Search/dahua
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Hackers compromise 14,500 Dahua web cameras in 35-day campaign
In a large-scale campaign that researchers dubbed CameraSwarm, hackers compromised more than 14,500 Dahua IP cameras mostly in Ukraine and Russia. The operation ran for at least 35 days between June 17 and July 22, compromising devices by exploiting vulnerabilities, brute-forcing logins, and using offline recovery codes from serial numbers for cloud-registered cameras. Researchers at threat intelligence company Hunt.io discovered the campaign after finding a working directory on an HTTP server that the operator left unprotected. Hunt.io recovered 407 MB of data comprising 2,616 files across 234 directories, including source code, logs, credentials, captured camera images, shell history, and exploitation results, which helped them map an impressive operation. According to their findings, the 35-day CameraSwarm campaign compromised 14,530 Dahua IP cameras using three attack methods in parallel: A brute-forcing system scanned TCP port 37777 and compromised devices at 12,324 unique IP addresses. It captured usable camera snapshots, sent results to Telegram, and exported them for Dahua’s SMART PSS platform. Exploiting CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 vulnerabilities using a tool called p2pwn that installed a persistent backdoor account (p2pwn / p2password) on 1,923 cameras. The account survives password changes and, on most firmware versions, factory resets. A cloud-relay attack reached 283 cameras behind NAT using only serial numbers and SDK credentials embedded in Dahua applications. Data indicates that 89.4% of live serials exposed an access channel without authentication. The recovery code generation mechanism in the attack toolkit leverages the camera serial number, which allows the CameraSwarm operator to redeem new codes via Dahua’s standard password-recovery process without knowing the current admin password. The researchers found two misleading vulnerability references in the toolkit, CVE-2024-39943 and CVE-2025-31702, which are not exploited in the observed attacks. Hunt.io's analysis uncovered that scanning was global, first checking the Russian address space, then scanning the entire IPv4 range. According to the researchers, "the operator's focus settled on Russian and CIS telecom netblocks." However, the researchers also found Russian comments in modified code inserted in repurposed public tools. On August 10, Hunt.io notified national CERTs and Dahua’s PSIRT about the CameraSwarm campaign. Dahua cameras reachable through port 37777 between June and July should be treated as potentially compromised. Owners should examine them for the presence of a ‘p2pwn’ account and remove it. Hunt.io warns that removing the backdoor account does not invalidate recovery codes generated by the toolkit, and they remain usable until Dahua alters the derivation server-side. Additionally, users are recommended to disable P2P when not needed, and apply the Dahua SA-2021-0130 firmware updates for CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, or a later firmware version. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comAug 19, 2026extracted
Hackers Compromised 14,500+ Dahua Devices Using Credential Attacks, Auth Bypasses, and P2P
Cybersecurity researchers at Hunt.io have disclosed details of a campaign that they say compromised more than 14,530 Dahua devices between June 17 and July 22, 2026, using credential attacks, two authentication-bypass flaws, and a peer-to-peer (P2P) relay technique. The activity, codenamed Operation CameraSwarm, was reconstructed from a 407 MB exposed working directory containing 2,616 files across 234 subdirectories, including tooling, logs, shell history, and campaign records, with the researchers saying confirmed compromises were concentrated in Ukraine and Russia. The researchers said 1,923 cameras were configured with a persistent account during the operation and 283 were reached through the P2P path. Users of affected Dahua products are advised to install the corresponding fix software or newer firmware, while ITRES Labs recommends disabling P2P where it is not required and checking firmware against the vendor's download site. "The relay establishes the route without prior authentication, leaving login checks to the device's web application," ITRES Labs said in an analysis published in October 2025. Hunt.io attributed the 14,530-plus total to three attack paths - Credential attacks: 12,324 unique IP addresses across 13,229 campaign records. Authentication bypass: 1,923 cameras reached using CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, which Hunt.io said were also configured with the persistent account. P2P relay: 283 cameras identified by serial number, including devices located behind network address translation (NAT). The two 2021 flaws are authentication-bypass vulnerabilities in Dahua cameras and related products. Dahua's advisory rates them 8.1 on the CVSS scoring system and lists fixed firmware, while the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) currently assigns each a CVSS score of 9.8. "Attackers can bypass device identity authentication by constructing malicious data packets," Dahua said in its advisory. A NetKeyboard client type triggers CVE-2021-33044 during authentication, while CVE-2021-33045 involves a loopback login request using the 127.0.0.1 address, according to the original disclosure from security researcher Bashis. As of August 19, 2026, both flaws remain listed in the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, which records them as Dahua IP camera authentication-bypass vulnerabilities and advises applying vendor mitigations or discontinuing use if mitigations are unavailable. As of August 19, 2026, the public p2pwn repository remains accessible and independently confirms that the tool accepts Dahua serial numbers as input, checks CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, and contains a default dummy-account configuration. The repository does not establish Hunt.io's count of 1,923 affected cameras or its claim that the account survives a factory reset on most firmware. The P2P path is separate from the two authentication-bypass flaws. ITRES Labs found during an earlier incident response investigation that, on firmware before mid-2024, a valid Dahua serial number could be used to establish an Easy4IP relay path before the connected device performed its own credential check, allowing a device behind NAT to become reachable through the vendor's relay infrastructure. The dh-p2p proof-of-concept repository also shows that the Dahua P2P protocol locates a device through Easy4IPCloud using its serial number and can establish a tunnel to the camera or network video recorder. A successful P2P relay can make the device reachable behind NAT, but device-level authentication can still be required for access. Hunt.io said the operator's recovered code recorded 89.4% of live serial numbers returning an open channel without authentication. That figure remains a campaign-specific claim from the recovered operator material. It has not been independently reproduced by ITRES Labs, Dahua, or a public computer emergency response team advisory located as of August 19, 2026. Two CVE labels associated with the recovered tooling do not describe the P2P behavior: CVE-2024-39943 is assigned by NVD to an operating-system command-injection flaw in Rejetto HFS, while Dahua describes CVE-2025-31702 as a privilege-escalation flaw that requires previously obtained normal-user credentials. ITRES Labs described the serial-number relay exposure as a non-CVE issue and said its testing found that the P2P path was reinforced in firmware released after mid-2024. The firm advised defenders to disable P2P unless required, restrict Easy4IP connectivity where appropriate, update devices using firmware from the vendor's website, use strong unique credentials, remove unused accounts, and segment video surveillance systems. Dahua's advisory directs customers to install the listed repair software or newer firmware. The Hacker News has reached out to Dahua to confirm the campaign scope and P2P findings and will update this story with any response. The researchers described the operator as Russian-speaking based on language artifacts recovered from the working directory, but the activity has not been attributed to a named threat actor, a Russian government entity, or another known group. The firm assessed with moderate confidence that parts of the toolkit may have been designed to transfer camera access to a third party. As of August 19, 2026, the campaign-specific totals of more than 14,530 devices, 1,923 persistent accounts, 283 P2P compromises, and the 89.4% open-channel figure remain attributed to Hunt.io. The public primary sources reviewed for this story corroborate the two old authentication bypasses, the p2pwn tool configuration, and the underlying serial-number P2P mechanism, but do not independently confirm those CameraSwarm counts.
