Search/CISA warns of Chinese "BrickStorm" malware attacks on VMware servers
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CISA warns of Chinese "BrickStorm" malware attacks on VMware servers

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday released details of a backdoor named BRICKSTORM that has been put to use by state-sponsored threat actors from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to maintain long-term persistence on compromised systems. "BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere and Windows environments," the agency said. "

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CISA Reports PRC Hackers Using BRICKSTORM for Long-Term Access in U.S. Systems
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday released details of a backdoor named BRICKSTORM that has been put to use by state-sponsored threat actors from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to maintain long-term persistence on compromised systems. "BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere and Windows environments," the agency said. "BRICKSTORM enables cyber threat actors to maintain stealthy access and provides capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command-and-control." Written in Golang, the custom implant essentially gives bad actors interactive shell access on the system and allows them to browse, upload, download, create, delete, and manipulate files The malware, mainly used in attacks targeting governments and information technology (IT) sectors, also supports multiple protocols, such as HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested Transport Layer Security (TLS), for command-and-control (C2), DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to conceal communications and blend in with normal traffic, and can act as a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement. The cybersecurity agency did not disclose how many government agencies have been impacted or what type of data was stolen. The activity represents an ongoing tactical evolution of Chinese hacking groups, which have continued to strike edge network devices to breach networks and cloud infrastructures. In a statement shared with Reuters, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington rejected the accusations, stating the Chinese government does not "encourage, support, or connive at cyber attacks." BRICKSTORM was first documented by Google Mandiant in 2024 in attacks linked to the zero-day exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887). The use of the malware has been attributed to two clusters tracked as UNC5221 and a new China-nexus adversary tracked by CrowdStrike as Warp Panda. Earlier this September, Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said they observed legal services, software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers, Business Process Outsourcers (BPOs), and technology sectors in the U.S. being targeted by UNC5221 and other closely related threat activity clusters to deliver the malware. A key feature of the malware, per CISA, is its ability to automatically reinstall or restart itself by means of a self-monitoring function that allows its continued operation in the face of any potential disruption. In one case detected in April 2024, the threat actors are said to have accessed a web server inside an organization's demilitarized zone (DMZ) using a web shell, before moving laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server and implanting BRICKSTORM. However, many details remain unknown, including the initial access vector used in the attack and when the web shell was deployed. The attackers have also been found to leverage the access to obtain service account credentials and laterally move to a domain controller in the DMZ using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) so as to capture Active Directory information. Over the course of the intrusion, the threat actors managed to get the credentials for a managed service provider (MSP) account, which was then used to jump from the internal domain controller to the VMware vCenter server. CISA said the actors also moved laterally from the web server using Server Message Block (SMB) to two jump servers and an Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) server, exfiltrating cryptographic keys from the latter. The access to vCenter ultimately enabled the adversary to deploy BRICKSTORM after elevating their privileges. "BRICKSTORM uses custom handlers to set up a SOCKS proxy, create a web server on the compromised system, and execute commands on the compromised system," it said, adding some artifacts are "designed to work in virtualized environments, using a virtual socket (VSOCK) interface to enable inter-VM [virtual machine] communication, facilitate data exfiltration, and maintain persistence." Warp Panda Uses BRICKSTORM Against U.S. Entities CrowdStrike, in its analysis of Warp Panda, said it has detected multiple intrusions targeting VMware vCenter environments at U.S.