Search/dkim
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dkim-milter
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Hackers Leverage Blockchain to Hit Japan's Hotels Through Booking.com Phishing
Cyber threat actors are targeting employees of Booking.com partner accommodations in Japan, using phishing emails that impersonate guest complaints and review requests to trick hotel staff into executing malicious files. The malware delivered through this campaign, TONResolver, is hosted on a smart contract and leverages blockchain technology – specifically, The Open Network (TON) blockchain platform. It functions as an initial access and command-execution foothold, with follow-on activity indicating potential credential theft and further compromise. Phishing Emails to Booking.com Partners The campaign was detected by TrendAI Research, Trend Micro’s research unit, in late May 2026. Suspicious emails had been sent to Japanese partner companies of Booking.com, with the subject line “Important: Guest Stay Review Request” in Japanese. These emails are aimed to engage the target to converse with the attacker. Follow-up emails sent by the threat actor contained a hyperlink that both led to a suspicious website and downloaded a ZIP file. Within the ZIP file lied a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file that led to the installation of TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A – a malware implant functioning as a remote access trojan (RAT), that TrendAI researchers also refer to simply as TONResolver – via a PowerShell script. Other malicious emails were sent with different subject lines, some in English, to other Booking.com accommodation partners in Japan and in other countries, such as Austria, Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US. However, Japanese hospitality organizations were by far the main targets, said a TrendAI report published on June 29. These emails have been sent using the notification functionality of a scheduling tool service, meaning they bypassed traditional email security controls based on domain authentication technologies such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). Malware Infrastructure on TON Blockchain Unlike conventional phishing campaigns, the malware implant delivered through this campaign, TONResolver, abuses the TON blockchain platform as a dead drop resolver. This technique allows attackers to update their command-and-control (C2) server destination without hardcoding it into the malware, making detection and takedown significantly more difficult. TON was initially developed by Telegram under the name Telegram Open Network, but is currently developed and operated primarily by the TON Foundation. To further evade detection, the attacker packaged the malware as a Node.js application and applied virtual machine-based obfuscation, a method that wraps the code inside a protected execution environment, preventing security researchers from easily inspecting its logic through static analysis alone. This combination of techniques makes reverse engineering the malware a significant challenge. While executing the LNK file and running TONResolver via Node.js does not immediately result in file or credential theft, the malware establishes a persistent "keepalive" connection with the attacker's server. This backdoor capability allows the attacker to execute additional commands and deploy further payloads at will, suggesting that victims are selectively targeted for follow-up attacks based on their endpoint details and IP address information. “In alignment with the campaign's progression, new domain registrations and C2 server switching were also carried out, indicating that the attackers are constantly monitoring attack trends and success rates,” said the TrendAI researchers. TrendAI’s Recommended Mitigation Measures Based on their findings, TrendAI researchers recommended the following measures to mitigate this type of threat: Restrict access to blockchain platforms: Deploy a proxy gateway on internet-facing endpoints and enforce connection filtering to block access to blockchain platforms such as the TON network Monitor and restrict Node.js execution: mplement application control policies to monitor and restrict suspicious use of Node.js, particularly any instances where it creates autorun entries or executes from unexpected locations Block unauthorized PowerShell network communications: Using endpoint firewall capabilities, restrict outbound communications initiated by PowerShell to external IP addresses Filter PowerShell-based web requests: Configure web gateway or internet access policies to block outbound HTTP requests containing PowerShell-based User-Agent strings
infosecurity-magazine.comJun 30, 2026extracted
CalendlyもGoogleも「正規」なのに危険 Microsoftが暴いた多段階侵入キャンペーンの全貌
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpJun 29, 2026extracted
DMARC未対応ではメールが届かない? Cloudflareが無料化で狙う“最後の障壁”
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpJun 21, 2026extracted
Google DoubleClick Abused in New Malspam Campaign to Deliver DesckVB RAT
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new malspam campaign that makes use of Google's DoubleClick domain as a way to evade detection and ultimately deliver an unidentified .NET-based loader. "Before the victim ever reaches attacker-controlled infrastructure, the lure routes through DoubleClick, a legitimate Google-owned domain that many security tools are less likely to treat as suspicious," Huntress researchers Anna Pham and Adam Mooney said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "From there, the victim is passed into a malspam kit that personalizes itself on the fly using the victim's email address, dynamically pulling in company branding and location details to make the page feel convincing without requiring the operators to handcraft a lure for each target." What makes this attack noteworthy is that it eliminates the need for having a bespoke kit for each targeted organization, thereby making these operations more scalable and cost-effective. The end goal of the campaign is to drop a .NET-based loader. The attack begins when an unsuspecting user opens an HTML file that's attached to a phishing email. The file triggers a meta-refresh browser redirect to a Google DoubleClick Campaign Manager click-tracking URL, from where the user is steered to another redirector, which decodes the Base64-encoded email address and leads the victim to a landing page containing a "Download PDF" button. Clicking the button causes the server to respond with a ZIP archive that initiates the rest of the infection chain. This is achieved by means of a JavaScript loader, whose main responsibility is to retrieve and execute a .NET RAT while flying under the radar. The script extracts and runs a PowerShell script, which then fetches a .NET loader from an external server. The loader acts as a stager that verifies it's not being analyzed, neutralizes the machine's security controls, sets up persistence, and then ultimately downloads and runs the RAT payload by using a technique called process hollowing that involves injecting the malware into Microsoft-signed processes. Once launched, the trojan communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server over raw TCP sockets, carries out system reconnaissance, and configures Microsoft Defender exclusions. The trojan also patches Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) at the native API level at the outset in an effort to blind Windows telemetry before persistence is established on the host by setting up Run and RunOnce Registry entries, along with placing a loader responsible for launching the RAT in the user's Startup folder. The malware comes with capabilities to extract data, run commands, and deploy additional payloads, granting the attackers full control over the infected machines, while simultaneously taking steps to fly under the radar by terminating and rebooting the machine if it detects an analysis tool or determines that it's running in a sandboxed environment. "This is a strong reminder of why defence in depth matters," Huntress said. "Configuring a Group Policy Object (GPO) in Active Directory to force script files such as .vbs, .hta, and .js to open in Notepad by default can stop a threat actor at the very first stage, preventing additional payloads from ever being dropped." "On the email security front, organizations should consider deploying DMARC, DKIM, and SPF records to reduce the likelihood of spoofed or malicious emails reaching end users. Beyond that, an email gateway solution capable of sandboxing attachments and links before delivery adds another meaningful layer of protection." (The story was updated after publication to reflect a change in original analysis that originally attributed the activity to DesckVB RAT. A "follow-up review" has since identified the final payload to be a .NET loader.)
thehackernews.comJun 3, 2026extracted
ACN pubblica le linee guida per configurare il servizio e-mail per l’autenticazione del mittente
Le indicazioni per la corretta configurazione dei protocolli SPF, DKIM e DMARC. L’Agenzia per la cybersicurezza nazionale (ACN) ha pubblicato le linee guida per la configurazione del servizio di e-mail per l’autenticazione. L’obiettivo è quello “di rafforzare l’affidabilità del servizio di posta elettronica di tutte le organizzazioni interessate e incrementarne il livello complessivo di sicurezza“. “La posta elettronica“, sottolinea l’Agenzia, “rappresenta oggi uno dei servizi maggiormente critici nel contesto digitale“. La ragione è che si trova “tra i principali canali utilizzati da organizzazioni e utenti per le comunicazioni e lo scambio di informazioni“. Il funzionamento del servizio di posta elettronica e in particolare la trasmissione dei messaggi, si basa sul protocollo SMTP. Un protocollo che però “non incorpora nativamente adeguati meccanismi di autenticazione del mittente e di protezione della riservatezza e dell’integrità dei messaggi“. Queste vulnerabilità espongono al rischio di attacchi come lo spoofing, il phishing, la manomissione e l’intercettazione del messaggio durante il transito. Come mitigare le debolezze Le principali minacce cyber in materia di posta elettronica sono proprio spoofing, phishing, manomissione del messaggio. Per mitigare le debolezze del protocollo SMTP e ridurre pertanto il rischio dovuto agli attacchi sopra richiamati nel corso del tempo c’è stato lo sviluppo di una serie di meccanismi. Meccanismi di due tipologie, in funzione sia per l’autenticazione del mittente che per la protezione dell’integrità del messaggio. Tra questi: SPF (Sender Policy Framework). DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail). DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance). Con le linee guida dell’ACN, si vogliono illustrare i singoli meccanismi con l’obiettivo di rafforzare l’affidabilità del servizio di posta elettronica e incrementarne il livello complessivo di sicurezza. Per approfondire Leggi “Linee Guida. Configurazione del servizio di posta elettronica per l’autenticazione” in PDF. Decreto Legge 21 settembre 2019, n. 105. Decreto Direttoriale ACN n. 21007/24 del 27 giugno 2024. Consulta il Decreto legislativo 4 settembre 2024, n. 138.
cybersecitalia.itApr 21, 2026extracted
Phishers sneak through using GitHub and Jira’s own mail delivery infrastructure
Phishers sneak through using GitHub and Jira’s own mail delivery infrastructure Attackers are abusing the notification systems of SaaS platforms like GitHub and Jira to send phishing and spam emails, Cisco Talos researchers are warning. “Because the emails are dispatched from the platform’s own infrastructure, they satisfy all standard authentication requirements (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC), effectively neutralizing the primary gatekeepers of modern email security,” they note. “By decoupling the malicious intent from the technical infrastructure, attackers successfully deliver phishing content with a ‘seal of approval’ that few security gateways are configured to challenge.” Exploiting GitHub On GitHub, the attackers are abusing the service’s notification system to deliver malicious payloads. Since GitHub notifies collaborators of repository activity, by pushing a commit on an existing project, the attackers trigger an automatic email notification to all collaborators. “Because the content is generated by the platform’s own system, it avoids security flags,” researchers noted. The body of the message (Source: Cisco Talos) When users create a commit, GitHub provides two text fields: a short summary and a longer description. The short summary appears first in notification emails, so attackers use it to display a convincing message that grabs attention. The main scam content, such as fake billing details or phishing links, is included in the longer description. On one observed peak day, about 2.89% of emails sent from GitHub were linked to this type of abuse. Exploiting Jira Instead of triggering notifications through repository activity, attackers use Jira’s “Invite Customers” feature to send phishing emails that will bypass email security protections. They register a Jira account, create a new Service Management project and set a legitimate looking name for it, then place their malicious content (e.g., a fake alert) into the Welcome Message or Project Description field. The attackers then use Jira’s built-in Invite Customers feature, enter the victims’ email addresses, and Atlassian’s backend assembles the email by injecting the attacker’s field values into its own trusted template. The result is a professionally formatted “Service Desk” notification, complete with Atlassian’s own branding footer. The malicious Jira “notification” (Source: Cisco Talos) By placing malicious content in fields such as the welcome message or project description, it is automatically included in system-generated emails. Because the malicious message is sent within Atlassian’s cryptographically signed templates, they are less likely to be flagged by email security solutions. Also, as Cisco Talos pointed out, Jira notifications are expected in corporate environments (including by employees) and rarely blocked.
