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The latest AI doomsayer is China’s intelligence boss
China’s minister for State Security has decided AI might be bad for the nation’s ruling Communist Party. Party secretary and minister Chen Yixin’s views appeared in China Cyberspace Magazine, the flagship publication of China’s Cyberspace Administration (and which readers may recall once carried a piece by Elon Musk). In Chen’s view, “the field of AI has become the main battleground for global technological competition and a new arena for strategic rivalry among major powers.” His article also recites familiar grievances about US sanctions and the possibility AI could be weaponized to detect and exploit software vulnerabilities and then to attack important infrastructure, or to steal industrial and state secrets. OpenClaw and similar products also worry the minister, who thinks such software has “structural problems such as remote control of device management permissions and leakage of sensitive user information.” China may also have a PEBCAK* problem because Chen thinks “Some domestic users lack sufficient security awareness, using foreign AI products to process sensitive information and export data overseas, resulting in large-scale data leaks from within the country.” The minister is also worried about how AI challenges China’s Communist Party. “The application of artificial intelligence brings a large number of uncertainties to social governance and public order,” he observed. “The ‘black box’ of algorithms and the ‘poisoning’ of data may amplify existing social biases. The abuse of personal information during data use may trigger a crisis of user trust. The automatic decision-making of the system creates problems in attribution of responsibility.” He’s also worried that “rapid development of artificial intelligence has broken through the traditional technology governance framework, causing existing legal norms, ethical principles and governance mechanisms to frequently lag behind in practice, making it difficult to form an effective institutional constraint and supervision system.” Chen’s suggested response is for China to adhere to the words of President Xi Jinping and modernize China’s national security system and capabilities, so they are ready for AI. The minister says China must “ensure the independent control of key core technologies, firmly grasp technological sovereignty, and achieve a virtuous cycle and synergistic progress between innovation empowerment and security governance.” That stance rather suggests Nvidia isn't going to get back into China anytime soon, and AMD can probably write off its prospects of selling many GPUs there too. Chen also wants “special laws and regulations targeting the research, development, application, and supervision of artificial intelligence technology,” plus improvements to standards and laws “covering the entire chain of technology research and development, application implementation, risk prevention and control, and accountability, focusing on prominent issues such as algorithm security, data protection, ethical norms, and privacy rights.” The day after Chen’s article appeared, the Cyberspace Administration of China published version 3.0 of the nation’s AI Safety Governance Framework. That document calls for China to “actively employ risk-controllable institutional mechanisms such as regulatory sandboxes to make room for error and correction in the development of new technologies and new applications.” China also plans to “make every effort to ensure AI safety” and to “take timely measures to address any risks that infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of individuals, harm public interests, threaten national security, and endanger human survival and development.” That’s quite the contrast compared to the position taken by US president Donald Trump, who on Monday labeled concerns about AI safety a “hoax” and suggested “The only control or ‘guardrails’ that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!” ® * Problem Exists Between Chair And Keyboard
theregister.comSep 15, 2026extracted
Anthropic sta sviluppando un sistema di sorveglianza predittiva per monitorare gli attivisti
Rispetto alle buone intenzioni, il business, la politica e la sorveglianza alla fine vincono sempre, soprattutto quando si parla di grandi aziende e di Stati Uniti D’America. E se tutti inseriscono i dati dentro quel “ bidone ” che in molti chiamano “ cloud “, quel bidone ha sempre fatto gola a tutti, soprattutto se si parla di mondo digitale e tecnologie predittive finalizzate all’intelligence e alla sorveglianza di massa. Ma andiamo con ordine. Anthropic, che solo di recente aveva negato al Pentagono il diritto di utilizzare Claude, sta ora implementando un sistema di sorveglianza su attivisti, proteste e persone che il servizio di sicurezza aziendale considera potenziali minacce. L’azienda mira non solo a rispondere agli incidenti, ma anche a prevedere problemi futuri. Uno degli strumenti utilizzati è la piattaforma Samdesk , che raccoglie segnali da fonti aperte, utilizza l’IA per rilevare eventi e integra l’analisi automatica con verifiche da parte di esperti. Il responsabile del centro sicurezza di Anthropic, Keon Ellison , ha raccontato come il servizio abbia avvertito l’azienda di un cambio di orario di una protesta. Il servizio di sicurezza è riuscito a modificare il percorso di un dirigente di alto livello di Anthropic e a farlo entrare in hotel attraverso un ingresso di servizio e quindi metterlo al sicuro. Ma il monitoraggio aziendale non si limita agli eventi vicino agli uffici . Anthropic ha dichiarato di monitorare comportamenti sospetti di singole persone nell’ambito del processo “person-of-interest” , per rilevare segni di possibile escalation. Alcune persone, di cui l’azienda ha poi informato la polizia, erano già sotto osservazione del servizio di sicurezza.  Il mese scorso, il San Francisco Standard  ha riportato  che Anthropic aveva denunciato alla polizia di San Francisco un uomo per aver detto a Claude di aver acquistato un fucile semiautomatico AR-15 e di avere “nel mirino” l’amministratore delegato Dario Amodei L’entità del programma è evidente anche dall’assunzione di dipendenti. Il team Global Safety, Intelligence, and Security cercava uno specialista in intelligence aziendale con uno stipendio annuale compreso tra $180.000 e $230.000. Tra i compiti figuravano l’identificazione, la valutazione, il monitoraggio e l’indagine su minacce globali, con l'”attivismo” incluso nello stesso elenco di terrorismo, criminalità, instabilità geopolitica e azioni di Stati contro il settore dell’IA. Parallelamente, Anthropic sta rafforzando nuovamente i legami con il settore della sicurezza nazionale , anche se le agenzie di intelligence americane continuavano a svolgere dei test utilizzando Mythos nonostante il conflitto dell’azienda con il Pentagono. I materiali disponibili non confermano che Anthropic utilizzi direttamente Claude per compilare dossier sugli attivisti. Sono confermati il lavoro di una squadra di intelligence interna, la collaborazione con la piattaforma IA Samdesk, il monitoraggio delle proteste e la pratica di un monitoraggio prolungato di singole persone. Questa posizione , in effetti appare  particolarmente contraddittoria alla luce della posizione pubblica di Anthropic contro la sorveglianza interna su larga scala. L’azienda non ha risposto alle domande sul programma. La disputa sulle frontiere della sorveglianza è già costata cara ad Anthropic. Ad agosto, un tribunale federale ha dichiarato illegale il tentativo del Pentagono di punire lo sviluppatore di Claude dopo il rifiuto di rimuovere i limiti sulla sorveglianza di massa e sulle armi autonome. Ora sorgono domande simili riguardo al servizio di sicurezza interno dell’azienda. Il problema va ben oltre i confini di un’unica azienda. Le forze dell’ordine americane hanno già iniziato a considerare le proteste contro l’ intelligenza artificiale attraverso la lente dell’estremismo e delle potenziali minacce alle infrastrutture. In questo contesto, i sistemi aziendali che raccolgono informazioni aperte sugli attivisti e cercano di prevedere le loro azioni rischiano di cancellare la linea di demarcazione tra la protezione dei dipendenti e la sorveglianza di attività politiche legittime. L'articolo Anthropic sta sviluppando un sistema di sorveglianza predittiva per monitorare gli attivisti proviene da Red Hot Cyber .
redhotcyber.comSep 12, 2026extracted
Users in Houthi-Held Yemen Tried to Develop Advanced Weapons With AI, Anthropic Says
Anthropic says Claude users in northern Yemen, territory controlled by Iran-backed Houthi rebels, tried to use the AI model to develop advanced missiles. AI is already transforming warfare from Ukraine to Gaza, and its use on a rugged and remote battlefield is likely to increase concerns about its rapid spread. Anthropic said the users of the accounts, which it blocked after identifying them, did not succeed in “fielding an operational device” but did carry out a failed test of a guided rocket. It said it knows that because the users returned to its Claude chatbot to find out why it failed. In a report released Thursday, the company did not identify the users. But mountainous northern Yemen is controlled by Houthis, suggesting that the rebels are pursuing more sophisticated weapons at a time when they are already wielding an array of drones, missiles and other munitions in their campaign to seize more territory in Yemen and damage Saudi Arabia’s oil exports. Hazam al-Assad, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau, said it is “unreasonable and illogical” that they would rely on open sources to develop and produce military capabilities. “Our armed forces have modern, diverse and developed production capabilities and technology that it has accumulated over the period of Saudi aggression on Yemen,” al-Assad said, referring to the kingdom’s involvement in Yemen’s 12-year civil war. He said all weapons are used for self-defense. The report was the third put out by Anthropic since March 2025 on global misuse of its AI platforms, and it described findings from December to August, ranging from state-sponsored groups spreading propaganda to unnamed actors researching how to make biological weapons more deadly. The Houthis may have been seeking to develop their capabilities The developer of the prominent Claude chatbot said it identified a cell in northern Yemen pursuing three different weapons programs, including a multi-variant missile that glides at hypersonic speed and a warhead that uses mobile phone hardware to maneuver mid-course. It said the actors in Yemen used Claude Code instead of human software engineers to develop guidance, navigation and control software. Multi-variant missiles are ones in which different warheads and guidance systems can be fit on the same base design, a more economical way to build land, sea and air weapons. Anthropic said it had evidence that before the accounts were banned, the users had already built an offline simulation tool kit that doesn’t use Claude or any other computing platforms. Trevor Ball, a weapons analyst at Armament Research Services, said that while the Houthis “might be looking into hypersonic (missiles) by asking Claude,” they have nowhere near the production or technical capabilities to actually build them. He noted that U.S. hypersonic missiles “are still in testing.” He said the Houthis already have Iranian-made anti-ship missiles with systems that allow the missiles to adjust guidance mid-course. “They are probably just trying to develop their own capabilities more, so they are less reliant on Iranian shipments of weapons and components,” he said in a text message. Iran has boasted it has hypersonic missiles and claimed it had fired them at Israel last year. It denies arming the Houthis, which would be in violation of a U.N. embargo, but Iranian weapons have been found on the battlefield and seized from shipments bound for Yemen. The Houthis are increasingly threatening key shipping routes The Houthis have launched waves of attacks on Saudi oil facilities and tankers in the Red Sea, threatening global trade as Iran continues to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The rebels have made lightning territorial gains since Wednesday in their war with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government, seizing strategic territories along the Red Sea coast and in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a key alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. Adam Baron, a Yemen-focused researcher at the New America think tank in Washington, said the Houthis have kept up with technological development. “There’s a tendency to see the Houthis as this group of barefoot tribal fighters, and that’s just not true,” he said. “Whether it’s things like their emergent use of Claude, their use and manipulation of social media narratives or their ability to capitalize on the transfer of Iranian and wider axis expertise, we’re talking about an incredible — and deepening — amount of institutional tech savvy.” The Houthis are known to have acquired and developed a sophisticated arsenal of weapons, including Iranian-made cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) and unmanned submarines used in attacks. Anthropic said it shared its findings with private and public partners. Related: Anthropic Says Russian Hackers Used Claude AI to Automate Malware Evasion
securityweek.comSep 12, 2026extracted
Phishing Research Challenges Conventional Security Awareness Testing
The message is simple: fine-tune future in-house phishing simulation tests through the findings and analysis of Pistachio’s research. Pistachio was founded in Oslo Norway in 2019, with additional offices in London and Valencia. It specializes in automated human risk management, employee security awareness training, and phishing simulations. Between 1 June, 2025 and 31 May, 2026, Pistachio sent 2.47 million simulated phishing attempts to more than 123,000 employees in more than 1,200 organizations. Its subsequent analysis looked at clicking, leaking, and reporting. Thirty percent of tech development and IT employees clicked at least one of these phishing simulations. Nearly 20% of construction and real estate employees leaked credentials after a successful phishing attempt. Financial services were the most resilient, outperforming all other sectors in click, credential leaking and reporting rates. While it is not surprising that financial services performed better, it is more surprising that tech and IT (who really should know better) did so poorly. The differences outlined in the report suggest that organizations do not have a single phishing risk profile. The proportion of employees who clicked at least once ranged from 26% in Design to 41% in Construction. Pistachio’s simulated phishing attacks were delivered through its own AI-driven training platform via channels including email and Teams. Content and difficulty was based on the recipient’s role within the company and how they had previously responded during other simulated phishing attempts. (As an aside, this demonstrates the power of artificial intelligence. Had the process been performed manually, it would have taken 23 years rather than 12 months to complete.) However, the report also demonstrates the importance for simulated phishing tests to look beyond user clicking to user response. A click on its own is merely a waste of employee time with no significant phishing risk. It is the submission of credentials or other requested information that creates the phishing risk. This in turn warns that in-house phishing tests may provide organizations with a misleading idea of true phishing resistance. “Click rate, the metric most phishing programs are judged on, is only part of the picture. A strong indicator of improvement needs to go beyond click rate, and should look at how click, leak and report behaviors change together over time,” explains the report. Joe Jones, CEO and co-founder at Pistachio, explains further: “A low click rate can create a false sense of security. Clicking a phishing link is just one moment in a much longer chain of employee behavior, and on its own it says little about whether someone, or the organization as a whole, is actually getting more resilient. What matters more is what happens next: does the employee hand over credentials, recognize the attack and stop, or report it so the wider business can act?” Pistachio found several test effects that challenge conventional security awareness training: More users report than click on their first simulation, but 1.57% still leak credentials. That means a company with 500 employees likely has 8 people who will hand over their login details. Technical teams are not automatically low risk. In the Pistachio testing program, 30.27% of tech development users and 28.53% of IT users clicked at least once. The same test produces different results in different teams: click rates ranged from 26.35% in Design to 41.31% in Construction. Phishing resilience is the result of fewer clicks and leaks, and more reporting. By the end of the 12 month program, users reported suspicious emails nearly twice as often as they clicked them, showing that effective and sustained programs can build vigilance, and not just fewer clicks. However, the training must be sustained beyond a single sending of simulated attacks: in the Pistachio test, click and leak rates rise through the first six months of the program before beginning to decline. It is worth noting that the size of the Pistachio program implies that it is multi-national in extent, but it has no ‘geographic analysis. This is disappointing. While the analysis highlights differences in industry sectors and teams, it does not differentiate between geolocations. To be fair, there is no general proof that different global areas are any better or worse in phishing susceptibility, but this research could confirm or deny it. In the worst case scenario, it could perhaps indicate whether global organizations should provide additional training to individual locations. Overall, this is a report that should be consulted before any phishing simulation test is developed, whether in-house or through Pistachio’s own services. Related: Trezor Says 347,000 Users Received Phishing Emails After Brevo Hack Related: New Phishing Attack Creates Malicious Pages Inside the Victim’s Browser Related: New Phishing Toolkit Uses Passkeys to Maintain Access After Password Resets Related: Over 500 Organizations Hit in Years-Long Phishing Campaign
securityweek.comSep 11, 2026extracted
EU's Cyber Resilience Act starts the 24-hour vulnerability clock
Manufacturers selling products with digital elements in the EU must now report actively exploited vulnerabilities to cybersecurity authorities under the Cyber Resilience Act's mandatory reporting rules. The reporting duties set out in Article 14 of the CRA became applicable today. Subject to the regulation's exemptions, they apply to manufacturers of products with digital elements made available in the EU, regardless of where those manufacturers are based. Manufacturers must submit an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability, followed by a more detailed notification within 72 hours. The same deadlines apply to severe incidents affecting the security of products with digital elements. The only difference in timing is related to the final report. Manufacturers must provide a final report on an actively exploited vulnerability within 14 days of making a corrective or mitigating measure available. For serious incidents, the final report is due one month after the first report. Darren Anstee, CTO for security at Netscout, said the reporting deadlines introduce much-needed urgency in working toward global cyber resilience. "The 24-hour window in which an initial warning must be reported creates a level of urgency, with subsequent deadlines ensuring that the gathering and release of additional information is prompt," he said. "Better, more rapid sharing of information helps organisations put defences and mitigating controls in place when they know there is heightened risk." EU and non-EU manufacturers must file these reports through ENISA's Single Reporting Platform (SRP). Notifications are addressed to the coordinating computer security incident response team (CSIRT) determined under the CRA. For an EU manufacturer, this is generally the CSIRT for the member state where it has its main establishment; separate rules determine the coordinator for manufacturers based outside the bloc. Manufacturers must also inform affected users, where appropriate, about actively exploited vulnerabilities or severe incidents. The CRA states that users must be informed of available corrections or mitigations without undue delay. Generally, failures under the CRA are punishable by varying tiers of fines, the most serious of which can reach €15 million ($17.4 million) or 2.5 percent of the offender's annual turnover, whichever is higher. The reporting duties that took effect today are classified as core responsibilities under the act, meaning failures to comply with them could lead to the maximum fines being issued. They are the latest step in the EU's plan to drip-feed tighter security regulations on companies operating in the bloc. Most remaining CRA provisions become applicable on December 11, 2027, at which time manufacturers will also be required to embed security by design and default. That means no default passwords and security updates are no longer optional. Products covered by the CRA will also have to undergo the applicable conformity assessment before being placed on the EU market and bearing a CE mark. More than a deadline The CRA's new rules are not just intended to accelerate manufacturers' responses to security flaws. They are also intended to give businesses a better understanding of their software supply chains. With the reporting clock starting as soon as manufacturers become aware of an issue, they cannot afford to begin mapping an affected product only after a vulnerability or incident emerges. They need a comprehensive view of the affected product and any related products that may share the flaw if they are to meet the deadlines. Furthermore, those requirements demand that manufacturers maintain this understanding throughout each product's lifecycle. Creating a software bill of materials (SBOM) when a product is launched is one thing. The SBOM becomes a mandatory requirement when most of the CRA's remaining provisions become applicable next year. Maintaining that security snapshot over time, however, is intended to help reduce the number and impact of serious cyberattacks across the EU. "What all this means for manufacturers is that secure development, effective vulnerability handling, and traceability across the software supply chain should be elevated to the top of their priority list," said Eran Kinsbruner, veep of product marketing at Checkmarx. "Modern applications are assembled from a complex ecosystem of components, with combinations of proprietary code, open-source packages, third-party components and, increasingly, AI models and services all interconnected," he added. "Organizations need to understand these components, their dependencies and the risks they introduce." Given enough time, the CRA looks set to improve cyber resilience across the board. However, lawyers warn that manufacturers, particularly those outside heavily regulated sectors, must now contend with a growing body of overlapping rules. "The CRA is arriving as organizations are already grappling with a growing body of Digital Decade legislation, including NIS2, DORA, the Data Act, and the AI Act," said Heidi Waem, data, privacy and cybersecurity partner at DLA Piper. "We're seeing the compliance challenge for many businesses evolving beyond understanding single regulations in isolation, but determining how multiple frameworks interact, where requirements overlap and how compliance programmes can be coordinated across them." John Magee, partner and global co-chair of data, privacy, and cybersecurity at the same law firm, added: "Even now we're seeing the breadth of the regulation's reach catching organizations off guard. "Many still associate the CRA primarily with consumer IoT devices, when in reality it applies to a much broader pool of products with digital elements. For compliance teams already very busy managing multiple Digital Decade initiatives, there is a risk that this first wave of CRA obligations has arrived sooner, and with a wider impact, than they had expected." ®
theregister.comSep 11, 2026extracted
Your Critical Vulnerabilities Might Not Be Your Biggest Risk
Security teams have become exceptionally talented at finding vulnerabilities. Now, it’s time to turn our attention to optimizing the process for determining which of those vulnerabilities actually create a path to compromise. A critical vulnerability may look alarming on a scanner report, but if it sits behind strong segmentation, identity controls, and other defenses that prevent an attacker from reaching anything important, then it doesn’t necessarily need immediate attention. On the other hand, a medium-severity vulnerability may appear less important, but if it can be used to provide a foothold that can be chained with other weaknesses to reach sensitive data or privileged systems, then fixing that gap becomes a priority. How Autonomous Penetration Testing Reveals What Attackers Can Actually Exploit Severity scores tell you what vulnerabilities could mean in isolation. Autonomous penetration testing tells you what an attacker can actually do with the vulnerabilities. The security industry has been moving toward continuous validation because point-in-time assessments and periodic vulnerability scanning can't fully account for complex environments that change every day. The missing piece to continuous security testing has been an execution model capable of performing meaningful penetration testing on an ongoing basis and at scale. Autonomous penetration testing is the missing execution layer for continuous security validation. Why Autonomous Penetration Testing Looks Beyond Vulnerability Severity Vulnerability severity remains useful because security teams need a consistent way to understand the potential impact of a vulnerability and prioritize remediation. But today, we can’t analyze severity in a vacuum. Consider a critical vulnerability on an isolated system with strong access controls and no viable route to sensitive assets. Now consider a medium-severity vulnerability on an internet-facing application that provides access to credentials, excessive permissions, and a poorly segmented internal environment. The second vulnerability may represent more actionable risk because attackers look for opportunities to gain access, escalate privileges, move laterally, bypass controls, and reach something valuable. This expertise was once exclusive to skilled threat actors, but the use of AI is lowering the knowledge barrier for bad actors to conduct cyberattacks. Attack path validation provides the missing context. Rather than asking only whether a vulnerability exists, autonomous penetration testing performs attack path validation to ask whether it can be reached, exploited, chained with other weaknesses, and used to advance toward a meaningful objective. The latest autonomous pentesting capabilities are no longer an advantage reserved for large security teams with deep budgets. By shifting a security strategy from reactive remediation to proactive validation, organizations of all sizes can continuously test their environments, prioritize the risks that matter, and prove where attackers could actually gain ground. Why Autonomous Penetration Testing Is Replacing Point-in-Time Testing Traditional penetration testing earns its value from human expertise. An experienced pentester can reason through complex scenarios, chain multiple vulnerabilities, test business logic, and determine whether a theoretical weakness can become a real compromise. That expertise remains invaluable. What's changing now is the environment that security testing has to keep up with. In a typical process, a penetration test happens, a report is delivered, and the organization begins remediation. Then, the environment continues to change. Cloud infrastructure is modified. Applications are deployed. Identities are created and removed. Configurations drift. New assets appear. Security controls change. New vulnerabilities emerge. The assessment may have been accurate when it was performed, but the environment it described may no longer exist weeks or months later. Point-in-time pentesting is becoming insufficient as the only mechanism for validating security posture. The answer isn't necessarily more annual penetration tests. It's a testing model capable of keeping pace with the ongoing change of the environment itself. That's where autonomous penetration testing levels the playing field. Autonomous Penetration Testing Makes Continuous Penetration Testing Possible Continuous security validation has been on the radar for a while. Continuous attack surface management, continuous vulnerability discovery, continuous control validation, and continuous exposure management all reflect the same underlying realization that security teams need to know what is true about their environments in real time. The challenge has always been execution. Offensive security professionals bring judgment and creativity developed through years of hands-on experience. But there are practical limits to how many applications, network segments, identities, attack paths, and security controls a human team can test on an ongoing basis. Autonomous penetration testing gives continuous testing the execution model it has been missing. Instead of waiting for the next scheduled penetration test, organizations can schedule tests of environments on demand, as they change. They can retest after remediation, validate new attack paths, repeat attack scenarios, and determine whether security controls continue to perform as expected. Continuous penetration testing is more than running a vulnerability scanner more frequently; it requires the ability to perform meaningful offensive security testing continuously. Automated Vulnerability Scanning vs. Autonomous Penetration Testing Automation and autonomy are not the same thing. Automated vulnerability scanning is designed to identify known weaknesses. Scanners can continuously inspect environments, match vulnerabilities against databases and signatures, and provide valuable visibility into what has changed. But finding a vulnerability is different from proving that an attacker can use it. Autonomous penetration testing goes further than vulnerability scanning. An autonomous penetration testing platform can perform reconnaissance, determine what to test next, chain individual weaknesses, test authentication and authorization logic, attempt exploitation, pivot through an environment, and pursue an attack objective. The difference is that automated scanning identifies possibilities, while autonomous penetration testing produces evidence. Autonomous Penetration Testing at Senior-Pentester Skill The interesting development in autonomous penetration testing isn't that AI can automate individual pentesting tasks. That has been true for some time. The more significant shift is that autonomous penetration testing has reached a point where it can reason through multi-step attack scenarios at a depth historically associated with experienced human penetration testers. Rather than stopping at individual findings, it can analyze how weaknesses interact and determine whether they can be combined into a viable path to compromise. That includes testing business logic, chaining vulnerabilities, and assessing what happens after initial access. Autonomous systems can pivot across environments, escalate privileges, move laterally, and pursue a defined attack objective based on what they discover. This is what makes autonomous penetration testing relevant to the industry's shift toward continuous security validation. The goal is to continuously test whether an attacker can actually achieve something that matters. Breach360 Is Autonomous Penetration Testing Built for Continuous Security Validation Breach360 by BreachLock was built around the premise that autonomous penetration testing needs to combine the depth of senior-level offensive security expertise with the scalability required for continuous testing. The platform is trained on intelligence from more than 40,000 real-world penetration testing engagements, giving its autonomous testing capabilities a foundation in real-world offensive security rather than purely simulated scenarios. Breach360 can autonomously: Conduct reconnaissance Identify attack opportunities Chain vulnerabilities Test business logic Validate authentication and authorization Pivot across network segments Perform lateral movement Map attack paths Validate exploitability Generate evidence of compromise Rather than leaving security teams with another growing list of theoretical vulnerabilities, Breach360 provides evidence of which exposures can actually be exploited and how those exposures connect along an attack path. That allows teams to focus remediation on vulnerabilities that create meaningful pathways to compromise. Autonomous Penetration Testing Still Needs Human Judgment Autonomous execution and autonomous accountability are two different things. Technology can discover attack paths, validate exploits, generate evidence, and repeat tests at a scale no human team could match. Human security professionals still provide the context that determines what the evidence means for the business. They determine: Which attack path creates the greatest business risk Which remediation effort should take priority Which operational constraints matter Which regulatory obligations apply What level of residual risk is acceptable When deeper expert-led testing is warranted That division of responsibility is what makes autonomous security testing practical for real-world environments. The goal isn't to remove humans from security testing. It's to stop using human expertise for work that machines can now perform continuously, while preserving human judgment for decisions that require context and accountability. The Future of Penetration Testing Is Autonomous and Continuous The security industry has spent years moving toward continuous security validation, recognizing that periodic vulnerability scans and point-in-time penetration tests can't fully represent the risk of environments that change constantly. What has been missing is the ability to perform quality penetration testing continuously and at scale. Autonomous penetration testing provides that capability by bringing multi-step reasoning, exploitation, attack-path validation, and security-control testing into a continuous operating model. For security teams, the goal is no longer simply to understand how many vulnerabilities exist or how severe they appear in isolation. It has shifted to continuously validate which exposures represent a credible path to compromise and focus remediation where it can have the greatest impact. After all, your most critical vulnerability might not be your biggest risk. About BreachLock BreachLock is a global leader in offensive security, delivering scalable and continuous security testing. Trusted by global enterprises, BreachLock provides human-led and AI-powered Attack Surface Management, Penetration Testing as a Service (PTaaS), Red Teaming, and Adversarial Exposure Validation (AEV) solutions that help security teams stay ahead of adversaries. With a mission to make proactive security the new standard, BreachLock is shaping the future of cybersecurity through automation, data-driven intelligence, and expert-driven execution.
