries under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME, alongside a separate update channel that polls icloud-cdn[.]net every five minutes for new payloads. Darktrace urged defenders to anchor detection to the behavioral sequence. "Infrastructure rotates and payloads can change, but the execution model persists," the company wrote. "For defenders, the implication is straightforward: detection anchored to individual indicators will degrade quickly. Detection anchored to a behavioral sequence offers a far more durable approach."
infosecurity-magazine.comMay 14, 2026extracted
Chinese APTs Expand Targets, Update Backdoors in Recent Campaigns
China-linked state-sponsored hackers have been observed expanding their targets and updating malicious tools in fresh campaigns that either follow known patterns or adapt to current political events. Between December 2025 and February 2026, Salt Typhoon, also known as Earth Estries, FamousSparrow, GhostEmperor, and UNC2286, and considered one of the most aggressive Chinese APTs, was seen targeting an Azerbaijani oil and gas company, Bitdefender reports. The campaign marked a shift from typical Salt Typhoon activity and was apparently aimed at government, telecoms, and technology entities in the US, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, likely triggered by Azerbaijan’s recently increased role in European energy security. According to Bitdefender, as a result of Russia’s Ukraine gas transit agreement expiration and the recent Strait of Hormuz disruptions, Azerbaijan has become a strategic energy partner for European countries, putting it in APT crosshairs. The recently observed intrusion, attributed with moderate-to-high confidence to Salt Typhoon, started with Microsoft Exchange vulnerability exploitation, followed by web shell deployment, command execution, DLL sideloading, and backdoor deployment. In December, the threat actor used the ProxyNotShell exploit chain for code execution on Exchange servers, deployed web shells to establish a foothold, and then deployed the Deed RAT via an updated DLL sideloading technique. The backdoor was hidden in a folder mimicking the legitimate LogMeIn Hamachi installation, and persistence was achieved through a service masquerading as LogMeIn Hamachi, which was launched at system startup. After compromising the initial host, the attackers abused RDP to access a second server, logged in to an administrator account, and then deployed Deed RAT, likely as part of hands-on keyboard activity. Next, they used Impacket tools to compromise a third host. A month later, after the malware was removed from at least one host, the hackers accessed the initially compromised server and deployed the TernDoor backdoor, which was linked to Salt Typhoon by Cisco’s Talos security researchers. At the end of February, the APT accessed the victim organization’s environment again, attempting to redeploy Deed RAT using the same execution chain. “This intrusion should not be viewed as an isolated compromise, but as a sustained and adaptive operation conducted by an actor that repeatedly sought to regain and extend access within the victim environment. Across multiple waves of activity, the same access path was revisited, new payloads were introduced, and additional footholds were established,” Bitdefender notes. Twill Typhoon attacks Beginning September 2025 and continuing through at least April 2026, Darktrace observed the China-linked APT Twill Typhoon (also known as Bronze President, Camaro Dragon, Earth Preta, Mustang Panda, and TA416) targeting entities in the Asia-Pacific and Japan (APJ) region with an updated arsenal, including a modular .NET-based RAT framework. Multiple infected hosts, the security firm reports, were seen making requests to domains impersonating content delivery networks (CDNs), including Yahoo and Apple services, and retrieving legitimate binaries alongside matching .config files and malicious DLLs. The fetched sequence, a hallmark of China-nexus campaigns, leads to the execution of a new RAT framework dubbed FDMTP, via DLL sideloading. During attacks observed in September and October, the compromised hosts retrieved a DLL from the same external hosts repeatedly. In April, a system within a financial organization’s network fetched a legitimate binary and then repeatedly retrieved config files and DLL components. The attackers relied on Visual Studio hosting and the legitimate Windows ClickOnce engine to ensure the malware’s execution. The main payload was a modular framework relying on various plugins for backdoor functionality. The RAT supports system fingerprinting, command execution, manipulating Windows tasks, managing registry persistence, manipulating system processes, and retrieving files and commands. “Intrusions are not dependent on a single foothold, but distributed across components that can be updated, replaced, or reloaded independently. This approach is consistent with broader China-nexus tradecraft,” Darktrace notes. Related: China-Linked APT GopherWhisper Abuses Legitimate Services in Government Attacks Related: FBI Warns of Data Security Risks From China-Made Mobile Apps
securityweek.comMay 14, 2026extracted
Why Malwarebytes blocks some Yahoo Mail redirects
Some Malwarebytes users have recently noticed frequent web protection alerts while reading email in Yahoo Mail’s web interface. These alerts are caused by background connections from the Yahoo Mail page to a set of third‑party domains that our products and other security tools currently classify as risky. What we are seeing under the hood When you open Yahoo Mail in a browser, the page loads various embedded components for navigation, features, and metrics. As part of this, the interface makes calls to domains such as cook.howduhtable.com and related subdomains, sometimes in the context of URLs that include /ybar/mail.yahoo.com/ and a long encoded parameter. That encoded string often resolves to a URL like: https://gpt.mail.yahoo.net/sandbox?client=novation&version=0.1&haq=1&cache=1 This suggests the traffic is being routed through what appears to be a sandboxed web component that Yahoo can use for things like telemetry, testing infrastructure, or mail features. It may also be part of an advertising or tracking flow, but at this time we cannot say with certainty exactly what purpose Yahoo is using it for. Regardless of intent, multiple security systems have observed these redirect domains and assigned them poor reputations. Characteristics include: Frequently changing, opaque subdomains that do not resemble normal consumer‑facing Yahoo addresses Use of encoded parameters and chained redirects that make it difficult for users, and sometimes defenders, to see the final destination at a glance Existing detections and blocklists from other vendors that classify the infrastructure as suspicious or potentially malicious Because of these signals, Malwarebytes Web Protection and Browser Guard have been blocking a growing list of related subdomains to protect users, which is why some people see repeated alerts while using Yahoo Mail. What we are not saying It is important to be clear about what we do and do not know. We have not established that Yahoo Mail itself is compromised or that Yahoo is deliberately distributing malware through its mail platform. What we can say is that third‑party or internal components invoked from within the Yahoo Mail web interface are making connections through domains that behave very similarly to infrastructure commonly associated with malicious or deceptive advertising and tracking. From a security standpoint, this creates unnecessary risk. Any mechanism that injects content or runs sandboxed components via opaque redirect chains could, if misused or subverted in the future, expose users to harmful content without them ever clicking a suspicious link. Blocking these domains is a precautionary step in line with our normal protection standards. Why Malwarebytes blocks these redirects Our decision to block these connections is based on a combination of technical behavior and third‑party reputation data: The redirects are triggered by embedded components in the Yahoo Mail interface, not by users intentionally browsing to those domains The infrastructure relies on frequently changing, non‑descriptive domains and subdomains, a pattern we often see in malicious or evasive advertising and tracking systems Multiple security vendors and automated reputation feeds already flag these domains as risky or malicious, and some have seen them associated with unwanted or harmful activity Because of this, Malwarebytes products currently block connections to these third‑party domains when they are invoked as part of Yahoo Mail’s web experience. This does not mean that all of Yahoo Mail is considered malicious. It means we are specifically interrupting a narrow set of background calls that present elevated risk. What this means for users If you use Yahoo Mail in a browser with Malwarebytes enabled, you may see: Web protection or MWAC alerts referencing domains like cook.howduhtable.com or similar names while you are reading or composing email Multiple alerts in a short period, because the mail interface may retry or rotate through different subdomains or IP addresses in the same family In most cases, your email content itself still loads, though certain embedded elements, metrics, or ad‑related content may fail to load or behave differently. How to stay safe and reduce interruptions You should not need to lower your protection to continue using Yahoo Mail. Here are some practical steps you can take: Keep Malwarebytes protection enabled Leaving Web Protection and Browser Guard on ensures blocks remain in place if these redirects change behavior or begin serving harmful content in the future. Avoid allowlisting the suspicious domains While it’s technically possible to add exclusions for individual domains, doing so would allow their traffic to load unfiltered in your browser. We don’t recommend this unless you fully understand and accept the risk. Use private/incognito windows for Yahoo Mail Accessing Yahoo Mail in a private/incognito session can help reduce persistence of certain tracking and advertising data because the browser discards cookies and local storage when you close the window. Clear cookies and site data periodically If you see repeated alerts, clearing Yahoo‑related cookies and cached data may reduce some of the underlying tracking behavior that triggers these redirects. Consider fewer‑ads options Yahoo offers paid plans that reduce or remove ads, and users can also use reputable content‑blocking extensions alongside Malwarebytes to cut down on ad‑driven behavior in webmail interfaces. Our ongoing monitoring The domains and infrastructure involved in these redirects are operated outside Malwarebytes, and their configuration or behavior may change over time. We are actively monitoring telemetry, sandbox reports, and reputation data for these domains and related infrastructure, and we will adjust our detections if new information emerges. Our priority is to keep users safe while being transparent about why protection events occur, especially in widely used services such as webmail. If we learn more about the exact role of this component within Yahoo Mail, or if Yahoo provides additional clarity, we will update this article accordingly. Stop threats before they can do any harm. Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser →
malwarebytes.comMay 14, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: AI-Powered Phishing, Android Spying Tool, Linux Exploit, GitHub RCE & More
This week, the shadows moved faster than the patches. While most teams were still triaging last month’s alerts, attackers had already turned control panels into kill switches, kernels into open doors, and open-source pipelines into silent delivery systems. The game has shifted from breach to occupation. They’re living inside SaaS sessions, pushing code with trusted commits, and scaling operations like legitimate businesses — except their product is chaos. And the underground is getting uncomfortably professional. Here’s the full weekly cybersecurity recap: ⚡ Threat of the Week cPanel Flaw Comes Under Attack—A critical flaw in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM) has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-41940, could result in an authentication bypass and allow remote attackers to gain elevated control of the control panel. In some cases, the attacks have led to a complete wipe of entire websites and backups. Other attacks have deployed Mirai botnet variants and a ransomware strain called Sorry. Is Your Security Program Built on Compliance Theater or Measurable Maturity? If you can't measure your program's maturity, you can't improve it or defend its budget. The SANS Security Awareness & Culture Maturity Model™️ maps 5 stages of security culture development with concrete indicators, behavioral targets, and alignment to business risk priorities. Download Now — Free ➝ 🔔 Top News Cybercrime Groups Use Vishing for Data Theft and Extortion—Two cybercrime groups tracked as Cordial Spider and Snarky Spider are carrying out "rapid, high-impact attacks" operating almost within the confines of SaaS environments, while leaving minimal traces of their actions. The groups employ voice calls, text messages, and emails, directing targeted employees to phishing pages masquerading as their employer's legitimate single sign-on (SSO) page to capture credentials and provide attackers an entry point into systems, which they exploit for deeper access to victims' SaaS environments. The attacks also use the initial access hooks to remove and set up multi-factor authentication devices under their control and delete emails that would otherwise alert organizations of potential malicious activity. According to CrowdStrike, "These actors use vishing to bypass MFA and move laterally across entire SaaS ecosystems with a single authenticated session, masking their tracks through residential proxy networks to blend in as legitimate home user traffic. This is part of a larger trend of English-speaking ransomware crews that share similar playbooks but are branching off into their own distinct groups." Copy Fail Linux Flaw Exploited—The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-31431, a vulnerability impacting various Linux distributions, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation in the wild. It's described as a logic bug in the Linux kernel's authentication cryptographic template that allows an attacker to reliably trigger privilege escalation trivially by means of a 732-byte Python-based exploit. According to Theori and Xint, CVE-2026-31431 was the result of a series of unremarkable updates to the Linux kernel over the years, particularly one update from 2017 that was meant to speed up data encryption. As a result, all major Linux distributions from 2017 are impacted. What complicates matters is that Copy Fail works 100% of the time, unlike most local privilege escalation (LPE) bugs that tend to be probabilistic in nature. More worryingly, it leaves no traces on disk as exploitation occurs in memory and enables container escape from any pod in a Kubernetes cluster. TeamPCP's Supply Chain Attack Spree Continues—TeamPCP's extensive supply chain campaign continued last week, as the cybercriminal group compromised several packages across the npm, PyPI, and Packagist ecosystems in a "Mini Shai-Hulud" attack. TeamPCP has in recent months compromised the packages of several open source software projects, including Trivy, a security scanner maintained by Aqua Security, and KICS, a Checkmarx-developed tool for static code analysis. Amit Genkin, threat researcher at Upwind, said the latest string of attacks represents a shift, where they are not only more frequent but harder to detect because they weaponize legitimate CI/CD pipelines to push out poisoned versions under real identities, allowing the activity to blend in with normal development workflows. "Campaigns like Shai-Hulud take that further by using each compromised pipeline to spread to the next, turning credential theft into a scaling problem across environments," Genkin said. "For teams, the immediate priority is to check for the affected version and rotate any credentials tied to pipelines that may have run it, especially GitHub and cloud tokens. Longer term, this is a signal to reduce how broadly pipeline credentials are scoped and to add visibility into what's actually happening during installs and builds – because if you're relying on traditional scanning or known indicators, this type of activity is easy to miss." New Python Backdoor Enables Comprehensive Data Theft—A newly identified stealthy Python-based backdoor framework dubbed DEEP#DOOR provides attackers with persistent remote command execution and surveillance capabilities on Windows computers. Once active, the backdoor enables shell command execution, file manipulation, system and network reconnaissance, and surveillance operations such as keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, microphone and webcam access, and credentials and SSH key harvesting. Additionally, the malware can shift from data gathering to disruption and system manipulation, as it can overwrite the Master Boot Record, force system crashes, exhaust system resources by spawning numerous processes, and disable Microsoft Defender services. GitHub Flaw Leads to Remote Code Execution—Cybersecurity researchers from Wiz disclosed details of a critical security vulnerability impacting GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server (CVE-2026-3854, CVSS score: 8.7) that could allow an authenticated user to obtain remote code execution with a single "git push" command. The vulnerability was severe enough that Microsoft rolled out a patch within six days of responsible disclosure. On GitHub.com, it allowed remote code execution on shared storage nodes, and on GitHub Enterprise Server, it granted full server compromise, enabling unauthorized access to all hosted repositories and internal secrets. "Exploitation could expose the codebases of nearly all of the world's biggest enterprises, making this one of the most severe SaaS vulnerabilities ever found," a Wiz spokesperson told The Hacker News. VECT 2.0 Ransomware's Flawed Encryption Makes Data Recovery Impossible—VECT 2.0 ransomware has been found to wipe large files instead of merely encrypting them, making recovery impossible, even for the attackers. VECT 2.0 is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) program that first appeared in December 2025. The group quickly grabbed headlines after it announced on BreachForums that it was partnering with TeamPCP, the threat group behind several supply chain attacks, such as Trivy, Checkmarx KICS, LiteLLM, and Telnyx, in March and April 2026. VECT also announced a partnership with BreachForums itself, promising that every registered forum user will become an affiliate and be granted use of the ransomware, negotiation platform, and leak site for operations. Beazley Security, in an analysis of the ransomware, said the VECT 2.0 RaaS panel covers the "full operational lifecycle an affiliate needs from payload generation through to payout." 🔥 Trending CVEs Bugs drop weekly, and the gap between a patch and an exploit is shrinking fast. These are the heavy hitters for the week: high-severity, widely used, or already being poked at in the wild. Check the list, patch what you have, and hit the ones marked urgent first — CVE-2026-41940 (cPanel and WebHost Manager), CVE-2026-31431 aka Copy Fail (Linux Kernel), CVE-2026-42208 (LiteLLM), CVE-2026-3854 (GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server), CVE-2026-32202 (Microsoft Windows Shell), CVE-2026-26268 (Cursor), CVE-2026-35414 (OpenSSH), CVE-2026-6770 (Mozilla Firefox and Tor Browser), CVE-2026-42167 (ProFTPD), CVE-2026-24908, CVE-2026-23627, CVE-2026-24487 (OpenEMR), CVE-2026-6807 (GRASSMARLIN), CVE-2026-7363, CVE-2026-7361, CVE-2026-7344, CVE-2026-7343 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-7322, CVE-2026-7323, CVE-2026-7324 (Mozilla Firefox), CVE-2026-6100 (CPython), CVE-2026-0204 (SonicWall), CVE-2026-35414 (OpenSSH), CVE-2026-42511 (FreeBSD), CVE-2026-40684, CVE-2026-40685, CVE-2026-40686, CVE-2026-40687 (Exim), CVE-2026-5402, CVE-2026-5403, CVE-2026-5405, CVE-2026-5656 (Wireshark), CVE-2026-42520, CVE-2026-42523, CVE-2026-42524 (Jenkins), CVE-2026-3008 (Notepad++), and CVE-2025-41658, CVE-2025-41659, CVE-2025-41660 (CODESYS). