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CVE-2026-18481 - Stored XSS in Participant URL Field leads to Account Takeover via Session Token Theft
CVE-2026-18481 - Stored XSS in Participant URL Field leads to Account Takeover via Session Token Theft Bulletin ID: 2026-068-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 07/31/2026 11:00 AM PDT Description: AWS Ops Wheel is an open-source operational decision-making tool published under the AWS GitHub organization and self-deployed by customers into their own AWS accounts via CloudFormation. The application did not sufficiently validate the participant URL field — server-side validation checked only the value's length, not whether it was a safe web URL (CWE-79) — so a user with participant-management permission (a Wheel Admin/Admin) could store a crafted URL that could execute script in another user's authenticated browser session (stored cross-site scripting). Impact is confined to a single self-deployed instance (each deployment has its own Cognito user pool); there is no cross-deployment impact and no impact to any AWS-managed service. Impacted versions: AWS Ops Wheel v2 deployments PR #168 and earlier Resolution: This issue has been addressed in PR #168 with defense-in-depth: server-side validation now restricts participant URLs to http/https schemes on create and update; the client hardens how stored URLs are rendered; and session tokens are no longer stored in a location accessible to page scripts. Because AWS Ops Wheel is deployed from source, we recommend updating your checkout to a revision that includes this fix, redeploying both the API and UI, and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched. Workarounds: Until you can redeploy the patched code: restrict Wheel Admin/Admin permissions to trusted users only; audit stored participants and remove any participant URL that is not a standard http/https URL; avoid interacting with participant entries originating from unintended users; and apply a strict Content-Security-Policy at your CloudFront/reverse proxy (a partial stopgap, not a substitute for the patch). References: Please email [email protected] with any security questions or concerns.
aws.amazon.comAug 20, 2026extracted
Lone attacker published 14 malicious npm packages mimicking popular OpenSearch, Elasticsearch libraries
SAAS Salesforce partners not seeing meaningful revenue from Agentforce AI platform, report saysShow us the money ai and ml AI companies are burning books, advocates complain to FTCFahrenheit 203, the temperature GPUs stop gorging on literature DEVOPS Go updates may delight diehard gophers but displease AI overlordsv 1.27 expands generics to support methods EDGE AND IOT Waymo has designed a robocar chip to stay ahead of Tesla5 nm ML accelerators promise 1,000+ TOPS, ultra-low latency SYSTEMS AMD inches closer to its goal of making AI suck less ... energyHouse of Zen claims latest systems already 4x more efficient than two years ago Security Russians are posing as Signal support to launch phishing attacksPLUS: US takes down Iranian propaganda sites; Marketing company asks 'Why Do We Have Your Information?' And more! Security Microsoft patches failed to fix on-prem SharePoint, which is now under zero-day attackPLUS: China upgrades smartphone surveillance tools; Ring eases anti-snooping stance; and more Black Hat and DEF CON DEF CON Franklin project enlists hackers to harden critical infrastructureVoting village reports have been so successful, says Jeff Moss, that the whole of DEF CON will now be included Security EQT buys majority share in Swiss cybersecurity biz AcronisWent at equivalent of $3.5B+ valuation for entire firm, though portion sold not specified Malware Month Ten years since the first corp ransomware, Mikko Hyppönen sees no end in sightOn the plus side, infosec's a good bet for a long, stable career FOSS smashed one Microsoft monopoly. After 20 years of failure, it's time to smash anotherWord up GNOME can look like Windows – and Flashback can do it without extensionsNew 'Simple-taskbar' is an option, but there's a simpler, stabler way A moment of silence, please, for the final release of Debian on x86-32New Debian versions hit FOSSland in the form of 13.6 and 12.15 Baddies caught exploiting extensions bugs with perfect 10 scores on vulnerable Joomla websitesFlaws in iCagenda, Balbooa Forms extensions can impact open source CMS that powers a million sites worldwide Frame: A new X11 server – implemented directly in assemblyJoins yserver, Phoenix, and of course XLibre – and outlier Arcan Cinnamon 6.8 will support Wayland – if you want itNext version of Linux Mint’s desktop has both kinds of display server