thehackernews.comAug 19, 2026extracted
⚡ Weekly Recap: Telecom Sleeper Cells, LLM Jailbreaks, Apple Forces U.K. Age Checks and More
Some weeks are loud. This one was quieter but not in a good way. Long-running operations are finally hitting courtrooms, old attack methods are showing up in new places, and research that stopped being theoretical right around the time defenders stopped paying attention. There's a bit of everything this week. Persistence plays, legal wins, influence ops, and at least one thing that looks boring until you see what it connects to. All of it below. Let's go. ⚡ Threat of the Week Citrix Flaw Comes Under Active Exploitation — A critical security flaw in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (CVE-2026-3055, CVSS score: 9.3) has come under active exploitation as of March 27, 2026. The vulnerability refers to a case of insufficient input validation leading to memory overread, which an attacker could exploit to leak potentially sensitive information. Per Citrix, successful exploitation of the flaw hinges on the appliance being configured as a SAML Identity Provider (SAML IDP). Your Engineers Are Drowning in Tools — Here's the Data Chainguard surveyed 1,200 engineers and tech leaders for their 2026 Engineering Reality Report. AI is buying back time but also introducing new security concerns, while technical debt, tool sprawl, and burnout keep dragging teams down. 72% say time pressure blocks new feature work; 88% report productivity loss from too many tools. Get the Full Report ➝ 🔔 Top News FBI Confirms Hack of Director Kash Patel's Personal Email Account — The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirmed that threat actors gained access to an email account belonging to FBI Director Kash Patel, but said no government information has been compromised. The Iran-linked hacker group Handala claimed responsibility for the hack, releasing files allegedly representing photos, emails, and classified documents taken from the FBI director's inbox. "The so-called 'impenetrable' systems of the FBI were brought to their knees within hours by our team," the hackers wrote. It's unclear when the account was hacked. The U.S. government, which recently took down multiple sites operated by Iranian state actors, said it's offering up to $10 million for information on threat groups like Parsian Afzar Rayan Borna and Handala. Parsian Afzar Rayan Borna is an IT company that's been implicated in Iran's disinformation and surveillance campaigns. The company is assessed to be linked to Banished Kitten, an Iran-nexus adversary active since at least 2008 and operates the Homeland Justice and Handala Hack personas. Red Menshen Uses Stealthy BPFDoor to Spy on Telecom Networks — A China-linked state-sponsored threat actor known as Red Menshen has deployed kernel implants and passive backdoors deep within telecommunication backbone infrastructure worldwide for long-term persistence. The implants have been fittingly described as sleeper cells that lie dormant and blend into target environments, but spring into action upon receiving a magic packet by quietly monitoring network traffic instead of opening a visible connection. Initial access is usually gained by exploiting known vulnerabilities in edge networking devices and VPN products or by leveraging compromised accounts. Once inside, the threat actor maintains long-term access by deploying tools like BPFdoor. Some BPFdoor samples mimic bare-metal infrastructure, posing as legitimate enterprise platforms to blend into operational noise. Others spoof core containerization components. By embedding the implant deep below traditional visibility layers, the goal is to significantly complicate detection efforts. Rapid7 has released a scanning script designed to detect known BPFDoor variants across Linux environments. GlassWorm Evolves to Drop Extension-Based Stealer — A new evolution of the GlassWorm campaign is delivering a multi-stage framework capable of comprehensive data theft and installing a remote access trojan (RAT), which deploys an information-stealing Google Chrome extension masquerading as an offline version of Google Docs. "It logs keystrokes, dumps cookies and session tokens, captures screenshots, and takes commands from a C2 server hidden in a Solana blockchain memo," Aikido said. GlassWorm is the moniker assigned to a persistent campaign that obtains an initial foothold through rogue packages published across npm, PyPI, GitHub, and the Open VSX marketplace. In addition, the operators are known to compromise the accounts of project maintainers to push poisoned updates. Russian Hacker Sentenced to 2 Years for TA551-Linked Ransomware Attacks — Ilya Angelov, a 40-year-old Russian national, was sentenced to two years in prison for managing a botnet that was used to launch ransomware attacks against U.S. companies. Angelov, who went by the online aliases "milan" and "okart," is said to have co-managed a Russia-based cybercriminal group known as TA551 (aka ATK236, G0127, Gold Cabin, Hive0106, Mario Kart, Monster Libra, Shathak, and UNC2420) between 2017 and 2021. The attacks leveraged spam emails to compromise systems and rope them into a botnet that other cybercriminals used to break into corporate systems and deploy ransomware. This included threat actors affiliated with BitPaymer and IcedID. FCC Bans New Foreign-Made Routers Over Security Risks — The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) said it was banning the import of new, foreign-made consumer routers, citing "unacceptable" risks to cyber and national security. To that end, all consumer-grade routers manufactured in foreign countries have been added to the Covered List, unless they have been granted a Conditional Approval by the Department of War (DoW) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after determining that they do not pose any risks. The development comes as the Indian government appears to be preparing to bar Chinese CCTV product makers, such as Hikvision, Dahua, and TP-Link, from selling their cameras from April 1, 2026, to tighten oversight under the Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) rules, the Economic Times reported. ️🔥 Trending CVEs New vulnerabilities show up every week, and the window between disclosure and exploitation keeps getting shorter. The flaws below are this week's most critical — high-severity, widely used software, or already drawing attention from the security community. Check these first, patch what applies, and don't wait on the ones marked urgent — CVE-2026-3055 (Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway), CVE-2025-62843, CVE-2025-62844, CVE-2025-62845, CVE-2025-62846 (QNAP), CVE-2026-22898 (QNAP QVR Pro), CVE-2026-4673, CVE-2026-4677, CVE-2026-4674 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-4404 (GoHarbor Harbor), CVE-2026-1995 (IDrive for Windows), CVE-2026-4681 (Windchill and FlexPLM), CVE-2025-15517, CVE-2025-15518, CVE-2025-15519, CVE-2025-15605, CVE-2025-62673 (TP-Link),CVE-2025-66176 (HikVision), CVE-2026-32647 (NGINX Open Source and NGINX Plus), CVE-2026-22765, CVE-2026-22766 (Dell Wyse Management Suite), CVE-2026-21637, CVE-2026-21710 (Node.js), CVE-2026-25185 aka LnkMeMaybe (Microsoft), CVE-2026-1519, CVE-2026-3104, CVE-2026-3119, CVE-2026-3591 (BIND 9), CVE-2026-2931 (Amelia Booking plugin), CVE-2026-33656 (EspoCRM), CVE-2026-3608 (Kea), CVE-2026-20817 (Microsoft Windows Error Reporting), CVE-2025-33244 (NVIDIA Apex), CVE-2026-32746 (Synology DiskStation Manager), and CVE-2026-3098 (Smart Slider 3 plugin). 🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars Your Identity Program Is Mature. So Why Are You Still Getting Breached? → Your identity program is mature. Yet hundreds of apps still operate outside it. New 2026 Ponemon research from 600+ security leaders shows exactly how big that gap is and what it costs. Now, AI agents are making it worse. This webinar breaks down the findings and shows you what to fix first. Everyone Agrees AI Agents Need Identity. Almost Nobody Knows How to Do It → Everyone agrees AI agents need identity. Few know how to actually do it. This session skips the theory and shows you what a real production deployment looks like, including how to give agents strong identities, see exactly what they're doing, and control how they behave. 