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RustDuck Botnet Rebuilds in Rust to Hijack Routers and Servers for DDoS
A new two-stage malware family called RustDuck is hijacking home routers, IP cameras, Android boxes, and poorly secured servers, then stitching them into a network built to knock websites and online services offline. Researchers at QiAnXin's XLab have tracked it since February 2026, and say the real story is not how big it is today, but how fast it is changing. The end goal is a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack: flooding a target with junk traffic from the infected machines until it buckles. RustDuck is one more entrant in a crowded field, but it stands out for two reasons. It is being rewritten from the C programming language into Rust, and its newer versions go to unusual lengths to avoid being studied or shut down. How it spreads RustDuck does not lean on a single clever trick. It sprays a mix of old, well-known weaknesses and hopes one sticks. The first is the oldest in the book: devices left on the internet with weak or default passwords on their remote-login services (Telnet and SSH). Guess the password, walk in. The second is unpatched device bugs. XLab says RustDuck goes after exposed Android debugging interfaces and flaws in gear from TVT (DVRs and cameras), Ruijie, TP-Link, and ZTE, plus a handful of named, years-old vulnerabilities that still litter the internet: CVE-2017-17215, a remote code execution bug in Huawei HG532 routers that the original Mirai-style botnets abused back in 2017. CVE-2025-29635, a command-injection flaw in discontinued D-Link DIR-823X routers that Akamai watched Mirai variants exploit in March 2026. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list the next month. CVE-2024-1781, a command-injection bug in Totolink X6000R routers, whose maker never responded to the disclosure. CVE-2018-8007, a remote code execution path in Apache CouchDB that an authenticated admin can abuse. The third path is web software. RustDuck also targets known holes in ThinkPHP, Jenkins, and Hadoop YARN, which stretches its reach from cheap home hardware to exposed server software. XLab counted more than 20 internet addresses spreading the malware, with the busiest at 176.65.139[.]204. What makes it tricky RustDuck installs in two stages: a small loader that decrypts and unpacks a heavier core module. That core is where the interesting engineering lives, and it is the part being rewritten in Rust. Rust binaries are generally tougher for analysts to take apart than the C that has powered device malware for years, and XLab says RustDuck's Rust core shows real depth in how it derives its keys, hides from analysis, and talks to its servers. The switch points to active development, not a quick re-skin of leaked code. The bigger tell is how hard the newer samples work to stay hidden. Before doing anything, RustDuck runs a checklist to decide whether it has landed in a security researcher's lab instead of on a real victim's device. It looks for analysis tools like Wireshark and gdb, for debuggers attached to its own process, for the fingerprints of a honeypot trap, even for virtual-machine hardware. Each hit adds points to a risk score. Cross a threshold, and the malware erases its traces and quits before anyone can watch it run. Two of those checks stand out. One quietly tries to reach an internet address that is reserved for testing and should never answer; if something replies, RustDuck knows it is inside a fake network built to fool malware, and bails. Another compares two clocks to catch sandboxes that speed up time to rush malware into showing its hand. Its communications are locked down to match. RustDuck encrypts its traffic with modern ciphers: ChaCha20-Poly1305 for the handshake, AES-GCM once it is taking commands. It derives its keys with HKDF-SHA256 and a Curve25519 exchange, rotates them every ten minutes, and dresses the connection up to look like ordinary encrypted web traffic so it blends in. Once a device checks in, the operators can send a short list of orders: start an attack, stop it, report status, switch to new control servers, or quietly upgrade the malware to a newer build. The control addresses lean on free dynamic-DNS services like duckdns.org, which is where the "Duck" in the name comes from. This fits a bigger pattern RustDuck is not the first botnet to reach for Rust. In April 2025, Fortinet documented RustoBot, a Rust-based botnet that spread through Totolink and other routers to run DDoS attacks, using the same recipe: cheap routers, a modern language, and flood traffic on demand. It also arrives in a brutal year for DDoS. The same kind of botnet, scaled up, has produced the biggest floods on record. AISURU and a cluster of related botnets, more than three million hijacked devices between them, drove attacks near 30 Tbps before a US-led operation tore down their infrastructure this spring. Next to that, RustDuck is tiny. The worry is the direction it is heading. One detail worth a second look: RustDuck's busiest delivery address, 176.65.139[.]204, sits in the same small block of addresses as the server behind a separate ADB-targeting DDoS botnet reported in spring 2026. That could be a coincidence or shared bulletproof hosting, and XLab does not link the two, but the overlap is the kind of thing worth checking. What to do There is no patch for RustDuck itself, because it is malware, not a single bug. Defense means closing the doors it walks through: Get remote-management interfaces off the public internet. Turn off Android Debug Bridge, Telnet, and SSH where they are not needed, and never leave them reachable with default passwords. Patch what you can, replace what you can't. CouchDB has fixed releases to upgrade to, but some of these routers are past end-of-life. For the D-Link DIR-823X, CISA's advice is to pull it from service rather than wait for a patch that isn't coming, and the Totolink maker never answered the disclosure. Unsupported gear has to be replaced, not fixed. Block the known indicators. XLab's report lists the malware's file hashes, control domains, and source addresses; feed them into your monitoring. RustDuck is a small botnet wearing the engineering of a serious one. Whether it grows into a real threat or fizzles out, the techniques it is testing, a Rust rewrite and a paranoid hide-from-researchers routine, are the parts other crews are most likely to borrow.
