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Enterprise Applications Carry 4.31x More Critical and High Vulnerabilities
Enterprise applications now carry 4.31 times more critical and high-severity vulnerabilities than before the acceleration of AI-driven software development. Sonatype analyzed four years of enterprise software development data and found that application creation has accelerated almost fivefold in the AI era. At the same time, the median age of unresolved vulnerabilities has fallen 59%, suggesting organizations are fixing vulnerabilities faster even as the volume of risk grows. “Developers shouldn’t have to choose between moving at AI speed and understanding the software they’re bringing into the organization,” said Mitchell Johnson, chief product development officer at Sonatype. In the report, the firm said the findings show that software creation is accelerating faster than traditional security processes can absorb, creating pressure to identify and address risk earlier in development. AI Accelerates Software Creation and Risk The report links the shift to the growing use of artificial intelligence in software development. Sonatype said teams are producing applications at a much faster rate while carrying more critical and high-severity vulnerabilities. The decline in the median age of unresolved vulnerabilities points in the other direction. Teams are shortening the time vulnerabilities remain open, but the faster pace of software creation means remediation improvements have not kept pace with the growth in risk. Sonatype said organizations need to move security decisions earlier in the software assembly process rather than relying primarily on reviews after development. “AI is changing the math of software development. We’re building more software, faster, but we’re also introducing risk faster than traditional security processes can absorb it,” said Brian Fox, co-founder and CTO of Sonatype. “The answer can’t be to put another review step at the end. We need to make better decisions at the moment software is assembled, whether that decision is being made by a developer or an AI agent.”
infosecurity-magazine.comAug 18, 2026extracted
North Korean Hackers Blamed for Mastra NPM Supply Chain Attack
The North Korean state-sponsored threat actor Sapphire Sleet is behind the Mastra supply chain attack that hit over 140 NPM packages last week, Microsoft reports. Mastra is an open source TypeScript framework for building AI agents, workflows, and RAG pipelines. It offers integrations for major LLM providers, MCP servers, and cloud deployments. The supply chain attack occurred on June 17. During a 45-minute window, the hackers published 141 packages that contained the malicious dependency easy-day-js, a typosquat of the legitimate dayjs date library. The affected Mastra packages have approximately 8 million weekly downloads. All users who installed a @mastra package during the attack window on June 17 should consider their systems affected. As part of the attack, the hackers compromised the ‘ehindero’ NPM maintainer account, which has publishing rights across the Mastra ecosystem. One day before the account takeover, the attackers published a clean version of easy-day-js to a separate account, ‘sergey2016’. The threat actor used the compromised maintainer account to add easy-day-js as a dependency to 141 NPM packages across the Mastra ecosystem, in such a manner that the latest version of the library would always be installed, and then published the modified packages to NPM. Simultaneously, they published a new, malicious version of the easy-day-js library to their account. An obfuscated postinstall dropper in the dependency would fetch a second-stage payload from the attackers’ servers, write it to the temp directory, execute it as a detached, hidden background process, and then delete itself to hide its tracks. “Because the payload executes during installation, any developer workstation or continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipeline that ran npm install or npm update after the compromised versions were published was potentially exposed, regardless of whether the package was imported in application code,” Microsoft says. Targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux, the malware was designed to masquerade as node-related tools while collecting system information and targeting more than 160 cryptocurrency-related browser extensions. Microsoft has attributed the attack to the financially motivated North Korean group Sapphire Sleet, also known as BlueNoroff, CageyChameleon, Copernicium, and Stardust Chollima, which was also blamed for the Axios supply chain attack. In April, hackers published modified versions of the Axios NPM library that were pointing to a phantom dependency designed to download and execute a cross-platform RAT. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group attributed the attack to UNC1069. Mastra users are advised to remove the affected package versions, check their systems for malware, rotate credentials, tokens, and other secrets, and harden access to their crypto-wallets. Cybersecurity firms Aikido, Ox, Socket, Sonatype, and StepSecurity have published technical details and indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the Mastra supply chain attack. Related: More Cybersecurity Firms Disclose Impact From Klue Hack Related: CryptoBandits Malware Doubles as a Backdoor, Abuses Tor Related: NPM 12 Will Change Script Execution Behavior to Prevent Supply Chain Attacks Related: Supply Chain Attack Hits 32 Red Hat NPM Packages
securityweek.comJun 22, 2026extracted
Over 400 Arch Linux packages compromised to push rootkit, infostealer
More than 400 packages in the Arch User Repository (AUR) are distributing a Linux rootkit and infostealer malware targeting credentials and access tokens. A report from the open-source intelligence community Independent Federated Intelligence Network (IFIN) notes that a new maintainer is spoofing a trusted publisher on the AUR platform to push infected packages. The Arch Linux distribution is popular among power users and developers, using the AUR catalog to provide the latest versions for installed software, drivers, and the kernel. AUR is a community-maintained repository for the Arch distribution that contains package build scripts (PKGBUILDs) with instructions for downloading, compiling, and installing software not available in Arch’s official repositories. AUR is considered essential for any Arch-based distribution because it contains proprietary applications, beta/nightly versions of open-source software, niche utilities, and older versions of packages that retain functionality which may have been removed in later releases. However, it is not a vetted space, and threat actors can use it to push malware through packages that change ownership without anyone noticing. According to IFIN member Michael Taggart, the compromised packages are modified with preinstall scripts that download and execute a malicious npm package called atomic-lockfile. Independent security researcher Whanos notes that one sample of the atomic-lockfile included a Linux ELF payload named deps, which was a "credential stealer with optional root-only eBPF [extended Berkeley Packet Filter] rootkit capabilities." "It is designed for developer workstations and build environments. It targets browser and Electron application data, Slack, Microsoft Teams, Discord, GitHub, npm, Vault, Docker/Podman, SSH, VPN material, shell histories, and other local developer secrets," Whanos says in the report. With eBPF technology present, the malware can run inside the kernel with elevated privileges and hide local processes. Supply-chain management company Sonatype also published a report on a campaign targeting the AUR repository and delivering the malicious atomic-lockfile npm package, but using a different method. Sonatype researchers say that the threat actor hijacked at least 20 orphaned packages on AUR and pushed atomic-lockfile by modifying the PKGBUILD file - a Bash script with the build information needed by Arch Linux packages. According to the report, the attacker added a post-install script to invoke npm and retrieve the malicious package. "The modified packages add a post-install script that invokes npm and installs atomic-lockfile during package installation," Sonatype says. However, analysis showed that the npm package installed a Linux executable with references to an eBPF rootkit that could hide processes, files, and network interfaces. Additionally, the Linux binary indicates that it has infostealer functionality, targeting the following types of sensitive information: GitHub credentials SSH artifacts HashiCorp Vault tokens Browser cookie databases Slack data Discord data Microsoft Teams data Telegram data Sonatype determined that the binary can archive data, handle multi-part files, and perform HTTP uploads, so the functionality for a typical exfiltration mechanism is present. AUR maintainers are working to identify and remove all malicious commits, and to ban the accounts pushing them. In a message to the community, Arch Linux package maintainer Jonathan Grotelüschen urged users to report any malicious package they find. As a general rule, it’s recommended to only trust projects with frequent updates and an active community around them. Arch users are advised to review the list of affected packages and look for the indicators of compromise provided in the report from Whanos. Michael Taggart also pointed to a script that checks for the atomic-lockfile malware on the system. If compromised packages are found, users should rotate all credentials and consider reinstalling Arch from scratch, since a rootkit may survive normal cleaning efforts. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 12, 2026extracted
Over 100 NPM, PyPI Packages Hit in New Shai-Hulud Supply Chain Attacks
New iterations of the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack have hit over 100 packages across the NPM and PyPI ecosystems, security researchers warn. Since September 2025, the self-replicating worm has been used in multiple campaigns targeting the open source software (OSS) community, with a surge in attacks observed over the past several months, following the Trivy vulnerability scanner incident. In mid-May, TeamPCP, the hacking group behind Shai-Hulud, released the worm’s source code, and the first clones emerged shortly after. Starting June 1, new variants of Shai-Hulud were used as part of broad, coordinated attacks. The first was the Red Hat incident, in which 32 packages part of Red Hat’s Hybrid Cloud Console JavaScript ecosystem were infected. The Miasma variant The payload used in the Red Hat attack contained the string “Miasma: The Spreading Blight”, which appeared in several other incidents last week. Ox Security identified nearly a dozen malicious NPM packages that contained a weaponized binding.gyp file, designed to bypass the postinstall execution logic but to behave similarly. A direct descendant of Mini Shai-Hulud, Miasma is a multi-stage dropper executed during NPM installation, Harness explains. The payload scans the local system and connected cloud services for credentials, API keys, tokens, and other secrets, and uses them to spread itself by infecting the packages the victim has access to. By June 5, at least 57 NPM packages and over 300 malicious package versions associated with the Miasma supply chain attack had been identified, Snyk, Sonatype, and StepSecurity warned. The attack hit the Vapi server SDK, as well as the ai-sdk-ollama, autotel, awaitly, executable-stories, node-env-resolver, and wrangler-deploy ecosystems. The Hades variant Shortly after Miasma hit NPM, security researchers identified roughly two dozen PyPI packages spreading a new variant of Shai-Hulud, characterized by the string “Hades – The End for the Damned”. The malware was seen in an initial wave of 19 packages containing a *-setup.pth file designed to execute at Python startup, fetch the Bun JavaScript runtime, and execute JavaScript code, Socket reports. Analysis of the worm revealed it was the PyPI branch of Miasma. It contained the same credential-harvesting and self-spreading behavior, as well as the previously observed Shai-Hulud data exfiltration mechanism that involved publishing the collected information to new GitHub repositories. On June 8, a second Hades wave hit the PyPI ecosystem, targeting more packages. Phantom releases were pushed to PyPI without corresponding iterations on GitHub, EndorLabs explains. At least 29 packages were affected, StepSecurity says. The attack hit bioinformatics, graph machine learning, and MCP-themed packages, and Socket identified a mutation in the execution chain, where the payload is no longer bundled in the loader. Instead, the code searches across sys.path to create a loader and payload split to evade detection. Across the affected NPM and PyPI packages, a total of 471 malicious artifacts were identified, including dozens of malicious PyPI wheel artifacts associated with the Hades Mini Shai-Hulud worm. Related: Over 5,500 GitHub Repositories Infected in ‘Megalodon’ Supply Chain Attack Related: GitHub Confirms Hack Impacting 3,800 Internal Repositories
securityweek.comJun 9, 2026extracted
6分に1つのペースで悪性パッケージが見つかる オープンソースエコシステムを狙う攻撃の実態
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpJun 2, 2026extracted
Axios NPM Package Breached in North Korean Supply Chain Attack
