Search/sfrclak[.]com
● IOC

sfrclak[.]com

Type
DOMAIN
Source
News extraction
First seen
Mar 31, 2026
Last seen
Apr 1, 2026
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TeamPCP Moves From OSS to AWS Environments
This is the fourth update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). Update 003 covered developments through March 28, including the first 48-hour pause in new compromises and the campaign's shift to monetization. This update consolidates intelligence from March 28-30, 2026 -- two days since our last update. HIGH: Databricks Investigating Alleged Compromise Linked to TeamPCP Credential Harvest CybersecurityNews reports that Databricks, the cloud data analytics platform, is investigating an alleged security compromise linked to the TeamPCP credential harvest. International Cyber Digest stated on X that they "notified them last week" and Databricks "scaled up to investigate." A separate analyst corroborated that screenshots showing AWS artifacts, CloudFormation dumps, and STS tokens "match TeamPCP's exact playbook." Databricks has not issued an official statement. If confirmed, this would be the first major cloud platform identified as a downstream victim of TeamPCP's credential trove -- distinct from the security tool vendors (Aqua, Checkmarx, BerriAI, Telnyx) directly compromised in the supply chain phase. The distinction matters: tool vendor compromises expanded TeamPCP's credential pool, while a Databricks compromise would represent the monetization of that pool against an enterprise target processing sensitive data across AWS, GCP, and Azure. Update (2026-03-30): Databricks' Head of Global Communications and their external PR agency FGS Global have confirmed the authenticity of the new @DatabricksSec X account. In their https://x.com/DatabricksSec/status/2038649955401794042, Databricks says they "thoroughly investigated this information in our internal systems and found nothing" and have "asked for more information beyond this screenshot." They state they will "transparently continue to share any new updates on all security matters." Recommended action: Organizations using Databricks should monitor for an official statement. If your CI/CD pipelines were exposed to any TeamPCP-compromised component AND those pipelines had access to Databricks credentials, treat those credentials as potentially compromised regardless of whether Databricks confirms the breach. HIGH: TeamPCP Operates Dual Ransomware Tracks - CipherForce Is Their Own Operation Update 002 documented TeamPCP's partnership with the Vect ransomware-as-a-service operation and BreachForums mass affiliate key distribution. New intelligence reveals that Vect is not TeamPCP's only ransomware channel. According to Flare and corroborated by Rami McCarthy's IOC tracker, TeamPCP operates under five confirmed aliases: PCPcat, ShellForce, DeadCatx3, CipherForce, and Persy_PCP. TeamPCP's own Telegram channel states: "you may already know us as TeamPCP or Shellforce... CipherForce is a newer project we are starting to find affiliates." CipherForce is TeamPCP's own ransomware operation, separate from the Vect partnership. This means TeamPCP is running two parallel ransomware tracks simultaneously: their proprietary CipherForce program for direct operations, and the mass Vect affiliate program via BreachForums for distributed operations. The SANS ISC Stormcast for March 30 also notes "more and more links between the TeamPCP crew and various ransomware actors" -- plural -- consistent with this dual-track model. Analysts assess this dual-track approach allows TeamPCP to maintain direct control over high-value targets (via CipherForce) while simultaneously flooding the ecosystem with mass affiliate operations (via Vect). The 300 GB stolen credential trove can feed both tracks simultaneously. Recommended action: Detection teams monitoring for Vect ransomware indicators should also add CipherForce to their watchlist. The strongest attribution link across all TeamPCP operations is a shared RSA-4096 public key embedded in payloads -- search for this key in forensic artifacts from any suspected TeamPCP exposure. HIGH: LAPSUS$ Releases AstraZeneca Data Free After Failed Sale Attempt The LAPSUS$/AstraZeneca breach claim documented in Updates 002-003 has escalated. Cybernews and Cybersecurity Insiders report two developments: LAPSUS$ released the claimed 3 GB archive for free after failing to find buyers via Session encrypted messaging. This shifts the incident from an extortion attempt to a full data exposure event. Cybernews research team has partially verified the dump's contents -- GitHub user information for internal AstraZeneca software developers, employee data spanning clinical research subsidiaries, and internal source code tree structures were assessed as consistent with legitimate AstraZeneca infrastructure. AstraZeneca has still not issued any public statement confirming or denying the breach at approximately 96 hours since the initial claim. Analysts assess that AstraZeneca's continued silence, combined with GDPR obligations if EU employee data is in the dump, creates increasing regulatory exposure with each passing day. Recommended action: Organizations should treat this as a probable confirmed breach for defensive planning purposes. If your organization shares integrations, data, or credentials with AstraZeneca, assess whether the exposed repository structures and configurations could affect your security posture. Given AstraZeneca's clinical research operations, the dump may contain protected health information (PHI) subject to HIPAA in the US and GDPR in the EU. Organizations with data-sharing agreements with AstraZeneca should evaluate whether their data may be in the exposed archive and prepare breach notification workflows accordingly. MEDIUM: ownCloud Discloses Build Infrastructure Impact From CVE-2026-33634 ownCloud published a security notice confirming their build infrastructure -- the systems producing container images and client binaries -- was affected by CVE-2026-33634 (the Trivy compromise). ownCloud confirms: no customer data compromised, no source code altered, impact limited to build systems only. This is one of the first named downstream organizations to publicly disclose that they were in the blast radius of the Trivy supply chain