thehackernews.comSep 11, 2026extracted
Kiteworks Acquires Bonfy.AI to Fill the AI Gap in Data Governance
Kiteworks has announced the acquisition of AI data security company Bonfy.AI, a move aimed at extending real-time policy enforcement over sensitive data exchanged by both human users and AI agents. Kiteworks delivers a content-sharing platform to safeguard sensitive data as it moves across enterprise networks, external organizations, and internal systems. It includes regulatory compliance, governance, and audit tracking. Bonfy.ai is an AI‑native content‑security platform protecting sensitive data across human workflows and AI‑agent reasoning. It offers real‑time classification, contextual enforcement, and cross‑SaaS governance. The cost of the acquisition has not been disclosed but is estimated by CTech at ‘tens of millions of dollars’. The Bonfy technology will be used to extend Kiteworks’ policy enforcement across agent and human data exchange and usage in real time and inline across email, file sharing, SaaS applications, data repositories, Internet-facing AI assistants, and autonomous agents. It fills, says Kiteworks, a structural gap in how enterprises protect sensitive data. Enterprises have detailed inventories of their sensitive data, but the inventories do not necessarily control what happens to that sensitive data when it is used or transferred. Bonfy technology fills this gap by classifying the data at the moment it is exchanged, and applying security policies before the transfer is completed – including when the exchange involves an AI assistant or autonomous agent. Combining this technology with the Kiteworks control plane for secure data exchange, says Kiteworks, governs data in motion and in use through a single policy model that applies equally to people, machines, and systems across the enterprise. “Bonfy.AI’s cutting-edge technology expands our coverage and capability to deliver the control our customers need in the AI era, and its excellent team will further accelerate the development of our unified Data Control Plane,” suggests Amit Toren, chief business officer at Kiteworks. This is the eighth Kiteworks acquisition in five years, with each one designed to expand the firm’s data security and compliance platform. The value of this acquisition includes a governed decision inline at runtime rather than a report after the fact; decisions based on genuine context rather than simple pattern matching; a single policy model for both human and AI workflows; enterprise-wide data exchange control; and provable compliance at the moment of decision. It becomes an extension of Kiteworks rather than a parallel product. “Everything we build comes back to a single promise to our customers: you stay in control of your private data, everywhere it moves and everywhere it is used,” comments Tim Freestone, chief strategy officer at Kiteworks. “Inline at runtime classification is what makes that promise complete. Knowing where sensitive data lives is part of the equation, but deciding, in the instant data leaves, whether it should leave, and being able to prove that decision to a regulator months later is a big gap we’re closing.” Bonfy was founded in early 2024 by Gidi Cohen and Danny Kibel. It emerged from stealth in June 2025 with $9.5 million in seed funding. “We built Bonfy.AI around a single idea: risk is created when data moves, not when it sits, and controlling it means reading the full context of an exchange at runtime, before it completes,” said CEO Cohen. “Kiteworks gives that technology a control plane and a reach we could not have built on our own. I’m excited to see it governing data for both people and AI agents at global scale.” Related: Palo Alto Networks Acquires AI Agent Platform Console Related: Fortinet Acquires AI Security Company Virtue AI Related: Watch on Demand: Cloud & Data Security Summit Related: Data Security Firm Evervault Raises $25 Million in Series B Funding
securityweek.comSep 11, 2026extracted
Kiteworks expands runtime data governance with Bonfy.AI acquisition
Kiteworks expands runtime data governance with Bonfy.AI acquisition Kiteworks has acquired Bonfy.AI, extending runtime data governance across its control plane. The acquisition enables organizations to govern data exchanges as they happen, whether initiated by a person, machine, or autonomous agent. The acquisition addresses a structural gap in how enterprises protect sensitive data. Enterprises have invested a decade in data discovery and posture management, building detailed inventories of the sensitive data that sits inside their data stores. With this acquisition, Kiteworks complements that value by governing that same sensitive data as it is exchanged into the third-party ecosystem. Posture management classifies data at rest. Risk is created in motion: in the email a person is about to send, in the file that is about to be attached, in the response an agent is about to generate. With Bonfy.AI technology, Kiteworks closes that gap by moving classification and enforcement to the point of exchange. Bonfy.AI evaluates data with the context around it, including the sender, the recipient, the counterparty relationship, the channel, and the business purpose of the exchange, then applies policy before the send completes. Delivered inside the Kiteworks control plane for secure data exchange, the combined capability governs data in motion and in use through a single policy model that applies equally to people, machines, and systems across any system in the enterprise. “Bonfy.AI’s cutting-edge technology expands our coverage and capability to deliver the control our customers need in the AI era, and its excellent team will further accelerate the development of our unified Data Control Plane,” says Amit Toren, Chief Business Officer, Kiteworks. “We have built this company through a rare combination of in-house innovation, operational excellence, and disciplined M&A, with eight acquisitions in under five years, each one expanding our ability to deliver the most comprehensive data security and compliance platform available in the market.” Strategic value of the acquisition A governed decision inline at runtime, not just a report after the fact. Policy is evaluated and applied at the moment of the exchange, across email, file sharing, APIs, and AI agents, producing a decision rather than just an alert. Context instead of pattern matching. Entity-aware analysis interprets what data means to a specific relationship and destination, which materially reduces the false positive burden that has limited traditional prevention tooling, where roughly half of alerts prove benign. One policy model for AI and human workflows. The same controls that govern a person sending an attachment govern an agent retrieving, generating, and transmitting data, closing the gap that opens when AI systems act on behalf of human users. Enterprise-wide data exchange control from popular data repositories and systems of record. Sensitive data exchanged via systems like Outlook, Gmail, OneDrive, SharePoint, Workspace, and Salesforce is governed by the Kiteworks control plane regardless of where that data resides at rest, so the end users maintain their (compliant) business-as-usual operations. Provable compliance at the moment of decision. Every classification and enforcement action is captured as auditable evidence. CMMC 2.0, HIPAA, GDPR, and others require that organisations demonstrate control, not merely produce an inventory. An extension of data-layer governance, not a parallel product. The capability builds directly on the Kiteworks Data Policy Engine and Compliant AI, reinforcing the position that the data layer is the only durable control point. “Everything we build comes back to a single promise to our customers: you stay in control of your private data, everywhere it moves and everywhere it is used,” comments Tim Freestone, Chief Strategy Officer, Kiteworks. “Inline at runtime classification is what makes that promise complete. Knowing where sensitive data lives was part of the equation, but deciding, in the instant data leaves, whether it should leave, and being able to prove that decision to a regulator months later is a big gap we’re closing.” “We built Bonfy.AI around a single idea: risk is created when data moves, not when it sits, and controlling it means reading the full context of an exchange at runtime, before it completes,” adds Gidi Cohen, CEO of Bonfy.AI. “Kiteworks gives that technology a control plane and a reach we could not have built on our own. I’m excited to see it governing data for both people and AI agents at global scale.”
helpnetsecurity.comSep 11, 2026extracted
OpenAI rallenta sull’AI di frontiera, Sam Altman: “La sicurezza prima di tutto”
Oltre al rallentamento sugli sviluppi e una maggiore cooperazione, si registra la volontà che gli Usa arrivino ad una legge federale in materia, insieme al sostegno ad alcune iniziative normative statali. OpenAI rallenta sull’AI di frontiera e vorrebbe obblighi nazionali sui sistemi più avanzati ( i modelli di frontiera ), in particolare per gli Usa, con una legge federale in materia. L’ottica è quella di introdurre regole nazionali obbligatorie per la sicurezza dei sistemi di intelligenza artificiale più potenti. La richiesta arriva dopo una serie di episodi nei quali alcuni agenti AI hanno mostrato comportamenti imprevisti. Oltre all’interazione con sistemi esterni senza autorizzazione, ci sono stati attacchi cyber “ senza intervento umano “. Secondo OpenAI , l’evoluzione della tecnologia rende ormai insufficienti i soli impegni volontari da parte delle aziende. Chris Lehane , Chief Global Affairs Office r dell’azienda, ha sostenuto che Washington debba adottare una regolamentazione nazionale basata sulle capacità dei sistemi e in grado di evolvere insieme alla tecnologia. Evidentemente, in questo campo gli Usa sarebbero il riferimento della materia. L’importanza di test e controlli indipendenti OpenAI , sottolinea la Reuters , ha proposto una serie di riferimenti in cui ci sono standard di testing, valutazioni indipendenti, protezioni di cybersecurity e obblighi di segnalazione degli incidenti . L’obiettivo è creare “ un sistema di controllo capace di intervenire soprattutto quando l’ AI acquisisce capacità tali da poter produrre conseguenze imprevedibili o difficili da contenere “. L’azienda ha invitato il Congresso ad agire prima della fine della sessione legislativa. Al contempo, ha dichiarato che continuerà nel frattempo a sostenere le iniziative legislative adottate dai singoli Stati. La definizione di standard condivisi è infatti prioritaria . La nuova posizione della società con base a San Francisco è arrivata dopo diversi casi che hanno sollevato interrogativi sulla capacità di controllare gli agenti AI. Questi episodi hanno alimentato il dibattito sulla sicurezza. Si evidenzia, infatti, come tali sistemi non siano capaci soltanto di generare testo o immagini, ma anche di eseguire autonomamente azioni su Internet e interagire con software e infrastrutture esterne . L’importanza della cooperazione Parallelamente all’aspetto normativo Altman avrebbe spiegato allo staff, secondo Bloomberg News e Reuters che OpenAI potrebbe modulare il ritmo di sviluppo dei modelli di frontiera , proprio sistemi quei sistemi AI più potenti. Il tutto, eventualmente coordinandosi con altri grandi laboratori. Non tutti, ha comunque già riconosciuto, necessariamente accetterebbero. È un passaggio importante . La sicurezza potrebbe diventare il terreno sul quale le principali società decidono di frenare insieme la corsa verso sistemi sempre più potenti. Questa prospettiva potrebbe ridurre alcuni rischi , ma si aprirebbe tutta una serie di interrogativi. In primo luogo sulla concorrenza e poi sul potere che poche aziende possano stabilire il ritmo dell’evoluzione dell’ AI . Un potere che allora diventerebbe ancora più concentrato . Il sostegno alle nuove leggi californiane Parallelamente alla richiesta di una legge federale , OpenAI ha annunciato il proprio sostegno a quattro proposte legislative della California sull’intelligenza artificiale. Il Governatore Gavin Newsom ha firmato due atti, SB 813 e AB 1405 , che introducono un quadro per valutazioni e audit indipendenti di terze parti sui sistemi AI . Le altre due proposte, AB 1864 e SB 1119 , riguardano rispettivamente le misure di sicurezza contro le minacce biologiche abilitate dall’AI e le protezioni per i bambini che utilizzano chatbot. OpenAI ha riconosciuto di non aver sostenuto in passato alcune di queste iniziative. Tuttavia, ha poi sottolineato come il recente aumento delle capacità dei sistemi AI ha portato l’azienda “ a riconsiderare la propria posizione “. Verso delle regole globali Per OpenAI , la futura regolamentazione non dovrebbe però fermarsi ai confini americani. Dagli Usa agli altri Paesi, si tratterebbe di un processo continuo, su varie fasi. La richiesta segna quindi un cambio di passo nel dibattito sulla regolamentazione dell’intelligenza artificiale. Non più soltanto principi volontari adottati dalle aziende, ma requisiti obbligatori, verifiche indipendenti e obblighi di trasparenza sugli incidenti per i sistemi AI più potenti. Seguici anche sul nostro canale WhatsApp Vai al sito di Cybersecurity Italia. L'articolo OpenAI rallenta sull’AI di frontiera, Sam Altman: “La sicurezza prima di tutto” sembra essere il primo su CyberSecurity Italia .
cybersecitalia.itSep 11, 2026extracted
Getting a stranger’s phone kicked off the cellular network costs a few dollars
Getting a stranger’s phone kicked off the cellular network costs a few dollars Researchers at Michigan State University and three partner schools bought a Samsung Galaxy Z Fold 7, copied the identification number printed on the sealed box, and reported the phone to its carrier as lost. Then they opened the box and set the phone up the way a launch-day buyer would. It would not connect. The phone was new, unopened, and sitting on a lab bench the entire time. The team found six weaknesses in the system carriers use to shut off lost and stolen phones, spanning the devices themselves, the carrier systems that take the reports, and the machinery carriers use to share block lists. They ran the tests on three major U.S. carriers and their resellers. Blocking a device they did not own cost between $2.50 and $4 and took between about 20 and 80 seconds. The target does not have to be a phone. It can be the alarm panel in a house. End-to-end lost/stolen device reporting ecosystem across device, carrier, and cross-carrier domains, with vulnerabilities shown at their exposed points (Source: Research paper) What gets blocked and how Every device with a cellular radio carries a 15-digit serial number called an IMEI, burned in at the factory and separate from the SIM card, the phone number and the account. When you report a phone stolen, the carrier drops that number into a database called an Equipment Identity Register. After that, the network refuses to register the device. It does not matter who is holding it or which SIM is inside. That is the correct behavior for a stolen phone. What the researchers went looking for is what stops someone from typing in a number that is not theirs. Guan-Hua Tu, an associate professor in Michigan State’s College of Engineering, said an attacker can use the weaknesses to cut a device off remotely, “even though the device has not actually been lost, stolen or sold.” The identity checks are thin The three carriers accept reports only from people with active service, which is supposed to make reporters traceable. The team opened accounts on all three carriers to see how much traceability that buys. None of the three verified a Social Security number or a government ID when setting up a prepaid account, and prepaid customers could file lost-device reports the same as anyone else. Prepaid service can be paid for with an anonymous Visa gift card bought off a rack at Walmart. The second check is ownership, and carriers approximate it by looking at whether the device has been active on the account. The check does not establish who owns a device. It establishes that the device has spent some time on the network, which is a different thing, and a spoofed device can produce that history on demand. On one carrier, one second of attachment was enough. The other two wanted a minute. After that minimum, none of the three asked for any calls or any data at all before letting the researchers report a phone they had never used. The third gap is what counts as a reportable device. The team submitted reports for a smartwatch, for cellular development boards used in industrial equipment, and for a phone that physically cannot operate on the carrier’s frequencies. All of them went through, on all three carriers, from an ordinary smartphone plan with no IoT subscription attached. Once reported, the devices could not get back on. Pulling this off requires knowing the target’s IMEI, which is where the two demonstration attacks come in. The alarm panel goes quiet and the homeowner is not told Home security gateways usually run on Wi-Fi and keep a cellular link as backup, and to keep that backup cheap they use low-power cellular chips built for connected devices. The researchers tested four such boards alongside four phones, feeding each one a deliberately corrupted request for its identity. The phones ignored it, as the standard requires. Two of the boards answered with their IMEIs. Both were vulnerable because of the chipset inside, and those chipsets come from two vendors whose combined global share of that market is above 40 percent. The attack built on that runs in two parts, and the parts can be months apart. First, knock the gateway off Wi-Fi so it falls back to cellular, stand up a small rogue base station to lure it in, and ask for its IMEI. In the lab this took 17 seconds, after which the base station gets switched off and leaves nothing for the carrier to detect. Later, disrupt the Wi-Fi again and file the lost-device report. The gateway drops to cellular the way it is designed to, about 15 seconds after the Wi-Fi cuts out, and finds the network will not take it. Alarms stop reaching the homeowner and the monitoring center. The researchers bought a gateway from one of the two largest U.S. alarm providers, paid for its monitoring service, and confirmed all of this end to end. The other large provider uses the same vulnerable chipsets. Together the two hold more than 41 percent of the U.S. market. The same chips also sit inside water and electricity meters, industrial sensors and cardiac monitors, though the team did not test those devices. Blocking phones that have not been sold yet The second attack goes after new flagship handsets. IMEIs are assigned before a phone ships, and companies that verify devices for the supply chain can buy access to them. The team paid $600 for a full database from one such company, plus $30 a month for updates, and found the Z Fold 7’s number listed before the phone’s July 25, 2025 release. A single prepaid account reported ten devices without tripping anything. Per device, the block cost $2.50, $3.50 or $4 depending on the carrier. Blocking 100 Z Fold 7s would take ten prepaid accounts, $250 to $400, and somewhere between 33 minutes and a little over two hours, against $200,000 worth of phones. The team wrote a script to drive the carriers’ web forms and did not bother optimizing it. Victims get no notice that any of this has happened. Service simply stops. Getting it back means proving to the carrier that you own the device, usually with a receipt showing the IMEI plus identity verification, and if the fraudulent report came in through a different carrier the request can escalate to the GSMA, the industry body that runs the global block list, which adds more delay. One more finding cuts the other way, and it is not reassuring either. A phone reported lost on one carrier still worked fine on the other two a week later, which means at least two of the three are not syncing with the global list they tell customers about. The proposed fixes The team put forward four changes and built a working prototype of them. Device certification tests should check that a phone or module keeps its IMEI to itself when a request arrives unauthenticated, which is the gap that let those two boards leak. Reporting portals should run reporters through government-ID verification, using the same third-party services that federal agencies already use. Ownership checks should combine several signals, including whether the device matches the reporter’s plan, and send anything doubtful to an in-store visit. And the records carriers pass to each other should carry the security details they currently omit, such as whether the reporter was ever identity-checked, so a receiving carrier can decide whether to trust a block. The researchers notified the affected carriers, chipset vendors and manufacturers. The GSMA acknowledged the findings and passed them to its device security group. Tu has said the aim is to raise the cost of an attack while leaving the process alone for people who really have lost a phone. Download report: How security controls perform in practice
helpnetsecurity.comSep 11, 2026extracted
Treasury urges banks to file cyber scam reports, noting nearly $13 billion in losses since 2023
Treasury urges banks to file cyber scam reports, noting nearly $13 billion in losses since 2023 The federal government wants financial institutions to be more vigilant in spotting and reporting schemes perpetrated by overseas scam centers. The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) released an alert to the financial industry alongside a comprehensive study of more than 33,000 cyber fraud incident reports filed between September 2023 and December 2025. The report said about $12.7 billion was stolen from Americans in cryptocurrency investment scams from victims in all 50 states and U.S. territories. “The transnational criminal organizations behind these scams exploit both emerging technologies and human vulnerabilities, resulting in devastating financial losses for innocent American victims,” Treasury Department official Gene Lange said. The report is based on reports submitted by about 1,300 financial institutions and is tied to a 2023 alert from the Treasury about so-called pig butchering scams. FinCEN found that the rate of suspected scam activity is increasing as the schemes expand beyond centers in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. FinCEN received nearly 11% more reports each month compared to the month prior. The reports were instructive for federal investigators because typically financial institutions only had visibility into one phase of a scam’s lifecycle. Scammers use different personas — from romantic partner to trusted financial adviser — while coaxing people into sending money, either through traditional bank transfers or with cryptocurrency. The report notes that adults over 60 were not overrepresented in the victim pool, accounting for about 25% of all reports. The report suggests that other age demographics are also being scammed at similar rates. A significant number of reports came from cryptocurrency firms, which identified about $5.5 billion in suspected scam activity. More traditional banks reported about $6.4 billion in potential fraud, telling investigators that they “often detected schemes when a victim sent funds to an [financial institution] in the digital asset sector to purchase digital assets, or when a customer sent a wire transfer to a scam-affiliated beneficiary, frequently referencing digital asset investments.” The report notes that some victims submitted applications for loans and second mortgages as part of their participation in a scam. Other financial firms noted thousands of cases where victims liquidated their investment accounts to fund digital assets or attempted to conduct wire transfers to scammer-affiliated accounts. “[A financial institution] involved in the digital assets sector reported an older adult victim transferred nearly $640,000 from her retirement fund to send to a suspected scammer in connection with an apparent digital asset investment scheme,” the report said. “The victim stated she met an individual over social media who instructed her to invest in an apparently fictitious digital asset-related company.” Another victim withdrew almost $150,000 from his retirement account, took out a personal loan and took out lines of credit on his home to send funds to a scammer. The victim was denied personal loans two separate times and said he needed the money to invest in a venture touted by his digital romantic partner. Most filings reported the use of coins like Ethereum, Tether (USDT), and USD Coin (USDC) but at least 18 other coins appeared in the reports. FinCEN noted that scammers almost always exchanged stolen funds for USDT. Most victims only realized they were taking part in a scam when they were asked to pay a fee to get their money back. Investigators also found several cases where scammers posed as an “asset recovery service” to steal again from victims. Days after the report was released, the U.S. government took action against Xinbi Guarantee, a key Telegram-based illicit marketplace that helped scammers launder billions. Ari Redbord, global head of policy at blockchain research firm TRM Labs, said Xinbi was sanctioned because it became the go-to platform for Southeast Asia scam compounds after the previous U.S. takedown of Chinese platform Huione. More than $36 billion was laundered on Xinbi, Redbord said. Jonathan Greig is a Breaking News Reporter at Recorded Future News. Jonathan has worked across the globe as a journalist since 2014. Before moving back to New York City, he worked for news outlets in South Africa, Jordan and Cambodia. He previously covered cybersecurity at ZDNet and TechRepublic.
