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16 Typosquatted RubyGems Packages Steal Browser Credentials and Crypto Wallets
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new typosquatting campaign targeting RubyGems users with a Windows-based information stealer. OpenSourceMalware, which discovered the activity on August 15, 2026, is tracking the threat under the moniker StubMaker. The complete list of packages published as part of the campaign is below - ubnuler ubnlder ri18nr reaker rakier orakw joxn ise18n ioe18n ie18u iai8n i1l8n i18om activesupmport brumdler brundlef "This new malware harvests browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, seed phrases, and Telegram data," security researcher Paul McCarty (aka 6mile) said. "All of the malicious RubyGems packages appear to be typosquats of popular Ruby dependencies, but rather than the clever SEO-fueled typosquats we've seen from other threat actors (e.g., events-channel imitating the popular Node.js events module), they're all clumsy typos." The 16 gems have been published by users named "mod8rz41mje" (aka Riley Miller) and "rbq95bwt6q" (aka Alex Davis). As of writing, the packages have been yanked from RubyGems. In at least two cases – brumdler and brundlef – the threat actor has been found to take advantage of a known RubyGems behavior that makes a namespace available for anyone to claim once all versions of a gem have been yanked. In both instances, the packages were originally published by "gemlewqqhu1" (aka Taylor Moore) before they were reclaimed by the aforementioned two accounts. Jenn Gile, co-founder of OpenSourceMalware, told The Hacker News that although the campaign was disrupted fairly early, it became more effective because of Ruby's "poor design choices" via package name reuse and an unvalidated author field. "When one of the malicious gems was yanked, the threat actor was able to spin up a new owner account and publish a new malicious version under the same package name," Gile said. "What should have been forever dead was revived to compromise more people." "The attacker assigned a different 'Author' name for each gem in an attempt to make them look unrelated, even though they all came from the same owner account. This is because the Author field is a totally unvalidated plaintext field. It doesn't have to match the Owner or anything else." The attack chain, at a high level, makes use of an "extconf.rb" hook to trigger the execution hook. Similar to npm's lifecycle hooks, "extconf.rb" is run automatically when a user installs a gem. The file is typically used to configure native extensions written in C, C++, or Rust that are bundled inside a Ruby package within the "ext/" directory and compiled during installation of the gem. In the case of StubMaker, the Ruby hook acts as a conduit to fetch a 22 MB Rust-based loader from a GitHub release, which, in turn, launches a Go-based stealer ("wincfg") payload embedded into it. The GitHub account ("github[.]com/bebraz1") is no longer accessible. The stealer, for its part, incorporates a DLL payload ("abe_payload.dll") that's used to extract credentials from Chromium-based web browsers (i.e., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, Yandex, Avast, AVG, and CCleaner Browser) by circumventing app-bound encryption (ABE) protections added by Google. It also collects extension data, browsing history, and payment card numbers; searches for cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases; extracts Telegram Desktop data; gathers system information; and makes an external request to "api.ipify[.]org" to obtain the victim's public IP address. Once the relevant data is captured, it's uploaded to Gofile in the form of a password-protected ZIP archive and the resulting download link is sent to the threat actor ("dresslee.com") over an unencrypted HTTP channel. "StubMaker doesn't build anything — it generates a Makefile with empty all, install, and clean targets, plus Unix and Windows stub scripts that do nothing but return success, so the extension phase reports a clean build while the real work (the platform beacon, the Windows loader fetch and execution) happens in the installer hook itself," McCarty explained. "The name points at that specific move: manufacturing a fake build toolchain to make a malicious install look like a routine one, rather than just describing another typosquatted RubyGems package." The disclosure coincides with the discovery of two software supply chain campaigns targeting npm - A cluster of 21 npm packages that typosquatted CLI binary names exposed by Google's scoped packages to deliver a minimal postinstall beacon. "The packages did not squat package names," SafeDep said. "They targeted the bin field, the part of package.json that defines executable command names. Every scoped package that declares a bin entry creates an unscoped name that anyone can register. None of the standard dependency confusion mitigations (scoped publishing, registry allowlists, lockfile pinning) cover this gap." A cluster of Baileys npm forks that engage in a variety of malicious behaviors: covertly make the installer's WhatsApp account follow channels the package author controls and inject the author's advertising URL into every image and video the bot sends. "Continuous monitoring of the npm registry records 4,250 package names that contain baileys and another 112 that contain libsignal-node," SafeDep said, adding the malicious behavior has been observed in 70 package names built on Baileys across 343 versions and 15 libsignal-node impersonators across 38 versions. Update The StubMaker campaign has also been observed targeting npm with a set of 37 packages that make use of a postinstall hook to retrieve the same GitHub-hosted Windows loader, which then unpacks a Go infostealer targeting browser credentials and sessions, payment-card data, cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases, Telegram data, and host information. "This was one threat actor running two typosquatting fronts against two package ecosystems, sharing a single payload and a single C2 backend," Gile said. As with the malicious RubyGems, the npm packages are typosquats of popular packages such as axios, chalk, commander, lodash, typescript, and react. None of the packages are available for download as of writing. The names of the typosquats are below - axois-http, axious-core chalk-core, chalk-lib, chalk-util, chalk-es comand, comander-cli, comanderjs, commandorjs, commandor-cli, commandor-core, comander-lib, commandor-lib, commander-lib loadashjs, lodash-lib, ladash-cli, lodahsjs, lodsh-cli, lodahs-cli, lodhash-cli typescirpt-cli, typscript-cli, typesript-cli, typscript-core, typescriptt-cli, typescrip-cli, typescipt-cli, tyepescript-cli, typescirpt-core, tyepescript-core, typesript-core, typescipt-core, typescriptt-core raectjs testingsmthb1g OpenHack, which also published details of the activity, said the packages were published on August 16, 2026. If any one of the packages was installed on a Windows machine during the time it was live, it's recommended to isolate the host, rotate credentials, and remove the malicious libraries. OpenSourceMalware has also flagged some key differences between the two campaigns - The gems use "extconf.rb," whereas the npm packages employ a postinstall hook to trigger the execution of the loader The Ruby installer decodes its loader URL from Base64, whereas the npm installer uses repeated-key XOR with a hard-coded key The gems were published during a two-day period, whereas the npm packages were uploaded to npm in an eight-minute window across five accounts "RubyGems' pattern was sequential and single-point-of-failure," Gile added. "One account gets caught, the operator adapts and returns. npm's pattern spread the same burst across multiple burner accounts simultaneously, so losing any one account wouldn’t have taken down the whole batch. However, in spite of the different approach, the npm packages were rapidly discovered and removed as a cohort." In a follow-up report published on August 20, 2026, CloudSEK said it identified three more npm packages mimicking the legitimate typescript library: typecript-cli*, typecript-core, and typescrit-cli. It's tracking the activity under the name BRIDGEHEAD. The packages also implement a Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) gate so that a developer running npm install inside the Linux environment is treated as a "bridge" to reach the underlying Windows machine and deploy the stealer malware. "The npm layer is loud, cheap and disposable: forty impersonation packages published to a public registry and withdrawn in since removed," security researcher Vikas Kundu said. "The payload layer is quiet and durable: one Rust executable on GitHub and one exfiltration route through a public file host, neither of which the npm takedown affected." "The WSL bridge narrows the target from developers in general to developers running that toolchain on Windows. That is a large and deliberately chosen group. A pure-Linux or macOS developer installing the same package is profiled and beaconed but receives no Windows payload; the gate simply does not open." (The story was updated after publication on August 19 and 21, 2026, to include the campaign's targeting of npm.)
thehackernews.comAug 18, 2026extracted
Week in review: Salesforce and ServiceNow portals exposed for 17 months, exploited Metabase 0-day
Week in review: Salesforce and ServiceNow portals exposed for 17 months, exploited Metabase 0-day Here’s an overview of some of last week’s most interesting news, articles, interviews and videos: GitHub Dependabot malware alerts now cover eight ecosystems GitHub has flagged npm malware since March 2026. Anyone pulling in a bad PyPI, Maven, RubyGems, NuGet, Go, crates.io, or PHP Composer package has had no such warning, because GitHub’s malware detection only ever watched one ecosystem. That changed this month. Dependabot malware alerts, which had run on npm data alone, now draw on all eight ecosystems the moment a user turns malware alerts on. Dependabot itself already runs across more than 30 million repositories and 34-plus package ecosystems overall, which gives a sense of the scale the malware pipeline now has to operate at. An AI tool found 84 flaws in 5G network software and 23 of them still have no fix Researchers at Nanyang Technological University turned a set of AI agents loose on the software that runs 4G and 5G phone networks, and the agents came back with 84 security flaws nobody had reported before. Developers have confirmed 83 of them, and 81 now carry CVE numbers. Post-quantum migration gets harder when every user holds a key In this Help Net Security interview, Christopher Smith, CEO of Quantus, discusses what cryptographic inventories turn up in banks and hospitals, including default passwords and admin keys still held by former employees. A stranger has been reading Salesforce and ServiceNow portals worldwide for 17 months Most security stories start with something broken. This one starts with everything working as designed. Researchers at Reco have been tracking a campaign they call City-Forum, named after a domain registered in 2002, abandoned, and now resolving to a generic rented server from a German hosting provider. From that server, someone has been pulling records out of Salesforce and ServiceNow portals around the world. N-able ships second N-central hotfix as attackers keep exploiting CVE-2026-18577 To help customers fend off ongoing attacks, N-able released a second security hotfix for N‑central, its monitoring and management (RMM) solution popular with managed service providers (MSPs). Metabase zero-day exploited to access Framework customer data Framework, the San Francisco-based company that designs repairable and upgradeable laptops, has suffered a data breach after attackers managed to exploit a zero-day vulnerability in the Metabase business intelligence service. According to the notification sent to affected Framework customers, the attackers accessed names, email addresses, phone numbers, physical addresses, and login IP addresses, but not payment information or records related to orders. Microsoft patches 400+ vulnerabilities, one zero-day under attack (CVE-2026-68820) Microsoft’s August 2026 Patch Tuesday delivered security fixes for 400+ vulnerabilities, including one that has been exploited in zero-day attacks (CVE-2026-68820) and three that were publicly disclosed prior to the release of the patches. Cisco fixes vulnerability exploited to DoS its firewalls (CVE-2026-20349) A high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2026-20349) is being leveraged by attackers to temporarily interrupt the operation of Cisco firewalls, the company has confirmed. The flaw has been added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and needs to be remediated by US civilian federal agencies by August 14, 2026. Who will be the Stanislav Petrov in your organization? Recent reports of “rogue AI” systems hacking companies reminded Brian Honan, CEO, BH Consulting, of Stanislav Petrov. In 1983, Soviet computers falsely detected a US nuclear missile launch. Instead of trusting the system, Petrov applied human judgement and correctly identified it as a false alarm, potentially preventing nuclear war. That is why the recent incidents involving OpenAI and Hugging Face, Anthropic, Meta, and the UK’s AI Security Institute deserve the attention of CISOs and boards. 338 million attack simulations reveal the state of enterprise defense First, a bit of good news: Enterprise defenses are recovering. However, it’s a narrow recovery, with a twist. Today, organizations are better at stopping loud attacks but have barely moved the needle at all against the quiet ones. This data, and a lot more, comes straight from the newly published Blue Report 2026, the fourth annual comprehensive study from Picus Labs. Four corporate investigation mistakes organizations make under pressure In this Help Net Security video, Christine Gadsby, VP and Chief Security Advisor at BlackBerry, explains why corporate investigations go wrong before the forensic team arrives. The first hours matter more than leaders assume. Access gets granted, conversations start, and decisions get made that later affect chain of custody, privilege, and how regulators judge the process. How to report an AI Act violation in the EU The EU’s fight to regulate AI models entered a new chapter on 2 August 2026, when the European Commission’s AI Office and national authorities began enforcing the AI Act. It creates a common set of rules for AI systems used or sold in the EU, with the goal of encouraging innovation while protecting people’s safety and fundamental rights. Chainloop: Open-source evidence store and policy engine for the software supply chain Chainloop is an open source evidence store for the software supply chain. A command line tool runs inside a GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins, or Dagger pipeline, picks up what the build produced, uploads those files to content-addressable storage, and references each one in a signed in-toto attestation. in-toto is a specification for recording who ran which step of a build, so the record can be checked afterward. Microsoft Entra ID is removing an extra MFA hurdle for Windows Hello and macOS PSSO users Microsoft is changing how Entra ID handles MFA for people who sign in with Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) or macOS Platform Single Sign-On (PSSO). The rollout reaches worldwide and GCC tenants starting early October 2026, with completion expected by late November. Cyberattack on Steam hardware shipper leaks names, addresses, and order data Video game publisher Valve is alerting customers in Europe to a data breach at CEVA Logistics, its Steam hardware shipping partner. Reports from affected customers began surfacing on social media earlier today, after Valve started sending out data breach notification emails. Previously unseen entry vector used to breach Polish energy plant The December 29 cyberattack on a Polish combined heat and power (CHP) plant was the first observed case of attackers gaining access to an OT network through a private APN, according to CERT Polska. The private APN is a dedicated mobile network that a Distribution System Operator (DSO), the company running the local electricity grid, sets up with a mobile carrier. GPT-5.6-Cyber refuses security researchers’ requests far less often GPT-5.6-Cyber is a new OpenAI model built on GPT-5.6 Sol, trained to find zero-day vulnerabilities and build exploit chains, with fewer refusals on higher-risk, dual-use work. Model is available only through Daybreak Red, the higher tier of OpenAI’s vetted access program for cybersecurity professionals. Ransomware gangs don’t need control system access to disrupt industrial production Disrupting IT systems that support industrial environments can be enough to interrupt production, even when ransomware operators do not gain direct access to industrial control systems (ICS), according to Dragos. The company identified 1,140 ransomware incidents involving industrial organizations in the second quarter of 2026, up 12% from 1,020 in Q1. Malicious SIMs can hijack smartphones, steal files, and lock them onto 2G Researchers have found that compromised or malicious SIM cards can issue commands to some smartphones and cellular-connected devices, allowing attackers to steal information, disrupt communications, downgrade connections to 2G, and in some cases execute code. Ready-made $500 kit puts a crypto scam within anyone’s reach A seller on a cybercrime forum is offering a ready-made scam kit for $500, complete with an admin panel that tracks victims, checks their crypto wallets for value, and inflates fake balances to squeeze out more money, Malwarebytes found. Split-second deepfake glitch blows digital certificate fraudster’s cover Spanish police have arrested a man in Murcia accused of using deepfake software to trick a certificate provider’s video identity checks in an attempt to obtain digital signatures he could use for financial fraud. Lazarus hackers pair fake job offers with Windows zero-day exploit The North Korea-linked Lazarus group is using fake job offers, trojanized PDF software and a Windows zero-day in attacks aimed primarily at the defense sector, Check Point researchers have found. Signal’s new security feature checks if your encrypted chats were tampered with Signal has introduced a feature called automatic key verification, giving users a new way to confirm that nobody has secretly interfered with their encrypted chats. 