thehackernews.comJun 30, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: Apple 0-Days, WinRAR Exploit, LastPass Fines, .NET RCE, OAuth Scams & More
If you use a smartphone, browse the web, or unzip files on your computer, you are in the crosshairs this week. Hackers are currently exploiting critical flaws in the daily software we all rely on—and in some cases, they started attacking before a fix was even ready. Below, we list the urgent updates you need to install right now to stop these active threats. ⚡ Threat of the Week Apple and Google Release Fixes for Actively Exploited Flaws — Apple released security updates for iOS, iPadOS, macOS, tvOS, watchOS, visionOS, and Safari web browser to address two zero-days that the company said have been exploited in highly targeted attacks. CVE-2025-14174 has been described as a memory corruption issue, while the second, CVE-2025-43529, is a use-after-free bug. They can both be exploited using maliciously crafted web content to execute arbitrary code. CVE-2025-14174 was also addressed by Google in its Chrome browser since it resides in its open-source Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE) library. There are currently no details on how these flaws were exploited, but evidence points to it likely having been weaponized by commercial spyware vendors. The CISO Org Chart Playbook This playbook is for security leaders who are scaling CloudSec teams and need a structure that keeps up with cloud complexity. Built specifically for modern cloud-forward security teams, it breaks down how CISOs are structuring cloud security functions today – including emerging roles, team models, reporting lines, and practical templates for planning headcount and responsibilities across cloud, AppSec, platform security, and more. Download Org Charts ➝ 🔔 Top News SOAPwn Exploits HTTP Client Proxies in .NET for RCE — Cybersecurity researchers uncovered an unexpected behavior of HTTP client proxies in .NET applications, potentially allowing attackers to achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability has been codenamed SOAPwn. At its core, the problem has to do with how .NET applications might be vulnerable to arbitrary file writes because .NET's HTTP client proxies also accept non-HTTP URLs such as files, a behavior that Microsoft says developers are responsible for guarding against — but not likely to expect. This, in turn, can open remote code execution (RCE) attack paths through web shells and malicious PowerShell scripts in many .NET applications, including commercial products. By being able to pass an arbitrary URL to a SOAP API endpoint in an affected .NET application, an attacker can trigger a leak of NTLM challenge. The issue can also be exploited through Web Services Description Language (WSDL) imports, which can then be used to generate client SOAP proxies that can be controlled by the attacker. "The .NET Framework allows its HTTP client proxies to be tricked into interacting with the filesystem. With the right conditions, they will happily write SOAP requests into local paths instead of sending them over HTTP," watchTowr said. "In the best case, this results in NTLM relaying or challenge capture. In the worst case, it becomes remote code execution through webshell uploads or PowerShell script drops." Attackers Exploit New Flaw in CentreStack and Triofox — A new vulnerability in Gladinet's CentreStack and Triofox products is being actively exploited by unknown threat actors to achieve code execution. The vulnerability, which does not have a CVE identifier, can be abused to access the web.config file, which can then be used to execute arbitrary code. At the core of the issue is a design failure in how they generate the cryptographic keys used to encrypt the access tokens the products use to control who can retrieve what files. As a result, the cryptographic keys never change and can be used to access files containing valuable data. Huntress said, as of December 10, 2025, nine organizations have been affected by the newly disclosed flaw. WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Multiple Threat Actors — A high-severity flaw in WinRAR (CVE-2025-6218, CVSS score: 7.8) has come under active exploitation, fueled by three different threat actors tracked as GOFFEE (aka Paper Werewolf), Bitter (aka APT-C-08 or Manlinghua), and Gamaredon. CVE-2025-6218 is a path traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute code in the context of the current user. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply the necessary fixes by December 30, 2025. Exploitation of React2Shell Surges — The recently disclosed maximum-severity security flaw in React (CVE-2025-55182, CVSS score: 10.0) has come under widespread exploitation, with threat actors targeting unpatched systems to deliver various kinds of malware. Public disclosure of the flaw triggered a "rapid wave of opportunistic exploitation," according to Wiz. Google said it observed a China-nexus espionage cluster UNC6600 exploiting React2Shell to deliver MINOCAT, a tunneling utility based on Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP). Other exploitation efforts included the deployment of the SNOWLIGHT downloader by UNC6586 (China-nexus), the COMPOOD backdoor (linked to suspected China-nexus espionage activity since 2022) by UNC6588, an updated version of the Go-based HISONIC backdoor by UNC6603 (China-nexus), and ANGRYREBEL.LINUX (aka Noodle RAT) by UNC6595 (China-nexus). "These observed campaigns highlight the risk posed to organizations using unpatched versions of React and Next.js," Google said. Hamas-Affiliated Group Goes After the Middle East — WIRTE (aka Ashen Lepus), a cyber threat group associated with Hamas, has been conducting espionage on government bodies and diplomatic entities across the Middle East since 2018. In recent years, the threat actor has broadened its targeting scope to include Oman and Morocco, while simultaneously evolving its capabilities. The modus operandi follows tried-and-tested cyber espionage tactics, using spear-phishing emails to deliver malicious attachments that deliver a modular malware suite dubbed AshTag. The components of the framework are embedded in a command-and-control (C2) web page within HTML tags in Base64-encoded format, from where they are parsed and decrypted to download the actual payloads. "Ashen Lepus remained persistently active throughout the Israel-Hamas conflict, distinguishing it from other affiliated groups whose activities decreased over the same period," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said. "Ashen Lepus continued with its campaign even after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, deploying newly developed malware variants and engaging in hands-on activity within victim environments." It's being assessed that the group may be operating from outside Gaza, citing continued activity throughout the conflict. ️🔥 Trending CVEs Hackers act fast. They can use new bugs within hours. One missed update can cause a big breach. Here are this week’s most serious security flaws. Check them, fix what matters first, and stay protected. This week’s list