Malicious versions of the highly popular Axios NPM library were distributed to millions in a fresh supply chain attack blamed on North Korean hackers. A promise-based HTTP client that supports asynchronous API requests from Node.js and browsers, Axios is used for fetching, sending, and updating data. With over 100 million weekly downloads, it is a top 10 NPM package and the most popular JavaScript HTTP client library, present in approximately 80% of cloud and code environments. On March 31, 2026, just after midnight, two backdoored Axios versions were published to the NPM registry to automatically execute a payload across Windows, macOS, and Linux systems, without user interaction. The nefarious package versions, namely 1.14.1 and 0.30.4, were removed from the registry roughly three hours later. During this window, they were downloaded by roughly 3% of the Axios userbase, Wiz says. The backdoored iterations contained a phantom dependency that was published to the registry 18 hours before the attack. Named [email protected], the dependency is never imported anywhere by the Axios code. “Its sole purpose is to execute a post-install script that acts as a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) dropper, targeting macOS, Windows, and Linux. The dropper contacts a live command-and-control server and delivers platform-specific second-stage payloads,” StepSecurity notes. The dropped payloads, Wiz explains, had similar functionality across operating systems, enabling remote shell execution, code injection, directory and process enumeration, and system reconnaissance. “After execution, the malware attempts to remove installation artifacts and replaces its own package metadata with a clean version to evade forensic detection,” Sophos says. According to Socket, the @shadanai/openclaw and @qqbrowser/[email protected] packages were seen distributing the same malware. Compromised account and attack timeline The supply chain attack was highly targeted and premeditated, security researchers say. To mount the attack, the threat actors compromised the NPM account of @jasonsaayman, the primary maintainer of Axios, Huntress explains. The attackers changed the email address for the account and used a long-lived access token to publish the backdoor package versions directly via the NPM CLI, bypassing the GitHub Actions OIDC-based CI/CD publishing workflow. “One critical detail: even on the v1.x branch where OIDC Trusted Publishing was configured, the publish workflow still passed NPM_TOKEN as an environment variable alongside OIDC credentials. When both are present, NPM uses the token. This meant the long-lived token was effectively the authentication method for all publishers, regardless of OIDC configuration,” Huntress says. This explains why the attackers could bypass publishing protections even if the maintainer has multi-factor authentication enabled “on practically everything” he interacts with, as he pointed out. A clean version of plain-crypto-js dependency used in the attack was published 18 hours before the attack, “to establish NPM publishing history, so the package does not appear as a zero-history account during later inspection,” StepSecurity notes. The malicious iteration of the dependency was published roughly 20 minutes before the first backdoored Axios version was published. The second backdoored Axios release was pushed 39 minutes later. NPM unpublished and removed the malicious versions three hours later and started a security hold on plain-crypto-js. It replaced the malicious dependency with an NPM security-holder stub an hour later. The initial plain-crypto-js version was an identical copy of the legitimate [email protected] package. The malicious iteration, 4.2.1, contained only three differences: the post-install script, an obfuscated dropper, and a clean JSON stub. The purpose of the stub was to rename itself (after the setup script finished execution and deleted itself) and report version 4.2.0 instead of 4.2.1, to trick defenders into believing that their systems were not compromised, StepSecurity notes. North Korean hackers to blame “The level of operational sophistication documented here, including compromised maintainer credentials, pre-staged payloads built for three operating systems, both release branches hit in under 40 minutes, and built-in forensic self-destruction, reflects a threat actor that planned this as a scalable operation,” said ReversingLabs chief software architect Tomislav Pericin. The attack, cybersecurity researchers say, was mounted by North Korean hackers. Elastic says the macOS binary used in the attack overlaps with WaveShaper, which was attributed by Google to UNC1069. In an emailed statement, Google Threat Intelligence Group chief analyst John Hultquist confirmed the attribution. “GTIG is investigating the Axios supply chain attack, an incident unrelated to the recent TeamPCP supply chain issues. We have attributed the attack to a suspected North Korean threat actor we track as UNC1069,” Hultquist said. “North Korean hackers have deep experience with supply chain attacks, which they’ve historically used to steal cryptocurrency. The full breadth of this incident is still unclear, but given the popularity of the compromised package, we expect it will have far-reaching impacts,” he added. Active since at least 2018, UNC1069 is a financially motivated threat actor known for targeting cryptocurrency and decentralized finance (DeFi) verticals, software developers, and venture capital firms. In February, Google warned of evolving UNC1069 tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including the use of new malware families in attacks against a FinTech entity. Downstream impact Impacted users are advised to immediately remove the malicious packages from their systems, to hunt for signs of infection, and to audit their dependency trees for potential downstream impact. “We are already seeing active exploitation. Any environment that installed [email protected] or [email protected] should be treated as compromised. Organizations must immediately audit their dependencies, downgrade to verified safe versions, rotate all credentials accessible during installation, and scan for malware artifacts specific to each operating system,” Huntress senior principal security researcher John Hammond said in an emailed comment. The attack, Sonatype field CTO Ilkka Turunen points out, shows that hackers are now exploiting the trust people place in code rather than in the code itself. “The malicious capability was introduced through a staged dependency and designed to erase its own tracks, which made the attack harder to spot and slower to understand. That’s not just malware — it shows a more deliberate and mature playbook,” Turunen said. “What makes this incident important is how little visible change was needed to create real downstream risk. When a widely trusted package can be turned into a delivery path like this, the issue is bigger than package hygiene. It’s a trust problem in the software supply chain, and it’s why organizations need security controls that look at what’s actually being installed, not just what appears safe at first glance,” he added. Despite the short window of availability for the two backdoored Axios iterations, the impact of this supply chain attack is believed to be broad, as the library is deeply embedded across environments and the malicious code was likely pulled through downstream build pipelines. “By briefly inserting malicious code into a common package, threat actors can exploit routine software updates and automated processes, often without anyone immediately realizing something is wrong. That downstream exposure is what makes these incidents particularly difficult to spot and contain, especially for teams that never directly chose to install Axios themselves,” Arctic Wolf VP Ismael Valenzuela said. “What makes this one worth paying close attention to is the IDE extension angle. Developers who pinned their versions, maintained lockfiles, and followed standard hygiene could still have been hit because their editor pulled the dependency behind the scenes,” Semgrep founder and CEO Isaac Evans pointed out. Related: Stolen Logins Are Fueling Everything From Ransomware to Nation-State Cyberattacks Related: TeamPCP Moves From OSS to AWS Environments Related: The Next Cybersecurity Crisis Isn’t Breaches—It’s Data You Can’t Trust
securityweek.comApr 1, 2026extracted
Supply chain attack hits widely-used AI package, risks impacting thousands of companies
Supply chain attack hits widely-used AI package, risks impacting thousands of companies LiteLLM, an open-source Python package widely used by artificial intelligence systems, has been compromised by hackers in a supply chain attack that researchers say could impact tens of thousands of corporate environments. Compromised versions of the package (identified as 1.82.7 and 1.82.8) were published on the Python Package Index on Tuesday and unwittingly downloaded into development and cloud environments, according to security researchers. Experts at Sonatype said the compromised packages were available for at least two hours on March 24, adding that “given the package’s three million daily downloads” the hackers could have reached a “significant” number of victims during that time. The incident highlights growing concerns over the security of the open-source software supply chain, where widely-used tools maintained by small teams can provide a gateway into thousands of organizations if compromised. Last year, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and software company Red Hat issued an urgent alert about a backdoor embedded in the XZ Utils tool. Similar attacks, including the Shai Hulud worm, have seen attackers target software dependencies trusted by developers in order to scale their intrusions far beyond a single victim, embedding malicious code deep inside corporate systems. In the liteLLM incident, the hackers introduced malicious code to the legitimate software package. How they managed to do so is unclear, although researchers say compromising a maintainer’s account is the most likely as the malicious versions were uploaded using valid publishing access. The manipulated packages contained malicious code designed to extract sensitive data — including cloud credentials, API keys and cryptocurrency wallets — and maintain access by installing a persistent downloader allowing the attackers to gain deeper access and carry out follow-on intrusions. Adam Reynolds, senior security researcher at Sonatype, said his team identified some unusual behaviours from the malware, including that it only reaches out to its command endpoint every 50 minutes. That long delay could help evade sandbox environments that typically execute samples for shorter periods, or it could function as a heartbeat mechanism allowing the operators to distinguish real targets from researchers attempting to probe their infrastructure. “In some cases the response from the server only contained a link to a song hosted on YouTube, which reinforces the idea that payload delivery is being selectively controlled,” said Reynolds. It is not known how many organizations have been impacted by the incident, but Wiz Research estimated the package was present in roughly 36% of all cloud environments. Users have been warned to treat any credentials exposed in affected environments as potentially compromised. Wiz researchers say the incident is part of a broader campaign claimed by a group calling itself TeamPCP, which uses a public Telegram channel to propagandize and solicit business from other cybercriminals. “This isn’t just credential theft,” said Ben Read, director of strategic threat intelligence at Wiz. “By moving across widely used tools, they are creating a ‘snowball effect’ that enables further compromise.” TeamPCP has previously claimed responsibility for an attack affecting Aqua Security’s Trivy vulnerability scanner — an incident confirmed by the company — and claims to be working with several other cybercriminal organizations, although this has not yet been confirmed. The group said it intends to continue targeting widely-used open-source projects, although its claims could not be verified and such groups often overstate their successes. A Telegram account claiming to be the group’s new leader said on Wednesday it was “actively sorting through the credential sets, this is an astronomical amount even for the man power and operational capacity between the teams, it will all be worth it though.” While there have been no publicly-confirmed reports of widespread exploitation tied to the liteLLM incident, security experts warned that the downstream risks could be significant if stolen credentials are reused in subsequent attacks. “For most individuals, the immediate risk is low unless they directly installed the affected versions,” said Reynolds. “This is first and foremost a supply chain compromise targeting developers, organizations, and technical environments using litellm. However, the downstream impact is where things get more serious. “If organizations were compromised, the individuals whose data they hold could absolutely be affected. Because the malware targets such a broad range of credentials and litellm is widely used, this creates the potential for second- and third-order effects that may ripple outward over time, leading to further breaches, service disruptions, or misuse of sensitive data well beyond the initial point of compromise,” said Reynolds. “This isn’t an isolated incident; it’s a systemic campaign,” Read said. “It will likely continue.” Additional reporting by Jonathan Greig. Alexander Martin is the UK Editor for Recorded Future News. He was previously a technology reporter for Sky News and a fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, now Virtual Routes. He can be reached securely using Signal on: AlexanderMartin.79
therecord.mediaMar 25, 2026extracted
From Trivy to Broad OSS Compromise: TeamPCP Hits Docker Hub, VS Code, PyPI