153GB of stolen credentials surface after LiteLLM supply chain attack A massive 153GB archive stolen during the LiteLLM supply chain attack exposes credentials and other sensitive data linked to thousands of corporate domains, including AWS, Samsung, Cisco, and Salesforce. Hudson Rock says it obtained and analyzed the archive, which contains 433,909 files, and attributed 118,829 CI runner dumps to 2,488 corporate domains. Attackers exploit critical SharePoint flaw after PoC goes public (CVE-2026-55040) Threat actors have begun exploiting a critical Microsoft SharePoint flaw following the release of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code by Rapid7. Tracked as CVE-2026-55040, the vulnerability was patched by Microsoft as part of its July 2026 Patch Tuesday updates. White House authorizes private US companies to hack foreign criminal networks President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum on August 12 allowing vetted private companies to run offensive cyber operations against foreign threat actors, under the control and oversight of the US government. Ukrainian police raid 94 fraudulent call centers, seize $2 million Ukrainian police have disrupted 94 fraudulent call centers during a nationwide operation that involved more than 400 searches and the seizure of thousands of computers, phones, and SIM cards. New Android malware relays bank cards to fraudsters while victims still hold them Group-IB researchers discovered WindRelay, a new Android malware built to capture live payment card data over NFC (Near Field Communication) and relay it to attackers in real time. WindRelay is paired with the SpyNote remote access trojan, which gives attackers remote access to a victim’s device. 71% of CISOs spend 10+ hours on board reports Boards want evidence that security controls and architecture reduce business risk, expressed in terms of resilience, consequence, and decision relevance. Translating technical findings into business language remains a major time burden for CISOs, who are calling for simpler data delivery, better frameworks, and better context. Pulse Security AI’s The CISO-Board Communication Gap report found that board members bring external information into discussions while many organizations still lack a formally defined cyber risk appetite. Product showcase: Enpass Password Manager breaks away from the proprietary cloud model Enpass is a password manager that stores passwords, passkeys, payment cards, identities, secure notes, software licenses, and other sensitive information in encrypted vaults. Vaults remain on the device or in a cloud storage service selected by the user. OpenAI locks down Astra over potential critical cyber capabilities OpenAI’s internal evaluation of its upcoming model, Astra, found significant advances in agentic coding and cybersecurity, leading the company to conclude that it cannot rule out the model reaching the critical capability level for cybersecurity under its Preparedness Framework. Anthropic to put AI in charge of reviewing Claude Code actions by default Anthropic will make auto mode in Claude Code the default for new sessions on Pro, Max, and Team plans starting August 14. Users who previously selected a different default may receive a one-time prompt asking whether they want to switch to auto mode. Your security vendor gets the frontier cyber model, you get the findings Selected red team specialists can now use OpenAI’s cyber models to find and exploit weaknesses in client applications and infrastructure. Those clients never get the models themselves. That split is the design of the Daybreak Cyber Partner Program, which OpenAI expanded on August 10: access to the underlying models stays with the approved partner and is not transferred directly to the customer. Locking your ssh-agent exposed local-only keys until OpenSSH 10.5 Lock your ssh-agent and it should sit there refusing to sign anything until you unlock it. In OpenSSH 10.4, locking it also switched off the check that tells the agent whether a request came from your own machine or arrived down a forwarded connection from a remote server. The fix shipped today in OpenSSH 10.5. AI deployments are stretching enterprise security to its limits CISOs and CTOs expect AI deployments to increase their organizations’ attack surface by an average of 14% over the next year. Nearly all lack visibility into AI deployments, and 90% are concerned about employees using unapproved AI tools outside formal oversight, according to NetFoundry’s 2026 State of Secure AI Access survey. PentestGPT: Open-source automated penetration testing agentic framework PentestGPT is an open-source penetration testing agent that points a large language model at a target and lets it work. In its default mode it runs recon, then exploit, then walkthrough, each stage feeding the next. Switch it to pentest mode and the stages become asset discovery, vulnerability identification, report. No human sits in the loop. Chrome’s anti-abuse protections block 7 billion unwanted Android notifications daily Google Chrome’s latest measures against abusive web push notifications include automatically revoking notification permissions for inactive and suspicious websites, helping reduce scams, phishing attempts, and other deceptive content. Wireshark 4.6.8 patches 28 security bugs, nine in file parsers Wireshark 4.6.8 fixes 28 security bugs in the protocol analyzer, and nine of them fire when someone opens a saved capture file. Those nine sit in file parsers, the code that reads a capture off disk before any dissection begins: pcapng, Endace ERF, Tektronix K12xx, BUSMASTER, Catapult DCT2000, Gammu DCT3, 3gpp phone logs, TTX Logger, and, on Windows only, Ixia IxVeriWave and Vector Informatik BLF. An attacker never has to touch your network for these. They only have to get you the file. Product showcase: Is this image real? Slop or Not investigates Slop or Not is an AI text and image detector for iPhone and Mac that runs entirely offline, with no account required. It uses on-device AI models powered by the Apple Neural Engine to detect AI-generated content. DDoS attacks hit record scale as 1 Tbps+ campaigns become more common DDoS attacks grew in scale during the first half of 2026, bringing larger traffic floods, shorter attack durations, and increasingly automated campaigns. Cloudflare’s H1 2026 DDoS Threat Report shows threat actors relying on multi-vector techniques and large-scale network-layer attacks to disrupt online services across multiple industries. 17 draft Cyber Resilience Act standards are open for comment A company selling a connected toy in Europe must show by the end of 2027 that the product meets the Cyber Resilience Act. The law states what manufacturers have to achieve and stops there, which leaves the toymaker to work out the technical detail alone. Seventeen draft standards, now open for comment, supply that detail. Weak IAM affects up to 98% of cloud environments Misconfiguration remains one of the leading threats to cloud environments because a single configuration error can result in public network access, unrotated keys, missing encryption, exposed services, and logging gaps. CISA now mandates baseline cloud configuration practices for US federal agencies. The hardest part of agentic AI may be rebuilding the business Organizations expect AI agents to change how work gets done, driving productivity and growth while allowing employees to focus on higher-value tasks. Few, however, have the processes and workflows needed to realize those benefits, according to Deloitte’s latest research. AWS Certificate Manager sets 2027 end date for email-validated certificate renewals AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) will phase out email validation for public certificates throughout 2027, ahead of the Certification Authority/Browser (CA/B) Forum’s March 15, 2028 deadline for ending email-based domain validation. OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Sol runs up to 14× faster with Ultrafast mode OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Sol on Ultrafast mode is available in limited preview to a select group of customers, launching first through the OpenAI API. The company says the service runs up to 14 times faster than Standard processing and generates up to 750 output tokens per second. Ultrafast is powered by Cerebras as part of the companies’ partnership on ultra-low-latency inference. Cybersecurity jobs available right now: August 11, 2026 We’ve scoured the market to bring you a selection of roles that span various skill levels within the cybersecurity field. Check out this weekly selection of cybersecurity jobs available right now. New infosec products of the week: August 14, 2026 Here’s a look at the most interesting products from the past week, featuring releases from A10 Networks, ScienceLogic, Searchlight Cyber, and SelectHub.
helpnetsecurity.comAug 16, 2026extracted
GitHub Dependabot malware alerts now cover eight ecosystems
GitHub Dependabot malware alerts now cover eight ecosystems GitHub has flagged npm malware since March 2026. Anyone pulling in a bad PyPI, Maven, RubyGems, NuGet, Go, crates.io, or PHP Composer package has had no such warning, because GitHub’s malware detection only ever watched one ecosystem. That changed this month. GitHub’s Advisory Database now ingests malware reports from OpenSSF’s malicious-packages repository, a public feed in OSV format that launched in 2023 with more than 15,000 reports and has grown daily since, covering typosquats, dependency-confusion packages, account takeovers, and malicious prebuilt binaries. Dependabot malware alerts, which had run on npm data alone, now draw on all eight ecosystems the moment a user turns malware alerts on. Dependabot itself already runs across more than 30 million repositories and 34-plus package ecosystems overall, which gives a sense of the scale the malware pipeline now has to operate at. One importer instead of eight Building eight separate detection systems would have taken years. Instead, the team built one importer that reads OpenSSF’s feed the way GitHub’s existing importers already read RubySec and RustSec advisories, and maps the records in. “Normalizing sounds boring until you meet the data. Upstream ecosystem strings don’t always match ours (the repo says PyPI, our database says pip). OSV records list affected versions as discrete values where we think in ranges, and some records name no usable version at all. The details field is frequently empty, and when several sources report the same package, their write-ups get appended into one blob. Reports also get retracted: the repo keeps a whole osv/withdrawn folder for advisories that turned out to be wrong, so the importer must cope with a package being flagged on Monday and disavowed on Wednesday,” Ankit Kumar Honey, Senior Engineering Manager at GitHub, wrote. There’s a subtler wrinkle: GitHub’s npm malware findings already flow into OpenSSF’s repository. Importing that feed without filtering would mean re-importing GitHub’s own advisories in a loop. The fix relies on origin metadata OSV records carry: any entry tagged “ghsa-malware” started at GitHub and gets dropped before it becomes a new feed entry. Once GitHub checked this against live data, more than half of the new npm reports arriving each month turned out to be exactly this kind of round-trip. The review step got skipped on purpose Madison Ficorilli, a colleague at GitHub, has written about what “reviewed” means for vulnerability advisories: a human checks package mappings, version ranges, and severity before anything ships. Malware advisories skip that step and publish automatically, on purpose, because a credential-stealing package sitting in a review queue for days is a win for whoever planted it. What’s new is that these unreviewed advisories can now trigger Dependabot alerts directly, something that was never true before this expansion. What happens if the upstream feed goes bad That arrangement only holds if the upstream feed stays clean, so the pipeline assumes it eventually won’t. Three safeguards cover that case. A batch cap limits how many advisories a single import run can create; exceed it and the run stops entirely, publishes nothing, and pages the team, because a run wanting five times the usual volume looks less like a busy day and more like a compromised source. Every imported advisory carries provenance back to the exact upstream commit, so a bad advisory can be traced to its origin in minutes. And every batch can be reverted as a single unit, without anyone hand-picking bad records out of the database after the fact. Turning it on “Malware alerts are opt-in: enable them in your repository, organization, or enterprise security settings. Dependabot will match your dependencies against malware advisories in the Advisory Database, including a backfill against existing advisories, starting the moment you turn it on,” Honey explained.
helpnetsecurity.comAug 10, 2026extracted
SleeperGem Uses Three Malicious RubyGems Packages to Target Developer Machines
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new software supply chain attack codenamed SleeperGem targeting the Ruby ecosystem after three malicious gems were published to RubyGems with the end goal of serving additional payloads. The rogue gems are listed below - git_credential_manager (versions 2.8.0, 2.8.1, 2.8.2, 2.8.3) - Published on July 18, 2026 Dendreo (versions 1.1.3, 1.1.4) - Published on October 14, 2017 fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab (version 0.3.2) - Published on February 06, 2018 "Each malicious release is a loader," StepSecurity said in an analysis. "It fetches a second stage from an attacker controlled Forgejo host, checks whether it is running in a build system and skips if it is, and on a developer machine it drops a native daemon and installs persistence." One aspect of the attack that immediately stands out is that "git_credential_manager" impersonates the official Microsoft Git Credential Manager, while the other two had been dormant for years before receiving the malicious updates. "Dendreo" was last updated on October 24, 2020, and "fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab" stayed inactive since March 9, 2019, prior to the new versions. Another defining trait of the activity is that the releases were published directly to the registry without any matching commit or tag in the source projects. Interestingly, "git_credential_manager" has been added as a dependency to five packages, including "Dendreo" and "fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab," effectively allowing the malicious payload to spread to existing users of the packages - Dendreo fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab slackHtmlToMarkdown seo_optimizer array_fast_methods All the aforementioned packages, with the exception of "fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab," are maintained by the same account ("LR-DEV"). The fact that the gem belongs to a different maintainer ("pinkroom") indicates that more than one account was likely compromised to push the rogue versions to RubyGems. Once installed, the malware embedded in these packages scans the infected system for about 30 environment variables, including those related to GitHub Actions, GitLab, CircleCI, Travis, Jenkins, and Vercel. If any of those are identified, it promptly exits. The check is assessed to be an intentional attempt to avoid running on ephemeral CI runners and ensure it's executed on a developer machine. In the case of "git_credential_manager," the malicious code is fired when the library is required, causing it to download two payloads from a public Forgejo instance ("git.disroot[.]org/git-ecosystem"): a shell script ("deploy.sh") and a native binary that carries the same name as the tool the gem masquerades as. On Windows, the retrieved payload is executed via PowerShell. While version 2.8.2 merely stages the payloads, version 2.8.3 of the gem moves to the next phase of the attack. This involves using the install script to launch the binary as a background daemon, after which it establishes persistence using a cron entry and as a systemd user service and queries the sudo and wheel groups. "If the user can run sudo without a password, the script re-runs itself as root, and when it runs as root it plants a setuid root copy of the system shell at a path chosen to mimic a networking utility," StepSecurity said. Users who have installed any of the aforementioned gems are advised to treat the machines and associated secrets as compromised. It's also recommended to remove the dropped daemon at "~/.local/share/gcm/," erase the persistence methods, check for a setuid shell at "/usr/local/sbin/ping6," and rotate all credentials. "A RubyGems account that has gone quiet for six or seven years doesn't look risky to anyone," Aikido Security researcher Charlie Eriksen said. "That's exactly the profile worth taking over. That's where the SleeperGem name comes from: not a planted, long-game attacker asset, but a real, ordinary account that had simply gone dormant, and looked harmless enough to hijack without anyone noticing." RubyGems as a Data Exfiltration Dead Drop The disclosure comes more than two months after RubyGems briefly paused account sign-ups after bad actors pushed dozens of malicious packages as part of a coordinated spam-publishing campaign. Around the same time, Socket researchers flagged a parallel campaign that flooded the registry with 150 gems that abused them as a data exfiltration channel. Earlier this month, Mend.io disclosed details of an undocumented software supply chain attack that employed another set of 14 RubyGems packages to store stolen credential data. Specifically, a malicious browser extension was found to have harvested credentials through a locally accessible API, packaged the information into valid .gem files entirely within the browser using JavaScript and standard Web APIs, and uploaded those packages directly to RubyGems.org using a hard-coded RubyGems API key. "The haul included plaintext passwords, SSH private keys, AWS credentials, crypto wallet seed phrases, Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, and bank account details across 63 vault items," Maciej Mensfeld said. "RubyGems wasn't the delivery mechanism here. It was the dead drop: a trusted, high-traffic domain where stolen data sat until the attacker came back for it, invisible among normal developer uploads."
