tradingclaw[.]pro

Fake AI trading agent steals crypto wallet passwords Attackers built a website for a fake AI crypto trading agent and used it to install Needle Stealer, malware that replaces a victim’s browser wallet with a copy that sends the wallet password to the attacker. HP caught the campaign between April and June 2026. The Needle campaign targets people who download AI agents from search results or ads, and users of seven browser wallet extensions, among them MetaMask, Coinbase Wallet and Phantom. HP also caught QR code phishing that moves victims onto their phones. Example of a website promising an installer for an AI trading agent (Source: HP) The installer is genuine Microsoft software The site, tradingclaw[.]pro, gave its bot a name that echoes a well-known AI assistant and promised an agent that trades crypto around the clock. Inside the ZIP download, Trading Agent.exe is OLEView, a Microsoft-signed program, so Windows SmartScreen’s reputation check trusts it. Its only purpose is to get past that check. When it runs, it loads iviewers.dll, the malicious file beside it, a trick called DLL side-loading. That DLL runs Needle Stealer inside a freshly started legitimate process, a technique called process hollowing. Needle looks for any of the seven wallet extensions, kills the browser, and unpacks a malicious copy into the extension’s folder. The fake extension then contacts the attacker’s command server and hands over whatever password the victim types. With the wallet ID and password, the attacker controls the funds. If you keep a crypto wallet in your browser, a familiar unlock screen does not prove the extension is the one you installed. HP recommends keeping wallet passwords and payment work out of agent apps you cannot verify. The QR code moves the victim to a phone Researchers also caught several campaigns that emailed PDF invoices showing a blurred document behind a QR code, with a note telling the recipient to scan it with a smartphone, a method known as quishing. The scan runs through redirects, including a fake email security scanner and a Cloudflare Turnstile check that confirms a person is loading the page, then lands on a page resembling OneDrive that asks for Microsoft credentials. A work PC may have email gateways and browser protections that already block a known phishing domain. A phone usually carries fewer defenses, so a link the desktop would stop may load on the phone. A stealer sold with customer support Phantom Stealer is sold openly on the web as a “penetration testing tool,” alongside a crypter that encrypts it against analysis, feature updates and 24/7 support. Buyers must agree not to use it for malicious purposes. HP isolated several email campaigns delivering it. A VBScript in each campaign built a PowerShell command that fetched an ordinary-looking image and pulled a .NET loader out of it, a method called steganography. A component named Phantom Gate, built into the PowerShell script, started that loader. The loader then downloaded the stealer, decoded it and injected it into RegAsm, a legitimate .NET Framework process. Researchers believe the shared name and delivery chain suggest one threat actor may be behind both tools. “Users move constantly between devices and applications, like browsers or new AI tools, and attackers are quick to follow. Security needs to work across all of those interactions, without getting in people’s way. That means organizations need a zero-trust approach built around isolation and containment, so untrusted clicks and downloads don’t become a risk,” said James Wright, HP’s Global Head of Security for Personal Systems. Hundreds of rigged images Other invoice campaigns arrived two ways. Some used HTML smuggling, which assembles the malicious file on the victim’s machine so it can slip past email gateway scanners. Others relied on search results leading to lookalike domains. Both routes ended with loaders that decoded payloads hidden in images and installed XWorm, PureLogs Stealer or Formbook, which steal credentials and system data. A perceptual-hash search of VirusTotal, which matches images by how they look, turned up about 400 distinct images tied to these campaigns over three months. Fake installers HP’s researchers also traced a Russian-language imitation of Microsoft’s site whose installer bundles other products for affiliate payouts and never installs Word. The security product it bundles then flags that installer as dangerous and deletes it. Two signed installers, UltraZip and AllFiles, hijack the default search engine and keep the change after uninstall. Download: 2026 Credential Risk Report

During our threat hunting, we found a campaign using the same malware loader from our previous research to deliver a different threat: Needle Stealer, data-stealing malware designed to quietly harvest sensitive information from infected devices, including browser data, login sessions, and cryptocurrency wallets. In this case, attackers used a website promoting a tool called TradingClaw (tradingclaw[.]pro), which claims to be an AI-powered assistant for TradingView. TradingView is a legitimate platform used by traders to analyze financial markets, but this fake TradingClaw site is not part of TradingView, nor is it related to the legitimate startup tradingclaw.chat. Instead, it’s being used here as a lure to trick people into downloading malware. What is Needle Stealer? Needle is a modular infostealer written in Golang. In simple terms, that means it’s built in pieces, so attackers can turn features on or off depending on what they want to steal. According to its control panel, Needle includes: Needle Core: The main component, with features like form grabbing (capturing data you enter into websites) and clipboard hijacking Extension module: Controls browsers, redirects traffic, injects scripts, and replaces downloads Desktop wallet spoofer: Targets cryptocurrency wallet apps like Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus Browser wallet spoofer: Targets browser-based wallets like MetaMask and Coinbase, including attempts to extract seed phrases The panel also shows a “coming soon” feature to generate fake Google or Cloudflare-style pages, suggesting the attackers plan to expand into more advanced phishing techniques. Analysis of the TradingClaw campaign In this campaign, the malware is distributed through a fake website advertising TradingClaw as an AI trading tool. The site itself behaves selectively. In some cases, visitors are shown the fake TradingClaw page, while in others they are redirected to a different site (studypages[.]com). This kind of filtering is commonly used by attackers to avoid detection and only show the malicious content to intended targets. Search engines, for example, see the Studypages version: If a user proceeds, they are prompted to download a ZIP file. This file contains the first stage of the infection chain. Like in the previous campaign, the attack relies on a technique called DLL hijacking. In simple terms, this means the malware disguises itself as a legitimate file that a trusted program will load automatically. When the program runs, it unknowingly executes the malicious code instead. In this case, the DLL loader (named iviewers.dll) is executed first. It then loads a second-stage DLL, which ultimately injects the Needle Stealer into a legitimate Windows process (RegAsm.exe) using a technique known as process hollowing. The stealer is developed in Golang, and most of the functions are implemented in the “ext” package. What the malware does Once installed, the Needle core module can: Take screenshots of the infected system Steal browser data, including history, cookies, and saved information Extract data from apps like Telegram and FTP clients Collect files such as .txt documents and wallet data Steal cryptocurrency wallet information One of the more concerning features is its ability to install malicious browser extensions. Malicious browser extensions The stealer also supports the distribution of malicious browser extensions, giving attackers a powerful way to take control of the victim’s browser. We identified multiple variations of these extensions, each with slightly different file structures and components. Behind the scenes, the malware uses built-in Golang features to unpack a hidden ZIP archive (often named base.zip or meta.zip) that contains the extension files, along with a configuration file (cfg.json). Partial cfg.json config file: { "extension_host": {}, "api_key": "… "server_url": "https://C2/api/v2", "self_destruct": true, "base_extension": true, "ext_manifest": { "account_extension_type": 0, "active_permissions": { "api": [ "history", "notifications", "storage", "tabs", "webNavigation", "declarativeNetRequest", "scripting", "declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess", "sidePanel" ], "explicit_host": [ " " ], "manifest_permissions": [], "scriptable_host": [ " " ] }, "commands": { "_execute_action": { "was_assigned": true } }, … This configuration file is key. It tells the malware where to send stolen data (the command-and-control server), which malicious extension to install, and which features to enable. The stealer extension is dropped in a random folder in the path %LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Extensions. The folder contains three main files popup.js, content.js, and background.js. The extensions analyzed have Google-related names. What the malicious extensions can do The extension gives attackers near full control over the browser, with capabilities that go far beyond typical malware. It can: Connect to a remote server using a built-in API key and regularly check in for instructions. It can also switch to backup domains if the main server goes offline. Generate a unique ID to track the infected user over time. Collect full browsing history and send it to a remote server (/upload ). Monitor what you’re doing in real time, including which sites you visit, and apply attacker-controlled redirect rules. This allows it to silently send you to different websites or alter what you see on a page, including injecting or hiding content. Intercept downloads, cancel legitimate files, and replace them with malicious ones from attacker-controlled servers. Inject scripts directly into web pages, enabling further data theft or manipulation. Display fake browser notifications with attacker-controlled text and images. How it communicates with attackers The stealer and its extension communicate with command-and-control (C2) servers using several API endpoints. These are essentially different “channels” used for specific tasks: /backup-domains/active —retrieves backup servers to stay connected if the main one is blocked /upload —sends stolen data back to the attackers /extension —receives instructions for redirects, downloads, and notifications /scripts —downloads malicious code to inject into web pages How to stay safe Scammers are increasingly using AI-themed tools to make fake websites look legitimate. In this case, a supposed “AI trading assistant” was used to trick people into installing malware. To reduce your risk: Download software only from official websites. If a tool claims to work with a well-known platform, check the platform’s official site to confirm it’s real. Check who created the file before running it. Look at the publisher name and avoid anything that looks unfamiliar or inconsistent. Review your browser extensions regularly. Remove anything you don’t recognize, especially extensions you didn’t knowingly install. What to do if you think you’ve been affected If you think you may have downloaded this infostealer: Check EDR and firewall logs for communications with the C2s listed in the IOCs part. From a different, clean device, sign out of every active session on your important accounts: Google, Microsoft 365, any banking portal, GitHub, Discord, Telegram, Steam, and your crypto exchange. Change all passwords and enable 2FA for accounts you have accessed from this machine. Check the folder %LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Extensions and suspicious browser extensions. If you have cryptocurrency wallets on the machine, move the funds from a clean device immediately. This is what these operators monetize first. Run a full scan with Malwarebytes. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) HASH 95dcac62fc15e99d112d812f7687292e34de0e8e0a39e4f12082f726fa1b50ed 0d10a6472facabf7d7a8cfd2492fc990b890754c3d90888ef9fe5b2d2cca41c0 Domains Tradingclaw[.]pro: fake website Chrocustumapp[.]com: related to malicious extension Chrocustomreversal[.]com: related to malicious extension google-services[.]cc: related to CountLoader/DeepLoad Coretest[.]digital: C2 panel Reisen[.]work: C2 panel IPs 178[.]16[.]55[.]234: C2 panel 185[.]11[.]61[.]149: C2 panel 37[.]221[.]66[.]27: C2 panel 2[.]56[.]179[.]16: C2 panel 178[.]16[.]54[.]109: C2 panel 37[.]221[.]66[.]27: C2 panel 209[.]17[.]118[.]17: C2 panel 162[.]216[.]5[.]130: C2 panel Researcher update April 28, 2026 Updated to specify the malware family: CountLoader/DeepLoad. From reporting threats to removing them. Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.