The TeamPCP hacking group has expanded its open source software campaign from the Trivy supply chain attack to NPM, Docker Hub, VS Code, and PyPI, and likely partnered with the Lapsus$ gang for monetization purposes. The attack on Aqua Security’s widely used Trivy vulnerability scanner started with the compromise of an access token in late February. Because the maintainers did not rotate all credentials and secrets simultaneously, the hackers were able to maintain access to the compromised environment. OpenSourceMalware reports with high confidence that the attackers compromised the Argon-DevOps-Mgt service account token, which provided them with write/admin access to both Aqua Security’s internal and public-facing repositories. The attack has been attributed to TeamPCP (also known as DeadCatx3, PCPcat, and ShellForce), which was behind a December worm-driven campaign that targeted Docker, Kubernetes, Ray, and Redis, and which also exploited the React2Shell vulnerability, according to Flare. In the Trivy supply chain attack, now tracked as CVE-2026-33634 (CVSS score of 9.4), the hackers released malicious package versions and modified GitHub Actions tags to push information-stealing malware that would harvest credentials, keys, tokens, and other sensitive data. In early March, a similar attack hit Xygeni: compromised credentials linked to repository automation were used to introduce malicious code. Initially, the attackers relied on pull requests, but when that failed, they modified a mutable tag to reference a malicious commit, leading to downstream infections. “While the attack leveraged a known GitHub Actions vulnerability involving mutable tags, the incident also highlights the importance of comprehensive repository protection, strict credential management, and defense-in-depth across CI/CD systems,” Xygeni notes in its incident report. The Trivy attack and blast radius TeamPCP started pushing malware to the Trivy repositories on March 19, but the multi-stage supply chain attack has been contained and is now in the remediation and documentation phase, Aqua said on Wednesday. However, it took five days to fully evict the attackers. Three days after the containment and remediation efforts started, the attackers published malicious Trivy Docker Hub images (v0.69.5 and v0.69.6), confirming that their access had not been blocked, Trivy’s maintainers revealed. “Working closely with Sygnia, we are developing formal documentation that includes the confirmed timeline, actions taken to remediate the incident, and supporting materials for customer assurance and attestation. This effort is informed by a comprehensive review of credentials, access controls, and affected systems,” Aqua says. What made the attack stand out was the use of modified GitHub Action tags to reference malware without any visible changes to the tag name, published dates, or the release page, allowing the attackers to operate under the radar. According to a SANS Institute report seen by SecurityWeek, more than 10,000 CI/CD workflows were affected by the Trivy incident. Every CI/CD pipeline referencing the modified GitHub Actions automatically executed the malicious code, dropping TeamPCP’s information stealer and exposing secrets, credentials, and infrastructure. To evade detection on the infected systems, malicious code contains instructions to remove all its temporary files after performing its multi-stage credential theft and exfiltration operation, CrowdStrike explains. “The remainder of the script is a functional copy of the real trivy-action entry point. It downloads and runs Trivy normally, producing expected scanner output. To an operator reviewing workflow logs, the step appears to have completed successfully,” the cybersecurity company notes. The Checkmarx attack On March 23, TeamPCP hit Checkmarx’s KICS open-source project, publishing malicious versions of the checkmarx.cx-dev-assist and checkmarx.ast-results VS Code plugins to the OpenVSX marketplace. Like the Trivy attack, the hackers injected malicious payloads into the plugins by force-pushing tags that were pointing to malicious commits. A total of 35 GitHub Action version tags were hijacked, SANS Institute says. Checkmarx has since updated GitHub Actions to ast-github-action v2.3.33 and kics-github-action v2.1.20 and permanently removed all previous versions from its repositories. The malicious plugin iterations, namely ast-results 2.53.0 and cx-dev-assist 1.7.0, should be immediately removed. “Upon discovery, we removed the malicious artifacts, pinned our workflows to safe verified commit SHAs, revoked and rotated all exposed credentials, blocked outbound access to the attacker-controlled domain, and reviewed our environments for any signs of further compromise,” Checkmarx says. The cybersecurity firm warns all organizations that downloaded or ran a compromised version of the two plugins from Open VSX to rotate all secrets and environment variables. GitHub credentials, Personal Access Tokens (PATs), repository and organization secrets, SSH keys, Docker registry credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, and GitHub, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud (GCP), and AWS access tokens should be considered compromised and immediately rotated. As ReversingLabs points out, the two VS Code extensions have a combined download count of over 36,000 and are designed for use within VS Code and compatible integrated development environments (IDEs), such as Cursor, Kiro, and Windsurf, making the attack’s blast radius large. CanisterWorm and the NPM attacks Last week, TeamPCP’s campaign also targeted the NPM ecosystem, using read/write access tokens to push malware downstream and using the same infostealer from the Trivy attack. The NPM supply chain attack hit at least 64 unique packages and affected more than 140 package artifacts, injecting install-time malware that relies on an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister dead drop to deliver follow-on binaries. Dubbed CanisterWorm, the final payload contains a component that uses compromised NPM publishing credentials to inject the payload into additional packages. To evade detection, it preserves the legitimate README files, Socket explains. As the attack unfolded, the hackers were seen updating their code, moving from using a postinstall hook to write a Python payload, install it as a systemd –user service, and execute it, to using a hardcoded Python dropper and using the service name pgmon for persistence. According to Aikido, the malware was initially similar to the one used in the Trivy attack, but was later updated with the worm component that allowed it to use harvested NPM tokens and environment variables and spawn a persistent background process using them, to infect additional packages. “Every developer or CI pipeline that installs this package and has an NPM token accessible becomes an unwitting propagation vector. Their packages get infected, their downstream users install those, and if any of them have tokens, the cycle repeats,” Aikido notes. The Kubernetes wiper targeting Iran The same ICP canister used in the CanisterWorm attack on NPM was also used in a campaign targeting Kubernetes. The main difference was that the code included a wiper aimed at Iran-based clusters. The payload contains standard Kubernetes pod detection, deploys privileged DaemonSets across every node, and drops the CanisterWorm backdoor on them as a systemd service, achieving persistence as PostgreSQL tooling. In more recent iterations of the attack, the malware added network-based lateral movement, using SSH via compromised keys and auth log parsing, and exploiting exposed Docker APIs, Aikido reports. The code also checks the system timezone and locale and, if it detects machines configured for Iran, drops a DaemonSet to wipe the entire cluster. Dubbed “kamikaze”, the wiper mounts the host’s root filesystem, erases the top-level content, and then forces a reboot. The operation is performed on all nodes, including the control plane, destroying the entire cluster. “The Kubernetes-native lateral movement via DaemonSets is consistent with TeamPCP’s known playbook, but this variant adds something we haven’t seen from them before: a geopolitically targeted destructive payload aimed specifically at Iranian systems,” Aikido notes. On non-Kubernetes systems configured for Iran, if root access is available, the malware wipes everything. If it does not have root access, it “tries passwordless sudo, then tries anyway. Even without root, it’ll destroy everything the user owns,” Aikido notes. The PyPI attack and LiteLLM compromise In its most recent phase, TeamPCP’s campaign moved to the PyPI ecosystem, compromising LiteLLM, an open source Python library and proxy server that has more than 95 million monthly downloads. LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 were injected with the same information-stealing and dropper malware observed in the other TeamPCP attacks, with the same goal: the compromise of valuable credentials for broad access. The malicious code in LiteLLM 1.82.8 “fires on every Python invocation in the environment” and “runs silently in the background without delaying Python startup,” EndorLabs explains. Used as a unified interface between applications and AI service providers such as Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI, LiteLLM supports over 100 LLM APIs and typically has access to sensitive information such as API keys and environment variables. “Additionally, the breadth of data targeted by the malware underscores how modern development environments — spanning local machines, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud infrastructure — are deeply interconnected. A single compromised dependency can expose credentials across multiple systems, dramatically increasing the potential blast radius,” Sonatype notes. LiteLLM compromise has provided the attackers with access to all the secrets the library touches, and the impact from the attack is broad: approximately 300GB of data was exfiltrated from around 500,000 infected machines, threat intelligence and research project Vx-Underground says. ReversingLabs says that the hackers likely compromised the GitHub account of LiteLLM co-founder and CEO Krish Dholakia on March 23 and then defaced the LiteLLM GitHub repositories in an automated manner the next day. Organizations that installed or executed the malicious LiteLLM versions should immediately remove the packages, rotate all credentials, and investigate the affected systems for suspicious connections, persistence mechanisms, and potentially affected packages. According to cybersecurity outfit Wiz, LiteLLM is present in 36% of all cloud environments, providing hackers with a foothold in highly sensitive parts of the development lifecycle. “In many cases, rebuilding affected systems from a known clean state may be the safest course of action,” Sonatype notes. The Lapsus$ connection In addition to expanding across multiple OSS communities, TeamPCP’s campaign has escalated to a monetization phase. The group is openly taking credit for the attacks and appears to have partnered with the Lapsus$ extortion group for financial gain. TeamPCP has boasted on its Telegram account about the Trivy compromise, the GitHub Actions attacks, the OpenVSX extensions incident, and the PyPI hack, stating a clear focus on security tools and high-leverage points within the OSS ecosystem. The group also claims its operation is still unfolding, saying that it will be “stealing terabytes of trade secrets with our new partners”, Socket reports. While the ‘partners’ were not named, it appears that the hacking group was hinting at Lapsus$, which boasted on its Telegram account about an upcoming supply chain attack from TeamPCP. According to Wiz, this explicit collaboration between the two threat actors is an ecosystem-wide ‘cascade’ aimed at the modern cloud-native and AI ecosystems. “We are seeing a dangerous convergence between supply chain attackers and high-profile extortion groups like Lapsus$,” Wiz lead researcher Ben Read told SecurityWeek. “By moving horizontally across the ecosystem – hitting tools like LiteLLM that are present in over a third of cloud environments – they are creating a ‘snowball effect.’ This isn’t an isolated incident; it’s a systemic campaign that requires security teams to take action and will likely continue to expand,” Read added. The partnership between the two groups also appears to explain why some security researchers linked the AstraZeneca data breach to TeamPCP’s campaign, while Lapsus$ has claimed responsibility for it. Related: Polyfill Supply Chain Attack Impacting 100k Sites Linked to North Korea Related: New ‘Sandworm_Mode’ Supply Chain Attack Hits NPM Related: Autonomous AI Agents Provide New Class of Supply Chain Attack Related: ‘PackageGate’ Flaws Open JavaScript Ecosystem to Supply Chain Attacks
securityweek.comMar 25, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: CI/CD Backdoor, FBI Buys Location Data, WhatsApp Ditches Numbers & More