theregister.comMay 29, 2026extracted
Mini Shai-Hulud Worm Compromises TanStack, Mistral AI, Guardrails AI & More Packages
TeamPCP, the threat actor behind the recentsupply chain attack spree, has been linked to the compromise of the npm and PyPI packages from TanStack, UiPath, Mistral AI, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI as part of a fresh Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. The affected npm packages have been modified to include an obfuscated JavaScript file ("router_init.js") that's designed to profile the execution environment and launch a comprehensive credential stealer capable of targeting cloud providers, cryptocurrency wallets, AI tools, messaging apps, and CI systems, including Github Actions, multiple reports from Aikido Security, Endor Labs, SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity, and Snyk show. The data is exfiltrated to the "filev2.getsession[.]org" domain. Using Session Protocol infrastructure is a deliberate attempt on the part of the attackers to evade detection, as the domain is unlikely to be blocked within enterprise environments, given that it belongs to a decentralized, privacy-focused messaging service. As a fallback option, the encrypted data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories under the author name "[email protected]" via the GitHub GraphQL API using the stolen GitHub tokens. The malware is also capable of establishing persistence hooks in Claude Code and Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) to survive reboots and re-execute the stealer on every launch of the IDEs. Furthermore, it installs a gh-token-monitor service to monitor and re-exfiltrate GitHub tokens, and injects two malicious GitHub Actions workflows to serialize repository secrets into a JSON object and upload the data to an external server ("api.masscan[.]cloud"). Unlike the previous SAP wave, where the compromised packages added a preinstall hook to trigger the infection sequence, the latest TanStack cluster adopts a different strategy by including a JavaScript file within the package tarball and adding an optional dependency that points to a GitHub-hosted package. The GitHub dependency contains a prepare lifecycle hook that executes the JavaScript payload via the Bun runtime. The updates to the Mistral AI packages, on the other hand, follow the earlier approach, replacing the contents of the "package.json" file with a preinstall hook to invoke "node setup.mjs," which downloads Bun and runs the same JavaScript malware. The TanStack supply chain compromise has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-45321. It carries a CVSS score of 9.6 out of a maximum of 10.0, indicating critical severity. The incident has impacted 42 packages and 84 versions across the TanStack ecosystem. TanStack has since traced the compromise to a chained GitHub Actions attack involving the "pull_request_target" trigger, GitHub Actions cache poisoning, and runtime memory extraction of an OIDC token from the GitHub Actions runner process. "No npm tokens were stolen, and the npm publish workflow itself was not compromised," TanStack said. Specifically, the attackers are assessed to have staged the malicious payload in a GitHub fork via an orphaned commit, injected it into published npm tarballs, then hijacked the project's legitimate "TanStack/router" workflow to publish the compromised versions with valid SLSA provenance. "The attack published malicious versions through the project's own GitHub Actions release pipeline using hijacked OIDC tokens," StepSecurity researcher Ashish Kurmi said. "In an extremely rare escalation, the compromised packages carry valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, making this the first documented npm worm that produces validly attested malicious packages. The worm has since spread beyond TanStack to packages from UiPath, DraftLab, and other maintainers." The attack is noteworthy for the fact that it abuses trusted publishing, allowing attacker-controlled code running within a workflow to leverage its OIDC permissions to "mint" a short-lived publish token during the build and use it to publish the packages without having to steal an npm token. What makes the worm stand out is its ability to spread itself to other packages by locating a publishable npm token with bypass_2fa set to true, enumerating every package published