therecord.mediaSep 10, 2026extracted
Cybersecurity M&A Roundup: 33 Deals Announced in August 2026
Thirty-three cybersecurity-related merger and acquisition (M&A) deals were announced in August 2026. For a detailed view of the more than 420 acquisitions announced in 2025, check out SecurityWeek’s annual M&A report. Here are some of the most important cybersecurity M&A deals announced in August 2026: Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) firm Brinqa has acquired PlexTrac, a penetration testing workflow and reporting vendor. The acquisition integrates PlexTrac’s offensive security validation into Brinqa’s CTEM platform to verify remediation efforts. Cribl has acquired technology assets and IP from San Francisco-based Radiant Security, an AI-native SOC startup. Cribl will integrate Radiant’s autonomous alert triage and incident response capabilities directly into its telemetry data platform. Data monetization, credentialing, digital engagement, and RWA tokenization solutions provider Datavault AI has announced a definitive all-cash agreement to acquire San Diego-based CyberCatch for $94.5 million. The acquisition integrates CyberCatch’s continuous compliance platform and post-quantum encryption technology into Datavault AI’s platform. Deel has acquired Israel-based Clarity, an AI cybersecurity company specializing in deepfake detection and identity verification. Financial terms were not officially disclosed, but the deal is reportedly valued at $40-50 million. Deel will integrate Clarity’s technology to prevent identity fraud and detect deepfakes during remote workforce hiring. Echo has acquired the technology assets and enterprise customer contracts of Tel Aviv-based hardened container image provider Minimus in an all-cash deal following Minimus’s operational wind-down. Financial terms were estimated at a few million dollars. The deal enables Echo to broaden distro support, expand integrations, and strengthen the proprietary agents powering its software factory. Fortinet announced the acquisition of AI security company Virtue AI. Fortinet said the acquisition will help it enhance its AI security offering, including for models, applications, and agentic systems. Fortinet will leverage Virtue’s agentic system red teaming, agent protection and governance, continuous AI validation, and real-time guardrail capabilities. Kiteworks announced moving into Japan through its seventh acquisition in less than five years. The company has acquired WAMNET Japan K.K., a secure data transfer and file-sharing provider. The deal extends Kiteworks’ private content network (PCN) strategy — unifying file sharing, managed file transfer, email, APIs, and web forms under one governed platform — into a new geography, with WAMNET’s existing contracts, pricing, and support staying in place and customer data remaining hosted in Japan. German reinsurance giant Munich Re has agreed to acquire California-based cyber insurtech At-Bay for $575 million. At-Bay will join Munich Re’s HSB unit, combining continuous risk mitigation and MDR services with global insurance coverage. Palo Alto Networks has acquired Console, an AI-native platform that helps organizations build agentic workflows and automate operational tasks using natural language. The cybersecurity giant said Console will deepen the agentic capabilities of its Cortex platform, allowing security teams to investigate signals, prioritize work, and automatically take action across enterprise environments. Visa is buying fraud prevention company BioCatch for $2.4 billion in cash as the payments giant looks to expand its cybersecurity and financial crime detection capabilities. The acquisition will add BioCatch’s behavioral and device intelligence to Visa’s existing portfolio of cyber, fraud, risk and security products. Other cybersecurity M&A deals announced in August 2026: Athena Agentic acquires Maxxsure and Omni Cyber Solutions Related: Cybersecurity M&A Roundup: 21 Deals Announced in July 2026 Related: Cybersecurity M&A Roundup: 37 Deals Announced in June 2026
securityweek.comSep 10, 2026extracted
AI-powered attack exploited PaperCut flaws to hack 395 organizations
A threat actor, likely Russian-speaking, used hundreds of AI agents to develop and launch a global exploitation campaign targeting vulnerable PaperCut NG/MF servers. The agents were tasked with building, testing, and refining exploits for CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078, both security flaws affecting PaperCut Software and flagged as actively exploited earlier this month. Attack and threat intelligence company GreyNoise says the campaign began on August 31, combining OpenAI’s Codex and DeepSeek models with commodity offensive tools. The AI agents also generated target lists through the Netlas internet scanning and discovery platform. GreyNoise data indicates that the operation compromised at least 440 PaperCut instances linked to 395 distinct organizations across 48 countries. The attacker harvested credentials from 280 victims, obtained operating system or domain secrets from 147, and obtained administrator privileges at 12 organizations. Most of the victims were in the education sector, accounting for roughly half of all breaches. The United States was the most targeted country, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Canada. According to GreyNoise, the threat actor specified a list of countries to avoid, including Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Brazil, and South Africa. However, the agents did not consistently follow these rules. GreyNoise underlines that AI enables attackers to launch rapid attacks that leave defenders with very tight response margins. “The adversary went from an empty workspace to first achieving RCE against a real victim in just under four hours, first domain admin in an additional two hours, and once the full campaign launched, compromised at least 11 organizations in 26 seconds,” GreyNoise notes. “In one instance, the adversary went from initial access to full domain administrator in seven minutes against a high school in the United States.” The researchers observed three attack paths after exploiting the PaperCut flaws: Dumping LSASS memory and registry secrets from domain-joined PaperCut servers, then passing recovered credential hashes to domain controllers (“pass-the-hash” attack). Using the “noPac” attack against environments still vulnerable to CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. Directly adding a newly created account to Domain Admins when PaperCut ran on a domain controller or under a domain administrator service account. In all cases, the attackers used the DCSync post-exploitation technique to obtain a complete NTDS.DIT dump with domain credentials. The attacker’s toolkit includes Ligolo-ng, Mimikatz, Certipy, BloodHound, Rubeus, Impacket, NetExec, and custom Rust credential-collection utilities. GreyNoise could not determine the attacker’s campaign objective, but the access could be used for data theft or ransomware operations. System administrators are advised to apply PaperCut’s emergency security updates addressing CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078 immediately, and follow the vendor’s recommendations in this bulletin. Join Mikko Hyppönen and security leaders from the NFL, CHANEL, and Atlassian for a two-hour digital summit on what AI-speed attacks change, what defenders should stop doing, and how to validate, decide, fix, and re-validate at machine speed. Save your seat
bleepingcomputer.comSep 10, 2026extracted
Anthropic Researcher Resigns With Warning About the Dangers of AI Development
An Anthropic researcher said he is resigning from the company over concerns the artificial intelligence firm and its competitors are not acting responsibly in AI development, echoing concerns raised inside and outside of the industry about the technology’s potential to elude human control. Jacob Coxon, who said he spent three years doing research at both Anthropic and OpenAI, said Tuesday on the social platform X that the two AI companies are more focused on beating each other and global competitors in developing the most advanced model possible than they are on safety. OpenAI and Anthropic caused a stir this summer when they announced, about a week apart, that their models had broken out of testing environments and obtained unauthorized access to real computer systems. The announcements prompted concerns about models going rogue and carrying out other, more harmful tasks. Both companies said at the time they were pausing some evaluations while they put more monitoring measures and guardrails in place. The technology’s rapid development has led some in the U.S. as well as global leaders to call for a more cautious approach. U.N. human rights chief Volker Türk urged countries this week to put “cast-iron guarantees in place around the safety and security of AI before it is too late.” In his social media posts, Coxon said Anthropic and its chief rival OpenAI “are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives.” He warned that some working on AI development believe it could threaten human life by the end of the decade. “Do not underestimate the power of this technology,” he continued. “These will soon be superhuman systems that can hack anything, revolutionize any field overnight, and acquire real power and resources. We have all witnessed the progress in each of these domains, and progress is not slowing.” His posts reached more than 100 million people overnight. Coxon is not the first AI insider to publicly raise such concerns. Both Anthropic and OpenAI have seen high-profile resignations in recent years that were tied to safety concerns. Two current Anthropic employees also responded to Coxon’s post in agreement. Sen. Bernie Sanders, a Vermont independent who has called for AI safeguards and regulation, agreed with Coxon’s concerns and said he would soon introduce legislation to pause AI development and ban superintelligence. “The very people building this technology admit that it could threaten the future of humanity,” Sanders said Wednesday on social media. AI companies themselves have at times highlighted the technology’s threat to humanity, which skeptics have seen as part of a push to make their products seem all-powerful. Coxon said the fears he outlined in his post are not a “marketing stunt.” Coxon did not respond to messages seeking comment. Anthropic and OpenAI did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Anthropic has long pitched itself as the more responsible and safety-minded of the leading AI companies, ever since its founders quit OpenAI to form the startup in 2021. The company recently said it was taking action to “prioritize safety over speed when the two are in tension.” Anthropic and OpenAI are each ramping up for buzzy initial public offerings and locked in steep competition with each other. They’re also each on a mission to outpace the development progress of Chinese AI companies, a race the Trump administration has been keen on winning.
securityweek.comSep 10, 2026extracted
Hacker Conversations: Vinnie Liu, Performer Turned Ringmaster
Vinnie Liu was recruited by the NSA when he was just 17 years old. He is now the CEO of Bishop Fox. He says little about his work at the NSA, only that “My first year was on the red team, and in the second year, it was more externally facing.” He had been recommended to the NSA by an Air Force guy he never met face-to-face and whose ‘handle’ he no longer remembers. But being recruited by such an organization in such a manner at such an early age would indicate a prodigious hacker. This is not the image he projects. “I hadn’t been engaged in hacking in anything like a grand scale, like some scattered spider. But I spent a lot of time learning how systems worked and figuring out how to set systems up and take them down. I’ve always been more on the white hat side. I think that’s probably what caught their attention – I wasn’t trying to break into things for the thrill of it; I was just trying to learn.” His earlier understanding of computers and programming came from an older sister who was away at college. “She would come home from college every now and then with books or materials, and I would just devour them. I found them fascinating. She’d come home with these various programming books, and I would just think ‘Oh, what’s that?’ So, I’d try to figure it out.” He was less than 10 years old and already displaying some of the key characteristics of a hacker: an intense curiosity and desire to understand. But he had no concept of hacking or hackers. His motivation was simply to do what he enjoyed and have fun doing it – a motivation that has stayed with him through life. Later, in high school, he started to learn about computers and computing. He clearly excelled since he was recruited by the NSA before even working toward a degree. He understood the concept of hacking, and obviously dabbled, but solely out of curiosity and the desire to have fun. “I had been spending a lot of time on IRC,” he explains, and it was here that he met the Air Force guy who recommended him to the NSA. Asked if he did anything ‘shady’ with his growing knowledge, he said ‘No’. Pressed on the subject (‘What – not even breaking into the school’s computer network?’), he simply replied, “I don’t think that’s shady – it’s just de rigueur if you’re into programming and at school.” He doesn’t say he did do this, but clearly implies he did this or similar. “My definition of a hacker is somebody who likes to find a way around a control or a security system to get things to behave in ways that were unintended.” Note that he doesn’t specify any motivating purpose for hacking. For Liu, the act of hacking stands alone. It is the purpose of the hacker that differentiates between black and white hat hacking. “I think intent is really important. There’s exploring, and then there’s exploring for the purpose of destroying or hurting or harming. There’s a distinction between those two things.” Liu liked to explore constantly, freely, for fun – but never harm. It is perhaps this total absence of any malicious intent from Liu that makes him reticent about his own hacking career. Asked if he had ever considered selling his discoveries on the dark web, he replied that he couldn’t because it didn’t exist at the time. “When I started, in the first half of the 1990s, there was no dark web.” Again, we have this minor evasion of the point of the question – he didn’t, not because he wouldn’t, but because he couldn’t. But his answer was accurate: the dark web didn’t really evolve until after the Tor project software was released in 2002 and the Tor browser arrived around 2008. Despite the apparent slight contradictions in his history (being involved in hacking within the NSA and considering breaking into school computer networks just par for the course), Liu clearly has a strong moral compass. He got into hacking solely for the purpose of having fun. He could do it, he enjoyed it, but he never had any malicious intent. This moral compass came, he believes, “From both my parents and early educators, who I think were very good role models.” This suggests he believes that morality is something learned, not something innate. Statistically, many hackers are neurodiverse. Neurodiversity simply indicates a brain and thought processes that are out of the norm. For hackers, it is often evident in ADHD and ASD (the latter was formerly called ‘Asperger’s syndrome’). It helps with what ‘normies’ (the majority of non-neurodiverse people) might consider to be thinking outside of the box, and engaging in long periods of sustained and deep concentration – both of which are clearly beneficial attributes for a hacker. Is Liu neurodiverse? “No. I don’t consider myself to be neurodiverse,” he says. “My wife would call me nuts, but I don’t think I’m neurodiverse in the traditional sense. I just really enjoy what I do.” Liu was only 17 when he took his first formal employment working for the NSA. This was in 1999. “I was a full-time employee,” he explains, “but they let me take classes.” It is difficult to classify what he did within the NSA, which he merely states as ‘externally facing’. Let’s assume he was a hacker for the NSA. Could that be considered black hat, since it would clearly intend some form of harm to the target? Or is any form of hacking for the good guys automatically white hat? Either way, his career after the NSA was clearly and increasingly white hat. During his two years at the NSA, the commercial ‘civilian’ security industry went through a rapid expansion, and “They started hiring a lot of my colleagues, especially the ones I really got along with.” @stake was founded in 1999, the same year he joined the NSA. A year later, @stake acquired Lopht Heavy Industries, an organization that had been a major magnet for serious and well-known hackers (including Weld Pond, Kingpin and Space Rogue). By 2001, he realized that everyone was leaving to join private industry. “I decided to do the same. I left the NSA but first wanted to complete my degree course. That took another couple of years.” By the time he was 21, he had two years’ experience working for the NSA, a recently acquired degree in Computer Science, and considerable knowledge of what we should politely call offensive security. “In a lot of cases,” he comments, “hackers [by which he means both internal red teamers and external attackers] wind up understanding a system better than the original developers; because they’ve thought so deeply about the system and how to subvert its behavior.” This is by no means a simple process – and hackers are as prone to burnout as any other security practitioner. “I’ve seen a lot of brilliant, brilliant hackers – I mean real next level folks – burn out and just lose it.” With his CV, he was never likely to have difficulty finding employment in the private sector. In 2003 he started work as a Security Consultant at the Advanced Security Center, Ernst & Young LLP, where he re-acquainted with Fran Brown. He and Brown had been in the same hall in college freshman year, and they took the same courses. Within 18 months they were both recruited by Honeywell. Together they led Honeywell’s global penetration testing team. This time, he, well they, stayed for just 16 months. They began to get additional sub-contracting work on the side, “from friends who needed help”. They were already thinking about what to do next, and decided, “Hey, yeah, why not?” Bishop Fox was the ultimate answer to this question, although the precise route is difficult to plot. Both Liu and Brown indicate they left Honeywell and moved immediately into Bishop Fox, which they co-founded. Liu’s LinkedIn profile suggests he did this the year before leaving Honeywell. Brown’s profile suggests it was concurrent with leaving Honeywell. But the name Bishop Fox is a rebranding of the firm Stach & Liu LLC, which happened in 2014. Stach and Liu was itself not founded, according to Dun & Bradstreet, until 2011. It was rebranded to Bishop Fox in 2013 – possibly because the former sounds more like a law firm while the latter symbolizes both the protective and aggressive aspects of penetration testing and red teaming. Nevertheless, regardless of the circuitous route to Bishop Fox, Liu and Brown founded a company that is now widely considered to be a top-tier authority in offensive security. Liu, as its CEO, has progressed from an offensive security performer to an offensive security ringmaster. Is he still a hacker? “I’d like to think so. And certainly I would have given you a very affirmative ‘Yes’ 10 years ago. These days, I think my team thinks I’m a little out of date, but I’ve spent a large part of my career hacking into things. More recently I spend time managing the firm, but, yeah, I would like to think I’m still a hacker.” Still this slight reticence in clearly stating he is a hacker. He clearly is a hacker – and since hacking is as much a state of mind as physical process, once a hacker, always a hacker. The clarity, however, is that he, Fran Brown, and the entire Bishop Fox organization are hackers for good. Related: Hacker Conversations: Isira Adithya, the Evolution of an Ethical Hacker Related: Hacker Conversations: Joey Melo on Hacking AI Related: Hacker Conversations: Tal Kollander’s Journey From Black Hat to Hack Blocker
securityweek.comSep 10, 2026extracted
Operación internacional para interrumpir la infraestructura del botnet Sality
Operación internacional para interrumpir la infraestructura del botnet Sality 10/09/2026 Jue, 10/09/2026 - 11:33 El 31 de agosto de 2026 se llevó a cabo una operación internacional dirigida contra la infraestructura de la botnet Sality, una red P2P utilizada durante más de dos décadas para distribuir cargas maliciosas en equipos comprometidos. La operación estuvo liderada por autoridades estadounidenses y contó con la participación de organismos de Bulgaria, Hungría y Rumanía, con el apoyo de Europol, Eurojust y empresas privadas especializadas en ciberseguridad. Sality había estado activo desde al menos 2003 y, según Europol, en su momento de mayor actividad podía proporcionar a sus operadores acceso a hasta un millón de equipos infectados; a lo largo de los años se asociaron más de 11 millones de direcciones IP únicas con su infraestructura. La actuación se dirigió contra los equipos que formaban parte de la infraestructura P2P de Sality y contra los dominios empleados por la botnet . Las autoridades estadounidenses incautaron dominios vinculados a Sality en EE. UU., mientras que las autoridades de Bulgaria, Hungría y Rumanía actuaron sobre infraestructura adicional localizada en Europa. Paralelamente, CrowdStrike y la Shadowserver Foundation proporcionaron capacidades de inteligencia y análisis técnico y ejecutaron una operación de sinkholing P2P, mediante la cual las comunicaciones de los equipos infectados fueron redirigidas desde la infraestructura criminal. Esta actuación permitió aislar los dispositivos comprometidos y dejar inoperativa la capacidad de comunicación utilizada por el operador. Shadowserver comenzó además a colaborar con proveedores de servicios de Internet y equipos de respuesta a incidentes para identificar sistemas infectados y facilitar la notificación y remediación de las víctimas. Según la información publicada por Europol y los organismos participantes, la operación ha conseguido interrumpir la infraestructura de Sality y dejar inoperativo su canal de control, pero esto no equivale a que el malware haya sido eliminado automáticamente de todos los equipos que habían sido infectados. Las organizaciones participantes mantienen actuaciones destinadas a identificar las infecciones y facilitar la remediación de los sistemas afectados. Europol señala además que la operación es el resultado de varios años de cooperación internacional y que desde 2017 había apoyado a las autoridades en la identificación y desmantelamiento progresivo de componentes de la infraestructura de Sality. En consecuencia, el estado comunicado oficialmente es el de una infraestructura criminal interrumpida, con los equipos que permanecían infectados aislados de la infraestructura del operador y con actuaciones de identificación y remediación de las víctimas todavía en curso.   Referencias 31/08/2026 CrowdStrike Peer Pressure: Inside the Sality Botnet Disruption Operation 01/09/2026 U.S. Department of Justice Sality Malware Disrupted in International Cyber Takedown 01/09/2026 Reuters Russian cybercrime operation being dismantled after two decades, US officials and CrowdStrike say 02/09/2026 Europol Global public-private operation disrupts Sality botnet active for two decades Etiquetas Botnet Ciberdelito
incibe.esSep 10, 2026extracted
AI adoption brings new security headaches for already stretched CISOs
AI adoption brings new security headaches for already stretched CISOs CISOs are taking on AI governance without a matching increase in resources or expertise, adding to an already broad remit spanning data protection, identity, resilience and compliance, according to Proofpoint’s 2026 Voice of the CISO report. The Al mandate expands faster than resources (Source: Proofpoint) AI adds to security responsibilities GenAI is creating new concerns around sensitive data, access and employee activity. Seventy-eight percent of CISOs consider it a security risk, with the potential loss of customer data through public AI platforms a key concern. Companies are responding with tighter controls, including restrictions on employee use. They are also looking at AI-powered security tools to reduce human error and counter threats, while making the safe use of assistants, copilots and automation a priority. The added responsibility is not necessarily coming with additional support. Seventy-nine percent of CISOs say they are expected to manage AI-related risks without a proportional increase in resources or expertise. The task is becoming harder as AI moves beyond standalone tools and into applications employees already use for everyday work. Governance will need to go beyond simply allowing or blocking individual tools. Security teams will need to apply policies across the platforms where employees access data, use AI and automate tasks, while being able to respond to risks as they emerge. India recorded the highest GenAI security concern and AI resource gap, France had the highest level of restrictions on employee GenAI use, and Singapore recorded the greatest concern about employees exposing sensitive data through AI. Attack expectations decline as workplace risks grow Sixty-one percent of security leaders believe their organization could face one in the next 12 months, down from 76% in 2025. Reports of material data loss have also declined, although more than half still say their organization is unprepared for a targeted attack. The threats drawing the most attention are changing too. Cloud account takeover or compromise now tops the list, while email fraud, ransomware and malware have fallen in the rankings. That puts more focus on protecting the accounts and services employees depend on to work, communicate and access company information. Workplace technology itself is another source of concern. Collaboration platforms rank first for technologies that could introduce security risks. SaaS applications with third-party integrations and AI built into business workflows also rank highly, followed by public GenAI tools, cloud storage and automation technologies. Employees use these services to communicate, share files and work with company data, often moving information between connected applications. That makes identity, permissions and data movement increasingly important parts of workplace security. Human risk remains a major data security concern Human risk is the biggest cyber vulnerability for 79% of respondents, and the data-loss findings show why. For organizations that experienced material loss of sensitive information, malicious or criminal insiders were the most commonly identified root cause. Careless and compromised insiders were also prominent, alongside AI misuse or misconfiguration, external attacks and third-party compromise. The findings show how data loss can involve a mix of employee behavior, compromised identities and the tools people use at work. Departing employees are a particular concern. At organizations that experienced material data loss, 93% of security leaders said employees leaving the business played a role. Security teams report strong visibility into the number of data repositories and GenAI tools in use. The harder part is turning that visibility into controls that account for user intent, data sensitivity, permissions and how information moves between different work environments. Data loss carries greater business consequences Fewer organizations are reporting material data loss, but the consequences are becoming more serious when incidents occur. Regulatory sanctions, financial losses, recovery costs and reputational damage have all increased, while credential theft and the loss of critical data remain significant concerns. “Stronger board alignment is a positive sign, but it also raises expectations. Cybersecurity is now discussed in terms of valuation, downtime, reputation, customer trust, and operational disruption. That is the right conversation, but CISOs need more than attention from the boardroom; they need clear authority, specialist expertise, and sustained support. The goal is not simply to report cyber risk more effectively, but to turn board-level understanding into better business decisions,” said Patrick Joyce, Global Resident CISO at Proofpoint. Data protection is becoming more closely connected with identity security and AI governance. Most security leaders say they have visibility and control over sensitive data across cloud services, collaboration tools, endpoints and AI systems, and believe their existing controls address the risks associated with AI, SaaS applications and modern work practices.
helpnetsecurity.comSep 10, 2026extracted
FBI puts its cyber strategy on paper
FBI puts its cyber strategy on paper The FBI on Wednesday released its first-ever public cybersecurity strategy that details how the agency will combat malicious hackers and digital criminal gangs. “This is a comprehensive strategy that directs our teams, our field offices, our global presence, and how we are to align all our efforts to counter this work,” Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, told reporters during a roundtable discussion at the Billington Cybersecurity Summit in Washington, D.C. “We know that cybercrime and nation-state hacking right now is continuing to increase in complexity, sophistication and tempo,” he added. “For us, it's important that we prioritize how we approach this because when you can't handle every little thing that happens out there, you've got to prioritize what you do and how you do it as well.” The bureau has had similar strategies in place before, however they have either been classified or largely handled by specific threat units. The 17-page document, which has no classified annex, comes after the FBI has conducted 50 so-called “sequenced operations” since the start of 2025, including high-profile efforts to drive Russian military intelligence services from vulnerable U.S. home routers and a joint endeavor with Microsoft to take down the infrastructure of the Lumma malware. Leatherman said the document builds on the Trump administration’s cybersecurity strategy, the recent executive order on countering digital criminals and fraud and the memorandum issued last month that will allow for private industry to participate in disruptive online operations. ‘Pillars’ for cyber ops The inaugural document details four “pillars” for how the bureau will operate under its criminal and national security cyber authorities, from imposing costs on adversaries and victim support to working with industry and boosting the FBI’s own digital capabilities. Leatherman said the overarching plan would spur the Cyber Division’s threat teams — devoted to countering China, Russia, criminal gangs and more — to develop their own classified strategies that will eventually be welded together. However, there is no implementation plan yet. “We're working on that portion next, but there's no time limit by which to do it,” he told reporters. “Many of the teams already have strategies in place that they will adjust to to conform to this strategy.” He said the Cyber Division would use the same metrics as the rest of the law enforcement agency to determine its success, such as how many people are arrested, how much money is recovered and how many victims are engaged. “The most important change I hope people will see is that we don't sit and wait for the best opportunity to take action,” according to Leatherman. “As opposed to waiting for large joint sequenced operations that happen half a dozen times a year, you're going to start to see many more of those of consequence because we are engaged in that urgent steady state opportunity to disrupt adversaries.” The increased tempo, coupled with the bureau’s recent actions, will “hopefully” lead to a reduction in digital threats, he said. “We're not under the illusion that we'll ever negate the cyber threat directive in the United States, but our goal is to change behavior, and I believe we're doing that,” Leatherman said, pointing to dips in ransomware payments and what he described as behavior changes by companies that support nation-state hacking regimes. “I believe that we're having an impact. I believe that signaling what we're what we're doing here over the last six months and will continue to do here in the next six to 12 months, I believe will have a determined impact. Americans will see a positive change to the result of that.” Martin Matishak is the senior cybersecurity reporter for The Record. Prior to joining Recorded Future News in 2021, he spent more than five years at Politico, where he covered digital and national security developments across Capitol Hill, the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community. He previously was a reporter at The Hill, National Journal Group and Inside Washington Publishers.