compromise. The disclosure is notable for its transparency -- most affected organizations have remained silent despite the CISA KEV entry and federal remediation deadline of April 8. Recommended action: Organizations using ownCloud should review the security notice and verify their deployments are using images produced after the remediation. More broadly, ownCloud's disclosure should prompt other organizations that used Trivy in their build pipelines between March 19-22 to conduct their own impact assessments and consider similar disclosure. MEDIUM: Supply Chain Pause Extends Past 96 Hours No new package compromises across any ecosystem have been publicly reported since the Telnyx PyPI disclosure on March 27, extending the supply chain pause documented in Update 003 past 96 hours. This is the longest quiet period since TeamPCP began active supply chain operations on March 19. Expanded ecosystem search results (March 30): An independent search of RubyGems, crates.io, and Maven Central -- the three ecosystems identified as plausible expansion targets in Update 003 -- found zero TeamPCP-related IOCs in any of them. The RubyGems, crates.io, and Maven Central watch items remain "Not observed." While the CanisterWorm's propagation technique is registry-agnostic (any stolen publish token would work), there is no evidence TeamPCP has moved beyond the five confirmed ecosystems (GitHub Actions, PyPI, npm, Docker Hub/GHCR, OpenVSX). Note on sourcing: CybersecurityNews listed "NPM and OpenVSX" alongside the other compromised ecosystems in their Databricks article. These are accurate in the sense that both ecosystems were hit, but they refer to the known CanisterWorm npm worm (March 20, 66+ packages) and the Checkmarx OpenVSX extensions (March 23, ast-results and cx-dev-assist) -- not new compromises. No new npm or OpenVSX activity has been documented since the original incidents. Recommended action: Use this supply chain pause as a remediation window. The CISA KEV deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is now 9 days away (April 8, 2026). Complete credential rotations and IOC sweeps before the deadline. HIGH: Campaign Transitions to Three Parallel Monetization Tracks While supply chain poisoning has paused, TeamPCP is not dormant. Analysts assess the group has completed its supply chain expansion phase and transitioned fully to credential exploitation and monetization. Three distinct operational tracks are now running simultaneously: Direct credential exploitation against high-value targets -- the Databricks investigation (see above) represents the first alleged downstream victim of the ~300 GB stolen credential trove, distinct from the tool vendors directly compromised in the supply chain phase. Proprietary ransomware via CipherForce -- TeamPCP's own ransomware operation, with recruitment via their Telegram channel. No confirmed deployments yet, but the infrastructure and affiliate recruitment are active. Mass affiliate ransomware via Vect/BreachForums -- Distributed operations leveraging the BreachForums mass affiliate key distribution documented in Update 002. The distribution window is now ~96 hours with no confirmed deployments. The distinction between these tracks matters for defenders: detection teams monitoring for Vect ransomware indicators should also add CipherForce to their watchlist. The shared RSA-4096 public key embedded in payloads is the strongest attribution link across all TeamPCP operations. INFO: Cloud Security Alliance Publishes Second Research Note on AI/ML Supply Chain Risk The Cloud Security Alliance AI Safety Initiative published a research note on March 29 framing the TeamPCP campaign as a structural shift in adversary methodology -- from opportunistic typosquatting to deliberate pipeline compromise of trusted AI/ML packages. The note assesses that "the economics of targeting high-value AI credential stores are accelerating adversary investment." This is the second CSA publication covering TeamPCP (the first was the Kubernetes wiper lab analysis documented in Update 003) and focuses specifically on the AI/ML ecosystem implications rather than technical TTPs. Watch Item Status The full campaign report is available at sans.org/white-papers/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. A SANS Emergency Webcast replay is available at sans.org/webcasts/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. Updates to the report will be in the form of these ISC diaries.
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Apr 4, 2026
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Threat Brief: Widespread Impact of the Axios Supply Chain Attack
Unit 42 stopped monitoring this threat and updating the brief on May 19, 2026. Please refer to the npm website for the latest information. Unit 42 researchers have observed widespread impact from the significant supply chain attack targeting the Axios JavaScript library. The attack occurred after an Axios maintainer's npm account was hijacked, leading to the release of malicious updates (versions v1.14.1 and v0.30.4). These compromised versions introduced a hidden dependency called plain-crypto-js. This dependency is a cross-platform remote access Trojan (RAT) capable of affecting Windows, macOS and Linux systems. The malware was designed to perform reconnaissance and establish persistence, with an added feature to self-destruct for evasion. Axios is a popular, promise-based HTTP client library for JavaScript, used to make API requests in browsers and Node.js. It features automatic JSON data transformation, request/response interception and request cancellation, making it a standard tool for connecting frontend apps to backend services. Analysis of malware that the attackers used overlaps with operations previously reported to involve the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This campaign has affected the following sectors in the U.S., Europe, Middle East, South Asia and Australia: Business services Customer Service Financial services High tech Higher education Insurance Media and entertainment Medical equipment Professional and legal services Retail services This article recommends a number of mitigations for the attack. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed in this article through the following products and services: Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security Advanced Threat Prevention Advanced WildFire Cortex AgentiX Cortex Cloud Cortex XDR and XSIAM The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk. The attacker published two compromised versions of Axios (v1.14.1 and v0.30.4) but they did not modify any of the Axios source code. Instead, they injected [email protected] into the package.json file as a runtime dependency. With compromised versions of Axios, when a developer runs npm install axios, npm automatically resolves the dependency tree and installs plain-crypto-js. This triggers npm's postinstall lifecycle hook, executing a heavily obfuscated Node.js dropper script named setup.js in the background. To obfuscate its operations, setup.js uses a two-layer encoding scheme involving string reversal, Base64-decoding and an XOR cipher using the key OrDeR_7077. The dropper queries the operating system and sends an HTTP POST request to a command-and-control (C2) server at sfrclak[.]com:8000. To make this outbound traffic look like benign npm registry requests, it appends platform-specific paths: packages.npm[.]org/product0 for macOS packages.npm[.]org/product1 for Windows packages.npm[.]org/product2 for Linux Figure 1 shows the commands for this first-stage download. The C2 server delivers a different payload depending on the victim's operating system: macOS: The dropper uses AppleScript to download a C++ compiled Mach-O binary, saves it to /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, makes it executable and launches it silently via /bin/zsh. Windows: The dropper searches for and copies the legitimate Windows PowerShell binary to %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe. It then uses VBScript to fetch and execute a secondary PowerShell RAT script, which is subsequently executed by wt.exe. It also establishes persistence via a registry Run key. Linux: The dropper uses the Node.js execSync command to download a Python RAT script to /tmp/ld.py, running it in the background using the nohup command. Despite being written in three different languages (C++, PowerShell and Python), all three payloads function as implementations of the same RAT framework. They all use an identical C2 protocol, send Base64-encoded JSON data over an HTTP POST request and beacon to the server every 60 seconds. The C2 server accepts the same four commands from the attacker: kill (self-terminate) runscript (execute shell/script commands) peinject (drop and execute binary payloads) rundir (enumerate directories) All the RAT variants use a hard-coded, highly anachronistic user-agent string spoofing Internet Explorer 8 on Windows XP: mozilla/4.0 (compatible; msie 8.0; windows nt 5.1; trident/4.0. Initial analysis of the payload confirms significant overlap with WAVESHAPER. WAVESHAPER is a C++ backdoor that communicates with its C2 server using the curl library, employing either HTTP or HTTPS as specified in the command-line arguments. The C2 server's address is also provided via command-line parameters, allowing the backdoor to download and execute arbitrary payloads from the adversary's infrastructure. WAVESHAPER also runs as a daemon by forking itself into a child process that runs in the background, detached from the parent session. It collects the returned system information, which is sent to the C2 server in an HTTP POST request. The entire process from installation to compromise takes roughly 15 seconds. Upon successfully launching the payload, the Node.js dropper performs aggressive anti-forensic cleanup. It deletes the setup.js file, removes the postinstall hook and replaces the tampered package.json with a clean decoy file named package.md. This ensures that developers inspecting their node_modules folders after the installation will find no obvious signs of malicious code. The Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting team continues to track any attempts to exploit this situation across our customers, using Cortex XDR and the XQL queries below. Cortex XDR customers can also use these XQL queries to search for signs of exploitation. Attackers have been increasing the frequency and scale of npm supply chain operations since early 2026. Securing the continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline should be a high priority for any organization to mitigate against this growing threat. Based on the amount of publicly available information, we highly recommend the following actions: Audit for malicious packages: Search your projects and node_modules directories for the compromised Axios versions (1.14.1 and 0.30.4) and the injected plain-crypto-js package (versions 4.2.0 and 4.2.1). Check for malware artifacts: Inspect systems for platform-specific indicators of compromise, such as /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond (macOS), %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe (Windows) and /tmp/ld.py (Linux). Isolate affected systems: If you discover the malicious packages or RAT artifacts, immediately isolate the system from the network. Rebuild from scratch: If an environment is compromised, do not attempt to clean the malware while it is still in place. Instead, completely rebuild the environment from a known-good state. Clear caches: Clear your local and shared package manager caches (npm, yarn, pnpm) on all workstations and build servers to prevent reinfection during future installs. Assume compromise: If the malicious package was executed, you must assume all secrets accessible on that machine have been stolen. Rotate all secrets: Immediately rotate exposed credentials, including npm tokens, AWS access keys, SSH private keys, cloud environment credentials (Google Cloud, Azure), CI/CD secrets and any sensitive values stored in .env files. Downgrade Axios: Immediately downgrade to the last known safe versions of Axios: 1.14.0 or 0.30.3. Pin dependencies: Pin Axios to these safe versions within your package-lock.json file to prevent accidental upgrades. Use overrides: Add an overrides block in your package configuration to prevent malicious versions from being resolved transitively by other packages. Restrict corporate repositories: Configure corporate-managed npm repositories to strictly serve only the known-good versions of Axios. Block C2 traffic: Block all egress traffic