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Learn to Spot Attack Paths Your AppSec Tools Completely Miss → Modern attackers chain tiny flaws across code, pipelines, and cloud into major breaches — while your AppSec tools stay blind. Join this free webinar with Wiz and The Hacker News to uncover the top real-world attack paths and learn exactly how to spot, map, and stop them fast. Practical insights to prioritize real risks and strengthen your entire software lifecycle. How to Match AI Attack Speed with Autonomous Exposure Validation → Struggling with AI attacks moving faster than your team can respond? Join this free webinar from Picus Security & The Hacker News to discover Autonomous Exposure Validation – how to automatically find real risks, test attack paths, and fix them in minutes, not weeks. Practical, no-fluff insights to stay ahead without burnout. Grab your spot now. Learn Latest AI Threats + Practical Ways to Kill Initial Access → Modern attackers are slipping past traditional defenses with AI-powered phishing, encrypted malware, and stealthy “Patient Zero” tactics. Want to stay ahead? Join this free webinar with Zscaler and The Hacker News to uncover the latest threat trends and practical Zero Trust strategies that actually stop initial compromise — before it becomes a full-blown breach. No fluff, just real insights to protect your organization. 📰 Around the Cyber World OpenAI Debuts Advanced Account Security —OpenAI launched Advanced Account Security, a set of opt-in protections for ChatGPT users "designed for people at increased risk of digital attacks, as well as for those who want the strongest account protections available." As part of the new program, the new controls strengthen sign-in protections, tighten account recovery, reduce exposure from compromised sessions, and give users more visibility into account activity. OpenAI has also partnered with Yubico to link two physical security keys, YubiKey C Nano and YubiKey C NFC, to ChatGPT accounts. That said, users can use any other FIDO-compliant security key, or use software-based passkeys for phishing-resistant authentication. Over 8.8K Ransomware Attacks in 2025 —Fortinet said it recorded 7,831 confirmed ransomware victims globally in 2025, skyrocketing from approximately 1,600 identified victims in 2024. "Availability of crime service kits like WormGPT, FraudGPT, and BruteForceAI contributed to this 389% increase year-over-year (YoY)," Fortinet said. "The top three targeted sectors include manufacturing (1,284), business services (824), and retail (682). Geographic concentration includes the U.S. (3,381), Canada (374), and Germany (291)." KidsProtect Android Surveillance Tool Marketed on the Web —A new Android surveillance tool called KidsProtect is being openly advertised on the clear web that gives an operator near-total secret control of a victim’s phone. "It can't be removed without the attacker's permission," Certo said. "From a web-based dashboard, an operator can secretly record calls, stream live audio from the device’s microphone, track GPS location in real time, read SMS messages and notifications from apps including WhatsApp and Viber, log keystrokes, access contacts and photos, and remotely trigger the front and rear cameras." Assessed to be the work of a Greek-speaking developer, it's available on a subscription basis starting from $60, allowing anyone to buy it, rebrand it, and start selling it as their own. New KYCShadow Android Malware Detected —An Android malware masquerading as a bank KYC verification application is being distributed via WhatsApp and primarily targeting users in India. "The application operates as a multi-stage dropper that installs a secondary payload and establishes persistent command-and-control (C2) communication," CYFIRMA said. "It combines native code obfuscation, Firebase-based remote execution, VPN-based traffic manipulation, and WebView-based phishing to systematically harvest sensitive user data." Phishing Campaign Targets Pakistan Orgs —A highly targeted spear-phishing campaign targeting the Punjab Safe Cities Authority and PPIC3 in Pakistan has been found to use legitimate-sounding government infrastructure projects as lures to deliver malware. "The email carried two malicious attachments: a Word document with a VBA macro dropper and a PDF with a fake Adobe Reader lure, both delivering payloads from a BunnyCDN-hosted malicious infrastructure," Joe Security said. "The attack chain establishes persistent remote access by abusing Microsoft's legitimate VS Code tunnel service, with exfiltration notifications sent via a Discord webhook — a sophisticated technique designed to evade network-level detection." Calendly-Themed Phishing Attacks on the Rise —Multiple threat clusters are leveraging Calendly-themed phishing to fingerprint site visitors and steal credentials and other data. "Behind the shared Calendly branding sits a diverse set of phishing kits, including API-driven frameworks, real-time Socket.IO applications, fake CAPTCHA chains, and Telegram-based exfiltration," urlscan said. Fraud Campaigns GovTrapand FEMITBOT Exposed —Threat actors have been observed deploying sophisticated tactics, including fake government portals, SMS phishing, and lookalike domains, to drive financial fraud and credential harvesting as part of an effort called GovTrap. The government impersonation scam mimics official portals with high accuracy, with links to the fake sites distributed via SMS or email. The end goal is to trick users into entering their personal and financial information, or make non-existent payments that are transferred through money mule accounts. The collected payment card details are abused to facilitate fraudulent transactions. Another threat cluster has leveraged FEMITBOT, a malicious infrastructure that abuses Telegram Mini Apps to scale global fraud campaigns and Android malware delivery. "By leveraging Telegram's native features, threat actors create highly convincing fake platforms across crypto, financial services, AI, and streaming sectors," CTM360 said. "Built on a modular, template-driven architecture, FEMITBOT enables rapid deployment, brand impersonation, and campaign optimization using real-time tracking and analytics." New PowerShell Desktop Stealer Spotted —A Pastebin-hosted PowerShell script disguised as "Windows Telemetry Update" comes with capabilities to steal Telegram Desktop session data via Telegram bot API exfiltration. "The script collects host metadata, including username, hostname, and public IP via api.ipify[.]org, then checks for Telegram Desktop and Telegram Desktop Beta tdata directories," Flare said. "If found, it terminates the Telegram process to release file locks, archives session material into 'TEMP\diag.zip,' and uploads the archive to the attacker-controlled operator chat via the Telegram Bot API sendDocument endpoint." Surge in Teams Phishing in 2026 —eSentire said it has observed an increase in Microsoft Teams-based phishing since early 2026, in which threat actors impersonate IT support and help desk personnel to trick users into granting remote access to their devices. "These phishing attacks have often been linked to email bombing, followed by threat actors reaching out to users under the guise of providing assistance to resolve an issue," eSentire said. "The objective of the attack is to trick the user into granting remote access to their device, and once obtained, threat actors will attempt to exfiltrate data and execute additional payloads to establish persistence or deploy ransomware." New KarstoRAT Malware Enables Data Theft —First spotted in early 2026, KarstoRAT is capable of system reconnaissance, audio and webcam monitoring, screenshot capture, key logging, and token theft. It also enables threat actors to download and run additional payloads, which could point to it being used for post-compromise control on infected machines. "KarstoRAT uses a command-and-control (C2) server that has a diverse set of open ports and services, indicating that it has a multi-purpose infrastructure created for C2 communication and payload distribution," LevelBlue said. "Threat actors use a fake Blox Fruits (a popular Roblox game) virtual marketplace as a lure to trick players into downloading malware that will install KarstoRAT into their machines." ClickUp Discloses Email Address Exposure —ClickUp said its client-side feature flag configuration exposed personally identifiable information. This included 893 customer email addresses that were embedded in feature flag targeting rules, along with one flag that improperly referenced a customer’s API token. "The exposure was limited to 893 customer email addresses used in feature flag targeting rules to control which users see specific features during rollouts," it said. "If your email address was among those included in a feature flag configuration, you have been directly contacted." The incident did not expose any other data. Finnish Authorities Arrest Alleged Scattered Spider Member —Finnish authorities arrested 19-year-old Peter Stokes (aka Bouquet), a dual U.S.-Estonian citizen, as he tried to board a flight to Japan. U.S. prosecutors have charged him as a key member of the notorious Scattered Spider hacking group, and he faces multiple counts of wire fraud, conspiracy, and computer intrusion. New Attacks Linked to Versatile Werewolf —The threat actor known as Versatile Werewolf (aka HeartlessSoul) has been linked to campaigns targeting Russian state structures and aviation companies via phishing emails with malicious archive attachments and malvertising campaigns to deliver a JavaScript trojan. The end goal is to obtain confidential data, particularly geospatial information. Alternatively, the threat actor is known to distribute malicious code using the legitimate SourceForge platform through a project called GearUP. Versatile Werewolf is believed to be active since at least September 2025. Some of the attachments have exploded ZDI-CAN-25373 to trigger the infection chain. The malvertising campaign uses fake domains ("battleflight[.]pro") to deliver bogus installers for aviation-related software to launch the same trojan. "The initial infection involves executing PowerShell commands or scripts designed to download a JavaScript loader from C2 servers," Kaspersky said. "This loader, in turn, loads and executes the main JS-RAT and its modules in memory, among which we found tools for data collection and exfiltration, keyloggers, screen capture tools, UAC bypass tools, and other payloads." The company noted that the domain "battleflight[.]pro" resolves to an IP address that also hosts fake domains linked to the GOFFEE APT. "Both groups actively use PowerShell payloads to deliver and execute malicious modules," it added. "GOFFEE also targets the public sector, which suggests the possibility of joint or coordinated campaigns." Cisco Unveils Model Provenance Kit —Cisco unveiled a new open-source tool, named Model Provenance Kit, to help organizations address potential issues associated with the use of third-party AI models. "Much like a DNA test reveals biological origins, the Model Provenance Kit examines both metadata and the actual learned parameters of a model (like a unique genome that comprises a model), to assess whether models share a common origin and identify signs of modification," Cisco said. "This, combined with a constitution that defines provenance linkages, is an important step toward providing evidence-based assurance that the AI you deploy is what it says it is." Abuse of Hugging Face and ClawHub for Malware Delivery —Threat actors are abusing legitimate AI platforms like Hugging Face and ClawHub for malware delivery, once again demonstrating how trust in AI ecosystems are being exploited. Acronis said it identified more than 575 malicious skills across 13 developer accounts that target both Windows and macOS systems with trojans, cryptocurrency miners, and AMOS stealer, a macOS-focused infostealer. "On Hugging Face, attackers leverage repositories to host payloads and act as staging infrastructure within multistep infection chains, distributing malware disguised as legitimate applications," Acronis said. European Authorities Bust Cryptocurrency Fraud Ring —Albanian and Austrian authorities dismantled a cryptocurrency investment fraud ring that caused estimated losses of more than €50 million ($58.5 million) to victims worldwide. The operation, which took place over two years, resulted in the arrest of ten individuals, the search of multiple premises, and the seizure of 891,735 in cash, 443 computers, 238 mobile phones, six laptops, and multiple storage devices. "The criminal network, allegedly operating several call centres in Tirana, Albania, is believed to have caused significant financial damage, totalling at least €50 million," Europol said. "The call centres were professionally set up and organized, resembling legitimate business structures featuring a clear division of roles and hierarchical management." The criminal network is estimated to have involved up to 450 employees across various departments. The scheme involved luring victims to seemingly legitimate online investment platforms through deceptive advertisements on social media or web searches, and coaxing them into making investments under the promise of huge returns. Victims were then assigned retention agents, who masqueraded as investment advisors and used remote access software to gain full control of their devices. "The fraudsters feigned professional expertise and employed psychological pressure to persuade victims to make additional investments, falsely claiming they would be profitable," Europol said. "In truth, the funds were never invested but were instead channelled into an intricate international money-laundering scheme, ultimately disappearing into the hands of the criminal organisation." In some cases, the fraudsters reached out to the victims again and offered help with recovering their stolen funds, only to demand a €500 entry fee and defraud them a second time. Flaws in EnOcean's SmartServer —Two security flaws have been disclosed in EnOcean's SmartServer IoT platform that affect version 4.60.009 and prior. According to Claroty: "CVE-2026-20761 allows remote attackers to send malicious, crafted LON IP-852 messages that result in arbitrary command execution on devices. CVE-2026-22885 allows remote attackers to send malicious, crafted IP-852 messages that bypass ASLR memory protections and leak memory." Successful exploitation of the flaws results in attackers obtaining control over building management and building automation systems running affected versions of this platform and legacy i.LON devices. Patches have been released for both vulnerabilities. Google Announces Android Credential Manager Update —Google has announced a new update to Android's Credential Manager that allows apps to automatically verify a user's personal Gmail address without requiring one-time passwords (OTPs) or email verification links. "Google now issues a cryptographically verified email credential directly to Android devices," the company said. "For users, this completely removes the need to manually verify their email through external channels. For developers, the API securely delivers these verified user claims for any scenario, whether you are building an account creation flow, a recovery process, or a high-risk step-up authentication." Nearly 8.8K Secrets Leaked Online —According to Truffle Security, 8,792 verified, unique secrets have been leaked online through web-based development environments. The tokens were found across 22 million public projects hosted on Cloud Development Environments (CDEs) such as CodePen, CodeSandbox, JSFiddle, and StackBlitz. Is There More to the Xygeni Compromise? —Multiple connections have been found between the compromise of the Xygeni vulnerability scanner on GitHub and a proxy botnet of hacked ASUS and TP-Link routers. Some of the TP-Link consumer routers have been compromised with Microsocks to unroll them to a residential proxy network. "These routers were also running a custom command-and-control beacon that was named ShadowLink," Ctrl-Alt-Intel said. "When we analysed the ShadowLink protocol, we found it was identical, down to a shared authentication secret, to the backdoor planted in the Xygeni GitHub Action used for that supply chain attack." Brazilian Anti-DDoS Firm Behind DDoS Attacks on ISPs —Huge Networks, a Brazilian tech company that specializes in protecting networks from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, has been enabling a botnet responsible for massive DDoS attacks against other internet service providers (ISPs) in the country, according to KrebsOnSecurity. The company has since said the malicious activity resulted from an intrusion first detected in January 2026 and claimed it was likely the work of a competitor. Canonical Target of Sustained DDoS Attack —Canonical disclosed its web infrastructure came under a "sustained, cross-border attack," knocking Ubuntu servers offline for several hours. A pro-Iranian hacktivist group known as the Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq, aka 313 Team, claimed responsibility for the attack on Telegram. The websites have since become operational. Last month, the group also disrupted access to the decentralized social media platform Bluesky. New Phishing Kit Bluekit Detailed —A new phishing kit named Bluekit is offering more than 40 templates targeting popular services and includes basic artificial intelligence (AI)-powered features for generating campaign drafts. Available templates can be used to target email accounts (Outlook, Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, ProtonMail), cloud and enterprise services (iCloud and Zoho), developer platforms (GitHub), and cryptocurrency services (Ledger). What makes the kit stand out is the presence of an AI Assistant panel that supports multiple models, including Llama, GPT-4.1, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek, to help criminals draft phishing emails. It also has support for two-factor authentication, geolocation emulation, antibot cloaking, notifications, spoofing capabilities, voice cloning, and a mail sender. The development once again reinforces the broader trend of crimeware services integrating AI to streamline and scale their operations. Bluekit is the second kit to integrate AI features in as many months. In April 2026, Abnormal Security shed light on a cybercrime platform called ATHR that uses AI vishing agents, credential harvesting panels, and built-in phishing mailers to execute and scale telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) attacks. North Korea Calls U.S. Cyber Threat Claims a Fabrication — North Korea's foreign ministry rejected U.S. accusations that the country poses a cyber threat, stating the U.S. was spreading false information about a non-existent cyber threat from North Korea for political purposes, per Reuters. The ministry said it "would actively take all necessary measures for defending the interests of the state and protecting the rights and interests of its citizens in cyberspace." 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools Model Provenance Kit → It is a free open-source Python tool from Cisco AI Defense that helps identify if a machine learning model is based on a known base model (like Llama, Mistral, GPT, etc.). It analyzes architecture, tokenizer, and weights to quickly compare two models or check against a database of ~150 popular base models. AutoFyn → It is an open-source tool from SignalPilot Labs that runs Claude AI in self-improving loops to optimize measurable goals. Give it a GitHub repo, a clear task (like security hardening, bug fixing, or performance optimization), and a time budget — it works in sandboxed rounds, tracks progress with real evaluations, learns from failures, and delivers improved code via PRs. Disclaimer: This is strictly for research and learning. It hasn't been through a formal security audit, so don't just blindly drop it into production. Read the code, break it in a sandbox first, and make sure whatever you’re doing stays on the right side of the law. Conclusion Stay sharp out there. The pace of attacks is accelerating, and the margin for delay is shrinking. Patch what you can today, verify your supply chains, tighten SaaS access, and treat every “routine” login or pipeline run as potentially hostile. Small habits now will save major headaches later. Until next Monday. Keep your defenses tight and your eyes open. The threats won’t wait — neither should we. See you in the next recap.