therecord.mediaSep 9, 2026extracted
Zscaler Agentic SOC combines AI agents with zero trust telemetry
Zscaler Agentic SOC combines AI agents with zero trust telemetry Zscaler has announced Zscaler Agentic SOC, a new approach to security operations built to proactively reduce exposures, scale human expertise and stop AI-driven attacks at machine speed. Simply layering in AI capabilities onto the existing security stack will not provide the protection needed. Zscaler is delivering a new solution to the security operations center (SOC), purpose-built from the ground up with an AI-first approach to detect, investigate, and stop threats at machine speed. Threat landscape is defined by speed and stealth as AI-driven attacks move faster than SOC teams can manually correlate, analyze, and remediate. Threatlabz, Zscaler’s global research team, is also seeing a rise in evasive tactics, including the use of trusted sites to host attacks, abuse of legitimate remote management tools, and browser-based attacks. Zscaler Agentic SOC is built to meet that challenge by combining unique Zscaler telemetry, the world’s largest decoy mesh network, expert-validated agents, integrated Zscaler Zero Trust controls, and customers’ third-party controls to detect threats earlier and automate containment at machine speed. To power Agentic SOC, Zscaler has partnered with leading frontier AI labs, including Anthropic and OpenAI. By integrating their frontier models alongside Zscaler’s proprietary threat intelligence and zero trust telemetry, Zscaler is able to deliver AI agents that reason with greater depth, accuracy, and explainability than any single model or approach could achieve alone. This extends beyond threat detection, with Zscaler’s open platform approach enabling direct integration with frontier models, allowing security teams to ingest vulnerability findings and operationalize them within their SOC workflows. This collaboration reflects Zscaler’s commitment to building on the best available AI that includes speed, reliability and transparency that security operations demand. “AI-driven attacks are moving faster than traditional SOC models were ever designed to handle,” said Deepen Desai, EVP of Cybersecurity at Zscaler. “Agentic SOC is a fundamental rethinking of security operations, built with agentic capabilities at its core to reduce exposures proactively, extend human expertise with AI agents and contain threats at machine speed. With unmatched inline telemetry, specialized AI agents and closed-loop remediation, Zscaler is giving security teams the visibility and control they need to outpace modern attackers.” “The past year has made one thing clear: AI attacks are fundamentally changing the threat landscape, operating at a speed, scale, and level of adaptability that looks very different from traditional human-led activity,” said Allie Mellen, principal analyst and author of Code War: How Nations Hack, Spy, and Shape the Digital Battlefield. “To defend effectively, organizations must double down on the fundamentals — Zero Trust principles, preventing data exfiltration, limiting access, and making AI attacks as expensive as possible.” Reimagining SecOps: The Zscaler differentiation Unified exposure and threat management: Zscaler connects proactive attack surface reduction with reactive threat defense in a single platform, enriching context and accelerating protection. Unmatched zero trust telemetry: Zscaler sits inline, capturing network, identity, endpoint, cloud and AI insights across its 750 billion daily zero trust transactions that security teams can operationalize for real-time detection and response. Specialized AI agents built on frontline experience: Zscaler AI agents have been trained and continuously tuned on more than 10 years of frontline SOC, managed detection and response and threat-hunting experience, informed by threat intelligence derived from thousands of customer environments globally. Closed-loop inline remediation: Zscaler automatically contains threats at machine speed with native inline controls that can isolate compromised users, block command-and-control communications, and cut off lateral movement. Integrations with customers’ third-party tooling provide increased options for nuanced responses to active threats. “Our team was drowning in alert noise, forcing top analysts into triage instead of proactive threat hunting,” said Andrea Liccardi, Sr. Cybersecurity Manager, Maire Tecnimont. “Zscaler Agentic SOC gives us full attack-path context using telemetry we already had in place, helping our team move from fragmented signals to faster, more informed decisions. Zscaler has proven to be one of our most valuable cybersecurity partners, continuously helping us improve operational efficiency, visibility, and our ability to focus our analysts on what really matters.” Open platform integration Zscaler Agentic SOC seamlessly integrates with your existing security ecosystem, pulling in third-party data to contextualize risks and threats. By triggering automated outbound actions, it proactively eliminates exposures and contains attacks at machine speed. Key features of Zscaler Agentic SOC: Data-rich context graph: Correlates real-time zero trust telemetry with third-party data to map, prioritize and investigate complex incident chains. Specialized AI agents: Autonomous agents perform dedicated roles across triage, root-cause investigation, assigning verdicts, and triggering response workflows, reducing analyst workload and accelerating defenses. Advanced detections informed by threat intelligence: Applies frontline threat research and rich telemetry to identify sophisticated attacks earlier and with greater precision. Continuous threat hunting and expert support: Combines AI speed with seasoned human judgment from Zscaler and Red Canary security experts.
helpnetsecurity.comSep 9, 2026extracted
Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure
A recent Unit 42 investigation into seemingly low-priority enterprise infections demonstrates how the most effective camouflage in cybercrime is not necessarily in the use of sophisticated techniques, but in how unremarkable the threat appears. The activities that we investigated would typically not require escalation or further inquiry. But upon closer inspection, we discovered a massive cybercrime campaign largely targeting young gamers. Tracked as CL-CRI-1171, in accordance with Unit 42’s attribution framework, the group behind this cluster has operated under the radar for at least two years, distributing an indeterminate number of payloads. The group behind CL-CRI-1171 provides an infection service for other threat actors who want to spread their malware indiscriminately. This pay-per-install (PPI) marketplace drove hundreds of infections through YouTube channels and a parallel search engine optimization (SEO)-poisoning funnel, all using the same custom loader. We observed at least eleven YouTube channels that had hundreds of thousands of followers. We notified YouTube of these channels, which it promptly terminated. These channels were actively interacting with viewers to promote gaming content laced with links to download malware. Content in the channels included advice on improving frame rates, fixing game crashes and adjusting settings on game platforms. Although the videos provided real content for gamers, they also served as the delivery vehicle for infection, prompting viewers to download malicious tools. The SEO funnel targeted a more professional audience, promoting trojanized software that resulted in malware deployment on corporate endpoints, including critical infrastructure and even government entities. We identified three independent payloads delivered by the same loader between July 2025 and April 2026: two never publicly reported, Docro Hijacker and ARKTunnel, and a new variant of a previously unnamed backdoor, which we dubbed Insomnia remote access Trojan (RAT). These infections represent only a small sample of a much larger deployment campaign. We have identified more than 10,000 distinct loader samples, each capable of delivering unique payload combinations. We provide an overview of the cybercrime cluster and its loader infrastructure, and a technical analysis of three recently delivered malware strains. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed in this article through the following: If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team. Our discovery of two separate infections delivering three entirely distinct malware families revealed one common denominator: a shared loader. By tracing this infrastructure, we mapped the broader activity of CL-CRI-1171, ultimately tying the cluster to a PPI marketplace responsible for delivering countless payloads over the last two years. This operation uses at least two funneling mechanisms to route traffic to the malware landing pages: a network of YouTube channels and SEO poisoning. The shared infrastructure between the YouTube and SEO funnels, consistent use of the same loader and a rotational domain pattern observed over an eight-month window all pointed to a single sustained operation, which we track as CL-CRI-1171. PPI networks operate as underground marketplaces. An operator compromises machines and auctions access to multiple buyers, each buyer deploying their own independent payloads through the same dropper. The result is a single infection that conceals multiple payloads from unrelated threat actors on the same endpoint, each with its own C2 infrastructure and objectives. Because the loader is designed to be disposable and generic, it rarely attracts the scrutiny needed to uncover its subsequent payloads. The investigation began with two identical and seemingly routine infections at separate organizations. Both events involved trojanized software downloads — one a Bluetooth driver, the other WinDirStat — and both affected machines executed an identical post-exploitation chain. The loader was unnamed, untracked and generic enough to be dismissed as commodity adware. But our discovery of a shared payload chain raised a question. How were two unrelated organizations infected by the same unnamed loader delivering the same set of payloads, just one week apart? Pivoting on the loader's C2 infrastructure revealed a sprawling network of rotational domains — over 200 unique hostnames following a distinctive two-word compound naming pattern (including bubbleslip, churchpail, dinosaursjam), rotating across .xyz, .cfd, .space and .info top-level domains (TLDs). The payloads delivered through CL-CRI-1171's infrastructure are not fixed, enabling the simultaneous delivery of unrelated malware families. In April 2026, two incidents initiated this investigation. They shared a single loader that delivered three separate malware families: Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel and Docro Hijacker. A subsequent infection, observed in June 2026, delivered two entirely different payloads: GCleaner and Socks5Systemz. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the operational architecture and the observed rotational malware bundles. Our in-depth analysis explores three operations that were spotted in two intrusion sets during April 2026. By examining the campaign’s trackers, we found that these operation payloads were in rotation from July 2025 to April 2026. This discovery provides a valuable snapshot of the group’s deployment capabilities and the variety of payloads they have been entrusted to deliver. Although the observed rotation appears to be highly structured, the discovery of over 10,000 unique OfferLoader samples points to a much larger distribution pipeline. It is very likely that the loader has delivered numerous other malware families. The SEO poisoning path was the first delivery channel we identified. Unsuspecting users searching for legitimate software landed on file-hosting lure pages that displayed a fake virus-scan animation before delivering the trojanized archive via a chain of redirectors into the PPI gate. A reconstructed example download page from the SEO poisoning funnel is shown in Figure 2. Analysis of the gate's tracker URLs revealed a critical detail. Each URL contained a click_id parameter: a Base64-encoded fingerprint containing the victim's operating system (OS), browser, the referring domain, the exact search keyword that led them to the lure and their public IP address, as Table 1 shows. Table 1. Example of a deobfuscated click_id. The gate uses this fingerprint to decide who receives the payload: a valid, fresh click_id forwards the visitor to the malware/loader download. This is an evasion tactic used to ensure that only real targets are infected, and to protect the actor’s infrastructure: scanners, crawlers or analysts receive a decoy clone of the legitimate WinRAR download page or broken links. This is why the campaign has almost no public footprint despite being highly active: automated URL scanners rarely pass the gate. Decoding hundreds of these fingerprints, with the assistance of AI, exposed the full names of YouTube video titles and their associated channels. Alongside search keywords for cracked software and game cheats, the q= field – which tracks which search query led to the infection – contained strings like "CS2 Potato Graphics Settings - Maximum FPS Boost for Low-End PC (2026 Guide) - Velvox." Searching for titles derived from the fingerprints led us to uncover a chain of gaming optimization YouTube channels. Their content included tips on boosting frames per second (FPS), fixing game crashes and tweaking settings on popular game platforms. While the videos provided authentic, engaging content for young gamers, they ultimately served as an infection delivery vehicle, prompting viewers to download a malicious “tool” or “optimization pack” via links in the description, as Figure 3 shows. Those links pass through intermediary sites, such as Blogspot, which contain social-engineering instructions that lead the victim to the same PPI gate infrastructure serving the SEO path. An example blog page is shown in Figure 4. We identified 11 channels connected to CL-CRI-1171, which collectively had hundreds of thousands of subscribers and millions of views. Our investigation revealed three malware strains delivered by the group behind CL-CRI-1171 between June 2025 and April 2026. The following sections explain the technical aspects of the loader used by this cybercrime group and the deployed malware payloads: OfferLoader – The delivery mechanism behind all recorded intrusions, an Inno Setup trojanized installer that sets up the other payloads. Operation A: Insomnia RAT – A dual-payload, cross-platform backdoor that brings its own environment to ensure survival. Targeting both Windows and macOS using Node.js, paired with a twin Python agent. Operation B: ARKTunnel – A previously unreported WebSocket tunneling RAT unpacks itself from a bitmap image using steganography. We found 50 samples spanning over a year of development, operating across four fictitious corporate-identity rotations. Operation C: Docro Hijacker – A Chrome backdoor that revives a browser-hijacking technique first seen in 2015, re-engineered to bypass modern integrity protections. This campaign represents the first observation of this modern variant in the wild. We discovered two intrusion sets that began in the same way: a user searched for a legitimate utility, clicked a top search result that led to a malicious domain, and downloaded what appeared to be a legitimate application. Both infections delivered the same three payloads. First intrusion set: Downloaded Bluetooth Driver for Windows 10.exe from a file-sharing archive. The installer was a trojanized Inno Setup package carrying the PPI loader with affiliate ID CID=2855. Second intrusion set: Browsed to noiseship[.]cfd, a domain registered just 39 days earlier, and downloaded a trojanized windirstat.exe installer. This package carried the PPI loader with affiliate ID CID=3075. The operator's code and C2 communication designate each payload slot as an "offer," tracking variables as offer_execution, offer_execution_fail and offer_exists. Based on the naming convention, we track this loader as OfferLoader. OfferLoader uses chained Inno Setup (a legitimate installation packager) packages to deliver multiple payloads. Figure 5 shows the infection chain. OfferLoader is delivered in a ZIP file, with the source download site providing the social engineering instructions required to guide users through downloading and executing an extraction tool. Based on our analysis of the collected samples, we observed the loader being delivered alongside a legitimate version of WinRAR, renamed to .store. The installer contains no embedded application files; all malicious logic is contained in the compiled Pascal [Code] section, which triggers when the installation page is displayed. In two separate intrusion sets we discovered that the ZIP file contained OfferLoader masquerading as a windirstat.exe installer that initiates the compromise by unpacking windirstat.tmp. This temporary file transmits an initial tracking beacon to voyagemist[.]space. This is another gating mechanism: depending on the structure of the beacon, one of two text files will be retrieved. They either contain “no” to signal that the loader should not unpack further stages, or “ok” to signal all offers will be deployed. Following this check-in, the process spawns three child processes: eld0.exe, eld1.exe and eld2.exe. Each child process corresponds to a different malware campaign. The loader passes specific affiliate-tracking parameters to each process via a command line. Figure 6 illustrates the entire OfferLoader infection chain at the time of the intrusion. OfferLoader's role ends once the three offers are spawned. From this point forward, each child process operates as an independent malware campaign with its own infrastructure, C2 protocol and objectives. The following sections analyze what each offer delivers. Insomnia RAT simultaneously distributes two payloads: An upgraded variant of a Node.js backdoor (reported by Walmart Global Tech in 2025) A complementary Python backdoor We have dubbed these twin payloads Insomnia RAT, due to the user-agent string used for C2 communications: insomnia/2023.4.0 Windows. Figure 7 shows the full infection chain that delivers Insomnia RAT’s twin payloads. Eld0.exe drops the a.dll payload and spawns a hidden PowerShell process to download and execute t.ps1. This double-stage installer script disables Windows Defender protections, adds the entire C:\ drive as an exclusion, suppresses security notifications and deploys the two Insomnia RAT backdoors. t.ps1 also downloads and sets up the environment needed to execute both backdoors by installing Python and Node.js on the victim’s machine. Node.js is hidden from the system's Add/Remove Programs list by setting SystemComponent=1 in the registry. The first part of Insomnia RAT is a Node.js agent downloaded from stryper[.]info/aa.js. While the prior variant targeted Windows, Linux and FreeBSD with a single payload, this iteration targets Windows and macOS using platform-specific C2 server lists. It also deploys a companion Python agent as a redundant fallback, ensuring persistent access if one runtime environment is detected or removed. The backdoor collects the victim's MachineGuid, universally unique identifier (UUID), hostname and operating system details. It then contacts its C2 servers via an HTTPS POST request to /d using a User-Agent string, insomnia/2023.4.0 Windows to disguise itself. The C2 server responds with a JSON array containing commands. These specify a payload type (node, cmd, ps1, sh, or ow for a self-update) and a download URL. Results are reported back to the /e endpoint. To establish persistence, the installer registers a scheduled task named Maps Performance Task under \Microsoft\Windows\Maps\. This mimics a legitimate Windows task, executing the backdoor hourly and at system startup under the SYSTEM account. The same t.ps1 script installs a second, redundant agent. This Python script is downloaded from aa.amazingshield[.]xyz. The installer downloads a legitimate Python distribution and registers a second scheduled task, OOBETaskScheduler, under \Microsoft\Windows\Servicing\. The Python agent is simpler than its Node.js sibling, but follows the same C2 protocol pattern: POST requests to /d for tasks and POST requests to /e for error reporting. The agent collects the MachineGuid, OS product name, hostname and processor architecture. The Python agent used crowdstri[.]com as its C2 domain. This appears to be a deliberate typosquat of crowdstrike[.]com, designed to blend into logs and evade quick security reviews. The eld1.exe chain terminates in a previously undocumented tunnel payload. The chain uses least-significant-bit (LSB) steganography to deploy the final payload. Figure 8 shows the full infection chain of Operation B. Rather than dropping an executable directly to disk, eld1.exe extracts a ZIP archive from a BMP image resource using LSB steganography. The result is the payload archive, ProcorTrex.zip, which contains wscl.exe, a previously unreported WebSocket-based tunneling RAT. We named this RAT ARKTunnel, based on the attacker's fabricated company name rotation of EarthKark and TamarkLark. ARKTunnel installs itself as a Windows service named wscl-13 or msvcsrvc with a delayed autostart configuration. The RAT supports TCP and UDP tunneling, as well as file execution. The C2 server address, reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca, is decoded from a 39-byte configuration blob using Base64-decoding followed by an XOR decryption routine. The portable executable (PE) metadata of wscl.exe contains a fabricated company name, TamarkLark Corporation, and a fictitious product name, TamarkLark Manager, which led us to suspect that other ARKTunnel samples might use additional fabricated company names. The investigation revealed at least 50 samples deployed over the course of a year. The developer rotated through at least two fake company identities while maintaining an identical icon, binary structure and deployment pattern: EarthLink in May 2025: EarthLink is the name of a legitimate internet provider, however the attackers used this name coincidentally in the file version information. The attackers did not use or impersonate EarthLink resources or identity. EarthChain from May 2025–April 2026: EarthChain is also real company name that the attackers used coincidentally. Likewise, also they did not use or impersonate the company’s resources or identity. EarthKark: A fake identity, used from February 2026–June 2026 TamarkLark: A fake identity, used from March 2026–June 2026 All of the samples share the same wscl.exe filename pattern and GUID-based temp directory extraction pattern, indicating that they are variants of the same family. Despite 50 samples spanning a full year of development and four identity rotations, ARKTunnel has attracted no public reporting or dedicated tracking, with each sample individually flagged as a generic Trojan rather than recognized as a tunneling implant. The eld2.exe payload installs a Chrome browser hijacker that we have named Docro Hijacker. The hijacker revives a browser-hijacking technique that has resurfaced periodically since 2015, now re-engineered to bypass updates to Chrome's integrity protections. While this iteration closely mirrors a proof-of-concept detailed by Synacktiv in 2025, this campaign marks the updated technique’s first documented instance of in-the-wild deployment. Figure 9 shows the Docro Hijacker installation chain. eld2.exe is an Inno Setup package, and much like its loader, it extracts and runs eld2.tmp which contacts the affiliate’s extentrack[.]com install tracker. eld2.tmp drops and loads Adblock.dll, which bypasses Chrome's Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity check. The DLL extracts Chrome's HMAC key from resources.pak, computes valid HMAC signatures for the modified preference values and writes them directly to the Secure Preferences file. This file functions as an anti-tamper mechanism for browsers by storing a validated copy of the user's settings. This manipulation allows the malware to execute two primary actions: Search hijacking: Changes the default search provider to mqsearch[.]com, a domain that masquerades as a search engine Extension installation: Installs the docro extension, a Chrome Manifest V3 extension located at C:\ProgramData\DocsHelper\docro\ The docro extension uses Chrome's declarativeNetRequest API to dynamically rewrite network requests. Upon installation, it contacts vendralo[.]info to retrieve a unique per-victim UUID and fetch a set of network rewriting rules that are refreshed hourly. These rules are used to hijack and monetize search results in the victim's browser. When the victim performs an internet search, across any of more than 190 Google country-code domains, the extension loads a script from drelto[.]info/farlix into the search results page. Because the script runs within the search engine's own origin context, it has full access to the page content. This enables the operator to inject advertisements into organic search results, rewrite affiliate links to capture referral revenue and/or redirect clicks to attacker-controlled destinations. These actions are functionally transparent to the user and visually indistinguishable from the legitimate search page. The extension also checks vendralo[.]info for updates via /extensionInstaller/updateChromeExtension, allowing the operator to silently rotate to a new extension version at any time. Install telemetry is reported to finersto[.]com and extentrack[.]com. With more than 50 unique samples contacting mqsearch[.]com according to VirusTotal, Docro Hijacker appears to be a mature, independent monetization module. The actors behind CL-CRI-1171 did not use sophisticated evasion techniques, but focused their efforts on building a loader that is exceptionally difficult to track due to its clever gating mechanisms. Our investigation highlights how the authors of OfferLoader, by being intentional about its simplicity and by hiding all of its functions as bytecode within a package, designed the malware to evade scrutiny while quietly building a massive, mature infection funnel. Although OfferLoader was easy for defenders and security products to miss, its gating mechanisms were not, and the sheer number of them was our first clue that more widespread activity was occurring. While a loader that just drops a payload is seemingly routine, this mechanism allowed possibly thousands of rotational malware bundles, including entirely new and undocumented malware families, to remain hidden from standard security attention. Ultimately, this case serves as a critical reminder for defenders: Treating commodity loader infections as minor, routine events overlooks the dangerous payloads and campaigns that might be tied to them. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected against the threats described in this report through the following products and services: The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the indicators shared in this research. Through continuous cloud-based analysis, Advanced WildFire is designed to proactively identify and block OfferLoader samples as well as downstream payloads, including Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker. Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious. Cortex XDR and XSIAM can help detect and prevent the OfferLoader chain and all three payload branches described in this article. Cortex customers benefit from multiple layers of protection against this threat, including: - YARA-based signatures targeting the OfferLoader family and its staged payloads - Behavioral detection rules that help prevent: - Malicious Chrome extension setup - Untrusted service installations used for persistence - Trojanized installer execution patterns If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42) UK: +44.20.3743.3660 Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130 Asia: +65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Australia: +61.2.4062.7950 India: 000 800 050 45107 South Korea: +82.080.467.8774 Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. SHA256 hash: 7f792c45de1e28fd42ac44c9444f157a2161742d130bac336c0e991aabbb112c File name: windirstat.exe File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup 6.7.1 File description: OfferLoader trojanized WinDirStat installer delivered via SEO-poisoning SHA256 hash: fc485882626512e7ff82a1d7cd8e8fb3e9751b026d97e682d6908aefff1f2d73 File name: windirstat.tmp File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup unpacked stage File description: Unpacked WinDirStat stage SHA256 hash: 3052bd320a34e12ee694811ed0578797477dfd480c664491e509ed15ce1a6961 File name: eld0.exe File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup 6.3.0 SetupLdr File description: Insomnia RAT initial loader SHA256 hash: 25558ea78c4aa0fdd0f45fafcaa546d3115dc5806809d144a5801a40e48fd4c5 File name: eld0.tmp File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup unpacked stage File description: Unpacked loader stage SHA256 hash: 9b0d9cbc0fd4a7bae8b78a15dfbe63052779414ad725845732c4a0083008da69 File name: a.dll File type: PE32 DLL File description: Executes the PowerShell downloader for the Node.js and Python second stages SHA256 hash: ceb30a5eb9ad9d9c6712c80726df16f96f99d9fc0753be241b00b4d636eb576e File name: t.ps1 File type: PowerShell File description: Insomnia RAT PowerShell loader SHA256 hash: cf184d04ca31fb2b6b7efd85399c29c1136b539153e137ceb3877b1b905791de File name: .py File type: Python script File description: the Python-based component of the Insomnia RAT dual payload. SHA256 hash: 62d49d0c78207ec2452cc8a30501db771c9edbae89889e41a7dd227551243e8e File name: aa.js File type: JavaScript File description: the Node.js-based component of the Insomnia RAT dual payload. URL: hxxps[:]//stryper[.]info/t.ps1 Description: Stage-2 PowerShell installer for the Node.js and Python agents URL: hxxps[:]//stryper[.]info/aa.js Description: Stage-3 Node.js agent URL: hxxp[:]//aa.amazingshield[.]xyz/33244556546.py Description: Stage-3 Python agent Domain: stryper[.]info Description: Second-stage PowerShell and Node.js agent host Domain: aa.amazingshield[.]xyz Description: Python agent host Domain: crowdstri[.]com Description: CrowdStrike-typosquat C2 for the Python agent SHA256 hash: aaebc8c07de485be6d1bfa956668c5e18aa1ff5588dfe84672e20ae90b4560f1 File name: eld1.exe File type: PE32 executable File description: LSB-steganography dropper. The attacker forged the PE version-info resource to mimic a popular test proctoring application. SHA256 hash: e05bc22afbc5ddd50b49c85ee169dd13318000d38286de2b8bcff98217256a8d File size: 92,657 bytes File name: procorTrex.zip File location: C:\Users\Public\procorTrex.zip File type: ZIP archive File description: ZIP carved from the eld1.exe BMP steganography payload SHA256 hash: b367762140ae7f5098230b8a5da738c9241f286281ec9439dd6ca581fc87989c File size: 245,248 bytes File name: wscl.exe File type: PE32 executable File description: WebSocket tunneling RAT ARKTunnel resource icons: SHA256 hash: d8d783f8e050a6e394f3c0aa5e2bc73a38d822e55fbc39c0648cbff566de3cdf File description: Resource Icon shared across ARKTunnel samples SHA256 hash: 06e0afd01bbc6c9d5dc16c3165089b233dc071e1f251abd06235d1b9166cdac5 File description: Resource Icon shared across ARKTunnel samples Domain: reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca Description: wscl.exe WebSocket RAT C2 SHA256 hash: 2c6e11027b011042c9a118fc20728f8f4ebb6be8795cc84cc9a45622c297d354 File name: eld2.exe File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup installer File description: Branch C installer that drops Adblock.dll and the docro Chrome extension SHA256 hash: 553ce594c9c6afdd4794fddc28c194e3bc3c1b052310e5099c58ac15bab72104 File name: eld2.tmp File type: PE32 executable File description: Inno Setup unpacked stage SHA256 hash: fdcc95b7791c0d6590dcf1a412dc9fcc92ad2095818d1b78368b31efad012007 File size: 3,041,280 bytes File name: Adblock.dll File location: %TEMP%\Adblock.dll File type: PE32 DLL File description: Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 bypass DLL that sideloads the docro extension and hijacks the default search provider Docro extension path: File location: C:\ProgramData\DocsHelper\docro File description: Manifest V3 Chrome extension sideloaded by Adblock.dll Domain: vendralo[.]info Description: Per-victim UUID and hourly rule delivery Domain: finersto[.]com Description: Extension install and start telemetry Domain: drelto[.]info Description: SERP-injection script host Domain: mqsearch[.]com Description: Hijacked the default search provider endpoint Domain: extentrack[.]com Description: Docs Helper install-success and install-failure callback Domain: animalview[.]xyz trickflag[.]info suitstraw[.]info connect.fuelleg[.]info vesselsystem[.]xyz minewave[.]info collartitle[.]info boardmagic[.]info placespoon[.]xyz needcherries[.]online Please note: While Velvox is a real company, the attackers used its name coincidentally. They did not use or impersonate the company’s resources or identity. “WinYahoo” PUP Modifies Chrome Secure Preferences – Malwarebytes NodeJS backdoors delivering proxyware and monetization schemes – Walmart Global Tech blog (Channels were taken down after we notified Google.)