by the same maintainer, and exchanging a GitHub OIDC token for a per-package publish token to sidestep traditional authentication entirely. "The orphaned commit additionally triggered a GitHub Actions workflow run against the legitimate TanStack/router workflow surface," Endor Labs researcher Peyton Kennedy said. "Because the repository's OIDC trusted publisher configuration granted trust at the repository level rather than scoped to a specific protected branch and workflow file, the workflow run triggered by that commit was able to request a valid short-lived npm publish token." Another new behavior introduced in the obfuscated JavaScript malware is the installation of a dead-man's switch that uses a shell script to periodically check if an npm token created by the malware is not revoked by polling the "api.github.com/user" endpoint every 60 seconds. The token has the description "IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner." Should the developer revoke the token from their npm dashboard, the script triggers a destructive routine that executes "rm -rf ~/" on the infected machine, essentially turning it into a wiper malware. These changes indicate that TeamPCP is growing aggressive and evolving its tradecraft with every campaign. It's therefore essential that developers do not revoke the npm tokens before isolating and imaging the system. "This campaign reflects a broader shift in supply chain attacks from isolated package compromise to identity-driven propagation through trusted CI/CD infrastructure," Avital Harel, security research lead at Upwind, said in a statement shared with The Hacker News. "Once attackers gain access to publishing workflows and pipeline identities, the software delivery process itself becomes the distribution mechanism. The challenge for defenders is that much of this activity can appear legitimate on the surface, which makes behavioral visibility during installs and builds increasingly important." Besides TanStack, the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign has also spread to several other packages, including some in PyPI - [email protected] (PyPI) [email protected] (PyPI) @opensearch-project/[email protected], 3.6.2, 3.7.0, and 3.8.0 @squawk/[email protected] @squawk/[email protected] @squawk/[email protected] @tallyui/[email protected], 1.0.2, and 1.0.3 @tallyui/[email protected], 1.0.2, and 1.0.3 According to data from OX Security, the incident has affected over 170 packages spanning both the npm and PyPI registries. The packages have more than 518 million downloads cumulatively. No less than 400 repositories with stolen credentials have been created as part of the attack wave. All the repositories contain the string "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again." Google-owned Wiz said the payload also exfiltrates stolen credentials via a third redundant channel, a typosquat domain named "git-tanstack[.]com," along with the Session messenger network and GitHub API dead drops using the stolen token, adding the trojanized PyPI packages associated with both Mistral AI and Guardrails AI contain the same malware, which "operates notably differently" from the JavaScript versions distributed via npm. Microsoft, in its analysis of the malicious mistralai PyPI package, said it's designed to download a credential stealer from a remote server ("83.142.209[.]194") that includes country-aware logic to avoid Russian-language environments and a "geofenced destructive branch that has a 1-in-6 chance of executing rm -rf / when the system appears to be in Israel or Iran." Mistral AI has published two advisories related to the compromise of its npm and PyPI packages, confirming that it was impacted by a supply chain attack related to the TanStack security incident. "Current investigation indicates that an affected developer device was involved," it said. "The [email protected] compromise is especially notable because the malicious code executes on import," Socket said. "The package checks for Linux systems, downloads a remote Python artifact from https://git-tanstack.com/transformers.pyz, writes it to /tmp/transformers.pyz, and executes it with python3 without integrity verification." "This latest activity shows the campaign continuing to propagate across both npm and PyPI, with affected packages spanning search infrastructure, AI tooling, aviation-related developer packages, enterprise automation, frontend tooling, and CI/CD-adjacent ecosystems." (The story was updated after publication to include additional insights.)