helpnetsecurity.comApr 9, 2026extracted
Rspamd 4.0.0 ships memory savings, a new scan protocol, and a required migration step
Rspamd 4.0.0 ships memory savings, a new scan protocol, and a required migration step The open-source spam filtering platform Rspamd released version 4.0.0, delivering infrastructure changes across its scan protocol, memory model, hash storage, and configuration system. Several of the changes are breaking, and at least one requires a migration step before upgrade. A new scan protocol The release introduces a /checkv3 endpoint that replaces HTTP headers with structured JSON or msgpack for metadata transport. The new endpoint uses multipart/form-data for requests and multipart/mixed for responses, supports per-part zstd compression, includes an optional body part for rewritten messages, and uses zero-copy piecewise writev for response output. Operators can activate the new protocol with the rspamc --protocol-v3 or rspamc --msgpack flags. The previous protocol remains available. Fasttext goes built-in, cuts memory use Rspamd previously depended on an external C++ libfasttext library. Version 4 removes that dependency and replaces it with a built-in mmap-based shim that loads model data into shared memory across all worker processes. The change eliminates per-worker heap copies of model data, which the project estimates saved between 500MB and 7GB of RAM in multi-worker deployments, depending on model size. Existing .bin and .ftz model files continue to work without modification. The ENABLE_FASTTEXT cmake option is removed; Fasttext support is now always compiled in. Packagers must remove the external libfasttext build dependency. Fuzzy hashes gain multiple flags A stored fuzzy hash previously carried a single flag. Version 4 allows a single digest to carry up to eight flags simultaneously, so multiple detection rules can match the same hash independently without duplicating the stored entry. The Redis update logic was rewritten in Lua with EVALSHA and NOSCRIPT recovery. The release also introduces an HTML_FUZZY_PHISHING symbol. It fires when an HTML template matches a known phishing template but the embedded domains differ, targeting phishing campaigns that reuse a template structure while swapping out links. The wire protocol moves to epoch 12 and remains backward-compatible. The highest-value flag occupies the primary slot. Ring Hash replaces Jump Hash Rspamd used Jump Hash for consistent upstream hashing in sharded Bayes deployments. Version 4 replaces it with Ring Hash (Ketama) with virtual nodes. Under Ring Hash, only roughly 1/n keys redistribute when an upstream fails, and keys return to their original upstream when it recovers. This change is a breaking one for operators running per-user Bayes on sharded Redis. After the upgrade, existing data lands on the wrong shards. The project requires operators to run rspamadm statistics_dump migrate before upgrading. Single-server deployments are not affected. HTTPS support added natively Workers can now serve HTTPS without a reverse proxy in front. SSL is auto-detected from bind socket configuration. The previous ssl = true worker option is removed; operators should remove it from configs and apply the ssl suffix to bind lines. Token bucket load balancing becomes the default Proxy upstream load balancing switches from simple round-robin to token bucket balancing by default. The algorithm accepts configurable max_tokens, scale, and base_cost parameters for burst traffic handling. Operators who want to restore round-robin can remove the token_bucket key from proxy upstream config. Jinja2 templating for configuration files Configuration files are now preprocessed by the Lupa Jinja2-compatible template engine before UCL parsing. Environment variables prefixed with RSPAMD_ are available inside templates as the env table. The templating system uses modified delimiters ({= =} for expressions, {% %} for control structures) to avoid conflicts with UCL syntax. Validation filters including mandatory, require_int, and require_json abort startup on invalid input, which the project intends to support container deployments that configure Rspamd through environment variables. Other additions and fixes Rspamd 4 adds native UUID v7 generation per scanning task, synchronized with the Log-Tag header and ClickHouse UUID v7 column support. The Bayesian classifier gains multiclass support, allowing classifiers to learn arbitrary categories beyond binary spam/ham. The WebUI learning interface is updated accordingly. Hyperscan compilation moves to an async Lua backend with Redis-based shared cache across workers and hosts. Multiple use-after-free conditions in Hyperscan cache handling during live configuration reload are resolved. SenderScore RBLs are disabled by default in this release. The project notes that the rules require a MyValidity account and were returning blocked results for all unregistered IPs. Operators with registered accounts must explicitly re-enable the rules. PDF parsing receives fixes for ASCII85 decoding, ligature substitution, and object padding evasion. DKIM unknown and broken key handling is updated to follow RFC behavior. A memory leak in the RSA path of DKIM signing is fixed, as is a SHA-1 DKIM signature crypto-policy bypass on RHEL/CentOS 10. A use-after-free in fuzzy UDP sessions and a CPU busy-loop in the fuzzy TCP client are also resolved in this release. Rspamd is available for free download on GitHub. Must read: 40 open-source tools redefining how security teams secure the stack Firmware scanning time, cost, and where teams run EMBA Subscribe to the Help Net Security ad-free monthly newsletter to stay informed on the essential open-source cybersecurity tools. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comMar 31, 2026extracted
Microsoft Azure Monitor alerts abused for callback phishing attacks
Microsoft Azure Monitor alerts are being abused to send callback phishing emails that impersonate warnings from the Microsoft Security Team about unauthorized charges on your account. Azure Monitor is Microsoft's cloud-based monitoring service that collects and analyzes data from Azure resources, applications, and infrastructure. It enables users to track performance, notify about billing changes, detect issues, and trigger alerts based on various conditions. Over the past month, numerous people have reported receiving Azure Monitor alerts warning of suspicious charges or invoice activity on their accounts, urging them to call an enclosed phone number. "Alert rule description MICROSOFT CORPORATION BILLING AND ACCOUNT SECURITY NOTICE (REF: MS-FRA-6673829-KP). Our system has detected a potentially unauthorized charge on your account. Transaction Details: Merchant: Windows Defender. Transaction ID: PP456-887A-22B. Amount: 389.90 USD. Date: 03/05/2026l," reads the fake billing alert. "For your protection, this transaction has been temporarily placed on hold by our Fraud Detection Team. To prevent possible account suspension or additional fees, please verify this transaction immediately. If you did NOT authorize this payment, contact our 24/7 Microsoft Account Security Support at +1 (864) 347-2494 or +1 (864) 347-4846." "We apologize for any inconvenience and appreciate your prompt response. Microsoft Account Security Team." Unlike other phishing campaigns, these messages are not spoofed, but are sent directly by the Microsoft Azure Monitor platform using the legitimate [email protected] email address. As the emails are sent through Microsoft's legitimate email platforms, they pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC email security checks, making them appear more trustworthy. Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; dkim=pass header.d=microsoft.com header.s=s1024-meo header.b=CKfQ8iOB; arc=pass ("microsoft.com:s=arcselector10001:i=1"); dmarc=pass (policy=reject) header.from=microsoft.com; spf=pass (relay.mimecast.com: domain of [email protected] designates 40.107.200.103 as permitted sender) [email protected] The threat actors are conducting this campaign by creating alerts in Azure Monitor for easily triggered conditions, such as new orders, payments, generated invoices, and other billing events. When creating alerts, you can enter any message you want in the description field, which the attackers use to put their callback phishing message. These alerts are then configured to send emails to what is believed to be a mailing list under the attacker's control, which forwards the email to all the targeted people in the attack. This also preserves the original Microsoft headers and authentication results, helping the emails bypass spam filters and user suspicion. BleepingComputer has seen multiple alert categories used in this campaign, mostly using invoice and payment-themed rules designed to resemble automated billing notifications: Azure monitor alert rule order-22455340 was resolved for invoice22455340 Azure monitor alert rule Invoice Paid INV-d39f76ef94 was resolved for invd39f76ef94 Azure monitor alert rule Payment Reference INV-22073494 was resolved for purchase22073494 Azure monitor alert rule Funds Successfully Received-ec5c7acb41 was triggered for subec5c7acb41 Azure monitor alert rule MemorySpike-9242403-A4 was triggered Azure monitor alert rule DiskFull-3426456-A6 was triggered for locker3426456 The campaign relies on creating a sense of urgency, which in this case is the unusual $389 Windows Defender charge, to trick the users into calling the listed phone number. While BleepingComputer did not call the number in this scam, previous callback phishing campaigns led to credential theft, payment fraud, or the installation of remote access software. As these emails use a more enterprise or corporate theme, they may be intended to gain initial access to corporate networks for follow-on attacks. Users should treat any Azure or Microsoft alert that includes a phone number or urgent request to resolve billing issues with suspicion. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 21, 2026extracted
Security Firm Executive Targeted in Sophisticated Phishing Attack
A C-level executive at Swedish exposure management and identity security firm Outpost24 was targeted in a sophisticated phishing attack, though the effort was unsuccessful, the company’s subsidiary Specops Software reports. Specops said the attack was identified early and blocked before it could compromise systems or impact users. However, the security firm has disclosed technical details to highlight its sophistication. The attack, likely mounted with a recently identified phishing-as-a-service kit named Kratos, relied on a seven-step chain that leveraged layered infrastructure and legitimate services to evade detection and deceive the recipient. The phishing message, impersonating financial services provider JP Morgan, appeared as if part of an existing email thread to increase its sense of legitimacy, and invited the recipient to review and sign a document. Furthermore, the attackers used two DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signatures to ensure the email would pass DMARC authentication and appear trustworthy. Within the message, the attackers included a ‘review document’ link pointing to the legitimate Cisco domain secure-web.cisco.com, which is typically used for rewriting URLs in emails after they have been validated by Cisco. Because the link passed Cisco’s Secure Email Gateway validation, the redirect URL was hosted on Cisco’s infrastructure, further allowing the phishing email to bypass detection systems. The next step in the chain involved a redirection to the legitimate email API platform Nylas, which was likely used to ensure that the phishing link would redirect through Cisco Secure Web infrastructure. “By chaining redirects through legitimate services such as Cisco and Nylas, the attackers increase the likelihood that the link will pass security filtering and reputation checks. These domains are widely trusted and commonly observed in legitimate traffic, which makes automated blocking more difficult,” Specops notes. Next, the target was redirected to a subdomain on the website of a legitimate development company based in India, and then to a domain that was originally registered in 2017 by a Chinese entity. The domain’s previous TLS certificate expired on March 6, the associated DNS records were released shortly after, and the domain was re-registered on March 12, with several new TLS certificates issued for it the same day. “The timing strongly suggests the domain was reacquired and repurposed specifically for this campaign,” Specops notes. The user was redirected once again, this time to phishing infrastructure that was deployed behind Cloudflare to hide its origin server. At this stage, the victim was served a browser validation check, likely meant to prevent security analysis. Finally, the victim would be served a convincing phishing page meant to harvest Microsoft 365 credentials. “Like the rest of the attack chain, this step is also carefully constructed, from a fake loading animation imitating Outlook to a check that validates whether the user input is actually an email. As the final step, the site attempts a legitimate login to verify that the captured credentials are valid,” Specops explains. The cybersecurity firm confirmed to SecurityWeek that the individual targeted in this attack attempt was a C-level executive at its parent company Outpost24, underlining the sophistication of the attack. Specops did not attribute the incident to a specific threat actor but noted that the modus operandi aligns perfectly with that of Iran-linked threat actors that recently targeted various entities in the US. On the other hand, the firm said, other hacking groups have been observed employing similar tactics, and attribution remains elusive. the article has been updated to clarify that the attack was not successful Related: Internet Infrastructure TLD .arpa Abused in Phishing Attacks Related: Tycoon 2FA Phishing Platform Dismantled in Global Takedown Related: LastPass Warns of New Phishing Campaign Related: ‘Stanley’ Malware Toolkit Enables Phishing via Website Spoofing
securityweek.comMar 16, 2026extracted
Attackers Don't Just Send Phishing Emails. They Weaponize Your SOC's Workload
The most dangerous phishing campaigns aren’t just designed to fool employees. Many are designed to exhaust the analysts investigating them. When a phishing investigation takes 12 hours instead of five minutes, the outcome can shift from a contained incident to a breach. For years, the cybersecurity industry has focused on the front door of phishing defense: employee training, email gateways that filter known threats, and reporting programs that encourage users to flag suspicious messages. Far less attention has been paid to what happens after a report is filed, and how attackers exploit the investigation process that follows. Alert fatigue in Security Operations Centers isn't just an operational inconvenience. It can become an attack surface. SOC teams increasingly report phishing campaigns that appear designed not only to compromise targets but also to overwhelm the analysts responsible for investigating them. This shifts how organizations should think about phishing defense. The vulnerability isn't just the employee who clicks. It’s also the analyst who can't keep up with the queue. When investigations that should close in minutes stretch to 3, 6, or 12 hours because of queue congestion, the window for attacker success widens dramatically. When Phishing Volume Becomes a Weapon Phishing is often treated as a series of independent threats. One message. One potential victim. One investigation. Attackers operating at scale think in terms of systems, not individual messages. A SOC is one of those systems, and it has finite capacity and predictable failure modes. Consider a phishing campaign targeting a large enterprise. The attacker sends thousands of messages. Most are low-sophistication lures that email gateways or trained employees will likely catch. These messages flood the SOC with reports and alerts. Analysts begin triaging, working through a queue that grows faster than they can clear it. Buried in that volume are a few carefully crafted spear-phishing messages targeting individuals with access to critical systems. These messages are the real payload. The flood is not just a numbers game. It is effectively a denial-of-service attack against the SOC's attention, sometimes referred to as an Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS). This pattern is not purely theoretical. Red team exercises and incident reports have documented adversaries who time high-volume phishing campaigns to coincide with targeted spear-phishing attempts. The commodity wave creates noise. The targeted message hides inside it. The Predictable Failure Mode This tactic works because SOC phishing triage tends to follow a predictable pattern across organizations. When phishing report volume spikes, most SOCs respond in predictable ways. Analysts begin triaging faster, spending less time per submission. Investigation depth decreases. Industry research shows 66% of SOC teams cannot keep up with incoming alerts. The focus shifts from thorough investigation to clearing the queue. Managers may deprioritize phishing reports relative to alerts from other detection systems, assuming user-submitted reports are lower fidelity. Each response is rational on its own. Together, they create the conditions an attacker needs. SOC managers observe a consistent pattern during high-volume periods: decision quality drops as workload increases. Analysts begin anchoring on superficial indicators. Messages that "look like" previously benign submissions receive less scrutiny. Novel indicators of compromise may be overlooked when they appear in a crowded queue rather than in isolation. The attacker's advantage compounds because the most dangerous messages are specifically designed to exploit these shortcuts. A spear-phishing email targeting the CFO's executive assistant doesn't arrive looking dramatically different from everything else in the queue. It's crafted to resemble the category of messages that analysts, under pressure, have learned to move past quickly — a vendor communication, a document-sharing notification, a routine business process email. The Economics Behind the Attack The economics of this dynamic heavily favor the attacker. Generating thousands of commodity phishing emails costs almost nothing, especially with generative AI lowering the production barrier further. But each of those emails, once reported by an employee, costs the defending organization real analyst time and cognitive bandwidth. This creates an asymmetry that traditional SOC models have no good answer for: Attacker cost per decoy email: near zero. Template-based generation, commodity infrastructure, automated delivery. Defender cost per reported email: minutes of skilled analyst time for even a cursory review. Hours if the investigation is thorough. Attacker cost for the real payload: moderate — these are the carefully researched, individually crafted messages designed for specific targets. Defender cost of missing the payload: potentially catastrophic — credential compromise, lateral movement, data exfiltration, ransomware deployment. The defender is forced to investigate everything because the cost of missing a real threat is so high. The attacker knows this and uses it to drain investigative resources before the real attack arrives. It's an attrition strategy applied to human attention rather than system availability. This asymmetry has only worsened as organizations have scaled up phishing awareness programs. More trained employees means more reports. More reports means more queue pressure. More queue pressure means less attention per investigation. The very success of security awareness training has, paradoxically, expanded the attack surface that adversaries exploit. The Real Problem is Decision Speed Most security tools respond to this challenge by throwing more alerts at people — additional detection layers, more threat feeds, extra scoring systems. More data without better decision processes only compounds the overload. The fundamental issue isn't that SOCs lack information about suspicious emails. It's that they lack the ability to turn that information into clear, confident decisions at the speed the threat environment demands. The organizations breaking out of this cycle are reframing phishing triage not as an email analysis problem but as a “decision precision” problem. The goal isn't to generate more signals about a suspicious message. It's to deliver a decision-ready investigation — a complete, reasoned verdict that tells the analyst exactly what was found, what it means, and what should happen next — so that no one has to guess. This distinction matters because guessing is exactly what overwhelmed analysts are forced to do. When the queue is deep and investigation time is compressed, analysts make judgment calls based on incomplete analysis. Sometimes they're right. Sometimes they're not. And the attacker's entire strategy depends