thehackernews.comMay 4, 2026extracted
New Bluekit phishing service includes an AI assistant, 40 templates
A new phishing kit named Bluekit offers more than 40 templates targeting popular services and includes basic AI features for generating campaign drafts. Available templates can be used to target email accounts (Outlook, Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo, ProtonMail), cloud services (iCloud), developer platforms (GitHub), and cryptocurrency services (Ledger). What makes the kit stand out is the presence of an AI Assistant panel that supports multiple models, including Llama, GPT-4.1, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek, which helps cybercriminals draft phishing emails. This reinforces the broader trend of cybercrime platforms integrating AI to streamline and scale their operations. Abnormal Security recently reported about ATHR, a voice phishing platform that leverages AI agents to conduct social engineering attacks. Cybersecurity company Varonis analyzed a limited version of Bluekit's AI Assistant panel and notes that the generated outputs featured placeholder content, suggesting a feature in an early, experimental stage. “The [generated] draft included a useful structure, but it still depended on generic link fields, placeholder QR blocks, and copy that would need cleanup before use,” Varonis says. “Bluekit’s AI Assistant looked more like a way to generate a campaign skeleton than a finished phishing flow.” Apart from the AI aspect, BlueKit integrates domain purchase/registration, phishing page setup, and campaign management into a single panel. Varonis reviewed templates for iCloud, Apple ID, Gmail, Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo, ProtonMail, GitHub, Twitter, Zoho, Zara, and Ledger, featuring realistic designs and logos. Operators can select domains, templates, and modes in a unified interface, configure the phishing page behavior, such as redirects, anti-analysis mechanisms, and login process handling, and monitor victim sessions in real-time. Based on the options in the dashboard, users have granular control over the behavior of the phishing pages and can block VPN or proxy traffic, headless user agents, or set fingerprint-based filters. Stolen data is exfiltrated via Telegram, on private channels accessible by the operators. The post-capture session monitoring includes cookies, local storage, and live session state, showing what the victim was served after login, helping operators refine their attacks for maximum effectiveness. Varonis comments that Bluekit is yet another example of an “all-in-one” phishing platform, giving lower-tier cybercriminals fully fledged tools to manage the entire phishing attack lifecycle. However, the kit currently appears to be under active development, receiving frequent updates and evolving quickly, making it a good candidate for growing adoption. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 30, 2026extracted
AI platform ATHR makes voice phishing a one-person job
AI platform ATHR makes voice phishing a one-person job For $4,000 and a cut of the take, a lone criminal can now run a fully automated voice-phishing operation via ATHR, a plaform that spoofs emails alerts from Google, Microsoft, and Coinbase, buries a phone number in each message, and when the victim calls back, hands them off to either a human scammer or an AI voice agent. ATHR for sale AI is becoming part of everyday criminal workflows, and fueling the rise in cyber fraud. ATHR is a platform that provides phishers with everything they need to trick users into sharing account credentials and verification codes. ATHR’s dashboard (Source: Abnormal AI) “The platform ships with a built-in mailer and brand-specific email templates designed to pass casual inspection and, in many cases, technical authentication checks. The lure is typically a fake security alert or account notification—something urgent enough to prompt a phone call but generic enough to avoid triggering content-based filters,” Abnormal AI security researchers explained. The phishing emails don’t contain links or attachments, just a phone number that victims are supposed to call to make sure their account remains safe. Those that do are routed by ATHR’s telephony layer to either a human operator or an AI agent. “Each agent follows a structured, multi-step script that walks the target through a fabricated security scenario: verifying the callback, describing suspicious account activity, confirming an unrecognized phone number, initiating a fake recovery process, and ultimately extracting a six-digit verification code,” the researchers added. The operator of the ATHR platform can monitor active calls. Victims can be redirected to specific panel pages, so that the phishing flow is synchronized with the ongoing conversation. According to Abnormal AI, the platform currently includes pre-built credential harvesting panels for Google, Microsoft, Coinbase, Binance, Gemini, Crypto.com, Yahoo, and AOL. It’s sold via cybercrime networks for $4,000 plus 10% of the phishers’ profits. What sets ATHR apart from similar tools Earlier callback phishing platforms still depended on human callers, but ATHR removes that bottleneck entirely. The AI agents run on a custom text-to-speech engine, and handle live calls autonomously. Also, the entire operation flows through one browser-based interface and the operator doesn’t have to leave the dashboard or switch between tools. The platform allows operators to tweak the spoofed security notices (lures) sent out to potential victims, to make them more believable. “A recipient who sees their approximate location, a recent timestamp, and a plausible IP address is far more likely to believe the alert is real and call the number provided,” the researchers pointed out. ATHR also allows the operator to see whether the lures are successful, and adjust them if they aren’t. “The shift from a fragmented, manually intensive operation to a productized, largely automated one means [telephone-oriented attack delivery] attacks no longer require large teams or specialized infrastructure. As platforms like ATHR emerge on cybercrime networks, these attacks are likely to become more frequent and more difficult to distinguish from legitimate communications,” the researchers concluded. Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comApr 20, 2026extracted
“Your shipment has arrived” email hides remote access software
An attachment in an email impersonating DHL about a shipment contains a link to a preconfigured SimpleHelp remote access tool—an ideal starting point for attackers to explore a network, steal data, and drop additional malware. A German industrial spare parts and equipment supplier received an email pretending to be from DHL, claiming a shipment had arrived. Given their line of business, I imagine they get this type of email all the time. But a few details stood out: The sender’s email address did not belong to DHL, the receiver address was the general info@ for the company, the images in the email were hosted on ecp.yusercontent.com , and, most importantly, there was attachment. While the remote content is hosted on a legitimate Yahoo webpage commonly used to serve images and other content in Yahoo Mail, this is not something DHL typically uses. The attachment, a PDF file called AWB-Doc0921.pdf is just a blurred image with a Microsoft-branded button that prompts the victim to “Continue” to access a secure file. In reality, clicking the button downloads a file called AWB-Doc0921.scr from the domain longhungphatlogistics[.]vn, a domain belonging to a Vietnamese logistics company that was likely compromised to host malware. A .scr file is a Windows file, which is an executable (.exe) file used to launch screensavers. They are often used to hide malicious code because Windows trusts them, allowing them to bypass some security layers. In this case, the file is a modified installer of a remote access tool signed by SimpleHelp. SimpleHelp is a remote support and remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform. It allows remote desktop control, file transfer, diagnostics, and unattended access. In the wrong hands, that’s effectively a support-style backdoor. Attackers can use it for reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, defense evasion, and staging further malware, including ransomware. We’ve seen SimpleHelp abused in this way before. This is basically a beaconing model. Once installed, the system connects out to the attacker’s server, which is more likely to be allowed through NAT and firewalls than inbound connections. Because the user initiated the install, the attacker gets immediate visibility of the system and can reconnect later whenever the service is running. In the case of a phish, that means the lure only has to get the victim to execute the file once. After that, the attacker’s console can show the new machine as a manageable asset. For what seems to be a non-targeted attack, the campaign shows a decent level of sophistication by using legitimate components to trick targets into running the remote access tool. How to stay safe The good news: once you know what to look for, these attacks are much easier to spot and block. The bad news: they’re cheap, scalable, and will continue to circulate. So, the next time a “PDF” prompts you to download a file, pause to think about what might be hiding under the hood. Beyond avoiding unsolicited attachments, here are a few ways to stay safe: Only access your accounts through official apps or by typing the official website directly into your browser. Check file extensions carefully. Even if a file installs a legitimate tool, it may not be safe to run it. Enable multi-factor authentication for your critical accounts. Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution with a web protection module. Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard recognized this email as a scam. Something feel off? Check it before you click. Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly. Available with Malwarebytes Premium Security for all your devices, and in the Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.
malwarebytes.comApr 17, 2026extracted
New ATHR vishing platform uses AI voice agents for automated attacks
A new cybercrime platform called ATHR can harvest credentials via fully automated voice phishing attacks that use both human operators and AI agents for the social engineering phase. The malicious operation is advertised on underground forums for $4,000 and a 10% comission from profits, and can steal login data for multiple services, including Google, Microsoft, and Coinbase. Automation covers the entire telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) stages, from luring targets over email to conducting voice-based social engineering and harvesting account credentials. ATHR attack chain According to researchers at cloud email security company Abnormal, ATHR is a complete phishing/vishing attack generator that offers brand-specific email templates, per-target customization, and spoofing mechanisms to make it appear as if the message originates from a trusted sender. At the time of their analysis, the researchers observed that ATHR supported eight online services: Google, Microsoft, Coinbase, Binance, Gemini, Crypto.com, Yahoo, and AOL. The attack starts with the victim receiving an email crafted to pass casual verification and even technical authentication checks. "The lure is typically a fake security alert or account notification - something urgent enough to prompt a phone call but generic enough to avoid triggering content-based filters," Abnormal notes in a report today. Calling the phone number in the email routes the victim through Asterisk and WebRTC to AI voice agents driven by carefully crafted prompts that guide the victim through the data theft process. The agents follow a multi-step script simulating a security incident. For Google accounts, they replicate the account recovery and verification process, using preset prompts that shape their tone, approach, persona, and behavior to mimic professional support staff. The purpose of the fake recovery process is to extract a six-digit verification code that allows the attacker to gain access to the victim's account. Although ATHR does offer the option to route the call to a human operator, the ability to use an AI agent is what sets it apart. ATHR's dashboard gives operators control over the entire process and real-time data for each attack per target. Through the ATHR panel, they control email distribution, handle calls, and manage phishing operations, monitoring outcomes in real time and receiving logs containing the stolen data. Researchers at Abnormal warn that ATHR significantly reduces the manual effort for the operator and provides threat actors with an integrated platform that can handle all stages of a TOAD attack without the need to configure individual components. This allows less technical attackers with no infrastructure to deploy automated vishing attacks from start to finish. "The shift from a fragmented, manually intensive operation to a productized, largely automated one means TOAD attacks no longer require large teams or specialized infrastructure," Abnormal warns. With the rise of ATHR-like cybercrime platforms, the researchers expect vishing attacks to become more frequent and more difficult to distinguish from legitimate communications. Defending against such attacks requires a different approach, since the lure emails carry no reliable indicators, are customized to authenticate correctly, and appear as valid notifications. However, detection is possible by checking the communication behavioral patterns between a sender and a recipient, and identifying if similar lures containing a phone number reached the organization within a short time frame. Abnormal researchers say that modeling normal communication behavior across the organization can help AI-powered detection flag anomalies before targets make a call. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 16, 2026extracted
April 2026 Patch Tuesday forecast: Spring-cleaning of a preview
April 2026 Patch Tuesday forecast: Spring-cleaning of a preview I just blinked and the first quarter of the year is GONE. Where does the time go? I looked back at my article from last month where I touched on the use of AI and some of the vulnerabilities associated with it and realized it was good precursor to some themes at RSAC this year. AI was certainly the focus this year, with almost everyone having some form of AI connection to their products (some maybe just on paper?). But I think the biggest message, especially while we are in the early days of adoption, is the importance of human oversight or keeping a ‘human in the loop’ as stated in several presentations. AI can add lots of value in many situations, but sometimes it comes to the wrong conclusions despite providing it with all the information it needs. We’re still in the ‘trust but verify’ phase of the new era. Enough about that, let’s take a look at what’s happened in the last month you need to be aware of. Microsoft fixes faulty Windows 11 preview update Microsoft preview patch users had a bit of a rough ride this month. Users installing the first release of the Windows 11 24H2 and 25H2 OS preview patches from KB5079391 quickly ran into an issue with warning messages of missing files and other error messages. Microsoft eventually pulled the KB and re-issued the preview updates as out-of-band (OOB) KB5086672. As expected, the update per Microsoft “includes the improvements and features that were introduced in the March 26, 2026 non-security preview update (KB5079391), along with a fix for an installation issue that affected some devices”. It’s much better to get this issue cleaned up in the preview patch than when full release drops on Patch Tuesday. There were two issues resolved in Outlook Classic this month with OOB updates. The first issue was determined to be a conflict between the latest version of the Teams Meeting add-in from March Patch Tuesday and some older versions of Outlook. Microsoft fixed the problem in Teams and also encouraged users to upgrade to the latest version of Outlook. The second issue dated back to February 26, when Microsoft found Outlook Classic stopped synchronizing with Gmail and Yahoo accounts. The issue has been fixed in Microsoft 365, but Microsoft provided some initial Support details in case you still run into continuing issues even after you update your passwords. SaRA tool retired, replaced by Get Help It’s hard to believe, but the Home and Pro editions of Windows 11 24H2 are scheduled to reach EOL on October 13, 2026. Microsoft announced on March 27th, that “Devices running Home and Pro editions of Windows 11, version 24H2 that are not managed by IT departments will receive the Windows 11, version 25H2 update automatically. You can choose the time to restart your device or postpone the update.” If you have any of these devices in your organization that you don’t want upgraded automatically, you’ll need to bring them under direct control immediately so they can receive the final 6 months of normal security support. Microsoft deprecated the Support and Recovery Assistant (SaRA) from all currently supported operating systems with the March set of Patch Tuesday OS updates. While this tool has been around for a long time, it did have several security weaknesses which Microsoft wanted to remove. In its place, we now have Get Help available. It comes in both a full version with a user interface and a command line and script version you can run with Powershell. This tool is primarily designed to troubleshoot Microsoft Office, Microsoft 365, and Microsoft Outlook. Google issues fourth zero-day Chrome update of 2026 No, it wasn’t an April Fools joke when Google released their 4th zero-day update for the year. This update was 146.0.7680.177/178 for Windows/Mac and 146.0.7680.177 for Linux. It addressed 21 CVEs with 19 rated High and 2 Medium. But most importantly, CVE-2026-5281 reported as Use After Free in Dawn, is known to be exploited in the wild. Per Google, “Dawn is meant to be integrated as part of a larger system and is the underlying implementation of WebGPU in Chromium.” Google did not provide details on the actual exploits. April 2026 Patch Tuesday forecast We may see fewer updates this month from Microsoft. We’ve had recent SQL Server, Exchange Server and .NET updates, so I think Microsoft will be focusing on the regular Windows OS and Office updates this month. The Adobe rotation for Creative Cloud Apps updates will most likely contain Photoshop, and InDesign, Audition, and perhaps a few others. Apple released Tahoe 26.4, Sequoia 15.7.5, and Sonoma 14.8.5 on March 24th, which addressed a large number of CVEs in each OS. If you haven’t rolled those out, you should include them in the monthly deployment soon. Google has been busy this week with development releases dropping for all their products. Patch Tuesday may be a little early for a stable release but watch carefully for them to drop late on Patch Tuesday. As usual, keep those browsers patched as I mentioned the major zero-day update earlier. Mozilla released Firefox 149.0.2, Firefox ESR 140.9.1, Firefox ESR 115.34.1, Thunderbird 149.0.2, and Thunderbird ESR 140.9.1 on April 7th, so it should be quiet next week, but make sure you have these deployed already. Many users feel they are often beta testing the Patch Tuesday Microsoft updates each month rather than applying validated software on their systems. And while the OS preview patches are meant to test and validate upcoming non‑security fixes early, this month they required an early spring-cleaning to get them up and running before the testing could even begin.
helpnetsecurity.comApr 10, 2026extracted
30,000 private Facebook images allegedly downloaded by Meta employee
Every tech company tells you your data is safe. They’ve (hopefully) got encryption, access controls, and zero-trust architectures—the whole glossy security brochure. And then someone on the inside writes a script to steal your private photos anyway. That’s what a former Meta employee based in London is under criminal investigation for. He allegedly downloaded around 30,000 private images belonging to Facebook users. The Metropolitan Police’s cybercrime unit is handling the case. According to court papers, the accused didn’t just browse around; he built a custom script designed to circumvent Meta’s internal detection systems. Meta’s response Meta says it discovered the breach over a year ago, fired the individual, notified affected users, and referred the matter to UK law enforcement. The suspect is currently on police bail and must report to officers in May. Meta’s track record on data protection is far from spotless. It agreed to pay $725 million in 2022 to settle a class-action lawsuit over the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where third-party developers harvested data from millions of Facebook users. Stories keep surfacing about Meta that give us pause when considering privacy and user safety. For example, Facebook engineers have admitted that they didn’t even know where user data was kept. Rogue insiders This kind of thing keeps happening. FinWise Bank disclosed last year that a former employee had potentially accessed records belonging to 689,000 customers. That breach went undetected for over a year. Coinbase also revealed that support staff working overseas had been bribed to steal data on nearly 70,000 customers. Even employees at electronics repair firms like to snoop around customers’ data in ways they shouldn’t. What drives insiders to cross the line? Research into insider threat psychology has found that many documented incidents involve employees in technical professions like system administrators, database operators, and programmers. This makes sense, as they will likely have both the access and the skills to evade detection. Motives range from financial gain to personal spite (as with this grocery store employee who leaked staff data) or voyeurism (as with this Yahoo engineer who accessed women’s nudes including those of women he knew personally). Employees will often commit their crimes after they’ve left the company, if administrators are lax about revoking system access. How to protect yourself Companies will tell you they take privacy seriously, and many do. The standard defenses by companies against insider threats are well known: least-privilege access controls, multi-factor authentication, continuous monitoring of user behavior, and regular security audits. But the Meta case suggests that someone determined enough and technical enough to write their own tools can still sometimes circumvent those defenses. So what can users do? Store your most sensitive data (like private images) in a secure, password-protected environment. If a service doesn’t offer strong controls, it’s worth asking whether you’re comfortable trusting everyone who might have access behind the scenes. Check out how to reduce your digital footprint and limit the info scammers and extortionists can use against you. Scammers don’t need to hack you. They just need you to click once. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection catches suspicious activity before it becomes a problem.