thehackernews.comMay 12, 2026extracted
Analyze AWS Network Firewall logs using Amazon OpenSearch dashboard
Analyze AWS Network Firewall logs using Amazon OpenSearch dashboard Amazon CloudWatch and Amazon OpenSearch Service have launched a new dashboard that simplifies the analysis of AWS Network Firewall logs. Previously, in our blog post How to analyze AWS Network Firewall logs using Amazon OpenSearch Service we demonstrated the required services and steps to create an OpenSearch dashboard. The new dashboard removes these extra steps and streamlines the entire process. In this post, I show you how to build and use the new OpenSearch Service dashboards to analyze Network Firewall logs more efficiently. Network Firewall is a managed security service that protects Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) VPCs by monitoring and filtering network traffic. Network Firewall provides stateful inspection, which gives you information that you can use to create custom rules to control incoming and outgoing traffic. It automatically scales, offers high availability, and integrates with other AWS security services, in addition to helping to block unexpected traffic, prevent unauthorized access, and filter traffic based on domains and IP addresses. Analyzing Network Firewall logs provides you with insight into the traffic entering or leaving your VPC and helps you troubleshoot issues and understand your security posture over time. This analysis is crucial for maintaining effective security controls. Network Firewall generates three types of logs from its stateful engine: Flow logs: These capture standard network traffic flow information based on your stateless rules Alert logs: These show traffic that matches stateful rules configured with DROP ,ALERT , orREJECT actions TLS logs: These provide details about TLS inspection events (requires TLS inspection configuration) Prerequisites This post assumes that you’re familiar with the fundamentals of AWS networking concepts and services such as Amazon VPC, subnets, routing tables, and other services such as Network Firewall, Amazon CloudWatch, and OpenSearch Service. To analyze Network Firewall logs using OpenSearch Service, you must have: An active Network Firewall in your VPC CloudWatch log groups configured for: - Flow logs, for example /inspection-nwfw-flow-logs - Alert logs, for example /inspection-nwfw-alert-logs Flow logs, for example If you haven’t deployed Network Firewall in your VPC, you can use one of the available Network Firewall deployment architecture templates to create a firewall. After creating a firewall, configure CloudWatch log groups for the firewall flow and alert logs and configure stateful logging. Fine-tune your firewall policy and rule configuration and make sure that you’re routing traffic symmetrically through the firewall. Verify that your CloudWatch log groups are receiving firewall logs. You can do this by navigating to the AWS Management Console for CloudWatch, selecting your log group, and viewing the log streams under the Log streams tab. With the firewall in the routed path and publishing metrics and log events, you can proceed with creating a Network Firewall OpenSearch dashboard. Scenario In this post, I show you how to set up a centralized architecture, single Availability Zone deployment as shown in Figure 1. Then, you will create an OpenSearch dashboard for your firewall to monitor and analyze traffic. Figure 1: Network Firewall centralized architecture, single Availability Zone deployment Solution deployment To analyze Network Firewall logs in OpenSearch Service, you first need to create an OpenSearch integration. To create an OpenSearch Service integration: Open the Amazon CloudWatch console. Choose Settings in the navigation pane. Choose the Logs tab. Scroll down to find OpenSearch integration and choose Create integration. Figure 2: Create an OpenSearch integration There are three items to be configured under OpenSearch collection: - Enter a name for Integration name. For example, CW-AOS-Integration01 . - KMS key ARN – optional is optional. If you leave that empty, your data will be encrypted by default with a key that AWS owns and manages. You also have an option to create and use an AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key. - For Data retention, select a number between 1 and 30 depending on your retention policy. For example, select 10 to retain logs for 10 days. Enter a name for Integration name. For example, Figure 3: Configure an OpenSearch collection Next, you need to configure AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions. - For the IAM role for writing to OpenSearch collection, you can either create a new role or use an existing role. If you choose Create new role, then you need to provide an IAM role name. For example, CWLogQueryOS . This role must have permissions to read from all log groups in the account. See Permissions that the integration needs for an example of the permission that the integration needs. - IAM roles and users who can view dashboards defines who can view the dashboards. Select either: - Allow all roles and users in