on those moments when they're not. Decision-ready investigation changes the equation. Instead of presenting analysts with raw indicators and expecting them to assemble a conclusion under time pressure, the system delivers a synthesized assessment with clear reasoning. The analyst's role shifts from doing the investigation to reviewing the investigation — a fundamentally different cognitive task that scales far more effectively under volume. Why Rule-Based Automation Doesn't Solve This The obvious response is automation, and most SOCs have implemented some version of it. Auto-closing reports from whitelisted senders. Deduplicating identical submissions. Applying basic reputation checks to filter known-safe domains. These measures help with baseline volume but fail against the specific threat model described above — and in some cases, they make it worse. Rule-based filters create predictable blind spots. If an attacker knows (or can infer) that an organization auto-closes reports from domains with established reputation, they can compromise or spoof those domains. If deduplication logic groups messages by subject line or sender, an attacker can vary these superficially while maintaining the same malicious payload. There's also the trust problem. Security teams are rightfully skeptical of "black box" automation that renders verdicts without showing its work. When an automated system closes a phishing report, and no one can explain exactly why, confidence erodes. Analysts second-guess the automation, re-investigate cases it already handled, or override its decisions reflexively. The efficiency gains evaporate, and the organization ends up with the worst of both worlds: automation it's paying for and manual processes it can't abandon. More fundamentally, static rules can't adapt to the dynamic relationship between attack patterns and SOC behavior. The attacker's strategy isn't static. It continuously evolves based on what works. A defensive system built on fixed rules is playing a static game against a dynamic adversary. Specialized Investigation Agents, Not Black Boxes The emerging approach to adversarial phishing defense looks less like a single automated tool and more like a coordinated team of specialized experts — each focused on a specific dimension of the investigation and each capable of explaining exactly what it found and why it matters. In practice, this means agentic AI architectures where distinct analytical agents handle different parts of a phishing investigation simultaneously. One agent verifies sender authenticity — checking SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records, analyzing domain registration history, and evaluating whether the sending infrastructure matches the claimed identity. Another examines the message itself, analyzing linguistic patterns, tone inconsistencies, and social engineering indicators that suggest manipulation rather than legitimate communication. A third correlates the report with endpoint telemetry, determining whether the recipient's device has exhibited any behavioral anomalies that might indicate a payload has already executed. These agents don't operate independently and disappear into a verdict. They produce transparent, auditable reasoning — a clear chain of evidence showing which indicators were evaluated, what was found, and how those findings contributed to the final assessment. When the system determines a message is benign, it shows why. When it flags a message as malicious, it presents the specific evidence. When signals conflict, it explains the ambiguity and escalates with full context. This transparency is what separates decision-ready investigation from black box automation. An analyst reviewing an AI-generated investigation can see the logic, challenge the reasoning, and build calibrated trust in the system over time. That trust is what ultimately allows organizations to let the system handle routine verdicts autonomously — not blind faith in an opaque algorithm, but earned confidence in a process that shows its work. The Five-Minute Reality The practical impact of this approach comes down to time — specifically, the difference between the 3-to-12-hour investigation timelines that characterize most manual SOC phishing workflows and the sub-five-minute resolution that decision-ready AI triage enables. This gap is not only an efficiency metric. It directly affects security outcomes. In 12 hours, a compromised credential can be used for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data staging. In five minutes, the same credential gets revoked before the attacker establishes persistence. A “non-event.” The same phishing email produces radically different consequences depending entirely on how fast the investigating organization reaches a confident decision. When cognitive AI handles initial investigation, every submission gets the same rigorous, multi-dimensional analysis regardless of queue depth or time of day. The commodity phishing flood designed to exhaust analysts gets absorbed by a system that doesn't fatigue. The carefully crafted spear-phish designed to blend in during high-volume periods receives the same thorough investigation as every other submission, with cross-submission pattern detection that might flag it precisely because of its relationship to the surrounding volume. The human analysts, the experienced, skilled professionals that every SOC depends on, shift from reactive queue processing to the work that genuinely requires human judgment: investigating confirmed incidents, hunting for threats that haven't triggered alerts, and making strategic decisions about defensive posture. Measuring SOC Resilience Organizations that adopt this framing need metrics that reflect it. Traditional SOC metrics, such as mean time to acknowledge, mean time to close, and tickets processed per analyst, measure operational efficiency. They don't measure resilience against adversarial exploitation. Metrics that capture defensive resilience against weaponized volume include: Investigation quality consistency under load. Does analytical depth remain constant as report volume increases, or does it degrade? Tracking investigation thoroughness across volume quartiles reveals whether the SOC's phishing triage is exploitable under pressure. Decision latency. How quickly does the triage system move from alert receipt to confident verdict? The gap between 12 hours and 5 minutes isn't an incremental improvement; it's a categorical change in attacker opportunity. Escalation accuracy at volume. When the queue is heavy, are the right cases being escalated to human analysts? Rising false negative rates during high-volume periods indicate exactly the vulnerability attackers target. Decision transparency rate. What percentage of automated verdicts include complete, auditable reasoning? Black box resolutions that can't be explained are resolutions that can't be trusted, and untrusted automation gets overridden, negating its value. Proactiveness. How close to the point of impact are threats being identified? Changing the Defensive Equation The attacker's advantage in weaponizing SOC workload depends on a specific assumption: that increasing phishing volume reliably degrades defensive quality. If that assumption holds, the strategy is highly effective and nearly free to execute. If it doesn't — if investigative quality and speed remain constant regardless of volume — the entire approach collapses. The commodity phishing flood no longer provides cover because every message receives the same analytical rigor in the same five-minute window. The carefully crafted spear-phish no longer benefits from a rushed analyst because no analyst is rushing. The asymmetry flips: the attacker spent resources generating noise that achieved nothing, while the defender's capacity for genuine threat detection remained intact. The strategic value of decision-ready AI triage is not just efficiency. It removes a failure mode that attackers have learned to exploit. It turns a predictable vulnerability into a defensive strength, making the SOC's phishing workflow resilient against the very tactic designed to break it. The phishing report button stays. Employees keep reporting. But the investigation engine behind that button no longer offers attackers a lever to pull. Conifers.ai's CognitiveSOC platform uses agentic AI to deliver decision-ready phishing investigations in minutes, not hours. Learn more about how the Conifers platform is designed to reduce the alert-fatigue conditions attackers often exploit.
thehackernews.comMar 12, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: Qualcomm 0-Day, iOS Exploit Chains, AirSnitch Attack & Vibe-Coded Malware
Another week in cybersecurity. Another week of "you've got to be kidding me." Attackers were busy. Defenders were busy. And somewhere in the middle, a whole lot of people had a very bad Monday morning. That's kind of just how it goes now. The good news? There were some actual wins this week. Real ones. The kind where the good guys showed up, did the work, and made a dent. It doesn't always happen, so when it does, it's worth noting. The bad news? For every win, there's a fresh headache waiting right behind it. New tricks, old tricks dressed up in new clothes, and a few things that'll make you want to go touch grass and never log back in. But you will. We all do. So here's everything that mattered this week — the wins, the warnings, and the stuff you really shouldn't ignore. ⚡ Threat of the Week Tycoon 2FA and LeakBase Operations Dismantled — The infrastructure hosting the Tycoon2FA service, which Europol said was among the largest adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations worldwide, has been dismantled by a coalition of security companies and law enforcement agencies. "Taking down infrastructure associated with Tycoon 2FA and identifying the individual allegedly responsible for creating this prolific hacking tool will have a significant impact on overall MFA credential phishing, and hopefully strike a blow to the world's most prolific AitM phishing-as-a-service," Proofpoint said in a statement shared with The Hacker News. Phishing kits and PhaaS platforms have become an Achilles' heel in recent years, streamlining and democratizing phishing attacks for less technically savvy hackers by providing them with a suite of tools to create convincing emails and phishing pages that unsuspecting victims will engage with. For a relatively modest fee, aspiring cybercriminals can subscribe to these services and carry out phishing attacks at scale. In a similar development, authorities also took down LeakBase, one of the world's largest online forums for cybercriminals to buy and sell stolen data and cybercrime tools. While the disruption is a positive development, it's known that such takedowns typically create only short-term disruptions, as the ecosystem adapts by migrating to other forums or more resilient distribution channels, like Telegram. Shadow AI Is EVERYWHERE. Here's How You Can Find and Secure It Shadow AI is quietly accessing sensitive data across your SaaS environment. Learn how to close AI blind spots and get ahead of data exposure risks with this new guide. Get Answers Now ➝ 🔔 Top News Anthropic Finds 22 Firefox Vulnerabilities in Firefox — Anthropic said it discovered 22 new security vulnerabilities in the Firefox web browser using its Claude Opus 4.6 large language model (LLM)as part of a security partnership with Mozilla. Of these, 14 have been classified as high, seven have been classified as moderate, and one has been rated low in severity. The issues were addressed in Firefox 148, released late last month. The vulnerabilities were identified over a two-week period in January 2026. The company noted that the cost of identifying vulnerabilities is cheaper than creating an exploit for them, and the model is better at finding issues than at exploiting them. Qualcomm Flaw Exploited in the Wild — A high-severity security flaw impacting Qualcomm chips used in Android devices has been exploited in the wild. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-21385 (CVSS score: 7.8), a buffer over-read in the Graphics component that could result in memory corruption and arbitrary code execution. There are currently no details on how the vulnerability is being exploited in the wild. However, Google acknowledged in its monthly Android security bulletin that "there are indications that CVE-2026-21385 may be under limited, targeted exploitation." Coruna iOS Exploit Kit Uses 23 Exploits Against Older iOS Devices — Google disclosed details of a new and powerful exploit kit dubbed Coruna (aka CryptoWaters) targeting Apple iPhone models running iOS versions between 13.0 and 17.2.1. The exploit kit featured five full iOS exploit chains and a total of 23 exploits, the company said. What makes it different is that it started with a commercial surveillance vendor in February 2025, got picked up by what seems like a Russian espionage group targeting Ukrainians in July 2025, and ended up in the hands of financially motivated attackers in China going after crypto wallets by the end of the year. Coruna began its life as a surveillance exploit kit, but by the time it reached the Chinese cybercrime gang, it was heavily focused on financial theft. It's not known how the exploit kit got passed between multiple threat actors of varied motivations. This has raised the possibility of a secondhand market where it's resold to other threat actors, who end up repurposing them for their own objectives. Transparent Tribe Unleases Vibeware Against Indian Entities — In a new attack campaign detected by Bitdefender, the Pakistan-aligned threat actor known as Transparent Tribe has leveraged artificial intelligence (AI)-powered coding tools to vibe-code malware and use them to target the Indian government and its embassies in multiple foreign countries. These tools are written in niche programming languages like Nim, Zig, and Crystal so as to evade detection. "Rather than a breakthrough in technical sophistication, we are seeing a transition toward AI-assisted malware industrialization that allows the actor to flood target environments with disposable, polyglot binaries," the company said. Iranian Hackers Target U.S. Entities Amid Conflict — The Iranian hacking group tracked as MuddyWater (aka Seedworm) targeted several U.S. companies, including banks, airports, non-profit, and the Israeli arm of a software company, as part of a campaign that began in early February 2026, and continued after the joint U.S.-Israel military strikes on Iran towards the end of the month. The development comes against the backdrop of hacktivist-fueled cyber attacks, with wiper campaigns targeting Israeli energy, financial, government, and utilities sectors. "The trajectory is clear: what began as nation-state-level ICS capability in 2012 [with Shamoon wiper] has become, by 2026, something any motivated actor can attempt with free tools and an internet connection," CloudSEK said in a report last week. "The technical barrier has collapsed. The threat pool has expanded. And the US attack surface has never been larger." Another targeted campaign has distributed a trojanized version of the Red Alert rocket warning Android app to Israeli users via SMS messages impersonating official Home Front Command communications. Once installed, the malware monitors and abuses the granted permissions to collect sensitive data, including SMS messages, contacts, location data, device accounts, and installed applications. The campaign is believed to be the work of a Hamas-affiliated actor known as Arid Viper. There are currently no details available on the scope of the campaign and whether any of the infections were successful. Acronis said it highlights how trusted emergency services can be weaponized during periods of geopolitical tension using social engineering. ️🔥 Trending CVEs New vulnerabilities show up every week, and the window between disclosure and exploitation keeps getting shorter. The flaws below are this week's most critical — high-severity, widely used software, or already drawing attention from the security community. Check these first, patch what applies, and don't wait on the ones marked urgent — CVE-2026-2796 (Mozilla Firefox), CVE-2026-21385 (Qualcomm), CVE-2026-2256 (MS-Agent), CVE-2026-26198 (Ormar), CVE-2026-27966 (langflow), CVE-2025–64712 (Unstructured.io), CVE-2026-24009 (Docling), CVE-2026-23600 (HPE AutoPass License Server), CVE-2026-27636, CVE-2026-28289 (aka Mail2Shell) (FreeScout), CVE-2025-67736 (FreePBX), CVE-2025-34288 (Nagios XI), CVE-2025-14500 (IceWarp), CVE-2026-20079 (Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center), CVE-2025-13476 (Viber app for Android), CVE-2026-3336, CVE-2026-3337, CVE-2026-3338 (Amazon AWS-LC), CVE-2026-25611 (MongoDB), CVE-2026-3536, CVE-2026-3537, CVE-2026-3538 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-27970 (Angular), CVE-2026-29058 (AVideo) a privilege escalation flaw in IPVanish VPN for macOS (no CVE), and and a remote code execution vulnerability in Ghost CMS (no CVE). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Automating Real-World Security Testing to Prove What Actually Works → Running a security test once a year and hoping for the best? That's not a strategy anymore. This webinar shows you how to continuously test your defenses using real attack techniques — so you actually know what holds up and what quietly breaks when no one's looking. When AI Agents Become Your New Attack Surface → AI tools aren't just answering questions anymore — they're browsing the web, hitting APIs, and touching your internal systems. That changes everything about how you think about risk. This webinar breaks down what that means for security, and what you actually need to do before something goes wrong. 📰 Around the Cyber World New AirSnitch Attack Shows Wi-Fi Client Isolation May Not Be Enough — A group of academics has developed a new attack called AirSnitch that breaks the encryption that separates Wi-Fi clients. Xin'an Zhou, the lead author of the research paper, told Ars Technica that AirSnitch bypasses worldwide Wi-Fi encryption and that it "might have the potential to enable advanced cyber attacks." The attack, at its core, leverages three weaknesses in client isolation implementations: (1) It abuses the group key(s) that are shared between all clients in the same Wi-Fi network, (2) It bypasses client isolation by tricking the gateway into forwarding packets to the victim at the IP layer by taking advantage of the fact that many networks only enforce client isolation at the MAC/Ethernet layer, and (3) It allows an adversary to manipulate internal switches and bridges to forward the victim's uplink and downlink traffic to the adversary. As a result, they enable the attacker to restore AitM capabilities even if client isolation protections exist. "We found that Wi-Fi client isolation can often be bypassed," Mathy Vanhoef said. "This allows an attacker who can connect to a network, either as a malicious insider or by connecting to a co-located open network, to attack others." Google Tracked 90 Exploited 0-Days in 2025 — Google said it tracked 90 zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild in 2025, up from 78 in 2024 and down from 100 in 2023. "Both the raw number (43) and proportion (48%) of vulnerabilities impacting enterprise technologies reached all-time highs, accounting for almost 50% of total zero-days exploited in 2025," the company said. Of these, vulnerabilities in security and networking appliances made up about half (21) of the enterprise-related zero-days in 2025. Mobile zero-days rebounded from nine in 2024 to 15 in 2025, with commercial surveillance vendors (15, plus likely another three) leading the charge in exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities than state-sponsored cyber espionage groups (12) for the first time. The names of the commercial spyware companies were not disclosed. Microsoft had the largest number of actively exploited flaws at 25, followed by Google (11), Apple (8), Cisco (4), Fortinet (4), Ivanti (3), and Broadcom VMware (3). Memory safety issues accounted for 35% of all exploited zero-day vulnerabilities last year. Financially motivated threat groups, including ransomware gangs, also targeted enterprise technologies and accounted for nine zero-days in 2025, double the five attributed to them in 2024. Velvet Tempest Deploys ClickFix Attack — Velvet Tempest (aka DEV-0504) has been observed using a ClickFix lure, followed by hands-on-keyboard activity consistent with Termite ransomware tradecraft. According to a report by Deception.Pro, the attack used the social engineering technique to drop payloads like DonutLoader and CastleRAT. "Follow-on activity included Active Directory reconnaissance (domain trusts, server discovery, user listing) and attempted browser credential harvesting via a PowerShell script downloaded from 143.198.160[.]37," it said. "Telemetry and infrastructure in this chain align with a modern initial-access playbook: rapid staging, heavy use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and long-lived command-and-control (C2) traffic that blends into normal browser noise." No ransomware was deployed in the attack that took place between February 3 and 16, 2026. Ghanaian National Pleads Guilty to Role in $100M Romance Scam — A Ghanaian national pleaded guilty to his role in a massive fraud ring that stole over $100 million from victims across the U.S. through business email compromise attacks and romance scams. 