-based legal, technology, and manufacturing entities this year that have led to the deployment of BRICKSTORM. The group is believed to have been active since at least 2022. "Warp Panda exhibits a high level of technical sophistication, advanced operations security (OPSEC) skills, and extensive knowledge of cloud and virtual machine (VM) environments," the company said. "Warp Panda demonstrates a high level of stealth and almost certainly focuses on maintaining persistent, long-term, covert access to compromised networks." Evidence shows the hacking group gained initial access to one entity in late 2023. Also deployed in the attacks alongside BRICKSTORM are two previously undocumented Golang implants, namely Junction and GuestConduit, on ESXi hosts and guest VMs, respectively. Junction acts as an HTTP server to listen for incoming requests and supports a wide range of capabilities to execute commands, proxy network traffic, and interact with guest VMs through VM sockets (VSOCK). GuestConduit, on the other hand, is a network traffic–tunneling implant that resides within a guest VM and establishes a VSOCK listener on port 5555. Its primary responsibility is to facilitate communication between guest VMs and hypervisors. Initial access methods involve the exploitation of internet-facing edge devices to pivot to vCenter environments, either using valid credentials or abusing vCenter vulnerabilities. Lateral movement is achieved by using SSH and the privileged vCenter management account "vpxuser." The hacking crew has also used the Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) to move data between hosts. Some of the exploited vulnerabilities are listed below - CVE-2024-21887 (Ivanti Connect Secure) CVE-2023-46805 (Ivanti Connect Secure) CVE-2024-38812 (VMware vCenter) CVE-2023-34048 (VMware vCenter) CVE-2021-22005 (VMware vCenter) CVE-2023-46747 (F5 BIG-IP) The entire modus operandi revolves around maintaining stealth by clearing logs, timestomping files, and creating rogue VMs that are shut down after use. BRICKSTORM, masquerading as benign vCenter processes, is employed to tunnel traffic through vCenter servers, ESXi hosts, and guest VMs. Similar to details shared by CISA, CrowdStrike noted that the attackers used their access to vCenter servers to clone domain controller VMs, possibly in a bid to harvest the Active Directory Domain Services database. The threat actors have also been spotted accessing the email accounts of employees who work in areas that align with Chinese government interests. "Warp Panda likely used their access to one of the compromised networks to engage in rudimentary reconnaissance against an Asia Pacific government entity," the company said. "They also connected to various cybersecurity blogs and a Mandarin-language GitHub repository." Another significant aspect of Warp Panda's activities is their focus on establishing persistence in cloud environments and accessing sensitive data. Characterizing it as a "cloud-conscious adversary," CrowdStrike said the attackers exploited their access to entities' Microsoft Azure environments to access data stored in OneDrive, SharePoint, and Exchange. In at least one incident, the hackers managed to get hold of user session tokens, likely by exfiltrating user browser files and tunneled traffic through BRICKSTORM implants to access Microsoft 365 services via a session replay attack and download SharePoint files related to the organization's network engineering and incident response teams. The attackers have also engaged in additional ways to set up persistence, such as by registering a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device through an Authenticator app code after initially logging into a user account. In another intrusion, the Microsoft Graph API was used to enumerate service principals, applications, users, directory roles, and emails. "The adversary primarily targets entities in North America and consistently maintains persistent, covert access to compromised networks, likely to support intelligence-collection efforts aligned with PRC strategic interests," CrowdStrike said.
thehackernews.comDec 5, 2025extracted
CISA, NSA warn of China’s BRICKSTORM malware after incident response efforts
CISA, NSA warn of China’s BRICKSTORM malware after incident response efforts Chinese hackers are using a strain of malware to attack governments in several countries and maintain long-term access, according to U.S. and Canadian cybersecurity officials. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security published an advisory on Thursday outlining the BRICKSTORM malware based off an analysis of eight samples taken from victim organizations. During a call with reporters on Thursday, CISA officials declined to explicitly say whether federal agencies have been impacted by BRICKSTORM. But the advisory said Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors are using the malware to specifically target the government and information technology sectors. In addition to the U.S. and Canada, cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike released its own BRICKSTORM advisory on Thursday that said the hackers “likely used their access to one of the compromised networks to engage in rudimentary reconnaissance against an Asia Pacific government entity.” “BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated and stealthy backdoor malware linked to PRC state-sponsored cyber actors,” said CISA Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity Nick Andersen. The advisory includes indicators of compromise and detections organizations can use to tell if they have been impacted by the campaign involving the malware. The malware is used “for long-term