this account to view dashboards. - Specify roles and users who can view dashboards. By choosing Specify roles…, you can select the IAM roles and users who can view the dashboard. - Choose Confirm integration setup to create the integration. It might take 1–5 minutes for the integration to be created. For the IAM role for writing to OpenSearch collection, you can either create a new role or use an existing role. If you choose Create new role, then you need to provide an IAM role name. For example, Figure 4: Configure IAM permissions After you receive notification of successful creation of the OpenSearch integration, you can create an OpenSearch dashboard. To create an OpenSearch dashboard: Navigate to Amazon CloudWatch console and choose Logs insights in the navigation pane. In Logs Insights, choose the Analyze with OpenSearch tab. Choose Create dashboard. Under Select dashboard type, select AWS Network Firewall. Enter a name for the dashboard, such as InspectionFirewall . Figure 5: Select the dashboard type and enter a name Under Dashboard data configuration, select Every 5 minutes. Under Select log groups, select Inspection-nwfw-alert-logs and Inspection-nwfw-flow-logs. Figure 6: Select data synchronization frequency and log groups Choose Create dashboard. If you have multiple firewalls in your environment, repeat steps 1–8 to create a dashboard for each Firewall. Choose Select a dashboard and select and select a dashboard to view. Figure 7: View a list of existing firewalls in OpenSearch dashboards Dashboard overview Your new OpenSearch dashboard, similar to Figure 8, provides you with visual insight into some of your firewall events such as: Top talkers Top protocols Alert log analysis Firewall engines Figure 8: Network Firewall OpenSearch dashboard As shown in Figure 9, you can refine your analysis to focus on a specific traffic pattern or security event by using the filters at the top of the dashboard to focus on traffic based on: Source or destination addresses Protocols Actions Firewall names Figure 9: Network Firewall OpenSearch dashboard filters To dive deep into a widget: Hover your cursor over a widget in the dashboard to reveal the options menu icon (…) in the top right corner of the widget. Choose the options menu icon (…) to maximize the widget or open the Inspect view, as shown in Figure 10. Figure 10: Top Source IP by Packets widget showing the options menu icon (…) Figure 11 shows the Inspect window for the Top Source IP by Packets widget. In this window, you can get information by selecting Statistics, Request, or Response. Figure 11: Inspect window for Top Source IP by Packets widget This window might look different depending on the widget you choose. Some widget options menus provide more information than others and include an option to download the information in CSV format. For example, you can use the Top Source IPs by Packets and Bytes widget to view data and download it in CSV format, as shown in Figure 12. Figure 12: Inspect window for Top Source IPs by Packets and Bytes widget When using the Top Source IPs by Packets and Bytes, you can use the View menu to switch the view from Data to Requests to access more information, as shown in Figure 13. Figure 13: Switch the Inspect window view for Top Source IPs by Packets and Bytes widgets between Data and Requests Example use cases The following are some examples of how you can use the Network Firewall OpenSearch dashboard to facilitate monitoring and troubleshooting: Identify unusual traffic patterns: - Use the Top Source IPs by Packets and Bytes widget - Look for unexpected spikes or outliers Monitor security rule effectiveness: - Analyze the Alert Log Analysis section - Track which rules are triggering most frequently Troubleshoot connectivity issues: - Use filters to isolate traffic for specific IP ranges - Examine flow logs for blocked connections Verify compliance: - Review TLS logs to verify encryption standards - Use filters to focus on traffic to and from sensitive resources Cost considerations You will incur charges for AWS Network Firewall and the OpenSearch services used. For more information, see AWS Network Firewall Pricing and Amazon CloudWatch Pricing. Conclusion By building Amazon OpenSearch Service dashboards for AWS Network Firewall logs to transform complex security data into actionable insights, you can monitor and analyze your network security posture more effectively. By combining the robust security features of Network Firewall with the powerful visualization capabilities offered by OpenSearch Service, you gain real-time visibility into network traffic patterns, can quickly identify potential security threats, and streamline your troubleshooting workflows. This solution reduces the mean time to detect security incidents and improves operational efficiency through visual analytics to support data-driven decision making. Whether you’re focusing on threat detection, compliance monitoring, or security optimization, these dashboards can provide the visibility and insights needed to strengthen your overall security posture. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.