📰 Around the Cyber World Fortinet FortiClient EMS Flaw Comes Under Attack — A recently patched security flaw affecting Fortinet FortiClient EMS has come under active exploitation in the wild as of March 24, 2026. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-21643 (CVSS score: 9.1), a critical SQL injection that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specifically crafted HTTP requests. The issue was addressed by Fortinet last month in FortiClient EMS version 7.4.5. "Attackers can smuggle SQL statements through the 'Site'-header inside an HTTP request," Defused Cyber said. Nearly 1,000 FortiClient EMS are publicly exposed. Meta Disrupts Influence Operation Linked to Iran — Meta said it disrupted an influence operation linked to Iran that employed "sophisticated fake personas" on Instagram to build relationships with U.S. users before sending political messaging. The network used accounts posing as journalists, commentators, and ordinary people to engage users and gradually introduce political narratives. A second layer of accounts amplified posts to help spread the messaging. Armenian National Extradited to U.S. in Connection with RedLine Stealer Operations — An Armenian national has been extradited to the United States over his alleged role in the administration of the RedLine infostealer malware. Hambardzum Minasyan, per court documents, allegedly developed and managed the stealer, while unnamed conspirators maintained digital infrastructure, including the command-and-control (C2) servers and administrative panels to enable the deployment of the malware by affiliates, and collected payments from the affiliates. "They allegedly responded to questions and requests from actual and potential RedLine affiliates, conspired with each other and affiliates to steal and possess the financial information, including access devices, of victims, and laundered the proceeds of cybercrime through cryptocurrency exchanges and other means," the U.S. Justice Department said. Minasyan has also been accused of registering two virtual private servers to host portions of RedLine's infrastructure, as well as two internet domains in support of the scheme, repositories on an online file sharing site to distribute the stealer to affiliates, and registering a cryptocurrency account in November 2021 to receive payments. RedLine Stealer was disrupted in an international law enforcement operation in October 2024. Minasyan has been charged with conspiracy to commit access device fraud, conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted, he faces up to 10 years in prison for access device fraud and up to 20 years in prison for the other two counts. In June 2025, the U.S. Department of State announced a $10 million reward for information on Maxim Alexandrovich Rudometov, who is believed to be the main developer and administrator of RedLine. New Android Malware "Android God Mode" Abuses Accessibility Permissions — The Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) has issued an advisory, alerting users of a new Android malware called Android God Mode that abuses its permissions to accessibility services to seize control of infected devices. The malware is propagated via dropper apps that masquerade as banking, public, and utility services such as SBI YONO, Jivan Parman Patra, and RTO Challan, indicating that the campaign's focus is on targeting Indian users. "By coercing users into granting elevated Android permissions, these threats achieve near-total control over the device, enabling stealthy overlay attacks and the real-time theft of sensitive financial and personal information," the I4C said. The malware is distributed in the form of links or APK files shared through WhatsApp. Once installed, it abuses Android's accessibility services to grant itself additional permissions to harvest incoming SMS messages, send messages on the victim's behalf, access contact lists, initiate fraudulent call forwarding, and take pictures using the device's camera. Android 17 Beta Gains New Security Features — To improve security against code injection attacks, Android now enforces that dynamically loaded native libraries must be read-only. If your app targets Android 17 or higher, all native files loaded using System.load() must be marked as read-only beforehand. Another new addition is the support for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) through the new v3.2 APK Signature Scheme. This scheme utilizes a hybrid approach, combining a classical signature with an ML-DSA signature. China-Linked Actors Deliver Mofu Loader and KIVARS — In recent months, Chinese-affiliated espionage clusters like DRBControl have employed DLL side-loading techniques to deliver Mofu Loader – a malware previously attributed to GroundPeony – which then drops a C++ backdoor capable of executing commands issued by an attacker-controlled server. Last year, companies and organizations in Japan and Taiwan have also been targeted by variants of a backdoor called KIVARS, which is tied to a Chinese hacking group called BlackTech. Automated Traffic Outpaces Human Traffic — HUMAN Security found that automated traffic grew eight times faster than human traffic year-over-year. "In 2025, automated traffic across the internet grew 23.51% year over year, while human traffic increased 3.10% over the same period," the company said. The cybersecurity company noted that its customers experienced more than 400,000 attempted post-login account compromise attacks, more than quadruple that of 2024. U.S. Accuses China of Backing Scam Compounds — A senior U.S. official accused Beijing of implicitly backing Chinese criminal syndicates running cyber scam compounds across Southeast Asia. Speaking during a Joint Economic Committee congressional hearing about U.S. efforts to combat digital scams, Reva Price, commissioner with the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said links have been unearthed between scam centers and the Chinese government's Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese criminal syndicates have "invested in projects linked to China's Belt and Road Initiative alongside China's state-owned enterprises," she said, adding that they "have also seen criminal leaders who appear to have gotten a pass by promoting messaging and other activities aligned with Chinese Communist Party priorities." Scam centers in Southeast Asia are often operated by Chinese crime syndicates that lure people into the region with enticing job opportunities and coerce them into participating in pig butchering or romance baiting scams by confiscating their passports and subjecting them to torture. Exploitation Against Oracle WebLogic Servers — A recently disclosed security flaw in Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2026-21962, CVSS score: 10.0) witnessed automated exploitation attempts almost immediately after public exploit code was released, demonstrating how software flaws are being rapidly weaponized by bad actors. The activity, detected by CloudSEK against its honeypots, also leveraged other WebLogic flaws (CVE-2020-14882, CVE-2020-14883, CVE-2020-2551, and CVE-2017-10271), as well as flaws impacting Hikvision and PHPUnit, indicating