persistence on victim systems,” according to U.S. agencies. Reinstall and restart The hackers using the malware primarily target VMware vSphere and Windows environments. Once systems are compromised, the threat actors extract credentials and create hidden virtual machines that enable further access. “At the victim organization where CISA conducted an incident response engagement, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors gained long-term persistent access to the organization’s internal network in April 2024 and uploaded BRICKSTORM malware to an internal VMware vCenter server,” CISA explained. “They also gained access to two domain controllers and an Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) server. They successfully compromised the ADFS server and exported cryptographic keys.” Each of the samples referenced in the advisory had slight differences but each allowed the hackers to maintain stealthy access. The malware has a “self-watching” function where it automatically reinstalls or restarts if disrupted. The malware also allows threat actors to browse, upload, download, create, delete and manipulate files. Some samples facilitated lateral movement that enabled the further compromise of other systems. CISA Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala added that Thursday’s advisory “underscores the grave threats posed by the People’s Republic of China that create ongoing cybersecurity exposures and costs to the United States, our allies and the critical infrastructure we all depend on.” “These state-sponsored actors are not just infiltrating networks — they are embedding themselves to enable long-term access, disruption, and potential sabotage,” he said. Private sector warnings Crowdstrike said it has seen “multiple intrusions targeting VMware vCenter environments at U.S.-based entities” throughout 2025 involving BRICKSTORM. In one incident tracked by Crowdstrike, the Chinese hackers had access dating back to 2023. CISA officials declined to answer questions about whether data had been exfiltrated from victims it has dealt with but Crowdstrike said it saw the hackers staging data for exfiltration “on numerous occasions.” “The adversary primarily targets entities in North America and consistently maintains persistent, covert access to compromised networks, likely to support intelligence-collection efforts aligned with PRC strategic interests,” Crowdstrike explained, adding that the hackers behind BRICKSTORM “will likely maintain their intelligence-collection operations in the near to long term.” Mandiant said in a September report that they have responded to “numerous” BRICKSTORM intrusions since March 2025 involving victims that include legal firms, software-as-a-service providers and technology companies. The goal of the campaign is to steal valuable intellectual property and sensitive data — with a particular focus on the email inboxes of senior company leaders, according to Mandiant. The company attributed the campaign to a threat actor they previously accused of abusing vulnerabilities in firewall products from tech company Ivanti. According to Mandiant, the hackers abused Microsoft tools to access mail in any mailbox — at times targeting the mailboxes of developers and system administrators while in other cases, going after the mailboxes of “individuals involved in matters that align with [People's Republic of China] economic and espionage interests.” Jonathan Greig is a Breaking News Reporter at Recorded Future News. Jonathan has worked across the globe as a journalist since 2014. Before moving back to New York City, he worked for news outlets in South Africa, Jordan and Cambodia. He previously covered cybersecurity at ZDNet and TechRepublic.
therecord.mediaDec 4, 2025extracted
CISA warns of Chinese "BrickStorm" malware attacks on VMware servers
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned network defenders of Chinese hackers backdooring VMware vSphere servers with Brickstorm malware. In a joint malware analysis report with the National Security Agency (NSA) and Canada's Cyber Security Centre, CISA says it analyzed eight Brickstorm malware samples. These samples were discovered on networks belonging to victim organizations, where the attackers specifically targeted VMware vSphere servers to create hidden rogue virtual machines to evade detection and steal cloned virtual machine snapshots for further credential theft. As noted in the advisory, Brickstorm uses multiple layers of encryption, including HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested TLS to secure communication channels, a SOCKS proxy for tunneling and lateral movement within compromised networks, and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) for added concealment. To maintain persistence, Brickstorm also includes a self-monitoring function that automatically reinstalls or restarts the malware if interrupted. While investigating one of the incidents, CISA found that Chinese hackers compromised a web server in an organization's demilitarized zone (DMZ) in April 2024, then moved laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server and deployed malware. The attackers also hacked two domain controllers on the victim's network and exported cryptographic keys after compromising an Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) server. The Brickstorm implant