includes — CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2025-14174 (Apple), CVE-2025-14174 (Google Chrome), CVE-2025-55183, CVE-2025-55184, CVE-2025-67779 (React), CVE-2025-8110 (Gogs), CVE-2025-62221 (Microsoft Windows), CVE-2025-59718, CVE-2025-59719 (Fortinet), CVE-2025-10573 (Ivanti Endpoint Manager), CVE-2025-42880, CVE-2025-55754, CVE-2025-42928 (SAP), CVE-2025-9612, CVE-2025-9613, CVE-2025-9614 (PCI Express Integrity and Data Encryption protocol), CVE-2025-27019, CVE-2025-27020 (Infinera MTC-9), CVE-2025-65883 (Genexis Platinum P4410 router), CVE-2025-64126, CVE-2025-64127, CVE-2025-64128 (Zenitel TCIV-3+), CVE-2025-66570 (cpp-httplib), CVE-2025-63216 (Itel DAB Gateway), CVE-2025-63224 (Itel DAB Encoder) CVE-2025-13390 (WP Directory Kit plugin), CVE-2025-65108 (md-to-pdf), CVE-2025-58083 (General Industrial Controls Lynx+ Gateway), CVE-2025-66489 (Cal.com), CVE-2025-12195, CVE-2025-12196, CVE-2025-11838, CVE-2025-12026 (WatchGuard), CVE-2025-64113 (Emby Server), CVE-2025-66567 (ruby-saml), CVE-2025-24857 (Universal Boot Loader), CVE-2025-13607 (D-Link DCS-F5614-L1, Sparsh Securitech, Securus CCTV), CVE-2025-13184 (TOTOLINK AX1800), CVE-2025-65106 (LangChain), CVE-2025-67635 (Jenkins), CVE-2025-12716, CVE-2025-8405, CVE-2025-12029, CVE-2025-12562 (GitLab CE/EE), and CVE-2025-64775 (Apache Struts 2). 📰 Around the Cyber World U.K. Fines LastPass for 2022 Breach — The U.K. Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) fined LastPass's British subsidiary £1.2 million ($1.6 million) for a data breach in 2022 that enabled attackers to access personal information belonging to its customers, including their encrypted password vaults. The hackers compromised a company-issued MacBook Pro of a software developer based in Europe to access the corporate development environment and related technical documentation, and exfiltrate a little over a dozen repositories. It's unclear how the MacBook was infected. Subsequently, the threat actors gained access to one of the DevOps engineers' PCs by exploiting CVE-2020-5741, a vulnerability in Plex Media Server, installed a keylogger used to steal the engineer's master password, and breached the cloud storage environment. The ICO said LastPass failed to implement sufficiently robust technical and security measures. "LastPass customers had a right to expect the personal information they entrusted to the company would be kept safe and secure," John Edwards, U.K. Information Commissioner, said. "However, the company fell short of this expectation, resulting in the proportionate fine being announced today." APT-C-60 Targets Japan with SpyGlace — The threat actor known as APT-C-60 has been linked to continued cyber attacks targeting Japan to deliver SpyGlace using spear-phishing emails impersonating job seekers. The attacks were observed between June and August 2025, per JPCERT/CC. "In the previous attacks, victims were directed to download a VHDX file from Google Drive," the agency said. "However, in the latest attacks, the malicious VHDX file was directly attached to the email. When the recipient clicks the LNK file contained within the VHDX, a malicious script is executed via Git, which is a legitimate file." The attacks leverage GitHub to download the main malware components, marking a shift from Bitbucket. ConsentFix, a New Twist on ClickFix — Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new variation of the ClickFix attack. Called ConsentFix, the new technique relies on tricking users into copy-pasting text that contains their OAuth material into an attacker-controlled web page. Push Security said it spotted the technique in attacks targeting Microsoft business accounts. In these attacks, targets are funneled through Google Search to compromised but reputable websites injected with a fake Cloudflare Turnstile challenge that instructs them to sign in to their accounts and paste the URL. Once the targets log in, they are redirected to a localhost URL containing the OAuth authorization code for their Microsoft account. The phishing process ends when the victims paste the URL back into the original page, granting the threat actors unauthorized access. The attack "sees the victim tricked into logging into Azure CLI, by generating an OAuth authorization code — visible in a localhost URL — and then pasting that URL, including the code, into the phishing page," the security company said. "The attack happens entirely inside the browser context, removing one of the key detection opportunities for ClickFix attacks because it doesn't touch the endpoint." The technique is a variation of an attack used by Russian state-sponsored hackers earlier this year that deceived victims into sending their OAuth authorization code via Signal or WhatsApp to the hackers. 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses — The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with the MITRE Corporation, released the 2025 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses, identifying the most critical vulnerabilities that adversaries exploit to compromise systems, steal data, or disrupt services. It was compiled from 39,080 CVEs published this year. Topping the list is cross-site scripting, followed by SQL Injection, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), missing authorization, and out-of-bounds write. Salt Typhoon Spies Reportedly Attended Cisco Training Scheme — Two of Salt Typhoon's members, Yu Yang and Qiu Daibing, have been identified as participants of the 2012 Cisco Networking Academy Cup. Both Yu and Qiu are co-owners of Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong, one of the Chinese companies that the U.S. government and its allies allege as being fronts for Salt Typhoon activity. Yu is also tied to another Salt Typhoon-connected company, Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie. SentinelOne found that Yu and Qiu represented Southwest Petroleum University in Cisco's academy cup in China. Yu's team was placed second in the Sichuan region, while Qiu's team took the first prize and later claimed the third spot nationally, despite the university being considered as a poorly-regarded academic institution. "The episode suggests that offensive capabilities against foreign IT products likely emerge when companies begin supplying local training and that there is a potential risk of such education initiatives inadvertently boosting foreign offensive research," security researcher Dakota Cary said. The episode stresses the need for demonstrating technical competencies when hiring technical professionals and that offensive teams may benefit from putting their own employees through similar training initiatives like Huawei's ICT academy. Freedom Chat Flaws Detailed — A pair of security flaws has been disclosed in Freedom Chat that could have allowed a bad actor to guess registered users' phone numbers (similar to the recent WhatsApp flaw) and expose user-set PINs to others on the app. The issues, discovered by Eric Daigle, have since been addressed by the privacy-focused messaging app as of December 7, 2025. In an update pushed out to Apple and Google's app stores, the company