aws.amazon.comNov 18, 2025extracted
Optimize security operations with AWS Security Incident Response
Optimize security operations with AWS Security Incident Response July 6, 2026: We updated this post to reflect current feature capabilities. Security threats demand swift action, which is why AWS Security Incident Response delivers protection that can immediately strengthen your security posture. This comprehensive solution combines automated triage and evaluation logic with your security perimeter metadata to identify critical issues, seamlessly bringing in human expertise when needed. When Security Incident Response is integrated with Amazon GuardDuty and AWS Security Hub within a unified security environment, organizations gain 24/7 access to AWS security incident response professionals for rapid detection, expert analysis, and efficient threat containment—managed through one intuitive console. AWS Security Incident Response is included with AWS Enterprise Support and AWS Unified Operations, which helps organizations adopt and operate AWS at scale efficiently and securely. In this post, we guide you through enabling Security Incident Response and executing a proof of concept (POC) to quickly enhance your security capabilities while realizing immediate benefits. We explore the service’s functionality, establish POC success criteria, define your configuration, prepare for deployment, enable the service, and optimize effectiveness from day one, helping your organization build confidence throughout the incident response lifecycle while improving recovery time. Understanding the functionality of Security Incident Response AWS Security Incident Response service provides comprehensive threat detection and response capabilities through a streamlined four-step process. It begins by ingesting security findings from GuardDuty and select Security Hub Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) integrations with third-party tools. The service then automatically triages these findings using customer metadata and threat intelligence to identify anomalous behavior and suspicious activities. When potential threats are detected, Security Incident Response team responders proactively investigate cases through the customer portal to determine whether they are true or false positives. For confirmed threats, the service escalates findings for immediate action, while false positives trigger updates to the auto-triage system and suppression rules for GuardDuty and Security Hub, continuously improving detection accuracy. Comprehensive protection with minimal prerequisites Security Incident Response delivers powerful security capabilities through seamless integration with both the threat detection and incident response (TDIR) system and third-party security services such as CrowdStrike, Lacework, TrendMicro, SentinelOne, Palo Alto Networks – Prisma Cloud Compute, and Wiz (Toxic Combinations). This solution provides a unified command center for end-to-end incident management—from planning and communication to resolution—while ingesting GuardDuty findings and integrating with external providers through Security Hub CSPM. For third-party integrations, only finding ingestion is required—not the full Security Hub CSPM feature set (no security standards, controls, or compliance checks needed). The first 10,000 findings per month do not incur any costs, then cost $0.00003 per finding thereafter (for example, 610,000 findings cost about $18 per month). For more information, see Security Hub CSPM pricing. With secure case management and an immutable activity timeline, it significantly enhances your security operations by augmenting your security operations center (SOC) and incident response (IR) teams with improved visibility and access to AWS-proven tools and personnel. AWS security incident response personnel work collaboratively with your responders during investigations and recovery, freeing your valuable resources for other priorities. The service delivers continuous value through proactive monitoring and response capabilities. It constantly monitors your environment using GuardDuty and Security Hub findings, with service automation, triage, and analysis working diligently in the background to alert you only for genuine security concerns. This protection provides immediate value during potential incidents without demanding your constant attention. Getting started is straightforward—the only prerequisite is having AWS Organizations enabled and making sure that you have established Organizations with a fundamental organizational unit (OU) structure encompassing member accounts. This foundation not only enables Security Incident Response deployment but also serves as the cornerstone for implementing a robust TDIR strategy across your organization. Determine success criteria Establishing success criteria helps benchmark the outcomes of the POC with the goals of the business. Some example criteria include: Designate an incident response team: Identity and document internal team members and external resources responsible for incident response. As highlighted in AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar, having designated personnel reduces triage and response times during security incidents. Develop a formal incident response framework: Develop a comprehensive incident response plan with detailed playbooks and regular table-top exercise