Another week, another reminder that the internet is still a mess. Systems people thought were secure are being broken in simple ways, showing many still ignore basic advisories. This edition covers a mix of issues: supply chain attacks hitting CI/CD setups, long-abused IoT devices being shut down, and exploits moving quickly from disclosure to real attacks. There are also new malware tricks showing attackers are becoming more patient and creative. It’s a mix of old problems that never go away and new methods that are harder to detect. There are quiet state-backed activities, exposed data from open directories, growing mobile threats, and a steady stream of zero-days and rushed patches. Grab a coffee, and at least skim the CVE list. Some of these are the kind you don’t want to discover after the damage is done. ⚡ Threat of the Week Trivy Vulnerability Scanner Breached in for Supply Chain Attack — Attackers have backdoored the widely used open-source Trivy vulnerability scanner, injecting credential-stealing malware into official releases and GitHub Actions used by thousands of CI/CD workflows. The breach has triggered a cascade of additional supply-chain compromises stemming from impacted projects and organizations not rotating their secrets, resulting in the distribution of a self-propagating worm referred to as CanisterWorm. Trivy, developed by Aqua Security, is one of the most widely used open-source vulnerability scanners, with over 32,000 GitHub stars and more than 100 million Docker Hub downloads. The Trivy compromise is the latest in a growing pattern of attacks targeting GitHub Actions and developers in general. GitHub changed the default behavior of pull_request_target workflows in December 2025 to reduce the risk of exploitation. BAS vs Automated Pentesting: What Each Actually Covers (and Doesn't) Most teams pick one without knowing what the other misses. This guide breaks down both by use case across blue, red, and purple teams so you can see where each fits and where the gaps are. Download Now ➝ 🔔 Top News DoJ Takes Down DDoS Botnets — A cluster of IoT botnets behind some of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded -- AISURU, Kimwolf, JackSkid, and Mossad -- were wiped as part of a broad law enforcement operation. The botnets largely spread across routers, IP cameras, and digital video recorders that are often shipped with weak credentials and rarely patched. Authorities removed the command-and-control servers used to commandeer the infected nodes. Together, operators of the four botnets had amassed more than 3 million devices, which they then sold access to other criminal hackers, who then used them to target victims with DDoS attacks to knock websites and internet services offline or mask other illicit activity. Some of these DDoS attacks were aimed at U.S. Department of Defense systems and other high-value targets. No arrests were announced, but two suspects associated with AISURU/Kimwolf are said to be based in Canada and Germany. All four botnets disrupted by the operation are variants of Mirai, which had its source code leaked in 2016 and has served as the starting point for other botnets. The U.S. Justice Department said some victims of the DDoS attacks lost hundreds of thousands of dollars through remediation expenses or ransom demands from hackers who would only stop overloading websites for a price. Google Debuts New Advanced Flow for Sideloading on Android — Google's advanced flow for Android changes how apps from unverified developers are installed, adding friction to combat scams and malware. The feature is aimed at experienced users and allows sideloading through a one-time setup. The advanced flow adds a 24-hour delay and verification steps intended to disrupt coercive pressure and give users time to make decisions. It’s designed to address scenarios where attackers pressure individuals to install unsafe software and play on the urgency of the operation to push them to bypass security warnings and disable protections before they can pause or seek help. Critical Langflow Flaw Comes Under Attack — A critical security flaw impacting Langflow has come under active exploitation within 20 hours of public disclosure, highlighting the speed at which threat actors weaponize newly published vulnerabilities. The security defect, tracked as CVE-2026-33017 (CVSS score: 9.3), is a case of missing authentication combined with code injection that could result in remote code execution. Cloud security firm Sysdig said that the attacks weaponize the vulnerability to steal sensitive data from compromised systems. "The real-world proof is definitive: threat actors exploited it in the wild within 20 hours of the advisory going public, with no public PoC code available," Aviral Srivastava, who discovered the vulnerability, told The Hacker News. "They built working exploits just from reading the advisory description. That's the hallmark of trivial exploitation when multiple independent attackers can weaponize a vulnerability from a description alone, within hours." Interlock Ransomware Exploited Cisco FMC Flaw as 0-Day — An Interlock ransomware campaign exploited a critical security flaw in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software as a zero-day well over a month before it was publicly disclosed. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-20131 (CVSS score: 10.0), a case of insecure deserialization of user-supplied Java byte stream, which could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary Java code as root on an affected device. "This wasn't just another vulnerability exploit; Interlock had a zero-day in their hands, giving them a week's head start to compromise organizations before defenders even knew to look," Amazon, which spotted the activity, said. Yet Another iOS Exploit Kit Comes to Light — A new watering hole attack against iPhone users has been found to deliver a previously undocumented iOS exploit kit codenamed DarkSword. While some of the attacks targeted users in Ukraine, the kit has also been put to use by two other clusters that singled out Saudi Arabian users in November 2025, as well as users in Turkey and Malaysia. It's worth noting that these exploits would not be effective on devices where Lockdown Mode is active or on the iPhone 17 with Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE) enabled. The kit used a total of six exploits in iOS to deliver various malware families designed for surveillance and intelligence gathering. Apple has since addressed all of them. "Completely written in JavaScript, DarkSword comprises six vulnerabilities across two exploit chains that were patched in stages ending with iOS 26.3," iVerify said. "Starting in WebKit and moving down to the kernel, it achieves full iPhone compromise with elegant techniques never publicly seen before." The discovery of DarkSword makes it the second mass attack targeting iOS devices. What's more, the Russian threat actor that deployed DarkSword demonstrated poor operational security. They left the full JavaScript code unobfuscated, unprotected, and easily accessible. The findings also point to a secondary market where such exploits are being acquired by threat actors of varied motivations to actively infect unpatched iOS users on a large scale. Perseus Banking Malware Targets Android — A newly discovered Android malware is masking itself within television streaming apps in order to steal users' passwords and banking data and spy on their personal notes, researchers have found. The malware, dubbed Perseus by researchers at ThreatFabric, is being actively distributed in the wild and primarily targets users in Turkey and Italy. To infect devices, attackers disguise the malware inside apps that appear to offer IPTV services — platforms that stream television content over the internet. These apps are also widely used to stream pirated content and are often downloaded outside official marketplaces like Google Play, making users more accustomed to installing them manually and less likely to view the process as suspicious. Once installed, Perseus can monitor nearly everything a user does in real time. It uses overlay attacks — placing fake login screens over legitimate apps — and keylogging capabilities to capture credentials as they are entered. The malware's most unusual feature is its focus on personal note-taking applications. "Notes often contain sensitive information such as passwords, recovery phrases, financial details, or private thoughts, making them a valuable target for attackers," ThreatFabric said. ️🔥 Trending CVEs New vulnerabilities show up every week, and the window between disclosure and exploitation keeps getting shorter. The flaws below are this week's most critical — high-severity, widely used software, or already drawing attention from the security community. Check these first, patch what applies, and don't wait on the ones marked urgent — CVE-2026-21992 (Oracle), CVE-2026-33017 (Langflow), CVE-2026-32746 (GNU InetUtils telnetd), CVE-2026-32297, CVE-2026-32298 (Angeet ES3 KVM), CVE-2026-3888 (Ubuntu), CVE-2026-20643 (Apple WebKit), CVE-2026-4276 (LibreChat RAG API), CVE-2026-24291 aka RegPwn (Microsoft Windows), CVE-2026-21643 (Fortinet FortiClient), CVE-2026-3864 (Kubernetes), CVE-2026-32635 (Angular), CVE-2026-25769 (Wazuh), CVE-2026-3564 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect), CVE-2026-22557, CVE-2026-22558 (Ubiquiti), CVE-2025-14986 (Temporal), CVE-2026-31381, CVE-2026-31382 (Gainsight Assist), CVE-2026-26189 (Trivy), CVE-2026-4439, CVE-2026-4440, CVE-2026-4441 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-33001, CVE-2026-33002 (Jenkins), CVE-2026-21570 (Atlassian Bamboo Center), and CVE-2026-21884 (Atlassian Crowd Data Center). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Learn How to Automate Exposure Management with OpenCTI & OpenAEV → Discover how to automate continuous, threat-informed testing using open-source tools like OpenCTI and OpenAEV to validate your security controls against real attacker behavior without increasing your budget. See a live demo on how to verify your security works, identify real gaps, and integrate it into your SOC workflow at no extra cost. Identity Maturity Cracking in 2026: See the New Data + How to Catch Up Fast → Identity programs are under massive pressure in 2026 - disconnected apps, AI agents, and credential sprawl are creating real risks and audit challenges. Join this webinar for new Ponemon Institute 2026 research from over 600 leaders, showing the scale of the problem and practical steps to close gaps, reduce friction, and catch up quickly. 📰 Around the Cyber World WhatsApp Tests Usernames Instead of Phone Numbers — WhatsApp is planning to introduce usernames and unique IDs instead of phone numbers, allowing users to send messages and make voice or video calls without sharing numbers. The optional privacy feature is expected to roll out globally by June 2026, with users and businesses able to reserve unique handles. "We're excited to bring usernames to WhatsApp in the future to help people connect with new friends, groups, and businesses without having to share their phone numbers," the company said in a statement shared with The Economic Times. The feature has been under test since early January 2026. Signal introduced a similar feature in early 2024. FBI Details SE Asia Scam Centers — The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detailed its work with Thai authorities to shut down scam centers proliferating in Southeast Asia. The schemes, which primarily target retirees, small-business owners, and people seeking companionship, have been described as a blend of cyber fraud, money laundering, and human trafficking, causing billions of dollars in annual losses. These scam centers operate in a manner that's similar to how legitimate corporations do. "Recruiters advertise high-paying jobs abroad. Workers are flown to foreign countries only to discover that the positions do not exist," the FBI said. "Passports are confiscated. Armed guards patrol the grounds. Under threat of violence, workers are forced to pose as potential romantic partners or savvy investment advisers, cultivating trust with victims over weeks or months." Recent crackdowns in countries like Cambodia have freed thousands of workers from scam compounds, but the FBI warned that these breakthroughs can be temporary, as criminal networks always tend to relocate, rebrand, or shift tactics in response to law enforcement actions. APT28 Exposed Server Leaks SquirrelMail XSS Payload — A second exposed open directory discovered on a server ("203.161.50[.]145") associated with APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) has offered insights into the threat actor's espionage campaigns targeting government and military organizations across Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and North Macedonia. According to Ctrl-Alt-Intel, the directory contained command-and-control (C2) source code, scripts to steal emails, credentials, address books, and 2FA tokens from Roundcube mailboxes, telemetry logs, and exfiltrated data. The stolen data consists of 2,870 emails from government and military mailboxes, 244 sets of stolen credentials, 143 Sieve forwarding rules (to silently forward every incoming email to an attacker-controlled mailbox), and 11,527 contact email addresses. One of the newly identified tools is an XSS payload targeting the SquirrelMail webmail software, highlighting the threat actor's continued focus on leveraging XSS flaws to steal data from email inboxes. It's worth noting that the server was attributed to APT28 by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) as far back as September 2024. "Fancy Bear developed a modular, multi-platform exploitation toolkit where a victim simply opening a malicious email – with no further clicks – could result in their credentials stolen, their 2FA bypassed, emails within their mailbox exfiltrated, and a silent forwarding rule established that persists indefinitely," Ctrl-Alt-Intel said. Analysis of a Beast Ransomware Server — An analysis of an open directory on a server ("5.78.84[.]144") associated with Beast, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that's suspected to be the successor to Monster ransomware, has uncovered the various tools used by the threat actors and the different stages of their attack lifecycle. These included Advanced IP Scanner and Advanced Port Scanner to map internal networks and find open remote desktop protocol (RDP) or server message block (SMB) ports. Also identified were programs to locate sensitive files for exfiltration and flag which servers hold the most data, as well as Mimikatz, LaZagne, and Automim (for credential harvesting), AnyDesk (for persistence), PsExec (for lateral movement), and MEGASync (for data exfiltration). Beast ransomware operations paused in November 2025 and resumed in January 2026. GrapheneOS Opposes the Unified Attestation Initiative — GrapheneOS has come out strongly against Unified Attestation, stating it "serves no truly useful purpose beyond giving itself an unfair advantage while pretending it has