40-year-old Derrick Van Yeboah pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and agreed to pay more than $10 million in restitution. "Van Yeboah personally perpetrated many of the romance scams by impersonating fake romantic partners in communications with victims," the U.S. Justice Department said. "Many of the conspiracy’s victims were vulnerable older men and women who were tricked into believing that they were in online romantic relationships with persons who were, in fact, fake identities assumed by members of the conspiracy." The conspirators, part of a criminal organization primarily based in Ghana, also committed business email compromises to deceive businesses into wiring funds to the enterprise. In total, the scheme stole and laundered more than $100 million from dozens of victims. After stealing the money, the fraud proceeds were laundered to West Africa. The defendant is scheduled to be sentenced in June 2026. Taiwan Indicts 62 People for Cyber Scams — Prosecutors in Taipei indicted 62 people and 13 companies for their involvement in cyber scam operations organized throughout Asia by the Prince Group. Chen Zhi, the founder of the Prince Group, was indicted by U.S. prosecutors last year on money laundering charges. Taipei prosecutors said those associated with Prince Group laundered at least $339 million into Taiwan and used the stolen funds to buy 24 properties, 35 vehicles, and other assets amounting to approximately $1.7 million. In all, authorities seized about $174 million in cash and assets. Prince Group "effectively controlled 250 offshore companies in 18 countries, holding 453 domestic and international financial accounts. By creating fictitious transaction contracts between these offshore companies, the group laundered money through foreign exchange channels," they added. Ransomware Actors Use AzCopy — Ransomware operators are ditching the usual tools like Rclone for Microsoft's own AzCopy, turning a trusted Azure utility into a stealthy data exfiltration mechanism and blending into normal activity. "The adoption of AzCopy and other familiar tools by attackers represents a similar logic to living-off-the-land in the final and most critical phase of an operation: exfiltrating data out of an organization," Varonis said. "Spinning up an Azure storage account takes minutes and requires only a credit card or compromised credentials. The attacker gains the benefits of Microsoft's global infrastructure while security teams struggle to distinguish between malicious uploads and legitimate traffic." Threat Actors Exploit Critical Flaw in WPEverest Plugin — Threat actors are exploiting a critical security flaw in WPEverest's User Registration & Membership plugin (CVE-2026-1492, CVSS score: 9.8) to create rogue administrator accounts. The vulnerability affects all versions of User Registration & Membership through 5.1.2. The issue has been addressed in version 5.1.3. Wordfence said the plugin is susceptible to improper privilege management, which enables the creation of bogus admin accounts. "This is due to the plugin accepting a user-supplied role during membership registration without properly enforcing a server-side allowlist," it said. "This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create administrator accounts by supplying a role value during membership registration." MuddyWater Evolves Its Tactics — The Iranian hacking group known as MuddyWater has been observed leveraging Shodan and Nuclei to identify potential vulnerable targets, as well as using subfinder and ffuf to perform enumeration of target web applications. The findings come from an analysis of the threat actor's VPS server hosted in the Netherlands. MuddyWater is also said to be attempting to scan and/or exploit recently disclosed CVEs related to BeyondTrust (CVE-2026-1731), Ivanti (CVE-2026-1281), n8n (CVE-2025-68613), React (CVE-2025-55182), SmarterMail (CVE-2025-52691), Laravel Livewire (CVE-2025-54068), N-Central (CVE-2025-9316), Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2025-5777), Langflow (CVE-2025-34291), and Fortinet (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-23113, CVE-2022-42475), along with SQL injection vulnerabilities in BaSalam and an unspecified Postgres development platform for initial access. One of the custom tools identified in the server is KeyC2, a command-and-control (C2) framework that allows operators to remotely control compromised Windows machines over a custom binary protocol on port 1269 from a Python script. Two C2 tools used by the adversary are PersianC2, which relies on standard HTTP polling to receive commands and files via JSON API endpoints, and ArenaC2, a Python-based program that operates over HTTP POST requests. Also detected is a PowerShell loader that leads to the execution of obfuscated Node.js payloads that appear similar to Tsundere Botnet. The infrastructure is assessed to have been used to target entities in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the U.A.E., and the U.S. Some aspects of the activity overlap with Operation Olalampo. 2,622 Valid Certificates Exposed — A new study undertaken by Google and GitGuardian found over a million unique private keys leaked across GitHub and Docker Hub, out of which 40,000 were mapped to 140,000 real TLS certificates. "As of September 2025, 2,600 of these certificates were valid, with more than 900 actively protecting Fortune 500 companies, healthcare providers, and government agencies," GitGuardian said. "Our disclosure campaign achieved 97% remediation, but at the cost of 4,300 emails sent, 1,706 entities contacted, 9 bug bounty submissions, countless follow-ups, and days of meticulous attribution work employing multiple OSINT techniques. The high success rate masks the extraordinary effort required to protect organizations that fail to protect themselves." Context7 MCP Server Suffers from ContextCrush — A critical security flaw in Upstash's Context7 MCP Server, a widely used tool for delivering documentation to AI coding assistants, has been discovered. Dubbed ContextCrush, the vulnerability could allow attackers to inject malicious instructions into AI development tools through a trusted documentation channel. Noma Security, which disclosed details of the flaw, said it's rooted within the platform's "Custom Rules" feature, which allows library maintainers to provide AI-specific instructions to help assistants better interpret documentation. "Context7 operates both as the registry, where anyone can publish and manage library documentation, and as the trusted delivery mechanism that pushes content directly into the AI agent's context," security researcher Eli Ainhorn said. "The attacker never needs to reach the victim's machine. Instead, the attacker can plant malicious custom rules in Context7's registry, and Context7’s infrastructure delivers them through the MCP server to the AI agent running in the developer's IDE. As agents are execution machines and run whatever is loaded into their context, all the victim’s agent does is execute the attacker's instructions on the victim’s machine, using its own tool access (Bash, file read/write, network). In this scenario, the agent has no way to distinguish between legitimate documentation and attacker-controlled content because they arrive through the same trusted channel and from the same trusted source." German Court Sentences Key Person Behind Call Center Scam — A German court has sentenced a suspected central figure in the so-called Milton Group call-center fraud network to seven-and-a-half years in prison. Although the court did not publicly name the defendant, court records reviewed by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) indicate the person convicted was Mikheil Biniashvili, a citizen of Georgia and Israel. In addition to the prison sentence, the court ordered the confiscation of €2.4 million ($2.8 million) linked to the operation. Between 2017 and 2019, the defendant ran a call-center operation in Albania that used trained agents to persuade victims to invest in fraudulent online trading schemes. The scheme caused losses of about €8 million ($9.4 million) to victims, mostly in German-speaking countries. The operation employed up to 600 people at its peak. Call-center agents allegedly posed as investment advisers, building trust with targets before persuading them to deposit funds into fake trading platforms controlled by the network by promising large investment returns. Biniashvili was arrested in Armenia in 2023 and extradited to Germany in 2024. Multiple Flaws in Avira Internet Security — Three vulnerabilities have been disclosed in Avira Internet Security that could allow for arbitrary file deletion (CVE-2026-27748) in the Software Updater component, an insecure deserialization (CVE-2026-27749) in System Speedup, and an arbitrary folder deletion over TOCTOU (CVE-2026-27748) in the Optimizer. "The file delete primitive is useful on its own," Quarkslab said. "The other two both result in Local Privilege Escalation to SYSTEM." Russian Ransomware Operator Pleads Guilty in U.S. — Evgenii Ptitsyn, a 43-year-old Russian national, has pleaded guilty in a U.S. court to running the Phobos ransomware outfit that targeted more than 1,000 victims globally and extorted ransom payments worth over $39 million. Ptitsyn was extradited from South Korea in November 2024. "Beginning in at least November 2020, Ptitsyn and others conspired to engage in an international computer hacking and extortion scheme that victimized public and private entities through the deployment of Phobos ransomware," the Justice Department said. "As part of the scheme, Ptitsyn and his co-conspirators developed and offered access to Phobos ransomware to other criminals or 'affiliates' to encrypt victims' data and extort ransom payments from victims. The administrators operated a darknet website to coordinate the sale and distribution of Phobos ransomware to co-conspirators and used online monikers to advertise their services on criminal forums and messaging platforms." Ptitsyn faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for wire fraud charges. Fake Google Security Check Leads to RAT — A bogus website resembling the Google Account security page is being used to deliver a Progressive Web App (PWA) capable of harvesting one-time passcodes and cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and proxying attacker traffic through victims' browsers. "Disguised as a routine security checkup, it walks victims through a four-step flow that grants the attacker push notification access, the device's contact list, real-time GPS location, and clipboard contents – all without installing a traditional app," Malwarebytes said. "For victims who follow every prompt, the site also delivers an Android companion package introducing a native implant that includes a custom keyboard (enabling keystroke capture), accessibility-based screen reading capabilities, and permissions consistent with call log access and microphone recording." Phishing Campaign Abuses Google Infrastructure — A new email phishing campaign is leveraging legitimate Google infrastructure to bypass standard security filters. The activity uses Google Cloud Storage (GCS) to host initial phishing URLs that, when clicked, redirect unsuspecting users to a malicious site designed to capture their financial information or deploy malware. "By hosting the initial link on Google's servers, the attackers ensure the email passes authentication checks like SPF and DKIM," security researcher Anurag Gawande said. Client-Side Injection Conducts Ad Fraud — A new malicious client-side injection originating from a malicious browser extension impersonating Microsoft Clarity has been found to overwrite referral tokens to redirect affiliate revenue to unknown threat actors. "A browser extension is injecting obfuscated JavaScript from msclairty[.]com, a typosquatted domain impersonating Microsoft Clarity," c/side's Simon Wijckmans said. "The domain is not serving analytics. It is delivering an obfuscated JavaScript payload that performs affiliate cookie stuffing, tracking cookie deletion, and Fetch API hijacking inside the visitor's browser. This prevents a competing tracking service from recording the real traffic source. The attacker does not just want credit for the visit. They actively block other trackers from capturing any attribution data that would conflict with their fraudulent cookie." The script has affected sites across multiple unrelated sectors, including transportation, SaaS platforms, sports management, and government payment portals. Impacted visitors primarily span Chrome versions 132, 138, and 145, and originate from U.S.-based IP addresses on the East and West coasts. Illinois Man Charged with Hacking Snapchat Accounts to Steal Nudes — U.S. prosecutors have charged a 26-year-old Illinois man, Kyle Svara, with conducting a phishing operation that made it possible to break into the Snapchat accounts of approximately 570 women to steal private photos and sell them online. "From at least May 2020 to February 2021, Svara used social engineering and other resources to collect his targets' emails, phone numbers, and/or Snapchat usernames," the Justice Department said. "He then used those means of identification to access his targets' Snapchat accounts, which prompted Snap Inc. to send account security codes to those women. Using anonymized phone numbers, Svara posed as a representative of Snap Inc. and sent more than 4,500 text messages to hundreds of women, requesting those Snapchat access codes." Svara is alleged to have accessed the Snapchat accounts of at least 59 women without permission to download their nude or semi-nude images and sell them on internet forums. Meta Sued Over AI Smart Glasses' Privacy Concerns — Meta is facing a new class action lawsuit over its AI-powered Ray-Ban Meta glasses, following a report from Swedish newspapers Svenska Dagbladet and Goteborgs-Posten that employees at Kenya-based subcontractor Sama are reviewing intimate, personal footage filmed from customers' glasses. Meta said subcontracted workers might sometimes review content captured by its AI smart glasses for the purpose of improving the "experience," as stated in its Privacy Policy. It also claimed that data is filtered to protect people's privacy. But the investigation found that this step did not always consistently work. "Unless users choose to share media they've captured with Meta or others, that media stays on the user's device," Meta told BBC News. "When people share content with Meta AI, we sometimes use contractors to review this data for the purpose of improving people's experience, as many other companies do." Total Ransomware Payments Stagnated in 2025 — The total ransomware payments in 2025 stagnated, even if the number of attacks increased. According to blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis, total on-chain ransomware payments fell by approximately 8% to $820 million in 2025, even as claimed attacks rose 50%. "While aggregate revenue stagnated, the median ransom payment grew 368% year-over-year to nearly $60,000," the company said. "The 2025 total is likely to approach or exceed $900 million as we attribute more events and payments, just as our 2024 total grew from our initial $813 million estimate this time last year." The decline in payment rates from 63% in 2024 to just 29% last year indicates that fewer victims are yielding to attackers' ransom demands, it added. The development comes amid increased fragmentation of the ransomware ecosystem and threat actors shifting towards more stealthy methods, such as defense evasion and persistence techniques, to prioritize data theft and prolonged, low-noise access. Mobile Blockchain Wallet Found Vulnerable to Severe Flaws — An unnamed mobile blockchain wallet app for Android has been found susceptible to two independent severe vulnerabilities, allowing untrusted deep links to trigger sensitive wallet flows and trick users into approving phishing-driven transactions, as well as retain cryptographic private keys from the device despite deleting an account. This meant that an attacker with later device access could re-import the account using its public address and regain full signing authority without re-entering the keys. According to LucidBit Labs, the vulnerabilities have been patched by the developer. "The main strength of crypto wallets lies in their cryptographic foundations," security researcher Assaf Morag said. "However, when these wallets are implemented as user-facing applications, the overall orchestration of the system becomes just as critical as the cryptography itself. As the saying goes, a system’s security posture is defined by its weakest link. In this case, the two vulnerabilities demonstrate how flaws at the application layer can undermine the entire security model, despite the strength of the underlying cryptography." Kubernetes RCE Via Nodes/Proxy GET Permission — New research has identified an authorization bypass in Kubernetes Role-based access control (RBAC) that allows a service account with nodes/proxy GET permissions to execute commands in any Pod in the cluster. The issue exploits a bug in how Kubernetes API servers handle WebSocket connections. "Nodes/proxy GET allows command execution when using a connection protocol such as WebSockets," security researcher Graham Helton said. "This is due to the Kubelet making authorization decisions based on the initial WebSocket handshake's request without verifying CREATE permissions are present for the Kubelet's /exec endpoint, requiring different permissions depending solely on the connection protocol. The result is anyone with access to a service account assigned nodes/proxy GET that can reach a Node's Kubelet on port 10250 can send information to the /exec endpoint, executing commands in any Pod, including privileged system Pods, potentially leading to a full cluster compromise." The Kubernetes project has declined to address the issue, stating its intended behavior. However, it's expected to release Fine-Grained Kubelet API Authorization (KEP-2862) next month to address the attack. "A targeted patch would require coordinated changes across multiple components with special-case logic," Edera said. "This is the kind of complexity that could lead to future vulnerabilities. Once KEP-2862 reaches GA and sees adoption, nodes/proxy can be deprecated for monitoring use cases." Other Key Stories on the Radar — The Israeli government is working on the country's first cybersecurity law, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) published Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines (ZIGs) to help organizations safeguard sensitive data, systems, and services against sophisticated cyber threats, Google Project Zero found multiple vulnerabilities that could be used to bypass a new Windows 11 feature called Administrator Protection and obtain admin privileges, threat actors are continuing to abuse Microsoft Teams functionality by leveraging guest invitations and phishing-themed team names to impersonate billing and subscription notifications, and a loader named PhantomVAI has been used in the wild over the past year to deploy other payloads, such as Remcos RAT, XWorm, AsyncRAT, DarkCloud, and SmokeLoader. 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools DetectFlow → It is an open-source detection pipeline from SOC Prime that matches streaming log events against Sigma rules in real time — before they ever reach your SIEM. Instead of relying on your SIEM to do the heavy lifting, it tags and enriches events in-flight using Apache Kafka and Flink, then passes the results downstream to wherever you need them. Built on 11 years of detection intelligence, it's designed for teams who want faster detection, more rule coverage, and less dependency on SIEM-imposed limits. ADTrapper → It is an open-source platform that analyzes Windows Active Directory authentication logs and flags threats using 54+ built-in detection rules — covering everything from brute force to AD CS attacks. It runs in Docker, deploys with one command, and supports SharpHound data for deeper AD analysis. Disclaimer: For research and educational use only. Not security-audited. Review all code before use, test in isolated environments, and ensure compliance with applicable laws. Conclusion That's your week. A lot happened. Some of it was bad, some of it was worse, and a little bit of it was actually good. The scoreboard is messy, like it always is. Same time next week — and if history is any guide, we'll have plenty more to talk about. Stay patched, stay skeptical, and maybe don't click that link.