protocols. AWS provides a reference library of playbooks on GitHub. Run tabletop exercises: Consider implementing regular simulations that test incident response plans, identify gaps, and build muscle memory across security teams before a real crisis occurs. AWS provides context on various types of tabletop exercises. Identify existing third-party security providers: Identify third-party security providers with Security Hub integrations that feed into Security Incident Response. AWS partners provide findings as documented at Detect and Analyze. Implement GuardDuty: Configure GuardDuty according to best practices to monitor and detect threats across critical services. AWS maintains GuardDuty best practices in AWS Security Services Best Practices for GuardDuty. Review your success criteria to make sure that your goals are realistic given your timeframe and potential constraints that are specific to your organization. For example, do you have full control over the configuration of AWS services that are deployed in an organization? Do you have resources that can dedicate time to implement and test? Is this time convenient for relevant stakeholders to evaluate the service? Define your Security Incident Response configuration After establishing your success criteria and timeline, it’s best practice to define your Security Incident Response configuration. Some important decisions include the following: Select a delegated administrator account: Identify which account will serve as delegated administrator (DA) for Security Incident Response. This account and the AWS Region you select will host the Security Incident Response service and portal. AWS Security Reference Architecture (AWS SRA) recommends using dedicated security tooling account. Review the considerations and recommendations documentation before finalizing the DA. Define the account scope: Security Incident Response is considered an organization-level service. Every account in every Region within your organization is entitled to coverage under a single subscription. Service coverage automatically adjusts as accounts are added or removed, providing complete protection across your entire AWS footprint. Configure findings sources: Determine which security findings meet your organization’s needs. The service automatically ingests GuardDuty findings organization-wide and select Security Hub finding types from third-party partners. Evaluate which GuardDuty protection plans and Security Hub findings provide the most value for your security posture and incident response capabilities. Develop an escalation framework: Establish clear escalation thresholds for different case types: self-managed, AWS-supported, and proactive cases. Define who has authority to determine case submission and type based on severity, impact, and resource requirements. Implement analytics strategy: Determine whether to use native AWS analytics tools (such as Amazon Athena, Amazon OpenSearch, and Amazon Detective) or integrate with existing security information and event management (SIEM) solutions. These capabilities can enrich incident response with contextual data and deeper insights. Prepare for deployment After determining success criteria and Security Incident Response configuration, identify stakeholders, desired state, and timeframe. Prepare for deployment by completing: Project plan and timeline: Develop a project plan with defined success criteria, scope boundaries, key milestones, and realistic implementation timelines. Suggested timeline of events: - Before enablement: Configure GuardDuty, and optionally Security Hub third parties, perform resource planning - Day 0 – Enable the service - Week 1 – Open reactive security incident response cases - Week 2 – Connect to IT service management (ITSM) tools - Week 3 – Execute a tabletop exercise - Week 4 – Review the reporting provided from the service Identify stakeholders: Identify CISO, information security teams, SOC personnel, incident response teams, security engineers, finance, legal, compliance, external MSSPs, and business unit representatives. Develop a RACI matrix: Create detailed RACI chart defining roles and responsibilities across incident response lifecycle, facilitating accountability and proper communication channels. Configure management account access: Secure authorization to delegate administrative access. For more information, see Permissions required to designate a delegated Security Incident Response administrator account. Set up IAM roles and permissions: Use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles to implement role-based access controls aligned with the RACI chart, including case management, escalation, and read-only roles using AWS managed policies. For more information, see AWS Managed Policies. Enable Security Incident Response With preparations in place, you are ready to enable the service. Access Security Incident Response in the management account: Within the organization’s management account, go to the AWS Management Console and search for Security Incident Response in the console search bar. Choose Sign Up. Verify that Use delegated administrator account – Recommended is selected, enter the delegated administrator account number in the Account ID field and choose Next. Sign in to the delegated administrator account configured in step 3, search for Security Incident Response, and choose Sign up. Complete setup in the