said: "A critical reset: A recent backend update inadvertently exposed user PINs in a system response. No messages were ever at risk, and because Freedom Chat does not support linked devices, your conversations were never accessible; however, we’ve reset all user PINs to ensure your account stays secure. Your privacy remains our top priority." Unofficial Patch for New Windows RasMan 0-Day Released — Free unofficial patches have been made available for a new Windows zero-day vulnerability that allows unprivileged attackers to crash the Remote Access Connection Manager (RasMan) service. ACROS Security's 0patch service said it discovered a new denial-of-service (DoS) flaw while looking into CVE-2025-59230, a Windows RasMan privilege escalation vulnerability exploited in attacks that was patched in October. The new flaw has not been assigned a CVE identifier, and there is no evidence of it having been abused in the wild. It affects all Windows versions, including Windows 7 through Windows 11 and Windows Server 2008 R2 through Server 2025. Ukrainian National Charged for Cyber Attacks on Critical Infra — U.S. prosecutors have charged a Ukrainian national for her role in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure worldwide, including U.S. water systems, election systems, and nuclear facilities, on behalf of Russian state-backed hacktivist groups. Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova (aka Vika, Tory, and SovaSonya), 33, was allegedly part of two pro-Kremlin hacktivist groups named NoName057(16) and CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR), the latter of which was founded, funded, and directed by Russia's military intelligence service GRU. NoName057(16), a hacktivist group active since March 2022, has over 1,500 DDoS attacks against organizations in Ukraine and NATO countries. If found guilty, Dubranova faces up to 32 years in prison. She was extradited to the U.S. earlier this year. The U.S. Justice Department said the groups tampered with U.S. public water systems and caused an ammonia leak at a U.S. meat processing factory. Dubranova pleaded not guilty in a U.S. court last week. The U.S. government is also offering rewards for additional information on other members of the two groups. Prosecutors said administrators of the two collectives, dissatisfied with the level of support and funding from the GRU, went on to form Z-Pentest in September 2024 to conduct hack-and-leak operations and defacement attacks. "Pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lower-impact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. These attacks use minimally secured, internet-facing virtual network computing (VNC) connections to infiltrate (or gain access to) OT control devices within critical infrastructure systems," U.S. and other allies said in a joint advisory. "Pro-Russia hacktivist groups – Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), Z-Pentest, NoName057(16), Sector 16, and affiliated groups – are capitalizing on the widespread prevalence of accessible VNC devices to execute attacks against critical infrastructure entities, resulting in varying degrees of impact, including physical damage." These groups are known for their opportunistic attacks, typically leveraging unsophisticated tradecraft like known security flaws, reconnaissance tools, and common password-guessing techniques to access networks and conduct SCADA intrusions. While their ability to consistently cause significant impact is limited, they also tend to work together to amplify each other's posts to reach a broader audience on platforms like Telegram and X. X's Safety team said it cooperated with U.S. authorities to suspend NoName057(16)'s account ("@NoName05716") for facilitating criminal conduct. APT36 Targets Indian Government Entities with Linux Malware — A new phishing campaign orchestrated by APT36 (aka Transparent Tribe) has been observed delivering tailored malware specifically crafted to compromise Linux-based BOSS operating environments prevalent in Indian government networks. "The intrusion begins with spear-phishing emails designed to lure recipients into opening weaponized Linux shortcut files," CYFIRMA said. "Once executed, these files silently download and run malicious components in the background while presenting benign content to the user, thereby facilitating stealthy initial access and follow-on exploitation." The attack culminates with the deployment of a Python-based Remote Administration Tool (RAT) that can collect system information, contact an external server, and run commands, granting the attackers remote control over infected hosts. "The group’s current activity reflects a broader trend in state-aligned espionage operations: the adoption of adaptive, context-aware delivery mechanisms designed to blend seamlessly into the target's technology landscape," the company said. Vietnamese IT and HR Firms Targeted by Operation Hanoi Thief — A threat cluster referred to as Operation Hanoi Thief has targeted Vietnamese IT departments and HR recruiters using fake resumes distributed as ZIP files in phishing emails to deliver malware called LOTUSHARVEST. The ZIP file contains a Windows shortcut (LNK) file that, when opened, executes a "pseudo-polyglot" payload present in the archive that serves as the lure and as well as the container for a batch script that displays a decoy PDF and uses DLL side-loading to load the LOTUSHARVEST DLL. The malware runs various anti-analysis checks and proceeds to harvest data from web browsers such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge. The activity has been attributed with medium confidence to a threat cluster of Chinese origin. Microsoft Adds New PowerShell Security Feature — With PowerShell 5.1, Microsoft has added a new feature to warn users when they're about to execute web content. The warning will alert users when executing the Invoke-WebRequest command without additional special parameters. "This prompt warns that scripts in the page could run during parsing and advises using the safer -UseBasicParsing parameter to avoid any script execution," Microsoft said. "Users must choose to continue or cancel the operation. This change helps protect against malicious web content by requiring user consent before potentially risky actions." The company also said it's rolling out a new Baseline Security Mode in Office, SharePoint, Exchange, Teams, and Entra that can automatically configure apps with minimum security requirements. The centralized experience began rolling out in phases last month and will be completed by March next year. "It provides admins with a dashboard to assess and improve security posture using impact reports and risk-based recommendations, with no immediate user impact," Microsoft said. "Admins can view the tenant's current security posture compared to Microsoft’s recommended minimum security bar." U.S. to Require Foreign Travelers to Share 5-Year Social Media History — The U.S. government will soon require all foreign travelers to provide five years' worth of social media history prior to their entry. This includes details about social media accounts, email