a spray and pray approach. "Attackers predominantly utilized rented Virtual Private Servers (VPS) from common hosting providers like DigitalOcean and HOSTGLOBAL.PLUS," the company said. "The overall activity was characterized by high-volume, automated scanning, with tools like libredtail-http and the Nmap Scripting Engine dominating the malicious traffic." Security Flaws in Cisco Catalyst 9300 Series Switches — Details have emerged about now-patched vulnerabilities in Cisco Catalyst 9300 Series switches (CVE-2026-20110, CVE-2026-20112, CVE-2026-20113, and CVE-2026-20114) that could result in privilege escalation, operational denial-of-service, stored cross-site scripting (XSS), and CRLF injection. "Collectively, these vulnerabilities introduce risks to administrative trust boundaries, service availability, session integrity, and system log reliability – affecting both operational continuity and security monitoring capabilities," OPSWAT said. "CVE-2026-20114 and CVE-2026-20110 are the most operationally impactful when chained. A low-privilege Web UI user can escalate access and invoke a maintenance-mode operation, resulting in full denial of service that may require physical intervention to restore." The issues were patched by Cisco last week. Financial Institution Targeted by BRUSHWORM and BRUSHLOGGER — A modular backdoor with USB-based spreading capabilities was used in an attack targeting an unnamed South Asian financial institution, according to findings from Elastic Security Labs. The malware, dubbed BRUSHWORM, is one of the two malware components identified in the victim's infrastructure, the other being a DLL keylogger referred to as BRUSHLOGGER. "BRUSHWORM features anti-analysis checks, AES-CBC encrypted configuration, scheduled task persistence, modular DLL payload downloading, USB worm propagation, and broad file theft targeting documents, spreadsheets, email archives, and source code," security researcher Salim Bitam said. BRUSHWORM is also responsible for running basic anti-analysis checks, maintaining persistence, command-and-control (C2) communication, and downloading additional modular payloads. BRUSHLOGGER augments the backdoor by capturing system-wide keystrokes via a simple Windows keyboard hook and logging the active window context for each keystroke session. "Neither binary employs meaningful code obfuscation, packing, or advanced anti-analysis techniques," Elastic said. "Given the absence of a kill switch, the use of free dynamic DNS servers in testing versions, and some coding mistakes, we assess with moderate confidence that the author is relatively inexperienced and may have leveraged AI code-generation tools during development without fully reviewing the output." U.K. Sanctions Xinbi — The U.K.'s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has sanctioned Xinbi, a Chinese-language guarantee marketplace accused of enabling large-scale online fraud and human exploitation by supporting #8 Park (aka Legend Park), an industrial-scale scam compound in Cambodia notorious for large-scale pig butchering scams and forced labor of trafficked workers. The U.K. is the first country to sanction Xinbi. The move is designed to isolate Xinbi from the legitimate crypto ecosystem and disrupt its operations. Xinbi is estimated to have processed over $19.9 billion between 2021 and 2025. "The platform facilitates everything from 'Black U' money laundering and unlicensed OTC trades to the sale of compromised personal databases and scam infrastructure," Chainalysis said. "In the face of previous takedowns, Xinbi demonstrated significant resilience by rapidly migrating to the SafeW messaging app and launching its own proprietary payment app, XinbiPay. This evolution highlights the challenges around pursuing illicit services as they build custom financial rails to insulate themselves from platform-level disruptions." According to a report published by Elliptic last month, #8 Park is linked to a company named Legend Innovation, which, in turn, has ties to Prince Group, whose chairman, Chen Zhi, was arrested and extradited to China in connection with a crackdown on a large-scale fraud operation. #8 Park is also tied to HuiOne Group, with its payment business, HuiOne Pay (later rebranded as H-PAY), which operates a physical store within the compound. There has since been a sharp decline in incoming payments to merchants operating inside the compound beginning around February 9, 2026, with transactions almost entirely ceasing by February 13. What is Tsundere? — Tsundere is a botnet that enables system fingerprinting and arbitrary command execution on victim machines. It's notable for the use of a technique called EtherHiding to retrieve command-and-control (C2) servers stored in smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. The malware is suspected to be a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering of Russian origin, owing to logic that checks whether the infected host is located in a CIS country, including Ukraine, and terminates execution if so. Most recently, the use of the botnet has been linked to the Iranian state-sponsored actor MuddyWater. Jailbreaking, a Continued Risk to LLMs — New research from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has uncovered that prompt jailbreaking remains a practical risk to large language models (LLMs) and that a genetic algorithm-based fuzzing approach can be used to generate meaning-preserving prompt variants to trigger policy-violating outcomes against both closed-source and open-weight pre-trained models. "The broader implication is that guardrails should be treated as probabilistic controls that require continuous adversarial evaluation, not as definitive security boundaries," Unit 42 said. The findings reinforce that security for LLM applications cannot rely on a single layer, necessitating that organizations define and enforce application scope, use robust, multi-signal content controls, treat user input as untrusted and isolate it from privileged instructions, validate outputs against scope and policy, and monitor for misuse, and apply standard security controls, such as authentication, rate limiting, and and least privilege tool permissions. SEO Campaign Delivers AsyncRAT — Since October 2025, an unknown threat actor has been running an active SEO poisoning campaign, using impersonation sites of over 25 popular applications to direct victims to malicious installers, including VLC Media Player, OBS Studio, KMS Tools, and CrosshairX. The campaign uses ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote management tool, to establish initial access and to deliver AsyncRAT. "Most notable in this campaign is the RAT’s added cryptocurrency clipper, dynamic plugin system capable of loading arbitrary capabilities at runtime, and a geo-fencing mechanism that deliberately excludes targets across the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia," NCC Group said. AsyncRAT has also been delivered as part of a series of attacks on Libyan organizations between November 2025 and February 2026. The attacks targeted an oil refinery, a telecoms organization, and a state institution. "AsyncRAT is a remote access Trojan with a variety of capabilities, including keylogging, screen capture, and remote command execution capabilities, making it ideal for use in intelligence gathering and espionage attacks," Symantec and Carbon Black said. "It is also modular, meaning it can be updated and customized, which is attractive for attackers." Nigerian National Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison — A Nigerian man has been sentenced to more than seven years in a U.S. prison for his role in a scheme that broke into business email accounts and tricked victims into