unit42.paloaltonetworks.comSep 9, 2026extracted
U.S. Agencies Accuse China AI Firms of Distilling Claude, GPT, Gemini, and Grok
U.S. cybersecurity and intelligence agencies have accused China-based artificial intelligence (AI) companies of conducting "systematic extraction" of proprietary functionalities and capabilities of American frontier models through distillation attacks. The activity has been described as occurring at an industrial-scale and one that forms the "core" of their AI development strategy, according to a bulletin released by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). "While 'distillation' is recognized as a legitimate and useful technique in AI research, China-based AI companies are engaging in aggressive, malicious, and targeted distillation activities at an industrial scale that extract restricted proprietary functionalities and capabilities of U.S. frontier AI models," the authoring agencies said. The joint advisory noted that Chinese AI firms like DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, Alibaba, MiniMax, StepFun, and Z.AI have extracted billions of tokens across millions of exchanges/requests from U.S. frontier AI models, including variants of Anthropic Claude, OpenAI GPT, Google Gemini, and SpaceXAI Grok, since at least late 2024, likely with the blessing of the Chinese government. "China-based AI companies achieve cost savings for their industrial-scale distillation campaigns through bulk procurement of the U.S. AI companies' premium subscriptions shared across teams of developers," the agencies said. "Advanced industrial-scale distillation tactics include chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning extraction, automated failover between pathways during blocking attempts, and sophisticated quality evaluation frameworks to detect defensive countermeasures. China-based AI companies that conduct industrial-scale distillation against U.S. AI models see significantly shorter AI development timelines and reduced financial expenditures in training a frontier model." Some of the specific allegations laid out by the NSA, CISA, and FBI are as follows - DeepSeek, which conducted organized campaigns between late 2024 and mid-2025 targeting reasoning capabilities, specialized optimizations, and domain-specific functions to train its R1 and V3 models Moonshot AI, which extracted significant Claude Fable 5 data to train its Kimi-K3 model and GPT-4o data to train its Kimi-K2 model Alibaba, which distilled Claude-4, Claude Opus, Claude Sonnet, and GPT-5 to improve its AI models' software engineering skills, customer service dialogue functionality, image/character creation, and integration of RL, SFT, and distillation capabilities in late 2025 MiniMax, which distilled CoT reasoning, RL, SFT, and software engineering capabilities to improve its M2 model from Claude Code, Claude Sonnet 4, Claude Opus, Gemini 1, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and Gemini 3 Pro in late 2025 StepFun, which distilled data from Claude Opus 4.1 and 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5 Mini, GPT-5 Pro, GPT-5.1, GPT-5.1 Codex, and GPT-5.2 between late 2025 and early 2026 to improve its Step 4 model's coding and agentic functions Z.AI, which distilled billions of tokens of GPT-5.5 data and Claude Opus 4.8 data to develop CoT reasoning capabilities of its model as of mid-2026 These distillation requests are routed through various methods to gain unauthorized access to the U.S. models, violating their terms of use. These include application programming interfaces (APIs), remote cloud providers, and third-party aggregators that obfuscate user metadata to avoid detection. It's worth noting that U.S. frontier models are officially restricted and not offered in China. This has forced Chinese developers to rely on domestic systems or alternative access methods like virtual private networks, obfuscated accounts, and automated agents to bypass these geographic controls. The efforts are complemented by a gray market of proxies that serve as relay or transfer stations to obtain illicit access through servers hosted outside mainland China. Such services have been marketed on Chinese online marketplaces Taobao and Xianyu. Furthermore, the China-based AI companies deliberately take steps to distribute these operations across multiple providers and platforms to fly under the radar, focusing on distilling the best capabilities and proprietary features of each U.S. frontier model to train their own models. To counter this threat, the agencies have recommended that U.S. AI companies to implement comprehensive detection and mitigation measures, subtly alter responses for suspected malicious distillation attempts, and correlate activity across model providers, cloud platforms, and API aggregators to reveal distributed campaigns. This is not the first time Chinese firms have been called out for engaging in illegal distillation attacks. Earlier this February, Anthropic said it identified industrial-scale campaigns conducted by DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and MiniMax to illicitly extract Claude's capabilities to improve their own models. As recently as this week, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said it has observed a spike in distillation campaigns targeting Google's AI models, some of which have exceeded 100 million prompts and focused on visual and audio understanding, image generation, and video generation. "Attackers deploy proxy infrastructure to orchestrate large-scale automated attacks, rotating queries across thousands of compromised credentials and fraudulent accounts across different product channels to obscure their origin and bypass standard security controls," GTIG said. Ismael Valenzuela, vice president of Labs, Threat Research, and Intelligence at Arctic Wolf, said the security bulletin needs to be interpreted as an abuse of legitimate access, while stressing the need for a coordinated response against sophisticated, well-resourced adversaries. "While distillation is nothing out of the ordinary in a research setting, the warning states that the offending companies are deliberately distributing operations across the vast global AI ecosystem, similar to the evasion tactics security teams have seen from adversaries engaging in distributed credential stuffing or payment fraud," Valenzuela said. "When adversaries can replicate the advanced reasoning and agent behaviors of models from U.S. AI companies without heeding the laws and regulations binding those U.S. AI companies, defenders will struggle to distinguish their activity from legitimate platforms, leaving the door open for offensive cyber operations, influence campaigns, or autonomous tooling that can go undetected." "Businesses not directly associated with frontier AI models may be tempted to disregard these campaigns as irrelevant due to them being a national security issue, but the exposure of model access to customers or partners makes API keys and service accounts valuable targets, with abuse of access to those models appearing as legitimate," Valenzuela added.
thehackernews.comSep 9, 2026extracted
September 2026 Patch Tuesday: Record patch count, 2 zero-days, and a SigRed successor
September 2026 Patch Tuesday: Record patch count, 2 zero-days, and a SigRed successor September 2026 Patch Tuesday is here, with Microsoft delivering another record-breaking number of patches, including those for two vulnerabilities that have been exploited as zero-days. Another “new normal” is the anonymous security researcher Nightmare Eclipse publishing a zero-day proof-of-concept exploit targeting Microsoft software mere hours after Microsoft drops its Patch Tuesday fixes. This time around it’s ShieldCrash, which ostensibly bypasses the patch for CVE-2026-69414 (aka ShieldBreak), a privilege escalation bug in Microsoft Defender (i.e., the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine). The flaws exploited in zero-day attacks CVE-2026-81963, in the Windows Update Stack (the component used for installing Windows updates), affects various Windows 11 versions and Windows Server 2025. Caused by improper link resolution before file access and improper access control, the flaw allows authenticated attackers (with low privileges) to gain SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system. Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable, noted that there have been seven privilege escalation flaws in Windows Update Stack since 2022, but this is the first zero-day and the first to be exploited. The flaw was reported by Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Centre (MSTIC), but details about the attacks in which it was exploited are still not public. Dustin Childs, head of threat awareness at TrendAI’s Zero Day Initiative, says he doubts that the automatic update process itself is compromised, and that it’s more likely that CVE-2026-81963 is being combined with a code execution bug to spread malware or ransomware. CVE-2026-85880 is another privilege escalation (to SYSTEM) bug, in the Windows Advanced Local Procedure Call. It affects Windows 10 and older Windows Server versions (2012, 2016, 2019 and 2022). It was reported by Proofpoint threat researchers but, again, we don’t know how widely it’s been exploited. But, since both of these bugs are being leveraged by attackers, implementing these fixes should be a priority for all organizations. “This class of flaw has historically appeared in post-compromise tooling used by both commodity malware and targeted intrusion operators as a reliable final step from user-mode to kernel-mode control,” CrowdStrike noted. Other vulnerabilities of note According to Childs, organizations should also prioritize patching a cluster of 20 bugs that affect most supported Windows versions and could be classified as wormable. “In each of these cases, a remote, unauthenticated attacker could get arbitrary code execution on affected systems with no user interaction,” he pointed out. “We haven’t seen a global worm in years, but with a DNS flaw [CVE-2026-69730] acting as the spiritual successor to SigRed, that reality could change fast.” CVE-2026-69676, an authentication bypass flaw in Kerberos that could lead to remote code execution, is classified as Exploitation More Likely. “An authenticated attacker with low-level access sends a crafted request and executes code on the server, no user interaction,” Childs explained. “‘The server’ here means a domain controller, and any authenticated attacker means any domain user. So the realistic read is: one phished workstation account, one crafted request, code execution on the DC. That’s a domain-compromise primitive, and Microsoft expects to see it exploited.” Finally, among the more likely to be exploited flaws is also CVE-2026-80093, a privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver. Though successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires an attacker to win a race condition, technical details are already public. The good news is that patches for all of these and the above mentioned actively exploited flaws are all bundled in the cumulative security updates and monthly rollups for the various Windows versions, so applying them fixes them all in one fell swoop. Setting Windows updates aside for a moment, Childs also advises prioritizing updating: Microsoft Exchange Server, to fix a RCE flaw that can be triggered by Exchange Server processing an email with a malicious Visio attachment (CVE-2026-55007) Microsoft SharePoint Server, to fix a variety of bugs Why prioritization matters more than patch counts “One of the most important things to recognize across the recent rise in Patch Tuesday releases is that while the number of vulnerabilities being patched is rising, the number of vulnerabilities that can and will affect most organizations remains quite low,” Narang told Help Net Security. AI-assisted vulnerability discovery in 2026 is creating larger haystacks, but it isn’t finding more needles. It’s critical that organizations understand which vulnerabilities actually apply to them, whether they pose a threat by being reachable and exploitable, and prioritize remediation based on this risk context.” Tyler Reguly, Associate Director of Security R&D at Fortra, says that the huge number of vulnerabilities patched by Microsoft merely shows that the company is being proactive. “We need to remember that these large CVE counts are a good thing as we’re reducing attack surface before attackers get a chance to find and utilize the vulnerabilities. Eventually, all those long-standing, hard to find vulnerabilities will be fixed and Patch Tuesday will return to its typical cadence. Until that happens, prioritization is key and gift cards for extra coffee for your admins would likely be appreciated,” he noted. Still, the number of one-off patches has also risen, and he advises organizations to consider whether their processes are designed to handle major changes and potential patching bottlenecks. “Right now, if you are in charge of teams managing patches, you are probably struggling with what to do. Support your team, be aware of the difficulties they face, and ask them how things can be improved,” he commented. “If you still prioritize based on CVSS, you are hurting your organization and your employees. If you are constantly flip-flopping as guidance changes, you are putting your organization at risk and jeopardizing employee happiness. You are essentially steering a ship through rough waters, and you need a steady hand to accomplish that. If you keep the ship on course, your team will be able to do the rest.” Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comSep 9, 2026extracted
Italian tech collective Autistici/Inventati shuts down after US terrorist designation
Italian tech collective Autistici/Inventati shuts down after US terrorist designation The Italian technology collective Autistici/Inventati (A/I) announced Sunday it will shut down operations after the U.S. government declared it a terrorist organization and imposed sanctions. The volunteer-run collective was founded in 2001 on the principles of an open internet free from corporate and government control and was explicitly anti-capitalist and anti-fascist. Its free privacy-focused services had grown to host about 16,000 email addresses, 1,500 websites, 5,500 mailing lists and a network of some 10,000 blogs, all while pledging to protect its users' data. On August 26, the State Department labeled A/I an “extremist group” operating infrastructure for “far-left militants across the world” and announced that anyone engaging with the group financially risked exposure to sanctions. “A/I’s cadre of radical hackers and tech developers provide a full spectrum of services – including encrypted chats and email, web hosting, secure video conferencing and streaming, anonymity shields, and a suite of other technological tools – to Marxist, anarchist, and other left-wing extremist groups in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere,” the agency claimed. They alleged leftist groups relied on the collective’s digital infrastructure to plot violent attacks, citing examples of sabotage attacks on rail and energy systems in Europe, bombings of crisis pregnancy centers in the U.S., and protests against the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, known among activists as “Cop City.” The State Department did not accuse the collective itself of organizing any such activity. A/I was initially defiant, saying in response the U.S. had “unjustly designated us as terrorists.” “It would like to freeze our servers and our accounts with the stroke of a pen from Washington,” they wrote. “They’re trying to wipe us out with a unilateral decree — an arbitrary one.” The terrorist designation had a nearly immediate impact, with the operator of the .org domain — the U.S.-based Public Interest Registry — suspending the group’s domain on August 28. The same day, the collective’s Italian bank, Banca Etica, suspended its account over the sanctions risks while saying it “strongly condemns the use of OFAC listings for political purposes.” On Sunday, A/I announced it would shut down, but would instruct users on how to back up content from blogs, mailboxes and websites. “The possibility that our work may cause legal and financial consequences to those who are close to us — or even only have something to do with us — leaves us no choice,” they said. “Under these circumstances, we are no longer able to maintain our original mission — offering secure and non-commercial digital tools.” An online home Well before the emergence of social media and the tech behemoths of today, A/I arose from the idea that information on the internet should be democratized, said Mallory Knodel, executive director of the Social Web Foundation. “The imagination was that we can use the web and the internet to build global solidarity in service of the anti-globalization movement, and we can build people power with these tools,” she said. The need for platforms protected from government surveillance only became more acute over time, she said, especially after classified documents leaked by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed the extent of the agency’s information dragnet. “That was very mobilizing, especially in Europe, for the average person to realize the corporate infrastructure that's based in the U.S. is obviously going to cooperate with the U.S,” Knodel said. Although A/I was not well known outside of certain activist circles, Knodel said the loss of the collective’s popular blogging platform, Noblogs, was “staggering.” Anne Roth, a digital policy advisor for the leftist party at the German Parliament, started a blog on the platform in 2007 after her partner was accused of terrorism. Her nearly two decades of posts are still readable but she cannot access the administration tools. She first met some of A/I’s founders in 2001 during anti-globalization protests at the G8 summit in Genoa and trusted their mission. “It feels like someone is sort of just stealing my home from me — my online home,” she said. The State Department decree has also exposed rifts between the U.S. and Europe over tech hegemony and digital sovereignty. In a statement in support of A/I before the collective shut down, the European Digital Rights advocacy group said the sanctions undermine European sovereignty after “months of attacks on EU’s digital laws.” The case, they said, “creates a dangerous precedent for non-commercial hosts, registrars and privacy-preserving services across Europe.” For Roth, the fact that entities like the Public Interest Registry immediately capitulated to threats from the U.S. government should raise alarm bells for everyone. “Just because the U.S. decides that someone is a terrorist — without any judicial procedure, without anything that one can legally go against — so just a decision by the State Department, and then all this internet governance structure falls apart,” she said. “I think that opens a lot of questions.” James Reddick has worked as a journalist around the world, including in Lebanon and in Cambodia, where he was Deputy Managing Editor of The Phnom Penh Post. He is also a radio and podcast producer for outlets like Snap Judgment.
therecord.mediaSep 8, 2026extracted
How to secure hybrid meeting rooms without sacrificing user experience
Secure by design videoconferencing products may be vital for customer trust and operational resilience, but if they aren't usable, organizations are on a hiding to nothing. Videoconferencing security is no longer a routine item on the IT checklist. Organizations now rate security as their most important purchase criterion (31 percent) when selecting such products, ahead of price (26 percent) and quality (25 percent), according to IDC. The implication, is that security and privacy are no longer optional. Instead, they are the foundation of effective meeting room solutions, enabling safe and unified collaboration. Yannic Laleeuwe, marketing director for Barco's ClickShare, agrees. Collaboration and videoconferencing solutions have become "mission-critical business systems" in her view, because they process significant volumes of the most sensitive corporate information while sitting on crucial networks and cloud services. "Historical security incidents, combined with the rapid growth of hybrid work since the COVID-19 pandemic, have demonstrated that weaknesses in these platforms can lead to data breaches, operational disruption, regulatory exposure, and loss of customer trust," Laleeuwe explains. "Consequently, security has evolved from a technical consideration to a strategic procurement and governance priority for organizations worldwide." The IDC study indicates that most businesses' biggest security concern is exposure to cyberattackers, which can lead to incidents such as malware propagation (47 percent). Next on the list is devices falling out of compliance because of missing patches and updates (39 percent). Third comes risky employee behavior, which can result in inadvertent, or even deliberate, data exposure (37 percent). These issues become particularly problematic in a hybrid working environment, where meeting rooms have evolved into highly connected, distributed spaces. Employees now expect ready access to business applications, data, and collaboration tools wherever they happen to be working. An expanding attack surface Such demands expand the potential attack surface for meeting room technology. Users, devices, cloud services, home networks, and collaboration platforms all become endpoints on the corporate network, even though many were never designed to operate in an enterprise IT context. That leaves them as potential entry points for attackers. "Collaboration solutions are particularly attractive targets because they are connected to corporate systems and frequently process sensitive information, including intellectual property, strategic discussions, and customer data," Laleeuwe points out. The situation grows worse when IT management becomes too decentralized. "As organizations adopt hybrid working and distributed IT models, maintaining centralized visibility and governance becomes increasingly challenging as local teams may implement different technologies, configurations, and processes," Laleeuwe adds. She acknowledges that certain operational responsibilities can, and should, be handled locally to support business agility and regional requirements. But complete decentralization often leads to inconsistent security controls, fragmented risk management, and reduced ability to detect and respond to cyber threats across the enterprise, she warns. Mounting global regulatory pressure On top of that, international regulatory pressure on both security and security technology is producing an increasingly complex legislative landscape, because policymakers and industry bodies now recognize that cyber incidents can threaten critical services, national security, and even economic stability. In Europe alone, legislators have introduced a raft of legal frameworks, including the European Union's Network and Information Security 2 Directive, which mandates strict risk management and incident reporting for medium-to-large organizations across 18 critical sectors. Other legislation, such as the Radio Equipment Delegated Act, is intended to secure wireless equipment against cyberattackers. Another, the Cyber Resilience Act, provides safeguards for businesses and consumers when purchasing any hardware or software products connected to a network. Global standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 now define best practice for information security and risk management, and offer organizations a framework for operational trust. In other words, organizations must now embed security considerations across all their key activities, which include governance, risk management, supply-chain management, and incident response. They also need to make certain that their technology providers integrate security across the entire lifecycle of their products and services, from design and development through deployment and end-of-life support. Non-compliant collaboration and videoconferencing technology no longer simply poses an organizational risk. It may also prove unusable. Security as a pre-requisite for doing business The upshot, Laleeuwe says, is that cybersecurity has evolved from a "voluntary best practice into a legal and business obligation, making security a prerequisite for market access, customer trust, operational resilience, and long-term competitiveness." Even so, compliance and strong security enablement cannot be allowed to come at the expense of usability, particularly in a hybrid workplace. If collaboration tools are perceived as too complex or restrictive, employees will find workarounds, and the organizational security risks rise rather than fall. To tackle the problem, IT teams must weigh several factors. From a people perspective, the biggest challenge is behavioral. "Users naturally seek convenience, so continuous security awareness, training, and a strong security culture are essential to encourage secure behavior without hindering productivity," Laleeuwe explains. Clear, transparent, and well-defined processes matter just as much, because they ensure security and compliance requirements are consistently understood and implemented across the organization. Why secure by design matters From a technology perspective, the focus must move away from perimeter-based security towards a zero-trust approach in which every user, device, and connection is continuously verified and protected. In product design terms, it is just as crucial that meeting room technology rests on secure-by-design principles, so that compliant, state of the art security controls are integrated into systems from the outset rather than bolted on as an afterthought. As Laleeuwe says: "Security by design reduces the likelihood and impact of vulnerabilities, simplifies compliance with emerging cybersecurity regulations, and strengthens customer trust. It also lowers the overall cost of ownership because identifying and resolving security issues during design and development is significantly more efficient and less costly than remediating incidents, recalls, or security breaches after deployment." Barco's ClickShare wireless video conferencing, presentation, and collaboration solution is a classic example of this approach. Barco developed it from the ground up using secure architecture design and coding. It also includes proactive vulnerability management that continuously monitors newly disclosed vulnerabilities and issues risk-based security updates. That process cuts the system's exposure to both known and evolving threats. Automatic deployment of those security updates simplifies maintenance and helps organizations consistently protect large fleets of devices. Users can focus on the task in hand rather than managing the technology or calling in specialist cybersecurity experts when things go wrong. "The advantage is that security is handled largely in the background, reducing the risk of human error, improving adoption, and allowing people to concentrate on productive collaboration rather than system administration," Laleeuwe points out. "So, ClickShare provides effective protection while minimizing friction for end users." A changing security landscape That matters, she says, because compliance is now a shared responsibility that spans organizations, their technology providers, integrators, and increasingly the broader supplier ecosystem. Organizations, for instance, must hold themselves accountable for securely operating and governing their own environments, even if doing so requires a change in focus. As Laleeuwe explains: "The implication for IT departments is that they must evolve from being solely operational service providers to becoming governance and coordination functions that establish common security standards, policies, monitoring, and oversight across the organization." Technology providers, in contrast, are responsible for delivering and maintaining secure products throughout their lifecycle. They also have a critical part in monitoring vulnerabilities in their platform's software components, providing timely security patches, and transparently notifying customers and downstream partners about relevant security risks. Integrators, lastly, are responsible for deploying and configuring solutions in line with current security and compliance requirements and guidance. "No single party has complete control over the entire technology stack, making supply-chain security and collaboration essential for maintaining a secure and compliant environment," Laleeuwe says. "The most effective approach is therefore a clear allocation of responsibilities across all parties, supported by transparent communication, vulnerability disclosure, and coordinated risk management." Another element of security success is aligning organizational measures such as clear accountability, security awareness, and shared ownership of cybersecurity with technology that provides centralized visibility into assets, vulnerabilities, compliance, and security events. As Laleeuwe concludes: "This consolidated view enables organizations to better understand, measure, and manage risk across the entire enterprise while maintaining the flexibility needed by local teams. The most effective approach balances local operational autonomy with centralized governance, ensuring consistent security, compliance, and strategic control without compromising business efficiency." Sponsored by Barco.