addresses, and phone numbers used over the past five years. The new requirement will be applied to foreigners from all countries, including those who are eligible to visit the U.S. for 90 days without a visa. "We want to make sure we're not letting the wrong people enter our country," U.S. President Donald Trump said. New AitM Phishing Campaign Targets Microsoft 365 and Okta Users — An active adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing campaign is targeting organizations that use Microsoft 365 and Okta for their single sign-on (SSO), with the main goal of hijacking the legitimate SSO flow and bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods that are not phishing-resistant. "When a victim uses Okta as their identity provider (IdP), the phishing page hijacks the SSO authentication flow to bring the victim to a second-stage phishing page, which acts as a proxy to the organization's legitimate Okta tenant and captures the victim’s credentials and session tokens," Datadog said. Phishing Campaign Uses Fake Calendly Invites to Spoof Major Brands — A large-scale phishing campaign has Calendly-themed phishing lures entered around a fake job opportunity to steal Google Workspace and Facebook business account credentials. These emails purport to originate from brands like Louis Vuitton, Unilever, Lego, and Disney, among others. "Only after the victim has responded to an initial email was the phishing link delivered under the guise of a Calendly link to book time for a call," Push Security said. "Clicking the link takes the victim to an authentic-looking page impersonating a Calendly landing page. From there, users are prompted to complete a CAPTCHA check and continue to sign in with their Google account, which causes their credentials to be stolen using an AitM phishing page. A similar variant has also been observed tricking victims into entering their Facebook account credentials on bogus pages, while another targets both Google and Facebook credentials using Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) techniques that display fake pop-up windows featuring legitimate URLs to steal account credentials. The fact that the campaign is focused on compromising accounts responsible for managing digital ads on behalf of businesses shows that the threat actors are looking to launch malvertising campaigns for other kinds of attacks, including ClickFix. This is not the first time job-related lures have been used to steal account information. In October 2025, phishing emails impersonating Google Careers were used to phish credentials. In tandem, Push Security said it also observed a malvertising campaign in which users who searched for "Google Ads" on Google Search were served a malicious sponsored ad that's designed to capture their credentials. Calendar Subscriptions for Phishing and Malware Delivery — Threat actors have been found leveraging digital calendar subscription infrastructure to deliver malicious content. "The security risk arises from third-party calendar subscriptions hosted on expired or hijacked domains, which can be exploited for large-scale social engineering," Bitsight said. "Once a subscription is established, they can deliver calendar files that may contain harmful content, such as URLs or attachments, turning a helpful tool into an unexpected attack vector." The attack takes advantage of the fact that these third-party servers can add events directly to users' schedules. The cybersecurity company said it discovered more than 390 abandoned domains related to iCalendar synchronization (sync) requests for subscribed calendars, potentially putting about four million iOS and macOS devices at risk. All the identified domains have been sinkholed. The Gentlemen Ransomware Uses BYOVD Technique in Attacks — A nascent ransomware group called The Gentlemen has employed tactics common to advanced e-crime groups, such as Group Policy Objects (GPO) manipulation and Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD), as part of double extortion attacks aimed at manufacturing, construction, healthcare, and insurance sectors across 17 countries. "Since its emergence, Gentlemen has been evaluated as one of the most active emerging ransomware groups in 2025, having attacked multiple regions and industries in a relatively short period," AhnLab said. The group emerged around July 2025, with PRODAFT noting in mid-October that Phantom Mantis (ArmCorp), led by LARVA-368 (hastalamuerte), tested Qilin (Pestilent Mantis), Embargo (Primeval Mantis), LockBit (Tenacious Mantis), Medusa (Venomous Mantis), and BlackLock (Incredible Mantis), before building their own ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS): The Gentlemen. 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Defining the New Layers of Cloud Defense with Zero Trust and AI: This webinar shows how Zero Trust and AI help stop modern, fileless attacks. Zscaler experts explain new tactics like “living off the land” and fileless reassembly, and how proactive visibility and secure developer environments keep organizations ahead of emerging threats. Speed vs. Security: How to Patch Faster Without Opening New Doors to Attackers: This session explores how to balance speed and security when using community patching tools like Chocolatey and Winget. Gene Moody, Field CTO at Action1, examines real risks in open repositories—outdated packages, weak signatures, and unverified code—and shows how to set clear guardrails that keep patching fast but safe. Attendees will learn when to trust community sources, how to detect version drift, and how to run controlled rollouts without slowing operations. 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools Strix: A small open-source tool that helps developers build command-line interfaces (CLIs) more easily. It focuses on keeping setup simple and commands clear, so you can create tools that behave the same way every time. Instead of dealing with complex frameworks, you can use Strix to define commands, handle arguments, and manage output in a few straightforward steps. Heisenberg: It is a simple, open-source tool that looks at the software your projects depend on and checks how healthy and safe those parts are. It reads information about packages from public sources and “software bills of materials” (SBOMs) to find security problems or bad signals in your dependency chain and can produce reports for one package or many at once. The idea is to help teams spot risky or vulnerable components early, especially as they change, so you can understand supply chain risks without a complex setup. Disclaimer: These tools are for learning and research only. They haven’t been fully tested for security. If used the wrong way, they could cause harm. Check the code first, test only in safe places, and follow all rules and laws. Conclusion We listed a lot of fixes today, but reading about them doesn't secure your device—installing them does. The attackers are moving fast, so don't leave these updates for 'later.' Take five minutes right now to check your systems, restart if you need to, and head into the weekend knowing you are one step ahead of the bad guys.