to the attacker's C2 domain (sfrclak[.]com) and IP address (142.11.206[.]73). Monitor logs: Monitor network logs for suspicious outbound connections over port 8000, beaconing behavior and anomalous HTTP POST requests. Audit CI/CD pipelines: Review automated build logs to see if the affected versions were installed during recent runs. Rotate any secrets for workflows that executed them. Pause and validate deployments: Temporarily pause CI/CD deployments for projects relying on Axios, to validate that your builds are not automatically pulling the poisoned “latest” versions. Disable lifecycle scripts: Use the --ignore-scripts flag during CI/CD installations to explicitly prevent npm postinstall hooks from running during automated builds. Sandbox environments: Isolate development environments using containers or sandboxes to restrict host file system access. Vault secrets: Migrate plaintext secrets away from developer machines and into secure vaults or OS keychains (using tools like aws-vault) so that malicious scripts cannot programmatically scrape them. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR): Ensure EDR solutions are deployed on developer workstations to monitor for suspicious processes spawning from Node.js applications. Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected by our products, as listed below. We will update this threat brief as more relevant information becomes available. Palo Alto Networks customers can leverage a variety of product protections and updates to identify and defend against this threat. If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42) UK: +44.20.3743.3660 Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130 Asia: +65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Australia: +61.2.4062.7950 India: 000 800 050 45107 South Korea: +82.080.467.8774 Advanced WildFire The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of indicators shared in this research. Next-Generation Firewalls With Advanced Threat Prevention Next-Generation Firewall with the Advanced Threat Prevention security subscription can help block the attack via the following Threat Prevention signature: 87121. Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known IP addresses and domains associated with this activity as malicious. Cortex AgentiX Security analysts can use natural language to prompt the Cortex AgentiX Threat Intel agent to extract file indicators of compromise (IoCs) from this threat brief. They will then need to enrich them, check for sightings in their Cortex tenant and related alerts, and provide a quick summary of the impact to the organization. Cortex XDR and XSIAM provide a multi-layer defense to help protect against the initial access, C2 and potential lateral movement described in this article. This includes Behavioral Threat Protection (BTP), Advanced WildFire and Cortex Analytics. Specifically, we have observed out-of-the-box (OotB) prevention via Advanced WildFire and BTP for the second stages of this attack on Windows and macOS. Cortex Analytics can help detect C2 activity and suspicious supply chain activity using our tailored detectors described in the following articles: How Behavioral Analytics Stop Linux C2 & Credential Theft - Palo Alto Networks Blog How Cortex XDR Global Analytics Protects Against Supply Chain Attacks - Palo Alto Networks Blog We advise customers to upgrade agents to supported versions and the latest content update to receive the best protection. The Cortex Cloud platform provides detection and prevention operations for both the first and second stages of the Axios attack chain. This includes Software Supply Chain Security, Application Security (AppSec), Cloud Workload Protection (CWP), Cortex XDR and XSIAM. Every phase of the attack can be mapped to a Cortex Cloud capability that either helps prevent or detects it, from CI/CD trusted publisher verification operations to runtime post-installation monitoring and endpoint persistence detection. ad8ba560ae5c4af4758bc68cc6dcf43bae0e0bbf9da680a8dc60a9ef78e22ff7 fcb81618bb15edfdedfb638b4c08a2af9cac9ecfa551af135a8402bf980375cf cdc05cd30eb53315dadb081a7b942bb876f0d252d20e8ed4d2f36be79ee691fa 8449341ddc3f7fcc2547639e21e704400ca6a8a6841ae74e57c04445b1276a10 01c9484abc948daa525516464785009d1e7a63ffd6012b9e85b56477acc3e624 7b47ed28e84437aee64ffe9770d315c1b984135105f7f608a8b9579517bc0695 526ab39d1f56732e4e926715aaa797feb13b1ae86882ec570a4d292e7fdc3699 a98e04dec3a7fe507eb30c72da808bad60bc14d9d80f9770ec99c438faa85a1a 0d83030ab8bfba675fc1661f0756b6770be7dd80b1b718de3d68a01f2e79a5f4 92ff08773995ebc8d55ec4b8e1a225d0d1e51efa4ef88b8849d0071230c9645a 58401c195fe0a6204b42f5f90995ece5fab74ce7c69c67a24c61a057325af668 fcb81618bb15edfdedfb638b4c08a2af9cac9ecfa551af135a8402bf980375cf e10b1fa84f1d6481625f741b69892780140d4e0e7769e7491e5f4d894c2e0e09 f7d335205b8d7b20208fb3ef93ee6dc817905dc3ae0c10a0b164f4e7d07121cd 617b67a8e1210e4fc87c92d1d1da45a2f311c08d26e89b12307cf583c900d101 e49c2732fb9861548208a78e72996b9c3c470b6b562576924bcc3a9fb75bf9ff 92ff08773995ebc8d55ec4b8e1a225d0d1e51efa4ef88b8849d0071230c9645a 506690fcbd10fbe6f2b85b49a1fffa9d984c376c25ef6b73f764f670e932cab4 4465bdeaddc8c049a67a3d5ec105b2f07dae72fa080166e51b8f487516eb8d07 fcb81618bb15edfdedfb638b4c08a2af9cac9ecfa551af135a8402bf980375cf 58401c195fe0a6204b42f5f90995ece5fab74ce7c69c67a24c61a057325af668 5bb67e88846096f1f8d42a0f0350c9c46260591567612ff9af46f98d1b7571cd 59336a964f110c25c112bcc5adca7090296b54ab33fa95c0744b94f8a0d80c0f a224dd73b7ed33e0bf6a2ea340c8f8859dfa9ec5736afa8baea6225bf066b248 5e2ab672c3f98f21925bd26d9a9bba036b67d84fde0dfdbe2cf9b85b170cab71 20df0909a3a0ef26d74ae139763a380e49f77207aa1108d4640d8b6f14cab8ca 5b5fbc627502c5797d97b206b6dcf537889e6bea6d4e81a835e103e311690e22 506690fcbd10fbe6f2b85b49a1fffa9d984c376c25ef6b73f764f670e932cab4 4465bdeaddc8c049a67a3d5ec105b2f07dae72fa080166e51b8f487516eb8d07 9c64f1c7eba080b4e5ff17369ddcd00b9fe2d47dacdc61444b4cbfebb23a166c 142.11.206[.]73 sfrclak[.]com callnrwise[.]com hxxp://sfrclak[.]com:8000 hxxp://sfrclak[.]com:8000/6202033 Updated April 1, 2026, at 1:15 p.m. PT to add coverage for Advanced WildFire. Updated April 9, 2026, at 8:50 a.m. PT to add coverage for Advanced Threat Prevention. Updated April 13, 2026, at 12:50 p.m. PT to clarify how the RAT is executed in its Windows version. Added coverage for Cortex AgentiX.