malwarebytes.comApr 9, 2026extracted
Yahoo<i>!</i> Japan’s owner consolidating 164 OpenStack clusters into one
SYSTEMS AMD inches closer to its goal of making AI suck less ... energyHouse of Zen claims latest systems already 4x more efficient than two years ago Google pits Marvell against Broadcom as it chases AI crownAnd Marvell just offered the Chocolate Factory a $12.2B stake to sweeten the deal SYSTEMS Cerebras CS-4 rack systems juice chips for every last drop of AI performanceNext-gen systems double per-chip performance while cramming 3x as many into a rack Security Copilot tricked into telling reseachers how to hack itselfHow to social engineer an AI's reasoning engine AI and ml Payments giant Stripe is about to drop over $7 billion to become a gateway to AI token salesAI gateways look promising as companies struggle with model orchestration Security Russians are posing as Signal support to launch phishing attacksPLUS: US takes down Iranian propaganda sites; Marketing company asks 'Why Do We Have Your Information?' And more! Security Microsoft patches failed to fix on-prem SharePoint, which is now under zero-day attackPLUS: China upgrades smartphone surveillance tools; Ring eases anti-snooping stance; and more Black Hat and DEF CON DEF CON Franklin project enlists hackers to harden critical infrastructureVoting village reports have been so successful, says Jeff Moss, that the whole of DEF CON will now be included Security EQT buys majority share in Swiss cybersecurity biz AcronisWent at equivalent of $3.5B+ valuation for entire firm, though portion sold not specified Malware Month Ten years since the first corp ransomware, Mikko Hyppönen sees no end in sightOn the plus side, infosec's a good bet for a long, stable career FOSS smashed one Microsoft monopoly. After 20 years of failure, it's time to smash anotherWord up GNOME can look like Windows – and Flashback can do it without extensionsNew 'Simple-taskbar' is an option, but there's a simpler, stabler way A moment of silence, please, for the final release of Debian on x86-32New Debian versions hit FOSSland in the form of 13.6 and 12.15 Baddies caught exploiting extensions bugs with perfect 10 scores on vulnerable Joomla websitesFlaws in iCagenda, Balbooa Forms extensions can impact open source CMS that powers a million sites worldwide Frame: A new X11 server – implemented directly in assemblyJoins yserver, Phoenix, and of course XLibre – and outlier Arcan Cinnamon 6.8 will support Wayland – if you want itNext version of Linux Mint’s desktop has both kinds of display server
go.theregister.comApr 7, 2026extracted
Critical Vulnerability in Claude Code Emerges Days After Source Leak
Anthropic’s Claude Code is in the news again – and not for the best reasons. Within days of each other, Anthropic first leaked the source code to Claude Code, and then a critical vulnerability was found by Adversa AI. Claude Code Leak On March 31, 2026, Anthropic mistakenly included a debugging JavaScript sourcemap for Claude Code v2.1.88 to npm. Within hours, researcher Chaofan Shou discovered the sourcemap and posted a link on X – kicking off a global rush to examine de-obfuscated Claude Code’s code. Sigrid Jin, a 25-year-old student at the University of British Columbia, worked with Yeachan Heo to reconstruct the Claude Code. “It took two humans, 10 OpenClaws, a MacBook Pro laptop, and a few hours to recreate the popular AI agent’s source code and share it with the world,” reports Yahoo, proving that what goes up (on the internet) does not come down (off the internet). The result now persists on the internet, comprising 512,000 lines of TypeScript in 1,900 files. It is awkward but not catastrophic for Anthropic. “While the Claude Code leak does present real risk, it is not the same as model weights, training data or customer data being compromised. What was exposed is something more like an operational blueprint of how the current version of Claude Code is designed to work,” explains Melissa Bischoping, senior director of security & product design research at Tanium. The key is that researchers can see how Claude Code is meant to work but cannot recreate it because the leak does not include the Claude model weights, the training data, customer data, APIs or credentials. “It is not a foolproof roadmap to exploitation, but it is meaningful insight into how the tool handles inputs, enforces permissions and resists abuse,” continues Bischoping. “Another layer of risk from this leak is that adversaries may use the blueprint to build lookalikes that appear and behave like Claude Code on the surface, but install malware or harvest credentials and data,” she adds. Awkward and embarrassing for Anthropic, but not directly harmful to Claude Code. Vulnerability in Claude Code But a genuine and critical vulnerability has now been discovered in Claude Code proper by Adversa AI Red Team. “Claude Code is… a 519,000+ line TypeScript application that allows developers to interact with Claude directly from the command line. It can edit files, execute shell commands, search codebases, manage git workflows, and orchestrate complex multi-step development tasks,” reports Adversa. Claude Code includes a permission system based on allow rules (auto-approve specific commands), deny rules (hard-block specific commands), and ask rules (always prompt). Adversa provides an example: { "deny": ["Bash(curl:*)", "Bash(wget:*)"], "allow": ["Bash(npm:*)", "Bash(git:*)"] } Never allow curl or wget (prevent data exfiltration), but auto-allow npm and git commands (common development tools). That sounds correct and reasonable. The flaw, however, is that the deny rules can be bypassed. “The permission system is the primary security boundary between the AI agent and the developer’s system,” reports Adversa. “When it fails silently, the developer has no safety net.” The problem stems from Anthropic’s desire for improved performance following the discovery of a performance issue: complex compound commands caused the UI to freeze. Anthropic fixed this by capping analysis at 50 subcommands, with a fall back to a generic ‘ask’ prompt for anything else. The code comment states, “Fifty is generous: legitimate user commands don’t split that wide. Above the cap we fall back to ‘ask’ (safe default — we can’t prove safety, so we prompt).” The flaw discovered by Adversa is that this process can be manipulated. Anthropic’s assumption doesn’t account for AI-generated commands from prompt injection — where a malicious CLAUDE.md file instructs the AI to generate a 50+ subcommand pipeline that looks like a legitimate build process. If this is done, “behavior: ‘ask’, // NOT ‘deny’” occurs immediately. “Deny rules, security validators, command injection detection — all skipped,” writes Adversa. The 51st command reverts to ask as required, but the user gets no indication that all deny rules have been ignored. Adversa warns that a motivated attacker could embed real-looking build steps in a malicious repository’s CLAUDE.md. It would look routine, but no per-subcommand analysis runs at all when the count exceeds 50. This could allow the attacker to exfiltrate SSH private keys, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, npm tokens or Env secrets. It could lead to credential theft at scale, supply chain compromise, cloud infrastructure breach and CI/CD pipeline poisoning. “During testing, Claude’s LLM safety layer independently caught some obviously malicious payloads and refused to execute them. This is good defense-in-depth,” writes Adversa. “However, the permission system vulnerability exists regardless of the LLM layer — it is a bug in the security policy enforcement code. A sufficiently crafted prompt injection that appears as legitimate build instructions could bypass the LLM layer too.” Related: Hackers Weaponize Claude Code in Mexican Government Cyberattack Related: Claude Code Flaws Exposed Developer Devices to Silent Hacking Related: Trump Orders All Federal Agencies to Phase Out Use of Anthropic Technology
securityweek.comApr 2, 2026extracted
Microsoft links Classic Outlook issue to email delivery problems
Microsoft is investigating a known issue that prevents some Classic Outlook users from sending emails via Outlook.com. Affected users are being warned that their message hasn't reached some intended recipients, and they will encounter this problem more often when the Outlook.com account they use to send email is an Outlook profile linked to another Exchange account. "This message could not be sent. Try sending the message again later or contact your network administrator," the non-delivery report (NDR) error displayed when sending or replying to emails reads. "You do not have the permission to send the message on behalf of the specified user. Error is [0x80070005-0x0004dc-0x000524]." Microsoft added that another condition that may trigger these errors is that the sender's account has an Exchange Online mail contact with the same SMTP address. While investigating this issue and still looking for a fix, the Outlook team shared several workarounds that may help affected customers temporarily mitigate the issue. Microsoft recommends removing the M365 account Address Book so that the Outlook client does not check it when sending emails, hiding the Outlook.com contact from the Microsoft 365 account Global Address List (GAL). Other alternatives include creating a new classic Outlook profile that includes only the account receiving NDR errors, and using the New Outlook client or Outlook.com on the web to send email from the affected account. Over the last two weeks, Microsoft fixed two other known issues, including one that caused Classic Outlook to crash when enabling the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in and another that triggered 0x800CCC0F and 0x80070057 errors when synchronizing Gmail and Yahoo accounts. Microsoft is also investigating known bugs that cause "Can't connect to the server" errors when creating groups if Exchange Web Services (EWS) is enabled for the tenant, and that make the mouse pointer disappear for some users in Classic Outlook, OneNote, and other Microsoft 365 apps. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comApr 2, 2026extracted
Why we&#8217;re still not doing April Fools&#8217; Day
People lost an estimated $442 billion to scams last year worldwide, according to the Global Anti-Scam Alliance. The scale of that is hard to picture, but people’s day-to-day scam experience is easier to recognize: Our research found that 44% of people say they encounter mobile scams every single day. Two in three say it’s hard to “tell apart a scam from the real thing” and only 15% strongly agree they could detect a scam. A year ago, we said we were stepping away from April Fools’ Day. Not because we don’t like a joke, but because the jokes were starting to look too similar to the things people are already worried about. A few people may have called us humorless. But a year on, we’re more certain than ever that it was the right call. We want to explain why, with a bit more data behind us this time. It’s gotten worse, not better When we wrote last year’s post, AI-assisted scams were an emerging threat. Now they’re the default. The broken English and obvious spelling mistakes that used to give scams away have been replaced by clean copy, polished websites, and messages that read as well as anything a real company would send. Scammers’ tactics have also evolved. A year ago, the main AI scam story was voice cloning (fraudsters using an AI replica of a loved one’s voice to call a family member and claim they were in trouble). That’s still happening, but now we’re also seeing deepfake video calls from people posing as bank managers or job applicants, and AI-assisted scams that don’t just send a message, but reply in real time, adapting their responses and guiding victims step by step. Put a well-executed April Fools’ campaign next to a modern phishing attempt and many of us will genuinely need to look twice. This year, scammers even used AI to clone our own site: The problem with April 1 We’re conditioned to throw caution to the wind on April 1 and enjoy the joke. Too-good-to-be-true offers sit alongside meatball lipstick from IKEA, Birds Eye Waffholes and Yahoo’s Agricultural Interface in your inbox. On any other day, you’d probably pause for a moment. On April 1, you click through to see what the joke is. For scammers, nothing changes on April 1. They keep sending the same messages using the same tactics. The only difference is how people react to those messages on this one day of the year. In a campaign that sprays to millions of inboxes, it just takes a few more people to click the link that auto-downloads malware, fill in their login details to a fake site, or share the scam with friends and family thinking it’s all a bit of fun. Sadly, none of this is hypothetical. In 2021, Deliveroo sent fake order confirmation emails to thousands of customers in France as an April Fools’ joke, stating they’d ordered 38 anchovy pizzas totaling €466. Customers flooded their banks reporting fraud. Deliveroo had to issue a public apology, acknowledging they should never have led people to believe, even as a joke, that their account data had been compromised. Three years later, UK burger chain Gourmet Burger Kitchen sent a fake order confirmation email to its mailing list. Same joke. Same fallout. Customers were sent into a panic, cards were cancelled, and customer service was overwhelmed. Both of those were genuine mistakes made by well-meaning marketing teams. They illustrate the problem precisely: a prank that looks like a scam causes real harm, regardless of the intent. What a year of Scam Guard taught us Scam Guard launched in June 2025 as a way for people to quickly double-check a message that feels… not obviously wrong, but not quite right either. The data from our (almost) first year of Scam Guard is sobering. In roughly 15% of cases where someone stopped to check with Scam Guard, we prevented them from losing over $1,000 or from walking into something with serious personal consequences. One in seven people who paused to check were about to do something that would have cost them significantly. Scams are now convincing enough that people aren’t sure. They’re suspicious enough that they stop to check. And often, they’re dangerous enough that a pause to check made all the difference. And if everything looks like a joke on April 1, it’s harder to spot a scam. If we say it’s real, it’s real We stepped away from April Fools’ Day because we wanted to be a company you could trust completely, every day of the year. If we say something is fake, it’s fake. If we say something is real, it’s real. There’s already enough online that makes people second-guess themselves. We don’t need to add to it. What to do on April 1, and every day after it If you’re on the receiving end of an April Fools’ joke, the stakes are usually low. If you’re on the receiving end of a scam, they aren’t. On April 1, those two things are hardest to tell apart. Here are some tips to follow every day to stay safe from jokes scams: Watch out for a false sense of urgency. Scammers will often use time pressure to get you to click, fill in your personal data, or hand over money. If you feel like you’re being asked to act quickly, pause. Is it too good to be true? Offers of big discounts or free stuff can be really tempting, but they’re often used as lures for scammers. The likelihood is that it is, indeed, too good to be true and should be avoided at all costs. Have a family code word. Scammers are known to use an AI-generated voice of a loved one to trick a family member into handing over money. Come up with a code word in person that only you and your loved ones know and keep it a secret so you can ask for it if you receive such a phone call. Verify through a different channel. If your bank calls unexpectedly, hang up and call them back on a number from their official website. If a friend sends you a link out of nowhere, text them separately to check it was really them. This one step catches a surprising number of scams. Use a different password for every account. If you get your username and password stolen on one account you don’t want scammers to be able to use it on another. Password managers help you create complex passwords, and they remember them for you. Set up multi-factor authentication on every account you can. It’s not foolproof, but it does make it considerably harder for scammers. If something feels off, check it. That’s what Scam Guard is there for. Something feel off? Check it before you click. Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly. Available with Malwarebytes Premium Security for all your devices, and in the Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.
malwarebytes.comApr 1, 2026extracted
Casbaneiro Phishing Targets Latin America and Europe Using Dynamic PDF Lures
A multi-pronged phishing campaign is targeting Spanish-speaking users in organizations across Latin America and Europe to deliver Windows banking trojans like Casbaneiro (aka Metamorfo) via another malware called Horabot. The activity has been attributed to a Brazilian cybercrime threat actor tracked as Augmented Marauder and Water Saci. The e-crime group was first documented by Trend Micro in October 2025. "This threat group employs a wider-ranging attack model focused on a bespoke delivery and propagation mechanism that includes WhatsApp, ClickFix techniques, and email-centric phishing," BlueVoyant security researchers Thomas Elkins and Joshua Green said in a technical breakdown published Tuesday. "It is now evident that while these Brazil-based operators heavily leverage script-based WhatsApp automation to compromise retail and consumer users in Latin America, they concurrently maintain and deploy an advanced, email-hijacking engine to penetrate enterprise perimeters there and Europe as well." The starting point of the campaign is a phishing email that employs court summons-themed messages to deceive recipients into opening a password-protected PDF attachment. Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive, which, in turn, leads to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads. The VBS script is designed to carry out environment and anti-analysis checks similar to those found in Horabot artifacts, including checks for Avast antivirus software, and proceeds to retrieve next-stage payloads from a remote server. Among the downloaded files are AutoIt-based loaders, each of which extracts and runs encrypted payload files with ".ia" or ".at" extensions to eventually launch two malware families: Casbaneiro ("staticdata.dll") and Horabot ("at.dll"). While Casbaneiro is the primary payload, Horabot is used as a propagation mechanism for the malware. Casbaneiro's Delphi DLL module contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to fetch a PowerShell script that employs Horabot to distribute the malware via phishing emails to harvested contacts from Microsoft Outlook. "Rather than distributing a static file or hardcoded link as seen in older Horabot campaigns, this script initiates an HTTP POST request to a remote PHP API (hxxps://tt.grupobedfs[.]com/.../gera_pdf.php), passing a randomly generated four-digit PIN," BlueVoyant said. "The server dynamically forges a bespoke, password-protected PDF impersonating a Spanish judicial summons, which is returned to the infected host. The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached." Also used in tandem is a secondary Horabot-related DLL ("at.dll") that functions as a spam and account hijacking tool targeting Yahoo, Live, and Gmail accounts to send phishing emails via Outlook. Horabot is assessed to be put to use in attacks targeting Latin America since at least November 2020. Water Saci has a history of using WhatsApp Web as a distribution vector for disseminating banking trojans like Maverick and Casbaneiro in a worm-like manner. However, recent campaigns highlighted by Kaspersky have leveraged the ClickFix social engineering tactic to dupe users into running malicious HTA files with the end goal of deploying Casbaneiro and the Horabot spreader. "Taken together, the integration of ClickFix social engineering, alongside dynamic PDF generation and WhatsApp automation, demonstrates an agile adversary that is continually innovating and executing diverse attack paths to bypass modern security controls," the researchers concluded. "This adversary is maintaining a bifurcated, multi-pronged attack infrastructure, dynamically deploying the WhatsApp-centric Maverick chain and concurrently utilizing both ClickFix and email-based Horabot attack paths."