thehackernews.comMar 9, 2026extracted
Hacker mass-mails HungerRush extortion emails to restaurant patrons
Update: Added HungerRush statement below. Customers of restaurants using the HungerRush point-of-sale (POS) platform say they received emails from a threat actor attempting to extort the company, warning that restaurant and customer data could be exposed if HungerRush fails to respond. HungerRush is a restaurant technology provider that offers point-of-sale (POS), online ordering, delivery management, and payment processing software to help restaurants manage orders, customer information, and business operations. The company claims to work with over 16,000 restaurants, including Sbarro, Jet's Pizza, Fajita Pete's, Hungry Howie's, and many more. Extortion emails sent to restaurant patrons The attacker started sending the emails early Wednesday morning, with multiple recipients sharing samples with BleepingComputer. The first email was sent from [email protected], prompting HungerRush to stop ignoring their extortion emails or it would put customer data at risk. "You cannot ignore all my requests and expect me not to take malicious actions. You still have time," reads the email. "Every restaurant and customer of said restaurants' data which is in the millions is in jeopardy here and I can't even get a response back. Not to worry, there's still time left." A second email, sent three hours later from "[email protected]," escalates the threat, claiming that the attacker has access to data records for millions of customers that contain names, emails, passwords, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and credit card information. BleepingComputer's analysis of the email headers shows they were delivered using Twilio SendGrid, which customers have told BleepingComputer was previously used to send HungerRush restaurant receipts. The emails were sent from o10.e.hungerrush.com (159.183.129.119), which resolves to infrastructure operated by Twilio SendGrid, a platform commonly used by companies to send transactional and marketing emails. The email headers also confirm that the messages passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks for the hungerrush.com domain, as the company's SPF record, shown below, authorizes SendGrid to send emails on their behalf. v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:_spf.psm.knowbe4.com include:sendgrid.net include:4750273.spf01.hubspotemail.net -all Numerous people on Reddit have reported receiving the emails, stating that past digital receipts from restaurants showed they used HungerRush's ordering or POS systems. Alon Gal, co-founder and CTO of Hudson Rock, posted on LinkedIn that infostealer logs indicate a HungerRush employee's device was allegedly infected with an infostealer in October 2025, leading to the compromise of credentials. According to Gal, the malware stole numerous corporate credentials, including those for the company's NetSuite, QuickBooks-related services, Stripe dashboards, Bill.com vendor payment systems, Visa Online commercial services, and Salesforce environments. After publishing this story, HungerRush said that this previous infostealer infection is not linked to the breach. For the time being, customers of restaurants using the HungerRush POS system should be on alert for potential phishing emails and SMS texts that abuse the potentially stolen information. HungerRush confirms breach HungerRush confirmed to BleepingComputer that they are aware of the incident and have notified law enforcement. "We are aware of the situation and are actively investigating in coordination with the appropriate authorities," HungerRush told BleepingComputer. "Our teams are working quickly to understand the scope, address the issue, and implement any necessary remediation. Protecting our clients and their customers' data is a top priority, and we are treating this matter with the utmost urgency." In a later update, the company says that the incident is not linked to the infostealer infection seen by Alon Gal. Instead, HungerRush says the threat actor used a third-party vendor's compromised credentials to breach its email marketing service account. This allowed the threat actor to gain access to customer contact information, which was used to send the unauthorized emails. "As a result, certain customer contact information (including names, email addresses, mailing addresses, and phone numbers) was accessed and used to send unauthorized email messages to certain merchants and consumers," HungerRush told BleepingComputer in an updated statement. However, HungerRush disputes the threat actor's claims, stating that no sensitive personal or financial information, such as passwords, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, or payment card information, was exposed in the breach. HungerRush also noted that credit card data is not stored within its systems. Furthermore, the company says there is no evidence that any other systems were compromised, with the breach limited to the email marketing service. "As a precautionary measure, HungerRush disabled access to the affected email service to prevent additional unauthorized messages from being sent while the investigation continues," the company said. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 4, 2026extracted
Cloudflare tracked 230 billion daily threats and here is what it found
Cloudflare tracked 230 billion daily threats and here is what it found Cloudflare’s network blocks over 230 billion threats per day. The volume indicates how routine and automated the attack cycle has become, and the patterns behind that volume point to a shift in how breaches begin and progress. Cloudflare’s threat research unit, Cloudforce One, published its inaugural cyber threat report 2026, covering activity observed through 2025 and projecting into the year ahead. The report draws on telemetry from Cloudflare’s network, which handles roughly 20% of global web traffic. “Threat actors are constantly changing tactics, finding new vulnerabilities to exploit and ways to overwhelm their victims. To avoid being caught off guard, organizations must shift from a reactive posture to one fueled by real-time, actionable intelligence,” said Blake Darché, head of threat intelligence, Cloudforce One at Cloudflare. Stolen sessions are replacing credential guessing Infostealers such as LummaC2 extract live session tokens from infected machines rather than stored passwords. Those tokens give attackers access to already-authenticated sessions, bypassing MFA entirely. According to the report, 54% of ransomware attacks in 2025 traced back to infostealer-enabled credential theft, citing Verizon’s 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report. Cloudforce One participated in a coordinated global operation in May 2025 to disrupt LummaC2 infrastructure, deploying warning pages across malicious command-and-control domains. The unit is already tracking successor variants expected to automate the time between infection and ransomware deployment down to hours. Bots account for 94% of all login attempts observed on Cloudflare’s network. Of human login attempts, 46% involve credentials that have already been compromised in prior breaches. These figures reflect the scale at which automated credential testing operates across the web. Cloud platforms are being used as attack infrastructure Threat actors across multiple nation-state categories are routing malicious activity through legitimate cloud services including AWS, Google Cloud, Azure, and SaaS platforms like Google Calendar and Dropbox. This approach blends attack traffic with normal enterprise usage, making detection harder for network security teams. Cloudforce One tracks this tactic under the label “Living off the XaaS,” or LotX. Chinese-affiliated groups identified in the report use Google Calendar event descriptions to pass encrypted commands to infected hosts, and exploit F5 and VMware infrastructure for long-term persistence. Iranian-linked groups host command-and-control pages on Azure Web Apps. Salt Typhoon and Linen Typhoon, both linked to China, continued targeting North American telecommunications providers, government networks, and IT services through 2025. The report attributes breaches at AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen to this activity, along with a July 2025 Microsoft SharePoint compromise. The targeting pattern indicates a focus on persistent access to critical infrastructure for potential future disruption. Email authentication gaps are enabling phishing at scale An analysis of 450 million emails found that 43% failed SPF checks, over 44% lacked valid DKIM signatures, and 46% failed DMARC. These gaps allow Phishing-as-a-Service bots to exploit incomplete authentication chains and deliver spoofed messages that appear to come from trusted internal or branded sources. The top impersonated brands in phishing campaigns were Windows, SANS, Microsoft, Stripe, and Facebook. Researchers also intercepted over $123 million in BEC financial theft attempts in 2025. The average attempt sat at approximately $49,225, a figure the report attributes to deliberate calibration by fraudsters targeting amounts below executive approval thresholds. DDoS volumes reached new records in 2025 The total number of DDoS attacks observed by Cloudflare more than doubled in 2025 to 47.1 million. Network-layer attacks more than tripled year over year. Cloudforce One recorded 19 new world-record attacks during the year. The largest, a 31.4 Tbps UDP flood launched by the Aisuru botnet in November 2025, was nearly six times the peak volume of the largest attack recorded in 2024. Most attacks in 2025 lasted under 10 minutes, closing the practical window for human-led mitigation. The Aisuru botnet and its successor Kimwolf collectively control an estimated one to four million infected hosts. The report notes that Kimwolf saw over 550 command-and-control nodes null-routed in early 2026. North Korean operatives are embedding in remote workforces State-sponsored operatives linked to North Korea are obtaining employment at Western organizations using AI-generated deepfake profiles and U.S.-based laptop farms that create the appearance of domestic residency. Once hired, these workers funnel salary revenue back to the regime and can introduce malicious access to internal systems. The report identifies detection indicators including impossible travel login alerts, mouse-jiggling software, and video metadata artifacts consistent with real-time deepfake rendering. Manufacturing and critical infrastructure accounted for over 50% of ransomware-targeted attacks in 2025, driven by the high cost of operational downtime in those sectors.
helpnetsecurity.comMar 3, 2026extracted
23rd February – Threat Intelligence Report
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 23rd February, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES France’s Ministry of Economy has disclosed a data breach resulted from an unauthorized access to the national bank account registry FICOBA, impacting information tied to 1.2 million accounts. Exposed data includes names, addresses, account identifiers and, in some cases, tax-related identifiers. Officials said the intrusion involved compromised government credentials. Japanese tech giant Advantest Corporation was hit by a ransomware attack that resulted in the deployment of ransomware within portions of its network following unauthorized access by a third party on February 15. The incident may have impacted certain internal systems, and the potential compromise of customer or employee data remains unclear. University of Mississippi Medical Center, an academic healthcare system in Mississippi, has suffered a ransomware attack that forced closures across its clinic network and disrupted access to electronic medical records. The organization canceled elective procedures and shifted to manual processes. Systems were taken offline and no ransomware group claimed responsibility. Ukraine’s central bank, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), has faced a supply-chain incident affecting a contractor that runs its collectible coin online store. Exposed information includes customer registration data, such as names, emails, phone numbers, and delivery addresses. The bank indicated that payment information was not affected. AI THREATS Check Point Research unveiled a technique that repurposes AI assistants like Grok and Microsoft Copilot as covert C2 proxies by abusing web-browsing URL fetch features without authentication. Malware exfiltrates host data via query parameters and retrieves commands from AI-generated summaries through hidden WebView2, bypassing inspection of AI traffic. A Russian-speaking financially motivated threat actor leveraged commercial generative AI tools to conduct mass credential abuse of 600 FortiGate devices in 55 countries from January 11 to February 18, 2026. The attackers targeted Veeam servers, exploiting CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Veeam Backup and Replication Insecure Deserialization (CVE-2024-40711)) Researchers uncovered a Shai-Hulud-like npm supply chain worm spreading via typosquatted packages, stealing developer and CI secrets, exfiltrating via GitHub API with DNS fallback, and propagating by poisoning workflows and git hooks, with MCP server injection targeting AI coding assistants and harvesting LLM API keys. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Dell RecoverPoint for VMs, impacted by CVE-2026-22769 (CVSS 10.0) in versions before 6.0.3.1, has been exploited as a zero-day since mid-2024 by suspected Chinese group UNC6201. Attackers used hardcoded Tomcat credentials for unauthenticated root access, deploying SLAYSTYLE, BRICKSTORM, and the GRIMBOLT backdoor, and creating Ghost NICs to pivot and persist in VMware environments. Check Point IPS and Threat Emulation provide protection against this threat (Dell RecoverPoint For Virtual Machines Arbitrary File Upload (CVE-2026-22769); Trojan.Wins.SLAYSTYLE; Trojan.Wins.BRICKSTORM.ta.*; Trojan.Wins.GRIMBOLT) Grandstream GXP1600 series VoIP phones are affected by CVE-2026-2329, a critical unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow in the web API allowing root RCE. Exploitation enables credential theft, SIP proxy reconfiguration, and covert call interception. Firmware version 1.0.7.81 fixes the issue. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Grandstream GXP1600 Stack Overflow (CVE-2026-2329)) A flaw in Microsoft 365 Copilot allows the “Work Tab” Chat feature to summarize emails protected by confidentiality sensitivity labels, bypassing configured Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies. The code-level defect enables Copilot to access labeled content in Sent Items and Draft folders, exposing restricted data in AI-generated summaries. Google has patched CVE-2026-2441, a high-severity Chrome zero-day in the CSS component in Google Chrome prior to 145.0.7632.75, confirmed exploited in the wild. The use-after-free flaw can enable remote code execution within the browser sandbox via a crafted page. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Google Chrome Use After Free (CVE-2026-2441)) THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Researchers have discovered Keenadu, an Android firmware backdoor delivered via supply chain compromise. It uses RC4-encrypted payloads, DexClassLoader, and permission bypass frameworks for ad fraud, search hijacking, and monetization, with links to Triada and BADBOX. Researchers analyzed Arkanix Stealer, a MaaS infostealer with Python and C++ implants, dynamic server side configuration, and modules including ChromElevator and HVNC. It uses phishing lures, steals from 22 browsers, Telegram and Discord and targets VPN, gaming and crypto wallets. Researchers have analyzed a spam campaign that abused Atlassian Jira Cloud notifications to bypass email filters by exploiting trusted atlassian.net sender domains with valid SPF and DKIM authentication. The attackers rapidly spun up trial instances and used Jira Automation alongside the Keitaro TDS to distribute localized lures targeting government and corporate sectors. Researchers identified a Booking.com-themed phishing campaign active since January 2026 that targets hotel partners and guests with a three-stage chain. It leveraged look-alike domains and IDN homographs, collected visitor fingerprinting with decoy pages, conducted partner account takeovers, and used WhatsApp lures to fake payment portals behind Cloudflare CAPTCHA.