thehackernews.comJul 20, 2026extracted
The ‘Miasma’ worm source code briefly leaked on GitHub
The Miasma credential-stealing attack framework, which has recently targeted open-source ecosystems through supply-chain attacks, was briefly open-sourced on GitHub. Miasma appears to be an evolution of the earlier Shai-Hulud worm, which was previously leaked on GitHub and shares much of the same features, techniques, and even code. The malware infects a developer machine, steals the build environment and cloud credentials, and then uses those to compromise legitimate repositories and packages, publishing trojanized versions to infect downstream developers and repeat the cycle. This autonomous, worm-like self-propagation mechanism can quickly expand its reach, potentially turning a single breach into a widespread supply chain attack. The malware has previously been linked to high-profile attacks against Red Hat npm packages and, more recently, 73 Microsoft repositories on GitHub. Researchers at SafeDep reported yesterday that the Miasma source code was leaked on GitHub via numerous compromised developer accounts. In each of those accounts, the threat actors leaked the source code in a repo named "Miasma-Open-Source-Release." This indicates that the threat actors deliberately released the source code, rather than it being an accidental leak, similar to how the Shai-Hulud code was published earlier. Analysis of the code showed that the toolkit requires no command-and-control (C2) infrastructure to operate, as it uses GitHub for that purpose. The framework harvests credentials from cloud providers, CI/CD systems, password managers, Kubernetes, and secret stores, and abuses them to compromise npm, PyPI, and RubyGems packages, as well as GitHub repositories, Actions workflows, and JFrog Artifactory instances. It can also move laterally through SSH and AWS Systems Manager (SSM), and poison configurations of AI coding tools such as Claude, Gemini, Cursor, Copilot, Kiro, and Cline. One interesting feature revealed in the leaked Miasma source code is a "dead-man switch" that is installed when the malware uses a victim's stolen GitHub token as an exfiltration channel. The component monitors the token's validity every minute and, if it's revoked, executes a destructive command (rm -rf ~/; rm -rf ~/Documents), recursively deleting files and directories in the user's home and Documents folders. The monitor runs as a systemd user service on Linux or a LaunchAgent on macOS, and remains active for up to 72 hours. Another interesting aspect revealed is a five-stage build pipeline that generates unique payloads for each build. SafeDep reports that the process combines per-file AES-256-GCM encryption of embedded assets, randomized string obfuscation, source transformations, JavaScript obfuscation, and a self-extracting loader that wraps the final payload in three layers of encryption. Random keys and a randomized outer encoding layer ensure that each generated sample differs from previous builds, making signature-based detection and static analysis harder. The leak of Shai Hulud led to the release of more advanced variants, such as Miasma, and to increased attack rates. Similarly, the leak of Miasma's source code is expected to have a similar effect as threat actors adopt the code and further adjust it. This could have significant consequences for the security of the open-source ecosystem, as supply-chain attacks continue to target it at an unprecedented pace. Software developers are advised to pin project dependencies, introduce multi-day delays before adopting newly released package updates, and validate new builds in isolated test environments. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 10, 2026extracted
New Shai-Hulud attack trojanizes 19 science-focused PyPI packages
Hackers compromised 19 packages on the PyPI, collectively downloaded hundreds of thousands of times, in a new Shai-Hulud supply-chain attack that delivered malware designed to steal developer secrets. Many of the infected packages are popular bioinformatics tools such as Dynamo, Spateo, CoolBox, U-FISH, and Napari-UFISH. The new campaign was discovered by application security company Socket and extended to 37 malicious releases for 19 packages that appear to be from a single maintainer. The researchers say that the malicious artifacts included a ‘*-setup.pth' file and an obfuscated JavaScript payload named ‘_index.js.’ Users would just have to start Python to trigger the execution of the PTH file, which then tries to download the Bun JavaScript runtime from GitHub to run the bundled script. “That means a compromised wheel can turn an otherwise passive dependency install into a delayed execution trigger: the next Python, pip, test run, notebook kernel, CI job, or package-management command that starts Python may process the malicious .pth,” Socket explains. The researchers believe that the attack is part of the broader “Shai-Hulud” campaign, due to the malware exhibiting several similarities in the techniques used. Because of this, Socket is tracking it alongside previous attacks, with the list of malicious artifacts attributed to Shai-Hulud activities now showing 453 items. An analysis of the JavaScript payload revealed that it targeted a broad range of developer secrets that included the following: GitHub tokens and GitHub Actions secrets npm, PyPI, RubyGems, JFrog publishing tokens AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, and Vault credentials SSH keys Docker credentials .env, .npmrc, .pypirc Shell histories Claude/MCP configuration files Other developer workstation and CI/CD secrets As with other Shai-Hulud attacks, the goal appears to be compromising software development workflows to further propagate the malware. The primary data exfiltration method is similar to past Shai-Hulud operations, using automatically created GitHub repositories to host secrets written via GitHub Actions. A second exfiltration method based on direct HTTPS also exists, pointing to a legitimate but invalid Anthropic API endpoint (api[.]anthropic[.]com/v1/api), which Socket believes was likely used for camouflage. The malware also features some evasion mechanisms, such as checking for Russian locales/environments, and security tools such as StepSecurity Harden-Runner. Persistence is established through systemd services on Linux and LaunchAgents on macOS, while GitHub workflow and Claude/MCP configuration files are also used. Socket’s report lists all affected packages and versions and recommends that organizations that installed them rotate all secrets and restore their environments from safe backups. Defenders should look for Python packages containing executable .pth startup hooks, unexpected downloads of the Bun JavaScript runtime from GitHub, and process chains where Python launches Bun to execute _index.js. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 8, 2026extracted
VS Code Adds 2-Hour Extension Auto-Update Delay to Limit Supply Chain Attacks
Microsoft has announced that Visual Studio Code (VS Code) will apply a two-hour delay before extensions for the integrated development environment (IDE) are updated automatically to a newer version in an attempt to tackle software supply chain threats. "When automatic updates are enabled, new versions are auto-updated two hours after they are published, adding an extra layer of protection against problematic or potentially compromised releases," Microsoft said. The new feature is available starting in VS Code 1.123. The tech giant noted that users still have the option to update any extension immediately at any point in time by using the "Update" button. When extensions have pending updates, a reason for why they haven't been updated yet will be available in the details view, along with when the automatic update will take place. That said, this two-hour delay does not apply to extensions from trusted publishers such as Microsoft, GitHub, and OpenAI, it added. Extensions from such publishers will continue to be updated immediately. The development comes days after RubyGems added an opt-in cooldown feature to Bundler 4.0.13 that delays installation of newly published gem versions for a pre-defined period. Specifically, the feature allows developers to configure Bundler to introduce a time-based install delay with an aim to reduce potential exposure arising from newly published malicious versions. Over the past year, similar installation controls have also been added to Bun, pnpm, npm, and Yarn - Bun - minimumReleaseAge (Bun 1.3+) npm - min-release-age (npm v11.10.0+) pnpm - minimumReleaseAge (pnpm 10.16+) Yarn - npmMinimalAgeGate (Yarn Berry 4.10.0+) These changes arrive against the backdrop of a surge in software supply chain incidents targeting various ecosystems to breach developer systems and propagate malware to downstream users. By enforcing a minimum age threshold before a particular package version can be installed, the defensive control minimizes the window during which it spreads before it's flagged as malicious and taken down by the registry maintainers.
thehackernews.comJun 8, 2026extracted
ThreatsDay Bulletin: AI Agents Gone Wrong, Sketchy C2 Tools, ClickFix Tricks, JS Backdoors & 20+ New Stories
It got stupid again. The internet still feels held together with tape. Bad plugins, old bugs, fake tools, trusted apps doing shady things. Same mess, new wrapper. And now the weird stuff is normal. Forums go down and come back worse. Cheap hackers get better toys. AI starts breaking real systems. Great. Read the whole thing before it ruins your week anyway. Unauthenticated SSRF riskCisco has released fixes to address a high-severity security flaw in Unified Communications Manager (CVE-2026-20230, CVSS score: 8.6) that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks through an affected device. "This vulnerability is due to improper input validation for specific HTTP requests," Cisco said. "An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write files to the underlying operating system that could be used later to elevate to root." The issue has been addressed in Cisco Unified CM and Unified CM SME Release versions 14SU6 and 15SU5. Cisco said it's aware of the availability of proof-of-concept exploit code for the flaw, but noted there is no evidence of active exploitation. It credited an independent security researcher working with SSD Secure Disclosure for reporting the vulnerability. Mobile spyware operationRussia's Federal Security Service (FSB) has disclosed details of what it described as a "large-scale action" undertaken by foreign intelligence services to stealthily implant spyware on the mobile devices of high-ranking officials in the country. "This software was utilized to exfiltrate existing data, intercept ongoing conversations, and conduct covert audio and video surveillance of the immediate surroundings of the electronic devices, with the ultimate objective of obtaining sensitive information," the FSB said. Russia did not reveal who was behind the attacks, but noted the "representatives of foreign intelligence services" leveraged the technical capabilities of major international IT corporations to exfiltrate sensitive data from the devices. This specifically included the exploitation of mobile communication channels, the agency added. An investigation into the activity is ongoing, with the FSB also initiating a criminal case to investigate the matter. Layered keylogger luresThreat actors have been relying on social engineering over the past few months to push VIP Keylogger via loaders written in JavaScript, batch scripts, and Visual Basic Script (VBS). "Attackers are masquerading as legitimate business communications such as bank payment notifications, procurement orders, and logistics updates to lure users into opening malicious files," Splunk said. Crypto sanctions escalationThe U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions against Nobitex, Iran's largest cryptocurrency exchange, for facilitating payments related to terrorist activities. "Nobitex has provided significant support to the regime, processing more than 50 percent of all Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025 and facilitating payments tied to Iran's terrorist activities, sanctions evasion efforts, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked transactions, including activity associated with IRGC-affiliated ransomware actors," the Treasury said. The sanctions also extend to Nobitex's chairman, co-founder, and former CEO, Amir Hossein Rad, as well as other Nobitex leaders and officials, and three other exchanges: Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex. According to Chainalysis, Nobitex processed over 50% of all Iranian digital asset inflows last year. The four exchanges accounted for roughly $7.7 billion, 78% of Iran's USD 9.9 billion in attributed 2025 crypto volume, per TRM Labs. Cybercrime forum falloutThe July 2025 law enforcement takedown of XSS, a prominent Russian-speaking cybercrime forum, didn't dismantle the ecosystem. Rather, it fractured it into competing, harder-to-track factions, Flashpoint said. The collapse has triggered an exodus into new, unvetted, and often adversarial communities. Some of the new forums that have rushed to fill up the void left by XSS include DamageLib (launched by legacy moderators of XSS), Rehub (launched by another former XSS moderator), XSS.pro (a resurrection using old backups and suspected to be a law-enforcement honeypot), and XSSF (started by a pro-Russian Telegram hacking group). RMM abuse surgeA lesser-known remote desktop tool called Tiflux is being used in a growing number of attacks to establish persistence, transmit screenshots, and run commands to collect system profiling information. "Threat actors behind the rogue Tiflux incidents also installed UltraVNC, an open-source remote access tool, sideloaded other commercial RMMs, including Splashtop and ScreenConnect, and installed an outdated driver that can permit the threat actor to elevate their own privileges on an infected system," Huntress said. "Threat actors continue to test and weaponize the use of commercial remote access management tools." Malware delivery networkA threat cluster tracked as DriveSurge has been operating large-scale malware distribution campaigns using ClickFix and FakeUpdates (aka SocGholish) social engineering techniques on compromised sites. Thousands of websites are estimated to have been compromised, directing users to malicious infrastructure. DriveSurge primarily acts as an initial access broker (IAB) operating on a pay-per-install (PPI) model, enabling follow-on attacks. Visitors of compromised websites are steered through a traffic distribution system (TDS) known as zTDS, which profiles the system and decides whether the visitor should be served a ClickFix or a FakeUpdates lure. zTDS, in use since at least 2015, is publicly available at ztds[.]info. "Using zTDS, DriveSurge hijacks thousands of legitimate, high-reputation websites and silently redirects visitors to malware, unbeknownst to the sites' owners or their visitors," Silent Push said. The campaign has been active since September 2025. Sensitive data leakThe Spanish National Police has arrested an unidentified individual for leaking sensitive information related to members of various critical state organizations, including the National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE), the State Attorney General's Office, the National Police, the Civil Guard, and the National Security Council. JavaScript backdoor malspamIntrinsec haș disclosed that multiple malspam campaigns have been used to distribute a JavaScript-coded backdoor. "The targets of those campaigns were from all regions and sectors, notably energy and finance ministries, including in the CIS region," the company said. "We believe the campaigns to be financially motivated and operated for email account compromise (EAC) and/or business email compromise (BEC)." The activity was observed in March 2026. On-chain malware deliveryCybersecurity researchers have flagged an intrusion in which threat actors used the EtherHiding technique to route ClearFake payload delivery through smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain testnet. "The attack chain ended with two simultaneously deployed stealers, SectopRAT and ACRStealer, alongside an on-chain execution tracker that confirmed each victim compromise in real time," Trend Micro said. Cloud attack tradecraftNation-state hacking groups like APT29, APT33, and UTA0355 are exploiting ROADtools, a Python-based open-source framework for red-teaming and research, to blend in with normal traffic and evade detection. "ROADtools operates through legitimate Microsoft APIs and can mimic typical traffic," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said. "Further defense evasion can be achieved by configuring request attributes such as user-agent strings. These capabilities have made ROADtools a valuable asset for attackers. Nation-state threat actors have used it in recent cloud intrusions for discovery, persistence, and defense evasion. Attackers involved in a targeted phishing campaign in early 2025 used tooling that matches ROADtools' token management capabilities." Data-only extortion risesPure data-exfiltration campaigns without deploying ransomware to pressurize victims are on the rise. In 2025, such attacks have primarily targeted professional services, healthcare, and consumer services firms. "Interestingly, while manufacturing remains the single most disrupted sector overall, construction has witnessed a 44% year-over-year increase as a data-only extortion hotspot," Unit 42 said. "These firms are attractive targets due to lucrative financial blueprints and bidding data combined with data egress controls." AI-assisted evasion testingAn unknown threat actor has been observed using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to automate Active Directory discovery and refine endpoint detection and response (EDR) evasion tactics in a red team post-exploitation framework. "Analysis revealed that AI for malware development was more limited and was mainly used to coordinate workflows and support experimentation," Sophos said. "The actual EDR-bypass path was a structured engineering test cycle that included human review and iteration." To develop tools for bypassing EDR agents, the attacker is said to have used Cursor and Anthropic Claude Opus. At the core of the framework is a Python tool that generates Go and Rust payloads for testing with an aim to resist sandboxing, antivirus, and EDR detection. This approach was used to build