allowed them to maintain access to the breached systems from at least April 2024 through September 2025. After obtaining system access, they've also been observed capturing Active Directory database information and performing system backups to steal legitimate credentials and other sensitive data. To detect the attackers' presence on their networks and block potential attacks, CISA advises defenders (especially those working for critical infrastructure and government organizations) to scan for Brickstorm backdoor activity using agency-created YARA and Sigma rules, and block unauthorized DNS-over-HTTPS providers and external traffic. They should also take inventory of all network edge devices to monitor for suspicious activity and segment the network to restrict traffic from demilitarized zones to internal networks. "CISA, NSA, and Cyber Centre urge organizations to use the indicators of compromise (IOCs) and detection signatures in this Malware Analysis Report to identify BRICKSTORM malware samples," the joint advisory urges. "If BRICKSTORM, similar malware, or potentially related activity is detected, CISA and NSA urge organizations to report the activity as required by law and applicable policies." Today, cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike also linked Brickstorm malware attacks targeting VMware vCenter servers on the networks of U.S. legal, technology, and manufacturing companies throughout 2025 to a Chinese hacking group it tracks as Warp Panda. CrowdStrike observed the same threat group deploying previously unknown Junction and GuestConduit malware implants in VMware ESXi environments. The joint advisory comes on the heels of a Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) report published in September that described how suspected Chinese hackers used the Brickstorm malware (first documented by Google subsidiary Mandiant in April 2024) to gain long-term persistence on the networks of multiple U.S. organizations in the technology and legal sectors. Google security researchers linked these attacks to the UNC5221 malicious activity cluster, known for exploiting Ivanti zero-days to target government agencies with custom Spawnant and Zipline malware. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comDec 4, 2025extracted
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China-linked hackers use ‘BRICKSTORM’ backdoor to steal IP
Chinese cyber threat actors are suspected of deploying a recently identified backdoor to get a foothold into the systems of US organizations across various sectors. According to a Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) report, published on September 24, threat actors have been using the backdoor known as ‘BRICKSTORM’ in intrusion campaigns since at least March 2025. The primary targets are US legal and tech firms, software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers and outsourcing companies. The GTIG researchers argued that the motivation of these attacks “extends beyond typical espionage missions, potentially providing data to feed development of zero-days and establishing pivot points for broader access to downstream victims.” In many occurrences, the threat actors were particularly interested in the emails of key individuals within the victim organizations and sometimes exfiltrated files from these emails. Google has attributed these campaigns to UNC5221, a Chinese-aligned threat cluster linked to sophisticated capabilities, including the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities targeting network appliances. While other security vendors consider UNC5221 and Silk Typhoon to be the same group, GTIG currently tracks them as two distinct entities. Sophisticated Campaigns Against US Organizations The Google report noted that the GTIG investigation into the BRICKSTORM campaigns had been made particularly difficult because of the threat actors’ speed in deploying the full attack chain. “In many cases, the average dwell time of 393 days exceeded log retention periods and the artifacts of the initial intrusion were no longer available,” the researchers wrote. Nevertheless, they found that UNC5221 used a range of sophisticated techniques to maintain persistence and minimize the visibility traditional security tools have into their activities. These include: Initial access: exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities Establishing foothold: BRICKSTORM deployment on appliances that do not support traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools (e.g. VMware vCenter and ESXi hosts) Escalating privilege: In-memory Servlet filter injection, credential harvesting via HTTP basic auth, bypassing MFA protections, VM cloning of critical servers, targeting Delinea Secret Server, execution of automated secret stealer tools Moving laterally: credential reuse from vaults and scripts Establishing persistence: init.d, rc.local, or systemd file changes to ensure BRICKSTORM starts on appliance reboot Completing mission: exploiting Microsoft Entra ID Enterprise Applications with mail.read or full_access_as_app scopes to access the email mailboxes of target accounts Inside the BRICKSTORM Backdoor BRICKSTORM Forensics Analysis BRICKSTORM is a Go backdoor targeting VMware vCenter servers. According to a previous Google report, published in April 2024, the backdoor supports the ability to set itself