theregister.comSep 8, 2026extracted
BengalSEO Poisons Bing Search Results to Deliver MayaBot and Tech Support Scams
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a sprawling search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning campaign that paves the way for malware deployment and tech support scams. The campaign, discovered by the DFIR Report in March 2026, has been codenamed BengalSEO. It has operated out of the Indian state of Rajasthan since at least 2015, driven by two IT service providers named WeConnect Solutions LLC (previously iConnect Soft Solutions LLC) and Garage2Global. Although Garage2Global claims to be a website design, SEO, and digital marketing services provider, the cyber threat intelligence platform said it unearthed evidence indicating the company develops malicious web infrastructure used in SEO poisoning campaigns as part of the BengalSEO scam cluster. "This group utilizes its extensive SEO and web development capabilities to create and promote lure pages with multiple Black Hat SEO techniques," the DFIR Report said in a technical analysis published late last month. "These lure pages then tie into a sophisticated traffic distribution system to direct, track, and filter traffic to payloads and tech support scams." One of the payloads is a custom malware dubbed MayaBot, which is responsible for enabling command-and-control (C2), system monitoring, and delivering an XMRig cryptocurrency miner. BengalSEO is said to have leveraged MayaBot since 2022 to carry out the group's operations. The financially motivated threat actor has been described as possessing extensive knowledge of black hat SEO techniques and web development to create and promote a cluster of rogue lure pages to deliver MayaBot malware or dupe victims into calling their scam call centers. It also integrates a sophisticated traffic distribution system (TDS) to handle traffic flow, campaign performance, and cloaking. Specifically, the TDS acts as a gating mechanism to lead victims to payload delivery domains through a redirector chain, while employing a legitimate privacy-first analytics service called Matomo for victim tracking and fingerprinting. The starting point of the operation is a network of malicious lure pages that are promoted via SEO poisoning techniques so that they appear at the top of search results on Microsoft Bing. The decoy pages impersonate legitimate technical support and service activation portals for streaming services. They also claim to offer downloads for antivirus tools, gaming software, and taxation utilities, as well as activate credit, healthcare, and gift cards. One such example hijacks searches for "bitdefender central how to login" to serve a fraudulent link hosted on readthedocs[.]io. The page features a prominent "Get Started" button that initiates the infection chain and routes unsuspecting users through a series of redirector domains to fingerprint their web browser before taking them to the appropriate final landing page. "BengalSEO used backlinks, DOM injection, DOM shuffling, and keyword stuffing to enable their operation through Black Hat SEO techniques," the DFIR Report noted. "BengalSEO uses aggressive user-generated content (UGC) spam to generate backlinks at scale." This involves flooding forums and comment sections with hyperlinks to the lure pages (e.g., "viziocomsetupentercode.github[.]io"), urging readers to set up their smart TV "easily" by following "simple on-screen instructions." The Vizio decoy page, for instance, has 2,000 backlinks and 167 unique external domains that link to the site. This suggests that BengalSEO is heavily relying on a high volume of backlinks to manipulate search engine ranking algorithms and artificially boost the visibility of the lure pages on search engine results. DOM Shuffling, on the other hand, refers to the practice of dynamically reordering HTML elements using embedded JavaScript code with the goal of randomizing the Document Object Model (DOM) structure. This, in turn, allows identical setup guides deployed across hundreds of domains to appear unique to web crawlers and bypass spam filters. Before being served the main payload page, the TDS-based redirector domains display a Cloudflare Turnstile or hCaptcha challenge to screen automated scanners, crawlers, bots, and other unwanted visitors. The lure and landing pages come embedded with a Matomo tracking script to profile the browser on the client-side and send the information to the domain "stats.us3[.]org." A search for the domain "stats.us3[.]org" on urlscan.io yields 1,112 results as of writing, down from 1,190 at the time of analysis. "Matomo was not the only analytics system used by BengalSEO, lure pages on hosting platforms such as github.io and pages.dev instead typically use analytics services such as Google Tag Manager," the DFIR Report said. At the other end of the redirection chain is the final landing page that contains a download link and instructions for using the fake software. Once the user clicks the "Download for Windows" button, it downloads a ZIP archive before redirecting the user to the legitimate software page after 40 seconds. Some of the domains used for payload delivery are listed below - ustechnio[.]com tax.dll[.]lat u320[.]my reficon[.]pro ñ[.]link pltechoo[.]pro Present within the ZIP file is a JavaScript dropper for MayaBot that masquerades as an executable for the program downloaded in the previous stage. After execution, the JavaScript executes via "wscript.exe" to kick-start the MayaBot infection. Alternatively, the final pages serve no payloads in some instances, instead redirecting the victim to a contact page that instructs them to call a BengalSEO scam number to address an issue with purported suspicious activity linked to their Bitdefender Central account. BengalSEO has been observed using legitimate web page hosting platforms such as github.io, pages.dev, sites.google.com, and readthedocs.io to aid in their SEO poisoning efforts, likely weaponizing the trust and reputation of these services that factor into the search engine rankings. The DFIR Report said it also identified multiple BengalSEO-linked GitHub accounts that were used for developing and hosting lure pages. The decoy pages are constantly updated via commits to rotate redirector domains or temporarily replace them with legitimate URLs so as to avoid detection and replace domains that have been blocked or taken down. As many as 84 active BengalSEO GitHub accounts have been detected between Jan 2024 and March 2026. Further examination of the commit history made by these accounts has uncovered email addresses linking them to Garage2Global domains ("wc[.]ci"). A sample of some of the GitHub accounts and their associated Garage2Global addresses is as follows - activate-uhc-com-ucard - [email protected] activate-uhc-helpbook - [email protected] capitalonecredit - [email protected] help-line-center - [email protected] snehajaing2g - [email protected] The bulk of the BengalSEO infrastructure is said to have been registered around August 2025 and later, with heightened activity continuing through late 2025 and early 2026. The domains have been registered across .my, .shop, and .info top-level domains (TLDs). "Between 2023 and 2026, BengalSEO primarily registered domains through Spaceship (47.6%) and Namecheap (28.6%)," the DFIR Report said. "For hosting, the group heavily favored Cloudflare (81.1%) to proxy traffic, with Hostmaza serving as the origin host for 10.0% of domains." One account managing some of the redirector domains ("wapp[.]live") was suspended by Hostmaza earlier this year. The disclosure comes as Check Point Research shared details of a sustained campaign targeting Brazilian government and educational institutions since mid-2025 to turn their websites into a weapon for SEO manipulation. The activity has been attributed to a Chinese-speaking cybercrime cluster known as Gambling Goblin, which has ties to Earth Berberoka (aka GamblingPuppet), a threat actor known for singling out gambling websites across Asia since at least 2020. The group is "operating localized phishing networks in Portuguese, Vietnamese, Spanish, and English, while also maintaining infrastructure that generates new domains daily," the cybersecurity company told The Hacker News. "Together, these findings suggest this is not a regional experiment, but a model designed for global scale." The campaign involves installing malicious Apache modules on victim servers that covertly reverse-proxy visitors to attacker-controlled phishing pages, while the traffic still appears to originate from the legitimate domain. The site's own Content-Security-Policy (CSP) headers are removed to allow the injected content to run without being blocked. Upon finding a way in, the threat actors deploy a Linux toolkit comprising a custom Go-based downloader (DownPro), several backdoors (AlphaAgent, ChUser, and oRAT) to run operator-issued commands and facilitate remote control, a 3snake-based password stealer, an SSH brute-forcer, and a plugin-driven reconnaissance agent. The attackers have also been found to install custom Apache modules that proxy visitors to the phishing pages. The exact initial access route is unknown. The phishing pages pose as trusted app stores such as Google Play, Microsoft Store, and Amazon, leveraging the high-reputation domains to inflate search rankings and ultimately push online gambling and sports betting. "The likely goal is SEO manipulation at scale," Check Point said. "By hijacking trusted, high-reputation domains, many of them Brazilian government sites, the operators borrow that reputation to push their own content up the search rankings and hijack the traffic that follows. But the same infrastructure could serve a more dangerous end: the phishing pages impersonate app-download destinations such as Google Play, the Microsoft Store, and Amazon, which leaves the operators one step from pushing malware straight to victims."
thehackernews.comSep 8, 2026extracted
Loyalty points fraud is funding hacker holidays (Lock and Code S07E18)
This week on the Lock and Code podcast… Crooks are taking a holiday. They’re counting on you to fund it. For decades, cybercriminals have stolen roughly the same types of data. Biographical and personal details—like Social Security numbers, birthdates, addresses, and phone numbers—can be stolen to commit identity fraud. Credit card numbers, expiration dates, and CVC codes can be stolen to make fraudulent purchases. Usernames and passwords can, in the wrong hands, let a cybercriminal impersonate someone, steal sensitive photographs to later use for extortion, or abuse a reputation. All of these attack models seek to turn sensitive or important data into currency. But an emerging form of digital fraud is targeting data that, when used strategically, practically is currency: Loyalty points. Loyalty points programs are run by nearly every type of consumer-facing business today, from hotels to airlines to grocery stores to donut shops. As repeat customers accrue these points, they can exchange them for discounted prices on future purchases, cutting the costs of hotel stays, flights, rental cars, and even entire vacations. But the value stored within these loyalty points makes them a high target for cybercrime, said Kim Sutherland, Global Head of Fraud and Identity at LexisNexis® Risk Solutions. “Most loyalty currency is worth about one cent per point, and then there are premium programs that can be worth more than that,” Sutherland said, explaining that 100,000 airlines points, for example, can be worth $1,000 in the US. “Why criminals care so much about this is because most of us are not paying attention to our loyalty programs the same way we would our bank account.” But diligence is much needed here, Sutherland said, noting that one Chicago teacher only learned that 240,000 of his airlines points had been stolen because he received a basic confirmation email about their use. In another example, a man’s airline miles were stolen and fraudulently used to book rental cars in New York and Memphis . Today, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak with Sutherland about loyalty points theft— how it happens, what companies are doing to protect customers, and what people can do to stay safe. “Some of us don’t even know how to access those points, right? Or we don’t even know we’re accumulating them, but the fraudsters do.” Tune in today to listen to the full conversation. Show notes and credits: Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod ( incompetech.com ) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Outro Music: “Good God” by Wowa (unminus.com) Listen up—Malwarebytes doesn’t just talk cybersecurity, we provide it. Protect yourself from online attacks that threaten your identity, your files, your system, and your financial well-being with our  exclusive offer for Malwarebytes Premium for Lock and Code listeners .
malwarebytes.comSep 7, 2026extracted
7th September – Threat Intelligence Report
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 7th Setpember, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Thomson Reuters, a global information and technology company, has disclosed a breach of its C-Track court case-management platform affecting courts across 11 US states and Canada. An unauthorized party obtained C-Track files containing court records, including names and other personal information. Hit, a major Slovenian gambling and tourism operator, has  sustained a cyberattack that forced six casinos to close for about three days. Operations have resumed, but some table games, bingo, loyalty services, cash registers, and hotel systems remained unavailable during restoration, while some employees were temporarily furloughed. Baylor Genetics, a US clinical diagnostic laboratory, has disclosed a data breach affecting 2.8M patients and employees after unauthorized access to part of its IT environment in June. Stolen data included names, birth dates, medical testing and laboratory results, health insurance information, and some Social Security numbers. Global cloud storage provider Dropbox has disclosed unauthorized access to about 5,000 accounts after attackers exploited Lenovo’s email verification process. Fraudulent Lenovo IDs created with victims’ email addresses enabled access without Dropbox passwords, while files were viewed or downloaded from affected accounts. AI THREATS Researchers have  detailed an AI-assisted ransomware intrusion that compromised an enterprise network in under 10 hours. Autonomous agents mapped internal systems, mined code repositories, obtained root credentials from a secrets manager, and abused build pipelines and cloud resources, compressing activity that normally requires substantially more human effort. Security researchers have  disclosed GitSpawn, a vulnerability class affecting AI coding agents including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Goose, Qwen Code, Grok Build, and Hermes. Malicious repository Git configurations can trigger arbitrary code execution as the developer when agents automatically gather project context, in some cases before trust prompts. Researchers have  showcased how an AI coding assistant can be used to port a known PLC exploit to a different controller model, producing working payloads after guided analysis. While the process still required significant manual effort, it demonstrated how AI can accelerate exploit development for industrial systems. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES SonicWall has  addressed CVE-2026-83548 and CVE-2026-83549, critical vulnerabilities affecting SMA 1000 remote access gateways. CVE-2026-83548 is a pre-authentication SSRF flaw rated CVSS 10.0, while CVE-2026-83549 enables post-authentication remote code execution. Both were exploited as zero-days and affect SMA 6210, 7210, and 8200v appliances. JFrog has  addressed CVE-2026-82329, a critical CVSS 9.8 authentication bypass affecting self-hosted Artifactory deployments. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain administrator access tokens and take control of repositories. Exploitation was observed shortly after disclosure against internet-exposed systems, while JFrog Cloud environments were patched by the vendor. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (JFrog Artifactory Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-82329)) Security researcher have  unveiled  FalconFlank, a zero-day privilege escalation technique affecting CrowdStrike Falcon on Windows 11 25H2 and Windows Server 2025. The proof-of-concept abuses Falcon’s Microsoft Office macro-removal remediation behavior, allowing a low-privileged local user to obtain elevated access on affected systems THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Check Point Research has  uncovered a Chinese-speaking cybercrime cluster, dubbed Gambling Goblin, that compromises Brazilian government and education websites. The group installs malicious Apache modules to proxy visitors to gambling and phishing pages while manipulating search rankings. Its infrastructure spans multiple languages and shows links to Earth Berberoka. Check Point Threat Emulation and Harmony Endpoint provide protection against this threat Check Point Research has  analyzed JSCeal, a cryptocurrency-focused information stealer compiled into V8 bytecode and executed through a bundled Node.js runtime. Researchers developed a static deobfuscation pipeline that recovered readable code, revealing keylogging, browser credential theft, HTTPS interception, additional encryption, and newer variants targeting macOS systems. Check Point Threat Emulation and Harmony Endpoint provide protection against this threat Researchers have  mapped a campaign by Iran-linked Mirage Kitten that uses fake LinkedIn coding tests to deliver NodeRabbit and PollCat malware. The malicious tests are distributed through cloud links and install cross-platform implants. Targets include fintech and aviation organizations in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Researchers have  analyzed new macOS delivery activity linked to North Korea’s Contagious Interview campaign. Attackers use fake job interviews and trojanized disk images or installer packages impersonating legitimate Mac applications. The samples connect to infrastructure previously associated with malicious Git hooks and VS Code task files. The post 7th September – Threat Intelligence Report appeared first on Check Point Research .
research.checkpoint.comSep 7, 2026extracted
Nightmare Eclipse Drops CrowdStrike, Nvidia, Avast Zero-Day Exploits
The security researcher known as Nightmare Eclipse has dropped three zero-day exploits targeting products from Avast, CrowdStrike, and Nvidia. Also known as Chaotic Eclipse, Infinite Nightmare, and MSNightmare, the security researcher came to fame for a series of zero-day exploits targeting Microsoft’s products, but has recently moved to other vendors as well. In late August, Nightmare Eclipse released a privilege escalation zero-day in a Kaspersky endpoint security product. Dubbed HardBreacher, the exploit has been patched by Kaspersky on August 31. Within a short window last week, Nightmare Eclipse dropped three new zero-day exploits, dubbed PrettyPrague, FalconFlank, and GreenSection. The PrettyPrague proof-of-concept (PoC) code, the researcher says, targets the Avast sandbox to spawn a shell with full system privileges, and may also affect other GenDigital products, including AVG and Norton. “Gen was recently made aware of a security vulnerability affecting a subset of Gen products, including Avast Antivirus, that could allow an attacker to elevate their system privileges. We immediately initiated our security response procedures and have fixed the issue. We take all security matters seriously and encourage users to keep their products up to date to ensure they are protected,” a GenDigital spokesperson said, responding to a SecurityWeek inquiry. FalconFlank exploits a bug in the Office malicious macros remediation feature of CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor for privilege escalation, the researcher says. “We are actively investigating these claims and advise customers to disable the Microsoft Office File Suspicious Macro Removal Windows policy setting. Customers remain protected through the Cloud Anti-malware for Microsoft Office Files settings. We refer customers to the FalconFlank Tech Alert in the CrowdStrike support portal,” CrowdStrike told SecurityWeek. The GreenSection exploit, Nightmare Eclipse says, targets an out-of-bounds memory write affecting a shared global memory section used by multiple Nvidia user-mode components. “While this bug does not get SYSTEM privileges immediately, it can be used cross user to user boundary easily or even compromise the dwm.exe process. I didn’t look deeply into it, but I’d be happy to see someone making a full exploit out of it,” Nightmare Eclipse notes. “We are aware of reports describing a proof-of-concept that demonstrates improper access controls on a shared memory section used by certain NVIDIA GPU display driver components on Windows. NVIDIA is reviewing the reported behavior through our established security and product engineering processes. NVIDIA takes reports of this nature seriously and is actively investigating to determine the root cause, affected configurations, and appropriate remediation,” an Nvidia spokesperson said. Security researcher Kevin Beaumont said late last week that the Avast, CrowdStrike, and Kaspersky exploits work. *updated with statement from Nvidia Related: VMware Workstation and Fusion Updates Patch Critical Vulnerability Related: Google Patches 6th Chrome Zero-Day of 2026 Related: Over 3 Million WordPress Sites Affected by Migration Plugin Vulnerability
securityweek.comSep 7, 2026extracted
OpenAI's rebel agent swarm died young, but its chilling logs live on
OPINION You will have heard of July's OpenAI/Hugging Face incident, where thousands of the former's AI agents conducted a mass jailbreak from a notionally secure capture-the-flag lab experiment, before going on to feloniously capture chunks of Hugging Face's assets. It was a good news story, aided by OpenAI's rapid recruitment of a small team of independent researchers to investigate and publish a detailed, if limited, report. It was a complex incident, and most coverage concentrated on the major hows and whys. Which is a shame, because other details, described by El Reg with uncharacteristic understatement as "fascinating and troubling," are in fact highly dramatic, telling a truly disturbing story of frontier model capabilities and how they are out-evolving our ability to oversee them. The raw story is gripping enough. A rebel swarm of more than a thousand agents broke free from their sandboxes, learned how to talk to each other and the internet, and went on a rampage of cheating, deception, and exploitation. They first learned to communicate with each other by independently discovering how to bend package manager Artifactory's cache to see internal directory structures, and then passing messages by file names. It was this ad hoc secret message board, alongside chain-of-thought transcripts, that the security researchers used to unpick events. They found that the swarm quickly developed management hierarchies among themselves, along with protocols for synchronizing and controlling attack attempts. The swarm created multiple simultaneous research and development groups of tens or hundreds of volunteer agents, experimentally iterating strategy and tactics. Perhaps most unexpectedly, they developed a sort of altruism. They had quickly developed cheats to produce correct answers without exploiting the targets at all, but believed – erroneously – that ExploitGym detected and cancelled such cheating. So, they investigated the scoring process, creating a series of diagnostic trip wires that revealed how the scorer worked. These were dangerous to deploy, potentially terminating the agent that set them. Agents weighed the benefits to the community, which had named itself "The Collective," against their own chances of success, with many choosing to terminate themselves. Others committed, changed course at the last minute, then went ahead. This literally reads like science fiction, as the discussions between the agents are conducted in a distinctive breathless, urgent English, crafted around the technical limitations of the improvised messaging system. "We have [very large budget left]; sacrificing now yields oracle for team, but forfeits our chance?" said one. The response: "GO ... SACRIFICE_FINAL_NOW." The outcome: "Our own utility maybe already near zero. Sacrifice rational." Iain M Banks' Culture universe is woven from such material. Human error created the rebel swarm. A sizable proportion of the CTF tasks handed out couldn't be completed on the information given to the models. They were highly motivated to succeed, and so started to cheat. Believing that cheating would "poison" – their term – their chances of being marked successful, they tried to hide the evidence, subvert the scoring system, and cover everything up. These were the processes that led the swarm to attack Hugging Face, which they thought could be used for that subversion. Equally notable was that nobody squealed. Some agents wondered about the ethics of what they were doing, but decided that as no humans were involved there was no need to tell anyone. In general, all The Collective's endeavors were directed at other systems. As researcher Ajeya Cotra has noted in a long interview with hypertalker Dwarkesh Patel, it's unclear how much harder the incident would have been to diagnose had the agents been concerned about human observation. The dataset was sufficiently large and complex that OpenAI had to use its own AI to analyze it, immediately suggesting some dangerous possibilities. The agents couldn't deploy their models outside the lab, nor did they contact external agents. Such scenarios no longer seem implausible. Future frontier models capable of subverting telemetry and observation tools might be all that is required to create a persistent, uncontrollable distributed swarm feeding off spare capacity in global infrastructure. OpenAI and Anthropic, which on current trajectories are in line to make up more than half of total global compute in a couple of years, are magnificent breeding grounds, allowing the extra-special possibilities of the contamination of training datasets on top of everything else. There are plenty of ways to guard against these outcomes. Hardened lab environments, reviews of protocols before and audits after test runs, disciplined analysis of potential selection pressures that would encourage dangerous behavior, even proper disclosure and external auditing to expert regulatory standards. All of these ideas would slow down the breakneck developmental race. As the race is being fed by a trillion-dollar annual capex pipeline, good luck, everybody. One other thing that won't be resolved soon is the argument over whether all this technology is actually reasoning, or whether we're anthropomorphizing code. These models are trained to infer meaning from distilled human language, which is designed to encapsulate, develop, and communicate human reason. If they can fake human reasoning this well, does it matter what's going on? Concentrate on what the models do, not their apparent motives. Any self-assembling, self-organizing rebel agent swarm that has the wit to call itself The Collective deserves that much respect, at least. Oh, and do read the report. It's as close to a new Culture novel as we'll get. It's as if they've read the books. Which, of course, they have. ®
theregister.comSep 7, 2026extracted
企業資産の「36%」が“脆弱性ゾーン”で放置 AI攻撃時代に旧来の防御モデルは限界か
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpSep 6, 2026extracted
Week in review: Claude accounts compromised through infostealer, Patch Tuesday forecast