nearly 80 modules covering more than 70 techniques. Also attributed to the threat actor are Python-based malware development scripts for injecting shellcode into legitimate Windows executables and a Telegram bot API-based external command and control (C2) mechanism. "The use of AI agents to accelerate tool development and test evasion techniques lowers the barrier to entry for sophisticated red team-style attacks," Sophos said. "However, this shift does not change how defenders should protect themselves." The framework is said to be built for stealthy post-exploitation activity in target environments, linking it to "known ransomware deployment and data theft operations." Steam-hosted malware payloadsA newly identified malware is using Steam Community profile comments to host malicious payloads for WordPress, hiding malicious infrastructure behind Valve's legitimate platform. "The malware employs invisible Unicode characters to conceal payloads within Steam profile comments, enabling steganographic data encoding that evades traditional text-based detection methods," GoDaddy said. "A cookie-authenticated backdoor enables remote code execution, allowing attackers to modify plugin and theme files by sending base64-encoded PHP code via POST requests." The malware performs two primary functions, including client-side JavaScript injection, which fetches encoded URLs from Steam profile comments, decodes them, and injects external JavaScript into WordPress pages, and a server-side backdoor that provides cookie-authenticated remote access for modifying PHP files across plugins and themes. The campaign was first detected in July 2025. The malware has been detected on approximately 1,980 WordPress sites. It is unclear how the websites are breached, but it's assessed that the initial infection vector could be stolen admin logins, compromised FTP/SFTP credentials, the exploitation of a vulnerable WordPress theme or plugin, or a supply chain compromise. Trusted tools abusedFlare.io has disclosed details of FalkonC2, a commercial hacking tool that appears designed to hide inside enterprise environments by abusing trusted remote access software. "FalkonC2 has an enterprise version called Rotemelli2 that runs in memory, rotates its command-and-control domains every 72 hours, and uses tools such as ScreenConnect, Datto, and SimpleHelp to quietly launch attacks," the company said in a statement. An analysis of dashboard telemetry suggests active enterprise infections across the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands, and Poland. The framework also checks infected machines for QuickBooks and Sage50 data, suggesting attackers are looking for accounting systems they can quickly exfiltrate. AI vulnerability surgeAnthropic is broadening access to its Project Glasswing program, adding approximately 150 organizations in 15 countries for access to its Claude Mythos Preview. "The bottleneck in cybersecurity is now verifying, disclosing, and patching the large numbers of vulnerabilities that Mythos-class models can surface," the company said. The growing number of flaws identified with the help of AI models has shifted the scales from discovery to patching. A recent report from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), the SANS Institute, and the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) concluded that in the near term, organizations are "likely to be overwhelmed" by threat actors using AI to find and exploit vulnerabilities faster than defenders can patch them. "The cost and capability floor to exploit discovery is dropping, the time between disclosure and weaponization is compressing toward zero, and capabilities that previously required nation-state resources are now becoming broadly accessible," the report said. Linux flaw under attackThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a Linux Kernel flaw (CVE-2022-0492, CVSS score: 7.8) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate the flaw by June 5, 2026. "Linux Kernel contains an improper authentication vulnerability which could allow for privilege escalation via the cgroups v1 release_agent feature," CISA said. The development comes after Kaspersky said it observed the flaw, along with CVE-2019-5736 and CVE-2024-21626, being exploited in attacks aimed at container environments. Fake image tools deliver malwareA new ClickFix-style lure is being dressed up as free image-editing tools to deliver CastleLoader, which then drops both NetSupport RAT and a custom .NET stealer called CastleStealer. "The sites look like every other 'remove your photo background' service with uploads, progress bars, and download buttons, but the entire UI is fake," Huntress said. The activity has been codenamed BackgroundFix. CastleLoader is attributed to a threat cluster known as GrayBravo. Session theft defenseGoogle has revealed that Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) in the Chrome browser is now generally available and enabled by default for Google Workspace users. "DBSC strengthens account security after users are logged in and helps bind a session cookie - small files used by websites to remember user information - to the device a user authenticated from," Google said. "Even if malware was present on the user's device, DBSC reduces the risk of session theft and makes it meaningfully more difficult for malicious actors to exploit stolen session cookies." The feature was formally released in April 2026. Adobe abused in phishingCybercriminals are weaponizing Adobe infrastructure in a LinkedIn phishing campaign that steals passwords and redirects victims to the legitimate LinkedIn site afterward. Opening an HTML attachment in the email message serves a login form urging the recipient to enter their credentials. The captured information is delivered to the domain "lnkd.tt.omtrdc[.]net/rest/v1/delivery," after which they are redirected to the LinkedIn site. "This domain belongs to Adobe and is associated with the Adobe Target A/B testing platform," Malwarebytes said. "But the campaign isn't using Adobe Target to receive the phished credentials. Instead, attackers are abusing Adobe Target as a redirect/abuse point in the phishing flow." Supply chain delay defenseRubyGems has included a cooldown, a time-based filter, in Bundler version 4.0.13 that refuses to resolve to a version until it has been public for at least "N" days. "Releases too new to have been scrutinized are passed over in favor of ones that have aged past the window," Hiroshi Shibata, RubyGems maintainer, said. "It is opt-in, and complements rather than replaces existing defenses like mandatory 2FA and trusted publishing." Users can declare a "small cooldown" on the source in the Gemfile. The efforts go along with other initiatives like AI-assisted vulnerability scanning against the most critical gems in the registry. Iran-linked Israel attacksESET said it recorded an unusual spike in Iran-aligned activity against Israeli targets between October 2025 and March 2026 that could not be linked to previously known groups. "Two unattributed activity clusters, Rusty Boots and MoKhargosh, demonstrated both espionage capabilities and destructive potential - including deployment of a bootkit-style wiper and retaining destructive tooling for later use - whereas a third, MOØN Badr, appears to have been limited to targeted espionage," the Slovakian company said. MoKhargosh, first observed in January 2026, used Go-compiled binaries in attacks targeting Israel. This includes a backdoor called GoKhargosh, along with wipers, filecoders that overwrite files with junk data, and a wiper that targets the master boot record to render the system unbootable. MOØN Badr, on the other hand, singled out three unidentified victims in Israel in early January 2026 to deliver the MOØN AGENT backdoor via phishing emails to facilitate command execution and file uploads and downloads. Fuel tank systems exposedThe U.S. government has issued an advisory urging organizations to take steps to defend against attacks targeting U.S.-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems by securing them with strong passwords and by removing them from the internet to reduce public exposure. The activity, which remains unattributed, involves the attackers compromising internet-exposed ATG systems via hard-coded credentials, command execution, and SQL injection vectors, followed by escalating privileges to obtain full administrator rights and modifying the system functions. "Should a cyber threat actor exploit these vulnerabilities and compromise an ATG system, they could disrupt or manipulate the below critical functions by interfacing directly with the tank management as though they possessed legitimate physical access to the system console," government agencies said. Verified call defenseGoogle has announced a fake call detection feature, built on Rich Communication Services (RCS), to Android devices running versions Android 12 and later that verifies whether a call is coming from the caller's actual Android smartphone. Enabled by default, the alert is designed to avoid falling victim to deepfake impersonation and call spoofing in real time. "When a contact calls you and you're both using Phone by Google, their device sends a silent confirmation signal in real time to your device to verify the call is legitimate and truly coming from the contact's device," Google said. "If a scammer tries to impersonate your contact, that initial confirmation signal will be missing. Your device will instantly notice this and ping your contact's actual device to double-check. If their real device says, 'I'm not making a call right now,' you'll get a warning on your screen advising you to hang up immediately." Because the digital handshake uses end-to-end encrypted RCS technology, Google said the process is completely private. That said, the feature requires users to have three Google apps installed: Phone by Google, Contacts, and Google Messages. It will roll out globally this month, starting with Pixel devices. Agentic AI failuresAn analysis of 7,200 publicly reported AI-security and operational incidents has identified "344 verified enterprise-relevant agent-inflicted damage cases between September 2023 and May 2026, including 188 incidents where autonomous AI systems caused direct organizational harm without any external attacker involvement," Cyera researchers Ehud Halamish, Assaf Morag, and Vladimir Tokarev said. "The majority of confirmed incidents involved real production impact rather than theoretical AI risk scenarios. Observed outcomes included deleted databases, destructive cloud actions, unauthorized financial operations, runaway API spending, service outages, exposed secrets, and silent integrity corruption inside enterprise environments. As agents gain broader permissions and deeper integration into SaaS, cloud, development, and business environments, the AI interaction layer itself increasingly becomes part of the enterprise attack surface and critical data perimeter." The lesson is boring because the lesson is always boring. Patch faster, kill exposed admin panels, stop trusting "safe" tools by name, and watch the weird edges where attackers like to hide. The cheap stuff still works because too many teams leave it cheap. Security is not magic. It is inventory, logs, least privilege, backups, tested restores, and people who notice when something normal starts acting wrong. Do that well, and half this mess gets a lot less exciting. That is the point.
thehackernews.comJun 4, 2026extracted
GemStuffer Abuses 150+ RubyGems to Exfiltrate Scraped U.K. Council Portal Data
Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a new campaign dubbed GemStuffer that has targeted the RubyGems repository with more than 150 gems that use the registry as a data exfiltration channel rather than for malware distribution. "The packages do not appear designed for mass developer compromise," Socket said. "Many have little or no download activity, and the payloads are repetitive, noisy, and unusually self-contained." "Instead, the scripts fetch pages from U.K. local government democratic services portals, package the collected responses into valid .gem archives, and publish those gems back to RubyGems using hardcoded API keys." The development comes as RubyGems temporarily disabled new account registration following what has been described as a major malicious attack. While it's not clear if the two sets of activities are related, the application security company said GemStuffer fits the "same abuse pattern," which involves using newly created packages with junk names to host the scraped data. At a high level, the campaign abuses RubyGems as a place to stage the scraped council content. It does this by fetching hard-coded U.K. council portal URLs, packaging the HTTP responses into valid .gem archives, and publishing those archives to RubyGems using embedded registry credentials. In some cases, the payload embedded within the gem creates a temporary RubyGems credential environment under "/tmp," overrides the HOME environment variant, builds a gem locally, and pushes it to RubyGems using the gem command-line interface (CLI), as opposed to depending on pre-existing RubyGems credentials on the target machine. Other variants of the malicious gems have been found to eschew the CLI component in favor of uploading the archive directly to the RubyGems API via an HTTP POST request. Once the new gems have been published, all an attacker has to do is run a "gem fetch" command with the gem name and version to access the scraped data. The novel scraping campaign has been found to target public-facing ModernGov portals used by Lambeth, Wandsworth, and Southwark, with an aim to collect committee meeting calendars, agenda item listings, linked PDF documents, officer contact information, and RSS feed content.It's not clear what exactly the end goals are, as the information appears to be publicly accessible anyway. Socket has assessed that the systematic bulk collection and archival of this data raises the possibility that the attacker may be leveraging the "council portal access as a pivot to demonstrate capability against government infrastructure." "It may be registry spam, a proof-of-concept worm, an automated scraper misusing RubyGems as a storage layer, or a deliberate test of package registry abuse," Socket said. "But the mechanics are intentional: repeated gem generation, version increments, hardcoded RubyGems credentials, direct registry pushes, and scraped data embedded inside package archives."
thehackernews.comMay 13, 2026extracted
Hundreds of Malicious Packages Force RubyGems to Suspend Registrations
New account registrations on RubyGems.org, the official Ruby gem hosting service, have been suspended after threat actors published hundreds of malicious packages. RubyGems maintainers announced on May 12 that registrations have been temporarily disabled due to a “DDoS attack”. Nearly 24 hours later, registrations are still disabled and will likely remain closed for another 2-3 days until account creation rate limiting can be tightened and WAF protection is enabled. According to RubyGems maintainers, the service was targeted in “spam activity” that involved bot accounts pushing more than 500 junk packages, including ones carrying exploits. The malicious packages have been removed from the registry, and existing packages have not been compromised. An investigation into the incident is ongoing, but at this point it appears that end users were not targeted. “Gem installs and pushes for existing users are unaffected,” RubyGems said on its status page. Maciej Mensfeld of the RubyGems security team noted in a post on X that the attack appears to have targeted RubyGems itself, with the attackers attempting XSS attacks and data exfiltration. “My worry with this RubyGems attack: it could be masking something more sophisticated. No proof, just a security researcher’s intuition. Hope I’m wrong,” Mensfeld said. Related: TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath Hit in Fresh Supply Chain Attack Related: Checkmarx Jenkins AST Plugin Compromised in Supply Chain Attack
securityweek.comMay 13, 2026extracted
RubyGems Suspends New Signups After Hundreds of Malicious Packages Are Uploaded
RubyGems, the standard package manager for the Ruby programming language, has temporarily paused account sign ups following what has been described as a "major malicious attack." "We're dealing with a major malicious attack on RubyGems right now," Maciej Mensfeld, senior product manager for software supply chain security at Mend.io, said in a post on X. "Signups are paused for the time being. Hundreds of packages involved – mostly targeting us, but some carrying exploits." Visitors to RubyGems' sign up page are now greeted with the message: "New account registration has been temporarily disabled." Mend.io, which secures RubyGems, said it intends to release more details once the incident is contained. It's currently not known who is behind the attack. The development comes as software supply chain attacks targeting open-source ecosystems have been on the rise, with threat actors like TeamPCP compromising widely used packages to distribute credential-stealing malware capable of harvesting sensitive data and allowing the attackers to expand their reach. In a report published Monday, Google said the credentials stolen from affected environments have been monetized through partnerships with ransomware and data theft extortion groups. Update In a follow-up update, Mensfeld said more than 120 malicious packages have been pulled from RubyGems, adding that the attack targeted the registry itself. Separately, Ruby Central's Marty Haught said RubyGems was responding to "a coordinated spam-publishing campaign" limited to newly registered accounts publishing junk packages. "The malicious spam activity against rubygems.org has stopped," RubyGems said in an update shared on May 13, 2026. "The bot accounts responsible have been blocked and removed, and the 500+ malicious packages pushed during the attack have been yanked from the registry." Account sign-ups are expected to be closed as it coordinates with Fastly to enable web application firewall (WAF) protection and tighten rate limiting on account creation. These actions will take two to three days, it noted, adding Gem installs and pushes for existing users are unaffected. Account Signups Enabled In an update posted on May 16, 2026, RubyGems said "this incident has been resolved and we've re-enabled account registrations." (The story was updated after publication to reflect the latest developments.)