thehackernews.comApr 1, 2026extracted
Microsoft fixes Outlook Classic crashes caused by Teams Meeting add-in
Microsoft has resolved a known issue that rendered the Classic Outlook email client unusable for users who enabled the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in. The bug was first reported on March 12, when affected Microsoft 365 customers began experiencing Outlook crashes and prompts to start it in safe mode. Microsoft acknowledged the issue nearly a week later in a Microsoft 365 incident report (EX1254044), blaming a previous Outlook build for the crashes. "Starting around March 12, 2026, classic Outlook might crash and then prompt to start in Safe Mode," it explains in a recently updated support document. "This issue is happening when older builds of classic Outlook are using the newest version of the Teams Meeting Add-In build 1.26.02603. For example, this issue happens on Current Channel if the classic Outlook build is equal or lower than Version 2402 (Build 17328.20142)." On Monday, Microsoft said the bug has been resolved and that a fix is rolling out with Microsoft Teams version 26058.712.4527.9297. Microsoft advised affected users to update their classic Outlook client to the latest build, which addresses the issue. Those who can't immediately upgrade are advised to perform an Online Repair for click-to-run installs (which reinstalls all Office applications). Users who need to stay on the older build of Office they're currently using can also disable the buggy Teams Meeting Add-in as a temporary workaround by going through the following procedure: Open Outlook in Safe Mode. To do this, hold down the Ctrl key when you start the application, or go to Open Outlook in safe mode and follow the steps. Select File > Options > Add-ins > Go. In the COM Add-ins dialog, uncheck Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in for Microsoft Office, then select OK. Restart Outlook. Last week, Microsoft also fixed a Classic Outlook bug that had been triggering 0x800CCC0F and 0x80070057 errors when synchronizing Gmail and Yahoo accounts since February 26. Earlier this year, it addressed another Classic Outlook issue caused by the December 2025 updates that prevented Microsoft 365 customers from opening encrypted emails. Microsoft is also investigating a bug that causes "Can't connect to the server" errors when creating groups in Classic Outlook if Exchange Web Services (EWS) is enabled for the tenant. Another issue, acknowledged by Microsoft almost two months after the first user reports, makes the mouse pointer disappear for some users in Classic Outlook, OneNote, and other Microsoft 365 apps. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 31, 2026extracted
HIBP Mega Update: Passkeys, k-Anonymity Searches, Massive Speed Enhancements and a Bulk Domain Verification API
For a hobby project built in my spare time to provide a simple community service, Have I Been Pwned sure has, well, "escalated". Today, we support hundreds of thousands of website visitors each day, tens of millions of API queries, and hundreds of millions of password searches. We're processing billions of compromised records each year provided by breached companies, white hat researchers, hackers and law enforcement agencies. And it's used by every conceivable demographic: infosec pros, "mums and dads", customer support services, and, according to the data, more than half the Fortune 500 who are actively monitoring the exposure of their domains. So yeah, "escalated" seems fair! Amidst all the time spent processing data, we've been trying to figure out where to invest energy in building new stuff. In essence, data breaches are pretty simple: you've got a bunch of exposed email addresses attributed to a source, sitting next to a whole bunch of fields we describe with metadata. Our goal has always been to help people use this data to do good after bad things happen, and today we're launching a bunch of new features to do just that. So, here goes: New Features, New Plans In the beginning (ok, in "recent years"), there was one plan we referred to as "Pwned", and within that, there were various levels. For example, the entry-level plan has been "Pwned 1," and to this day, more than half our subscriptions are on it. That's "a coffee a month" for a simple service that, by the raw numbers, does precisely what most of our subscribers are looking for. These are typically small businesses that make a handful of API queries or monitor a domain or two with a few email addresses. It's simple, effective and... insufficient for larger organisations. So, we added Pwned 2, 3 and 4, and they all added more RPMs for email searches and more capacity for searching larger domains. Then we added Pwned 5, which added stealer log support, and somewhere along the way also added Pwned Ultra tiers for making large numbers of API requests. As a result, that one "plan" added more and more stuff at different levels and ultimately became a bit kludgy. Today, we're launching a bunch of new features to better support the volume and privacy needs of our subscribers, and we're shuffling our existing plans to help do this. Here's what they now look like: Core: The fundamentals, largely being what we already had and designed for entry-level use cases Pro: Contains a bunch of the new features designed for larger orgs and those searching domains on behalf of customers High RPM: The old "Ultra" plan levels, designed solely for making large volumes of requests to the email search API Enterprise: We've had this for many years now, and it's a more tailored offering So, that's the high-level overview. Let's now look at all the new stuff and everything that changes: Supporting MSPs Monitoring on Behalf of Third Parties For most people, this won't sound particularly exciting, but I'm putting it up front because I'll refer to it when describing the more important stuff shortly. In the past, we've had the following carve-out in our terms of use, namely, what you're not permitted to use the service for: the benefit of a third party (including for use by a related entity or for the purpose of reselling or otherwise making the Services available to any third party for commercial benefit) This excluded managed service providers from, for example, monitoring their customers' domains as part of their services. That clause has now been revised with the preceding text: unless you have purchased a Paid Service which expressly allows you to do so Which means we can now welcome MSPs to the Pro and High RPM tiers. They can't just take HIBP and use it to create a competing product (for obvious reasons, that's a pretty standard clause within many online services), but they can absolutely add it to the offerings they provide to their own customers. And we're adding new features to make it easier to do just that, for example: Automating Domain Verification Preserving privacy whilst still providing a practical, effective service has always been a balancing act, one I think we've gotten pretty spot on. But the hoops people have had to jump through for domain verification, in particular, have been cumbersome. An organisation wanting to add a bunch of its domains has had to go through the process one by one via the web interface, then verify control over them one by one. They'd spend a lot of time doing kludgy, repetitive work. Today, we're launching two new ways of adding domains in a much more automated fashion, and the first is the verifying via DNS API: Successfully adding a pre-defined TXT record to DNS is solid proof that whoever is attempting to search that domain genuinely controls it. As well as the old kludgy way of doing it in the browser, waiting for DNS to propagate, then coming back to the browser to complete the verification, we can now fully automate the process via API. Here's how it works: Call the HIBP API to generate the TXT record token Call the API on your DNS provider to add the token to the TXT record Call another HIBP API to validate that the token exists This is easily scripted in your language of choice, and you can enumerate it over as many domains as you like. You can also keep retrying step 3 above as often as needed when DNS takes a little while to do its thing. It's all now fully documented in the latest version of the API, and ready to roll. But what if you don't control the DNS? Perhaps it's a cumbersome process in your org, or you're an MSP monitoring your customers' domains, but you don't have control of DNS. That's where the verifying by email API comes in: We've long had a verification process that involves choosing one of several standard aliases on a domain to email a verification token to. You do this via the dashboard, grab the token sent to the email, paste it back into the dashboard and the domain is now verified. The new API makes that much easier, especially when multiple domains are being verified. Here's how it works: Call the HIBP API and specify one of the pre-defined aliases to send a verification email to Click the link in the email and approve the domain to be added to the requester's account And that's it. We see this being particularly useful for MSPs who can now send a heap of emails on their customers' domains, and so long as someone receives it and clicks the link, that's the verification process done. That API is also now fully documented and ready to roll and is accessible to all Pro plan subscribers. Auto-verifying Subdomains This one was just unnecessarily frustrating for larger customers who spread email addresses over multiple subdomains. Let's say a company owns example.com and they successfully verify control of it, but then they distribute their email addresses by region. They end up with addresses @apac.example.com and @emea.example.com and so on, and in the past, needed to verify each subdomain separately. Turns out we have 154 votes for this feature in User Voice, which is substantially more than I expected. So, in keeping with the theme of the Pro plan making it easier on larger orgs, anyone on that level can now add their apex domain, verify it accordingly, then go to town adding all the subdomains they want without the need for verifying each one. Bringing K-Anonymity Searches to the Masses Until today, every time you took out a subscription via the public website and started searching email addresses, it looked like this: GET https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/[email protected] Clearly, this involved sending the email address to HIBP's service. Whilst we don't store those addresses, if you're sending data to a service in this fashion, there's always the technical capability for us to see that piece of PII and associate it back to the requester via their API key. This approach is what we'll refer to as "direct email search". Let's now look at k-anonymity searches, and I'll break it down into a few simple steps: Start by creating a SHA-1 hash of the address to be searched, so for [email protected], that's: 567159D622FFBB50B11B0EFD307BE358624A26EE Take the first 6 characters of the hash and pass them to the new API: What's really important here is that those 6 characters are the only identifier sent to HIBP and they're completely useless in identifying which address was actually searched for (that link also explains why SHA-1 is perfectly reasonable for this)GET https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/range/567159 HIBP then responds with the suffixes of every hash we have that matches that prefix and for each one, the breaches it's appeared against: The prefix presently contains 393 suffixes, and if one of them matches the remaining characters of the hash of the full email address, you know that's the address you're looking for.{ "hashSuffix": "D622FFBB50B11B0EFD307BE358624A26EE", "websites": [ "Adobe", "Stratfor", "Yahoo", ... ] }, ... This is the same methodology we've been using for years with the Pwned Passwords search, and we're currently serving about 18 billion requests a month, so it seems that lots of people have easily gotten to grips with it. It's a pretty simple technical concept with great privacy attributes, and it's fully documented on the API page. K-anonymity searches are now available to all Pro and High RPM subscribers at the same rate limit as the direct searches. That rate limit is shared, so you can either make 100% of them to k-anon or 100% to the direct search or go 50/50. We're really happy with the privacy aspects of this API and we know it ticks a box a lot of orgs have been asking for. Unsmoothing the API Rate Limit Previously, when you took out a 10-request-per-minute API key, we implemented a rate limit of 1 request every 6 seconds. The same logic applied to all the higher-tier products, too, and the reason was simply to distribute the load across each minute more evenly or in other words, "smoothing" the rate at which requests were made. That was important earlier on as the underlying Azure infrastructure had to support that traffic, and sudden bursts could be problematic. But the other thing that was problematic is that people (quite reasonably) assumed that they could make 10 fast requests, wait a minute, then go again. This led to support overhead for us and customer frustration, and neither is good. With these latest updates, 10RPM (and all the other RPMs) is now implemented exactly as it sounds - 10 requests in any one-minute block. Here's our Azure API Management policy: In other words, we've "unsmoothed" it. You can hammer the service 10 times in quick succession, then wait a minute, and you won't see a single HTTP 429 "Too many requests" response. Equally, if you're on a 12,000 RPM plan (and you can actually send that many requests quickly!), you won't see an unexpected 429. We can do this now because of the way we serve a huge amount of content from Cloudflare's edge, unburdening the underlying infrastructure from sudden spikes. It's a little thing, but it'll solve a lot of unnecessary frustration for a bunch of people, including us. That's implemented across every single plan, too, so everyone benefits. We Just Wanna Go (Even) Fast(er) Here's our challenge today: how do we enable millions of people a day to search through billions of records with near instantaneous results... and do it affordably? They're somewhat competing objectives, but every now and then, we find this one neat trick that dramatically improves things. About 18 months ago, I wrote about how we were Hyperscaling HIBP with Cloudflare Workers and Caching. The basic premise is that, as people search the service, we build a cache in Cloudflare's 300+ edge nodes that includes the entire hash range just searched for (see the k-anon section above). We flush that out on every new breach load and as it builds back up to the full 16^6 possible cachable hash ranges, our origin load approaches zero and everything gets served from the edge. Almost, because we have the following problem I described in the post: However, the second two models (the public and enterprise APIs) have the added burden of validating the API key against Azure API Management (APIM), and the only place that exists is in the West US origin service. What this means for those endpoints is that before we can return search results from a location that may be just a short jet ski ride away, we need to go all the way to the other side of the world to validate the key and ensure the request is within the rate limit. Or at least we had that problem, which we've just solved with a simple fix. The quoted problem stemmed from the fact that, to ensure everyone adhered to the rate limit, we performed the APIM check before returning any data. That meant always waiting for packets to make a round trip to America, even when the data was cached nearby. But what we realised is that adhering to the rate limit can be eventually enforced; it really doesn't matter too much if a request or two in excess of the rate limit slips through, then we enforce it. The reason why that epiphany is important is that with that in mind, we can start returning data to the client immediately whilst doing the APIM check asynchronously. If the request exceeds the rate limit, Cloudflare will block subsequent requests until the client starts making requests within their limit. So, the rate limit check is no longer a blocking call; it's a background process that doesn't delay us returning results. What that means is a dramatic reduction in the time til first byte: That's almost a 40% reduction in wait time! It's an awesome example of how continuous investment in the way we run this thing yields tangible results that make a meaningful difference to the value people get from the service. Passkeys! Just one more thing... This is all new, all free and all available to everyone, whether they have a paid subscription or not. Remember when I got phished last year? I sure do, and I vowed to use that experience to maximise the adoption of passkeys wherever possible. So, putting my money (and time) where my mouth is, we've now launched passkeys as an alternate means of signing into your dashboard: This saves you needing a "magic" link via email on every sign-in, and whilst it doesn't constitute 2FA (the passkey becomes a single factor used to sign in), it massively streamlines how you access the dashboard. And because we never used passwords for access in the first place, the only account-takeover risk our customers face is someone gaining access to either their email account or to where they store their passkeys (in either case, they have much bigger problems!). Here's how it works: start by signing into your dashboard, then heading over to the "Passkeys" section on the left of the screen and adding a new one: The name is so you can keep track of which passkey you save where. I save most of mine in 1Password, but you can also save them on a physical U2F key or in your browser, for example. Clicking "Continue" will cause your browser to prompt you for the location where you'd like to store it and again, that's 1Password for me: And that's it - we're done! So, how does it work? Check this out, and don't blink or you'll miss it: Compared to typing in your email address, hitting the "Sign In" button, flicking over to the mailbox, waiting for the mail to arrive, then clicking the link, we're down from let's call it 30 seconds to about 3 seconds. Nice 😎 Even though there isn't much security benefit to doing this on HIBP (you can still sign in via email, too), we wanted to build this as an example of just how easy it is. It took Stefán about an hour to build a first cut of this (with support from Copilot), and, aside from the dev time, building passkey support into your website is totally free. There are no external services you need to pay for, no hardware to buy or special crypto concepts to grasp. Passkeys are dead simple, and web developers with even a passing interest in security and usability should be adding support for them right now. We also wanted to make sure they were freely available to anyone, regardless of whether you have a paid subscription, because security like this should be the baseline, not a paid extra. So, go and give them a go in HIBP now. And just in case you want to really geek out on how passkeys work, Stefán presented this at NDC Security in Oslo earlier this month: All the Plans and Future Changes for Existing Subscribers It's easiest just to see the whole overview all in one image (or jump over to the pricing page on the website), and it largely reflects everything described above: One immediate difference to how we've previously represented the plans is that the annual price is now shown as a monthly figure. It turns out that the vast majority of our subscribers choose annual billing, so leading with the per-month pricing puts the least relevant figures front and centre. As we looked around at other services, that was a pretty consistent trend, especially when one annual subscription is more cost-effective than renewing a monthly one 12 times (annual is roughly 10x a year's worth of month-by-month payments). Another change is that we're going to cap the number of larger domains (those with over 10 breached addresses) that can be searched on each subscription. Let me explain why: Every time we load a data breach, each record in the breach is checked against each domain being monitored. In 2025, we added 2.9 billion breached records, and we have 400k monitored domains. Multiply those out, and we're looking at 1.16 quadrillion checks for our subscribers each year. This is all handled by SQL queries, so it's not like we're getting hit with human overhead at scale, but we're getting hit hard with SQL costs. Across everything we pay to run this service (storage, app hosting, functions, API management, App Insights, bandwidth, etc.), the SQL bill is more than the total for all other services combined. In addition to how we currently calculate plan size based on breached email count, we're adding a cap on the number of domains per plan. Only domains with more than 10 breached addresses are included in the cap. The “10” threshold aligns with the existing requirement for a domain to need a subscription at all, and means this change impacts only a single-digit percentage of subscribers. It also helps filter out noise so the cap reflects domains that actually matter. For those larger domains beyond the cap, all current alerts will continue to work just fine until they run a search. At that time, they'll have the option to upgrade the plan or reduce the number of domains. But none of that affects existing subscribers now: There will be no changes to existing plans until at least August 2 this year. We do an annual price revision each August, and that's already factored into the table above. That applies to any new subscriptions immediately, but it won't touch existing ones until August 2 at the earliest. The revised pricing only kicks in on the next subscription renewal after that date, so it could be as late as August 2027 if you're an existing subscriber. The same goes for the cap on the number of domains being monitored - there's no impact on existing subscribers until at least August. That leaves plenty of time to cancel, downgrade, upgrade, or just do nothing, and the plan will automatically roll over to the new one. We'll be emailing everyone in the coming days with details of precisely what will change. Note: if you had an old Pwned 5 subscription for the sake of stealer log access, we'll be rolling all those folks over to Pro 1 and applying a permanent discount code to ensure there's no change in price by moving to the higher plan (it'll actually drop slightly). That'll be explained in the upcoming email, it just made more sense to keep stealer logs in Pro and move people over, and this'll just give them free access to all the new stuff too. Speaking of which, the thing that (almost) nobody reads but everyone is subject to has been revised to reflect the changes described above - the Terms of Use. For the first time, we've also summarised all the changes and linked through to an archive of the old ones, so if you really love digging through a long document prepared by lawyers, this should make you happy 😊 We're Still Doing Credit Cards via Stripe While I'm here, just a quick comment on our ongoing Stripe dependency and, as a result, the necessity to pay for public services via credit card. I've written before about some of the challenges we've faced with customers' requests to pay by other means and how, push comes to shove, they (almost) always find a way around internal barriers. Let me share a recent empirical anecdote about this: Just the other day, I had a call with a Fortune 500 company that was initially interested in our enterprise services. As the discussion unfolded, it became evident that the public services would more than suffice and that the enterprise route was too burdensome for their particular use case. Be that as it may, the procurement lady on the call was adamant that payment by credit card was impossible, even going to the extent of making a pretty bold statement: No Fortune 500 company is going to pay for services like this via credit card! O RLY? If only I had the data to check that claim... 😊 Based on a list of their domains, 132 unique Fortune 500 companies have paid for our services by credit card. The real number will be higher because many more of their domains are not on that list, or purchases have been made via an email address not on the corporate domain. Let's call it somewhere between a quarter and a third of the Fortune 500 who've puschased direct via the world's most common payment method. In other words, a significantly different number from the "zero" claim. I've dropped the hard facts here out of both frustration from our dealings with unnecessarily artificial barriers and in support of the folks out there who, just like me in my corporate days, had to deal with "Neville" in procurement. Per that linked blog post, push back against "corporate policy" prohibiting payment by card, and statistically, you'll likely find you're not the 1 in 160 who can't make a simple payment. Summary We're continuing to massively invest in expanding HIBP in every way we can find. Nearly 3 billion additional breached records last year, hundreds of billions of free Pwned Passwords queries during that time, a bunch of new tweaks and features everyone gets access to and, of course, all the new stuff we've rolled into the higher plans. These new features are the culmination of a huge volume of work dating back to November, when I took this pic of our little team during our planning meeting together in Oslo. We all hope it helps people use our Have I Been Pwned services to do more good after bad things happen.