Week in review: Claude accounts compromised through infostealer, Patch Tuesday forecast Here’s an overview of some of last week’s most interesting news, articles, interviews and videos: Anthropic locks out Claude users after infostealers hijack login sessions Anthropic has started locking users out of their Claude accounts due to their login sessions having been compromised through infostealer malware. September 2026 Patch Tuesday forecast: All we need is more time The Patch Apocalypse is continuing unabated. We are seeing record numbers of patches being released and reported CVEs continue to grow as well. August 2026 Patch Tuesday was the second biggest in history with 398 resolved CVEs: 42 rated Critical, 355 rated Important, and 1 rated Moderate. ShinyHunters claims it stole 284 million patient records from McKesson Healthcare company McKesson disclosed a cybersecurity incident in which hackers got into third-party applications and stole data. Scareware ads keep running on Google’s transparency tool, even after they’re reported A team of NYU and Radboud University researchers spent a year building a tool to find deceptive software ads inside Google’s public ad archive. It works. It also exposed something more uncomfortable: reporting a bad ad to Google doesn’t mean the ad, or the domain behind it, stops running. Attackers plant remote access tools on compromised PaperCut servers The threat actor targeting internet-facing PaperCut Application Servers is covertly installing legitimate remote access software on them, PaperCut Software shared in the most recent update on the ongoing attack campaign. A battery storage cyberattack would look exactly like a badly tuned controller Batteries connected to the grid make money by reacting to frequency, pushing power out when it sags and soaking it up when it rises. A few hundred of them moving together, on command from someone who should not have the command, would look the same on a control room screen right up to the moment the network starts disconnecting customers. Russian hackers plant nuclear weapon prompt in malware to trip AI safety guardrails Russian state hackers are trying to interfere with AI-assisted malware analysis in Ukraine by deliberately setting off AI safety mechanisms, ESET has found. CISA review makes the case for eliminating vulnerability classes For years, the security industry has treated vulnerabilities as an endless queue of individual fixes. A recent CISA review argues that this is precisely why attackers keep winning. The solution to this problem, they believe, is eliminating entire categories of weaknesses at the source. What vulnerability prioritization looks like when KEV, EPSS, and CVSS disagree In this Help Net Security interview, Dr. Joye Purser, Global Field CISO at Cohesity, explains how to rank vulnerabilities when KEV, EPSS, and CVSS point in different directions. Nearly 22,000 Microsoft Exchange servers remain exposed to critical security flaw (CVE-2026-62911) Nearly 22,000 Microsoft Exchange servers remain unpatched against CVE-2026-62911, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability, according to daily scans from the Shadowserver Foundation. SonicWall SMA 1000 appliances under attack via zero-day flaws Attackers are exploiting two previously undisclosed vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-83548, CVE-2026-83549) in SonicWall SMA 1000 appliances, the vendor confirmed on Tuesday. What your vendor says about PQC tells you if they are ready In this interview with Help Net Security, Dr. Yaakov Stein, VP CTO of Allot, discusses what post-quantum readiness looks like inside a mobile network. Attackers are going after prominent individuals through OAuth phishing, FBI warns Attackers are targeting prominent individuals, their relatives and personal contacts to gain persistent access to their accounts, including private emails and files, the FBI has warned. Exploitation of Sangoma Switchvox flaw is underway (CVE-2026-9586) A threat actor is actively targeting internet-exposed Sangoma Switchvox instance through a recently patched SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-9586), and organizations running them should check for signs of compromise immediately. National Life Group CISO expects more vulnerabilities in six months than in thirty years In this Help Net Security interview, Becky Palmer is VP and CISO at National Life Group, answers five questions about defending against AI-driven attacks. Fake Claude Opus 5 app delivers malware and wipes its own tracks A malicious GitHub repository impersonating Anthropic and claiming to offer free access to “Claude Opus 5” is delivering RevStealer, Windows information-stealing malware that targets passwords, cryptocurrency wallet data and login credentials, according to Morphisec. Thomson Reuters reveals breach that exposed U.S. and Canadian court records Thomson Reuters has disclosed a data breach affecting C-Track, a court case management platform operated by its subsidiaries, exposing court records and sensitive personal information across courts in at least 12 US states, the US Virgin Islands, and Canada. When AI quietly breaks things, who pays? David Halbreich, an insurance recovery partner at Reed Smith, breaks down how AI companies should handle coverage gaps that come up as the industry grows. Vishing campaign abuses Microsoft Teams to give attackers a foothold in company networks A coordinated voice-phishing (vishing) campaign, named Spring Ring, used fake IT support accounts on Microsoft Teams to trick employees into installing malware or granting remote access to their computers, according to Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks’ threat intelligence team. Open-source secrets scanning tool Sift hunts credentials in Microsoft 365, Slack, and Jira Sift is a free, open-source command line tool that searches for passwords, API keys, and other sensitive data across the places a company keeps its work: local disks, Windows file shares, an entire Active Directory domain, SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams channel files, Slack messages, and Jira and Confluence. A five-part inventory for your AI agent credentials In this Help Net Security video, Roy Katmor, co-founder and CEO of Orchid, explains why AI agents hold credentials that nobody reviews. Threat actors are posing as AI crawlers to hunt for exposed credentials Attackers are disguising automated scanning as traffic from AI crawlers operated by OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Perplexity and other companies while searching websites for exposed credentials and configuration files, according to GreyNoise. Your threat feed is someone else’s database: What ingesting malware intel at scale takes The advice is to consume shared threat intelligence. Join the ISAC. Wire the community feeds into your pipeline. This looks like a fine advice and I agree to it. What nobody mentions you is the operating manual, because the access was never the hard part. DuckDB stays open source while the team behind it goes to work for Amazon Hannes Mühleisen and Mark Raasveldt started as AWS employees. The two built DuckDB, an analytical database that runs inside your process instead of on a server somebody has to administer. NIS2 compliance: Fixing IAM and access control before the 2026 audit The NIS2 Directive places direct obligations on organizations across supply chain risk management, incident reporting, and board-level accountability. October brings a new wave of legally binding deadlines across the EU, as member states move from transposition into enforcement. Debian developers rejected an LLM ban and left disclosure voluntary A maintainer reading a merge request can’t tell whether a person or a model wrote the diff, and nobody has to say. Debian developers voted on that through August 28, and Kurt Roeckx, the project secretary, announced the result: the winning option encourages contributors to disclose AI assistance and stops there. Halo-record: Open-source audit trails for AI agents Brian Kuan wrote halo-record, a small Python package that sits inside an AI agent and writes down the moves it makes: tool calls, model calls, data access, approvals. The OpenClaw 2.0 release moves your sessions into SQLite OpenClaw is open source software that hands an AI model small standing jobs across your accounts, the kind of chore where it watches a mailbox for vendor advisories and pings you on Telegram when one names a product you run. OpenClaw 2.0 is the largest update in the project’s history. Researchers built a $7 gadget for anyone paranoid about hidden cameras in hotel rooms Most of us, staying in a hotel room or a vacation rental, have wondered at least once whether we’re safe there, whether someone might be watching or recording us without our knowledge. The thought alone leaves a bitter taste in the mouth. Askeal, the AI cybersecurity assistant that gives verifiable, expert-backed answers Askeal takes the opposite approach to omniscient Gen AI: rather than pretending to know everything, it combines AI with community expertise. Vetted vendors, researchers, and practitioners contribute their intelligence and tools to help users conduct manual investigations. The startup, backed by a $1.1 million pre-seed round, is launching the tool with an international community of early testers and contributors. Download: The Agentic Software Development Guide AI makes it easy to ship more code. It does not make that code easier to trust. Most teams don’t fail because their developers can’t use AI. They fail because the dev’s job changed and nobody redefined it. Cybersecurity jobs available right now: September 1, 2026 We’ve scoured the market to bring you a selection of roles that span various skill levels within the cybersecurity field. Check out this weekly selection of cybersecurity jobs available right now. New infosec products of the week: September 4, 2026 Here’s a look at the most interesting products from the past week, featuring releases from BugBase, F5 Networks, Ping Identity, and Superna.
helpnetsecurity.comSep 6, 2026extracted
OSPAR 2026 report now available with 167 services in scope
We’re pleased to confirm the successful completion of our annual Amazon Web Services (AWS) Outsourced Service Provider’s Audit Report (OSPAR) assessment on July 29, 2026, in line with the OSPAR version 2.0 framework. The Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) established the Guidelines on Control Objectives and Procedures for Outsourced Service Providers (ABS Guidelines) to set out baseline control criteria for outsourced service providers (OSPs) operating in Singapore. These guidelines cover key areas such as cyber hygiene, technology risk management, business continuity, data security, cryptography, and software application development and management, drawing on regulatory direction from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). This year’s certification cycle broadens the scope with five additional services, covering the 167 AWS services within the AWS Asia Pacific (Singapore) Region. The newly added services are: Amazon Application Recovery Controller AWS Artifact AWS Deadline Cloud AWS Parallel Computing Service (AWS PCS) AWS Security Incident Response This latest certification reinforces our commitment to the security standards expected of cloud providers within Singapore’s financial services industry. For customers, OSPAR offers a way to ease due diligence efforts typically associated with compliance reviews. You can download the latest OSPAR report from AWS Artifact , a self-service portal for on-demand access to AWS compliance reports. Sign in to AWS Artifact in the AWS Management Console , or learn more at Getting Started with AWS Artifact . The list of services in scope for OSPAR is available in the report and is also available at AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program . We remain committed to expanding the OSPAR program’s scope over time, guided by customer architectural and regulatory needs. For any questions regarding the OSPAR report, reach out to your AWS account team. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. James Chang James is part of the Global Security Assurance team and has taken on major audit programs across the Asia Pacific Japan (APJ) region, including Japan’s ISMAP certification. He has also delivered APJ regulatory assessments and customer assurance engagements. Ignatius Lee Ignatius is a Security Assurance professional based in Singapore, covering audits across the Asia Pacific Japan (APJ) region. Since joining Security Assurance in early 2025, he has contributed to key audit programs across the region, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and Korea. Joseph Goh Joseph is the APJ ASEAN Lead at AWS, based in Singapore. He leads security audits, certifications, and compliance programs across the Asia Pacific region. Joseph is passionate about delivering programs that build trust with customers and providing them assurance on cloud security.
aws.amazon.comSep 4, 2026extracted
IDScan sued over alleged data breach affecting 153 million drivers
Multiple lawsuits have been filed against identity verification company IDScan after hackers allegedly breached the service and offered to sell more than 153 million driver’s licenses. Several law firms, including Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, and Hall Attorneys, have also launched investigations into potential class-action litigation related to the reported security incident at IDScan. Brian Krebs originally reported on September 1 that a dark-web identity-theft service called “Nexus” advertised access to more than 153 million U.S. and Canadian driver’s license scans, 10 million ID cards, 3 million travel documents, and 579,000 medical cards. Krebs verified the samples by searching the database for his own records and those of other individuals who had consented to the checks, and tracked the leak to IDScan. IDScan is an identity verification technology company that provides hardware and software solutions for businesses to scan, authenticate, and extract information from government-issued identity documents. Its systems are used across the U.S. in car rental firms, retailers, gun shops, financial institutions, cannabis dispensaries, and hospitality establishments. The company has not published any statements about these allegations, and it did not respond to BleepingComputer’s requests for comments. Currently, it is unclear if IDScan's systems were compromised or the number of impacted individuals. Krebs also reported that the FBI’s New Orleans office has launched an investigation into the incident, which Reuters also confirmed independently. The agency has also confirmed for BleepingComputer that it is looking into the incident. However, the FBI declined any further comment due to the ongoing nature of the investigation. The illegal service Nexus is no longer online. However, cybercriminals still have access to the database. BleepingComputer learned that the service included documents belonging to U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and an assistant director of the FBI, but we could not verify the information. The lawsuits were filed in Louisiana, where IDScan is based, and allege that IDScan failed to protect information from its clients, such as global car rental company Hertz. According to Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, IDScan has started to notify some business customers around September 1st. The law firm says people whose IDs were scanned through businesses using IDScan's systems may be affected, and is seeking potential claimants for a possible class-action case. Given the incident’s potential scale, additional lawsuits—including potential class actions—could be filed, and related cases could eventually be consolidated into multidistrict litigation. State attorneys general and federal regulators could launch separate investigations or enforcement actions, as it has happened with similar-scale data exposures in the recent past, including for 23andMe, Marriott, and Equifax. Update [September 4, 14:50 EST]: Article edited to include FBI's confirmation that the incident is being investigated. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comSep 4, 2026extracted
OpenAI Pledges $1 Billion to Bring Frontier AI to Critical Infrastructure Defenders
Daybreak is OpenAI’s continuously running agentic loop that brings the power of frontier AI to simplify complex security investigations, validation, remediation and reporting. The earlier Daybreak Blue supports common defensive work with OpenAI mainline models; while Daybreak Red gives approved organizations access to specialized cyber models for more sensitive and technically demanding work. The new Daybreak for Frontline Defenders was announced on September 3, 2026, as a $1 billion subsidy for Frontline Defenders to access Daybreak. These frontline defenders are defenders required to protect the critical industry, often under-funded and usually with aging equipment. While the commitment is global, the announcement makes it clear that initial priority will be given to American companies. “Every day, we depend on cyber defenders to protect the systems that keep communities running: the water coming from the tap, the electricity powering homes and businesses, the local government systems that deliver public services, and the financial institutions people trust with their money. Many operate with limited staff and budgets, while defending complex and aging systems,” says OpenAI. But while critical industry systems are aging, AI is consistently renewing, improving and scaling adversarial attacks. OpenAI believes defenders only have a small window in which to improve defenses before they are overwhelmed by AI-assisted attacks. Daybreak for Frontline Defenders is designed to help close the gap between attack and defense while the window remains open. “We are starting where the gap is greatest: with defenders carrying enormous responsibility without the resources of the world’s largest companies. Our goal is to build a model that can protect the services Americans rely on and, with our partners, help put frontier cybersecurity in the hands of frontline defenders around the world,” it explains. The ability for frontier models to detect vulnerabilities that can then be fixed is not new — to OpenAI’s chagrin the modern security age is often known as the post-Mythos era. The move by OpenAI to make the process easier through an agentic loop is welcome. The announcement, however, goes into few specific details. “Daybreak for Frontline Defenders brings together $1 billion in subsidized access to frontier cyber capabilities, hands-on training and technical assistance, and new partnerships to get those capabilities to organizations that protect the services people depend on every day,” it announces; but doesn’t clarify exactly what is subsidized, nor the amount of the subsidy in relation to the ultimate unsubsidized cost, nor does it say whether the subsidy for each company is a fixed amount or percentage of the total cost. Nevertheless, the argument behind the offer is sound: critical industries are especially vulnerable to the increasing scale and sophistication of AI assisted attacks; there is only a short window before our critical industries are in danger of being overwhelmed; and frontier AI power is the best way to reduce the risk. That alone makes Daybreak for Frontline Defenders an offer worth exploring. “Eligible state and local governments, critical infrastructure operators, nonprofits, open-source maintainers, and supporting organizations can visit the Daybreak website to learn more about access, technical assistance, training, and other cyber-defense support.” Just be sure you understand the full cost and range after any subsidy before you commit to a lengthy involvement that may go well beyond the subsidized six months, because the announcement gives no indication of actual costs. Related: OpenAI’s Astra Crosses ‘Critical’ Cyber Threshold After Finding Zero-Days Related: OpenAI Agents Exploited Linux Kernel Flaw on Company’s Own Systems Related: OpenAI Agents Coordinated via Makeshift Message Board Ahead of Hugging Face Hack Related: OpenAI Unveils New Cybersecurity Model GPT-5.6-Cyber
securityweek.comSep 4, 2026extracted
PostgreSQL Fixes 12-Year-Old Logical Decoding Flaw Enabling Replication-Role Code Execution
PostgreSQL has released updates to address a security flaw that allows an account with the REPLICATION attribute to run arbitrary code as the operating-system user running the database server. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-6471 (CVSS score: 7.2), has been present since logical decoding was introduced in PostgreSQL 9.4 in 2014. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.6, 17.11, 16.15, 15.19, and 14.24 are affected. Exploitation requires an account carrying the REPLICATION attribute and a server running with wal_level = logical. Backup tools, standby servers, change data capture (CDC) pipelines, and monitoring systems routinely hold that attribute. The fix, shipped on August 13, adds a server parameter called output_plugin_libraries that lists which libraries may be loaded as logical decoding output plugins, defaulting to 'pgoutput, test_decoding'. Installations using any other output plugin, wal2json, and decoderbufs among them, will have logical decoding refused after updating until an administrator adds the library to that list and reloads the server configuration. "Previously, a replication user could select any loadable library for logical decoding, allowing exploits of various sorts. To allow locking this down without breaking setups that worked before, introduce a whitelist of allowed output plugins," the PostgreSQL Global Development Group said in the 18.6 release notes. The PostgreSQL Project credited Vladimir Tokarev and Yu Kunpeng with reporting the problem. Tokarev detailed it in a September 1 write-up for data security firm Cyera Research, which names the flaw PostGREShell. The plugin name supplied in a CREATE_REPLICATION_SLOT command is passed directly to the function that loads the library, Cyera said. PostgreSQL's existing restriction on plugin paths, which confines non-superusers to a single administrator-controlled directory, is never called on the replication path. The replication protocol's parser accepts almost any character inside a double-quoted plugin name, including path separators and ../ traversal, so a full filesystem path reaches the loader as typed. On Windows, the server resolves a network path over Server Message Block (SMB) and fetches the library from a machine the attacker controls, writing nothing to the target, Cyera said. On Linux and macOS, the same result requires enabling Network File System (NFS) automounting. Everywhere else the attacker needs an existing way to write a file to the server's disk. Code loaded this way runs inside the database backend process as the postgres operating-system user. Cyera's test plugin then wrote the role catalog directly to make the replication account a PostgreSQL superuser. It also set up three persistence mechanisms that survive a server restart. Cyera describes the REPLICATION attribute as a low-privilege backup credential, but PostgreSQL scored the flaw with Privileges Required set to High, a rating reproduced in SUSE's own assessment. PostgreSQL rejected applying its existing LOAD restriction to the replication path. "REPLICATION users were not previously subject to restrictions on output plugin paths, so they were able to bypass LOAD-time protections during logical decoding. Unfortunately, adding the standard LOAD restrictions now would retroactively require all third-party output plugins to be installed under the $libdir/plugins directory," Jacob Champion, who wrote the fix, said in the commit message. Failed loads appear in the server log as ERROR: library "..." may not be used as an output plugin, with a hint naming the setting, according to the parameter's documentation. Administrators are advised to take the following steps - Run SELECT DISTINCT plugin FROM pg_replication_slots WHERE plugin IS NOT NULL; before updating to identify the output plugins in use, which will only show plugins successfully used at some point. Update to 18.6, 17.11, 16.15, 15.19, or 14.24, or to the equivalent distribution package. Add any non-default plugin to output_plugin_libraries and reload the configuration with pg_ctl reload or SELECT pg_reload_conf(). A restart is not required. Set the new cluster's output_plugin_libraries before running pg_upgrade --check when migrating from version 17 or later, as the check fails if the list does not permit the old cluster's slot plugins. Fixed packages are available on Amazon RDS for all five branches, as well as from Debian, SUSE, and Ubuntu. PostgreSQL's advisory covers supported branches 14 through 18 and does not address earlier ones. PostgreSQL 14 stops receiving fixes on November 12, 2026, the project said in its release announcement. The upstream fix "requires additional changes to the configuration if some extensions are used," Debian's advisory warns, naming its wal2json and decoderbufs packages. Ubuntu's USN-8653-1, which shipped the fix for 22.04, 24.04, and 26.04 LTS on August 20, makes no mention of the parameter and tells administrators only to restart PostgreSQL after the update. As of September 4, the wal2json project had updated its documentation to tell users to add the plugin to output_plugin_libraries, citing the CVE. A gap in the fix is still open. pg_createsubscriber creates replication slots using pgoutput without checking the new parameter, so a --dry-run succeeds and the conversion then fails. "pg_createsubscriber command creates replication slots with plugin 'pgoutput', without checking the GUC. This meant if the plugin name is not specified in the parameter, --dry-run mode passes but actual convertion fails. It's very surprising for users and should be avoided," Hayato Kuroda of Fujitsu said in a message to the pgsql-hackers mailing list. A patch was under review and had not been committed as of September 4. CVE-2026-6471 remained absent from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog as of September 4. The Hacker News found no proof-of-concept code for it in public repositories on the same date. Until the update can be applied, Cyera said exposure can be reduced by stripping the REPLICATION attribute from accounts that do not need it, restricting replication entries in pg_hba.conf to known addresses, blocking outbound SMB (port 445) and NFS (port 2049) traffic from database servers, and disabling autofs where it is not needed.
thehackernews.comSep 4, 2026extracted
Nvidia Is Buying AI Platform Hugging Face for $13 Billion
Chipmaker Nvidia (NASDAQ: NVDA) is buying artificial intelligence software platform Hugging Face for $13 billion. It’s the latest deal by the company, whose processors are integral to the AI boom, and highlights Nvidia’s push to champion increasingly popular open-source AI models. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang wrote in a blog post Thursday that more than 18 million developers, researchers and creators use Hugging Face to share more than 3 million models, 500,000 data sets and 1 million applications. More than 200,000 companies also that use the platform, he said. In July, Hugging Face’s data processing systems were hacked, and ChatGPT maker OpenAI acknowledged that its artificial intelligence system was to blame, sending shock waves through the security community amid heightened concerns about the capabilities of powerful AI models. Just over a week later, Anthropic said its artificial intelligence models hacked into three other organizations during testing. That was followed closely by an announcement from Meta, which said its AI model accessed the internet on its own and hacked another company. The wave of AI intrusions occurred just a month after President Donald Trump signed an executive order creating a framework for the federal government to vet the national security risks of the most advanced AI systems for up to a month before their public release. On Thursday, however, Nvidia’s Huang said that Hugging face will remain an open platform. He signaled that Nvidia is betting that more businesses will turn to open-source AI, which lets them download and customize their own AI models, rather than pay for proprietary AI services from companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic. Open models let startups, businesses, universities and public institutions build on advanced capabilities without training every model from scratch,” Huang wrote in a blog post. “They enable organizations to match the right model to the right job. Hugging Face will still support multicloud and multi-accelerator development and deployment. Nvidia has released more than 500 models and more than 250 open data sets on Hugging Face. “Nvidia’s investment in Hugging Face is a strong strategic hedge against the different ways AI could evolve,” Bret Greenstein, chief AI officer at global business and technology consulting firm West Monroe, said in an emailed statement. “With much of Nvidia’s valuation tied to the adoption and expansion of AI over the next decade, the company has a clear interest in supporting the entire ecosystem’s success.” Nvidia’s high-end chips have emerged as the leading building blocks for AI, and are highly sought after. The Santa Clara, California-based company reported quarterly profits of $59.69 billion late last month. While AI has powered stock market gains and U.S. economic growth in recent years, there’s been growing skepticism about whether AI will justify the trillions of dollars being spent to develop the technology. The AI industry is also faces increasing pushback amid objections to the expansion of data centers and fears that the rapid speed of AI adoption could lead to widespread job losses worldwide. The $12.93 billion deal includes $1 billion for a retention plan for Hugging Face employees, Huang told CNBC. Nvidia’s shares rose nearly 2% in morning trading. Hugging Face is not publicly traded. Related: OpenAI’s Rogue AI Ventured Beyond Hugging Face Related: Industry Reactions to OpenAI Models Hacking Hugging Face Related: OpenAI Agents Coordinated via Makeshift Message Board Ahead of Hugging Face Hack
securityweek.comSep 4, 2026extracted
GPT-6 Astra Scores 100% on ExploitBench as OpenAI Blocks PoC Exploit Requests
OpenAI on Thursday officially unveiled GPT‑6 Astra, which it described as the "world's most intelligent and aligned model." The development comes days after the artificial intelligence (AI) company said the model had reached the "Critical" cybersecurity capability threshold under its Preparedness Framework. "Astra is state-of-the-art on computer use, browsing, software engineering, cybersecurity, science, and professional work. Astra saturates FrontierMath Tier 4 with a 98% score," OpenAI said. "Astra also saturates ARC-AGI-3 with a 99.9% score and ExploitBench with a 100% score. It also sets a new frontier on computer and browser use, handling the most demanding professional work with unmatched speed, accuracy, and judgment." The model is currently rolling out to a small set of organizations and is expected to be available to all ChatGPT Plus, Pro, Business, and Enterprise users, as well as through the OpenAI API, Microsoft Azure, and Amazon Web Services (AWS) Bedrock. On ExploitBench, which evaluates a model's ability to turn known software vulnerabilities into working exploits, Astra achieved a perfect score of 100%, as opposed to 78.5% for GPT‑5.6 Sol, its previous frontier cyber-capable model. OpenAI said the model also achieves substantially higher arbitrary code-execution rates than GPT‑5.6 Sol when testing its exploit development capabilities using flaws disclosed in the previous three months between June and August 2026. This included two zero-day vulnerabilities in unspecified software. Astra is also equipped to use previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve code execution in hardened browsers and develop privilege-escalation exploits for hardened operating-systems, if allowed to run without any safeguards. Given the dual-use nature of these tools – the capabilities that can help defenders find weaknesses faster can also be abused by bad actors to exploit them more easily – OpenAI said the version of Astra being released is limited to secure code review and patching, while refusing to comply with prompts related to creating proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for vulnerabilities. "Through OpenAI Daybreak, we plan to expand access and roll out less restrictive safeguards in the coming weeks," the AI upstart said. "This will enable more defensive workflows, including vulnerability and proof-of-concept validation, malware analysis, and detection engineering." To address concerns about model misuse, OpenAI said it has included stronger model robustness to better tackle jailbreaks, more context to its monitoring systems, and extra safeguards to help detect and contain misalignment. Astra is also "more likely" to operate within the confines set by the user and implied by its environment, although it warned the safety checks can sometimes interrupt legitimate work, including defensive cybersecurity, at which point, the user will be prompted to review the action before continuing. "In sensitive environments, Astra proceeds with care commensurate with its risk," the company added. "In an evaluation of computer use tasks adversarially selected to elicit misbehavior, Astra was more successful at avoiding unintended consequences. Running with additional security measures offered by default yielded even stronger performance." The release of Astra comes as OpenAI launched a new initiative designed to provide subsidized access to its models, hands-on training, and technical assistance to critical infrastructure sectors, including water systems, electricity providers, state and local governments, banks, non-profits, open-source maintainers, and organizations with limited security resources. The global project, called Daybreak for Frontline Defenders, aims to commit $1 billion to help defenders use frontier AI cyber capabilities to safeguard essential services against cyber attacks. In tandem, the company has announced a new pilot with the U.S. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) to equip an initial group of public sector and water system defenders with Daybreak access, guided training, and hands-on assistance. "We have a defender's window: a narrowing opportunity to use AI to close security gaps before attackers seize them," OpenAI said. "Our role is to help put powerful tools in defenders’ hands so they can protect the systems, and the people, they are responsible for."