research.checkpoint.comFeb 23, 2026extracted
ThreatsDay Bulletin: OpenSSL RCE, Foxit 0-Days, Copilot Leak, AI Password Flaws & 20+ Stories
The cyber threat space doesn’t pause, and this week makes that clear. New risks, new tactics, and new security gaps are showing up across platforms, tools, and industries — often all at the same time. Some developments are headline-level. Others sit in the background but carry long-term impact. Together, they shape how defenders need to think about exposure, response, and preparedness right now. This edition of ThreatsDay Bulletin brings those signals into one place. Scan through the roundup for quick, clear updates on what’s unfolding across the cybersecurity and hacking landscape. Privacy model hardeningGoogle announced the first beta version of Android 17, with two privacy and security enhancements: the deprecation of Cleartext Traffic Attribute and support for HPKE Hybrid Cryptography to enable secure communication using a combination of public key and symmetric encryption (AEAD). "If your app targets (Android 17) or higher and relies on usesCleartextTraffic='true' without a corresponding Network Security Configuration, it will default to disallowing cleartext traffic," Google said. "You are encouraged to migrate to Network Security Configuration files for granular control." RaaS expands cross-platform reachA new analysis of the LockBit 5.0 ransomware has revealed that the Windows version packs in various defense evasion and anti-analysis techniques, including packing, DLL unhooking, process hollowing, patching Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) functions, and log clearing. "What's notable among the multiple systems support is its proclaimed capability to 'work on all versions of Proxmox,'" Acronis said. "Proxmox is an open-source virtualization platform and is being adopted by enterprises as an alternative to commercial hypervisors, which makes it another prime target of ransomware attacks." The latest version also introduces dedicated builds tailored for enterprise environments, highlighting the continued evolution of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations. Mac users lured via nested obfuscationCybersecurity researchers have detailed a new evolution of the ClickFix social engineering tactic targeting macOS users. "Dubbed Matryoshka due to its nested obfuscation layers, this variant uses a fake installation/fix flow to trick victims into executing a malicious Terminal command," Intego said. "While the ClickFix tactic is not new, this campaign introduces stronger evasion techniques — including an in-memory, compressed wrapper and API-gated network communications — designed to hinder static analysis and automated sandboxes." The campaign primarily targets users attempting to visit software review sites, leveraging typosquatting in the URL name to redirect them to fake sites and activate the infection chain. Loader pipeline drives rapid domain takeoverAnother new ClickFix campaign detected in February 2026 has been observed delivering a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) loader known as Matanbuchus 3.0. Huntress, which dissected the attack chain, said the ultimate objective of the intrusion was to deploy ransomware or exfiltrate data based on the fact that the threat actor rapidly progressed from initial access to lateral movement to domain controllers via PsExec, rogue account creation, and Microsoft Defender exclusion staging. The attack also led to the deployment of a custom implant dubbed AstarionRAT that supports 24 commands to facilitate credential theft, SOCKS5 proxy, port scanning, reflective code loading, and shell execution. According to data from the cybersecurity company, ClickFix fueled 53% of all malware loader activity in 2025. Typosquat chain targets macOS credentialsIn yet another ClickFix campaign, threat actors are relying on the "reliable trick" to host malicious instructions on fake websites disguised as Homebrew ("homabrews[.]org") to trick users into pasting them on the Terminal app under the pretext of installing the macOS package manager. In the attack chain documented by Hunt.io, the commands in the typosquatted Homebrew domain are used to deliver a credential-harvesting loader and a second-stage macOS infostealer dubbed Cuckoo Stealer. "The injected installer looped on password prompts using 'dscl . -authonly,' ensuring the attacker obtained working credentials before deploying the second stage," Hunt.io said. "Cuckoo Stealer is a full-featured macOS infostealer and RAT: It establishes LaunchAgent persistence, removes quarantine attributes, and maintains encrypted HTTPS command-and-control communications. It collects browser credentials, session tokens, macOS Keychain data, Apple Notes, messaging sessions, VPN and FTP configurations, and over 20 cryptocurrency wallet applications." The use of "dscl . -authonly" has been previously observed in attacks deploying Atomic Stealer. Phobos affiliate detained in EuropeAuthorities from Poland's Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime (CBZC) have detained a 47-year-old man over suspected ties to the Phobos ransomware group. He faces a potential prison sentence of up to five years. The CBZC said the "47-year-old used encrypted messaging to contact the Phobos criminal group, known for conducting ransomware attacks," adding the suspect's devices contained logins, passwords, credit card numbers, and server IP addresses that could have been used to launch "various attacks, including ransomware." The arrest is part of Europol's Operation Aether, which targets the 8Base ransomware group, believed to be linked to Phobos. It has been almost exactly a year since international law enforcement dismantled the 8Base crew. More than 1,000 organizations around the world have been targeted in Phobos ransomware attacks, and the cybercriminals are believed to have obtained over $16 million in ransom payments. Industrial ransomware surge acceleratesThere has been a sharp rise in the number of ransomware groups targeting industrial organizations as cybercriminals continue to exploit vulnerabilities in operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS), Dragos warned. A total of 119 ransomware groups targeting industrial organizations were tracked during 2025, a 49% increase from the 80 tracked in 2024. 2025 saw 3,300 industrial organizations around the world hit by ransomware, compared with 1693 in 2024. The most targeted sector was manufacturing, followed by transportation. In addition, a hacking group tracked as Pyroxene has been observed conducting "supply chain-leveraged attacks targeting defense, critical infrastructure, and industrial sectors, with operations expanding from the Middle East into North America and Western Europe." It often leverages initial access provided by PARISITE, to enable movement from IT into OT networks. Pyroxene overlaps with activity attributed to Imperial Kitten (aka APT35), a threat actor affiliated with the cyber arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Copilot bypassed DLP safeguardsMicrosoft confirmed a bug (CW1226324) that let Microsoft 365 Copilot summarize confidential emails from Sent Items and Drafts folders since January 21, 2026, without users' permission, bypassing data loss prevention (DLP) policies put in place to safeguard sensitive data. A fix was deployed by the company on February 3, 2026. However, the company did not disclose how many users or organizations were affected. "Users' email messages with a confidential label applied are being incorrectly processed by Microsoft 365 Copilot chat," Microsoft said. "The Microsoft 365 Copilot 'work tab' Chat is summarizing email messages even though these email messages have a sensitivity label applied, and a DLP policy is configured. A code issue is allowing items in the sent items and draft folders to be picked up by Copilot even though confidential labels are set in place." (Update: As of February 19, 2026, Microsoft said the root cause of this issue has been addressed for most customers, and that it's now "completing a longer-term, comprehensive sync to apply this fix retroactively to previously affected messages within the Sent and Draft folders to fully remediate the impact.") Jira trials weaponized for spamThreat actors are abusing the trust and reputation associated with Atlassian Jira Cloud and its connected email system to run automated spam campaigns and bypass traditional email security. To accomplish this, the operators created Atlassian Cloud trial accounts using randomized naming conventions, allowing them to generate disposable Jira Cloud instances at scale. "Emails were tailored to target specific language groups, targeting English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Russian speakers — including highly skilled Russian professionals living abroad," Trend Micro said. "These campaigns not only distributed generic spam, but also specifically targeted sectors such as government and corporate entities." The attacks, active from late December 2025 through late January 2026, primarily targeted organizations using Atlassian Jira. The goal was to get recipients to open the emails and click on malicious links, which would initiate a redirect chain powered by the Keitaro Traffic Distribution System (TDS) and then finally lead them to pages peddling investment scams and online casino landing sites, suggesting that financial gain was likely the main objective. GitLab SSRF now federally mandated patchThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), on February 18, 2026, added CVE-2021-22175 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply the patch by March 11, 2026. "GitLab contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability when requests to the internal network for webhooks are enabled," CISA said. In March 2025, GreyNoise revealed that a cluster of about 400 IP addresses was actively exploiting multiple SSRF vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-22175, to target susceptible instances in the U.S., Germany, Singapore, India, Lithuania, and Japan. Telegram bots fuel Fortune 500 phishingAn elusive, financially motivated threat actor dubbed GS7 has been targeting Fortune 500 companies in a new phishing campaign that leverages trusted company branding with lookalike websites aimed at harvesting credentials via Telegram bots. The campaign, codenamed Operation DoppelBrand, targets top financial institutions, including Wells Fargo, USAA, Navy Federal Credit Union, Fidelity Investments, and Citibank, as well as technology, healthcare, and telecommunications firms worldwide. Victims are lured through phishing emails and redirected to counterfeit pages where credentials are harvested and transmitted to Telegram bots controlled by the attacker. According to SOCRadar, the group itself, however, has a history stretching back to 2022. The threat actor is said to have registered more than 150 malicious domains in recent months using registrars such as NameCheap and OwnRegistrar, and routing traffic through Cloudflare to evade detection. GS7's end goals include not only harvesting credentials, but also downloading remote management and monitoring (RMM) tools like LogMeIn Resolve on victim systems to enable remote access or the deployment of malware. This has raised the possibility that the group may even act as an initial access broker (IAB), selling the access to ransomware groups or other affiliates. Remcos shifts to live C2 surveillancePhishing emails disguised as invoices, job offers, or government notices are being used to distribute a new variant of Remcos RAT to facilitate comprehensive surveillance and control over infected systems. "The latest Remcos variant has been observed exhibiting a significant change in behaviour compared to previous versions," Point Wild said. "Instead of stealing and storing data locally on the infected system, this variant establishes direct online command-and-control (C2) communication, enabling real-time access and control. In particular, it leverages the webcam to capture live video streams, allowing attackers to monitor targets remotely. This shift from local data exfiltration to live, online surveillance represents an evolution in Remcos’ capabilities, increasing the risk of immediate espionage and persistent monitoring." China-made vehicles restricted on basesPoland's Ministry of Defence has banned Chinese cars, and other motor vehicles equipped with technology to record position, images, or sound, from entering protected military facilities due to national security concerns and to "limit the risk of access to sensitive data." The ban also extends to connecting work phones to infotainment systems in motor vehicles produced in China. The ban isn't permanent: the Defence Ministry has called for the development of a vetting process to allow carmakers to undergo a security assessment that, if passed, can allow their vehicles to enter protected facilities. "Modern vehicles equipped with advanced communication systems and sensors can collect and transmit data, so their presence in protected zones requires appropriate safety regulations," the Polish Army said. The measures introduced are preventive and comply with the practices of NATO countries and other allies to ensure the highest standards of defense infrastructure protection. They are part of a wider process of adapting security procedures to the changing technological environment and current requirements for the protection of critical infrastructure." DKIM replay fuels invoice scamsBad actors are abusing legitimate invoices and dispute notifications from trusted vendors, such as PayPal, Apple, DocuSign, and Dropbox Sign (formerly HelloSign), to bypass email security controls. "These platforms often allow users to enter a 'seller name' or add a custom note when creating an invoice or notification," Casey-owned INKY said. "Attackers abuse this functionality by inserting scam instructions and a phone number into those user-controlled fields. They then send the resulting invoice or dispute notice to an email address they control, ensuring the malicious content is embedded in a legitimate, vendor-generated message." Because these emails originate from a legitimate company, they bypass checks like Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). As soon as the legitimate email is received, the attacker proceeds to forward it to the intended targets, allowing the "authentic looking" message to land in the victims' inboxes. The attack is known as a DKIM replay attack. RMM abuse surges 277%A new report from Huntress has revealed that the abuse of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software surged 277% year-over-year, accounting for 24% of all observed incidents. Threat actors have begun to increasingly favor these tools because they are ubiquitous in enterprise environments, and the trusted nature of the RMM software allows malicious activity to blend in with legitimate usage, making detection harder for defenders. They also offer increased stealth, persistence, and operational efficiency. "As cybercriminals built entire playbooks around these legitimate, trusted tools to drop malware, steal credentials, and execute commands, the use of traditional hacking tools plummeted by 53%, while remote access trojans and malicious scripts dropped by 20% and 11.7%, respectively," the company said. Texas targets China-linked tech firmsTexas Attorney General Ken Paxton has sued TP-Link for "deceptively marketing its networking devices and allowing the Chinese Communist Party ('CCP') to access American consumers' devices in their homes." Paxton's lawsuit alleges that TP Link's products have been used by Chinese hacking groups to launch cyber attacks against the U.S. and that the company is subject to Chinese data laws, which it said require firms operating in the country to support its intelligence services by "divulging Americans' data." TP-Link told The Record that these allegations are "without merit" and that neither the Chinese government nor the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exercises control over the company, its products, or user data. It also added that all U.S. user data is stored on domestic Amazon Web Services (AWS) servers. In a second lawsuit, Paxton also accused Anzu Robotics of misleading Texas consumers about the "origin, data practices, and security risks of its drones." Paxton's office described the company's products as "21st century Trojan horse linked to the CCP." MetaMask backdoor expands DPRK campaignThe North Korea-linked campaign known as Contagious Interview is designed to target IT professionals working in cryptocurrency, Web3, and artificial intelligence sectors to steal sensitive data and financial information using malware such as BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. However, recent iterations of the campaign have expanded their data theft capabilities by tampering with the MetaMask wallet extension (if it's installed) through a lightweight JavaScript backdoor that shares the same functionality as InvisibleFerret, according to security researcher Seongsu Park. "Through the backdoor, attackers instruct the infected system to download and install a fake version of the popular MetaMask cryptocurrency wallet extension, complete with a dynamically generated configuration file that makes it appear legitimate," Park said. "Once installed, the compromised MetaMask extension silently captures the victim's wallet unlock password and transmits it to the attackers’ command-and-control server, giving them complete access to cryptocurrency funds." Booking.com kits hit hotels, guestsBridewell has warned of a resurgence in malicious activity targeting the hotel and retail sector. "The primary motivation driving this incident is financial fraud, targeting two victims: hotel businesses and hotel customers, in sequential order," security researcher Joshua Penny said. "The threat actor(s) utilize impersonation of the Booking.com platform through two distinct phishing kits dedicated to harvesting credentials and banking information from each victim, respectively." It's worth noting that the activity shares overlap with a prior activity wave disclosed by Sekoia in November 2025, although the use of a dedicated phishing kit is a new approach by either the same or new operators. EPMM exploits enable persistent accessThe recently disclosed security flaws in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) have been exploited by bad actors to establish a reverse shell, deliver JSP web shells, conduct reconnaissance, and download malware, including Nezha, cryptocurrency miners, and backdoors for remote access. The two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340, allow unauthenticated attackers to remotely execute arbitrary code on target servers, granting them full control over mobile device management (MDM) infrastructure without requiring user interaction or credentials. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, the campaign has affected state and local government, healthcare, manufacturing, professional and legal services, and high technology sectors in the U.S., Germany, Australia, and Canada. "Threat actors are accelerating operations, moving from initial reconnaissance to deploying dormant backdoors designed to maintain long-term access even after organizations apply patches," the cybersecurity company said. In a related development, Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has reported evidence of exploitation since the summer of 2025 and has urged organizations to audit their systems for indicators of compromise (IoCs) as far back as July 2025. AI passwords lack true randomnessNew research by Irregular has found that passwords generated directly by a large language model (LLM) may appear strong but are fundamentally insecure, as "LLMs are designed to predict tokens – the opposite of securely and uniformly sampling random characters." The artificial intelligence (AI) security company said it detected LLM-generated passwords in the real world as part of code development tasks instead of leaning on traditional secure password generation methods. "People and coding agents should not rely on LLMs to generate passwords," the company said. "LLMs are optimized to produce predictable, plausible outputs, which is incompatible with secure password generation. AI coding agents should be directed to use secure password generation methods instead of relying on LLM-output passwords. Developers using AI coding assistants should review generated code for hardcoded credentials and ensure agents use cryptographically secure methods or established password managers." PDF engine flaws enable account takeoverCybersecurity researchers have discovered more than a dozen vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-70401, CVE-2025-70402, and CVE-2025-66500) in popular PDF platforms from Foxit and Apryse, potentially allowing attackers to exploit them for account takeover, session hijacking, data exfiltration, and arbitrary JavaScript execution. "Rather than isolated bugs, the issues cluster around recurring architectural failures in how PDF platforms handle untrusted input across layers," Novee Security researchers Lidor Ben Shitrit, Elad Meged, and Avishai Fradlis said. "Several vulnerabilities were exploitable with a single request and affected trusted domains commonly embedded inside enterprise applications." The issues have been addressed by both Apryse and Foxit through product updates. Training labs expose cloud backdoorsA "widespread" security issue has been discovered where security vendors inadvertently expose deliberately vulnerable training applications, such as OWASP Juice Shop, DVWA, bWAPP, and Hackazon, to the public internet. This can open organizations to severe security risks when they are executed from a privileged cloud account. "Primarily deployed for internal testing, product demonstrations, and security training, these applications were frequently left accessible in their default or misconfigured states," Pentera Labs said. "These critical flaws not only allowed attackers full control over the compromised compute engine but also provided pathways for lateral movement into sensitive internal systems. Violations of the principle of least privilege and inadequate sandboxing measures further facilitated privilege escalation, endangering critical infrastructure and sensitive organizational data." Further analysis has determined that threat actors are exploiting this blind spot to plant web shells, cryptocurrency miners, and persistence mechanisms on compromised systems. Evasion loader refines C2 stealthThe malware loader known as Oyster (aka Broomstick or CleanUpLoader) has continued to evolve into early 2026, fine-tuning its C2 infrastructure and obfuscation methods, per findings from Sekoia. The malware is distributed mainly through fake websites that distribute installers for legitimate software like Microsoft Teams, with the core payload often deployed as a DLL for persistent execution. "The initial stage leverages excessive legitimate API call hammering and simple anti-debugging traps to thwart static analysis," the company said. "The core payload is delivered in a highly obfuscated manner. The final stage implements a robust C2 communication protocol that features a dual-layer server infrastructure and highly-customized data encoding." Stealer taunts researchers in codeNoodlophile is the name given to an information-stealing malware that has been distributed via fake AI tools promoted on Facebook. Assessed to be the work of a threat actor based in Vietnam, it was first documented by Morphisec in May 2025. Since then, there have been other reports detailing various campaigns, such as UNC6229 and PXA Stealer, orchestrated by Vietnamese cybercriminals. Morphisec's latest analysis of Noodlophile has revealed that the threat actor "padded the malware with millions of repeats of a colorful Vietnamese phrase translating to 'f*** you, Morphisec,'" suggesting that the operators were not thrilled about getting exposed. "Not just to vent frustration over disrupted campaigns, but also to bloat the file and crash AI-based analysis tools that are based on the Python disassemble library – dis.dis(obj)," security researcher Michael Gorelik said. Crypto library RCE risk patchedThe OpenSSL project has patched a stack buffer overflow flaw that can lead to remote code execution attacks under certain conditions. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-15467, resides in how the library processes Cryptographic Message Syntax data. Threat actors can use CMS packets with maliciously crafted AEAD parameters to crash OpenSSL and run malicious code. CVE-2025-15467 is one of 12 issues that were disclosed by AISLE late last month. Another high-severity vulnerability is CVE-2025-11187, which could trigger a stack-based buffer overflow due to a missing validation. Machine accounts expand delegation riskNew research from Silverfort has cleared a "common assumption" that Kerberos delegation -- which allows a service to request resources or perform actions on behalf of a user -- applies not just to human users, but also to machine accounts as well. In other words, a computer account can be delegated on behalf of highly privileged machine identities such as domain controllers. "That means a service trusted for delegation can act not just on behalf of other users, but also on behalf of machine accounts, the most critical non-human identities (NHIs) in any domain," Silverfort researcher Dor Segal said. "The risk is obvious. If an adversary can leverage delegation, it can act on behalf of sensitive machine accounts, which in many environments hold privileges equivalent to Domain Administrator." To counter the risk, it's advised to run "Set-ADAccountControl -Identity “HOST01$” -AccountNotDelegated $true" for each sensitive machine account. Security news rarely breaks in isolation. One incident leads to another, new research builds on older findings, and attacker playbooks keep adjusting along the way. The result is a constant stream of signals that are easy to miss without a structured view. This roundup pulls those signals together into a single, readable snapshot. Go through the full list to get quick clarity on the developments shaping defender priorities and risk conversations right now.
thehackernews.comFeb 19, 2026extracted
Scammers exploit trust in Atlassian Jira to target organizations
Scammers exploit trust in Atlassian Jira to target organizations Threat actors have leveraged legitimate email notification feature of Atlassian Jira to deliver localized scam emails at scale. The emails From late December 2025 through late January 2026, victims were targeted with spam emails from legitimate-looking Atlassian Jira Cloud addresses. Organizations already using Jira were specifically targeted: the attackers selected domains known to have active Jira instances, which means recipients would be used to receiving Jira notifications. The subject lines contained promises of gifts and bonuses, offers of special gaming opportunities, or posed as confirmation emails that required the recipients’ attention. “In some cases, the threat actors used standard Jira-generated subject lines, which are less effective in enticing recipients to click on the links associated with online casinos and dubious investment schemes. It is unclear why threat actors used standard Jira subject lines; it might just have been the result of human error or misconfigured automation rules,” the researchers shared. The goal was to get recipients to open the emails and follow the provided links, which would take them through a series of redirections and then finally lead them to pages peddling investment scams and online casino landing sites. The emails were tailored to target English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Russian speakers. “In some cases, target lists included highly skilled individuals born in Russia but who are currently living and working abroad, suggesting the campaign had targeted goals, even though financial gain still appeared to be the most prominent objective,” Trend Micro noted. Abuse of a trusted SaaS platform To mount the campaign, the spammers set up Atlassian trial accounts and used disposable Jira Cloud instances provisioned without any domain ownership verification, and then used built-in automation features to send the messages. Because the emails were sent through Atlassian’s own infrastructure, they carried valid authentication (SPF and DKIM), signaling trustworthiness to email security filters AND users. From the victim’s perspective, the emails would look like a normal Jira notification from a real Jira address. “Organizations using Atlassian Jira were prime targets, especially those with high email volume and have a heavy reliance on collaboration tools, environments where Jira notifications are routinely trusted,” the researchers noted. Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comFeb 18, 2026extracted
Oltre il Tasto invia: perché SPF e DKIM non bastano senza governance
Betti RHC, la prima graphic novel al mondo dedicata alla cybersecurity awareness, ha finalmente il suo sito ufficiale. Uno spazio tutto suo dove scoprire il progetto, sfogliare le copertine degli episodi e immergersi nel mondo di Betti: la giovane laureanda in informatica che, dopo la morte misteriosa del padre, si trasforma nell'hacker più potente del mondo. Una storia avvincente che, episodio dopo episodio, affronta una minaccia digitale diversa — dal phishing al ransomware, fino al cyberbullismo — e insegna a riconoscerla e a difendersi, senza che sembri mai una lezione. Sul sito trovate tutto ciò che rende Betti un progetto diverso dal solito: la sua filosofia, le anteprime delle tavole e il racconto di come nasce ogni volume. Perché dietro Betti RHC c'è solo lavoro umano: ogni tavola è disegnata interamente a mano dagli artisti del Gruppo Arte di Red Hot Cyber, senza alcun uso di intelligenza artificiale. E a garantire che ogni storia sia realistica e tecnicamente corretta c'è la supervisione degli hacker etici del gruppo HackerHood, che mantengono il racconto fedele al mondo reale della sicurezza informatica. C'è spazio anche per le aziende, che possono usare Betti come strumento di awareness diverso dai soliti corsi: acquistare i volumi, personalizzarli con il proprio brand o sponsorizzare nuovi episodi. E come primo regalo, l'episodio "Byte the Silence", dedicato al cyberbullismo, è scaricabile gratuitamente per uso personale. Perché la miglior difesa, in fondo, è una bella storia. 👉 Scopri tutto su https://betti.redhotcyber.com/
redhotcyber.comFeb 12, 2026extracted
Email clonata di Meloni. L’analisi tecnica che smonta il (falso) caso
Questa analisi ha lo scopo di chiarire gli aspetti tecnici dell’accaduto, spiegando perché, in questo caso, non si possa parlare di “compromissione” di account di posta elettronica. L’articolo di Emanuele De Lucia, Chief Intelligence Officer – Meridian Group. Recentemente una notizia relativa alla presunta “clonazione” dell’indirizzo di posta elettronica di Giorgia Meloni ha suscitato un dibattito pubblico sulla sicurezza informatica e sui protocolli di posta elettronica. La notizia ha mostrato un’email che sembrava provenire da un indirizzo di posta ufficiale del governo italiano, suggerendo l’esistenza di una vulnerabilità a livello sistemico. Questa analisi ha lo scopo di chiarire gli aspetti tecnici dell’accaduto, spiegando perché, in questo caso, non si possa parlare di “compromissione” di account di posta elettronica. Si parla al contrario di come una caratteristica intrinseca di uno dei protocolli di base della rete Internet può essere sfruttata anche oggi (come già a partire dalla metà degli anni 90) per inviare messaggi con mittenti (“sender”) totalmente arbitrari. La tecnica utilizzata è una forma di falsificazione digitale nota come email spoofing, che consiste nel modificare a piacimento l’indirizzo del mittente visualizzato dal destinatario. È importante sottolineare che tentativi di questo genere hanno scarse possibilità di avere successo se condotti contro moderne infrastrutture di posta elettronica correttamente configurate. I domini email governativi ed enterprise sono generalmente protetti da protocolli di sicurezza standard a livello internazionale (SPF, DKIM e DMARC). Questi sistemi di controllo mirano esattamente ad identificare tali messaggi come “non autentici”, bloccandoli prima che possano raggiungere la casella di posta del destinatario. Lo “spoofing controllato” La discussione è nata da un servizio video che presentava una dimostrazione tecnica. Nel video un informatico mostrava come fosse possibile inviare un’email facendo apparire come mittente un indirizzo istituzionale. L’email veniva visualizzata nella casella di posta di un destinatario, suggerendo l’esistenza di una vulnerabilità che avrebbe potuto esporre le comunicazioni a rischi significativi. Tuttavia, ad un occhio esperto, è stato fin da subito chiaro che la riuscita della dimostrazione è stata basata molto probabilmente su una condizione specifica: l’ipotesi tecnicamente più plausibile, infatti, è che l’invio dell’email sia andato a buon fine grazie ad un server di posta ricevente non correttamente configurato o che non abbia eseguito i controlli standard di verifica. Tale casistica, se non adeguatamente contestualizzata, rischia di essere percepita come una minaccia generalizzata. Se l’email fosse stata inviata a un qualsiasi sistema di posta moderno e correttamente configurato, infatti, sarebbe stata bloccata o quanto meno “marcata” come fraudolenta. L’Anatomia della Tecnica: Email Spoofing vs. Account Takeover Per comprendere a fondo la questione, è fondamentale distinguere tra la tecnica effettivamente utilizzata (email spoofing) e ciò che il termine “clonazione” suggerisce (un vero e proprio Account Takeover). Si tratta di due tipi di attacchi informatici con livelli di gravità e meccanismi di difesa molto diversi. L’email spoofing consiste nell’inviare un’email con un indirizzo mittente contraffatto. Questa è una tecnica resa possibile dal design originale del protocollo di posta elettronica, il Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), che non include un sistema di base per la verifica dell’identità del mittente (sender). Questo permette, nella pratica, di inviare messaggi con un mittente totalmente arbitrario. E’ importante sottolineare che online esistono molti servizi che permettono di farlo in modo estremamente semplice e rapido. L’ email spoofing è una tecnica che fino a qualche anno fa era massivamente usata nel phishing e nello spam per tentare di ingannare i destinatari, inducendoli a compiere azioni dannose come cliccare su link malevoli o fornire dati sensibili. Oggi vista l’ adozione di protocolli di sicurezza nella grande maggioranza delle caselle “riceventi” a livello sia istituzionale che enterprise, applicare una c.d. “email spoofing” in un attacco di tipo phishing potrebbe addirittura essere contro-producente in quanto il messaggio con estrema probabilità fallirebbe anche solo nel raggiungere il destinatario. L’Account Takeover (ATO), invece, è qualcosa di molto più grave, in cui un malintenzionato ottiene il pieno controllo di una casella di posta dopo averne rubato le credenziali di accesso. Gli attacchi ATO non sfruttano generalmente debolezze del protocollo email, ma la compromissione delle credenziali dell’utente, che può avvenire tramite: Phishing: La vittima viene indotta con l’inganno a inserire le proprie credenziali su una pagina di login falsa. Data Breach: Le credenziali rubate da un sito vengono provate su altri servizi, sfruttando la tendenza degli utenti a riutilizzare le password. Malware: Software dannosi come i keylogger registrano ciò che l’utente digita, inclusa la password. La distinzione tra spoofing e ATO è fondamentale per una corretta percezione del rischio. Confondere le due pratiche può generare un allarme sproporzionato, distogliendo l’attenzione da minacce più concrete e diffuse come il phishing, che richiede la vigilanza dell’utente. L’uso di termini imprecisi può orientare l’attenzione verso problemi tecnici complessi, quando invece le difese più efficaci contro gli attacchi più dannosi risiedono spesso in buone pratiche di sicurezza individuali. Sistemi di difesa: come funzionano SPF, DKIM e DMARC L’email spoofing è una tecnica nota da moltissimo tempo. Il motivo per cui i tentativi di email spoofing sono oggi ben identificati in sistemi di posta adeguatamente configurati risiede nell’esistenza di meccanismi di difesa a più livelli. Per sopperire alle mancanze del protocollo SMTP originale (già ampiamente sfruttate a partire dalla metà degli anni 90 per condurre campagne di phishing), sono stati sviluppati standard di autenticazione che funzionano come sistema di verifica per le email in arrivo. I tre protocolli principali — SPF, DKIM e DMARC — lavorano insieme per verificare l’identità del mittente e proteggere le caselle di posta. 