unit42.paloaltonetworks.comApr 1, 2026extracted
North Korean hackers linked to Axios npm supply chain compromise
North Korean hackers linked to Axios npm supply chain compromise The software supply chain attack that resulted in the compromise of npm packages of Axios, an extremely popular HTTP client library, is believed to be the work of financially-motivated North Korean attackers. Links to UNC1069 On March 31, 2026, unknown attackers managed to publish two backdoored Axios npm packages after gaining access to a maintainer’s npm account. The malicious versions introduced a hidden dependency containing a post-install script, and this script executed automatically during installation and attempted to download and run additional payloads from the attacker-controlled infrastructure. The goal was to deploy malware capable of remote access and system compromise, potentially allowing attackers to steal sensitive data or move laterally within affected environments. The stealth and sophistication of the attack pointed to skilled attackers. The injected code was minimal and designed to evade detection and the malicious behavior was offloaded to the external dependency and remote payload, which made it harder for developers or automated tools to quickly identify the compromise. The attribution of the attack was made by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) researchers and Mandiant analysts, based on the backdoor that was deployed on victim systems and the command and control (C2) infrastructure used. “The platform-specific payloads ultimately deploy variants of a backdoor tracked by GTIG as WAVESHAPER.V2, a backdoor written in C++ that targets macOS to collect system information, enumerate directories, or execute additional payloads and that connects to the C2 provided via command-line arguments,” the researchers noted. Additional variants of WAVESHAPER.V2 have been written in PowerShell and Python to target Windows and Linux environments, respectively. The backdoor acts as a remote access trojan and is capable of system reconnaissance, file system enumeration, and code execution. Previous versions of the backdoor were used by a North Korea-nexus threat actor GTIG calls UNC1069, which has been active since at least 2018 and is known for targeting organizations to steal cryptocurrency. “Analysis of the C2 infrastructure (sfrclak[.]com resolving to 142.11.206.73) revealed connections from a specific AstrillVPN node previously used by UNC1069. Additionally, adjacent infrastructure hosted on the same ASN has been historically linked to UNC1069 operations,” they added. Further breaches expected The exposure window was short – the malicious Axios npm versions were available less than three hours before being removed – but even such a short-lived compromise is expected to have a wide impact. “This compromise is particularly significant because Axios is a widely used library and is often included as a transitive dependency across millions of applications,” noted Andres Ramos, Senior Threat Intelligence Researcher at Arctic Wolf. “Organisations that install npm packages in CI/CD pipelines may have automatically pulled the malicious versions into build environments during the ~3-hour window Even systems that did not directly install Axios could be indirectly impacted if another package in the environment depended on the compromised versions, highlighting the broader downstream risk across modern JavaScript ecosystems.” Various security companies have offered remediation advice for potentially affected developers and organizations, as well as threat detection rules, and advice aimed at preventing similar attacks affecting them in the future. Similarly, many companies have provided advice for those affected by the other supply chain attacks that happened in the last few days and targeted open-source projects like the Trivy security scanner, the LiteLLM library, and Telnyx on PyPI. Those attacks have all been attributed to the financially-motivated TeamPCP – or, as GTIG calls them, UNC6780 – and there’s reports that the secrets harvested in those attacks will be used by “partnering” groups like the Vect ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) and extortion groups like Lapsus$. “Hundreds of thousands of stolen secrets could potentially be circulating as a result of these recent attacks. This could enable further software supply chain attacks, software as a service (SaaS) environment compromises (leading to downstream customer compromises), ransomware and extortion events, and cryptocurrency theft over the near term,” GTIG researchers warned. “Defenders should pay close attention to these campaigns, and enterprises should initiate dedicated efforts to assess the existing impact, remediate compromised systems, and harden environments against future attacks.” Subscribe to our breaking news e-mail alert to never miss out on the latest breaches, vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. Subscribe here!
helpnetsecurity.comApr 1, 2026extracted
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Update 005 - First Confirmed Victim Disclosure, Post-Compromise Cloud Enumeration Documented, and Axios Attribution Narrows, (Wed, Apr 1st)
This is the fifth update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). Update 004 covered developments through March 30, including the Databricks investigation, dual ransomware operations, and AstraZeneca data release. This update consolidates two days of intelligence through April 1, 2026. HIGH: Mercor AI Confirms Breach Tied to LiteLLM Supply Chain Compromise - First Official Victim Disclosure AI recruiting startup Mercor has publicly confirmed it was breached as a direct consequence of the LiteLLM supply chain compromise, making it the first organization to officially acknowledge being victimized through the TeamPCP campaign. TechCrunch reported on March 31 that LAPSUS$ claims to have exfiltrated approximately 4TB of data, including 939GB of source code, a 211GB user database, and 3TB of video interviews and identity verification documents (passports). Initial access was reportedly via a compromised Tailscale VPN credential. Mercor stated it was "one of thousands of companies" affected by the LiteLLM compromise. The nature of the claimed exfiltrated data -- which includes biometric identity verification materials -- raises significant privacy and regulatory implications under GDPR, CCPA, and potentially HIPAA depending on the contents. This is operationally significant because it moves the campaign's downstream impact from theoretical to confirmed. Prior victim claims (AstraZeneca, Databricks) remain unconfirmed by the named organizations. Mercor's public acknowledgment validates what analysts have assessed since Update 002: the credential trove harvested during the supply chain phase is being actively exploited for data theft and extortion. Recommended action: Organizations that used LiteLLM v1.82.7 or v1.82.8 should treat this as confirmation that credential exploitation is actively underway. If you have not completed credential rotation, the Mercor disclosure demonstrates