TeamPCP deploys Iran-targeted wiper in Kubernetes attacks
The TeamPCP hacking group has expanded its open source software campaign from the Trivy supply chain attack to NPM, Docker Hub, VS Code, and PyPI, and likely partnered with the Lapsus$ gang for monetization purposes. The attack on Aqua Security’s widely used Trivy vulnerability scanner started with the compromise of an access token in late February. Because the maintainers did not rotate all credentials and secrets simultaneously, the hackers were able to maintain access to the compromised environment. OpenSourceMalware reports with high confidence that the attackers compromised the Argon-DevOps-Mgt service account token, which provided them with write/admin access to both Aqua Security’s internal and public-facing repositories. The attack has been attributed to TeamPCP (also known as DeadCatx3, PCPcat, and ShellForce), which was behind a December worm-driven campaign that targeted Docker, Kubernetes, Ray, and Redis, and which also exploited the React2Shell vulnerability, according to Flare. In the Trivy supply chain attack, now tracked as CVE-2026-33634 (CVSS score of 9.4), the hackers released malicious package versions and modified GitHub Actions tags to push information-stealing malware that would harvest credentials, keys, tokens, and other sensitive data. In early March, a similar attack hit Xygeni: compromised credentials linked to repository automation were used to introduce malicious code. Initially, the attackers relied on pull requests, but when that failed, they modified a mutable tag to reference a malicious commit, leading to downstream infections. “While the attack leveraged a known GitHub Actions vulnerability involving mutable tags, the incident also highlights the importance of comprehensive repository protection, strict credential management, and defense-in-depth across CI/CD systems,” Xygeni notes in its incident report. The Trivy attack and blast radius TeamPCP started pushing malware to the Trivy repositories on March 19, but the multi-stage supply chain attack has been contained and is now in the remediation and documentation phase, Aqua said on Wednesday. However, it took five days to fully evict the attackers. Three days after the containment and remediation efforts started, the attackers published malicious Trivy Docker Hub images (v0.69.5 and v0.69.6), confirming that their access had not been blocked, Trivy’s maintainers revealed. “Working closely with Sygnia, we are developing formal documentation that includes the confirmed timeline, actions taken to remediate the incident, and supporting materials for customer assurance and attestation. This effort is informed by a comprehensive review of credentials, access controls, and affected systems,” Aqua says. What made the attack stand out was the use of modified GitHub Action tags to reference malware without any visible changes to the tag name, published dates, or the release page, allowing the attackers to operate under the radar. According to a SANS Institute report seen by SecurityWeek, more than 10,000 CI/CD workflows were affected by the Trivy incident. Every CI/CD pipeline referencing the modified GitHub Actions automatically executed the malicious code, dropping TeamPCP’s information stealer and exposing secrets, credentials, and infrastructure. To evade detection on the infected systems, malicious code contains instructions to remove all its temporary files after performing its multi-stage credential theft and exfiltration operation, CrowdStrike explains. “The remainder of the script is a functional copy of the real trivy-action entry point. It downloads and runs Trivy normally, producing expected scanner output. To an operator reviewing workflow logs, the step appears to have completed successfully,” the cybersecurity company notes. The Checkmarx attack On March 23, TeamPCP hit Checkmarx’s KICS open-source project, publishing malicious versions of the checkmarx.cx-dev-assist and checkmarx.ast-results VS Code plugins to the OpenVSX marketplace. Like the Trivy attack, the hackers injected malicious payloads into the plugins by force-pushing tags that were pointing to malicious commits. A total of 35 GitHub Action version tags were hijacked, SANS Institute says. Checkmarx has since updated GitHub Actions to ast-github-action v2.3.33 and kics-github-action v2.1.20 and permanently removed all previous versions from its repositories. The malicious plugin iterations, namely ast-results 2.53.0 and cx-dev-assist 1.7.0, should be immediately removed. “Upon discovery, we removed the malicious artifacts, pinned our workflows to safe verified commit SHAs, revoked and rotated all exposed credentials, blocked outbound access to the attacker-controlled domain, and reviewed our environments for any signs of further compromise,” Checkmarx says. The cybersecurity firm warns all organizations that downloaded or ran a compromised version of the two plugins from Open VSX to rotate all secrets and environment variables. GitHub credentials, Personal Access Tokens (PATs), repository and organization secrets, SSH keys, Docker registry credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, and GitHub, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud (GCP), and AWS access tokens should be considered compromised and immediately rotated. As ReversingLabs points out, the two VS Code extensions have a combined download count of over 36,000 and are designed for use within VS Code and compatible integrated development environments (IDEs), such as Cursor, Kiro, and Windsurf, making the attack’s blast radius large. CanisterWorm and the NPM attacks Last week, TeamPCP’s campaign also targeted the NPM ecosystem, using read/write access tokens to push malware downstream and using the same infostealer from the Trivy attack. The NPM supply chain attack hit at least 64 unique packages and affected more than 140 package artifacts, injecting install-time malware that relies on an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister dead drop to deliver follow-on binaries. Dubbed CanisterWorm, the final payload contains a component that uses compromised NPM publishing credentials to inject the payload into additional packages. To evade detection, it preserves the legitimate README files, Socket explains. As the attack unfolded, the hackers were seen updating their code, moving from using a postinstall hook to write a Python payload, install it as a systemd –user service, and execute it, to using