something to do with security." The Unified Attestation initiative is an open-source, decentralized alternative to the Google Play Integrity API to provide device and app integrity checks for custom ROMs without requiring Google Play Services. "We strongly oppose the Unified Attestation initiative and call for app developers supporting privacy, security, and freedom on mobile to avoid it," GraphenseOS said. "Companies selling phones should not be deciding which operating systems people are allowed to use for apps." VoidStealer Uses Chrome Debugger to Steal Secrets — An information stealer known as VoidStealer has observed using a novel debugger-based Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) bypass technique that leverages hardware breakpoints to extract the "v20_master_key" directly from browser memory and use it to decrypt sensitive data stored in the browser. VoidStealer is a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) infostealer that began being marketed on several dark web forums in mid-December 2025. The ABE bypass technique was introduced in version 2.0 of the stealer announced on March 13, 2026. "The bypass requires neither privilege escalation nor code injection, making it a stealthier approach compared to alternative ABE bypass methods," Gen Digital said. VoidStealer is assessed to have adopted the technique from the open-source ElevationKatz project. FBI Says it is Buying Americans' location Data — FBI director Kash Patel admitted that the agency is buying location data that can be used to track people's movements without a warrant. "We do purchase commercially available information that’s consistent with the Constitution and the laws under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and it has led to some valuable intelligence for us," Patel said at a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Iranian Botnet Exposed via Open Directory — An Open Directory on "185.221.239[.]162:8080" has been found to contain several payloads, including a Python-based botnet script, a compiled DDoS binary, multiple C-language denial-of-service files, and IP addresses associated with SSH credentials. "A Python script called ohhhh.py reads credentials in a host:port|username|password format and opens 500 concurrent SSH sessions, compiling and launching the bot client on each host automatically," Hunt.io said. "The exposed .bash_history captured three distinct phases of work: standing up the tunnel network, building and testing DDoS tooling against live targets, and iterative botnet development across multiple script versions." The activity has not been linked to any state-directed campaign. OpenClaw Developers Targeted in Phishing Attack — OpenClaw's combination of flexibility, local control, and a fast-growing ecosystem has made it popular among developers in a very short time. While that unprecedented adoption speed has exposed organizations to new security risks of its own (i.e., vulnerabilities and the presence of malicious skills on ClawHub and SkillsMP), threat actors are also capitalizing on the brand name and reputation to set up fake GitHub accounts for a phishing campaign that lures unsuspecting developers with promises of free $CLAW tokens and trick them into connect their cryptocurrency wallet. "The threat actor creates fake GitHub accounts, opens issue threads in attacker-controlled repositories, and tags dozens of GitHub developers," OX Security researchers Moshe Siman Tov Bustan and Nir Zadok said. "The posts claim that recipients have won $5,000 worth of CLAW tokens and can collect them by visiting a linked site and connecting their crypto wallet." The linked site ("token-claw[.]xyz") is a near-identical clone of openclaw.ai rigged with a wallet-draining "Connect your wallet" button designed to conduct cryptocurrency theft. New Campaign Targets Energy Operations Personnel in Pakistan — A targeted campaign against operations personnel at energy firms linked to projects in Pakistan has leveraged phishing emails mimicking invitations to the upcoming Pakistan Energy Exhibition & Conference (PEEC). The messages, sent from compromised accounts from a Pakistani university and a government organization, aim to deceive victims into opening PDF attachments with a fake Adobe Acrobat Reader update prompt. Clicking the update leads to the download of a ClickOnce application resource that drops the Havoc Demon C2 framework. "The redirect chain was also wrapped in geofencing and browser fingerprinting, limiting access to intended targets," Proofpoint said. "That likely reduced the exposure to automated analysis while keeping the delivery path tightly scoped." The activity has been codenamed UNK_VaporVibes. It's assessed to share overlaps with activity publicly associated with SloppyLemming. Over 373K Dark Web Sites Down — International law enforcement agencies announced the takedown of one of the largest known networks of fraudulent platforms on the dark web, uncovering hundreds of thousands of fake websites used to scam users seeking child sexual abuse content. A 10-day international operation led by German authorities and supported by Europol shut down more than 373,000 dark web domains run by a 35-year-old man based in China, who had been operating a sprawling network of fraudulent platforms since at least 2021. While the sites advertised child abuse material and cybercrime-as-a-service offerings, nothing was actually delivered after victims made a payment in Bitcoin. The fraudulent scheme netted the operator an estimated €345,000 from around 10,000 people. Authorities from 23 countries participated in the operation, and have since identified 440 customers whose purchases are now under active investigation. Malicious npm Packages Steal Secrets — Two malicious npm packages, sbx-mask and touch-adv, have been found to steal secrets from victims' computers. While one invokes the malicious code via the postinstall script, the other executes it when application code is invoked by the developer after importing it. "The evidence strongly suggests account takeover of a legitimate publisher, rather than intentional malicious activity," Sonatype said. "Hijacked publisher accounts are particularly concerning as, over time, maintainers build trust with the users of their components. Attackers aim to take advantage of that trust in order to steal valuable, or profitable, information." China to Have Its Own Post-Quantum Cryptography in 3 Years — China is reportedly planning to develop its own national post-quantum cryptography standards within the next three years, according to a report from Reuters. The U.S. finalized its first set of post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 and is aiming to achieve full industry migration by 2035. What's Next for Tycoon2FA? — A recent law enforcement operation dismantled the infrastructure associated with the Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform. However, a new analysis from Bridewell has revealed that some of the 2FA phishing CAPTCHA pages are still live. The lingering activity, the cybersecurity company noted, stems from the fact that these pages operate on a massive network of compromised third-party sites, legitimate SaaS platforms, and thousands of disposable domains. "Operators and affiliates are highly agile and will attempt to rebuild, migrate to new infrastructure, or pivot to competing PhaaS platforms," it added. "The live CAPTCHA pages we are seeing may belong to surviving criminal affiliates attempting to keep their individual campaigns breathing on secondary proxy networks." 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools MESH → It is an open-source tool from BARGHEST that enables remote mobile forensics and network monitoring over an encrypted, peer-to-peer mesh network resistant to censorship. It connects Android/iOS devices behind firewalls or CGNAT using a modified Tailscale-like protocol (no central servers needed), supports ADB wireless debugging, libimobiledevice, PCAP capture, and Suricata IDS—allowing secure, direct access for live logical acquisitions in restricted or hostile environments. enject → It is a lightweight Rust tool that protects .env secrets from AI assistants like Copilot or Claude. It replaces real values in your .env file with placeholders (e.g., en://api_key). Secrets stay encrypted in a per-project store (AES-256-GCM, master password protected). When you run enject run -- , it decrypts them only in memory at runtime, then wipes them—never leaving plaintext on disk. Open-source, macOS/Linux, perfect for safe local development. Disclaimer: For research and educational use only. Not security-audited. Review all code before use, test in isolated environments, and ensure compliance with applicable laws. Conclusion And that’s the week. The real pattern isn’t any one story; it’s the gap. The gap between a flaw and detection. Between a patch and a deployment. Between knowing and doing. Most of this week’s damage happened in that gap, and it’s not new. Before you move on: update your mobile devices, review anything touching your CI/CD pipeline, and don’t store crypto wallet recovery phrases in notes apps.
thehackernews.comMar 23, 2026extracted
Open-source malware zeroes in on developer environments
Open-source malware zeroes in on developer environments Open source malware activity during 2025 concentrated on a single objective: executing code inside developer environments, according to Sonatype. The focus reflected a broader shift in supply chain attacks away from end users and toward the tools, machines, and pipelines used to build software in the first place. Key takeaways (Source: Sonatype) Malware campaigns scaled through registries Researchers identified more than 450,000 new malicious open source components during the year. Attackers published large batches of packages that shared naming patterns and internal code, then rapidly replaced them after removal. Most malicious releases appeared in npm, where its central role in front-end development and CI pipelines enabled distribution at scale. Publishing followed short, automated cycles, with packages reappearing shortly after takedowns. Some campaigns spread without manual republishing. One operation observed in September propagated laterally through developer machines and linked projects, compromising hundreds of downstream components within days. Another campaign generated tens of thousands of packages in a short window, creating sustained load on registries. The volume and speed of these incidents underscored how malware publishing has become an automated process. As attackers encounter friction in more mature ecosystems, they are increasingly redirecting efforts toward environments with weaker safeguards. Execution shifted to install time Rather than categorizing malware by artifact labels, the study classified malicious components based on behavior. Registry abuse accounted for more than half of all malicious entries, with automated publication used to maximize reach. Other behaviors focused on access. Some packages harvested credentials or system data from developer workstations and CI environments. Others retrieved secondary payloads after installation. A smaller subset included backdoor functionality designed to maintain long-term access. Across these categories, a common tactic emerged: install-time execution. Malicious code ran as dependencies were installed, before builds completed or applications were ever executed. A single download was enough to trigger activity inside environments holding API keys, tokens, and deployment credentials. Attackers also paid close attention to social engineering details. Package names mimicked familiar plugins, helpers, and troubleshooting tools. Documentation followed standard project formats, reflecting how easily dependencies are added during routine development work without deep inspection. State-linked campaigns refined delivery methods Sonatype attributed hundreds of malicious releases published during 2025 to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, almost all within npm. These packages combined multiple threat behaviors into a single component. Droppers, credential theft, and persistence mechanisms appeared together, forming staged intrusion chains where the open source package itself served as the delivery vehicle. Targeting focused on widely used frameworks and build tools, with names referencing common development keywords to increase the likelihood of installation during debugging or feature development. Researchers also observed consistent reuse across campaigns. Variants shared code templates and infrastructure, and replacement packages appeared quickly after removals, indicating an organized and well-resourced operation rather than opportunistic abuse. AI systems introduced new exposure AI assisted development further complicated dependency risk during 2025. Sonatype observed language models selecting packages, resolving build errors, and suggesting upgrades based on public data that often lagged real-world conditions. Testing showed a dependency upgrade hallucination rate of 27.76%, with AI systems recommending nonexistent versions or unsafe dependencies when resolving issues. These errors became more impactful when agents operated autonomously inside CI pipelines. Attackers exploited naming similarity and namespace resolution behavior. When AI agents acted independently, they installed dependencies based on resolution success rather than validating origin, reputation, or abuse indicators. Researchers also identified AI model artifacts that executed code during loading, enabling data exfiltration or remote access. These models frequently ran in shared environments containing credentials and sensitive data. The growing volume of AI-generated output has also changed how vulnerability reports reach maintainers and development teams. Teams need to rethink how they triage reports at scale.