sending millions of dollars to fraudulent bank accounts. James Junior Aliyu, 31, received a 90-month prison sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. The court also ordered Aliyu to forfeit $1.2 million and repay nearly $2.39 million to the victims. Aliyu, who pleaded guilty in August 2025, acknowledged that he conspired with others, including Kosi Goodness Simon-Ebo, 31, and Henry Onyedikachi Echefu, 34, to deceive and defraud multiple American victims from February 2017 until at least July 2017. The business email compromise scheme targeted American businesses and individuals by compromising email accounts and sending false wiring instructions to deceive victims into sending money to bank accounts under their control. "Aliyu and his accomplices conspired to commit money laundering by disbursing the fraudulently obtained funds in the drop accounts to other accounts," the U.S. Justice Department said. "Co-conspirators moved the stolen money by initiating account transfers, withdrawing cash, and obtaining cashier’s checks. They also wrote checks to other individuals and entities to hide the true ownership and source of these assets. In total, Aliyu and his co-conspirators attempted to defraud victims of at least $10.4 million, and the victims suffered an actual loss of at least $2,389,130." Sensor Technology to Combat Deepfakes — Researchers at ETH Zürich have developed a sensor system that stamps a cryptographic signature onto images, video, and audio within a sensor chip at the exact moment they are captured, making it impossible to tamper with the data without being detected. "If the signatures are uploaded to a public ledger (e.g., a blockchain), anyone can verify the authenticity of videos and other data," ETH Zürich said. "The technology can, in principle, be integrated into any type of sensor or camera. It would then be possible to identify manipulated content on online platforms with minimal effort." Middle East Conflict Fuels Cyber Attacks — Threat actors have been capitalizing on geopolitical tensions in the Middle East region to spread Android spyware by distributing trojanized versions of Israel's Red Alert apps via SMS phishing messages. The espionage campaign has been codenamed Operation False Siren by CYFIRMA. ZIP archives containing lures related to the conflict are also being used to launch malicious payloads that lead to the deployment of PlugX and LOTUSLITE backdoors. These ZIP-based phishing campaigns have been attributed to a Chinese nation-state actor known as Mustang Panda. Elsewhere, an Iran-themed fake news blog site hosting malicious JavaScript has been found, leading to the deployment of StealC malware. Apple Tests Ways to Block Malicious Copy-Pastes in macOS — With the release of macOS 26.4 last week, Apple has introduced a new feature that warns Mac users if they paste harmful commands in the Terminal app to curb ClickFix-style attacks that have increasingly targeted macOS in recent months. "Scammers often encourage pasting text into Terminal to try and harm your Mac or compromise your privacy," the message reads. "These instructions are commonly offered via websites, chat agents, apps, files, or a phone call." The alert comes with a "Paste Anyway" for those who wish to proceed. The disclosure comes as multiple ClickFix campaigns have come to light, including using a Cloudflare-themed verification page to deliver a Python-based macOS stealer dubbed Infiniti Stealer. A similar Cloudflare verification, but for Windows, has been used to launch PowerShell commands that ultimately drop StealC, Lumma, Rhadamanthys, Vidar Stealer, and Aura Stealer malware. The ClickFix strategy has also been adopted by a traffic distribution system known as KongTuke to redirect visitors of compromised WordPress websites to phishing pages and malware payloads. According to eSentire, ClickFix lures have been used to deliver EtherRAT, a Node.js-based backdoor linked to North Korean threat actors. "EtherRAT allows threat actors to run arbitrary commands on compromised hosts, gather extensive system information, and steal assets such as cryptocurrency wallets and cloud credentials," the Canadian security company said. "Command-and-Control (C2) addresses are retrieved using 'EtherHiding,' a technique to make C2 addresses more resilient by storing and updating them in Ethereum smart contracts, allowing threat actors to rotate infrastructure at a small cost and avoid takedowns by law enforcement." Recorded Future said it has identified five distinct clusters leveraging ClickFix to facilitate initial access to Windows and macOS systems since May 2024. "This indicates that the ClickFix methodology has transitioned into a standardized, high-ROI template adopted across a fragmented ecosystem of threat actors," Insikt Group said. "While visually diverse, all analyzed clusters use a consistent execution framework that bypasses traditional browser security controls by shifting the point of exploitation to user-assisted manual commands. These campaigns target a wide variety of sectors, including accounting (QuickBooks), travel (Booking.com), and system optimization (macOS)." Apple Rolls Out Mandatory Age Verification in U.K. — In more Apple news, the tech giant has rolled out mandatory U.K. age verification with iOS 26.4, requiring users to provide a credit card or ID to confirm if they are an adult before "downloading apps, changing certain settings, or taking other actions with your Apple Account." The move comes at a time when online child safety is increasingly drawing attention from regulators, causing many digital services, including social media apps and porn sites, to roll out similar checks. Discord, which announced plans to verify the ages of all its users last month, has since paused the effort until H2 2026 after concerns were raised about how IDs and personal information would be handled. Discord has reiterated that it does not receive any identifying personal information from users who need to manually verify their age. Instead, it is partnering with third-party age verification companies, who will "handle verification and only pass back your age group." The company also said it's no longer working with age verification vendor Persona, which has attracted criticism over allegations that it shared users' data with other companies and left its frontend source code exposed to the internet. 🔧 Cybersecurity Tools OpenClaw Security Handbook → It is a detailed security guide published by ZAST AI for users of OpenClaw, a multi-channel AI gateway that connects messaging platforms, LLMs, and local system capabilities. Because that combination creates a serious attack surface, the handbook covers the real risks — prompt injection, malicious skills, exposed ports, credential theft — backed by documented incidents and CVEs, with practical configuration guidance for locking it down. VulHunt → It is an open-source framework from Binarly's research team for hunting vulnerabilities in software binaries and UEFI firmware. It uses customizable rulepacks for scanning and can connect to Binarly's Transparency Platform for large-scale triage. It also supports running as an MCP server, letting AI assistants interact with it directly. Disclaimer: For research and educational use only. Not security-audited. Review all code before use, test in isolated environments, and ensure compliance with applicable laws. Conclusion That's the week. Some of it will age well, some of it is already being quietly exploited while you're reading this sentence. The through-line, if there is one: patience. Attackers are playing long games. The detections, the arrests, the patches — they matter, but they're almost always trailing. Stay sharp, check the CVE list, and see you next Monday.