thehackernews.comMay 12, 2026extracted
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Update 004 - Databricks Investigating Alleged Compromise, TeamPCP Runs Dual Ransomware Operations, and AstraZeneca Data Released, (Mon, Mar 30th)
This is the fourth update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). Update 003 covered developments through March 28, including the first 48-hour pause in new compromises and the campaign's shift to monetization. This update consolidates intelligence from March 28-30, 2026 -- two days since our last update. HIGH: Databricks Investigating Alleged Compromise Linked to TeamPCP Credential Harvest CybersecurityNews reports that Databricks, the cloud data analytics platform, is investigating an alleged security compromise linked to the TeamPCP credential harvest. International Cyber Digest stated on X that they "notified them last week" and Databricks "scaled up to investigate." A separate analyst corroborated that screenshots showing AWS artifacts, CloudFormation dumps, and STS tokens "match TeamPCP's exact playbook." Databricks has not issued an official statement. If confirmed, this would be the first major cloud platform identified as a downstream victim of TeamPCP's credential trove -- distinct from the security tool vendors (Aqua, Checkmarx, BerriAI, Telnyx) directly compromised in the supply chain phase. The distinction matters: tool vendor compromises expanded TeamPCP's credential pool, while a Databricks compromise would represent the monetization of that pool against an enterprise target processing sensitive data across AWS, GCP, and Azure. Update (2026-03-30): Databricks' Head of Global Communications and their external PR agency FGS Global have confirmed the authenticity of the new @DatabricksSec X account. In their https://x.com/DatabricksSec/status/2038649955401794042, Databricks says they "thoroughly investigated this information in our internal systems and found nothing" and have "asked for more information beyond this screenshot." They state they will "transparently continue to share any new updates on all security matters." Recommended action: Organizations using Databricks should monitor for an official statement. If your CI/CD pipelines were exposed to any TeamPCP-compromised component AND those pipelines had access to Databricks credentials, treat those credentials as potentially compromised regardless of whether Databricks confirms the breach. HIGH: TeamPCP Operates Dual Ransomware Tracks - CipherForce Is Their Own Operation Update 002 documented TeamPCP's partnership with the Vect ransomware-as-a-service operation and BreachForums mass affiliate key distribution. New intelligence reveals that Vect is not TeamPCP's only ransomware channel. According to Flare and corroborated by Rami McCarthy's IOC tracker, TeamPCP operates under five confirmed aliases: PCPcat, ShellForce, DeadCatx3, CipherForce, and Persy_PCP. TeamPCP's own Telegram channel states: "you may already know us as TeamPCP or Shellforce... CipherForce is a newer project we are starting to find affiliates." CipherForce is TeamPCP's own ransomware operation, separate from the Vect partnership. This means TeamPCP is running two parallel ransomware tracks simultaneously: their proprietary CipherForce program for direct operations, and the mass Vect affiliate program via BreachForums for distributed operations. The SANS ISC Stormcast for March 30 also notes "more and more links between the TeamPCP crew and various ransomware actors" -- plural -- consistent with this dual-track model. Analysts assess this dual-track approach allows TeamPCP to maintain direct control over high-value targets (via CipherForce) while simultaneously flooding the ecosystem with mass affiliate operations (via Vect). The 300 GB stolen credential trove can feed both tracks simultaneously. Recommended action: Detection teams monitoring for Vect ransomware indicators should also add CipherForce to their watchlist. The strongest attribution link across all TeamPCP operations is a shared RSA-4096 public key embedded in payloads -- search for this key in forensic artifacts from any suspected TeamPCP exposure. HIGH: LAPSUS$ Releases AstraZeneca Data Free After Failed Sale Attempt The LAPSUS$/AstraZeneca breach claim documented in Updates 002-003 has escalated. Cybernews and Cybersecurity Insiders report two developments: LAPSUS$ released the claimed 3 GB archive for free after failing to find buyers via Session encrypted messaging. This shifts the incident from an extortion attempt to a full data exposure event. Cybernews research team has partially verified the dump's contents -- GitHub user information for internal AstraZeneca software developers, employee data spanning clinical research subsidiaries, and internal source code tree structures were assessed as consistent with legitimate AstraZeneca infrastructure. AstraZeneca has still not issued any public statement confirming or denying the breach at approximately 96 hours since the initial claim. Analysts assess that AstraZeneca's continued silence, combined with GDPR obligations if EU employee data is in the dump, creates increasing regulatory exposure with each passing day. Recommended action: Organizations should treat this as a probable confirmed breach for defensive planning purposes. If your organization shares integrations, data, or credentials with AstraZeneca, assess whether the exposed repository structures and configurations could affect your security posture. Given AstraZeneca's clinical research operations, the dump may contain protected health information (PHI) subject to HIPAA in the US and GDPR in the EU. Organizations with data-sharing agreements with AstraZeneca should evaluate whether their data may be in the exposed archive and prepare breach notification workflows accordingly. MEDIUM: ownCloud Discloses Build Infrastructure Impact From CVE-2026-33634 ownCloud published a security notice confirming their build infrastructure -- the systems producing container images and client binaries -- was affected by CVE-2026-33634 (the Trivy compromise). ownCloud confirms: no customer data compromised, no source code altered, impact limited to build systems only. This is one of the first named downstream organizations to publicly disclose that they were in the blast radius of the Trivy supply chain compromise. The disclosure is notable for its transparency -- most affected organizations have remained silent despite the CISA KEV entry and federal remediation deadline of April 8. Recommended action: Organizations using ownCloud should review the security notice and verify their deployments are using images produced after the remediation. More broadly, ownCloud's disclosure should prompt other organizations that used Trivy in their build pipelines between March 19-22 to conduct their own impact assessments and consider similar disclosure. MEDIUM: Supply Chain Pause Extends Past 96 Hours No new package compromises across any ecosystem have been publicly reported since the Telnyx PyPI disclosure on March 27, extending the supply chain pause documented in Update 003 past 96 hours. This is the longest quiet period since TeamPCP began active supply chain operations on March 19. Expanded ecosystem search results (March 30): An independent search of RubyGems, crates.io, and Maven Central -- the three ecosystems identified as plausible expansion targets in Update 003 -- found zero TeamPCP-related IOCs in any of them. The RubyGems, crates.io, and Maven Central watch items remain "Not observed." While the CanisterWorm's propagation technique is registry-agnostic (any stolen publish token would work), there is no evidence TeamPCP has moved beyond the five confirmed ecosystems (GitHub Actions, PyPI, npm, Docker Hub/GHCR, OpenVSX). Note on sourcing: CybersecurityNews listed "NPM and OpenVSX" alongside the other compromised ecosystems in their Databricks article. These are accurate in the sense that both ecosystems were hit, but they refer to the known CanisterWorm npm worm (March 20, 66+ packages) and the Checkmarx OpenVSX extensions (March 23, ast-results and cx-dev-assist) -- not new compromises. No new npm or OpenVSX activity has been documented since the original incidents. Recommended action: Use this supply chain pause as a remediation window. The CISA KEV deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is now 9 days away (April 8, 2026). Complete credential rotations and IOC sweeps before the deadline. HIGH: Campaign Transitions to Three Parallel Monetization Tracks While supply chain poisoning has paused, TeamPCP is not dormant. Analysts assess the group has completed its supply chain expansion phase and transitioned fully to credential exploitation and monetization. Three distinct operational tracks are now running simultaneously: Direct credential exploitation against high-value targets -- the Databricks investigation (see above) represents the first alleged downstream victim of the ~300 GB stolen credential trove, distinct from the tool vendors directly compromised in the supply chain phase. Proprietary ransomware via CipherForce -- TeamPCP's own ransomware operation, with recruitment via their Telegram channel. No confirmed deployments yet, but the infrastructure and affiliate recruitment are active. Mass affiliate ransomware via Vect/BreachForums -- Distributed operations leveraging the BreachForums mass affiliate key distribution documented in Update 002. The distribution window is now ~96 hours with no confirmed deployments. The distinction between these tracks matters for defenders: detection teams monitoring for Vect ransomware indicators should also add CipherForce to their watchlist. The shared RSA-4096 public key embedded in payloads is the strongest attribution link across all TeamPCP operations. INFO: Cloud Security Alliance Publishes Second Research Note on AI/ML Supply Chain Risk The Cloud Security Alliance AI Safety Initiative published a research note on March 29 framing the TeamPCP campaign as a structural shift in adversary methodology -- from opportunistic typosquatting to deliberate pipeline compromise of trusted AI/ML packages. The note assesses that "the economics of targeting high-value AI credential stores are accelerating adversary investment." This is the second CSA publication covering TeamPCP (the first was the Kubernetes wiper lab analysis documented in Update 003) and focuses specifically on the AI/ML ecosystem implications rather than technical TTPs. Watch Item Status The full campaign report is available at sans.org/white-papers/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. A SANS Emergency Webcast replay is available at sans.org/webcasts/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. Updates to the report will be in the form of these ISC diaries.
isc.sans.eduMar 30, 2026extracted
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Update 002 - Telnyx PyPI Compromise, Vect Ransomware Mass Affiliate Program, and First Named Victim Claim, (Fri, Mar 27th)
This is the second update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). Update 001 covered developments through March 26. This update covers developments from March 26-27, 2026. CRITICAL: Telnyx Python SDK Compromised on PyPI -- New WAV Steganography TTP TeamPCP compromised the telnyx Python SDK (670,000+ monthly downloads) on PyPI, publishing malicious versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 at approximately 03:51 UTC on March 27, 2026. No corresponding GitHub releases or tags exist for these versions -- the attacker used stolen PyPI credentials rather than a repository compromise. The most significant technical finding is a new TTP: WAV audio file steganography. Payloads are embedded inside .wav files, which blend naturally with Telnyx's purpose as a voice and telecom API provider. Platform-specific payloads are delivered: Windows: A persistent binary dropped to the Startup folder as msbuild.exe Linux/macOS: A credential harvester following the same pattern as the LiteLLM compromise Forensic analysis by Aikido Security, JFrog, and SafeDep confirms the same RSA-4096 public key and tpcp.tar.gz exfiltration pattern seen in the LiteLLM compromise. Both malicious versions have been quarantined by PyPI. Recommended action: Check your Python environments and CI/CD pipelines for telnyx versions 4.87.1 or 4.87.2. If found, treat all credentials accessible to that environment as compromised and rotate immediately. The last known-safe version is 4.87.0. Also search for .wav files in unexpected locations, msbuild.exe in Windows Startup folders, and outbound connections to known TeamPCP exfiltration domains. This confirms the "expansion to additional PyPI packages" watch item from Update 001. TeamPCP's PyPI campaign is not limited to LiteLLM -- they are actively working through stolen credentials to compromise additional high-value packages. CRITICAL: TeamPCP Partners with Vect Ransomware and BreachForums for Mass Affiliate Program TeamPCP has formally partnered with the Vect ransomware-as-a-service operation and BreachForums. Per Cybernews and Infosecurity Magazine, the announcement states that all approximately 300,000 registered BreachForums users will receive personal Vect affiliate keys. The operational model: TeamPCP provides initial access via compromised supply chain packages and stolen credentials, Vect provides encryption and extortion tooling, and BreachForums provides the operator base. Analysts assess this represents a fundamental shift from supply chain credential theft to industrialized ransomware deployment. If even a small fraction of 300,000 users activate, this could become one of the largest coordinated ransomware affiliate mobilizations observed. The convergence of supply chain compromise, ransomware-as-a-service, and dark web forum mobilization at this scale is, to the best of our knowledge, unprecedented. Recommended action: Organizations that were exposed to any phase of the TeamPCP campaign (Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Telnyx) should assume their stolen credentials may now be distributed to a large affiliate network. Credential rotation is no longer optional -- it is urgent. Monitor for Vect ransomware indicators. HIGH: LAPSUS$ Claims 3GB AstraZeneca Breach Using TeamPCP Credentials LAPSUS$ is publicly claiming a 3GB breach of AstraZeneca, as reported by SecurityWeek and CSO Online. The claimed data includes internal code repositories, cloud infrastructure configurations (AWS, Azure, Terraform), Spring Boot configs, GitHub Enterprise user information, and employee data. LAPSUS$ is selling access via Session encrypted messaging. This is the first named victim claim from the TeamPCP/LAPSUS$ partnership, confirming the "named victim breach disclosures" watch item from Update 001. AstraZeneca has not confirmed or denied the breach as of publication time. Recommended action: Organizations should not wait for public victim disclosures to take action. If you were exposed to any TeamPCP-compromised component, assume credential theft occurred and rotate proactively. The extortion timeline is accelerating. HIGH: LiteLLM CEO's Personal GitHub Account Was the Compromise Vector ReversingLabs has published new intelligence identifying the specific mechanism behind the LiteLLM PyPI compromise: TeamPCP compromised Krish Dholakia's personal GitHub account (LiteLLM co-founder and CEO) on March 23-24. This was not a generic CI/CD token sweep -- the attacker specifically identified and targeted a named executive's account from the stolen credential trove harvested during the Trivy/Checkmarx phase. This detail refines the attack chain narrative. TeamPCP appears to be triaging stolen credentials for maximum impact, targeting package maintainers with PyPI publishing privileges rather than indiscriminately using every credential they harvested. MEDIUM: CISA KEV Remediation Deadline Correction -- April 8, Not April 3 Update 001 reported the CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 as April 3, 2026. The official CISA KEV catalog entry shows the actual deadline is April 8, 2026. This update corrects the previously reported date. Additionally, Help Net Security reports that CISA simultaneously added CVE-2026-33017 (Langflow unauthenticated RCE, affecting versions prior to 1.8.2) alongside the Trivy CVE in the same KEV update. The pairing of two AI/ML infrastructure tool vulnerabilities in a single KEV addition signals that CISA is treating AI toolchain supply chain security as a systemic risk category. Federal agencies now face remediation deadlines of April 8 for CVE-2026-33634 (Trivy) and April 9 for CVE-2026-33017 (Langflow). INFO: LiteLLM's Compliance Certifications Performed by Embattled Auditor TechCrunch reported on March 26 that LiteLLM's SOC2 and ISO 27001 certifications were performed by Delve, a YC startup currently under scrutiny for allegations of "rubber-stamped" compliance audits. This intersection of two Silicon Valley scandals raises questions about the effectiveness of third-party compliance certifications in the AI/ML supply chain ecosystem. HIGH: First Responder Publishes Full Attack Transcript With New IOCs FutureSearch has published the full forensic transcript from Callum McMahon, the engineer who first discovered the compromised LiteLLM package and coordinated the PyPI quarantine on March 24. McMahon used Claude Code to perform real-time forensic analysis of the malicious litellm==1.82.8 package in an isolated Docker environment, producing what is likely the most detailed public record of this attack's execution. Key technical findings not previously documented in the campaign report: .pth file exploitation: The payload (litellm_init.pth , 34 KB) exploited Python's automatic.pth site-packages execution, triggering on every Python interpreter startup -- not just when LiteLLM was imported. This is a persistence mechanism that runs across all Python processes in the environment. C2 domain: models.litellm.cloud -- a typosquat of LiteLLM's legitimate infrastructure, used for HTTPS exfiltration with RSA encryption. Persistence path: ~/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py with systemd service registration. In McMahon's case, the write was interrupted at 0 bytes by a forced reboot. Kubernetes lateral movement: The payload attempted to create privileged alpine:latest pods and harvest service account tokens from/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token , usingnode-setup-* pod naming to blend with legitimate infrastructure. Multi-cloud credential sweep: A single payload targeted SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, .env files, database passwords, crypto wallets, and shell history simultaneously. Accidental fork bomb: The .pth auto-execution combined with subprocess spawning created exponential process multiplication -- each child Python process re-triggered the payload, causing resource exhaustion that inadvertently exposed the attack. The 72-minute timeline from detection to public PyPI quarantine demonstrates how AI-assisted forensic analysis dramatically accelerated incident response. This transcript is highly instructive for defenders studying the attack mechanics and should be reviewed by any team performing forensic analysis of TeamPCP-compromised environments. Recommended action: Search environments for the C2 domain models.litellm.cloud, the persistence path ~/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py, unexpected .pth files in site-packages directories, and node-setup-* pods in Kubernetes clusters. These IOCs supplement the indicators in the parent report. INFO: GitHub Announces Actions Security Roadmap in Response to Supply Chain Attacks GitHub has published a 2026 security roadmap for GitHub Actions that directly references the TeamPCP campaign. The blog post states: "incidents targeting projects like tj-actions/changed-file, Nx, and trivy-action show a clear pattern: attackers are targeting CI/CD automation itself." The roadmap introduces three categories of controls that, if implemented at the time of the Trivy compromise, would have materially altered the attack surface: Workflow dependency locking: A new dependencies: section in workflow YAML pins all direct and transitive action references to immutable commit SHAs. Hash mismatches stop execution before jobs run. This directly addresses the tag-rewriting TTP that TeamPCP used to redirect 76 trivy-action tags and all 91 ast-github-action tags to malicious commits. Public preview in 3-6 months. Policy-driven execution controls: Rulesets-based policies that restrict which actors can trigger workflows, which events are permitted, and which execution contexts can access secrets. Scoped secrets prevent a single compromised token from accessing all repository secrets. Public preview in 3-6 months. Egress firewall for hosted runners: Layer 7 network monitoring and enforcement for GitHub-hosted runners, restricting which external domains workflows can reach. This would have blocked the exfiltration to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org andmodels.litellm.cloud . Public preview in 6-9 months. Analysts assess these controls represent the most substantive platform-level response to the GitHub Actions supply chain attack vector to date. However, the 3-9 month rollout timeline means organizations remain exposed to tag-rewriting and credential theft TTPs in the interim. Pinning actions to full commit SHAs remains the primary defensive measure until dependency locking reaches GA. Additional Intelligence Kaspersky publishes independent verification: Kaspersky published their own technical advisory characterizing this as a unified "trojanization" campaign, independently verifying the attack chain and broadening awareness to their enterprise customer base. GitGuardian draws "Shai Hulud" parallel: GitGuardian frames the campaign alongside the "Shai Hulud" attack pattern -- both targeting CI/CD pipelines to harvest secrets rather than attacking applications directly. Their analysis emphasizes that Aqua Security's non-atomic credential rotation was the root cause enabling the second compromise wave (Docker Hub images v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 on March 22). Corrections to Update 001 Aqua Security "additional findings" deadline: Update 001 stated "Aqua Security promised additional findings by end of day March 26" as a watch item. This was incorrect. On March 23, 2026, Aqua Security's blog stated they would "provide a further update, including additional findings, tomorrow end of day" -- meaning end of day March 24, not March 26. Aqua published their comprehensive incident report, "Trivy Supply Chain Attack: What Happened and What You Need to Know", on March 24 at 23:00 UTC, meeting their stated deadline. The report covers the full attack timeline, root cause (non-atomic credential rotation after the March 1 incident), and remediation details. This is no longer a watch item. CISA KEV remediation deadline: Also corrected in this update's MEDIUM finding above -- April 8, not April 3 as originally reported in Update 001. Watch Items Vect ransomware affiliate key distribution and first deployments linked to TeamPCP credentials Additional PyPI packages compromised via stolen credentials (telnyx confirms the pattern) AstraZeneca confirmation or denial of the LAPSUS$ breach claim Mandiant formal attribution report (BerriAI engagement announced, report pending) CISA standalone advisory or emergency directive (KEV entries issued, no dedicated advisory yet) Expansion to RubyGems, crates.io, or Maven Central (Endor Labs prediction, not yet confirmed) LiteLLM/BerriAI forensics completion and release resumption The full campaign report is available at sans.org/white-papers/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. A SANS Emergency Webcast replay is available at sans.org/webcasts/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. Updates to the report will be in the form of these ISC diaries.