up as a web server, perform file system and directory manipulation, perform file operations such as upload/download, run shell commands, and perform SOCKS relaying. BRICKSTORM communicates over WebSockets to a hard-coded command-and-control (C2) server. Upon execution, BRICKSTORM checks for an environment variable, WRITE_LOG, to determine if the file needs to be executed as a child process. If the variable returns false or is unset, it will copy the BRICKSTORM sample from /home/vsphere-ui/vcli to /opt/vmware/sbin as vami-httpd. It will then execute the copied BRICKSTORM sample and terminate execution. If WRITE_LOG is set to true, it assumes it is running as the correct process, deletes /opt/vmware/sbin/vami-httpd, and continues execution. BRICKSTORM contains a separate function called Watcher, which contains self-monitoring functionality. If the environment variable WORKER returns false or is unset, it will continue the monitoring, checking for the file /home/vsphere-ui/vcli and copying the contents over to /opt/vmware/sbin/vami-httpd. Then, it sets the appropriate environment variables and spawns the process. The watcher process then begins monitoring the exit status of the child process. If it finds the environment variable WORKER is set to true, it assumes it is a spawned worker process meant to execute the backdoor functionality and skips the remainder of the Watcher function. BRICKSTORM communicates with the C2 using WebSockets. This sample contains a hard-coded WebSocket address of wss://opra1.oprawh.workers[.]dev. Additionally, it contains the following legitimate DNS over HTTPS (DoH) addresses. BRICKSTORM Deployment Typically, threat actors deploy the backdoor to a network appliance before pivoting to VMware systems. The hackers then move laterally to a vCenter server in the environment using valid credentials, which were likely captured by the malware running on the network appliances. In April 2025, European cybersecurity company NVISO discovered two new BRICKSTORM samples affecting Windows environments. These samples had been used to spy on European organizations via Windows since at least 2022, NVISO said. While Google has acknowledged the NVISO report, it said it has not observed BRISTORM Windows-focused variants in any investigation to date. Google’s Mandiant has released a scanner script that can run on *nix-based appliances and other systems without requiring YARA to be installed. The tool is designed to replicate a specific YARA rule (G_APT_Backdoor_BRICKSTORM_3) by searching for a combination of strings and hex patterns unique to the backdoor.
2 shared
Sep 25, 2025
3 Threat Groups Started Targeting ICS/OT in 2025: Dragos
A maximum severity security vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines has been exploited as a zero-day by a suspected China-nexus threat cluster dubbed UNC6201 since mid-2024, according to a new report from Google Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). The activity involves the exploitation of CVE-2026-22769 (CVSS score: 10.0), a case of hard-coded credentials affecting versions prior to 6.0.3.1 HF1. Other products, including RecoverPoint Classic, are not vulnerable to the flaw. "This is considered critical as an unauthenticated remote attacker with knowledge of the hardcoded credential could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access to the underlying operating system and root-level persistence," Dell said in a bulletin released Tuesday. The issue impacts the following products - RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Version 5.3 SP4 P1 - Migrate from RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines 5.3 SP4 P1 to 6.0 SP3, and then upgrade to 6.0.3.1 HF1 RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Versions 6.0, 6.0 SP1, 6.0 SP1 P1, 6.0 SP1 P2, 6.0 SP2, 6.0 SP2 P1, 6.0 SP3, and 6.0 SP3 P1 - Upgrade to 6.0.3.1 HF1 RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Versions 5.3 SP4, 5.3 SP3, 5.3 SP2, and earlier - Upgrade to version 5.3 SP4 P1 or a 6.x version, and then apply the necessary remediation "Dell recommends that RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines be deployed within a trusted, access-controlled internal network protected by appropriate firewalls and network segmentation," it noted. "RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines is not intended for use on untrusted or public networks." "We are aware of less than a dozen impacted organizations, but because the full scale of this campaign is unknown, we recommend that organizations previously targeted by BRICKSTORM look out for GRIMBOLT in their environments," Rich Reece, Manager, Mandiant Consulting at Google Cloud, told The Hacker News via email. Mandiant said it discovered CVE-2026-22769 earlier this year while investigating multiple Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines within an unspecified victim's environment. "The actor is likely still active in unpatched and remediated environments, and because exploitation has been occurring since mid-2024, they have had significant time to establish persistence and carry out long-term espionage," Reece said. "We anticipate additional companies will find active or historic compromises as they begin hunting using the new IOCs/YARA rules we published." Per Google, the hard-coded credential relates to an "admin" user for the Apache