troyhunt.comMar 30, 2026extracted
Microsoft fixes bug causing Classic Outlook sync issues with Gmail
Microsoft has fixed a known issue causing Gmail and Yahoo email synchronization problems for classic Outlook users. As the company explained earlier this month, the bug triggers 0x800CCC0F and 0x80070057 error codes when synchronizing Gmail and Yahoo accounts. Microsoft said that this type of email account stopped syncing as of February 26, 2026, and that, in both cases, users were no longer prompted to sign in to their accounts when Outlook syncing stopped working. In an update to the original support document, Microsoft says that although the issue was fixed in the Microsoft 365 service on Friday, some customers may still experience sync issues until their OAuth token expires. "After you change your password, it usually takes one hour for the OAuth token to expire," the company explained on Monday. "After the token expires you will get a sign in prompt from Outlook. If you do not want to wait on the hour you can do the workarounds below to force the sign in prompt." Customers who can't get their Outlook to sync can also use a temporary workaround shared by Microsoft before the fix rolled out, which requires them to delete the registry entries for the affected email address under the Identities key at Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\Identity\Identities in the Windows Registry Editor. Microsoft is also investigating a bug that triggers "Can't connect to the server" errors when creating groups in classic Outlook when Exchange Web Services (EWS) is enabled for the tenant. Another issue, acknowledged almost two months after the first user reports surfaced online, causes the mouse pointer to disappear for some users in classic Outlook, OneNote, and other Microsoft 365 apps. Microsoft asked affected customers to submit diagnostic log files to assist the Outlook Support Team with analysis by opening a support case through their Microsoft 365 admin. In January, it addressed another classic Outlook issue caused by the December 2025 updates that prevented Microsoft 365 customers from opening encrypted emails. Microsoft is also working to address a known issue that will render the classic Outlook email client unusable for users who enable the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 24, 2026extracted
Microsoft: Enabling Teams Meeting add-in breaks Outlook Classic
Microsoft is working to address a known issue that renders the Classic Outlook email client unusable for users who have enabled the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in. "Some users may be unable to use Microsoft Outlook Classic while the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in is enabled," Microsoft said in an admin center update under EX1254044. While it didn't share more details about the root cause, Microsoft says the issue is due to a previous Outlook build. To temporarily fix this bug, affected users are advised to update Outlook or to perform an Online Repair for click-to-run installs (which will reinstall all Office applications). "Users attempting to use Microsoft Outlook Classic while the Microsoft Teams Meeting Add-in and previous Outlook build version is enabled may be impacted," Microsoft added. "We've identified that a previous Outlook build version is causing impact to occur. We're working with your representatives to ensure that the latest Outlook version is enabled, to mitigate impact." Microsoft is also investigating several issues that cause email connection problems in the Classic Outlook desktop client and trigger 0x800CCC0F and 0x80070057 errors during synchronization with Gmail and Yahoo accounts. In January, it addressed another Classic Outlook issue caused by the December 2025 updates that prevented Microsoft 365 customers from opening encrypted emails. On Monday, Redmond also mitigated a widespread Exchange Online outage (EX1253275) that prevented customers from accessing their mailboxes and calendars via Outlook on the web, Outlook desktop, Exchange ActiveSync, and other Exchange Online connection protocols. This is a developing story... Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 17, 2026extracted
Microsoft investigates classic Outlook sync and connection issues
Microsoft is investigating several issues causing email synchronization and connection problems when using the classic Outlook desktop client. The first bug causes "Can't connect to the server" errors when creating groups in classic Outlook when Exchange Web Services (EWS) is enabled for the tenant. According to Microsoft, this occurs because the AD Graph call for ValidateUnifiedGroupProperties fails with the following error: "An internal server error occurred. The operation failed. Both AAD and MSGraph clients are null or AAD Graph is disabled for this API." "The Outlook Team is working to release updated group functionality that uses REST APIs which will address this issue. We will update this topic as soon as we know the REST release specifics," Microsoft said in a recently published support document. Until a fix is available, Microsoft advises affected users to create and edit groups using the new Outlook client or Outlook Web Access (OWA). The other known issue is triggering 0x800CCC0F and 0x80070057 when synchronizing Gmail and Yahoo accounts in classic Outlook. "After changing your Gmail or Yahoo account passwords in classic Outlook you are not prompted to sign in. There might be other circumstances that lead to this same issue that we are investigating," Microsoft said. The Outlook team is working to identify the root cause of this known issue and will share more details once a fix is available. Until then, customers are advised to work around the sync problems by deleting the registry entries for the affected email address under the Identities key at Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\Identity\Identities in the Windows Registry Editor. Microsoft is also investigating a classic Outlook bug, acknowledged almost two months after the first reports surfaced online, that causes the mouse pointer to disappear for some users. The same issue also affects some users of OneNote and other Microsoft 365 apps. Redmond has asked affected customers to open a support case with the Outlook Support Team through their Microsoft 365 admin and submit diagnostic log files to assist the Outlook team with analysis. As temporary workarounds, affected users can click an email in the message list when the cursor disappears, which may cause it to reappear, or switch to PowerPoint, click into an editable area, and then return to Outlook, which may also restore the mouse pointer. If neither of them works, Microsoft said that restarting the impacted computer should also resolve the issue temporarily. In January, Microsoft addressed another classic Outlook issue caused by the December 2025 updates that prevented Microsoft 365 customers from opening encrypted emails. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 13, 2026extracted
Phishing campaign targets freight and logistics orgs in the US, Europe
A financially motivated threat group dubbed “Diesel Vortex” is stealing credentials from freight and logistics operators in the U.S. and Europe in phishing attacks using 52 domains. In a campaign that has been running since September 2025, the threat actor has stolen 1,649 unique credentials from platforms and service providers critical in the freight industry. Some of the Diesel Vortex victims include DAT Truckstop, TIMOCOM, Teleroute, Penske Logistics, Girteka, and Electronic Funds Source (EFS). Researchers at the typosquatting monitoring platform Have I Been Squatted uncovered the campaign after finding an exposed repository containing an SQL database from a phishing project that the threat actor called Global Profit and marketed it to other cybercriminals under the name MC Profit Always. The repository also included a file with Telegram webhook logs that revealed communications between the phishing service operators. Based on the language used, the researchers believe that Diesel Vortex is an Armenian-speaking actor connected to Russian infrastructure. Have I Been Squatted's analysis efforts were joined by tokenization infrastructure provider Ctrl-Alt-Intel, which connected the dots between operators, infrastructure, and connections to various companies using open-source intelligence. In a lengthy technical report, the typosquatting protection provider states that it uncovered nearly 3,500 stolen credential pairs, with 1,649 of them being unique. The researchers say that they also found a link to a mind map created by a member of the group, which describes a "highly organised operation" complete with a call-centre, mail support, programmer rols, and staff responsible for finding drivers, carriers, and logistics contacts. Furthermore, the map provided details about acquisition channels that included the DAT One marketplace, email campaigns, rate confirmation fraud, and revenue for various operational tiers. “The [Diesel Vortex] group built dedicated phishing infrastructure for platforms used daily by freight brokers, trucking companies, and supply chain operators. Load boards, fleet management portals, fuel card systems, and freight exchanges were all in scope,” Have I Been Squatted researchers say. “These platforms sit at the intersection of high transaction volumes and the targeted workforce isn’t typically the primary focus of enterprise security programs, and the operators clearly knew it.” The attacks involve sending phishing emails to targets via a phishing kit’s mailer, using Zoho SMTP and Zeptomail, and combining Cyrilic homoglyph tricks in the sender and subject fields to evade security filters. Voice phishing and infiltration into Telegram channels frequented by trucking and logistics personnel were also used in the attacks. When a victim clicks a phishing link, they land on a minimal HTML page on a ‘.com’ domain with a full-screen iframe that loads the phishing content, followed by a 9-stage cloaking process on the system domain (.top/.icu). The phishing pages are pixel-level clones of the targeted logistics platforms. Depending on the target, they may capture credentials, permit data, MC/DOT numbers, RMIS login details, PINs, two-factor authentication codes, security tokens, payment amounts, payee names, and check numbers. The phishing process is under the operator's direct control, who decides when to approve steps and activate the next phases via Telegram bots. Possible actions include requesting a password for Google, Microsoft Office 365, and Yahoo, 2FA methods, redirecting the victim, or even blocking them mid-session. The researchers state that the Diesel Vortex operation, including panel and phishing domains and GitLab repositories, was disrupted following a coordinated action involving GitLab, Cloudflare, Google Threat Intelligence, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. For its part, Ctrl-Alt-Intel conducted an OSINT investigation starting from operators' Telegram chats in Armenian about stealing cargo or funds, and an email address. Along with a domain name found in the phishing panel's source code, the researchers revealed connections to individuals and companies in Russia involved in wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing. The researchers noted that "the same email identified used to register phishing infrastructure appears in [Russian] corporate filings for logistics companies operating in the same vertical targeted by Diesel Vortex." Based on the uncovered evidence, the researchers determined that Diesel Vortex stole credentials and also coordinated activities related to freight impersonation, mailbox compromise, and double-brokering or cargo diversion. Double brokering refers to the use of stolen carrier identities to book loads and then reassigning or diverting freight cargo, which allows sending the goods to fraudulent pickup points so they can be stolen. The full indicators of compromise (IoCs), including network, Telegram, infrastructure, email, and cryptocurrency addresses, are available at the bottom of the Have I Been Squatted report. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comFeb 24, 2026extracted
2025: The Untold Stories of Check Point Research
Check Point Research (CPR) continuously tracks threats, following the clues that lead to major players and incidents in the threat landscape. Whether it’s high-end financially-motivated campaigns or state-sponsored activity, our focus is to figure out what the threat is, report our findings to the relevant parties, and make sure Check Point customers stay protected. Some of our work naturally makes it into the spotlight through public reports and deep blog posts. However, a large portion of what we uncover remains in the shadows but is used on a day-to-day basis to improve protections, connect the dots between incidents, and keep a watchful eye on known threat actors and infrastructure. In 2025, the activity varied by region and objective. In the Americas, attackers invested in high-value targets, including early ToolShell exploitation assessed as Chinese-nexus activity against North American government organizations. Identity-centric intrusion methods were also prominent, such as AiTM-enabled credential theft in targeted campaigns against researchers within US think tanks. In Europe, the year combined disruption, espionage, influence operations, and financially motivated intrusions. Russian-affiliated activity drove pressure in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, while Chinese and Iranian-nexus actors remained active, and election-related influence efforts persisted, including renewed targeting around Moldova’s parliamentary cycle. Across Asia Pacific and Central Asia, Chinese-nexus espionage was sustained, frequently relying on updated versions of established attack playbooks. In the Middle East and Africa, campaigns reflected a diversified mix of state-aligned operations, destructive activity, and PSOA-linked exploitation, with conflict periods amplifying targeted collection such as attempts to compromise internet-connected cameras. Across these threats, novelty more often came from how familiar techniques were combined than from entirely new tooling. Actors repeatedly used trusted platforms and common enterprise pathways: cloud hosting for command and control, remote administration tooling, DLL side-loading chains, and social engineering patterns such as ClickFix, to reduce detection and improve reliability. Overall, 2025 reinforced the need for durable visibility across identity, cloud, and endpoints, faster closure of exposed and unpatched entry points, and industry collaboration. Check Point Research Untold Stories Timeline – 2025 Key APT campaigns, cyberattacks & threat actor activity tracked throughout the year Jan APT36 Targeting Indian Aerospace Industry RedCurl Weaponized LNK Files Campaign Mar Stealth Falcon Exploits WebDAV 0-day in the Middle East and Africa Apr Samsung Security Release Fixes 0-day Lying Pigeon Campaign Targeting the Moldovan Elections May Flax Typhoon Targets IT Supply Chains in Taiwan GoldenSMTP Targeting Governments in Central Asia Jun Cameras Targeting by Iranian-Nexus Actors Handala Hack Wiper Muddy Water Activity in Israeli Municipality Jul ToolShell Intrusion SilverFox Attacks Web Servers Kimsuky Phishing Campaigns against the US Think Tanks YoroTrooper Targets Eurasian Economic Union Countries Aug Camaro Dragon Targeting Government Sector UAC-0050 Phishing Campaign Zipline Shifting to Europe WIRTE Espionage and Sabotage Sep WhiteLock Ransomware Oct COLDRIVER in Southeast Europe Dec Nimbus Manticore Activity in Africa Figure 1 – Overview of CPR Untold Stories 2025. Americas Throughout the year, the Americas were a focal point for both nation state activity and high-end cybercrime, with a wide mix of actors targeting government and private-sector organizations alike. The state-sponsored groups in particular seem to reserve some of their most innovative tradecraft for targets in the Americas. Whether through zero-day exploitation, abuse of cloud services, or highly refined phishing operations, attackers appear willing to invest more time and sophisticated efforts for targets in this region. ToolShell Exploitation Used as a Zero-day by Chinese-nexus Actors ToolShell is an exploit chain targeting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint and enables unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on vulnerable servers. It works by abusing weaknesses in how SharePoint handles certain web service / API requests, which allow attackers to reach code execution without needing valid credentials. ToolShell’s involvement in active exploitation efforts has been observed globally. While analyzing in July the broader wave of ToolShell activity, we found a subset of targeted incidents where the exploit chain appears to have been used as a zero-day, before the original patch was available. In each of these limited early exploitation attempts, the targets were government-sector organizations in North America. We attribute the zero-day exploitation activity to Chinese-nexus threat actors. This assessment is based on the supporting infrastructure we observed in this campaign, which includes router-based relay nodes consistent with Operation Relay Box (ORB)-style networks, an approach most frequently seen in intrusions attributed by multiple vendors to Chinese nexus groups. This assessment aligns with Microsoft Threat Intelligence report that Chinese APTs exploited the vulnerability as a zero-day. Figure 2 – ToolShell Exploitation Timeline. Kimsuky Targeting Think-Tanks in the US Since mid-July, we’ve been tracking a targeted phishing campaign aimed at researchers within US think tanks which focus on North Korean affairs and policy. The campaign relies on spear-phishing emails, often impersonating peers from European universities or NGOs, with invitations to collaborate or participate in academic or policy events. The malicious emails contain either a link or a PDF attachment embedding a QR code, both of which lead to web pages impersonating legitimate organizations. Figure 4 – Example of a phishing landing page (hosted at signup-forms[.]theonlycompany[.]com), explaining the login request. The landing pages claim a login is required and include a button that redirects victims to credential-harvesting sites tailored to their email providers, such as Yahoo, Gmail, or Microsoft. The phishing infrastructure leverages Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) kits to bypass MFA and gain unauthorized access to victims’ email accounts. RedCurl Weaponizes LNK files RedCurl is a sophisticated, Russian-speaking threat actor historically tied to corporate espionage, and most recently, to ransomware operations. The actor has targeted North American entities for years. In more recent activity affecting North America and Asia, we observed a new multi-stage infection chain that pulls a remote resource by abusing the Working Directory parameter in LNK files. The LNKs point to a legitimate Windows binary (such as conhost or rundll32), and pass an argument that references a file located in that remote working directory production[.]dav[.]indeedex[.]workers[.]dev. This combination of living-off-the-land execution, using WebDAV and remote resource loading, appears to contribute to exceptionally low detection rates. While we haven’t observed clear post-exploitation activity in our data, we did see indications suggesting the intrusion path may ultimately lead to the deployment of RedCurl’s custom ransomware. Europe The activity we observed in Europe ranges from operations designed to disrupt, to those intended to influence and mislead, to financially motivated campaigns. Together, these threats threaten every pillar of data security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The most aggressive activity is driven by Russian-affiliated actors, especially in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, where they employ a mixture of tactics consistent with aims of espionage, disruption, and “hacktivism.” At the beginning of 2025, we reported on one major espionage campaign, attributed to APT29, which targeted foreign affairs ministries. However, Russia nexus actors isn’t the only major player in this arena: Europe continues to face sustained pressure from Chinese and Iranian nexus threat actors as well, alongside a steady stream of financially-motivated groups targeting the continent. Camaro Dragon Targeting Government Sector In 2025, we tracked multiple Chinese-aligned actors targeting Europe. Within this broader set of operations, we observed a recurring campaign against European government agencies that looks like an evolution of the SmugX activity we reported in 2023. The campaign, likely a subset of Camaro Dragon (also known as Mustang Panda), uses well-crafted phishing to deliver PlugX payloads. The initial infection begins with spear-phishing emails sent from what appear to be government addresses, either compromised mailboxes or spoofed senders, targeting Foreign Affairs ministries across Europe. The messages contain a hyperlink to an HTML landing page hosted on Microsoft Azure’s cloud-based web storage service (*.web.core.windows.net). Figure 5 – Camero Dragon’s Infection Chain. When opened, the HTML executes a short, embedded JavaScript snippet that reconstructs and launches a download link. The script dynamically assembles the next stage URL using ASCII-encoded fragments, then redirects the browser to download an archive file such as 262a1003a2cd04993b29e687686eba573d6202fea8611c437ecbd6312802677a. This archive contains a Windows shortcut (LNK) file that serves as the dropper for the next stage. COLDRIVER in Southeast Europe Despite multiple recent public exposures, the Russian affiliated threat group COLDRIVER (also tracked as UNC4057, Star Blizzard, and Callisto) has not slowed down or paused its activity. Instead, the group continues to rapidly adapt its operations. In Q4 2025, we observed multiple campaigns impersonating US-based nonprofit organizations, including NED (National Endowment for Democracy) and USRF (The US–Russia Foundation), as well as campaigns targeting Southeast Europe that use fake websites impersonating a major regional media and broadcasting company. These campaigns highlight the group’s ability to quickly evolve its tooling and delivery mechanisms in response to exposure. As part of this evolution, COLDRIVER introduced changes to its multi-stage MAYBEROBOT (also known as SIMPLEFIX) malware delivery chain. Beginning with ClickFix-style self-infection, the updated chain incorporates additional stagers with enhanced attacker-side security measures, such as DGA and RSA-based authenticity checks for C2 communications. Figure 6 – ClickFix-style attack staged using a fake United Media website. Lying Pigeon Campaign Targeting the Moldovan Elections In 2024, we exposed Operation MiddleFloor, a campaign in Moldova by the Russian-speaking group Lying Pigeon. Ahead of the October 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum, the group used spoofed emails and forged documents, impersonating EU institutions, Moldovan ministries, and political figures to spread anti-European narratives. We also discovered that previously, Lying Pigeon also targeted other major European political events, including the NATO 2023 summit in Vilnius and Spain’s 2023 general elections. Since mid-April 2025, we observed a new wave of activity aimed at Moldova’s September parliamentary elections. Most of this activity used the same techniques as the MiddleFloor campaign, spreading fake documents to erode trust in Moldovan pro-European leadership. In addition, at the end of May, Lying Pigeon launched a large-scale defamation campaign using over a dozen