the consequence of delay. VPN credentials, cloud access tokens, and API keys accessible in compromised environments should be prioritized for rotation. HIGH: Wiz Documents TeamPCP Post-Compromise AWS and Cloud Enumeration in the Wild SecurityWeek reported on March 31 that Wiz's Cloud Incident Response Team (CIRT) has published detailed findings on TeamPCP's post-compromise cloud operations in "Tracking TeamPCP: Investigating Post-Compromise Attacks Seen in the Wild". This is the first detailed public documentation of what TeamPCP does after obtaining stolen credentials. Key findings from the Wiz CIRT investigation: Credential validation via TruffleHog: TeamPCP uses the open-source secret scanning tool TruffleHog to programmatically verify that stolen AWS access keys, Azure application secrets, and SaaS tokens are still valid and in use. 24-hour operational tempo: Within 24 hours of validating stolen secrets, the group transitions to discovery operations in compromised AWS environments. AWS enumeration focus: Discovery operations enumerate IAM roles, EC2 instances, Lambda functions, RDS databases, S3 buckets, and ECS clusters, with particular focus on container infrastructure where the group maps clusters and task definitions. Bold operational signatures: The group uses conspicuous resource names including "pawn" and "massive-exfil" -- analysts assess this indicates either operational carelessness or deliberate intimidation, consistent with their public Telegram messaging. The Wiz findings also contextualize the Flare threat intelligence report, which found that TeamPCP's cloud infrastructure targeting breaks down as Azure (61%) and AWS (36%), accounting for 97% of compromised servers. Recommended action: Organizations should search cloud audit logs for unauthorized IAM enumeration, EC2/ECS/Lambda discovery calls, and S3 listing operations originating from unfamiliar principals. TruffleHog validation attempts may appear as rapid sequential API calls testing credential validity across multiple services. Search for resources with names containing "pawn", "massive-exfil", or similar conspicuous strings. Note for threat hunters: The full Wiz CIRT report contains extensively documented indicators of compromise including specific AWS API call patterns, resource naming conventions, and infrastructure fingerprints observed in the wild. Threat hunters and SOC teams should review the Wiz report in detail for actionable detection content. MEDIUM: Axios npm Compromise Attributed to North Korean UNC1069 - Not TeamPCP, but Credential Source Remains Open The axios npm compromise (March 30-31, malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4) has received formal attribution. Elastic Security Labs published a detailed analysis identifying the macOS Mach-O binary payload as overlapping with WAVESHAPER, a C++ backdoor that Mandiant attributes to UNC1069, a suspected North Korean threat actor. Google's Threat Intelligence Group published a companion analysis confirming the DPRK attribution. This narrows the assessment from Update 004's "credential provenance raises TeamPCP questions" to a more specific picture: analysts assess with high confidence that a different threat actor executed the axios attack, but the question of how the maintainer's npm token was originally obtained remains unanswered. The token was a long-lived classic npm access token -- exactly the type that TeamPCP's CanisterWorm findNpmTokens() function harvests from CI/CD environments. The timing aligns with TeamPCP's monetization phase and the BreachForums credential distribution to approximately 300,000 users. The SANS ISC Stormcast for April 1, 2026 noted: "Given that TeamPCP recently collected so many developer credentials, it's very possible that they were involved in the Axios compromise, though the follow-up compromise doesn't look like TeamPCP, as the techniques look a little bit different." Singapore's Cyber Security Agency has issued a second advisory, AD-2026-002, specifically addressing the axios supply chain attack -- making Singapore the only government to have issued dedicated advisories for both the TeamPCP campaign and the axios incident. Recommended action: Organizations that installed axios v1.14.1 or v0.30.4 should check for platform-specific IOCs: macOS (/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond), Windows (%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe), Linux (/tmp/ld.py). Block C2 domain sfrclak[.]com and IP 142.11.206[.]73. The DPRK attribution elevates the severity -- this is now a nation-state operation exploiting the same credential ecosystem that TeamPCP seeded. MEDIUM: LiteLLM Resumes Publishing After Forensic Audit - Release Freeze Lifted BerriAI has lifted the LiteLLM release freeze that has been in effect since March 25. According to the LiteLLM security update, the Mandiant-led forensic audit verified every release from v1.78.0 through v1.82.6 via SHA-256 comparison against the Git repository, confirming no additional compromised versions exist beyond the known-malicious v1.82.7 and v1.82.8. A new safe version was published on March 31, 2026. This resolves the "LiteLLM/BerriAI release resumption" watch item that has been tracked since Update 001. The quarantine lift and publishing resumption signal that the forensic investigation found no evidence of earlier or broader compromise beyond the two known-malicious versions. Recommended action: Organizations that froze LiteLLM upgrades can resume normal update procedures. Verify you are running a version that post-dates the forensic audit. Continue to treat any historical installation of v1.82.7 or v1.82.8 as a confirmed compromise requiring full credential rotation. INFO: ownCloud Discloses CVE-2026-33634 Build Infrastructure Impact ownCloud published a security notice confirming their build infrastructure was affected by the Trivy supply chain compromise (CVE-2026-33634). ownCloud stated that no customer data was compromised, characterizing the impact as limited to build pipeline exposure. This is notable as one of the few organizations to proactively disclose exposure without a corresponding extortion claim. This is a positive example of transparent incident communication. INFO: Supply Chain Pause Extends to Approximately 192 Hours No new package compromises have been reported since the Telnyx PyPI disclosure on March 27. The supply chain pause is now approximately 192 hours (8 days) -- extending the record documented in Updates 003 through the Update 005 draft. The CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is now 7 days away (April 8, 2026). Independent searches of RubyGems, crates.io, and Maven Central continue to show zero TeamPCP-related IOCs. The campaign remains confined to five ecosystems: GitHub Actions, PyPI, npm, Docker Hub/GHCR, and OpenVSX. Watch Item Status The full campaign report is available at sans.org/white-papers/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. A SANS Emergency Webcast replay is available at sans.org/webcasts/when-security-scanner-became-weapon. Updates to the report will be in the form of these ISC diaries.