helpnetsecurity.comJan 29, 2026extracted
Researchers Uncover 454,000+ Malicious Open Source Packages
Security researchers have warned that the open source ecosystem has become a “structural risk,” after revealing another surge in malicious packages last year. Sonatype said in its 2026 State of the Software Supply Chain report that developers downloaded components 9.8 trillion times last year across Maven Central, PyPl, npm and NuGet. The challenge is that many of these contained malware or vulnerabilities. The security vendor said it discovered 454,648 new malicious packages last year, warning that threats had evolved from “spam and stunts” into “sustained, industrialized campaigns” – many of which are state sponsored. “Public registries provide a low-friction distribution channel, while developer machines and CI/CD pipelines provide an execution environment that often sits close to sensitive data and production access,” the report noted. “As a result, the malicious package is increasingly not the whole attack, but the first step in a larger supply chain intrusion.” Over half (56%) of recorded malicious packages were classified as “repository abuse,” including efforts to persuade users to click on spammy links or the harvesting of TEA tokens. A further 28% were classed as potentially unwanted apps, such as empty packages, demos with hardcoded credentials and messaging app spam bot orchestration frameworks. Other popular categories included host information and secrets exfiltration, droppers/loaders and backdoors – indicating the multi-stage nature of attacks that begin with malicious packages. Threat actors are apparently turning to “social and technical mimicry” to target stretched developers. These techniques include typosquatting and namespace confusion, toolchain masquerading and front-end workflow lures. “Attackers increasingly rely less on individual mistakes and more on scale, momentum, and volume,” the report said. “They know developers under deadline pressure are unlikely to pay detailed attention on every dependency. If a package ‘looks right’ with mostly comprehensible code, a legitimate seeming README.MD, and a reasonable amount of downloads, it is likely to get installed.” The Problem With AI AI represents another threat to developers, as it becomes more important to modern pipelines. Malicious payloads are being hidden in AI models, as well as container images and helper binaries, and distributed through trusted platforms like Hugging Face, Sonatype claimed. Meanwhile, AI agents threaten to amplify the risk of malicious or buggy packages because they fail to check provenance, policy or known-malicious indicators. Many fall for the deceptive naming patterns and evasion tactics used by threat actors to mimic legitimate dependencies, the report argued. On other occasions, AI agents recommend non-existent versions. Sonatype analyzed nearly 37,000 real dependency upgrades assisted by LLMs across Maven, npm, PyPI and NuGet. It claimed 28% were hallucinations. Open Source Bugs Are Everywhere Sonatype also warned that severe vulnerabilities remain widespread in the open source ecosystem. In 2025, 40% of vulnerable Maven Central releases and 39% of NuGet releases carried CVSS 9.0+ scores. The problem for security teams is compounded by a lack of vulnerability intelligence. Two-thirds (65%) of open source CVEs were not assigned CVSS scores by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Sonatype said. Even when information and patches exist, buggy versions continue to be downloaded en masse. “Set-and-forget dependencies, transitive sprawl, and upgrade friction keep old risk flowing into new builds,” the report warned. “The problem is not awareness. It is workflow inertia and unclear ownership.”
infosecurity-magazine.comJan 28, 2026extracted
Log4Shell Downloaded 40 Million Times in 2025
Tens of millions of downloads of the popular Java logging library Log4j this year were vulnerable to a CVSS 10.0-rated vulnerability that first surfaced four years ago, according to Sonatype. The security vendor claimed 13% of Log4j downloads in 2025 were still vulnerable to Log4Shell, hinting at the challenge of persistent risks in the open source ecosystem. “On one side, there’s unfixed risk: vulnerabilities that never get patched upstream. On the other, there’s corrosive risk: vulnerabilities that do have fixes, but continue to spread because consumers don’t move,” it explained. “The Log4j vulnerability – and the heavily used commons packages sitting alongside it – are now textbook examples of corrosive risk at scale.” Sonatype compiled its analysis from Maven Central download data, revealing that 40 million of the 300 million Log4j downloads this year were buggy. Among the countries with the largest developer populations, India (29%), China (28%) and Japan (22%) all recorded large shares of Log4Shell downloads. The US (9%), Brazil (8%) and France (8%) fared better, but still accounted for millions of avoidable vulnerable downloads, Sonatype claimed. The issue is not confined to Log4j: Sonatype claimed that around 95% of downloads featuring vulnerable components have a safer version available, while only around 0.5% of components actually lack a fix. The vendor claimed that developers continue to make these mistakes because of set-and-forget dependencies, transitive dependency blind spots and flawed criteria for choosing libraries that focus on popularity over security posture. Security tools like software composition analysis (SCA) can make matters worse by flooding developers with alerts that lack actionable guidance, while product managers continue to be incentivized to prioritize time to market over security. Eliminating Unnecessary Risk Sonatype urged developers to stop pulling known-bad versions of components by: Using SCA tools and artifact repositories to understand how many downloads are vulnerable, which components show up in builds (and what versions) and which teams/apps/business units are responsible Changing how they select components, prioritizing security track record, active maintenance, governance and transparency Automating upgrade pull requests to safe versions, batching non-breaking upgrades regularly, autocompleting to safe versions in internal repositories and automatically alerting when someone tries to pull in a known vulnerable version Putting guardrails in place in artifact repositories and CI/CD pipelines to block downloads/use of known vulnerable versions for which a fix exists Adopting new metrics such as “unnecessary risk rate,” “fix adoption time” and “policy effectiveness”
infosecurity-magazine.comDec 10, 2025extracted
640 NPM Packages Infected in New ‘Shai-Hulud’ Supply Chain Attack
Approximately 640 NPM packages have been infected with a new variant of the Shai-Hulud self-replicating worm in a fresh wave of attacks. The first Shai-Hulud iteration emerged in mid-September, when it infected over 180 packages in a supply chain attack leading to the exposure of GitHub, NPM, AWS, and Google Cloud credentials, Atlassian keys, and Datadog API keys. Upon execution on a victim’s system, the malware would search for NPM tokens, enumerate the packages the victim has access to, inject them with a post-install script to propagate itself, repackage them, and then publish the malicious package versions to the repository. Within days, the malware compromised dozens of developer accounts and published over 700 malicious package versions. It also harvested credentials and other secrets from the victim and published them to public repositories, and migrated private repositories to public ones. In the fresh version of the supply chain attack, launched over the weekend, the Shai-Hulud worm is even more aggressive and has been updated with destructive capabilities, security researchers warn. Unlike the previous version, the new Shai-Hulud samples rely on the NPM packages’ preinstall scripts for propagation, which “dramatically widens the blast radius across dev machines and CI/CD pipelines,” cybersecurity outfit Wiz warns. The worm drops two files, named ‘setup_bun.js’ and ‘bun_environment.js’, which contain a loader and the actual payload, respectively. According to Wiz, it also adds multiple GitHub Actions workflows, including a backdoor that supports command execution triggered via discussions in the GitHub repository. JFrog also observed that a system’s DNS would be hijacked following infection and that, if the worm does not find GitHub or NPM tokens to abuse, it executes a wiping function to delete all user data on Windows and erase all files and empty directories on Unix-based systems. The malware also launches privileged Docker containers and modifies sudoers files to gain root access for privilege escalation, Upwind notes. Wiz and Upwind said on Monday that they identified over 25,000 malicious repositories published by the malware. Wiz warned that it was seeing approximately 1,000 new packages being published every 30 minutes. The same as in September, Shai-Hulud seeks to harvest developer secrets, including tokens, cookies, and local workspace data, which it uploads to GitHub repositories under the attackers’ control. As ReversingLabs explains, the data exfiltration repositories associated with the attack have random names and the ‘Sha1-Hulud: Second Coming’ description. The company has identified 27,000 such repos. Unlike the previous version, the new Shai-Hulud iteration can infect up to 100 NPM packages maintained by any of its victims. The first trojanized package distributing the worm might have been @asyncapi/specs, which has roughly 1.4 million weekly downloads, ReversingLabs says. Aikido says it detected 36 packages from AsyncAPI that were trojanized, and that the attack later spread to PostHog packages, Postman packages, and many others. “Threat actors have slipped malicious code into hundreds of NPM packages — including major ones from Zapier, ENS, AsyncAPI, PostHog, Browserbase, and Postman. If a developer installs one of these bad packages, the malware quietly runs during installation, before anything even finishes installing,” Aikido warns. The compromised packages have a combined monthly download count of over 130 million. As Upwind points out, what makes the fresh supply chain attack a major threat is the speed and automation in turning each infected maintainer into a point of amplification. “Stolen tokens are reused instantly to republish malicious packages and inject rogue workflows, transforming Shai Hulud 2.0 into an ecosystem-wide worm rather than an isolated supply-chain incident,” Upwind notes. According to Sonatype principal security researcher Garrett Calpouzos, another worrying aspect of the attack is how the massive malicious source file that publishes harvested data to public repos confuses AI analysis tools. “It’s so large that it exceeds a normal context window and the models can’t keep track of everything they’re reading. I’ve asked both ChatGPT and Gemini to analyze it and I get different answers each time. Looking at their reasoning, they’re searching for obvious malware patterns — like calls to suspicious domains — and not finding any, so they incorrectly conclude it’s just a legitimate session or token management library,” Calpouzos said. Organizations are advised to scan their systems for indicators of compromise (IoCs), rotate potentially compromised secrets (including SSH keys, GitHub and cloud credentials, and tokens), and ensure strong multi-factor authentication is enforced. They should also review workflows and pipelines for anomalies, recreate self-hosted runners and CI agents from clean images, improve pipeline guardrails, and implement continuous monitoring to detect anomalous behavior. “To defend against this kind of attack, dev and security teams must treat npm package management and CI/CD pipelines as part of the threat surface. This means enforcing strict token/scoped access policies, limiting or auditing lifecycle scripts (especially preinstall/postinstall hooks), monitoring secrets in build environments and using behavioral analytics to detect unusual GitHub Actions workflows or outbound connections from build hosts. Given the worm‑like nature of Shai‑Hulud, time is of the essence: any delay in rotating tokens or cleaning compromised build agents can lead to rapid spread,” SOCRadar CISO Ensar Seker said. Related: Chinese Cyberspies Deploy ‘BadAudio’ Malware via Supply Chain Attacks Related: GlassWorm Malware Returns to Open VSX, Emerges on GitHub Related: Amazon Detects 150,000 NPM Packages in Worm-Powered Campaign Related: 136 NPM Packages Delivering Infostealers Downloaded 100,000 Times
securityweek.comNov 25, 2025extracted
What happens when vulnerability scores fall apart?
