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Windows 11のログから“攻撃に使われたツール”が分かる? JPCERT/CCの無料分析シート
JPCERT/CC�́A�U���҂����p����\���������c�[����R�}���h�ɂ��āA�uWindows�v�Ɏc����s���Ղ��܂Ƃ߂��u�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�v�̍ŐV�ł����J�����B�C���V�f���g�����ɂǂ��𗧂̂��B ���̋L���͉������ł��B����o�^�i�����j����ƑS�Ă������������܂��B �@�Z�L�����e�B�@�ւ�JPCERT�R�[�f�B�l�[�V�����Z���^�[�i�ȉ��AJPCERT/CC�j��2026�N6��11���A�u�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�v�̃A�b�v�f�[�g�\�����B2017�N�Ɍ��J�������e�ɂ��āA�U���҂̎���◘�p�����i�̕ω��܂��Č��������B �@�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�́A�U���҂����p����\���������c�[����R�}���h�ɂ��āA�uWindows�v�ɂǂ̂悤�Ȏ��s���Ձi���O����s�����A�t�@�C���Ȃǁj���c�邩���܂Ƃ߂��������B�C���V�f���g�����S���҂��A���s���ꂽ�\��������c�[����R�}���h�𐄒肷��ۂɊ��p�ł���B �@JPCERT/CC�́A�V���ɁuWindows 11�v�iversion 24H2�j�ƁuWindows Server 2025�v�ŁA�c�[����R�}���h�̎��s���ɂǂ̂悤�Ȏ��s���Ղ��c�邩���������B�ΏۂƂ����c�[����R�}���h��60���i�}1�A�}2�j�B �@�����Ώۂ̎��s���Ղɂ́AWindows�̊č��|���V�[��L���ɂ��Ď擾�����C�x���g���O��A�V�X�e���Ď��c�[���uSysmon�v�̃��O������B���̑��A�A�v���P�[�V�����̎��s�����L�^����uPrefetch�v�t�@�C����A�c�[������уR�}���h�̎��s�����������ΏۂƂ��Ă���B �@JPCERT/CC�ɂ��ƃc�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�́A�C�x���g���O�̃C�x���gID��t�@�C�����A���W�X�g���Ȃǂ̏��A���s���ꂽ�\��������c�[����R�}���h���t��������ۂɊ��p�ł���B�Ⴆ�C���V�f���g�����S���҂��A�����Ō������������I�ȃt�@�C�����Ńc�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g���������邱�ƂŁA���s���ꂽ�\��������c�[����R�}���h�𐄒肵�A�U���҂̖ړI�𐄑��ł���Ƃ����i�}3�j�B �@����̃A�b�v�f�[�g�ɍ��킹�āAJPCERT/CC��2017�N�Ɍ������c�[����R�}���h�ɂ��Ă��AWindows�̊e�o�[�W�����œ��삷�邩�ǂ������m�F�����B�N���C�A���gOS�ɂ��Ă�Windows 11�ɉ����āuWindows 7�^8�^8.1�^10�v�A�T�[�oOS�ɂ��Ă�Windows Server 2025�ɉ����āuWindows Server 2012 R2�^2016�^2019�^2022�v�œ���̉ۂ��m�F�����Ƃ����B �@JPCERT/CC�́A�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g��JSON�t�@�C�����A�\�[�X�R�[�h����уt�@�C���̋��L�T�[�r�X�uGitHub�v�Ō��J���Ă���BJSON�t�@�C���𗘗p���邱�ƂŁA�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�̓��e���@�B�I�Ɋ��p���₷���Ȃ鑼�A�Q�Ƃ⌟�����e�ՂɂȂ�Ƃ����B�c�[�����͌��ʃV�[�g�����JSON�t�@�C���͖����ŗ��p�ł���BJPCERT/CC�͍���A���p���ꂽ�c�[����R�}���h�̌��m���@�ɂ��Ă�����i�߂�v�悾�B Copyright © ITmedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpJul 23, 2026extracted
脆弱性報告を受け付けない企業は危うい? CISAら5機関が共同指針
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpJul 20, 2026extracted
CISA flags exploited FileZen command injection bug, patch now! (CVE-2026-25108)
CISA flags exploited FileZen command injection bug, patch now! (CVE-2026-25108) CISA has added CVE-2026-25108, an OS command injection vulnerability in Soliton Systems’ FileZen secure file transfer solution, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The vendor has confirmed active exploitation, stating it has received multiple reports of damage caused by attackers abusing the flaw. Because public disclosures from the Japanese CERT Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) and a ransomware incident reported by Japan’s Washington Hotel occurred around the same time, there has been speculation that CVE-2026-25108 may have been used to deploy ransomware against organizations. However, the KEV listing itself does not indicate that the vulnerability is currently linked to ransomware activity. About CVE-2026-25108 The appliance-based FileZen file-sharing server is developed and sold by Tokyo-based Soliton Systems to businesses and government agencies. The solution enables secure, authorized transfers of large files between segregated networks and provides content sanitization, antivirus scanning, and comprehensive audit logging. CVE-2026-25108 allows remote, authenticated attackers to inject commands via a specially crafted HTTP request into a specific field on the screen after logging in (either by using compromised login credentials for a low-level account or by guessing them). The vulnerability affects both the physical and virtual versions of FileZen, and is exploitable only if antivirus scanning is enabled. It does not affect FileZen S. CVE-2026-25108 affects FileZen v5.0.0 to v5.0.10 and v4.2.1 to v4.2.8. Customers are urged to upgrade to v5.0.11 or later. CISA has ordered US federal civilian agencies to mitigate the vulnerability by March 17, 2026. Japan’s CERT notes that FileZen includes a file-monitoring feature for its system directory, meaning that if those files are altered, the activity may be recorded in the logs. Customers are advised to contact the vendor for guidance on how to review and interpret those logs. In addition, organizations should examine logs for signs of unauthorized access using compromised accounts. If evidence of such activity is identified, they should consider resetting passwords for all accounts as a precaution. This is not the first time attackers exploited a zero-day vulnerability in FileZen. Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comFeb 25, 2026extracted