isc.sans.eduApr 1, 2026extracted
Google Attributes Axios npm Supply Chain Attack to North Korean Group UNC1069
Google has formally attributed the supply chain compromise of the popular Axios npm package to a financially motivated North Korean threat activity cluster tracked as UNC1069. "We have attributed the attack to a suspected North Korean threat actor we track as UNC1069," John Hultquist, chief analyst at Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), told The Hacker News in a statement. "North Korean hackers have deep experience with supply chain attacks, which they've historically used to steal cryptocurrency. The full breadth of this incident is still unclear, but given the popularity of the compromised package, we expect it will have far reaching impacts." The development comes after threat actors seized control of the package maintainer's npm account to push two trojanized versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 that introduced a malicious dependency named "plain-crypto-js" in order to deliver a cross-platform backdoor capable of infecting Windows, macOS, and Linux systems. Rather than introducing any code changes to Axios, the attack leverages a postinstall hook within the "package.json" file of the malicious dependency to achieve stealthy execution. Once the compromised Axios package is installed, npm automatically triggers the execution of malicious code in the background. Specifically, the "plain-crypto-js" package functions as a "payload delivery vehicle" for an obfuscated JavaScript dropper dubbed SILKBELL ("setup.js"), which fetches the appropriate next-stage from a remote server based on the victim's operating system. As previously detailed by The Hacker News, the Windows execution branch delivers PowerShell malware, a C++ Mach-O binary for macOS, and a Python backdoor for Linux systems. The dropper also performs a cleanup to remove itself and replace the "plain-crypto-js" package's "package.json" file with a clean version that does not have the postinstall hook. The backdoor, codenamed WAVESHAPER.V2, is assessed to be an updated version of WAVESHAPER, a C++ implant deployed by UNC1069 in attacks aimed at the cryptocurrency sector. The threat actor has been operational since 2018. The supply chain attack's links to UNC1069 were first flagged by Elastic Security Labs, citing functionality overlaps. The three WAVESHAPER.V2 variants support four different commands, while beaconing to the command-and-control (C2) server at 60-second intervals - kill, to terminate the malware's execution process. rundir, to enumerate directory listings, along with file paths, sizes, and creation/modification timestamps. runscript, to run AppleScript, PowerShell, or shell commands based on the operating system. peinject, to decode and execute arbitrary binaries. "WAVESHAPER.V2 is a direct evolution of WAVESHAPER, a macOS and Linux backdoor previously attributed to UNC1069," Mandiant and GTIG said. "While the original WAVESHAPER uses a lightweight, raw binary C2 protocol and employs code packing, WAVESHAPER.V2 communicates using JSON, collects additional system information, and supports more backdoor commands." "Despite these upgrades, both versions accept their C2 URL dynamically via command-line arguments, share identical C2 polling behaviors and an uncommon User-Agent string, and deploy secondary payloads to identical temporary directories (e.g., /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond)." The links to North Korea are also bolstered by the fact that the macOS binary references developer build paths like "Jain_DEV/client_mac/macWebT/macWebT," where "macWebT" links directly to BlueNoroff's "webT" module from RustBucket and Hidden Risk malware campaigns in 2023 and 2024, according to researcher Giuseppe Massaro. Taylor Long, senior analyst at GTIG, told The Hacker News that the use of supply chain attacks is not a new strategy for threat actors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). "Several DPRK threat actors have a history of conducting supply chain compromises and leveraging malicious npm packages for cryptocurrency theft, while also continuing to rely on social engineering techniques," Long added. What's currently unclear is the motivation behind the campaign. While UNC1069 is assessed to be financially driven, the attack activity stemming from the compromise of Axios does not explicitly involve cryptocurrency theft or ransomware deployment. "We currently don’t have enough visibility into post-compromise activity to assess their motivation, but given what we know about UNC1069 and how DPRK threat actors are mandated to generate revenue, we're likely to see some financially-motivated attacks to emerge from this," Long said. To mitigate the threat, users are advised to audit dependency trees for compromised versions (and downgrade to a safe version, if found), pin Axios to a known safe version in the "package-lock.json" file to prevent accidental upgrades, check for presence of "plain-crypto-js" in "node_modules," terminate malicious processes, block C2 domain ("sfrclak[.]com," IP address: 142.11.206[.]73), isolate affected systems, and rotate all credentials. "The Axios attack should be understood as a template, not a one-time event. The level of operational sophistication documented here, including compromised maintainer credentials, pre-staged payloads built for three operating systems, both release branches hit in under 40 minutes, and built-in forensic self-destruction, reflects a threat actor that planned this as a scalable operation," ReversingLabs Chief Software Architect Tomislav Peričin told The Hacker News. "If this campaign is now appearing in PyPI and NuGet, that's consistent with what the attack mechanics already suggest: the goal was maximum developer reach. Organizations need to audit not just their npm dependencies, but every package manager feeding their build pipelines, and treat any secrets exposed in affected environments as compromised, regardless of which registry they touched." Update Microsoft has attributed the supply chain compromise to a North Korean state-sponsored threat actor it tracks as Sapphire Sleet (aka CryptoCore or CageyChameleon), an offshoot of BlueNoroff (aka Alluring Pisces, APT38, Black Alicanto, Copernicium, Nickel Gladstone, Stardust Chollima, and TA444). It's assessed to be active since at least March 2020. "The threat actor focuses primarily on the finance sector, including cryptocurrency, venture capital, and blockchain organizations," the company said. "The primary motivation of this actor is to steal cryptocurrency wallets to generate revenue, and target technology or intellectual property related to cryptocurrency trading and blockchain platforms." CrowdStrike, in its report, linked the incident to Stardust Chollima with moderate confidence based on the deployment of an updated variant of ZshBucket, a macOS malware previously identified as exclusively used by the adversarial collective. "The observed macOS variant in this case extensively reuses code from previous instances, including function names," it said. "All variants retain characteristics of previous instances, including how it profiles the user and host of the operating system, and how it sends the collected information." The new version of ZshBucket also iterates over the predecessor's functionality by implementing a common JSON-based messaging protocol for all platform-specific instances and adding commands that make it possible to binary payloads, execute arbitrary scripts and commands, enumerate the file system, and remotely terminate the implant. According to the cybersecurity company, the supply chain attack leveraging updated ZshBucket variants is part of broader efforts undertaken by the threat actor to scale its campaigns. This is significant, not least because Stardust Chollima has demonstrated an increased operational tempo since the end of Q4 2025. "Stardust Chollima's operations prioritize currency generation and regularly target cryptocurrency holders, and the adversary has also conducted widespread supply chain compromises impacting fintech companies' npm and PyPI repositories," it added. "The adversary's motivation probably aligns with this currency generation objective." Veracode has since found evidence of possible spread via a mirrored package named "@depup/axios" that republished the compromised Axios version (1.14.1) just 17 minutes after its release. "This indicates that the malware was quickly copied and spread by automated systems before it could be removed, possibly expanding its reach beyond npm itself," the company said in a statement shared with The Hacker News. "It also underscores that even short-lived supply chain attacks may persist through affected packages." Additional analyses of the Axios supply chain incident, along with indicators of compromise, have been published by various security vendors - "The Axios npm compromise serves as a stark reminder of the compounding nature of supply chain attacks," Aaron Walton, senior threat intel analyst at Expel, told The Hacker News. "When a core package is compromised, the threat surface expands exponentially to include every downstream dependency, application, and environment that relies on it." "High-profile incidents in March alone, including Trivy and LiteLLM, underscore the increasing frequency and severity of these exploits. While the cybersecurity community and maintainers are accelerating their response times, even a narrow window of exposure can lead to catastrophic data loss. Supply chain compromises are no longer 'outlier' events; they're a persistent reality. Organizations must shift from reactive response to proactive defense to protect their own data." (The story was updated on April 3, 2026, to reflect the latest developments.)