What happens when vulnerability scores fall apart? Security leaders depend on vulnerability data to guide decisions, but the system supplying that data is struggling. An analysis from Sonatype shows that core vulnerability indexes no longer deliver the consistency or speed needed for the current software environment. A system that no longer keeps pace The CVE program still serves as the industry’s naming backbone, and the NVD remains a primary source for severity ratings. These tools were built for an era of slower release cycles. They have not kept up with continuous deployment, heavy dependency use, and automated development workflows. 64% of open source CVEs in 2025 had no CVSS score in the NVD. Security teams must choose between assuming high risk or filling gaps on their own. After scoring the missing items, Sonatype found that almost half were High or Critical, which shows how often the absence of a score conceals real exposure. Alignment across sources is weak even when severity scores exist. Only 19% of CVE severity categories matched Sonatype’s analysis. 62% overstated severity. Others understated it and left meaningful risks unrecognized. These inconsistencies influence scanners, SBOM processes, and automated remediation tools. When inaccurate data shapes automated decisions, errors spread quickly. Sonatype identified nearly 20,000 false positives and more than one 150,00 false negatives. False positives waste time. False negatives allow vulnerabilities to remain in production. Both outcomes reduce confidence in the data used across security programs. Slow scoring breaks response cycles Timeliness is another major gap. The average delay between public disclosure and NVD scoring in 2025 was 6 weeks. Some CVEs waited more than 50 weeks. Proof of concept exploits often appear within hours. Maintainers release patches within days. A score that arrives weeks later adds little value for rapid response. The slowdown in 2024, when NVD output dropped for several months, showed how fragile the scoring pipeline has become. Even after operations resumed, the backlog did not recover. The consequences reach beyond security teams Compliance processes assume that CVE data provides a complete record. Build systems allow or block components based on CVE information. Strategic metrics, such as mean time to remediation, rely on severity categories that may not reflect real risk. Recent supply chain incidents have shown these gaps in plain view. During events like Log4Shell and XZ Utils, the community understood and mitigated the issues before official scoring became available. The threat environment rewards fast interpretation. The current system was not built for that pace. “The CVE program was never built for the scale and speed of modern software development. That has been the case with open source, and is even more true with AI. Vulnerability intelligence must shift from indexing what someone assigned yesterday, to delivering real-time insight into what’s actually running in your environment,” said Brian Fox, CTO of Sonatype. How data quality breaks down The report outlines several causes behind the inconsistencies. Some maintainers publish broad affected version ranges because it is easier than tracing exact boundaries. Others exclude older versions because those releases are no longer supported, even though many organizations still use them. Researchers may also publish CVEs quickly and move on. Once the identifier is assigned, there is little incentive to refine version ranges or scoring details. These individual shortcuts add up and create inaccuracies.
helpnetsecurity.comNov 24, 2025extracted
Amazon Inspector detects over 150,000 malicious packages linked to token farming campaign
Amazon Inspector detects over 150,000 malicious packages linked to token farming campaign Amazon Inspector security researchers have identified and reported over 150,000 packages linked to a coordinated tea.xyz token farming campaign in the npm registry. This is one of the largest package flooding incidents in open source registry history, and represents a defining moment in supply chain security, far surpassing the initial 15,000 packages reported by Sonatype researchers in April 2024. Through a combination of advanced rule-based detection and AI, the research team uncovered a self-replicating attack pattern where threat actors automatically generate and publish packages to earn cryptocurrency rewards without user awareness, revealing how the campaign has expanded exponentially since its initial identification. This incident demonstrates both the evolving nature of threats where financial incentives drive registry pollution at unprecedented scale, and the critical importance of industry-community collaboration in defending the software supply chain. The Amazon Inspector team’s capability to detect subtle, non-traditional threats through innovative detection methodologies, combined with rapid collaboration with the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) to assign malicious package identifiers (MAL-IDs) and coordinate response, provides a blueprint for how security organizations can respond swiftly and effectively to emerging attack vectors. As the open source community continues to grow, this case serves as both a warning that new threats will emerge wherever financial incentives exist, and a demonstration of how collaborative defense can help address supply chain attacks. Detection On October 24, 2025, Amazon Inspector security researchers deployed a new detection rule—paired with AI—to identify additional suspicious package patterns in the npm registry. Within days, the system began flagging packages linked to the tea.xyz protocol—a blockchain-based system designed to reward open source developers. By November 7, the researchers flagged thousands of packages and began investigating what appeared to be a coordinated campaign. The next day, after validating the evaluation results and analyzing the patterns, they reached out to OpenSSF to share their findings and coordinate a response. With OpenSSF’s review and alignment, Amazon Inspector security researchers began systematically submitting discovered packages to the OpenSSF malicious packages repository, with each package receiving a MAL-ID within 30 minutes. The operation continued through November 12, ultimately uncovering over 150,000 malicious packages. Here’s what the investigation revealed: Over 150,000 packages linked to the tea.xyz token farming campaign Self-replicating automation that creates packages without legitimate functionality Systematic inclusion of tea.yaml files that link packages to blockchain wallet addresses Coordinated publishing activity across multiple developer accounts Unlike traditional malware, these packages do not contain overtly malicious code. Instead, they exploit the tea.xyz reward mechanism by artificially inflating package metrics through automated replication and dependency chains, allowing threat actors to extract financial benefits from the open source community. Token farming as a new attack vector This campaign represents a concerning evolution in supply chain security. Although the packages might not steal credentials or deploy ransomware, they pose significant risks: Registry pollution – The npm registry is flooded with low-quality, non-functional packages that obscure legitimate software and degrade trust in the open source community. Resource exploitation – Registry infrastructure, bandwidth, and storage are consumed by packages created solely for financial gain rather than genuine contribution. Precedent for abuse – The success of this campaign could inspire similar exploitation of other reward-based systems, normalizing automated package generation for financial gain. Supply chain risk – Even packages that seem benign can add unnecessary dependencies, potentially introducing unexpected behaviors or creating confusion in dependency resolution. Collaboration with OpenSSF: rapid response The collaboration between Amazon Inspector security researchers and OpenSSF led to swift action and benefits such as the following: Immediate threat intelligence sharing – The researchers’ findings were shared with OpenSSF’s malicious packages repository, providing the community with comprehensive threat data. MAL-ID assignment – OpenSSF rapidly assigned MAL-IDs to the detected packages, enabling community-wide blocking and remediation. Average time of assignment was 30 minutes. Coordinated disclosure – Both organizations worked together to inform the broader open source community about the threat. Enhanced detection standards – Insights from this campaign are informing improved detection capabilities and policy recommendations across the open source security community. This collaboration exemplifies how industry leaders and community organizations can work together to help protect software supply chains. The rapid assignment of MAL-IDs demonstrates OpenSSF’s commitment to maintaining the integrity of open source registries, while the researchers’ detection work and threat intelligence provide the advanced insights needed to stay ahead of evolving attack patterns. Technical details: how the researchers detected the campaign Amazon Inspector security researchers used a combination of rule-based detection paired with AI-powered techniques to uncover this campaign. The researchers developed pattern matching rules to identify suspicious characteristics such as the following: Presence of tea.yaml configuration files Minimal or cloned code with no original functionality Predictable naming patterns and automated generation signatures Circular dependency chains between related packages By monitoring publishing patterns, the researchers revealed coordinated campaigns that used automated tooling to create packages at automated speeds. How to respond to these types of events You should follow your standard incident response process for active incidents to resolve the issue. To sweep your development environment, we recommend the following steps: Use Amazon Inspector – Check the findings for packages that are linked to tea.xyz token farming and follow recommended remediation. Audit packages – Remove low-quality, non-functional packages. Harden supply chains – Enforce software bills of materials (SBOMs), pin package versions, and isolate continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, add a note in AWS re:Post tagged with Amazon Inspector, or contact AWS Support.
aws.amazon.comNov 14, 2025extracted
Lazarus Group rises again, this time with malware-laden fake FOSS
INFOSEC IN BRIEF North Korea’s Lazarus Group has changed tactics and is now creating malware-laden open source software. Software supply chain management vendor Sonatype last week published research in which it claimed that Lazarus Group has created hundreds of “shadow downloads” that appear to be popular open source software development tools but are full of malware. The company says it found 234 unique malware packages built by Lazarus in the first half of 2025 alone. “Lazarus has increasingly pivoted from disruption to long-term infiltration, using tailored malware, modular payloads, and infrastructure evasion techniques to achieve persistent access to high-value targets — including the open source software ecosystem,” the company’s researchers wrote. Lazarus Group’s rap sheet includes the 2014 Sony Pictures hack, the 2016 attack on banks in Bangladesh, and 2017’s WannaCry ransomware attack. Like many other North Korean operatives, Lazarus Group shifted to cryptocurrency theft. Developers who don’t carefully check downloads appear to be the gang’s latest targets. - Simon Sharwood MFA mess costs Canucks big bucks Slow rollout of two-factor authentication has cost the Canadian city of Hamilton CAD$5 million ($3.6 m). In February 2024 the city was crippled for weeks by a ransomware attack that saw criminals demand CAD$18.5 million ($13.4m) in exchange for the decryption keys. The city told them no and then spent CAD$18.4 million ($13.3m) fixing the problem by building a more secure network. At a town meeting last Wednesday, officials said the city's insurance company declined to pay out CAD$5 million ($3.6 million) in costs, saying that the city had broken the contract by not installing multi-factor authentication across its entire network. In 2022 the insurers required the city to install MFA and Hamilton commenced a pilot program the following year Before the city completed its rollout, the ransomware scum attacked. "This has been a test of our system and a test of our leadership," said Mayor Andrea Horwath last Wednesday. "We are not sweeping this under the rug. We are owning it, we're fixing it and we're learning from it." Cyrus Tehrani, acting chief information officer for the city, disputes the claims that a lack of MFA was to blame for the ransomware attack, as the city faced a "highly sophisticated attack on an external, internet-facing server, gaining unauthorized access to the City of Hamilton systems." And there are a couple of upsides to the saga. Firstly the criminals lost out on their big payday, and secondly the city's infrastructure is much more up-to-date, the Mayor said. "This city needed to change," she opined. "This city needed to become more modernized. When I got here I felt this was a city time forgot." We'll see how the voters agree. Bug bounties all round! Fancy becoming an instant millionaire (before tax)? All you'll need is to find a zero-click flaw in WhatsApp that allows code execution, fly to Dublin on October 21, and demonstrate it at the latest Pwn2Own competition. WhatsApp is a focus of this year’s competition, which will pay $500,000 for a single click crack of Meta’s messaging tool. Other big money prizes on offer include winning $300,000 to remotely crack an iPhone 16 or a Pixel 9 handset, $150,000 for no-interaction remote code execution on Meta's Quest 3 and Ray-Ban headsets, and a host of smaller prizes, with a particular focus this year on smart home devices and printers. As ever, if you hack a device you also get to keep it. Last year over 70 zero-day flaws were demonstrated and contestants walked away with combined winnings of $1,066,625 in total. Not to be outdone, this week Microsoft announced increases in the bounties it offers for .NET vulnerabilities. Find something wrong with .NET and ASP.NET Core (including Blazor and Aspire) and you can now win rewards of up to $40,000 for the most serious flaws, up from $30,000 last year. Redmond was a relative latecomer to the bug bounty crowd, starting its first program in 2013 at the prompting of security maven Katie Moussouris. Microsoft used to be considered one of the worst companies for this sort of thing - making legal threats to researchers and refusing to compensate them for their discoveries. But it began to see the benefits and in 2008 publicly vowed not to resort to legal threats. Teams touched up While we’re talking Microsoft, last week it announced that Teams admins will have a slightly easier time of it thanks to some new code. Teams already has an audit logging system that