thehackernews.comDec 15, 2025extracted
Salt Typhoon Exploits Cisco, Ivanti, Palo Alto Flaws to Breach 600 Organizations Worldwide
The China-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) actor known as Salt Typhoon has continued its attacks targeting networks across the world, including organizations in the telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure sectors. "While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks," according to a joint cybersecurity advisory published Wednesday. "These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks." The bulletin, courtesy of authorities from 13 countries, said the malicious activity has been linked to three Chinese entities, Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., Ltd., and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co., Ltd. These companies, the agencies said, provide cyber-related products and services to China's intelligence services, with the data stolen from the intrusions, specifically those against telecoms and Internet service providers (ISPs), providing Beijing with the ability to identify and track their targets' communications and movements globally. The countries that have co-sealed the security advisory include Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. Brett Leatherman, head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division, said the Salt Typhoon group has been active since at least 2019, engaging in a persistent espionage campaign aimed at "breaching global telecommunications privacy and security norms." In a standalone alert issued today, Dutch intelligence and security services MIVD and AIVD said while organizations in the country "did not receive the same degree of attention from the Salt Typhoon hackers as those in the U.S.," the threat actors gained access to routers of smaller ISPs and hosting providers. However, there is no evidence the hackers penetrated these networks further. "Since at least 2021, this activity has targeted organisations in critical sectors including government, telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure globally, with a cluster of activity observed in the U.K.," the National Cyber Security Centre said. According to The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the hacking crew has expanded its targeting focus to other sectors and regions, attacking no less than 600 organizations, including 200 in the U.S., and 80 countries. Salt Typhoon, which overlaps with activity tracked as GhostEmperor, Operator Panda, RedMike, and UNC5807, has been observed obtaining initial access through the exploitation of exposed network edge devices from Cisco (CVE-2018-0171, CVE-2023-20198, and CVE-2023-20273), Ivanti (CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887), and Palo Alto Networks (CVE-2024-3400). However, the agencies pointed out these vulnerabilities are not "exhaustive" and that the threat actors may also go after other devices such as Fortinet firewalls, Juniper firewalls, Microsoft Exchange, Nokia routers and switches, Sierra Wireless devices, and Sonicwall firewalls, among others for initial access. "The APT actors may target edge devices regardless of who owns a particular device," the agencies noted. "Devices owned by entities that do not align with the actors’ core targets of interest still present opportunities for use in attack pathways into targets of interest." The compromised devices are then leveraged to pivot into other networks, in some cases even modifying the device's configuration and adding a generic routing encapsulation (GRE) tunnel for persistent access and data exfiltration. Persistent access to target networks is accomplished by altering Access Control Lists (ACLs) to add IP addresses under their control, opening standard and non-standard ports, and running commands in an on-box Linux container on supported Cisco networking devices to stage tools, process data locally, and move laterally within the environment. Also put to use by the attackers are authentication protocols like Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+) to enable lateral movement across network devices, while simultaneously conducting extensive discovery actions and capturing network traffic containing credentials via compromised routers to burrow deeper into the networks. "The APT actors collected PCAPs using native tooling on the compromised system, with the primary objective likely being to capture TACACS+ traffic over TCP port 49," the agencies said. "TACACS+ traffic is used for authentication, often for administration of network equipment and including highly privileged network administrators' accounts and credentials, likely enabling the actors to compromise additional accounts and perform lateral movement." On top of that, Salt Typhoon has been observed enabling the sshd_operns service on Cisco IOS XR devices to create a local user and grant it sudo privileges to obtain root on the host OS after logging in via TCP/57722. Google-owned Mandiant, which was one of the many industry partners that contributed to the advisory, stated the threat actor's familiarity with telecommunications systems offers them a unique advantage, giving them an upper hand when it comes to defense evasion. It's worth pointing out that UNC5807 is a threat cluster that's distinct from UNC2286, which, in the past, has been identified as overlapping with FamousSparrow and GhostEmperor, according to Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant. "While some public reporting has associated both UNC5807 and UNC2286 with the 'GhostEmperor' alias, Google assesses these to be distinct threat clusters," Dan Perez, China Mission Lead at GTIG, told The Hacker News. "Our analysis is based on distinctions in their operational tradecraft and motivations." "The toolsets used by each group are different. UNC5807 has been observed using a specific and limited set of malware families. In contrast, UNC2286 employs a much broader and more varied arsenal of malicious tools. Additionally their objectives are different. We have observed UNC2286 conducting financially motivated attacks, including ransomware deployment and extortion. The activities attributed to UNC5807, however, are consistent with espionage operations." "An ecosystem of contractors, academics, and other facilitators is at the heart of Chinese cyber espionage," John Hultquist, Chief Analyst at GTIG, told the publication. Contractors are used to build tools and valuable exploits as well as carry out the dirty work of intrusion operations. They have been instrumental in the rapid evolution of these operations and growing them to an unprecedented scale." "In addition to targeting telecommunications, reported targeting of hospitality and transportation by this actor could be used to closely surveil individuals. Information from these sectors can be used to develop a full picture of who someone is talking to, where they are, and where they are going." (The story was updated after publication to make it clear that the threat actors are targeting and may target a broad range of edge network appliances.)