isc.sans.eduMar 27, 2026extracted
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Update 001 - Checkmarx Scope Wider Than Reported, CISA KEV Entry, and Detection Tools Available, (Thu, Mar 26th)
This is the first update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). That report covers the full campaign from the February 28 initial access through the March 24 LiteLLM PyPI compromise. This update covers developments since publication. Checkmarx ast-github-action: All 91 Tags Were Compromised, Not Just v2.3.28 The most significant new finding since the report's publication: the scope of the Checkmarx ast-github-action compromise was substantially larger than publicly reported. Checkmarx's official security advisory stated that "all older versions have been permanently deleted" but did not quantify how many tags were affected. This ambiguity allowed the security community to anchor on a single confirmed version — v2.3.28 — as the extent of the compromise. Sysdig's analysis characterized it as "Checkmarx/ast-github-action/2.3.28: (possibly more)." Even Wiz, which assessed that "it is likely all tags were impacted," only observed the single tag directly. An independent security researcher who was working this incident firsthand at a Checkmarx customer has now provided primary evidence that all 91 published tags were overwritten — every version from v0.1-alpha through v2.3.32. The evidence is publicly visible in the GitHub activity log, which shows 91 tag deletions performed during Checkmarx's remediation between 19:09 and 19:16 UTC on March 23, 2026. Three of the malicious commits are still visible on GitHub: Each malicious commit follows an identical pattern: the legitimate Docker-based action.yml was replaced with a composite action that executes a credential-stealing setup.sh before delegating to the legitimate Checkmarx action at pinned SHA 327efb5d. Each commit was individually crafted with a version-appropriate backdated timestamp and fake commit message (e.g., "2.0.30: PR #"). The attacker did not reuse a single malicious commit across multiple tags — they created individual poisoned commits for individual versions. The impact of this under-reporting is material. Organizations that searched their CI/CD logs only for [email protected] would have missed compromised runs referencing any of the other 90 poisoned tags. The credential stealer executed regardless of which tag version was referenced. Recommended action: Search your CI/CD workflow logs for ANY reference to checkmarx/ast-github-action that executed between 12:58 and 19:16 UTC on March 23, 2026. If found, treat all secrets accessible to that workflow as compromised and rotate immediately. The only safe version is v2.3.33, released during remediation. For comparison, the companion kics-github-action received accurate "all 35 tags" reporting from the outset, largely because GitHub Issue #152 was filed publicly with the title "Malware injected in all Git Tags." No equivalent public issue was filed for ast-github-action. CISA Adds CVE-2026-33634 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog CISA has added CVE-2026-33634 (CVSS 9.4) to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, confirming active exploitation. Federal agencies are required to remediate by April 3, 2026. All organizations using Trivy, trivy-action, or setup-trivy should verify they are running safe versions: Trivy binary: ≥ v0.69.2 trivy-action: v0.35.0 (or pin to SHA 57a97c7e7821a5776cebc9bb87c984fa69cba8f1 ) setup-trivy: v0.2.6 (re-released clean) PyPI Quarantine Lifted; LiteLLM Freezes All Releases PyPI lifted its quarantine of the LiteLLM package on March 25 at 20:15 UTC. Malicious versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 have been yanked. However, BerriAI has announced they are pausing all new LiteLLM releases pending a complete supply chain security review. Google's Mandiant has been engaged for forensic analysis. The last known-safe version is v1.82.6.rc.2. Any installation of LiteLLM v1.82.7 or v1.82.8 should be treated as compromised — rotate all credentials that were present as environment variables, in configuration files, or in Kubernetes secrets on the affected system. Community Detection Tools Now Available Two community-developed detection tools are now available: jthack/litellm-vuln-detector — Scans for malicious .pth files, persistence backdoors (~/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py , systemd user services), exfiltration domains (models.litellm.cloud ), and attacker Kubernetes pods (node-setup-* inkube-system ). Community detection gist — Checks for compromised LiteLLM versions and TeamPCP indicators. Run these against your CI/CD runners, developer workstations, and any systems where LiteLLM was installed during the March 24 exposure window. Additional Intelligence TeamPCP Telegram statement: The threat actor posted to their Telegram channel: "These companies were built to protect your supply chains yet they can't even protect their own... we're gonna be around for a long time stealing terrabytes [sic] of trade secrets with our new partners." Socket.dev characterizes this as confirmation that TeamPCP is deliberately and systematically targeting security tools as a strategy. Wiz publishes third analysis: Wiz Research published "Three's a Crowd: TeamPCP Trojanizes LiteLLM", confirming LiteLLM is present in 36% of cloud environments they monitor. This is the third Wiz blog post covering the campaign arc (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM). RSA Conference timing: Analysts assess that TeamPCP may have deliberately timed the LiteLLM attack to coincide with RSA Conference, when many security teams had reduced staffing. This assessment, reported by CSO Online, is based on temporal correlation and has not been confirmed by the threat actor or forensic evidence. Parallel campaign — ForceMemo: SecurityWeek reports a separate campaign ("ForceMemo") using credentials stolen via GlassWorm VS Code extensions to force-push malicious code into approximately 150 GitHub Python repositories. This is NOT TeamPCP but demonstrates the breadth of the current supply chain threat landscape. Watch Items Named victim breach disclosures — expected imminently given active extortion Expansion to RubyGems, crates.io, or Maven Central — predicted by Endor Labs but not yet confirmed Aqua Security promised additional findings by end of day March 26 CISA standalone advisory — KEV entry issued, but no dedicated advisory document yet The full campaign report is available at sans.org/white-papers/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. A SANS Emergency Webcast is scheduled at sans.org/webcasts/when-security-scanner-became-weapon.
isc.sans.eduMar 26, 2026extracted
APT37 hackers use new malware to breach air-gapped networks
North Korean hackers are deploying newly uncovered tools to move data between internet-connected and air-gapped systems, spread via removable drives, and conduct covert surveillance. The malicious campaign has been named Ruby Jumper and is attributed to the state-backed group APT37, also known as ScarCruft, Ricochet Chollima, and InkySquid. Air-gapped computers are disconnected from external networks, especially the public internet. Physical isolation is achieved at the hardware level by removing all connectivity (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Ethernet), while logical segregation relies on various software-defined controls, like VLANs and firewalls. In a physical air-gap environment, typical in critical infrastructure, military, and research sectors, data transfer is done through removable storage drives. Researchers at cloud security company Zscaler analyzed the malware employed in APT37's Ruby Jumper campaign and identified a toolkit of five malicious tools: RESTLEAF, SNAKEDROPPER, THUMBSBD, VIRUSTASK, and FOOTWINE. Bridging the air gap The infection chain begins when the victim opens a malicious Windows shortcut file (LNK), which deploys a PowerShell script that extracts payloads embedded in the LNK file. To divert attention, the script also launches a decoy document. Although the researchers did not specify any victims, they note that the document is an Arabic translation of a North Korean newspaper article about the Palestine-Israel conflict. The PowerShell script loads the first malware component, called RESTLEAF, an implant that communicates with APT37's command-and-control (C2) infrastructure using Zoho WorkDrive. RESTLEAF fetches encrypted shellcode from the C2 to download the next-stage payload, a Ruby-based loader named SNAKEDROPPER. The attack continues with installing the Ruby 3.3.0 runtime environment - complete with the interpreter, standard libraries, and gem infrastructure - disguised as a legitimate USB-related utility named usbspeed.exe. "SNAKEDROPPER is primed for execution by replacing the RubyGems default file operating_system.rb with a maliciously modified version that is automatically loaded when the Ruby interpreter starts," via a scheduled task (rubyupdatecheck) that executes every five minutes, the researchers say. The THUMBSBD backdoor is downloaded as a Ruby file named ascii.rb, as well as the VIRUSTASK malware as the bundler_index_client.rb file. The role of THUMBSBD is to collect system information, stage command files, and prepare data for exfiltration. Its most crucial function is to create hidden directories on detected USB drives and copy files to them. According to the researchers, the malware turns removable storage devices "into a bidirectional covert C2 relay." This allows the threat actor to deliver commands to air-gapped systems as well as extract data from them. “By leveraging removable media as an intermediary transport layer, the malware bridges otherwise air-gapped network segments,” Zscaler researchers say. VIRUSTASK's role is to spread the infection to new air-gapped machines, weaponizing removable drives by hiding legitimate files and replacing them with malicious shortcuts that execute the embedded Ruby interpreter when opened. The module will only trigger an infection process if the inserted removable media has at least 2GB of free space. Zscaler reports that THUMBSBD also delivers FOOTWINE, a Windows spyware backdoor disguised as an Android package file (APK) that supports keylogging, screenshot capture, audio and video recording, file manipulation, registry access, and remote shell commands. Another piece of malware also observed in the APT37's RubyJumper campaign is BLUELIGHT, a full-fledged backdoor previously associated with the North Korean threat group. Zscaler has high confidence attributing the RubyJumper campaign to APT37 based on several indicators, including the use of the BLUELIGHT malware, initial vector relying on LNK files, two-stage shellcode delivery technique, and C2 infrastructure typically observed in attacks from this actor. The researchers also note that the decoy document indicates that the target of the RubyJumper activity is interested in North Korean media narratives, which aligns with the victim profile of this threat group. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comFeb 27, 2026extracted
The OpenClaw Hype: Analysis of Chatter from Open-Source Deep and Dark Web
OpenClaw started as a side project of a developer who wanted to make his (and others) life easier with AI assistance. Clean mailbox, control schedule, organize thoughts and hear some music while his bot is doing all the dirty jobs for him. With vibe coding Peter Steinberger developed OpenClaw. Kudus for that. But since then apart from changing its name twice it created a massive chatter around two topics. The AI hype and its cyber security implications. This project has rapidly moved from a niche automation framework discussed in developer communities to a topic appearing across security research feeds, Telegram channels, forums, and underground-adjacent chatter. Alongside it, names like ClawDBot and MoltBot have appeared in the same narrative space, often framed as malicious derivatives, companion tooling, or botnet-like ecosystems. However, when Flare looked at aggregated telemetry across open sources, social platforms, and fringe underground discussions, a more nuanced story emerges. The data suggests a real supply-chain security risk, but one that has not yet been fully weaponized into a mass-exploitation ecosystem. Instead, the conversation appears largely driven by security research amplification, platform hype cycles, and early-stage experimentation. What OpenClaw Is: AI Automation Framework With Plugin Marketplace OpenClaw is an AI-powered automation framework that allows users to manage emails, schedules, and system tasks through modular "skills"—user-installable plugins that execute commands on behalf of users. The platform architecture includes: Local or remote agent nodes that run automation tasks A skills marketplace (ClawHub) where users download plugins API integrations for external services (SSH, cloud platforms, productivity tools) Centralized orchestration through gateway components Conceptually, OpenClaw behaves less like a single application and more like a lightweight automation operating environment. That architectural model is powerful and also creates a large attack surface. The moment execution logic becomes modular and user-installable, the platform inherits the same risks historically seen in: Browser extension ecosystems Package managers (npm, PyPI, RubyGems) IDE plugin stores CI/CD automation marketplaces OpenClaw's skills ecosystem is where most of the real security discussion currently lives. This project has rapidly moved from a niche automation framework discussed in developer communities to a topic appearing across security research feeds, Telegram channels, forums, and underground-adjacent chatter. Clawdbot (the original name) was released in November 2025, but the real hype began during January 2026, as reflected in Flare's threat monitoring platform: Alongside it, names like ClawdBot and MoltBot have appeared in the same narrative space, often framed as malicious derivatives, companion tooling, or botnet-like ecosystems. However, when examining aggregated telemetry across open sources, social platforms, and underground discussions, a more nuanced story emerges. The data suggests a real supply-chain security risk, but not yet a fully weaponized, mass-exploitation ecosystem. Instead, the conversation appears largely driven by security research amplification, platform hype cycles, and early-stage experimentation. Flare monitors Telegram channels and dark web forums where threat actors share malicious automation tools, poisoned plugins, and credential-stealing exploits. Detect when your infrastructure appears in attacker discussions before damage occurs. Start Free Trial Critical Security Flaws Enable Remote Code Execution and Credential Theft Security researchers identified multiple critical vulnerabilities that made OpenClaw an attractive target for supply chain attacks: Confirmed Critical Vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-25253 (One-click RCE): Malicious links can steal authentication tokens and trigger remote code execution without requiring skill installation—attackers can compromise systems through a single click. Malicious Skill Supply Chain: Hundreds of poisoned skills uploaded to ClawHub delivering infostealers, remote access trojans (RATs), and backdoors disguised as legitimate automation tools. No Skill Sandboxing: Skills execute with full agent and system permissions, allowing malware to access credentials, files, and network resources without restriction. Prompt Injection Attacks: Malicious content can manipulate AI agents into executing attacker-controlled workflows through natural language commands, bypassing traditional software vulnerabilities. Token and OAuth Abuse: Attackers leverage stolen or inherited authentication tokens to trigger legitimate API actions, making malicious activity appear authorized. Common Deployment Misconfigurations: Agents running with root or excessive system privileges Publicly exposed OpenClaw instances with weak authentication Skills dynamically pulling and executing remote code Shadow deployments operating outside security team visibility Emerging Attack Patterns: Credential-stealing skills Instruction/reasoning hijacking Multi-stage kill chains Once executed, these malicious skills harvest credentials, session cookies, and sensitive data from the compromised system, packaging them into stealer logs distributed through underground markets. Underground Forums Show Limited Exploitation Despite High Discussion Volume Flare's analysis of underground discussions reveals an emerging threat landscape that hasn't yet reached mass criminal operationalization: Dataset Analysis Across 2,764 collected records from underground forums and Telegram channels: OpenClaw mentions: 3,072 ClawDBot mentions: 1,365 MoltBot mentions: 864 ClawHub marketplace references: 90 However, breaking down the discussion types shows: Skills security discussions: 193 mentions ClawHub ecosystem references: 110 mentions Infostealer references: 53 mentions Botnet orchestration: 8 mentions DDoS infrastructure: 7 mentions What This Distribution Reveals If OpenClaw were already weaponized at scale for mass exploitation, underground forums would typically show: Active tool sales and access broker offerings Botnet panel discussions and leaked administration interfaces Established monetization threads with pricing structures Commercial exploitation services Instead, the conversation consists primarily of: Security research reports and technical analysis Platform risk speculation and proof-of-concept discussions Early-stage experimentation without commercial operations Tool confusion across different communities (ClawDBot vs MoltBot naming) This supply chain poisoning approach mirrors tactics seen in traditional infostealer distribution campaigns, where attackers disguise malware as legitimate software to compromise user systems at scale. The One Area That Is Real: Supply Chain Skill Abuse The strongest confirmed risk pattern currently visible is: Malicious skill distribution. Execution inside trusted automation context. Payload run - Credential / session / data exfiltration. This is enough to be dangerous, even without botnet-scale weaponization. Automation frameworks collapse the distance between initial access and privileged execution. If a malicious skill lands inside a trusted agent, the attacker effectively inherits the permissions of the automation environment. Why Security Researchers Are Driving the Conversation The most likely explanation for the current OpenClaw hype cycle is timing. OpenClaw sits at the intersection of three major trends: Agentic automation platforms Plugin marketplace trust models AI-assisted workflow execution Security researchers tend to detect these risks early, before criminal ecosystems fully monetize them. Conclusion: High Risk Potential, Early Exploitation Stage The combined dataset suggests that OpenClaw is not currently showing signs of mass criminal operationalization at scale. Instead, what we see is: A real supply-chain risk surface (skills ecosystem) Heavy research-driven discussion volume Early experimentation and PoC-level malicious capability Strong narrative amplification across social and fringe underground channels The security community is talking about OpenClaw more than threat actors are currently exploiting it. Having said that, this is not a reason to ignore it. Historically, this phase often precedes real weaponization by weeks or months. The lesson from OpenClaw is less about one framework and more about a broader shift. Automation platforms with plugin ecosystems are becoming high-value targets long before organizations realize they have deployed them at scale. Sponsored and written by Flare.