Washington Hotel in Japan discloses ransomware infection incident
The Washington Hotel brand in Japan has announced that that its servers were compromised in a ransomware attack, exposing various business data. The hospitality group has established an internal task force and engaged external cybersecurity experts to assess the impact of the intrusion, determine whether customer data was compromised, and coordinate recovery efforts. Washington Hotel, a brand operating under Fujita Kanko Inc. (WHG Hotels), is a business-focused hospitality chain with 30 locations across Japan. WHG has 11,000 rooms over its properties and has nearly 5 million guests every year. According to the company’s disclosure, hackers breached its network on Friday, February 13, 2026, at 22:00 (local time). The IT staff immediately disconnected servers from the internet to prevent the attack from spreading on the network. The organization states that it started consulting with the police and external cybersecurity experts. Although an investigation is ongoing, Washington Hotel can confirm that the attacker gained access to various business data stored on the affected servers. Customer data is unlikely to be exposed because the company stores this information on servers managed by a separate company, for which no unauthorized access has been confirmed. The incident is impacting operations at some Washington Hotel brand properties, including the temporary unavailability of credit card terminals. Besides that, the firm says it recorded no significant operational disruption. The financial impact of the incident is currently under review. Washington Hotel promised to provide updates if any additional relevant details emerge. As of writing, no ransomware groups have claimed the Washington Hotel on known dark-web-based extortion portals that BleepingComputer monitors. Multiple companies in Japan have been targeted by hackers lately. Some of the recent incidents include global automaker Nissan, retail giant Muji, the largest brewer in the country, Asahi, and telecom giant NTT. Although not necessarily related to the breach at Washington Hotel, JPCERT/CC disclosed late last week that hackers were exploiting an arbitrary command injection flaw in Soliton Systems’ FileZen products, tracked under CVE-2026-25108. The file-sharing appliance is widely used by Japanese companies and was also targeted in 2021. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comFeb 16, 2026extracted
China-Linked Tick Group Exploits Lanscope Zero-Day to Hijack Corporate Systems
The exploitation of a recently disclosed critical security flaw in Motex Lanscope Endpoint Manager has been attributed to a cyber espionage group known as Tick. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-61932 (CVSS score: 9.3), allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with SYSTEM privileges on on-premise versions of the program. JPCERT/CC, in an alert issued this month, said that it has confirmed reports of active abuse of the security defect to drop a backdoor on compromised systems. Tick, also known as Bronze Butler, Daserf, REDBALDKNIGHT, Stalker Panda, Stalker Taurus, and Swirl Typhoon (formerly Tellurium), is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage actor known for its extensive targeting of East Asia, specifically Japan. It's assessed to be active since at least 2006. "We're aware of very targeted activity in Japan and believe the exploitation by Bronze Butler was limited to sectors aligned with their intelligence objectives," Rafe Pilling, director of threat intelligence at Sophos CTU, told The Hacker News. "Since this vulnerability is now publicly disclosed, other threat actors may seek to exploit it." The sophisticated campaign, observed by Sophos, involved the exploitation of CVE-2025-61932 to deliver a known backdoor referred to as Gokcpdoor that can establish a proxy connection with a remote server and act as a backdoor to execute malicious commands on the compromised host. "The 2025 variant discontinued support for the KCP protocol and added multiplexing communication using a third-party library [smux] for its C2 [command-and-control] communication," the Sophos Counter Threat Unit (CTU) said in a Thursday report. The cybersecurity company said it detected two different types of Gokcpdoor serving distinct use-cases - A server type that listens for incoming client connections to enable remote access A client type that initiates connections to hard-coded C2 servers with the