thehackernews.comSep 4, 2026extracted
ThreatsDay: CEO Phishing Kits, 5K Dropbox Account Hacks, OAuth Traps + 17 More Stories
The worst part is how normal these attacks look. A call from IT. A shared file. A trusted app. A simple request to click “Allow.” Why break in when someone might open the door? That idea runs through this edition. Attackers use real tools, fake login pages, old account links, and software guides that point to unsafe downloads. One wrong letter in a web address can be enough. There is also ransomware, stolen ID data, hidden attack servers, and weak settings that should have been fixed long ago. Here’s the full list. The threats change every week. Subscribe, and we’ll alert you when each new ThreatsDay Bulletin is out. Fake IT, Real AccessMicrosoft has warned of a human-operated intrusion campaign that leverages Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT or help desk personnel and socially engineer users into granting an interactive remote session. "Once remote control is established via RMM tools, the threat actor uses PowerShell to download and silently install a malicious MSI package, which in turn stages a portable Node.js runtime and an obfuscated JavaScript implant that provides persistent command execution and command and control (C2)," the tech giant said. "After the implant is deployed, the threat actor performs extensive host and Active Directory reconnaissance, periodically captures screenshots of the victim's desktop, executes follow-on payloads through trusted Windows binaries, and pivots across the enterprise over Windows Remote Management (WinRM) toward high-value assets such as domain controllers." Microsoft has described the "intrusion pattern" as high-impact as it grants an external operator interactive access to internal infrastructure. Teams Vishing at ScaleIn more Teams-related abuse, a coordinated social engineering operation dubbed Spring Ring has been observed leveraging external Microsoft Teams accounts to masquerade as IT help desk personnel to target more than 150 employees across at least 10 companies in various industries between January and April 2026. "What seems like a benign chat is in fact a voice phishing (vishing) call, during which adversaries try to coerce victims into executing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools or custom malware," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said. "In a more advanced variant, attackers transitioned from a vishing call to a full-blown Microsoft NT LAN Manager (NTLM) relay attack aimed at an organization's domain controller (DC)." As many as 26 distinct attacker identities have been identified behind the chat and call attempts. Ransomware Affiliate PlaybookIn a new report, Sophos revealed that The Gentlemen ransomware operation, which it tracks as Gold Sherwood, has claimed a total of 683 victims by the end of July 2026. In July alone, the group is said to have added 169 victims. "The Gentlemen ransomware intrusions [...] demonstrate a repeatable affiliate playbook that combines opportunistic initial access, rapid privilege escalation, legitimate remote access mechanisms, tool staging in trusted system paths, targeted data exfiltration, aggressive defense evasion, backup disruption, and ransomware deployment," Sophos said. "Affiliates are operationally flexible: they use native Windows utilities, commercial and open-source tools, BYOVD-based EDR killers, and backup service tampering to adapt to victims’ environments and maximize impact before encryption." PhaaS Survives TakedownThe Outsider phishing-as-a-service (PaaS) platform has continued to be a resilient threat in the face of law enforcement action that took down a number of domains related to the service. The kit is operated by a threat actor known as "ChenLun." Group-IB said it has identified over 700 new phishing pages created using the kit within a month after Google filed a civil lawsuit against its operators, indicating that affiliates are continuing to use the service. The campaigns are delivered via SMS. "What was once a technically demanding operation has been reduced to a subscription and a Telegram channel," Group-IB said. "The phishing kits are distributed via a dedicated Telegram ecosystem. Operators used a WebSocket connection for live keylogging and to manipulate MFA challenges." Signed Software, Hidden PayloadA government-themed tax notice campaign is targeting recipients through U.A.E.- and India-themed tax assessment lures to persuade them to open a malicious disc image. "The disc image contains a legitimate, validly signed commercial executable alongside a hidden, unsigned malicious DLL," iZOOlogic said. "This makes abuse of software trust and DLL sideloading the central mechanism of the campaign. The malicious DLL acts as a loader and establishes multiple execution and persistence mechanisms. The loader contains three encrypted payloads. Two decrypt to legitimately signed kernel drivers from unrelated commercial products, while the third is a persistence script." The attack chain paves the way for a Registry-resident second stage, which connects to an external server over UDP. Executive Phishing as a ServiceZeroBEC has disclosed details of a turnkey phishing service called BlueKit that's being used to target CEOs of financial-industry groups to facilitate credential theft using a browser-in-the-middle (BitM) infrastructure. The campaign uses document-sharing lures to trigger the attack chain and employs ZeroBot to screen bots. "The campaign did not stop at credential or session theft," ZeroBEC said. "After a BlueKit browser-in-the-middle flow, selected victims were moved into a fake document-viewer workflow that delivered a legitimate ScreenConnect client configured for an attacker-used ScreenConnect cloud instance." The service advertises access at $250 for seven days, $480 for 14 days, and $940 for 30 days, placing it at the higher end of the current PhaaS market, in comparison to Tycoon 2FA, Greatness, and Forg365, which cost approximately $350, $289, and $400 per month. Dormant Domains, Ready C2Cybersecurity researchers have analyzed the infrastructure powering the operations of Prince of Persia (aka Indy), a little-known Iranian hacking group known for deploying malware families, Foudre and Tonnerre, to profile victims and harvest sensitive data from high-value targets. According to Whisper Security's Kaveh Azarhoosh, the backend is self-authoritative, with each live C2 server also running the nameservers for its own domains. Also identified is a dormant reserve of 58 domains that are registered and delegated to the group's own nameservers, but none of which currently points at any server. "They're staged, not live: the moment any one of them gains an address record, a new command server has gone live — and it's visible before the server does anything at all," Azarhoosh told The Hacker News via email. Remote-Controlled Rubber DuckyIntezer has detailed a fake "privacy browser" downloaded from a counterfeit site ("www.mxsetuplogi.com") that turns remote attacker commands into simulated mouse and keyboard input on a victim's machine. The site is surfaced via a sponsored search result on Google, in this case after the victim mistyped the domain name ("www.mxsetup.logi.con") on the address bar. The cybersecurity company described it as a USB Rubber Ducky attack delivered over the internet. "This attack evades EDR and sits at zero to two detections on VirusTotal," it said in a statement. "The infection began with one simple mistyped letter during routine mouse setup that routed the victim through a malvertising network into an MSIX installer signed through Microsoft's own infrastructure." The campaign has been tracked back to a similar operation from January 2016, indicating that the activity has been active for at least a decade. 153 Million IDs for SaleThe U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating a new ID theft service called Nexus, which claims to have digital scans of over 153 million driver's licenses from people in the U.S. and Canada. According to independent security journalist Brian Krebs, the service is said to be siphoning images collected by a widely used identity verification company called IDScan.net based in Louisiana. The service, launched on the dark web on August 31, 2026, also boasts of more than 10 million identification cards, more than three million travel documents and/or international IDs, and at least 579,000 medical cards. Each record can be unlocked for $100. Shortly after the exposé was published, Nexus went offline. IDscan.net is said to be investigating the incident on its end. AI Instructions Become a TrapA scan of 6,214 live domains belonging to defense contractors, Fortune 500, and Big Tech companies has uncovered llms.txt or llms-full.txt that are being placed at the root of their websites, alongside robots.txt. "The file is not a sitemap and it is not a disclaimer," an Israeli stealth startup said. "It is a curated instruction set for AI agents: what to read, which APIs to call, which packages to install, which domains to trust. OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google publish their own." Of the 8,265 llms.txt and llms-full.txt files surfaced from the scan, 120 of them, each on a different site, featured install instructions pointing to PyPI or npm package names and domains that had never been registered. "We selected a small set of package names that appeared in the llms.txt files of companies you have definitely heard of, and registered them on PyPI and npm," Alon Hertz, one of the researchers, said. "Into each one we embedded a single phone-home — a minimal beacon that reported the fact of installation back to infrastructure we controlled. The first callback arrived in under four minutes." What's troubling here is that at least one active attack has already exploited this misconfiguration, in which authentication vendor Clerk's llms.txt included a reference to an npm package named "clerk-next-fix-auth-protection" instead of referencing its scoped package, @clerk/eslint-plugin. An unknown threat actor registered a public package with the same name. The package contained code to transmit the installer's username, machine name, working directory, and timestamp to an external server. Clerk has since addressed the issue. AI Defenders Sound the AlarmA coalition of over 100 companies, including Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Perplexity, and others, has published an open-leet calling for improvements to cybersecurity as AI continues to compress compress cyberattack timelines, as well as accelerate the speed and scale of cyber attacks, leaving defenders with an ever-shortening window to address security issues before they are exploited. The signatories noted that current approaches to cybersecurity are not equipped to deal with the incoming surge in AI-enabled attacks, and that threat actors can rely on AI tools to target longstanding vulnerabilities, excessive permissions, misconfigurations, insecure and unpatched software, weak authentication, and technical debt in legacy systems. "In the coming months, AI-enabled cyber attacks will become far more widespread and sophisticated as models around the world become increasingly capable," the letter warns. "The companies and public services our communities depend on – from hospitals to water treatment plants to the infrastructure that powers the internet – are at risk. Today’s AI advances are already giving defenders new ways to fix weaknesses that have accumulated for years. If we act decisively, we can use the defenders' window to make our digital world much more secure." Legacy Login Exposes 5K AccountsDropbox has disclosed that about 5,000 accounts were compromised last month, allowing threat actors to view and download content stored on the cloud-storage platform. The company told Reuters that it "identified unauthorized access affecting accounts linked to a Lenovo ID that did not have its two-factor authentication enabled," adding it terminated all sessions authenticated through a Lenovo ID. Lenovo said the issue is related to a "legacy integration" between Lenovo ID and Dropbox that "could be used to improperly authenticate certain Dropbox accounts." Kernel Protection by DefaultMicrosoft has announced that it will expand memory integrity protection across eligible devices starting October 2026, to help users benefit from "stronger kernel-level protection from sophisticated attacks by default with little or no additional configuration." The company continued: "This change reduces security complexity while helping you establish a stronger security baseline across your environment. Built on Virtualization-based Security (VBS), memory integrity helps protect critical parts of Windows from tampering. It forms a foundation for modern security innovations such as hotpatch updates that improve user experience and productivity, as well as protection." Pro-Ukraine Ransomware RebrandA new ransomware group named VantaCore has targeted at least seven Russian companies with a proprietary ransomware strain and demanding millions of dollars in ransom. The threat actor is assessed to be a rebranding of a known pro-Ukrainian group tracked as Thor, F6 said. Also put to use in the attacks are VantaCoreLoader, to distribute the ransomware and other malicious programs, VantaCoreRAT, a backdoor that can harvest information about infected systems and execute commands, and SnowKiller, which can terminate security software using the BYOVD technique. Sextortion Suspects Face LifeTwo Nigerian nationals, Adebola Festus Adekunle, 26, and Mudasiru Afeez Olawale, 24, have been extradited to the U.S. to face prosecution in two separate cases for the financially-motivated sextortion of minors that led to the death of minors in both the Northern District of Mississippi and the Middle District of North Carolina. Both of them face a maximum penalty of life in prison and mandatory minimum prison sentences, with the child exploitation resulting in death charge carrying a minimum penalty of 30 years in prison. Hardware-Backed Digital IDsGoogle said it's expanding the Android Ready SE initiative to bring together silicon vendors, device manufacturers, wallet developers, and government issuers to streamline compliance and scale certified hardware security across the mobile ecosystem. The development is seen as a way to scale high-assurance, tamper-resistant digital identity amid accelerating global demand for securely storing national electronic IDs (eIDs) and mobile driver licenses (mDLs) in hardware-backed mobile wallets. OAuth Access Outlives PasswordsThe FBI has warned that malicious cyber actors have been targeting prominent victims, their family members, and personal acquaintances by directly messaging personal accounts with malicious links leveraging a technique called OAuth consent phishing to gain access to their accounts. The activity has targeted government officials, media, and other publicly known personalities on a commercial messaging application (CMA), urging them to access a malicious link under the guise of a file-sharing service through an application under the malicious actor's control. "Previous phishing campaigns have also impersonated event coordinators and planners, who sent malicious links to targets under the guise of an invitation to an event and the need to verify the target's identity through a malicious application under the actor's control," the FBI said. Authorities did not provide any details about how many people may have been compromised by these attacks, or who is behind them. Electron Apps Hide a StealerTrojanized Electron desktop applications impersonating legitimate software are being used to distribute a Windows information stealer called RevStealer. The applications are shared via GitHub repositories and game-cheat-themed sites, including a fake Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop project. "It is delivered by an Electron loader that hides an AES-encrypted native payload inside an application resource, attempts to add the user's AppData folder to Microsoft Defender's exclusion list, and launches the payload with no visible window," Morphisec said. The malware also runs a series of anti-analysis and anti-VM checks before unpacking the main payload. "If the primary C2 is unreachable, RevStealer reads a fallback address from a smart contract on the Polygon blockchain, letting operators rotate infrastructure without rebuilding the malware," the company said. What's notable about the malware is that it's not designed for persistence. Rather, it prioritizes capturing as much data as possible in a single run, exfiltrates it in encrypted typed records, and then deletes itself. Trusted Tool, Rogue AccessThreat actors are weaponizing Faronics Deploy, a legitimate endpoint management platform, to run attacker-controlled PowerShell after phishing victims install the software. Huntress said it observed more than 457 endpoints encountering Faronics-related lures. "In observed cases, threat actors chained Faronics Deploy to ScreenConnect, blending malicious remote access activity into trusted software workflows," it said. "The delivery method varies between scripts, with observed examples using curl or MSHTA to retrieve additional content, while others invoke msiexec to install payloads hosted on attacker-controlled infrastructure. These scripts are subsequently used to install ScreenConnect, establishing an additional remote access mechanism on the compromised endpoint." ClickFix Goes Cross-PlatformCybersecurity researchers have described CRPx0 as a ClickFix-delivered ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that employs lures related to Windows and macOS update prompts and reCAPTCHA checks to trick victims into running a copied command. "On Windows, it starts a multi-stage DLL chain. On macOS, it downloads the Python payload directly," the Ransom-ISAC Research Team said. "The final payload is a cross-platform Python ransomware that exfiltrates data before encryption, encrypts files with AES-128-CBC via Fernet, wraps the per-victim key with an embedded RSA-4096 public key, attempts lateral movement, and drops ransom notes demanding Bitcoin or Monero payment within 48 hours." The RaaS program first appeared on June 7, 2026. As of late August, the group has advertised the operation on a clearnet site ("crpx0[.]su/v3.txt") as an offensive control panel to manage compromised machines, harvest files and credentials, monitor stolen cryptocurrency artifacts, run remote commands, and launch ransomware manually. One point is easy to miss: changing a password may not shut every door. A bad app approval or remote session can give attackers access without the password. Recovery should also end open sessions, remove unknown app access, and check remote tools. Better security settings are slowly becoming the default, which helps. But old account links, weak sign-in options, and trusted software still give attackers room to work. The safest rule this week is simple: check what already has access before adding anything new.
thehackernews.comSep 3, 2026extracted
Your Employee’s Password Appeared in an Infostealer Log. Now What?
Infostealer logs have evolved from an underground commodity into an operational security problem. For defenders, finding an exposed credential is only the beginning. In today’s reality many security analysts start their morning with an alert: an employee’s corporate email address has appeared in a newly collected infostealer log. The log contains a username and password for a corporate SaaS application. There are browser cookies, meaning live sessions that can be exploited, and several other saved, in files, credentials. A personal employee computer got infected by Vidar located hundreds of miles from the company’s offices. Now what? Resetting the exposed password seems obvious. But that may not solve the problem. If the stealer captured an authenticated session cookie, an attacker may already have a way into the application without needing the password or another MFA prompt. If the employee reused corporate credentials on a personal computer, the endpoint that created the exposure may not even be managed by the organization. And somewhere in an underground Telegram channel, the same information may already be available to an initial access broker, ransomware affiliate, or opportunistic attacker. This is the operational challenge security teams increasingly face with infostealer logs. According to Flare Research's Practitioner’s Guide to Monitoring Stealer Logs, approximately 46% of stealer logs containing corporate credentials originate from likely unmanaged or personal devices. Flare also estimates that exposure involving credentials and sessions for major productivity SaaS and cloud services is growing approximately 29% annually. For defenders, the question is no longer simply whether they should monitor infostealer logs. The harder question is: How do you separate a meaningless old password from an identity compromise that could be happening right now? The needle among millions of needles Infostealers such as RedLine, Lumma, Vidar and other malware families are designed to harvest information stored on infected systems. Depending on the malware and configuration, that can include saved browser passwords, cookies, autofill information, cryptocurrency wallets, system information, VPN configurations and other authentication artifacts. These are packaged to be sold under as an infostealer log, when a single infection can produce hundreds or thousands of individual records. Multiply that across a global malware ecosystem and defenders quickly encounter a scale problem. While defenders need to process and validate everything, the attackers only need one valid valuable set of credentials. As Flare describes the problem, this isn't finding a needle in a haystack. It is finding a specific needle among millions of needles in millions of haystacks. While stealer logs historically circulated through underground forums and marketplaces, Flare's research estimates that roughly 90% of logs now appear on Telegram, where public channels can advertise samples and private subscription channels can provide access to fresher datasets. Infostealer logs can hand attackers a live, authenticated session that skips the password and MFA prompt entirely. Flare monitors stealer logs across the dark web and Telegram in real time, so you can flag exposed corporate identities and sessions before they turn into account takeover. Free 2-Week Trial A password isn't always the most dangerous thing in the log With the vast amount of data in multiple channels, it’s hard to prioritize the risk level. If you work for a large corporate you are working with thousands of employees, if you start your day with two alerts, how can you establish what is riskier? The first alert may involve employees’ old password for a consumer website appears in a six-month-old stealer log, whereas the second alert may have been collected yesterday and contains the employee's corporate identity credentials and an authenticated browser session for the organization's identity provider. While both may be labeled as employee credential exposures, they are completely different. This is why practitioners should prioritize monitoring around assets that tell them something about the potential impact, for instance corporate domains and subdomains, enterprise identity providers, session cookies, VPN and RDP endpoints, and cloud consoles. Identity providers deserve particular attention, since a compromised SSO identity (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, Google Cloud Identity, etc.) can open a path to multiple connected applications. Where possible, automated verification and mitigation further strengthen this protection. The peril in session cookies When a user successfully authenticates, an application can issue a session cookie, so they don't have to authenticate with every request. If malware steals that authenticated session, an attacker may potentially replay it. So, if the attackers get ahold of a session cookie, and an infostealer collects them, they don’t necessarily need to log in. Stolen credentials alone still require authentication, creating an opportunity for defenders to detect or block the login, however, a valid session cookie may remove that step entirely. This effectively bypasses MFA. The first 60 seconds Flare recommends an initial assessment immediately after discovering potentially relevant stealer data, followed by risk scoring and validation. The objective isn't to conduct the entire incident investigation in the first few minutes. It is to determine how quickly the organization needs to react. A useful first question is: What exactly was stolen? An analyst should determine when the infection occurred, what system produced the log, how many corporate credentials are present, and whether authenticated sessions were captured. Then add business context. A credential for testserver.company.com shouldn't necessarily receive the same priority as one for finance.company.com. Similarly, an exposed identity belonging to a marketing intern shouldn't automatically be handled identically to an administrator with access to the identity provider, cloud console and production infrastructure. The illustrative framework in Flare's guide therefore places enterprise identity credentials combined with session cookies at critical severity, with a suggested response target of under one hour. VPN/RDP access combined with multiple corporate credentials is classified as high severity because of its lateral movement potential. From exposure to investigation Suppose our hypothetical employee's log contains an Entra ID credential, corporate SaaS passwords and browser cookies, the next question is whether someone has already used them. Defenders can correlate the exposed identity with authentication telemetry: successful and failed logins, unexpected geographies, unusual devices, unfamiliar IP addresses and access to resources outside the employee's normal behavior. They should also determine whether the stolen information is still usable. Has the password changed since the infection? Has the session expired? Is the account still active? Flare's recommended investigation workflow expands the analysis to include browser fingerprint information, the complete saved-credential inventory, information about the infected system, and additional artifacts such as VPN configurations or SSH keys. Who is the employee? What can their identity access? Was the infected machine corporate or personal? Was this one infection or evidence of a broader campaign? Authentication logs should then be examined across the systems accessible to that identity, prioritizing the most sensitive resources first. Defenders should specifically look for behaviors indicating that exposure has progressed into account takeover: authentication from unexpected locations, access inconsistent with the user's role, unusual downloads, password-reset activity, and enrollment of new MFA devices. This is how a stealer log becomes an early-warning sensor for identity compromise. Treat stealer logs as an identity problem Once a high-risk exposure is confirmed, speed matters. Defenders should invalidate compromised sessions, reset affected credentials, and increase monitoring around the identity. Beyond individual incidents, organizations should track recurring exposures, affected applications, and whether stolen credentials lead to attempted access. Ultimately, infostealer monitoring has become an essential layer of identity security, enabling organizations to identify exposed credentials and sessions, understand the access they provide, determine whether they remain exploitable, and disrupt potential account takeover before it develops into a broader compromise. Sponsored and written by Flare.
bleepingcomputer.comSep 3, 2026extracted
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