bleepingcomputer.comFeb 25, 2026extracted
Open source registries don't have enough money to implement basic security
FOSDEM 2026 Open source registries are in financial peril, a co-founder of an open source security foundation warned after inspecting their books. And it's not just the bandwidth costs that are killing them. "The problem is they don't have enough money to spend on the very security features that we all desperately need to stop being a bunch of idiots and installing fu when it's malware," said Michael Winser, a co-founder of Alpha-Omega, a Linux Foundation project to help secure the open source supply chain. Winser spoke at FOSDEM this year, in a talk we dropped in on virtually. Trusted registries are widely treated as a key component of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) - driven supply chain security efforts, one of the main approaches promoted for securing open source software. Rule one: Get your open source packages from a trusted source. Yet many of these registries operate on razor-thin margins, relying on non-continuous funding from grants, donations, and in-kind resources. Google and Microsoft kicked in an initial $5 million to launch Alpha-Omega in 2022 under the Open Source Security Foundation. And the first thing Winser noticed when he ramped up operations was that open source registries are all dirt poor. All the major registries are facing the same issue: They're experiencing exponential growth, even though their investment in infrastructure and people remains flat. "We're living on borrowed time," he warned. Scant money for security "One of the problems that people have is they actually conflate open source software and open source infrastructure," Winser said. Open source software itself is free to use, and its costs don't increase the more people use it. The costs of registries to hold all open source applications and libraries, however, do indeed keep increasing with greater usage. Packages don't go away. Collections just grow larger and larger. And AI is now adding to the pile at a considerable clip. In 2025, Alpha-Omega took a deep dive into the operations of some of the largest registries, including PyPI, Node.js's npm, Rust's Crates.io, RubyGems, and Maven Central for the Java folks. Winser ginned up a mock version of Family Feud (play here) to help FOSDEMers guess the 10 biggest expenses for these registries. Bandwidth naturally turned out to be the #1 cost, about 25% of the total expenses. Storage (18%), compute (15%) and battling malware (12%) all followed. New feature development barely registers at 2% and documentation wasn't even in the top 10. In a follow-up LinkedIn exchange after this article had posted, Winser estimated it could cost $5 million to $8 million a year to run a major registry the size of Crates.io, which gets about 125 billion downloads a year. And this number wouldn't include any substantial bandwidth and infrastructure donations (Like Fastly's for Crates.io). Adding to that bill is the growing cost of identifying malware, the proliferation of which has been amplified through the use of AI and scripts. These repositories have detected 845,000 malware packages from 2019 to January 2025 (the vast majority of those nasty packages came to npm). It now takes a median of 39 hours to remove malicious packages — more than enough time for a self-propagating worm to spread through an ecosystem, as the Shai-Hulud outbreak did across npm in September. Secure that bag The good news may be that "Registries are effective monopolies. They own the name space," as Winser put it. But as monopolies, their hold is tenuous at best, because "the cost of spinning up an alternative, crappy registry, is effectively zero," he added. Winser went through the various ways of covering expenses, though none, he calculated, could fully defray expenses. The obvious solution would be to start charging for bandwidth. Caching and mirroring, though they lower bandwidth costs, do not solve the problem. As soon as a registry starts charging, other entities will most likely start caching the artefacts, offering them gratis. And they should be doing this anyway, Winser noted, for the benefit of the registry. "If you're not caching you're a goddamn idiot," Winser said. In some cases benevolent parties can cover these bills: Python's PyPI registry bandwidth needs for shipping copies of its 700,000+ packages (amounting to 747PB annually at a sustained rate of 189 Gbps) are underwritten by Fastly, for instance. Otherwise, the project would have to pony up about $1.8 million a month. Yet the costs Winser was most concerned about are not bandwidth or hosting; they are the security features needed to ensure the integrity of containers and packages. Alpha-Omega underwrites a "distressingly" large amount of security work around registries, he said. It's distressing because if Alpha-Omega itself were to miss a funding round, a lot of registries would be screwed. Alpha-Omega's recipients include the Python Software Foundation, Rust Foundation, Eclipse Foundation, OpenJS Foundation for Node.js and jQuery, and Ruby Central. Donations and memberships certainly help defray costs. Volunteers do a lot of what otherwise would be very expensive work. And there are grants about. Winser churned through other ways to pay the bills. How about running an app store? Charging $0.99 per package seems pretty reasonable, yes? Yet this approach faces several immediate challenges. For starters, the package maintainers will want a cut of that. Setting up and maintaining payment infrastructure would incur additional costs. Plus, open source developers probably would not be okay with any form of digital rights management, so the containers they will download will be unencumbered and easy to copy around. Any attempt to monetize a monopoly will immediately result in people routing around it. "They've done this time and time again," Winser said. Back to square one. The same problems would apply to a subscription model, in Winser's view. One person buys a subscription to the registry then shares the log-in with his friends, like you do with your streaming accounts. How about charging the producers of the open source software? In effect, the registry becomes the publisher. This, Winser argued, would cause a fair number of projects, or companies with open source projects, to set up their own registry sites, fragmenting the community. And who knows what their security posture will be. Another approach: Add enterprise features, then charge for them. This has worked for some service providers – such as GitHub – so perhaps it could work for registries as well. Still, corporations aren't exactly clamoring for enterprise registries, Winser noted. And if they want to pay for security features, it will probably be through a security vendor. "Anybody have any better ideas?" Winser asked the crowd, rhetorically. One audience member suggested ads. Winser did not offer a solution, though he suggested the key is to convince the corporate bean counters to consider paid registries as "a normal cost of doing business and have it show up in their opex as opposed to their [open source program office] donation budget." "I don't have the answers," he admitted. The cost of free beer Money is a rarely discussed aspect of open source. The software is just supposed to be like free beer, right? Hospitals, universities, and museums are all nonprofits, yet they still charge for services. In fact it is good practice; otherwise people will abuse the system. But in open source, the idea of payment remains taboo. Open source may indeed be like free beer, but no one enjoys their frothy lager served chock full of parasites and bacteria. So maybe we all should get used to ponying up at the bar. ® Update: This post has been updated with the correct number ofCrates.io downloads, as well as with revised registry cost estimates from Winser.
go.theregister.comFeb 16, 2026extracted
Researchers Expose GhostCall and GhostHire: BlueNoroff's New Malware Chains
Threat actors tied to North Korea have been observed targeting the Web3 and blockchain sectors as part of twin campaigns tracked as GhostCall and GhostHire. According to Kaspersky, the campaigns are part of a broader operation called SnatchCrypto that has been underway since at least 2017. The activity is attributed to a Lazarus Group sub-cluster called BlueNoroff, which is also known as APT38, CageyChameleon, CryptoCore, Genie Spider, Nickel Gladstone, Sapphire Sleet (formerly Copernicium), and Stardust Chollima. Victims of the GhostCall campaign span several infected macOS hosts located in Japan, Italy, France, Singapore, Turkey, Spain, Sweden, India, and Hong Kong, whereas Japan and Australia have been identified as the major hunting grounds for the GhostHire campaign. "GhostCall heavily targets the macOS devices of executives at tech companies and in the venture capital sector by directly approaching targets via platforms like Telegram, and inviting potential victims to investment-related meetings linked to Zoom-like phishing websites," Kaspersky researchers Sojun Ryu and Omar Amin said. "The victim would join a fake call with genuine recordings of this threat's other actual victims rather than deepfakes. The call proceeds smoothly to then encourages the user to update the Zoom client with a script. Eventually, the script downloads ZIP files that result in infection chains deployed on an infected host." On the other hand, GhostHire involves approaching prospective targets, such as Web3 developers, on Telegram and luring them into downloading and executing a booby-trapped GitHub repository under the pretext of completing a skill assessment within 30 minutes of sharing the link, so as to ensure a higher success rate of infection. Once installed, the project is designed to download a malicious payload onto the developer's system based on the operating system used. The Russian cybersecurity company said it has been keeping tabs on the two campaigns since April 2025, although it's assessed that GhostCall has been active since mid-2023, likely following the RustBucket campaign. RustBucket marked the adversarial collective's major pivot to targeting macOS systems, following which other campaigns have leveraged malware families like KANDYKORN, ObjCShellz, and TodoSwift. It's worth noting that various aspects of the activity have been documented extensively over the past year by multiple security vendors, including Microsoft, Huntress, Field Effect, Huntabil.IT, Validin, and SentinelOne. The GhostCall Campaign Targets who land on the fake Zoom pages as part of the GhostCall campaign are initially served a bogus page that gives the illusion of a live call, only to display an error message three to five seconds later, urging them to download a Zoom software development kit (SDK) to address a purported issue with continuing the call. Should the victims fall for the trap and attempt to update the SDK by clicking on the "Update Now" option, it leads to the download of a malicious AppleScript file onto their system. In the event the victim is using a Windows machine, the attack leverages the ClickFix technique to copy and run a PowerShell command. At each stage, every interaction with the fake site is recorded and beaconed to the attackers to track the victim's actions. As recently as last month, the threat actor has been observed transitioning from Zoom to Microsoft Teams, using the same tactic of tricking users into downloading a TeamsFx SDK this time to trigger the infection chain. Regardless of the lure used, the AppleScript is designed to install a phony application disguised as Zoom or Microsoft Teams. It also downloads another AppleScript dubbed DownTroy that checks stored passwords associated with password management applications and installs additional malware with root privileges. DownTroy, for its part, is engineered to drop several payloads as part of eight distinct attack chains, while also bypassing Apple's Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework - ZoomClutch or TeamsClutch, which uses a Swift-based implant that masquerades as Zoom or Teams while harboring functionality to prompt the user to enter their system password in order to complete the app update and exfiltrate the details to an external server DownTroy v1, which uses a Go-based dropper to launch the AppleScript-based DownTroy malware that's then responsible for downloading additional scripts from the server until the machine is rebooted. CosmicDoor, which uses a C++ binary loader called GillyInjector (aka InjectWithDyld) to run a benign Mach-O app and inject a malicious payload into it at runtime. When it's run with the --d flag, GillyInjector activates its destructive capabilities and irrevocably wipes all files in the current directory. The injected payload is a backdoor written in Nim named CosmicDoor that can communicate with an external server to receive and execute commands. It's believed that the attackers first developed a Go version of CosmicDoor for Windows, before moving to Rust, Python, and Nim variants. It also downloads a bash script stealer suite named SilentSiphon. RooTroy, which uses Nimcore loader to launch GillyInjector, which then injects a Go backdoor called RooTroy (aka Root Troy V4) to collect device information, enumerate running processes, read payload from a specific file, and download additional malware (counting RealTimeTroy) and execute them. RealTimeTroy, which uses Nimcore loader to launch GillyInjector, which then injects a Go backdoor called RealTimeTroy that communicates with an external server using the WSS protocol to read/write files, get directory and process information, upload/download files, terminate a specified process, and get device information. SneakMain, which uses Nimcore loader to launch a Nim payload called SneakMain to receive and execute additional AppleScript commands received from an external server. DownTroy v2, which uses a dropper named CoreKitAgent to launch Nimcore loader, which then launches AppleScript-based DownTroy (aka NimDoor) to download an additional malicious script from an external server. SysPhon, which uses a lightweight version of RustBucket named SysPhon and SUGARLOADER, a known loader previously utilized to deliver the KANDYKORN malware. SysPhon, also employed in the Hidden Risk campaign, is a downloader written in C++ that can conduct reconnaissance and fetch a binary payload from an external server. SilentSiphon is equipped to harvest data from Apple Notes, Telegram, web browser extensions, as well as credentials from browsers and password managers, and secrets stored in configuration files related to a long list of services: GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, npm, Yarn, Python pip, RubyGems, Rust cargo, NET Nuget, AWS, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Oracle Cloud, Akamai Linode, DigitalOcean API, Vercel, Cloudflare, Netlify, Stripe, Firebase, Twilio, CircleCI, Pulumi, HashiCorp, SSH, FTP, Sui Blockchain, Solana, NEAR Blockchain, Aptos Blockchain, Algorand, Docker, Kubernetes, and OpenAI. "While the video feeds for fake calls were recorded via the fabricated Zoom phishing pages the actor created, the profile images of meeting participants appear to have been sourced from job platforms or social media platforms such as LinkedIn, Crunchbase, or X," Kaspersky said. "Interestingly, some of these images were enhanced with [OpenAI] GPT-4o." The GhostHire Campaign The GhostHire campaign, the Russian cybersecurity company added, also dates back to mid-2023, with the attackers initiating contact with the targets directly on Telegram, sharing details of a job offer along with a link to a LinkedIn profile impersonating recruiters at financial companies based in the U.S. in an attempt to lend the conversations a veneer of legitimacy. "Following up on initial communication, the actor adds the target to a user list for a Telegram bot, which displays the impersonated company’s logo and falsely claims to streamline technical assessments for candidates," Kaspersky explained. "The bot then sends the victim an archive file (ZIP) containing a coding assessment project, along with a strict deadline (often around 30 minutes) to pressure the target into quickly completing the task. This urgency increases the likelihood of the target executing the malicious content, leading to initial system compromise." The project in itself is innocuous, but incorporates a malicious dependency in the form of a malicious Go module hosted on GitHub (e.g., uniroute), causing the infection sequence to be triggered once the project is executed. This includes first determining the operating system of the victim's computer and delivering an appropriate next-stage payload (i.e., DownTroy) programmed in PowerShell (Windows), bash script (Linux), or AppleScript (macOS). Also deployed via DownTroy in the attacks targeting Windows are RooTroy, RealTimeTroy, a Go version of CosmicDoor, and Rust-based loader named Bof that's used to decode and launch an encrypted shellcode payload stored in the "C:\Windows\system32\" folder. "Our research indicates a sustained effort by the actor to develop malware targeting both Windows and macOS systems, orchestrated through a unified command-and-control infrastructure," Kaspersky said. "The use of generative AI has significantly accelerated this process, enabling more efficient malware development with reduced operational overhead." "The actor's targeting strategy has evolved beyond simple cryptocurrency and browser credential theft. Upon gaining access, they conduct comprehensive data acquisition across a range of assets, including infrastructure, collaboration tools, note-taking applications, development environments, and communication platforms (messengers)."