Tomcat Manager instance that could be used authenticate to the Dell RecoverPoint Tomcat Manager, upload a web shell named SLAYSTYLE via the "/manager/text/deploy" endpoint, and execute commands as root on the appliance to drop the BRICKSTORM backdoor and its newer version dubbed GRIMBOLT. "This is a C# backdoor compiled using native ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation, making it harder to reverse engineer," Mandiant's Charles Carmakal added. Google told The Hacker News that the activity has targeted organizations across North America, with GRIMBOLT incorporating features to better evade detection and minimize forensic traces on infected hosts. "GRIMBOLT is even better at blending in with the system's own native files," it added. UNC6201 is also assessed to share overlaps with UNC5221, another China-nexus espionage cluster known for its exploitation of virtualization technologies and Ivanti zero-day vulnerabilities to distribute web shells and malware families like BEEFLUSH, BRICKSTORM, and ZIPLINE. Despite the tactical similarities, the two clusters are assessed to be distinct at this stage. It's worth noting that the use of BRICKSTORM has also been linked by CrowdStrike to a third China-aligned adversary tracked as Warp Panda (aka Clay Typhoon and Storm-2416) in attacks aimed at U.S. entities. A noteworthy aspect of the latest set of attacks revolves around UNC6201's reliance on temporary virtual network interfaces – referred to as "Ghost NICs" – to pivot from compromised virtual machines into internal or SaaS environments, and then delete those NICs to cover up the tracks in an effort to impede investigation efforts. "Consistent with the earlier BRICKSTORM campaign, UNC6201 continues to target appliances that typically lack traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) agents to remain undetected for long periods," Google said. Exactly how initial access is obtained remains unclear, but like UNC5221, it's also known to target edge appliances to break into target networks. An analysis of the compromised VMware vCenter appliances has also uncovered iptable commands executed by means of the web shell to perform the following set of actions - Monitor incoming traffic on port 443 for a specific HEX string Add the source IP address of that traffic to a list and if the IP address is on the list and connects to port 10443, the connection is ACCEPTED Silently redirect subsequent traffic to port 443 to port 10443 for the next 300 seconds (five minutes) if the IP is on the approved list Furthermore, the threat actor has been found replacing old BRICKSTORM binaries with GRIMBOLT in September 2025. While GRIMBOLT also provides a remote shell capability and uses the same command-and-control (C2) as BRICKSTORM, it's not known what prompted the shift to the harder-to-detect malware, and whether it was a planned transition or a response to public disclosures about BRICKSTORM. "Nation-state threat actors continue targeting systems that don't commonly support EDR solutions, which makes it very hard for victim organizations to know they are compromised and significantly prolongs intrusion dwell times," Carmakal said. The disclosure comes as Dragos warned of attacks mounted by Chinese groups like Volt Typhoon (aka Voltzite) to compromise Sierra Wireless Airlink gateways located in electric and oil and gas sectors, followed by pivoting to engineering workstations to dump config and alarm data. The activity, according to the cybersecurity company, took place in July 2025. The hacking crew is said to acquire initial access from Sylvanite, which rapidly weaponizes edge device vulnerabilities before patches are applied and hands off access for deeper operational technology (OT) intrusions. "Voltzite moved beyond data exfiltration to direct manipulation of engineering workstations investigating what would trigger processes to stop," Dragos said. " This represents the removal of the last practical barrier between having access and causing physical consequences. Cellular gateways create unauthorized pathways into OT networks bypassing traditional security controls." Update The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), on February 18, 2026, added CVE-2026-22769 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply the patch by February 21, 2026. Update In a follow-up analysis published on March 5, 2026, Team Cymru shed more light on the C2 infrastructure associated with GRIMBOLT, using an X.509 certificate's subject field value for the IP address 149.248.11[.]71 – CN=WIN-DO6FVJH67FN – to uncover additional IP addresses using the same certificate: 140.82.18[.]134 and 66.42.111[.]219. "Analysis of these IP addresses revealed that they are also located on the same VPS provider (Vultr) due to their autonomous system number (ASN) being the same in their WHOIS records," security researcher Will Thomas said. "Furthermore, these two additional IP addresses both had the same 3389 (RDP) port open as well." "The overlap of a cryptographically identical X509 certificate, matching autonomous system (ASN) routing, and correlated open port profiles strongly indicates the use of cloned virtual machine images or an automated provisioning script by the threat actor on a single VPS provider, Vultr." (The story was updated after publication on March 6, 2026, with new insights from Team Cymru.)