delegated administrator account: Define membership details: - Select your home region under Region selection. - For Membership name, enter a suitable name that follows your organization’s naming standards. - Under Membership contacts, enter the Primary and Secondary contact information. Add Membership tags according to your organization’s tagging strategy. Choose Next. Configure permissions: - Select By choosing this option…, then choose Next. - Review service permissions and choose Next. Review the membership configuration and details, then choose Sign up. Note: Detailed instructions can be found in the YouTube setup video. Many organizations have well-established processes and application suites for IR and security threat management. To accommodate these pre-existing setups, AWS has developed integrations with popular ITSM and case management applications. AWS Security Incident Response enables bi-directional integration with Jira and ServiceNow (case updates are synced in both directions), and event-driven integrations with Slack and PagerDuty through Amazon EventBridge—with more on the way. We have provided comprehensive instructions to guide you through the setup process in GitHub. Optimize value on day one Immediately after enabling the service, Security Incident Response begins to ingest your GuardDuty findings—and Security Hub CSPM findings from security partners if you’ve configured them. Your findings are automatically triaged and monitored using deterministic evaluation logic; based on your organization’s unique metadata and security perimeter, high-priority threats are escalated to your Security Incident Response command center for immediate investigation. While your organization receives 24/7 coverage from the start, implementing these recommended optimizations will significantly enhance threat detection accuracy, reduce false positives, accelerate response times, and strengthen your overall security posture through customized protection aligned with your specific business risks and compliance requirements. To maximize immediate value from Security Incident Response, we suggest using its reactive capabilities beginning on day one. When your team encounters suspicious activities or requires expert investigation, you can create an AWS-supported case through the service portal to engage AWS security incident responders directly. These security experts effectively extend your team’s capabilities, providing specialized knowledge and guidance to help you quickly understand, contain, and remediate potential security concerns. This on-demand access to AWS security incident response can reduce your mean time to resolution, minimize potential impact, and make sure you have professional support even for complex security scenarios that might otherwise overwhelm internal resources. Examples of reactive support queries include: We noticed a suspicious IP address in our environment, performing various API calls. Can you help us investigate? A new account was created two days ago, we were notified through an Amazon EventBridge rule and our endpoint detection and response (EDR) integrations, can you help us scope it and find out who created it? How was it created? An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user is making cross-Region API calls and creating resources in an unused Region. Our EDR solution detected unusual behavior on our production website, indicating a potential breach. Our EDR detected a suspicious web-shell upload and activity. We need help investigating and isolating this. An unauthorized user generated API activity above their authorization level, help us find privilege escalations. We need help analyzing security logs from our AWS WAF and Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances. Are there any Indicators of compromise or suspicious patterns? Next steps If you decide to move forward with AWS Security Incident Response and deploy a POC, we recommend the following action items: Configure and deploy GuardDuty to help maintain comprehensive and relevant coverage across your management and member accounts, critical services, and workloads. Verify that third-party security tools (such as CrowdStrike, Lacework, or Trend Micro) are properly integrated with Security Hub. Communicate the security incident response tooling changes to the relevant organizational teams. Conclusion In this post, we showed you how to plan and implement an AWS Security Incident Response POC. You learned how to do so through phases, including defining success criteria, configuring Security Incident Response, and validating that Security Incident Response meets your business needs. As a customer, this guide will help you run a successful POC with Security Incident Response. It guides you in assessing the value and factors to consider when deciding to implement the current features. Additional resources AWS Security Incident Response – Getting started Configuring security tool integrations through Security Hub Managing Security Incident Response events with Amazon EventBridge Amazon GuardDuty best practices AWS Security Hub best practices AWS Security Incident Response Technical Guide (best practices) AWS Managed Services Offering AWS Security Incident Response Blog: The customer’s journey to accelerating the incident response lifecycle If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.
aws.amazon.comSep 23, 2025extracted