thehackernews.comOct 28, 2025extracted
npm, PyPI, and RubyGems Packages Found Sending Developer Data to Discord Channels
Cybersecurity researchers have identified several malicious packages across npm, Python, and Ruby ecosystems that leverage Discord as a command-and-control (C2) channel to transmit stolen data to actor-controlled webhooks. Webhooks on Discord are a way to post messages to channels in the platform without requiring a bot user or authentication, making them an attractive mechanism for attackers to exfiltrate data to a channel under their control. "Importantly, webhook URLs are effectively write-only," Socket researcher Olivia Brown said in an analysis. "They do not expose channel history, and defenders cannot read back prior posts just by knowing the URL." The software supply chain security company said it identified a number of packages that use Discord webhooks in various ways - mysql-dumpdiscord (npm), which siphons the contents of developer configuration files like config.json, .env, ayarlar.js, and ayarlar.json to a Discord webhook nodejs.discord (npm), which uses a Discord webhook to likely log alerts (an approach that's not inherently malicious) malinssx, malicus, and maliinn (PyPI), which uses Discord as a C2 server by triggering an HTTP request to a channel every time the packages are installed using "pip install " sqlcommenter_rails (RubyGems.org), which collects host information, including contents of sensitive files like "/etc/passwd" and "/etc/resolv.conf," and sends it to a hard-coded Discord webhook "Abuse of Discord webhooks as C2 matters because it flips the economics of supply chain attacks," Brown noted. "By being free and fast, threat actors avoid hosting and maintaining their own infrastructure. Also, they often blend in to regular code and firewall rules, allowing exfiltration even from secured victims." "When paired with install-time hooks or build scripts, malicious packages with Discord C2 mechanism can quietly siphon .env files, API keys, and host details from developer machines and CI runners long before runtime monitoring ever sees the app." Contagious Interview Floods npm With Fake Packages The disclosure comes as the company also flagged 338 malicious packages published by North Korean threat actors associated with the Contagious Interview campaign, using them to deliver malware families like HexEval, XORIndex, and encrypted loaders that deliver BeaverTail, instead of directly dropping the JavaScript stealer and downloader. The packages were collectively downloaded more than 50,000 times. "In this latest wave, North Korean threat actors used more than 180 fake personas tied to new npm aliases and registration emails, and ran over a dozen command and control (C2) endpoints," security researcher Kirill Boychenko said. Targets of the campaign include Web3, cryptocurrency, and blockchain developers, as well as job seekers in the technical sector, who are approached on professional platforms like LinkedIn with lucrative opportunities. Prospective targets are then instructed to complete a coding assignment by cloning a booby-trapped repository that references a malicious package (e.g., eslint-detector) that's already published to the npm registry. Once run locally on the machine, the package referenced in the supposed project acts as a stealer (i.e., BeaverTail) to harvest browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, macOS Keychain, keystrokes, clipboard content, and screenshots. The malware is designed to download additional payloads, including a cross-platform Python backdoor codenamed InvisibleFerret. Of the hundreds of packages uploaded by North Korean actors, many of them are typosquats of their legitimate counterparts (e.g., dotevn vs. dotenv), especially those related to Node.js, Express, or frontend frameworks like React. Some of the identified libraries have also been found to be lookalikes of Web3 kits (e.g., ethrs.js vs. ethers.js). "Contagious Interview is not a cybercrime hobby, it operates like an assembly line or a factory-model supply chain threat," Boychenko said. "It is a state-directed, quota-driven operation with durable resourcing, not a weekend crew, and removing a malicious package is insufficient if the associated publisher account remains active." "The campaign's trajectory points to a durable, factory-style operation that treats the npm ecosystem as a renewable initial access channel."
thehackernews.comOct 14, 2025extracted
GitHub tightens npm security with mandatory 2FA, access tokens
GitHub is introducing a set of defenses against supply-chain attacks on the platform that led to multiple large-scale incidents recently. Notable cyberattacks that started from compromising GitHub repositories and then spread to NPM include the "s1ngularity" attack in late August, the "GhostAction" campaign in early September, and the worm-style campaign dubbed "Shai-Hulud" from last week. The attacks led to the compromise of thousands of accounts and private repositories, the theft of sensitive data, and significant remediation costs. Although GitHub responded quickly to minimize the impact of these incidents, the developer platform admits that stronger proactive measures would be more effective. To reduce these risks, GitHub announced that it would gradually implement the following measures: Require two-factor authentication (2FA) for local publishing. Enforce granular tokens with a 7-day lifetime. Expand and encourage the adoption of trusted publishing. Deprecate classic tokens and TOTP 2FA (migrating to FIDO-based 2FA). Shorten the expiration of publishing tokens. Default publishing access to disallow tokens. Remove the option to bypass 2FA for local publishing. Trusted publishing, already adopted across multiple ecosystems, is strongly encouraged as it eliminates the need to manage API tokens in build systems. NPM maintainers are advised to switch to trusted publishing immediately, as well as to enforce 2FA for publishing and writing, and use WebAuth instead of time-based one-time passwords (TOTP) for 2FA. The code hosting and collaboration platform will roll out these changes gradually and provide the necessary documentation and migration guides to minimize disruption to existing workflows. The announcement also stresses that ecosystem security is a collective duty, and developers are expected to take action themselves to mitigate supply-chain risks by adopting the better security options available on the platform. Ruby Central also announced tighter governance of the RubyGems package manager to improve its supply-chain protections. This ecosystem also suffered from similar problems recently, like a campaign with 60 malicious Ruby gems that were downloaded 275,000 times, and another one typosquating the Fastlane project for Telegram. Until the new governance model and underlying policies are finalized, only Ruby Central staff will hold admin access. The announcement promises a shift to a more transparent, community-centered model. A Q&A scheduled for later today is expected to clear concerns related to the sudden action, which many Ruby community members characterized as a crude takeover. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comSep 23, 2025extracted
60 Gems Dannose su RubyGems: Furto di Credenziali con Typosquatting
Betti RHC, la prima graphic novel al mondo dedicata alla cybersecurity awareness, ha finalmente il suo sito ufficiale. Uno spazio tutto suo dove scoprire il progetto, sfogliare le copertine degli episodi e immergersi nel mondo di Betti: la giovane laureanda in informatica che, dopo la morte misteriosa del padre, si trasforma nell'hacker più potente del mondo. Una storia avvincente che, episodio dopo episodio, affronta una minaccia digitale diversa — dal phishing al ransomware, fino al cyberbullismo — e insegna a riconoscerla e a difendersi, senza che sembri mai una lezione. Sul sito trovate tutto ciò che rende Betti un progetto diverso dal solito: la sua filosofia, le anteprime delle tavole e il racconto di come nasce ogni volume. Perché dietro Betti RHC c'è solo lavoro umano: ogni tavola è disegnata interamente a mano dagli artisti del Gruppo Arte di Red Hot Cyber, senza alcun uso di intelligenza artificiale. E a garantire che ogni storia sia realistica e tecnicamente corretta c'è la supervisione degli hacker etici del gruppo HackerHood, che mantengono il racconto fedele al mondo reale della sicurezza informatica. C'è spazio anche per le aziende, che possono usare Betti come strumento di awareness diverso dai soliti corsi: acquistare i volumi, personalizzarli con il proprio brand o sponsorizzare nuovi episodi. E come primo regalo, l'episodio "Byte the Silence", dedicato al cyberbullismo, è scaricabile gratuitamente per uso personale. Perché la miglior difesa, in fondo, è una bella storia. 👉 Scopri tutto su https://betti.redhotcyber.com/
redhotcyber.comAug 29, 2025extracted
RubyGems, PyPI Hit by Malicious Packages Stealing Credentials, Crypto, Forcing Security Changes
A fresh set of 60 malicious packages has been uncovered targeting the RubyGems ecosystem by posing as seemingly innocuous automation tools for social media, blogging, or messaging services to steal credentials from unsuspecting users and likely resell them on dark web forums like Russian Market. The activity is assessed to be active since at least March 2023, according to the software supply chain security company Socket. Cumulatively, the gems have been downloaded more than 275,000 times. That said, it bears noting that the figure may not accurately represent the actual number of compromised systems, as not every download results in execution, and it's possible several of these gems have been downloaded to a single machine. "Since at least March 2023, a threat actor using the aliases zon, nowon, kwonsoonje, and soonje has published 60 malicious gems posing as automation tools for Instagram, Twitter/X, TikTok, WordPress, Telegram, Kakao, and Naver," security researcher Kirill Boychenko said. While the identified gems offered the promised functionality, such as bulk posting or engagement, they also harbored covert functionality to exfiltrate usernames and passwords to an external server under the threat actor's control by displaying a simple graphical user interface to enter users' credentials. Some of the gems, such as njongto_duo and jongmogtolon, are notable for focusing on financial discussion platforms, with the libraries marketed as tools to flood investment-related forums with ticker mentions, stock narratives, and synthetic engagement to amplify visibility and manipulate public perception. The servers that are used to receive the captured information include programzon[.]com, appspace[.]kr, and marketingduo[.]co[.]kr. These domains have been found to advertise bulk messaging, phone number scraping, and automated social media tools. Victims of the campaign are likely to be grey-hat marketers who rely on such tools to run spam, search engine optimization (SEO), and engagement campaigns that artificially boost engagement. "Each gem functions as a Windows-targeting infostealer, primarily (but not exclusively) aimed at South Korean users, as evidenced by Korean-language UIs and exfiltration to .kr domains," Socket said. "The campaign evolved across multiple aliases and infrastructure waves, suggesting a mature and persistent operation." "By embedding credential theft functionality within gems marketed to automation-focused grey-hat users, the threat actor covertly captures sensitive data while blending into activity that appears legitimate." The development comes as GitLab detected multiple typosquatting packages on the Python Package Index (PyPI) that are designed to steal cryptocurrency from Bittensor wallets by hijacking the legitimate staking functions. The names of the Python libraries, which mimic bittensor and bittensor-cli, are below - bitensor (versions 9.9.4 and 9.9.5) bittenso-cli (version 9.9.4) qbittensor (version 9.9.4) bittenso (version 9.9.5) "The attackers appear to have specifically targeted staking operations for calculated reasons," GitLab's Vulnerability Research team said. "By hiding malicious code within legitimate-looking staking functionality, the attackers exploited both the technical requirements and user psychology of routine blockchain operations." The disclosure also follows new restrictions imposed by PyPI maintainers to secure Python package installers and inspectors from confusion attacks arising from ZIP parser implementations. Put differently, PyPI said it will reject Python packages "wheels" (which are nothing but ZIP archives) that attempt to exploit ZIP confusion attacks and smuggle malicious payloads past manual reviews and automated detection tools. "This has been done in response to the discovery that the popular installer uv has a different extraction behavior to many Python-based installers that use the ZIP parser implementation provided by the zipfile standard library module," the Python Software Foundation's (PSF) Seth Michael Larson said. PyPI credited Caleb Brown from the Google Open Source Security Team and Tim Hatch from Netflix for reporting the issue. It also said it will warn users when they publish wheels whose ZIP contents don't match the included RECORD metadata file. "After 6 months of warnings, on February 1st, 2026, PyPI will begin rejecting newly uploaded wheels whose ZIP contents don't match the included RECORD metadata file," Larsen said.
thehackernews.comAug 8, 2025extracted