thehackernews.comMar 30, 2026extracted
FCC bans new routers made outside the USA over security risks
The Federal Communications Commission has updated its Covered List to include all consumer routers made in foreign countries, banning the sale of new models in the U.S. The Covered List, created under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, is an FCC-maintained list of communications equipment and services that the U.S. government has determined to pose an unacceptable risk to national security or the safety of Americans. The list previously included specific products and companies tied to security concerns, such as Kaspersky, Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and Dahua. Adding all routers manufactured abroad to the Covered List follows a National Security Determination issued on March 20 by an Executive Branch interagency body. According to the assessment, foreign-produced routers carry a supply-chain risk "that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and national defense." The agency determined that these devices could also be used "to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons." In support of the decision, the FCC highlights that foreign-made routers helped the Volt, Flax, and Salt Typhoon hackers carry out attacks that targeted vital U.S. infrastructure. Exemptions and alternative approval path Conditional approval has been granted to certain routers used in the U.S. Department of War (DoW) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for drone systems, which have been determined not to constitute a security risk. Also, the new rules do not bar foreign consumer-grade router makers from seeking approval in the U.S., as long as they transparently disclose: Corporate and ownership structure, including any foreign government financial support and influence. Manufacturing and supply chain details, including bill of materials, country of origin for all components, IP ownership details, manufacturing and assembly locations, and origin of software/firmware. Plan to move critical components manufacturing to the United States, and provide a description of existing U.S.-based manufacturing or assembly processes. Consumer impact For regular consumers in the United States, the new rules are expected to have no immediate effect, as all existing routers will continue to be sold in the country. In what concerns Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and their critical components, the FCC noted that it will allow software and firmware updates until at least January 1, 2027. Access to new router models for U.S.-based consumers may become more difficult, and the devices may also become more expensive, as the regulatory approval process adds extra complications and costs. Given that testing, approvals, and FCC certification typically take a couple of months, even when all conditions are met. In some cases, this might lead to a delay in entering the U.S. market. Some manufacturers may also decide that the alternative certification pathway is not worth the effort - particularly due to the onshoring requirement - and exit the U.S. market, reducing model availability. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 24, 2026extracted
Iran-Linked MuddyWater Hackers Target U.S. Networks With New Dindoor Backdoor
New research from Broadcom's Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team has discovered evidence of an Iranian hacking group embedding itself in several U.S. companies' networks, including banks, airports, non-profit, and the Israeli arm of a software company. The activity has been attributed to a state-sponsored hacking group called MuddyWater (aka Seedworm). It's affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The campaign is assessed to have begun in early February, with recent activity detected following U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran. "The software company is a supplier to the defense and aerospace industries, among others, and has a presence in Israel, with the company's Israel operation seeming to be the target in this activity," the security vendor said in a report shared with The Hacker News. The attacks targeting the software company, as well as a U.S. bank and a Canadian non-profit, have been found to pave the way for a previously unknown backdoor dubbed Dindoor, which leverages the Deno JavaScript runtime for execution. Broadcom said it also identified an attempt to exfiltrate data from the software company using the Rclone utility to a Wasabi cloud storage bucket. However, it's currently not known if the effort paid off. Also found in the networks of a U.S. airport and a non-profit was a separate Python backdoor called Fakeset, which was downloaded from servers belonging to Backblaze, an American cloud storage and data backup company. The digital certificate used to sign Fakeset has also been used to sign Stagecomp and Darkcomp malware, both previously linked to MuddyWater. Brigid O Gorman, senior intelligence analyst, Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team, said Microsoft and Kaspersky have detected samples associated with the Stagecomp and the Darkcomp malware with Muddywater-linked signatures – "Trojan:Python/MuddyWater.DB!MTB" for Microsoft and "Backdoor.Python.MuddyWater.a" for Kaspersky. "While this malware wasn't seen on the targeted networks, the use of the same certificates suggests the same actor -- namely Seedworm -- was behind the activity on the networks of the U.S. companies," Symantec and Carbon Black said. "Iranian threat actors have become increasingly proficient in recent years. Not only has their tooling and malware improved, but they've also demonstrated strong social engineering capabilities, including spear-phishing campaigns and 'honeytrap' operations used to build relationships with targets of interest to gain access to accounts or sensitive information." The findings come against the backdrop of an escalating military conflict in Iran, triggering a barrage of cyber attacks in the digital sphere. Recent research from Check Point has uncovered the pro-Palestinian hacktivist group known as Handala Hack (aka Void Manticore) routing its operations through Starlink IP ranges to probe externally facing applications for misconfigurations and weak credentials. In recent months, multiple Iran-nexus adversaries, such as Agrius (aka Agonizing Serpens, Marshtreader, and Pink Sandstorm), have also observed scanning for vulnerable Hikvision cameras and video intercom solutions using known security flaws such as CVE-2017-7921 and CVE-2023-6895. The targeting, per Check Point, has intensified in the wake of the current Middle East conflict. The exploitation attempts against IP cameras have witnessed a surge in Israel and Gulf countries, including the U.A.E., Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, along with Lebanon and Cyprus. The activity has singled out cameras from Dahua and Hikvision, weaponizing the two aforementioned vulnerabilities, as well as CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2025-34067, and CVE-2021-33044. "Taken