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Feb 19, 2026
Attackers Exploit Third Arista VCO Zero-Day in Four Months
Networking solutions provider Arista Networks on Thursday rolled out patches for an exploited zero-day vulnerability in its centralized management tool VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO). The critical-severity security defect is tracked as CVE-2026-114625 (CVSS score of 9.9) and is described as a remotely exploitable SQL injection. “VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host,” Arista notes in its advisory. Successful exploitation could impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of both VCO and the data it manages. “On an affected system, any authenticated user can gain operator privileges and masquerade as a local ‘superuser operator’ user. This includes access to functionality that is intended for internal use only and which is not intended to be remotely accessible,” the company says. All VCO releases before versions 5.2.3.18, 6.1.3.10, and 6.4.2.12 are affected. Arista has already patched the hosted VCO deployments, but urges users to update their on-premises installations as soon as possible. “This issue was detected by Arista and is known to be actively exploited,” the company says. Arista notes that VCO deployments are exposed by default, and that attackers need access to the VCO web interface and a valid authenticated session, with the lowest built-in tenant role privileges. “There is no configuration that can prevent the exposure,” the company notes. Attacks have been observed originating from two IP addresses, 74.82.197.86 and 38.54.50.151. Administrators should block them, check logs for their presence, and investigate high-request rates, as well as requests with unusual URL-like path components, encoded characters, and references to local or internal services. “If compromise is suspected, operators should preserve VCO web access logs, backend application logs, system logs, database logs, and relevant file-system timestamps before remediation where operationally feasible,” Arista notes. Updating to a fixed VCO release is the recommended remediation action. Until the fixes are deployed, administrators should restrict access to the VCO interface, review recent admin activity, monitor for suspicious access, block outbound ports, and monitor for backdoor daemons and webshells. CVE-2026-114625 is the third exploited zero-day vulnerability Arista patches in VCO in four months, after CVE-2026-16812 in July and CVE-2026-93952 in September. Related: Atlassian Patches 75 Flaws in Data Center and Server Products Related: Signal Vulnerability Lets Malicious Callers Block Hang-Ups Related: Splunk, SolarWinds Release Fresh Security Updates Related: Cisco Patches 34 Vulnerabilities Across Multiple Products
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Oct 29, 2026
Chinese Hackers Quietly Used Low-Severity ESXi Logging Flaw as Zero-Day
The US cybersecurity agency CISA on Wednesday warned that hackers have been exploiting another VMware ESXi vulnerability in attacks. Tracked as CVE-2026-41709, the exploited flaw is described as a low-severity insufficient logging issue. It allows attackers logged in as administrators to perform certain operations without being logged. The security defect was disclosed on July 29 alongside three critical and one high-severity bug in VMware vCenter, ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion. VMware ESXi-9.1.0.0-25370933, ESXi-9.0.2.0100-25595025, and ESXi80U3j-25429389 and newer releases contain the relevant patches. CISA added CVE-2026-41709 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, urging federal agencies to patch it within the next two weeks. CISA did not provide details on the observed exploitation, but CrowdStrike reported on Wednesday that the China-nexus threat actor Warp Panda had exploited CVE-2026-41709 as a zero-day in intrusions at US organizations, including law firms. According to CrowdStrike, Warp Panda typically gains initial access through internet-facing edge devices and pivots to VMware vCenter, where it deployed malware such as BrickStorm, TetanusStorm, SharpStorm, DualGauge and GuestConduit in intrusions throughout 2025. In several of those attacks, and as late as early 2026, the group used CVE-2026-41709 to significantly reduce audit trail visibility. At least two other security defects described in Broadcom’s July 29 advisories have been targeted in the wild, namely CVE-2026-59309 (a critical-severity authentication bypass) and CVE-2026-59310 (a critical directory traversal issue leading to arbitrary code execution). In mid-August, cybersecurity company Quirso said an APT had been exploiting CVE-2026-59310 to compromise approximately 360 web-accessible VMware vCenter servers and deploy an SSH reverse shell. Later, Quirso attributed the activity to a China-linked threat actor and warned that CVE-2026-59309 had been exploited as well, likely before CVE-2026-59310, potentially by a different threat actor. Mass targeting of CVE-2026-59310 was flagged in early September. Related: Chrome and Firefox Updates Patch Over 200 Vulnerabilities Related: TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices Related: China-Linked Hackers Exploit PHP2Shell to Root Firewalls Related: Long-Hidden Flaws Patched in EPICS Research Facility Control Software
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Oct 29, 2026