thehackernews.comAug 28, 2025extracted
China’s Salt Typhoon Hacked Critical Infrastructure Globally for Years
The China-linked cyberespionage group known as Salt Typhoon has been compromising backbone and edge routers globally for persistent access to networks across multiple industries, government agencies in the US and allied countries warn. Also tracked as GhostEmperor, Operator Panda, RedMike, and UNC5807, the threat group has been conducting cyberespionage operations in the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and UK, and across other regions for over half a decade, the agencies note in a joint advisory. Blamed for multiple intrusions at telecom companies in the US and Canada, and for the hacking of a US National Guard unit, Salt Typhoon has been busy targeting government, telecom, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks globally since at least 2021, the advisory reads. The APT’s operations have been linked to China-based companies such as Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co. Ltd. (sanctioned by the US), Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., Ltd., and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co., Ltd., known for providing cyber products and services to the Chinese intelligence. “The data stolen through this activity against foreign telecommunications and Internet service providers (ISPs), as well as intrusions in the lodging and transportation sectors, ultimately can provide Chinese intelligence services with the capability to identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world,” the advisory reads. Salt Typhoon has exploited known vulnerabilities in Cisco (CVE-2018-0171, CVE-2023-20198, and CVE-2023-20273), Ivanti (CVE-2024-21887), and Palo Alto Networks (CVE-2024-3400) products for initial access, but has not targeted zero-day flaws. The APT was seen targeting backbone routers at telecom providers and edge routers, regardless of who owns them, and then leveraging them to pivot into other networks, as well as modifying routing and enabling traffic mirroring. For persistence and evasion, the hackers have been tampering with Access Control Lists (ACLs), opening standard and non-standard ports, creating tunnels over protocols, leveraging open source multi-hop pivoting tools, enumerating and altering other device’s configuration, and executing various commands. For lateral movement, they have been targeting authentication protocols, router interfaces, RSVP sessions, BGP routes, configuration files, network traffic, installed software, and provider-held data, and have been extracting credentials from captured network traffic. Additionally, Salt Typhoon was seen modifying server configurations to point to IP addresses it controls, creating privileged user accounts, scanning for ports, using monitoring tools, updating routing tables, hiding its tracks by deleting logs and disabling logging, and abusing peering connections for data exfiltration. Warning of Salt Typhoon’s persistent, long-term access to the compromised networks, the joint advisory provides indicators-of-compromise (IOCs) and recommendations on actions threat hunters should conduct to identify compromises and evict the attackers. “The APT actors often take steps to protect their established access, such as compromising mail servers or administrator devices/accounts to monitor for signs that their activity has been detected. Organizations should take steps to protect the details of their threat hunting and incident response from APT actor monitoring activities,” the advisory reads. According to John Hultquist, chief analyst of Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, the hackers “are distinguished by deep familiarity with the tech allowing them to evade detection and spread broadly,” and heavily rely on Chinese contractors for their large-scale operations. “The contractor ecosystem at the heart of Chinese cyber espionage has been instrumental in the rapid evolution of these operations and growing them to an unprecedented scale. Contractors do everything from building infrastructure to the dirty work of carrying out intrusions,” he said. In an emailed comment, Swimlane lead security automation architect Nick Tausek underlined the importance of corporate backing in Salt Typhoon’s operations, pointing out that the threat actor targeted hundreds of organizations in 80 countries in 2024 alone. “Unfortunately, just because we understand how it happened doesn’t mean the threat is now gone. Salt Typhoon is still just as dangerous as ever, and companies need to be prepared. Organizations should follow the guidelines set by the NSA and gain a full understanding of the APT actors’ accesses before implementing visible incident response and mitigation actions to maximize the chance of achieving full eviction from compromised networks,” Tausek said. Related: Report Links Chinese Companies to Tools Used by State-Sponsored Hackers Related: Salt Typhoon Targeting Old Cisco Vulnerabilities in Fresh Telecom Hacks Related: Chinese Silk Typhoon Hackers Targeting Multiple Industries in North America
securityweek.comAug 28, 2025extracted
Chinese Tech Firms Linked to Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaigns
The UK, US and partners from across the globe have released a new report on the notorious Chinese APT group Salt Typhoon, claiming it has received help from several commercial tech companies to further its cyber-espionage goals. The report named Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology, Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology as providing “cyber-related products and services” to China’s intelligence services. “The data stolen through this activity against foreign telecommunications and Internet service providers (ISPs), as well as intrusions in the lodging and transportation sectors, ultimately can provide Chinese intelligence services with the capability to identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world,” it warned. These efforts have been ongoing since at least 2021, with the focus for initial access on exploitation of known vulnerabilities rather than zero-days. The report urged network defenders in potentially impacted organizations to prioritize patching of network edge devices, specifically the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-21887 (Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure) CVE-2024-3400 (Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect) CVE-2023-20273 and CVE-2023-20198 (Cisco IOS XE) CVE-2018-0171 (Cisco Smart Install RCE) By exploiting the above, threat actors can gain access to routers and edge devices, and then potentially hijack trusted connections between providers and customers to pivot into other networks. “The APT actors leverage infrastructure, such as virtual private servers (VPSs) and compromised intermediate routers, that have not been attributable to a publicly known botnet or obfuscation network infrastructure to target telecommunications and network service providers, including ISPs,” the report explained. “The APT actors may target edge devices regardless of who owns a particular device. Devices owned by entities who do not align with the actors’ core targets of interest still present opportunities for use in attack pathways into targets of interest.” Reports suggest that these techniques were used to compromise organizations in scores of countries worldwide. Network Defenders Urged to Act Now The latest report comes on the back of warnings last November that Salt Typhoon had breached at least eight US telecom firms in “a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.” The hackers obtained customer call records data and the private communications of a limited number of people involved in government or political activity, as well as information subject to US law enforcement requests. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) even warned at the time that high-risk individuals should move away from using unencrypted SMS and adopt end-to-end encrypted messaging apps and phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA). The latest advisory was signed by the UK, US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, indicating the scale of Salt Typhoon operations. “We are deeply concerned by the irresponsible behavior of the named commercial entities based in China that has enabled an unrestrained campaign of malicious cyber activities on a global scale,” said NCSC CEO, Richard Horne. “It is crucial organizations in targeted critical sectors heed this international warning about the threat posed by cyber actors who have been exploiting publicly known – and so therefore fixable – vulnerabilities.” Horne urged network defenders to proactively hunt for malicious activity and apply recommended mitigations based on indicators of compromise (IoCs), as well as regularly review network device logs for signs of unusual activity.