together, these findings are consistent with the assessment that Iran, as part of its doctrine, leverages camera compromise for operational support and ongoing battle damage assessment (BDA) for missile operations, potentially in some cases prior to missile launches," the company said. "As a result, tracking camera-targeting activity from specific, attributed infrastructures may serve as an early indicator of potential follow-on kinetic activity." The U.S. and Israel's war with Iran has also prompted an advisory from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), which cautioned that Iran will likely use its cyber apparatus to stage retaliatory attacks against critical infrastructure and information operations to further the regime's interests. Some other key developments that have unfolded in recent days are listed below - Israeli intelligence agencies hacked into Tehran's extensive traffic camera network for years to monitor the movements of bodyguards of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top Iranian officials in the lead up to the assassination of the supreme leader last week, the Financial Times reported. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted Amazon's data center in Bahrain for the company's support of the "enemy's military and intelligence activities," state media Fars News Agency said on Telegram. Active wiper campaigns are said to be underway against Israeli energy, financial, government, and utilities sectors. "Iran's wiper arsenal includes 15+ families (ZeroCleare, Meteor, Dustman, DEADWOOD, Apostle, BFG Agonizer, MultiLayer, PartialWasher, and others)," Anomali said. Iranian state-sponsored APT groups like MuddyWater, Charming Kitten, OilRig, Elfin, and Fox Kitten "demonstrated clear signs of activation and rapid retooling, positioning themselves for retaliatory operations amid the escalating conflict," LevelBlue said, adding "cyber represents one of Iran's most accessible asymmetric tools for retaliation against Gulf states that condemned its attacks and support U.S. operations." According to Flashpoint, a massive #OpIsrael cyber campaign involving pro-Russian and pro-Iranian actors has targeted Israeli industrial control systems (ICS) and government portals across Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain. The campaign is driven by NoName057(16), Handala Hack, Fatemiyoun Electronic Team, and Cyber Islamic Resistance (aka 313 Team). Between 28 February 2026 and 2 March 2026, pro-Russia hacktivist group Z-Pentest claimed responsibility for compromising several U.S.-based entities, including ICS and SCADA systems and multiple CCTV networks. "The timing of these unverified claims, coinciding with Operation Epic Fury, suggests Z-Pentest likely began prioritizing U.S. entities as targets," Adam Meyers, head of Counter Adversary Operations at CrowdStrike, told The Hacker News. "Iran's offensive cyber capability has matured into a durable instrument of state power used to support intelligence collection, regional influence, and strategic signaling during periods of geopolitical tension," UltraViolet Cyber said. "A defining feature of Iran's current cyber doctrine is its emphasis on identity and cloud control planes as the primary attack surface." "Rather than prioritizing zero-day exploitation or highly novel malware at scale, Iranian operators tend to focus on repeatable access techniques such as credential theft, password spraying, and social engineering, followed by persistence through widely deployed enterprise services." Organizations are advised to bolster their cybersecurity posture, strengthen monitoring capabilities, limit exposure to the internet, disable remote access to operational technology (OT) systems, enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA), implement network segmentation, take offline backups, and ensure that all internet-facing applications, VPN gateways, and edge devices are up-to-date "Western organizations should continue to remain on high-alert for potential cyber response as the conflict continues and activity may move beyond hacktivism and into destructive operations," Meyers said.
thehackernews.comMar 6, 2026extracted
Surge in Attacks on Surveillance Cameras Linked to Iranian Hackers
A surge in attempts to compromise internet-connected surveillance cameras across the Middle East has been identified during the ongoing regional conflict, with activity attributed to infrastructure linked to Iranian threat actors. The targeting, which began intensifying on February 28, has affected Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Cyprus, with additional focused activity observed in parts of Lebanon on March 1. The findings, released by Check Point Research (CPR), point to a coordinated campaign against devices manufactured by Hikvision and Dahua. The researchers said the pattern of activity aligns with Iran's established military doctrine of using compromised cameras to support operational planning and battle damage assessment following missile strikes. Activity Tied To Regional Escalation According to CPR, the spike in exploitation attempts coincided with key geopolitical developments. Earlier, more targeted scanning was recorded on January 14–15, around the time Iran temporarily closed its airspace amid expectations of a possible US strike. Subsequent waves of activity aligned with other high-profile events, including: January 24 – A visit to Israel by the US Central Command commander during heightened tensions Early February – Public warnings from Iranian leadership that a US strike could spark wider regional conflict The infrastructure used in the campaign combines commercial VPN exit nodes, including Mullvad, ProtonVPN, Surfshark and NordVPN, along with virtual private servers assessed to be operated by multiple Iran-linked threat actors. Specific Vulnerabilities Exploited The campaign observed by CPR focused exclusively on Hikvision and Dahua products. Researchers observed scanning for known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass and remote code execution (RCE) flaws. Patches are available for all identified issues. Check Point examined exploitation attempts involving CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2017-7921, traced to infrastructure attributed to Iran and active since the start of the year. The researchers noted similar tactics during the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran in June 2025. In one widely reported incident, a street camera facing the Weizmann Institute of Science was allegedly compromised shortly before a ballistic missile struck the site. The report concluded that monitoring camera-targeting activity from known Iranian-linked infrastructure may offer early warning of potential follow-on kinetic operations. To help mitigate these risks, defenders should eliminate public exposure by removing WAN access and using a VPN, while enforcing strong credentials and keeping firmware up-to-date. Additionally, they should implement network segmentation for cameras on a dedicated VLAN and monitor for unusual login attempts and outbound connections.