goal of setting up a covert communication channel The attack is also characterized by the deployment of the Havoc post-exploitation framework on select systems, with the infection chains relying on DLL side-loading to launch a DLL loader named OAED Loader to inject the payloads. Some of the other tools utilized in the attack to facilitate lateral movement and data exfiltration include goddi, an open-source Active Directory information dumping tool; Remote Desktop, for remote access through a backdoor tunnel; and 7-Zip. The threat actors have also been found to access cloud services such as io, LimeWire, and Piping Server via the web browser during remote desktop sessions in an effort to exfiltrate the harvested data. This is not the first time Tick has been observed leveraging a zero-day flaw in its attack campaigns. In October 2017, Sophos-owned Secureworks detailed the hacking group's exploitation of a then-unpatched remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2016-7836) in SKYSEA Client View, a Japanese IT asset management software, to compromise machines and steal data. "Organizations upgrade vulnerable Lanscope servers as appropriate in their environments," Sophos TRU said. "Organizations should also review internet-facing Lanscope servers that have the Lanscope client program (MR) or detection agent (DA) installed to determine if there is a business need for them to be publicly exposed." (The story was updated after publication to include a response from Sophos.)
thehackernews.comOct 31, 2025extracted
Lanscope Endpoint Manager vulnerability exploited in zero-day attacks (CVE-2025-61932)
Lanscope Endpoint Manager vulnerability exploited in zero-day attacks (CVE-2025-61932) CVE-2025-61932, an “improper verification of source of a communication channel” vulnerability affecting Lanscope Endpoint Manager, has been exploited as a zero-day since April 2025, the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) warned on Wednesday. According to information received from the solution’s vendor, Motex Inc., a Japanese cybersecurity/IT tools company, Japan-based customers have been targeted with exploit attempts. Based on vendor claims, the Lanscope Endpoint Manager has significant adoption in Japan, particularly among financial institutions, but its global presence appears to be far more limited. Nevertheless, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, requiring US federal civilian agencies to remediate it within three weeks. About CVE-2025-61932 Lanscope Endpoint Manager is an endpoint management and security solution that has a SaaS/cloud version (unaffected by this vulnerability) and an on-premises version. The law can be exploited by sending specially crafted packets to TCP port 443 on systems running affected software: the client program (MR) and detection agent (DA) components of Lanscope Endpoint Manager On-Premise v9.4.7.1 and earlier. Such packets may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. CVE-2025-61932 has been fixed in versions 9.4.7.3, 9.4.6.3, 9.4.5.4, 9.4.4.6, 9.4.3.8, 9.4.2.6, 9.4.1.5, 9.4.0.5, 9.3.3.9, and 9.3.2.7. Organizations have been urged to update all client PCs. The management server software is not affected and doesn’t need to be upgraded, according to Motex. “If managed endpoints with the client program (MR) or detection agent (DA) installed are deployed in environments that are accessible from external networks, the likelihood of attack attempts exploiting this vulnerability is expected to increase,” JPCERT/CC stated. Windows servers exposed to the Internet, devices assigned a public/global IP address, and Lanscope Endpoint Manager servers with MR or DA installed are at elevated risk of compromise, the agency added. JPCERT/CC has published a list of IP addresses used to send malicious packets as well as command-and-control IP addresses contacted by the attacker-installed backdoor. UPDATE (October 30, 2025, 07:05 p.m. ET): Sophos has revealed details about the attacks in which CVE-2025-61932 had been leveraged: The attacks have been attributed to Chinese state-sponsored APT Bronze Butler, which “has been active since 2010 and previously exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Japanese asset management product SKYSEA Client View in 2016” The attackers used the Gokcpdoor malware to establish a backdoor on compromised hosts and achieve remote access They used the Havoc C2 framework and OAED Loader malware (previously linked to the group), and a number of known and legitimate tools for lateral movement and data exfiltration. Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comOct 23, 2025extracted
Fuji Electric HMI Configurator Flaws Expose Industrial Organizations to Hacking