infosecurity-magazine.comAug 28, 2025extracted
Global Salt Typhoon hacking campaigns linked to Chinese tech firms
The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and partners from over a dozen countries have linked the Salt Typhoon global hacking campaigns to three China-based technology firms. According to the joint advisories [NSA, NCSC], Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co. Ltd., Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co. Ltd. have provided cyber products and services to China's Ministry of State Security and the People's Liberation Army, enabling cyber espionage operations tracked as Salt Typhoon. Since at least 2021, the Chinese threat actors have breached government, telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military networks worldwide, stealing data that can be used to track targets' communications and movements worldwide. In particular, over the past couple of years, Salt Typhoon has performed concerted attacks on telecommunication firms to spy on the private communications of individuals worldwide. BleepingComputer contacted the Chinese embassy about these claims and will update the story if we receive a response. Targeting networking equipment A joint advisory by cyber and intelligence agencies in 13 countries warns that the threat actors have had "considerable success" exploiting widely known and fixed flaws on network edge devices rather than relying on zero-days. These vulnerabilities include: CVE-2024-21887 (Ivanti Connect Secure command injection), CVE-2024-3400 (Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect RCE), CVE-2023-20273 and CVE-2023-20198 (Cisco IOS XE authentication bypass and privilege escalation) CVE-2018-0171 (Cisco Smart Install RCE). Using these flaws, the threat actors gain access to routing and network devices, allowing them to modify access control lists, enable SSH on non-standard ports, create GRE/IPsec tunnels, and exploit Cisco Guest Shell containers to maintain persistence. "The APT actors may target edge devices regardless of who owns a particular device," explains the joint report. "Devices owned by entities who do not align with the actors' core targets of interest still present opportunities for use in attack pathways into targets of interest. The actors leverage compromised devices and trusted connections or private interconnections (e.g., provider-to-provider or provider-to-customer links) to pivot into other networks." They also collected packet captures of authentication traffic, redirected TACACS+ servers, and deployed custom Golang-based SFTP tools ("cmd1," "cmd3," "new2," and "sft") to monitor traffic and steal data. As many of these vulnerabilities have had fixes available for some time, both the NCSC and NSA urge organizations to prioritize patching devices first, then hardening device configurations, monitoring for unauthorized changes, and turning off unused services. It is also recommended that admins restrict management services to dedicated networks, enforce secure protocols such as SSHv2 and SNMPv3, and disable Cisco Smart Install and Guest Shell where not needed. CISA has previously warned that administrators should disable the legacy Cisco Smart Install (SMI) feature after observing it being abused in attacks by both Chinese and Russian threat actors. Admins are also advised to actively search for signs of compromise, as the campaigns utilize known weaknesses rather than stealthy zero-days. Salt Typhoon's past activity The new advisories follow years of Salt Typhoon attacks against telecommunications providers and government entities. The group previously breached major U.S. carriers, including AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen, gaining access to sensitive communications such as text messages, voicemails, and even U.S. law enforcement's wiretap systems. These breaches caused the FCC to order telecoms to secure their networks under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) and submit annual certifications confirming that they have an up-to-date cybersecurity risk management plan. Salt Typhoon also exploited unpatched Cisco IOS XE vulnerabilities to infiltrate more U.S. and Canadian telecoms, where they established GRE tunnels for persistent access and stole configuration data. The threat actors used a custom malware known as JumbledPath to monitor and capture traffic from telecom networks. In addition to telecom breaches, Salt Typhoon was linked to a nine-month breach of a U.S. Army National Guard network in 2024, during which they stole configuration files and administrator credentials that could be used to compromise other government networks. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comAug 27, 2025extracted
Allied spy agencies blame 3 Chinese tech companies for Salt Typhoon attacks
Allied spy agencies blame 3 Chinese tech companies for Salt Typhoon attacks Intelligence and cybersecurity agencies from more than a dozen allied countries published an advisory on Wednesday blaming three Chinese technology companies for cyber-espionage campaigns targeting global critical infrastructure. The activity identified by the intelligence services partially overlaps with campaigns reported by the cybersecurity industry and tracked as Salt Typhoon, RedMike, OPERATOR PANDA, UNC5807 and Ghost Emperor among others, stated the document. The campaign first came to light last year after threat actors intercepted the correspondence of senior officials within both presidential campaigns, including from President-elect Donald Trump and his running mate JD Vance. In December, U.S. officials said dozens of other countries had been impacted. The group more recently breached devices linked to seven telecommunications companies — including Comcast and MTN Group — since February, according to research from Recorded Future. The Record is an editorially independent unit of the company. Thirteen countries co-sealed the announcement on Wednesday, including agencies from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland and Spain. The three Chinese companies — Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., Ltd, Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co., Ltd and Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co. Ltd, which was sanctioned by the United States back in January — were accused of providing “cyber-related products and services to China’s intelligence services, including multiple units in the People’s Liberation Army and Ministry of State Security” since at least 2021, according to the advisory. Data obtained through these companies’ intrusions against the telecommunications, lodging and transportation sectors, has provided “Chinese intelligence services with the capability to identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world,” it warned. A list of vulnerabilities included in the advisory include CVE-2024-21887, which in January the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned was being exploited in attacks targeting federal agencies, and CVE-2024-3400, a zero-day discovered in Palo Alto Networks’ VPN product in April last year. The advisory comes as Brett Leatherman, the top cyber official at the FBI, told the Wall Street Journal that more than 80 countries had been impacted by a China-sponsored espionage campaign known as Salt Typhoon targeting telecommunications providers. Richard Horne, the chief executive of Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre, said: “We are deeply concerned by the irresponsible behaviour of the named commercial entities based in China that has enabled an unrestrained campaign of malicious cyber activities on a global scale. “It is crucial organisations in targeted critical sectors heed this international warning about the threat posed by cyber actors, who have been exploiting publicly known — and so therefore fixable — vulnerabilities.” The advisory stresses that these bugs have all been patched and provides remediation advice for companies still running the exploitable software, as well as ways for companies in the co-authors’ countries to contact their respective cybersecurity authorities. Alexander Martin is the UK Editor for Recorded Future News. He was previously a technology reporter for Sky News and a fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, now Virtual Routes. He can be reached securely using Signal on: AlexanderMartin.79
therecord.mediaAug 27, 2025extracted