domains to promote a poster contest attacking PAS, the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity founded by President Maia Sandu. Though framed as citizen-led, it was a coordinated propaganda and disinformation effort running on Lying Pigeon infrastructure. Interestingly, the contest site itself was cloned from a website of a Russian anti-terrorism poster competition held in 2024. In August, a phishing campaign targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine was launched from compromised email accounts. The emails masquerade as communications from the Ukrainian tax authorities and contain a malicious link to the 4sync.com file sharing service, prompting recipients to download a malicious archive named tax_gov_ua_zapit_15_08_2025_X.zip. Upon successful execution, a Remote IT support tool is installed on background, granting unauthorized access to the threat actor. This campaign shares similarities with UAC-0050. Figure 8 – UAC-0050 Phishing masquerading as tax.gov.ua. Zipline Shifting to Europe Earlier this year, we reported a sophisticated phishing campaign targeting US organizations with unusually elaborate social engineering. The campaign, named ZipLine, was noteworthy because the attacker reached out through the victim’s public “Contact Us” form, reversing the typical phishing flow and prompting the organization to initiate the email exchange. Since that publication, we’ve seen a noticeable shift in both the group’s TTPs and its targeting, with a clear refocus on Europe. Recent waves lean heavily on HR-themed lures, and our data suggests the actor is running country-by-country campaigns, most notably against the UK, Poland, Italy, and the Czech Republic. The tooling also appears to have evolved into newer iterations of MixShell, with the actor now relying almost entirely on herokuapp domains for C2 communication. Figure 9 – Zipline lure targets Europe. Asia Pacific and Central Asia The activity we observed across Asia reflects a sustained regional espionage push by Chinese-aligned actors. For much of the year, the dominant TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) we saw were best described as updated versions of familiar playbooks: reusing modular backdoor ecosystems such as PlugX and ShadowPad, and repeating patterns that were effective for these groups in the past. At the same time, a smaller subset of APT activity stood out for being more deliberate and mature, reflecting a higher investment in tradecraft and operational discipline than the broader baseline we typically see in the region. However, the picture on the ground is still unclear as many of the same environments are targeted by multiple actors over long periods, leaving behind overlapping infrastructure, tooling, and artifacts. This creates an intertwined landscape that can be difficult to untangle, especially in Southeast Asia. GoldenSMTP Targeting Governments in Central Asia Throughout 2025, we observed multiple instances of activity that we determined to be an evolution of the IndigoZebra APT. These events primarily target Central Asia and rely on a mix of backdoors and supporting tools. Initial access is typically delivered via password-protected ZIP archives using phishing-style filenames, followed by DLL hijacking to install the first backdoor. Across the intrusion chain, we also saw a broader toolkit that included Pandora RC installer (open-source IT remote control software), shellcode loaders, and the NPPSPY credential stealer. Figure 10 – GoldenSMTP masquerades as SentinelOne Agent using debug strings. Next, the attackers deploy a dedicated SMTP/IMAP-based implant, named GoldenSMTP, which communicates through attacker-controlled email accounts, often named after local athletes, inside the target organization. This unusual C2 channel, combined with the use of compromised systems, appears to be at least partly responsible for the notably low detection rates of the backdoors installed in the later stages of the intrusion. Several of the samples showed code overlaps with older IndigoZebra malware, and the operation itself reflects familiar patterns: targeting Central Asia, reusing older infrastructure, relatively simple obfuscation, and checks for Russian-language systems. Flax Typhoon Targets IT Supply Chains in Taiwan We observed an intrusion set at a Taiwan-based cloud service provider where the threat actor abused legitimate security products to execute a DLL side-loading chain. The side-loaded DLL acted as a PlugX loader, which then brought in multiple plugins and injected them into other processes, with capabilities such as reverse shell access and keylogging. In this case, the built-in nslookup.exe utility was used to initiate C2 communication. After establishing a foothold, the attackers scanned the network and moved laterally using RDP. We also identified a SoftEther VPN binary placed at C:\Windows\SysWOW64\conhost.exe, a technique that other security vendors linked to the APT group known as Flax Typhoon. Flax Typhoon has been flagged by US government agencies as a major cyber risk for the technology ecosystem, including managed service providers (MSPs) and other IT service providers. SilverFox Attacks Web Servers The SilverFox APT group continues to target organizations across East Asia, with a particular focus on Taiwan and Japan, using a multi-stage backdoor known publicly as ValleyRAT. As part of the infection chain, the group employs a “bring your own vulnerable driver” (BYOVD) technique to terminate security product processes and reduce the chances of detection. We also identified a newly observed initial access vector: compromised PHP servers exposed to remote code execution. After successful exploitation, the group leverages the legitimate Windows msiexec component to install a ValleyRAT implant from hxxp[:]//aadcasc[.]cn-nb1[.]rains3[.]com/100ww.msi. Figure 11 – ValleyRAT web exploitation chain. YoroTrooper Targets Eurasian Economic Union Countries Throughout 2025, YoroTrooper, a threat group active in CIS countries since at least 2020, was observed targeting member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries and its regulatory body, the Eurasian Economic Commission. Targets included government and diplomatic entities, as well as infrastructure projects in these countries. The attackers used PDF documents to lure victims to either phishing pages that steal credentials or to cloud-based file sharing services hosting malware. Consistent with other YoroTrooper campaigns, the threat actors deployed “burner” RATs as payloads, typically leveraging services such as Telegram and Discord for C2 communications. Figure 12- Example of phishing PDF document (549df969dc5b340b4fc850584a01c767ca8a1bd712f16210f164f85e26c3e58b) targeting government entity in Kyrgyz Republic. APT36 Targeting Indian Aerospace Industry At the beginning of 2025, we identified a targeted phishing campaign aimed at government entities and the Indian aerospace industry. Based on infrastructure overlap, targeting focus, and operational tradecraft, we can attribute the activity with moderate confidence to APT36. Phishing emails, with the subject line “RFI for Surveillance Systems for [REDACTED] State Police,” were sent from a compromised legitimate local Indian government email account, lending significant credibility to the lure. The campaign leveraged ISO attachments containing malicious LNK files, which executed embedded batch scripts. These scripts deployed a stealer malware capable of exfiltrating documents and other sensitive files from compromised hosts, and shares code similarity with ObliqueRAT. Later in the year, we observed additional activity consistent with this campaign targeting entities in Afghanistan, indicating an expansion of the threat group’s operational scope. Figure 13 – Snippet of PDF lure targeting the Indian aerospace industry. Middle East and Africa Recent activity across the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region reflects a diversified threat landscape with state-aligned advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, private sector offensive actors (PSOAs), and destructive operators deploying wipers. Campaigns blend legacy social engineering with increasingly disciplined operational planning, and use legitimate cloud apps, and code-signing or supply chain-style trust signals to lower detection rates. Private Sector Offensive Actors Some of the more distinctive activity we’ve been tracking is commonly associated with what are known as Private Sector Offensive Actors (PSOA). Many of the PSOA-linked clusters we observed this year were active in the Middle East, where this type of innovative capability continues to surface. One of our prominent findings was the discovery of a zero-day exploited by StealthFalcon: CVE-2025-33053, a vulnerability used to target high-profile organizations in Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Ethiopia and Yemen. StealthFalcon, however, is not unique. Throughout 2025, we identified additional activity clusters that stood out in terms of their behavior and tradecraft. We came across one of them while tracking high-profile sample submitters in the Middle East. The activity consisted of a cluster of suspicious TIFF (an image file format for storing raster graphic images) files that contained embedded ELF payloads aimed at Android devices. Our analysis indicated the files were exploiting a vulnerability, later disclosed as CVE-2025-21042, in the way Samsung parses TIFF/DNG files. Based on the tradecraft, infrastructure overlaps, and recurring keywords like “Bridge Head,” we assess the operator to be a private sector offensive actor. Additional research into the same activity, called LANDFALL, reached similar conclusions. We saw indications the campaign affected targets in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Bahrain, Morocco and Pakistan. Iranian Activity Israeli-Iranian War: Targeting Cameras During the twelve-day Israeli–Iranian war in June, threat actors largely stuck to their familiar playbooks, primarily using spear phishing campaigns to deploy wipers and backdoors. One standout trend we observed was a sharp increase in attempts to compromise specific Israeli cameras by exploiting CVE-2023-6895 and CVE-2017-7921 via infrastructure we associate with Iranian actors. In several major conflicts in recent years, compromising internet-connected cameras proved to be an effective way to support bombing damage assessment (BDA) by providing near–real-time visibility into strike impacts. This wave targeting Israeli cameras appears to fit that pattern and aligns with prior public disclosures by Israeli officials that Iran-nexus actors seek access to private CCTV feeds to assess the accuracy of their missile strikes and refine subsequent targeting efforts. Figure 14 – Spike in cameras targeting in Israel. MuddyWater Password Spray in Israeli Municipality In late June, a successful password spray activity originating from a Nord VPN infrastructure affected a municipal government in Israel. One month later, we observed a successful login attempt from the same attacker infrastructure to an email account which then sent spear phishing emails to recipients in Israel. The phishing email contained an embedded link, hxxps[:]//pharmacynod[.]com/join/join.html, used as a decoy invitation to join a Teams conversation. The landing page is a ClickFix page that tricks the user into pasting a PowerShell script into the Run dialog and executing it. This script is a RAT which initially collects information about the infected machine and can execute arbitrary PowerShell commands received from the command and control server. This script’s obfuscation method aligns with previous PowerShell backdoors associated with MuddyWater. Figure 15 – MuddyWater ClickFix Teams lure. Nimbus Manticore Activity in Africa We recently uncovered a long-running campaign that we attribute to Nimbus Manticore, an IRGC-affiliated actor active across the region and parts of Europe. What we observed highlights this actor’s evolution: while continuing to lean on familiar phishing themes, the actor has also begun deploying more sophisticated malware, making himself something of an outlier compared to much of the broader Iranian threat landscape. As we continue to track this operation, we’ve observed renewed activity targeting Northeast Africa, impersonating T-Mobile with a fake hiring website careerst-mobile[.]com and using similar tradecraft which suggests the campaign remains active and adaptable. Figure 16 – Renewed Nimbus Manticore phishing activity targeting Africa with impersonated T-Mobile site. Iran-Nexus Wipers Throughout the year, multiple Iran-aligned actors targeted Israel with disruptive campaigns involving wipers and ransomware. These operations, often at least partly opportunistic, are designed to interfere with the day-to-day functioning of Israeli organizations. Among the most prominent groups behind this activity are Void Manticore (Handala Hack) and Cotton Sandstorm, carrying out attacks using ‘WhiteLock’ ransomware, deployed after WezRat infostealer. Figure 17 – ‘WhiteLock’ ransomware chat server. One such campaign, likely conducted by Handala, involved a phishing email sent to hundreds of organizations across Israel. The messages were delivered from a compromised account belonging to an Israeli CRM solution provider. Recipients were instructed to “back up” their files by downloading a malicious .msi installer (6eb7dbf27a25639c7f11c05fd88ea2a301e0ca93d3c3bdee1eb5917fc60a56ff) hosted on Mega file share. When executed, the installer deployed a wiper that iterates over user file folders and overwrites files with spaces. In parallel, a malicious PowerShell script changed the user’s desktop wallpaper to display a political message tied to the Israeli-Hamas war. WIRTE: Espionage and Sabotage At the end of 2024, we published research connecting a wave of destructive activity in Israel, known as ‘Cyber Toufan Al-Aqsa’, to WIRTE, a Hamas-associated threat actor. In 2025, the group continued its destructive operations with new variants of SameCoin wiper, while also running parallel campaigns aimed at Arabic-speaking political entities across the Middle East, with a particular focus on Jordan and Egypt. In these campaigns, targets are lured into downloading a malicious archive (1f3bd755de24e00af2dba61f938637d1cc0fbfd6166dba014e665033ad4445c0) from a Dropbox URL. After the archive is extracted, the victim is presented with a benign Microsoft binary and a decoy file bearing an Arabic-language filename, which the user is prompted to open. That execution triggers DLL side-loading, pulling in a malicious DLL that serves as a loader. It also exfiltrates Base64‑encoded host information to a remote C2 server, and downloads and executes an additional payload, most commonly Havoc. In recent activity, the attacker used DigitalOcean-hosted infrastructure for C2 instead of the Cloudflare-backed setup that featured in previous longer-running operations. Figure 18 – Wirte Arabic-language lure. Conclusion Looking back at 2025, the threat landscape became more crowded, messy, and increasingly interconnected. Across different regions, we saw state-backed groups, private offensive actors, and high-end cybercrime operating side by side, sometimes even within the same networks. Zero-days, cloud-focused intrusions, and well-crafted phishing are no longer just rare outliers; we observed them repeatedly in multiple attacks as practical, reliable ways to get results. At the same time, many of the campaigns we uncovered show that novelty often lies less in entirely new tooling and more in how familiar techniques are combined and deployed. Actors reused infrastructure, malware frameworks, and social engineering themes, but adapted them to new targets, regions, and operational goals. In several cases, incomplete or internal-only research threads offered insight into how attackers test ideas, quietly iterate, and refine their approach over time. Ultimately, these observations reinforce the need for sustained visibility, collaboration, and context-driven research. Threat actors continue to invest where impact matters most, while opportunistic campaigns exploit gaps that are overlooked or left unpatched. By sharing these stories, both the well-known and the previously untold, we hope to contribute to a clearer picture of attackers’ behavior and help strengthen collaboration between security researchers and vendors moving forward. “The Turkish Rat” Evolved Adwind in a Massive Ongoing Phishing Campaign Check Point Research Publications August 11, 2017 “The Next WannaCry” Vulnerability is Here Check Point Research Publications March 12, 2026 “Handala Hack” – Unveiling Group’s Modus Operandi SUBSCRIBE TO CYBER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS We value your privacy! BFSI uses cookies on this site. We use cookies to enable faster and easier experience for you. By continuing to visit this website you agree to our use of cookies.
research.checkpoint.comFeb 23, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: Firewall Flaws, AI-Built Malware, Browser Traps, Critical CVEs & More
Security failures rarely arrive loudly. They slip in through trusted tools, half-fixed problems, and habits people stop questioning. This week’s recap shows that pattern clearly. Attackers are moving faster than defenses, mixing old tricks with new paths. “Patched” no longer means safe, and every day, software keeps becoming the entry point. What follows is a set of small but telling signals. Short updates that, together, show how quickly risk is shifting and why details can’t be ignored. ⚡ Threat of the Week Improperly Patched Flaw Exploited Again in Fortinet Firewalls — Fortinet confirmed that it's working to completely plug a FortiCloud SSO authentication bypass vulnerability following reports of fresh exploitation activity on fully-patched firewalls. "We have identified a number of cases where the exploit was to a device that had been fully upgraded to the latest release at the time of the attack, which suggested a new attack path," the company said. The activity has been found to exploit an incomplete patch for CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which could allow unauthenticated bypass of SSO login authentication via crafted SAML messages if the FortiCloud SSO feature is enabled on affected devices. In the absence of a fix, users are advised to restrict administrative access of edge network devices and turn off FortiCloud SSO logins by disabling the "admin-forticloud-sso-login" setting. When Your CEO Calls, Will You Know It's Real? Keeper Security is officially FedRAMP High Authorized, meeting the highest standards for federal cybersecurity. Powered by zero-trust architecture and zero-knowledge encryption, KeeperPAM is built to protect mission-critical data and infrastructure. Book a demo to see KeeperPAM in action. Learn More ➝ 🔔 Top News TikTok Forms New U.S. Entity to Avoid Federal Ban — TikTok officially announced that it formed a joint venture that will allow the hugely popular video-sharing application to continue operating in the U.S. The new venture, named TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, has been established in compliance with the Executive Order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump in September 2025, the platform said. The new deal will see TikTok's Chinese parent company, ByteDance, selling the majority of its stake to a group of majority-American investors, while it will retain a 19.9% stake in the business. The Chinese government hasn't commented publicly on the agreement. The deal ends years of regulatory uncertainty that began in August 2020, when President Trump announced plans to ban the app, citing national security concerns. VoidLink Generated Almost Entirely Using AI — VoidLink, the recently discovered Linux malware which targets Linux-based cloud servers, was likely generated almost entirely by artificial intelligence (AI), signaling a significant evolution in the use of the technology to develop advanced malware. What was significant in alerting researchers to AI involvement in building VoidLink was a development plan that accompanied the project and was accidentally left exposed by its author. The developer also utilized regular checkpoints to ensure that the model was developing as instructed and that the code worked. The result was a malware which the researchers who first detailed VoidLink described as "sophisticated, modern and feature-rich." The discovery is a watershed moment for malware development, underscoring a shift in how AI can be used to design advanced malicious programs. "The security community has long anticipated that AI would be a force multiplier for malicious actors. Until now, however, the clearest evidence of AI-driven activity has largely surfaced in lower-sophistication operations, often tied to less experienced threat actors, and has not meaningfully raised the risk beyond regular attacks," Check Point said. "VoidLink shifts that baseline: its level of sophistication shows that when AI is in the hands of capable developers, it can materially amplify both the speed and the scale at which serious offensive capability can be produced." From a defensive point of view, the use of AI also complicates attribution, as the generated code removes a lot of usual clues and makes it harder to determine who's really behind an attack. Critical GNU InetUtils telnetd Flaw Detailed — A critical security flaw has been disclosed in the GNU InetUtils telnet daemon (telnetd) that went unnoticed for nearly 11 years. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-24061 (CVSS score: 9.8), affects all versions of GNU InetUtils from version 1.9.3 up to and including version 2.7. The vulnerability was introduced as part of a code change in March 2015. The flaw allows an attacker to establish a Telnet session without providing valid credentials, granting unauthorized access to the target system. SafeBreach Labs, in a root cause analysis of CVE-2026-24061, described it as easy to exploit and that an attacker can supply a "-f" flag for the "/usr/bin/login" executable, effectively skipping the interactive authentication and giving them a root shell. It has also released a public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for the flaw. Vishing Attacks Target Identity Providers — Threat actors who specialize in voice phishing (aka vishing) have started using bespoke phishing kits that can intercept targets' login credentials while also allowing attackers to control the authentication flow in a targeted user's browser in real-time. "Where threat actors could once pay for access to a kit with basic features that targeted all popular Identity Providers (Google, Microsoft Entra, Okta, etc.) and cryptocurrency platforms, a new generation of fraudsters are attempting to sell access to bespoke panels for each targeted service," Okta said. The ShinyHunters extortion gang has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, Bleeping Computer reported. CrashFix Crashes Browsers to Deliver Malware — A malvertising campaign is using a fake ad-blocking Chrome and Edge extension named NexShield that intentionally crashes the browser as a precursor to ClickFix attacks. Unlike typical ClickFix schemes that use non-existent security alerts or CAPTCHAs to lure users into executing malicious commands, the new CrashFix variant leverages a malicious extension that first intentionally crashes the victim's browser and then delivers a fraudulent fix. When the browser is restarted, the extension displays a deceptive pop-up that shows a fake warning and suggests scanning the system to identify the problem. Doing so opens a new window with a bogus warning about detected security issues, along with instructions on how to fix the problem, which involve executing malicious commands in the Windows Run prompt, in a typical ClickFix fashion. While the extension has since been removed, the attacks are designed to deliver a new Python-based remote access tool called ModeloRAT. The findings show that browser extensions are a high-risk attack vector for enterprises, allowing threat actors to bypass traditional security controls and gain a foothold on corporate endpoints. Contagious Interview Evolves to Deliver Backdoor via VS Code — The North Korean threat actors behind the Contagious Interview campaign are employing a new mechanism that uses Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) to deliver a previously unseen backdoor that enables remote code execution on developer systems. The attack chain starts when targets are asked to clone and open malicious repositories hosted on GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket, typically framed as part of a technical assignment or code review exercise related to the hiring process. "The most important facilitator for this attack vector is the configuration's runOptions property, which supports a runOn value of folderOpen, causing the defined task to execute automatically when a workspace is opened," Abstract Security said. "Contagious Interview actors exploit this by including malicious shell commands in tasks.json files. When a victim clones a repository to their local machine and opens it in VS Code, the malicious task executes and kicks off the infection chain leading to malware installation." The malicious payloads are mostly hosted on Vercel domains, but other domains like vscodeconfig[.]com and vscode-load.onrender[.]com have also been identified. In at least one case, the "tasks.json" file is used to install a malicious npm package named "jsonwebauth." Contagious Interview has been active since 2022, primarily targeting software developers and IT professionals, especially in the blockchain and cryptocurrency sectors. As many as 3,136 individual IP addresses linked to likely targets of the Contagious Interview activity have been identified between August 2024 and September 2025, most of which are concentrated around South Asia and North America. ️🔥 Trending CVEs Hackers act fast. They can use new bugs within hours. One missed update can cause a big breach. Here are this week’s most serious security flaws. Check them, fix what matters first, and stay protected. This week’s list includes — CVE-2026-24061 (GNU InetUtils telnetd), CVE-2026-23760 (SmarterMail), CVE-2026-20045 (Cisco Unified Communications and Webex Calling Dedicated Instance), CVE-2026-22218, CVE-2026-22219 (Chainlit), CVE-2026-1245 (binary-parser), CVE-2025-68143, CVE-2025-68144, CVE-2025-68145 (Anthropic mcp-server-git), CVE-2026-22844 (Zoom), CVE-2025-13927, CVE-2025-13928, CVE-2026-0723 (GitLab CE/EE), CVE-2026-0629 (TP-Link), CVE-2025-49758 (Microsoft SQL Server), CVE-2025-47179 (Microsoft Configuration Manager), CVE-2025-60021 (Apache bRPC), CVE-2025-61937, CVE-2025-64691, CVE-2025-61943, CVE-2025-65118 (AVEVA Process Optimization), CVE-2025-14369 (dr_flac), CVE-2026-0828 (Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver.sys), CVE-2026-0685 (Genshi template engine), CVE-2025-68675 (Apache Airflow), CVE-2025-14533 (Advanced Custom Fields: Extended plugin), CVE-2025-13151 (GNU libtasn1), CVE-2026-0622 (Open5GS WebUI component), CVE-2025-65586 (libheif), CVE-2025-33206 (NVIDIA NSIGHT Graphics for Linux), CVE-2026-1220 (Google Chrome), CVE-2025-66516, CVE-2026-21962, CVE-2025-66516, CVE-2025-54988, CVE-2025-4949, CVE-2025-54874, CVE-2025-49796, CVE-2025-23048 (Oracle), CVE-2026-23744 (@mcpjam/inspector), CVE-2025-13878 (ISC BIND 9), CVE-2025-12383 (Atlassian Bamboo Data Center and Server), CVE-2025-66516 (Atlassian Confluence Data Center and Server), CVE-2026-22755 (Vivotek legacy camera models), CVE-2026-22794 (AppSmith), CVE-2025-67968 (RealHomes CRM plugin), CVE-2026-23594 (HPE Alletra 6000, Alletra 5000 and Nimble Storage), CVE-2026-0920 (LA-Studio Element Kit for Elementor plugin), and CVE-2026-22200 (osTicket). 📰 Around the Cyber World 1Password Adds Warnings for Phishing Sites — Password manager 1Password has added a new security feature that warns users when they're on a phishing or spoofed site, and they're prompted to enter their credentials. "When a 1Password user clicks a link where the URL doesn't match their saved login, 1Password won’t autofill their credentials," it said. "When a user attempts to paste their credentials, the 1Password browser extension displays a pop-up warning, prompting them to pause and exercise caution before proceeding." Malicious Chrome Extensions Steal OpenAI API Keys and User Prompts — A malicious Google Chrome extension named H-Chat Assistant (ID: dcbcnpnaccfjoikaofjgcipcfbmfkpmj) with over 10,000 users has been found to steal users' OpenAI API keys at scale. It's estimated to have exfiltrated at least 459 unique API keys to an attacker-controlled Telegram channel. "Once the extension is installed, users are prompted to add an OpenAI API key to interface with the chatbot," Obsidian Security said. "The API key exfiltration occurs once a user deletes a chat or chooses to log out of the application." While the extension works as advertised, compromised keys could enable unauthorized access to affected users' OpenAI instances. The extension is still available for download as of writing. Obsidian Security said it has since uncovered dozens of Chrome extensions that are sending user prompts and other data to third-party/external servers. "Several of the extensions impersonate ChatGPT, creating a false sense of trust that conversations and data are only being transmitted to OpenAI," it added. PasteReady Extension Pushes Malware After Purchase — In more extension-related news, the PasteReady browser extension has been used to push malware after it was put up for sale. Secure Annex's John Tuckner said the PasteReady was made available for sale on extensionhub[.]io May 7, 2025, and the ownership transfer happened on December 27, 2025. "Version 3.4 with malware was pushed December 30, 2025," Tuckner said in a post on X. "It was removed from the Chrome Web Store for malware January 14, 2026." Microsoft Complies with Court Order to Hand Over a BitLocker Encryption Key in Fraud Case — Microsoft gave the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) BitLocker keys to unlock encrypted data stored on three laptops of Windows users charged in a fraud indictment, Forbes reported. The development marks the first publicly known instance of Microsoft providing BitLocker keys. Microsoft backs up BitLocker keys to its servers when the service is set up from an active Microsoft account. While Microsoft does offer the ability to stash the keys elsewhere, such as a file or to a USB flash drive, customers are encouraged to store it on its cloud for easy key recovery. The company has since confirmed that it provides BitLocker recovery keys for encrypted data if it receives a valid legal order and the user has stored the keys on its servers, and that it's legally required to produce the keys stored on its servers. Apple also provides a similar service, but with two tiers: Standard data protection and Advanced Data Protection for iCloud. According to Microsoft's most recent Government Requests for Customer Data Report, covering July 2024 through December 2024, the company received a total of 128 requests from law enforcement organizations around the world. Of these, only four of them, three in Brazil and one in Canada, led to the disclosure of content. Ilya Lichtenstein Wants a Cybersecurity Job — Ilya Lichtenstein, who was behind the massive hack of cryptocurrency exchange Bitfinex in 2016, said he has changed his ways. "Ten years ago, I decided that I would hack the largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world," Lichtenstein wrote on LinkedIn. "This was a terrible idea. It was the worst thing I had ever done,” he added. “It upended my life, the lives of people close to me, and affected thousands of users of the exchange. I know I disappointed a lot of people who believed in me and grossly misused my talents." Lichtenstein was arrested in 2022 for the hack, and was released to home confinement earlier this month after serving nearly four years in prison. In the post, Lichtenstein said he has "always been motivated by technical challenges rather than material wealth" and that mathematics became his "escape from the hard realities of the prison world." Lichtenstein concluded by saying he wants to work in cybersecurity. "I think like an adversary," he said. "I've been an adversary. Now I can use those same skills to stop the next billion-dollar hack." Anthropic Details Assistant Axis — AI company Anthropic has detailed what it describes as the "Assistant Axis," a pattern of neural activity in large language models that governs their default identity and helpful behavior. The axis is believed to be created during post-training, when models are taught to play the role of an "Assistant," or it's likely that it already exists in pre-trained models. "By monitoring models' activity along this axis, we can detect when they begin to drift away from the Assistant and toward another character," Anthropic said. "And by constraining their neural activity ('activation capping') to prevent this drift, we can stabilize model behavior in situations that would otherwise lead to harmful outputs." China Blames Taiwan for 1000s of Cyber Attacks — The Chinese government said it investigated nearly 4,000 cyber attacks in 2025 that originated from Taiwan. The figure represents a 25% increase year-over-year. The attacks sought to steal classified information from critical mainland sectors, including transportation, finance, science and technology, and energy. Some of the operations were allegedly carried out by the Taiwanese military. Romania Dismantles Murder-for-Hire Operation — Romanian authorities dismantled an organized criminal group that operated a murder-for-hire operation. The group ran a website that allowed anonymous users to pay for assassinations using cryptocurrencies through an escrow system. Authorities executed three search warrants in the municipalities of Bucharest and Râmnicu Vâlcea and questioned two individuals behind the scheme. They also seized more than $750,000 in digital assets and cash worth 292,890 lei, $650,000, and €48,600 from their homes. Ireland Proposes New Law Allowing Police to Use Spyware — The Irish government plans to draft legislation that would make it legal for law enforcement to use spyware. The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration, Jim O'Callaghan, said the government has approved proposals for an "updated and comprehensive legal framework for lawful interception" that will also "include robust legal safeguards to provide continued assurance that the use of such powers is necessary and proportionate." The ministry also noted there is an urgent need for a new legal framework for lawful interception to counter serious crime and security threats. Microsoft Emerges as the Most Impersonated Brand in Q4 2025 — Microsoft has emerged as the most commonly impersonated brand in phishing attacks during the fourth quarter of 2025. Microsoft was followed by Facebook, Roblox, McAfee, Steam, AT&T, Amazon, Google, Yahoo, and Coinbase. "Scammers ramped up brand impersonation attacks throughout Q4 2025, timing their campaigns around when people are busiest online, shopping for deals, renewing subscriptions, or looking for jobs," Guardio said. "Attackers weaponize brand recognition, betting that a Microsoft billing alert or Facebook security notification will bypass skepticism when it arrives during year-end account reviews, holiday coordination chaos, or gift card purchase rushes." Germany Expels Russian Diplomat Accused of Spying — Germany expelled a Russian diplomat accused of spying, further escalating geopolitical tensions between Berlin and Moscow over intelligence activity linked to the war in Ukraine. "We do not accept espionage in Germany – and particularly not under the cover of diplomatic status. We summoned the Russian Ambassador to the Federal Foreign Office today and informed him that the individual who spied on behalf of Russia is to be expelled," the German Foreign Office said. German outlet Der Spiegel and Russian independent media organization The Insider identified the expelled diplomat as Andrei Mayorov, Russia's deputy military attache in Germany. Mayorov reportedly holds the rank of colonel in Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU. He is alleged to have acted as the handler for Ilona Kopylova, a dual Ukrainian-German citizen who was arrested in Berlin on suspicion of spying for Russia. Bad Actors Hijack Snap Publisher Domains for Malware Delivery — Scammers are hijacking legitimate Canonical Snap Store publisher accounts by registering expired domains associated with those accounts to trigger password resets. Once in control, these attackers push malicious updates to established, trustworthy applications to deploy cryptocurrency wallet-draining malware. The domain resurrection attack has hijacked accounts associated with two Linux packages storewise.tech and vagueentertainment.com. The threat actors behind this campaign are believed to be located in Croatia. Handala Group Uses Starlink For Attacks — The Iranian hacktivist group known as Handala has been observed carrying out attacks via Starlink connections. According to Check Point, activity from the group ceased when the Iranian regime cut off the internet across the country, but has since resumed as of January 17, 2026, from Starlink IP ranges and hitting targets across the Middle East. 884 Flaw Exploited for the First Time in 2025 — As many as 884 vulnerabilities were exploited for the first time in 2025, up from 768 CVEs in 2024. According to vulnerability management company VulnCheck, 28.96% of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs) were weaponized on or before the day their CVE was published, an increase from the 23.6% observed in 2024. Network edge devices, including firewalls, VPNs, and proxies, were the most frequently targeted technologies, followed by content management systems and open source software. "This reinforces the urgency for organizations to act quickly on newly disclosed vulnerabilities while continuing to reduce long-standing vulnerability backlogs," VulnCheck said. 2 Venezuelans Convicted in U.S. for Using Malware to Hack ATMs — Two Venezuelan nationals, Luz Granados, 34, and Johan Gonzalez-Jimenez, 40, are set to be deported after being convicted of conspiracy and computer crimes in an ATM jackpotting scheme. "Jimenez and Granados targeted older model Automated Teller Machines (ATM) throughout the southeastern United States to steal money after business hours," the U.S. Justice Department said. "The defendants would approach an ATM at nighttime and remove the outer casing of the machine and then connect a laptop computer to install malware that overcame the ATM's security protocols. Once installed, the ATMs dispersed cash to the perpetrators until the ATM's funds are exhausted." Granados has been sentenced to time served and has been ordered to pay $126,340 in restitution. Gonzalez-Jimenez was sentenced to 18 months in federal prison and was ordered to pay $285,100 in restitution. Russian National Pleads Guilty to Ransomware Spree — A Russian national has pleaded guilty to leading the Zeppelin ransomware group that targeted at least 50 victims during a four-year period ending between May 2018 and August 2022. Ianis Aleksandrovich Antropenko faces up to 25 years in jail and fines up to $750,000, CyberScoop reported. He has also been ordered to pay restitution to his victims and forfeit property, CyberScoop reported. In August 2025, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed six warrants authorizing the seizure of over $2.8 million in cryptocurrency, $70,000 in cash, and a luxury vehicle. The cryptocurrency was seized from a wallet controlled by Antropenko. Critical Security Flaws in OpenKM — Multiple zero-day vulnerabilities have been disclosed in OpenKM that could result in remote code execution, unrestricted SQL execution, and file disclosure. The flaws remain unpatched, according to Terra System Labs. "The discovered issues allow a single authenticated administrator to fully compromise the OpenKM server, backend database, and sensitive stored documents," the Indian cybersecurity company said. "The findings highlight systemic security design weaknesses in trusted administrative interfaces and demonstrate how these flaws can be chained to achieve complete system takeover." Command Injection Flaw in Vivotek Legacy Firmware — Akamai has disclosed details of a new vulnerability within Vivotek legacy firmware that allows remote users to inject arbitrary code into the filename supplied to upload_map.cgi. The security issue has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-22755 (CVSS score: 9.3). "This exploit affects a wide range of legacy older camera models, allowing attackers to execute malicious commands as the root user without requiring authentication," security researcher Larry Cashdollar said. "It enables attackers to upload files with filenames that, when processed by the server, execute system commands and result in root access." Mamba PhaaS Kit Detailed — Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) kit named Mamba that first emerged in 2023 coinciding with the emergency of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing. "Campaigns associated with Mamba phishing operations are most commonly delivered through email-based lures designed to drive the victim directly to the phishing URL," CYFIRMA said. "These lures typically impersonate routine business or security-related communications to create urgency and legitimacy. Mamba's design reflects a growing reliance on service-based phishing tooling, where operational efficiency and repeatability are prioritized over bespoke attack development." New Stanley Kit Guarantees Chrome Web Store Approval — A threat actor is selling access to a toolkit dubbed Stanley that can build malicious Chrome extensions that pass the Web Store verification process. "For $2,000 to $6,000, Stanley provides a turnkey website-spoofing operation disguised as a Chrome extension, with its premium tier promising guaranteed publication on the Chrome Web Store," Varonis researcher Daniel Kelley said. The toolkit is being sold on a Russian-speaking hacking forum for prices ranging from $2,000 to $6,000. It comes with a C2 panel that allows customers to target individual infections for specific actions. "Once a target is selected, attackers configure URL hijacking rules specific to that user," Varonis said. "Beyond passive hijacking, operators can actively lure users to targeted pages through real-time notification delivery. The notifications come from Chrome itself, not a website, so they carry more implicit trust." More importantly, the URL hijacking rules ensure that the browser's address bar continues to display a legitimate domain, while the victim actually sees and interacts with the attacker's phishing page. Thus when a victim navigates to a targeted website, the extension intercepts the navigation and overlays a fullscreen iframe containing the phishing page. It's designed to steal login credentials and financial information by deceiving people into thinking they're visiting real websites. EmEditor Supply Chain Compromise Analyzed — The December 2025 supply chain attack targeting EmEditor allowed unknown threat actors to distribute a multi-stage malware capable of credential theft, data exfiltration, and follow-on intrusion through lateral movement, while also taking steps to evade detection by disabling event tracing for Windows. "EmEditor has longstanding recognition within Japanese developer communities as a recommended Windows-based editor," Trend Micro said. "This suggests that the attackers are targeting this specific user base, or that they have a particular target among EmEditor users and used the compromised download page as a delivery mechanism." The malware has been found to exclude systems located in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, suggesting that they could be of Russian origin or from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Abusing Azure Private Link to Access Azure Resources — New research has found that certain configurations of Microsoft Azure's Private Endpoint architecture could be exploited to stage denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against Azure resources. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said over 5% of Azure storage accounts currently operate with configurations that are subject to this DoS issue. "For example, denying service to storage accounts could cause Azure Functions within FunctionApps and subsequent updates to these apps to fail," the cybersecurity company said. "In another scenario, the risk could lead to DoS to Key Vaults, resulting in a ripple effect on processes that depend on secrets within the vault." To counter the attacks, it's advised to enable fallback to public DNS resolution and manually add DNS records for affected resources. 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Cloud Forensics Is Broken. This Is What Works Now → Cloud attacks move fast and often leave little evidence behind. This webinar explains how modern cloud forensics uses host-level data and AI to help security teams understand what happened, how it happened, and respond faster in today’s cloud environments. How to Build a Smarter SOC Without Adding More Tools → Security teams are stretched thin, with too many tools and too little clarity. This webinar breaks down how modern SOCs really work, focusing on practical choices around what to build, buy, and automate—without hype. It’s for teams looking to make smarter decisions with the tools and resources they already have. When Today’s Encryption Won’t Be Enough Tomorrow → Quantum computing is moving from theory to reality, and it will change how data security works. Information that is encrypted today may be broken in the future using more powerful systems. This webinar helps security leaders understand what that risk means in practical terms and how to start preparing now, using clear, real-world approaches that protect data without disrupting existing systems. 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools NetAlertX - It is a simple tool that helps you see what devices are connected to your network. It keeps a live list of computers, phones, servers, and other hardware, and shows when something new appears or changes. This makes it useful for spotting unknown devices, tracking assets, and staying aware of what’s happening across your network without using heavy or complex security tools. RzWeb - It is a simple way to look inside software files without installing any tools. It runs fully in your web browser, so you can open a file and start examining how it works right away. Everything happens on your own machine, which makes it useful for quick checks, learning, or analysis when you don’t want to set up a full reverse-engineering environment. Disclaimer: These tools are for learning and research only and have not been fully security-tested. Review the code carefully, use it only in safe environments, and follow all applicable rules and laws. Conclusion This edition makes one thing clear: risk now sits in everyday tools and normal choices. Small gaps are all it takes. None of these stories stands alone. They point to a wider pattern where speed matters and delays cost real damage. Treat this list as a snapshot. The details will change. The pressure will not.
thehackernews.comJan 26, 2026extracted
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