infosecurity-magazine.comMar 4, 2026extracted
Interplay between Iranian Targeting of IP Cameras and Physical Warfare in the Middle East
Interplay between Iranian Targeting of IP Cameras and Physical Warfare in the Middle East March 4, 2026 Key Findings During the ongoing conflict, we identified intensified targeting of IP cameras from two manufacturers starting on February 28, originating from infrastructure we attribute to Iranian threat actors. The targeting extends across Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Cyprus – countries that have also experienced significant missile activity linked to Iran. On March 1st, we additionally observed camera-targeting activity focused on specific areas in Lebanon. We also observed earlier, more targeted activity against cameras in Israel and Qatar on January 14–15. These dates surround with Iran’s temporary closure of its airspace, reportedly amid expectations of a potential U.S. strike. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the assessment that Iran, as part of its doctrine, leverages camera compromise for operational support and ongoing battle damage assessment (BDA) for missile operations, potentially in some cases prior to missile launches. As a result, tracking camera-targeting activity from specific, attributed infrastructures may serve as an early indicator of potential follow-on kinetic activity. Introduction As highlighted in the Cyber Security Report 2026, cyber operations have increasingly become an additional tool in interstate conflicts, used both to support military operations and to enable ongoing battle damage assessment (BDA). During the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran in June 2025, the compromise of cameras was likely used to support BDA and/or target-correction efforts. In the current Middle East conflict, Check Point Research has observed intensified targeting of cameras beginning in the first hours of hostilities, including a sharp increase in exploitation attempts against IP cameras not only in Israel but also across Gulf countries: specifically the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, as well as similar activity in Lebanon and Cyprus. This activity originated from multiple attack infrastructures that we attribute to several Iran-nexus threat actors. Notably, we also identified earlier activity exhibiting similar patterns, dated January 14, coinciding with the peak of anti-regime protests in Iran, a period during which Iran anticipated potential action from the United States and Israel and temporarily closed its airspace. Findings Check Point Research (CPR) continuously tracks infrastructure used by Iran-nexus threat actors. Starting February 28, we observed a spike in targeting of IP cameras in several countries in the Middle East including Israel,UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon, while also similar activity occurred against Cyprus. The attack infrastructure we track combines specific commercial VPN exit nodes (Mullvad, ProtonVPN, Surfshark, NordVPN) and virtual private servers (VPS), and is assessed to be employed by multiple Iran-nexus actors. Scanning activity we observed targets cameras such as Hikvision and Dahua and aligns with attempts to identify exposure to the vulnerabilities listed below. No attempts to interact with other camera vendors were observed from this infrastructure. The popular devices of Hikvision and Dahua are targeted with the following vulnerabilities: Patches are available for all of the vulnerabilities listed above. As a case study, we conducted a deep dive into two of the CVEs listed above – CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2017-7921 – and examined exploitation attempts originating from operational infrastructure we attribute to Iran, observed since the beginning of the year. Waves of activity against Israel: The spikes in this activity are closely aligned with geopolitical events around the same time: January 14-15 – While internal anti-regime protests in Iran peaked, Iranian officials and state media portrayed the unrest as a foreign-backed plot by Iran’s adversaries, including the United States and Israel and also closed its airspace. At the same time we also observe a wave of scans of cameras in the Iraqi Kurdistan. January 24 – The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander visited Israel and met with the Israel Defense Forces’ chief of staff amid heightened tensions. Beginning of February – Iran’s leadership was increasingly worried about a possible U.S. strike; Iranian/IRGC-linked messaging warned a strike could trigger a wider regional war. Waves of activity against Qatar: Waves of activity against Bahrain: Waves of activity against Kuwait: Waves of activity against United Arab Emirates: Waves of activity against Cyprus: Waves of activity against Lebanon: We observed similar targeting patterns during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, likely to support battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or targeting correction. One of the best-known cases occurred when Iran struck Israel’s Weizmann Institute of Science with a ballistic missile and had reportedly taken control of a street camera facing the building just prior to the hit Recommendations for Defenders: Eliminate public exposure: remove direct WAN access to cameras/NVRs; place them behind VPN or a zero-trust access gateway; block inbound port-forwards. Patch management: keep cameras/NVR firmware and management software updated – updates from the manufacturers are available; remove/replace end-of-life devices that no longer get security fixes. Network segmentation: isolate cameras on a dedicated VLAN with no lateral access to corporate/OT networks; tightly control outbound traffic (only to required update/cloud endpoints). “The Turkish Rat” Evolved Adwind in a Massive Ongoing Phishing Campaign Check Point Research Publications August 11, 2017 “The Next WannaCry” Vulnerability is Here Check Point Research Publications March 12, 2026 “Handala Hack” – Unveiling Group’s Modus Operandi SUBSCRIBE TO CYBER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS We value your privacy! BFSI uses cookies on this site. We use cookies to enable faster and easier experience for you. By continuing to visit this website you agree to our use of cookies.
research.checkpoint.comMar 4, 2026extracted
Critical Dahua Camera Flaws Enable Remote Hijack via ONVIF and File Upload Exploits
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed now-patched critical security flaws in the firmware of Dahua smart cameras that, if left unaddressed, could allow attackers to hijack control of susceptible devices. "The flaws, affecting the device's ONVIF protocol and file upload handlers, allow unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands remotely, effectively taking over the device," Bitdefender said in a report shared with The Hacker News. The vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2025-31700 and CVE-2025-31701 (CVSS scores: 8.1), affect the following devices running versions with built timestamps before April 16, 2025 - IPC-1XXX Series IPC-2XXX Series IPC-WX Series IPC-ECXX Series SD3A Series SD2A Series SD3D Series SDT2A Series SD2C Series It's worth noting that users can view the build time by logging in to the web interface of the device and then navigating to Settings -> System Information -> Version. Both shortcomings are classified as buffer overflow vulnerabilities that could be exploited by sending specially crafted malicious packets, resulting in denial-of-service or remote code execution (RCE). Specifically, CVE-2025-31700 has been described as a stack-based buffer overflow in the Open Network Video Interface Forum (ONVIF) request handler, while CVE-2025-31701 concerns an overflow bug in the RPC file upload handler. "Some devices may have deployed protection mechanisms such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), which reduces the likelihood of successful RCE exploitation," Dahua said in an alert released last week. "However, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks remain a concern." Given that these models are used for video surveillance in retail, casinos, warehouses, and residential settings, the flaws can have significant consequences as they are unauthenticated and exploitable over the local network. "Devices exposed to the internet through port forwarding or UPnP are especially at risk," the Romanian cybersecurity company said. "Successful exploitation provides root-level access to the camera with no user interaction. Because the exploit path bypasses firmware integrity checks, attackers can load unsigned payloads or persist via custom daemons, making cleanup difficult."
thehackernews.comJul 30, 2025extracted