allows admins to quickly check for suspicious activity such as users who have inappropriate control rights or are sharing material that’s not appropriate given their access privileges. An improved logging system Microsoft introduced last week added better timestamp monitoring, plus the ability to log screensharing sessions and all who participate in them. This will be handy for preventing the loss of corporate information, either to competitors, corporate espionage, and - of course - leaky juicy titbits to journalists (hint, hint). CISA swings hammer of Thorium The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) last week released Thorium, a digital forensics tool developed in partnership with Sandia National Laboratories. The tool allows massive scaling up of file analysis and incident response times and can take in and analyze more than 10 million files per hour. "Thorium enables teams that frequently analyze files to achieve scalable automation and results indexing within a unified platform," the agency said. "Analysts can integrate command-line tools as Docker images, filter results using tags and full-text search, and manage access with strict group-based permissions." Thorium runs at scale on Kubernetes and ScyllaDB systems and has a strict permissions database that controls who can see its output. CISA says it'll be particularly useful for running custom commands for inspecting Docker images, as well as commercial, open source, and proprietary code. Republicans and Democrats agree on banning stingray scanners The use of stingray cellphone monitoring towers by US law enforcement could be curtailed if bipartisan legislation introduced in the House and Senate passes. Stingrays are fake cellphone towers that records the IMEI number and location of any handset in the area. They have been used for nearly a decade but the tech has sparked concerns that the devices are used to conduct mass surveillance. There have also been multiple reports that unknown entities are using such kit for espionage purposes. The Cell Site Simulator Warrant Act, introduced by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Steve Daines (R-MT), and Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA), and Tom McClintock, (R-CA) last Thursday, would require police to get a warrant based on probable cause before using the devices, other than in some emergencies. If the bill passes, an Inspector General would audit all stingray use, and any judge ruling on a case using stingray data should be informed on its potential flaws. Police would also be limited to only collecting directly relevant data. "Law enforcement agencies need clear and transparent rules about when it’s acceptable to use stingray phone surveillance, so they can properly investigate crimes without endangering Americans' privacy or violating their constitutional rights," Wyden said. "Our bipartisan bill protects Americans against warrantless stingray surveillance while setting clear rules for law enforcement about when and how they can use these devices." The proposed law will also include a $250,000 fine for anyone illegally stingray devices to spy. Building your own stingray is relatively simple, all it takes is about $1,000-worth of kit and the right software. The bill includes exceptions for those using homebrewed kit for teaching or legitimate research. ®
go.theregister.comAug 4, 2025extracted
North Korean hackers target open-source repositories in new espionage campaign
North Korean hackers target open-source repositories in new espionage campaign North Korean state-backed hackers have planted malicious code in open-source software repositories as part of an ongoing campaign that has already put tens of thousands of developers at risk of surveillance and data theft, according to new research. Between January and July, cybersecurity firm Sonatype said it blocked 234 malicious packages uploaded to the widely used npm and PyPI code repositories and linked to the campaign. The packages, which impersonated legitimate developer tools, were designed to steal credentials, profile victims’ devices and plant backdoors. The researchers estimate the campaign may have impacted more than 36,000 developers. In its latest operation, Lazarus took advantage of major gaps in the open-source software supply chain — like developers depending on unvetted packages and the lack of oversight for popular tools that are often maintained by just one or two people. Many of the malicious packages used typosquatting and brand impersonation tactics, mimicking well-known libraries or company tools to fool developers and automated systems into downloading them. Once installed, the malicious packages deploy a range of spying tools — including a clipboard stealer, keylogger, screenshot utility and credential harvester. More than 90 of the packages were built to steal secrets and credentials, while over 120 served as droppers to deliver additional malware, suggesting a broader strategy focused on long-term network infiltration and persistence, rather than quick financial gain, researchers said. The campaign reflects an evolution in tactics by Lazarus, a North Korean state-backed hacking group that has been linked to the world’s largest cryptocurrency heists, including a $1.4 billion theft from Dubai-based Bybit earlier this year. While historically focused on financial theft, Lazarus has shifted its operations toward espionage and covert access to critical infrastructure, Sonatype said. The latest operation appears to have specifically targeted developers in DevOps and CI/CD-heavy environments. Although attribution in cyber operations is often inconclusive, researchers said the infrastructure and tactics closely mirror previous Lazarus-linked campaigns. Malicious actors are increasingly exploiting open-source repositories for financial gain or espionage. In July, hackers compromised a popular npm package by phishing its maintainer via a fake login page, allowing them to publish a backdoored version of code used in millions of projects. Around the same time, PyPI warned users about a separate phishing campaign using a spoofed website to harvest developer credentials. The campaigns have not been attributed to any specific threat actor. “Lazarus is turning open source ecosystems into sophisticated delivery mechanisms for cyberespionage,” Sonatype said about the latest campaign, adding that such attacks are “a clear signal that the trust inherent in the open source community is being actively exploited for geopolitical gain.” Daryna Antoniuk is a reporter for Recorded Future News based in Ukraine. She writes about cybersecurity startups, cyberattacks in Eastern Europe and the state of the cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia. She previously was a tech reporter for Forbes Ukraine. Her work has also been published at Sifted, The Kyiv Independent and The Kyiv Post.
therecord.mediaJul 31, 2025extracted
N. Korean Hackers Used Job Lures, Cloud Account Access, and Malware to Steal Millions in Crypto
The North Korea-linked threat actor known as UNC4899 has been attributed to attacks targeting two different organizations by approaching their employees via LinkedIn and Telegram. "Under the guise of freelance opportunities for software development work, UNC4899 leveraged social engineering techniques to successfully convince the targeted employees to execute malicious Docker containers in their respective workstations," Google's cloud division said [PDF] in its Cloud Threat Horizons Report for H2 2025. UNC4899 overlaps with activity tracked under the monikers Jade Sleet, PUKCHONG, Slow Pisces, and TraderTraitor. Active since at least 2020, the state-sponsored actor is known for its targeting of cryptocurrency and blockchain industries. Notably, the hacking group has been implicated in significant cryptocurrency heists, including that of Axie Infinity in March 2022 ($625 million), DMM Bitcoin in May 2024 ($308 million), and Bybit in February 2025 ($1.4 billion). Another example that highlights its sophistication is the suspected exploitation of JumpCloud's infrastructure to target downstream customers within the cryptocurrency vertical. According to DTEX, TraderTraitor is affiliated with the Third Bureau (or Department) of North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau and is the most prolific of any of the Pyongyang hacking groups when it comes to cryptocurrency theft. Attacks mounted by the threat actor have entailed leveraging job-themed lures or uploading malicious npm packages, and then approaching employees at target companies with a lucrative opportunity or asking them to collaborate on a GitHub project that would then lead to the execution of the rogue npm libraries. "TraderTraitor has demonstrated a sustained interest in cloud-centric and cloud-adjacent attack surfaces, often with a final goal of compromising companies that are customers of cloud platforms rather than the platforms themselves," cloud security firm Wiz said in a detailed report on TraderTraitor this week. The attacks observed by Google Cloud targeted the respective organizations' Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services (AWS) environments, paving the way for a downloader called GLASSCANNON that's then used to serve backdoors like PLOTTWIST and MAZEWIRE that can establish connections with an adversary-controlled server. In the incident involving the Google Cloud environment, the threat actors have been found to employ stolen credentials to interact remotely using Google Cloud CLI over an anonymous VPN service, carrying out extensive reconnaissance and credential theft activities. However, they were thwarted in their efforts due to the multi-factor authentication (MFA) configuration applied to the victim's credentials. "UNC4899 eventually determined the victim's account had administrative privileges to the Google Cloud project and disabled the MFA requirements," Google said. "After successfully gaining access to the targeted resources, they immediately re-enabled MFA to evade detection." The intrusion targeting the second victim's AWS environment is said to have followed a similar playbook, only this time the attackers used long-term access keys obtained from an AWS credential file to interact remotely via AWS CLI. Although the threat actors ran into access control roadblocks that prevented them from performing any sensitive actions, Google said it found evidence that likely indicated the theft of the user's session cookies. These cookies were then used to identify relevant CloudFront configurations and S3 buckets. UNC4899 "leveraged the inherent administrative permissions applied to their access to upload and replace existing JavaScript files with those containing malicious code, which were designed to manipulate cryptocurrency functions and trigger a transaction with the cryptocurrency wallet of a target organization," Google said. The attacks, in both cases, ended with the threat actors successfully withdrawing several million worth of cryptocurrency, the company added. The development comes as Sonatype said it flagged and blocked 234 unique malware npm and PyPI packages attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group between January and July 2025. Some of these libraries are configured to drop a known credential stealer referred to as BeaverTail, which is associated with a long-running campaign dubbed Contagious Interview. "These packages mimic popular developer tools but function as espionage implants, designed to steal secrets, profile hosts, and open persistent backdoors into critical infrastructure," the software supply chain security firm said. "The surge of activity in H1 2025 demonstrates a strategic pivot: Lazarus is now embedding malware directly into open source package registries, namely npm and PyPI, at an alarming rate." Update Veracode, in a new analysis published on July 31, 2025, said it uncovered a dozen malicious packages published by North Korean threat actors as part of a cryptocurrency stealing campaign. The malware is assessed to be a variant of BeaverTail, capable of harvesting system information, exfiltrating data from cryptocurrency wallet apps and browser extensions, and downloading additional Python payloads. None of the identified packages are available for download from npm. (The story was updated after publication on August 2, 2025, to include additional insights from Veracode.)
thehackernews.comJul 31, 2025extracted
Over 200 Malicious Open Source Packages Traced to Lazarus Campaign
North Korean threat actors have distributed over 200 malicious open source packages, in an audacious new cyber-espionage campaign, according to Sonatype. The security vendor blocked 234 unique npm and PyPI malware packages in the first half of 2025 alone, claiming they may have compromised as many as 36,000 victims. Sonatype attributed the campaign to the notorious Lazarus Group, claiming it represents a “strategic shift” for the state-backed actors. They apparently targeted open source in this way because developers often install packages without verification or sandboxing, CI/CD systems propagate malicious dependencies automatically and embedded malicious code can persist for lengthy periods. Many of the packages detected were designed to impersonate or resemble legitimate development libraries, according to Sonatype. Once installed, they typically executed a multi-stage attack “designed to maintain stealth, achieve persistence, and exfiltrate sensitive data.” Of the 234 malicious packages detected, 120 were droppers designed to deliver additional malware, while 90 were built for secrets exfiltration. “This demonstrates that Lazarus is not singularly pursuing opportunistic monetization like resource hijacking for mining,” the report noted. “Instead, they are leveraging open source to silently harvest sensitive data and pave the way for long-term access to lucrative financial information and espionage operations. The stolen credentials are not the end goal. They are the key to unlocking the kingdom – gaining access to source code repositories, cloud infrastructure, and internal networks.” Lazarus Targets Developers Sonatype claimed the packages were aimed at developers working in “DevOps-heavy organizations” or teams with automated CI/CD pipelines. Targets included: Build pipelines, where secrets and tokens could be obtained Developer machines, which could enable theft of credentials and keys, or lateral movement opportunities Cloud-based deployments, where stolen credentials could be used to access wider infrastructure “The potential impact of a single compromised developer machine or build agent is severe,” warned Sonatype. “It can lead to intellectual property theft, injection of backdoors into production software, lateral movement across the corporate network, and significant reputational damage.” The report pegged Lazarus for the operation due to command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, payload behavior and campaign timing observed from previous campaigns associated with the group.
infosecurity-magazine.comJul 31, 2025extracted