a hardcoded Python dropper and using the service name pgmon for persistence. According to Aikido, the malware was initially similar to the one used in the Trivy attack, but was later updated with the worm component that allowed it to use harvested NPM tokens and environment variables and spawn a persistent background process using them, to infect additional packages. “Every developer or CI pipeline that installs this package and has an NPM token accessible becomes an unwitting propagation vector. Their packages get infected, their downstream users install those, and if any of them have tokens, the cycle repeats,” Aikido notes. The Kubernetes wiper targeting Iran The same ICP canister used in the CanisterWorm attack on NPM was also used in a campaign targeting Kubernetes. The main difference was that the code included a wiper aimed at Iran-based clusters. The payload contains standard Kubernetes pod detection, deploys privileged DaemonSets across every node, and drops the CanisterWorm backdoor on them as a systemd service, achieving persistence as PostgreSQL tooling. In more recent iterations of the attack, the malware added network-based lateral movement, using SSH via compromised keys and auth log parsing, and exploiting exposed Docker APIs, Aikido reports. The code also checks the system timezone and locale and, if it detects machines configured for Iran, drops a DaemonSet to wipe the entire cluster. Dubbed “kamikaze”, the wiper mounts the host’s root filesystem, erases the top-level content, and then forces a reboot. The operation is performed on all nodes, including the control plane, destroying the entire cluster. “The Kubernetes-native lateral movement via DaemonSets is consistent with TeamPCP’s known playbook, but this variant adds something we haven’t seen from them before: a geopolitically targeted destructive payload aimed specifically at Iranian systems,” Aikido notes. On non-Kubernetes systems configured for Iran, if root access is available, the malware wipes everything. If it does not have root access, it “tries passwordless sudo, then tries anyway. Even without root, it’ll destroy everything the user owns,” Aikido notes. The PyPI attack and LiteLLM compromise In its most recent phase, TeamPCP’s campaign moved to the PyPI ecosystem, compromising LiteLLM, an open source Python library and proxy server that has more than 95 million monthly downloads. LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 were injected with the same information-stealing and dropper malware observed in the other TeamPCP attacks, with the same goal: the compromise of valuable credentials for broad access. The malicious code in LiteLLM 1.82.8 “fires on every Python invocation in the environment” and “runs silently in the background without delaying Python startup,” EndorLabs explains. Used as a unified interface between applications and AI service providers such as Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI, LiteLLM supports over 100 LLM APIs and typically has access to sensitive information such as API keys and environment variables. “Additionally, the breadth of data targeted by the malware underscores how modern development environments — spanning local machines, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud infrastructure — are deeply interconnected. A single compromised dependency can expose credentials across multiple systems, dramatically increasing the potential blast radius,” Sonatype notes. LiteLLM compromise has provided the attackers with access to all the secrets the library touches, and the impact from the attack is broad: approximately 300GB of data was exfiltrated from around 500,000 infected machines, threat intelligence and research project Vx-Underground says. ReversingLabs says that the hackers likely compromised the GitHub account of LiteLLM co-founder and CEO Krish Dholakia on March 23 and then defaced the LiteLLM GitHub repositories in an automated manner the next day. Organizations that installed or executed the malicious LiteLLM versions should immediately remove the packages, rotate all credentials, and investigate the affected systems for suspicious connections, persistence mechanisms, and potentially affected packages. According to cybersecurity outfit Wiz, LiteLLM is present in 36% of all cloud environments, providing hackers with a foothold in highly sensitive parts of the development lifecycle. “In many cases, rebuilding affected systems from a known clean state may be the safest course of action,” Sonatype notes. The Lapsus$ connection In addition to expanding across multiple OSS communities, TeamPCP’s campaign has escalated to a monetization phase. The group is openly taking credit for the attacks and appears to have partnered with the Lapsus$ extortion group for financial gain. TeamPCP has boasted on its Telegram account about the Trivy compromise, the GitHub Actions attacks, the OpenVSX extensions incident, and the PyPI hack, stating a clear focus on security tools and high-leverage points within the OSS ecosystem. The group also claims its operation is still unfolding, saying that it will be “stealing terabytes of trade secrets with our new partners”, Socket reports. While the ‘partners’ were not named, it appears that the hacking group was hinting at Lapsus$, which boasted on its Telegram account about an upcoming supply chain attack from TeamPCP. According to Wiz, this explicit collaboration between the two threat actors is an ecosystem-wide ‘cascade’ aimed at the modern cloud-native and AI ecosystems. “We are seeing a dangerous convergence between supply chain attackers and high-profile extortion groups like Lapsus$,” Wiz lead researcher Ben Read told SecurityWeek. “By moving horizontally across the ecosystem – hitting tools like LiteLLM that are present in over a third of cloud environments – they are creating a ‘snowball effect.’ This isn’t an isolated incident; it’s a systemic campaign that requires security teams to take action and will likely continue to expand,” Read added. The partnership between the two groups also appears to explain why some security researchers linked the AstraZeneca data breach to TeamPCP’s campaign, while Lapsus$ has claimed responsibility for it. Related: Polyfill Supply Chain Attack Impacting 100k Sites Linked to North Korea Related: New ‘Sandworm_Mode’ Supply Chain Attack Hits NPM Related: Autonomous AI Agents Provide New Class of Supply Chain Attack Related: ‘PackageGate’ Flaws Open JavaScript Ecosystem to Supply Chain Attacks