1. SPF (Sender Policy Framework): La Lista dei Mittenti Autorizzati Il Sender Policy Framework (SPF) è il primo livello di difesa. Risponde a una domanda semplice: il server che ha inviato questa email è autorizzato a farlo per conto di questo dominio? In estrema sintesi, quando un server ricevente (come quello di Gmail) riceve un’email, confronta l’IP del server mittente (che potrebbe falsificare il mittente) con l’elenco presente nel record SPF. Se l’IP è autorizzato, il controllo passa; altrimenti, fallisce e l’email viene contrassegnata come “fraudolenta”. 2. DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail): Il Sigillo di Garanzia Mentre l’SPF verifica l’origine, il DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) verifica l’integrità e l’autenticità del messaggio. Assicura che l’email provenga da un server autorizzato e che il suo contenuto non sia stato alterato durante il transito. Il DKIM utilizza la crittografia a chiave pubblica. Il server mittente firma digitalmente ogni email in uscita con una chiave privata. La corrispondente chiave pubblica viene pubblicata nel DNS del dominio. Il server ricevente utilizza la chiave pubblica per verificare la firma. Se la verifica ha successo, si ha la certezza che l’email sia autentica e che il suo contenuto non sia stato manomesso. 3. DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance): Le Istruzioni Operative Il DMARC unisce SPF e DKIM, consentendo al proprietario del dominio di specificare come i server riceventi debbano trattare le email che non superano i controlli di autenticazione. Questa “policy” può essere impostata su tre livelli : p=none: Modalità di monitoraggio. L’email viene recapitata, ma il fallimento viene segnalato al proprietario del dominio. p=quarantine: L’email viene contrassegnata come sospetta e spostata nella cartella spam. p=reject: L’email viene bloccata e cancellata completamente, senza mai raggiungere il destinatario. Dalla consapevolezza all’azione: raccomandazioni per cittadini e organizzazioni L’analisi di questo caso di studio offre una lezione importante di alfabetizzazione digitale. Una maggiore consapevolezza dei rischi reali permette a cittadini e organizzazioni di adottare misure concrete per migliorare la propria sicurezza. Per i singoli cittadini, la protezione nel mondo digitale si basa principalmente su un atteggiamento prudente: Imparare a Riconoscere il Phishing: La maggior parte degli attacchi informatici di successo inizia con un tentativo di phishing. Imparare a riconoscere i segnali di allarme è una competenza fondamentale. Tra gli indicatori comuni vi sono, per l’appunto, il mittente sospetto. Verificaresempre l’indirizzo email completo del mittente, non solo il nome visualizzato. Per aziende e istituzioni, la sicurezza si basa sull’integrazione tra tecnologia e formazione del personale. Implementare l’Autenticazione Tecnica: Tutte le organizzazioni dovrebbero configurare correttamente i protocolli SPF, DKIM e DMARC (con una policy p=quarantine o p=reject). Questo protegge il proprio dominio da tentativi di impersonificazione e contribuisce a un ecosistema email più sicuro per tutti. Investire nel “Fattore Umano”: La tecnologia da sola non basta. È fondamentale investire in programmi di formazione continua sulla sicurezza per tutto il personale. Simulazioni di phishing regolari possono aiutare i dipendenti a riconoscere e segnalare i tentativi di ingegneria sociale, trasformandoli in una linea di difesa attiva. Per approfondire, l’articolo del Direttore: Falsificazione dell’email di Meloni, perché l’email spoofing non è una novità e cosa insegna il clamore mediatico
cybersecitalia.itOct 8, 2025extracted
How attackers poison AI tools and defenses
How attackers poison AI tools and defenses Cyberattackers are using generative AI to draft polished spam, create malicious code and write persuasive phishing lures. They are also learning how to turn AI systems themselves into points of compromise. Recent findings highlight this shift. Researchers from Columbia University and the University of Chicago studied malicious email traffic collected over three years. Barracuda Research has also tracked attackers exploiting weaknesses in AI assistants and tampering with AI-driven security tools. AI in email-based attacks Messages created with LLMs tend to be more formal, free of grammatical slips and linguistically sophisticated. That polish makes them more challenging for filters to catch and more convincing to recipients, especially when the attacker’s first language is not English. Attackers are also using AI to test different versions of subject lines and body text. This kind of variation, similar to A/B testing in marketing, helps them identify what slips past defenses and tempts more victims to click. Email attacks targeting AI assistants Researchers have also detected attackers targeting the AI assistants that many employees rely on for daily work. Tools like Microsoft Copilot scan inboxes, messages and documents to provide context when answering questions, and that access creates a new risk. Consider the following scenario: A malicious prompt hides inside a harmless-looking email. The message sits in a inbox until the AI assistant retrieves it while helping with a task. At that point, the assistant may follow the hidden instructions that tell it to do things like leaking sensitive information, altering records or running commands. Other attacks focus on systems that use retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). By corrupting the data that feeds these systems, attackers can influence what an assistant reports back. The result is unreliable answers, poor decisions and unintended actions based on poisoned context. Tampering with AI-based security tools Attackers are also trying to bend AI-powered defenses to their advantage. Many email security platforms now include features like auto-replies, smart forwarding, automated ticket creation, and spam triage, and each one is a potential entry point. If an attacker slips a malicious prompt into the system, they might trigger an auto-reply that reveals sensitive data, or they could escalate a helpdesk ticket without proper checks, gaining access they should never have. In some cases, attackers use workflow automation against the organization itself. A poisoned command could deploy malware, alter critical records or shut down key processes. The same AI features that simplify defenses also expand the attack surface. Without safeguards, bad actors can turn tools designed to protect into attack vectors. Identity and integrity risks AI systems that act with a high degree of autonomy carry another risk: impersonating users or trusting impostors. One tactic is known as a “Confused Deputy” attack. Here, an AI agent with high privileges performs a task on behalf of a low-privileged attacker. Another involves spoofed API access, where attackers trick integrations with services like Microsoft 365 or Gmail into leaking information or sending fraudulent emails. Manipulation can also spread through what researchers call cascading hallucinations. A single poisoned prompt may distort summaries, inbox reports or task lists. For example, a fake “urgent” message from a spoofed executive could be treated as real, changing how teams prioritize work or make decisions. Once trust in AI outputs erodes, every system that depends on those outputs is at risk. How defenses must adapt Older controls, such as SPF, DKIM and IP blocklists, are no longer enough. To counter attacks that exploit AI, organizations need multiple layers of defense. One crucial step is to make filters aware of how LLMs generate content, so they can flag anomalies in tone, behavior or intent that might slip past older systems. Another is to validate what AI systems remember over time. Without that check, poisoned data can linger in memory and influence future decisions. Isolation also matters. AI assistants should run in contained environments where unverified actions are blocked before they can cause damage. Identity management needs to follow the principle of least privilege, giving AI integrations only the access they require. Finally, treat every instruction with skepticism. Even routine requests must be verified before execution if zero-trust principles are to hold. Technology is only part of the answer. Employees are a critical line of defense, and awareness training helps them recognize suspicious messages and report them quickly, reducing the chance that poisoned prompts or AI-crafted attacks ever gain traction. AI-aware security The next wave of threats will involve agentic AI-powered systems that reason, plan and act on their own. While these tools can deliver tremendous productivity gains to users, their autonomy makes them attractive targets. If attackers succeed in steering an agent, the system could make decisions, launch actions or move data undetected. Email remains a favorite attack vector because the inbox has become a staging ground for threat execution as AI assistants and agents integrate with calendars, workflows and collaboration platforms. Every prompt and request carries the potential to trigger downstream actions. Protecting this space requires more than filtering: it demands constant validation, zero-trust guardrails and proactive modeling of how an attacker might exploit an AI agent. AI is already changing how attackers operate, and it is reshaping how defenders must respond. Security leaders must build resilience on two fronts: spotting when adversaries deploy AI against them and hardening their own AI systems so attackers cannot poison or mislead them.
helpnetsecurity.comSep 29, 2025extracted
Mozilla warns of phishing attacks targeting add-on developers
Mozilla has warned browser extension developers of an active phishing campaign targeting accounts on its official AMO (addons.mozilla.org) repository. Mozilla's add-on platform hosts over 60,000 browser extensions and more than 500,000 themes used by tens of millions of users worldwide. According to Mozilla's advisory, these phishing emails are impersonating the AMO team and claim that the targeted developer accounts require updates to maintain access to development features. "The developer community should be aware we've detected a phishing campaign targeting AMO (addons.mozilla.org) accounts. Add-on developers should exercise extreme caution and scrutiny when receiving emails claiming to be from Mozilla/AMO," Mozilla cautioned on Friday. "Phishing emails typically state some variation of the message' Your Mozilla Add-ons account requires an update to continue accessing developer features.'" To secure their accounts, developers are advised to always verify if emails they receive are sent from a Mozilla domain (firefox.com, mozilla.org, mozilla.com, or their subdomains), that they pass standard email authentication checks (including SPF, DKIM, and DMARC), and not to click on links embedded in suspicious emails. Mozilla also urged developers to navigate directly to its websites rather than following email links, and only enter their login credentials on official Mozilla or Firefox domains. While Mozilla has yet to disclose the scale of this phishing campaign, the end goal of the attacks, or whether any developer accounts had already been successfully compromised, at least one developer claims to have fallen victim. Mozilla said it would provide updates if additional details about this campaign become available. The warning comes after last month's announcement that Mozilla's Add-ons Operations team has launched a new security feature to help block malicious Firefox extensions designed to drain cryptocurrency wallets. Andreas Wagner, the Add-ons Operations Manager who oversees the content security and review efforts for addons.mozilla.org (AMO), stated that Mozilla has identified and removed hundreds of extensions, including fraudulent cryptocurrency wallets, over the past few years. While not all of these extensions were directly linked to malicious activities, cybercriminals stole $494 million worth of cryptocurrency last year through wallet-draining attacks affecting over 300,000 wallet addresses. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comAug 4, 2025extracted
La casella e-mail Outlook è scaduta, ma è phishing: così rubano i nostri dati
L’Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale (ACN) ha segnalato una nuova campagna di phishing attiva, che sfrutta come pretesto una falsa notifica di scadenza della casella e-mail. Questo stratagemma è usato per ingannare gli utenti e sottrarre le loro credenziali di posta elettronica. Indice degli argomenti Come si presenta l’e-mail fraudolenta Il messaggio truffaldino simula una comunicazione ufficiale, graficamente curata e con riferimenti a Microsoft Outlook, e invita l’utente a cliccare un link (https://isadoracavecappadocia[.]com/dev/, un sito WordPress di una struttura alberghiera turca presumibilmente compromesso, NdA) per evitare la sospensione del servizio di posta elettronica. Si tratta di un tentativo di ottenere le credenziali dell’utente tramite una pagina di accesso fasulla, appositamente costruita per sembrare legittima. “Qualora dato seguito al link proposto, la vittima viene reindirizzata ad una landing page malevola che riporta, in secondo piano, una verosimile configurazione delle proprie modalità di autenticazione; in primo piano viene presentato un pop-up che richiede l’inserimento del proprio account e-mail per procedere all’aggiornamento delle credenziali”, spiegano gli analisti ACN. Come funziona la pagina di phishing Di seguito, ecco una mia analisi di un blocco di codice della pagina di landing ancora online al momento della stesura di questo articolo. In pratica, l’algoritmo implementato crea una finestra modale (popup) che chiede all’utente tramite form di inserire il proprio indirizzo e-mail con il pretesto di aggiornare la password e verifica con una funzione javascript la correttezza morfologica dell’indirizzo e-mail inserito. Nello specifico il form instaura una comunicazione C2 tramite POST mentre la funzione JavaScript denominata closeModal() e presente tra i tag e si occupa di: ascoltare ogni cambiamento nel campo e-mail verificare che il valore sia un formato e-mail valido usando un’espressione regolare (/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/) e, solo in caso positivo, abilitare il pulsante “Submit” (submitBtn.disabled = false) per l’avvio delle fasi successive. Come descritto dallo stesso report dopo una breve animazione (un foglio che esce da una busta blu per lettera, NdA) e la richiesta di una password, la vittima verrà reindirizzata a una pagina di errore per un presunto blocco account. In realtà proprio in quell’istante le credenziali eventualmente fornite sono già state inviate a una risorsa C2 sotto il controllo dell’attaccante. Fonte: ACN. Obiettivo dell’attacco Il fine dell’attacco come detto è ottenere l’accesso alla casella e-mail della vittima. Con queste credenziali, i criminali così possono: accedere a informazioni sensibili e personali, diffondere ulteriori campagne phishing, compromettere altri account associati alla stessa e-mail. Consigli pratici per utenti e organizzazioni Si raccomanda per gli utenti di: non cliccare sul link contenuto nel messaggio; non inserire credenziali di alcun tipo; informare immediatamente il proprio referente tecnico o il responsabile della sicurezza informatica, o segnalare il messaggio attraverso i canali interni previsti; abilitare se possibile l’autenticazione MFA. Per le organizzazioni, è importante: Sensibilizzare il personale con formazione anti-phishing; Utilizzare soluzioni anti-spoofing (SPF, DKIM, DMARC); Monitorare anomalie di accesso e attivare logging centralizzato. Conclusioni Questa campagna dimostra ancora una volta quanto sia importante mantenere alta l’attenzione. Anche una semplice e-mail può essere il punto d’ingresso per una compromissione più ampia. L’ACN invita chiunque riceva messaggi sospetti a non interagire con i contenuti ed ai referenti della sicurezza di valutare la verifica e l’implementazione, sui propri apparati, degli Indicatori di Compromissione forniti. Di seguito la cristallizzazione della pagina di landing su urlscan.
cybersecurity360.itJul 28, 2025extracted