Several vulnerabilities patched recently by Fuji Electric in its V-SFT product could be exploited by threat actors to gain access to the systems of industrial organizations. Fuji Electric (Hakko Electronic) V-SFT is a configuration and development software for human-machine interfaces (HMIs). Organizations in the manufacturing and other industrial sectors use it to create and manage user interfaces for Fuji Electric’s Monitouch series HMIs, which are widely used around the world. Cybersecurity researcher Michael Heinzl discovered that V-SFT is affected by several vulnerabilities, including ones that can lead to information disclosure or arbitrary code execution on the system running the software. An attacker would need to use social engineering to trick a V-SFT user at the targeted organization into opening a malicious project file, which results in arbitrary code execution with the victim’s privileges. This can allow the hacker to take control of the system, Heinzl told SecurityWeek. Heinzl has published his own advisories for each of the V-SFT vulnerabilities. “The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a read past the end of an allocated data structure,” the researcher explained. The Japanese electrical equipment company has released patches (version 6.2.9.0), and Japan’s JPCERT recently published an advisory to inform organizations about the vulnerabilities. However, JPCERT’s advisory contains little information on potential impact, and Fuji’s release notes do not appear to mention any security fixes. The researcher told SecurityWeek that it took the vendor roughly four months to release patches after being notified. A previous batch of V-SFT vulnerabilities found by Heinzl took approximately nine months to address. In total, more than 20 security holes discovered by Heinzl were patched by Fuji Electric in its HMI programmer in recent months. Related: Radiflow Unveils New OT Security Platform Related: Many Attacks Aimed at EU Targeted OT, Says Cybersecurity Agency
securityweek.comOct 16, 2025extracted
Hackers Found Using CrossC2 to Expand Cobalt Strike Beacon’s Reach to Linux and macOS
Japan's CERT coordination center (JPCERT/CC) on Thursday revealed it observed incidents that involved the use of a command-and-control (C2) framework called CrossC2, which is designed to extend the functionality of Cobalt Strike to other platforms like Linux and Apple macOS for cross-platform system control. The agency said the activity was detected between September and December 2024, targeting multiple countries, including Japan, based on an analysis of VirusTotal artifacts. "The attacker employed CrossC2 as well as other tools such as PsExec, Plink, and Cobalt Strike in attempts to penetrate AD. Further investigation revealed that the attacker used custom malware as a loader for Cobalt Strike," JPCERT/CC researcher Yuma Masubuchi said in a report published today. The bespoke Cobalt Strike Beacon loader has been codenamed ReadNimeLoader. CrossC2, an unofficial Beacon and builder, is capable of executing various Cobalt Strike commands after establishing communication with a remote server specified in the configuration. In the attacks documented by JPCERT/CC, a scheduled task set up by the threat actor on the compromised machine is used to launch the legitimate java.exe binary, which is then abused to sideload ReadNimeLoader ("jli.dll"). Written in the Nim programming language, the loader extracts the content of a text file and executes it directly in memory so as to avoid leaving traces on disk. This loaded content is an open-source shellcode loader dubbed OdinLdr, which ultimately decodes the embedded Cobalt Strike Beacon and runs it, also in memory. ReadNimeLoader also incorporates various anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques that are designed to prevent OdinLdr from being decoded unless the route is clear. JPCERT/CC said the attack campaign shares some level of overlap with BlackSuit/Black Basta ransomware activity reported by Rapid7 back in June 2025, citing overlaps in the command-and-control (C2) domain used and similarly-named files. Another notable aspect is the presence of several ELF versions of SystemBC, a backdoor that often acts as a precursor to the deployment of Cobalt Strike and ransomware. "While there are numerous incidents involving Cobalt Strike, this article focused on the particular case in which CrossC2, a tool that extends Cobalt Strike Beacon functionality to multiple platforms, was used in attacks, compromising Linux servers within an internal network," Masubuchi said. "Many Linux servers do not have EDR or similar systems installed, making them potential entry points for further compromise, and thus, more attention is required."
thehackernews.comAug 14, 2025extracted