thehackernews.comApr 1, 2026extracted
Axios supply chain attack chops away at npm trust
Researchers found that compromised Axios versions installed a Remote Access Trojan. Axios is a promise-based HTTP Client for node.js, basically a helper tool that developers use behind the scenes to let apps talk to the internet. For example, Axios makes requests such as “get my messages from the server” or “send this form to the website” easier and more reliable for programmers and it saves them from having to write a lot of low‑level networking code themselves. Since it works both in the browser and on servers (Node.js), a lot of modern JavaScript‑based projects include it as a standard building block. Even if you never install Axios yourself, you might indirectly run into it when you: Use web apps built with frameworks like React, Vue, or Angular. Use mobile apps or desktop apps built with web technologies like Electron, React Native, and others. Visit smaller Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) tools, admin panels, or self‑hosted services built by developers who picked Axios. You could compare it to the plumbing in your house. Usually you don’t notice the pipes, but they bring the water to where you open a faucet. And you don’t need to know where they are until a leak occurs. What happened? Using compromised credentials of a lead maintainer of Axios an attacker published poisoned packages to npm: [email protected] and [email protected]. The malicious versions inject a new dependency, [email protected], which is never imported anywhere in the axios source code. Together the two affected packages reach up to 100 million weekly downloads on npm, which means it has a huge impact radius across web apps, services, and pipelines. It is important to note that the affected Axios version does not appear in the project’s official GitHub tags. This means that the people and projects affected are developers and environments which ran npm install that resolved to: [email protected] [email protected] , or the dependency [email protected] . Any workflow that installed one of those versions with scripts enabled may have exposed all injected secrets (cloud keys, repo deploy keys, npm tokens, etc.) to an interactive attacker, because the postinstall script (node setup.js) that runs automatically on npm install downloaded an obfuscated dropper that retrieves a platform‑specific RAT payload for macOS, Windows, or Linux. If you are a developer deploying Axios, treat any machine that installed the bad versions as potentially fully compromised and rotate secrets. The attacker may have obtained repo access, signing keys, API keys, or other secrets that can be used to backdoor future releases or attack your backend and users. Users apps built with Axios do not have any direct reason to worry. If you’re just loading your app in a browser you’re not directly executing this RAT via Axios. The infection path is the install/build step, not app runtime. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) As the rsearchers pointed out the malware dropper cleans up after itself: “Any post-infection inspection of node_modules/plain-crypto-js/package.json will show a completely clean manifest. There is no postinstall script, no setup.js file, and no indication that anything malicious was ever installed. Running npm audit or manually reviewing the installed package directory will not reveal the compromise.” What you can look for, then, are these IOCs: Domain: sfrclak[.]com IP address: 142.11.206.73 (both blocked by Malwarebytes products) Files: macOS: /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond Linux: /tmp/ld.py Windows: %PROGRAMDATA%\wt and %TEMP%\6202033.vbs/.ps1 which only exist briefly during execution Malicious npm packages: [email protected] sha-256 checksum: 2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca [email protected] sha-256 checksum: d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71 [email protected] sha-256 checksum: 07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766 From reporting threats to removing them. Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
malwarebytes.comMar 31, 2026extracted
Axios Supply Chain Attack Pushes Cross-Platform RAT via Compromised npm Account
The popular HTTP client known as Axios has suffered a supply chain attack after two newly published versions of the npm package introduced a malicious dependency that delivers a trojan capable of targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux systems. Versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 of Axios have been found to inject "plain-crypto-js" version 4.2.1 as a fake dependency. According to StepSecurity, the two versions were published using the compromised npm credentials of the primary Axios maintainer ("jasonsaayman"), allowing the attackers to bypass the project's GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline. "Its sole purpose is to execute a postinstall script that acts as a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) dropper, targeting macOS, Windows, and Linux," security researcher Ashish Kurmi said. "The dropper contacts a live command and control server and delivers platform-specific second-stage payloads. After execution, the malware deletes itself and replaces its own package.json with a clean version to evade forensic detection." Users who have Axios versions 1.14.1 or 0.30.4 installed are required to rotate their secrets and credentials with immediate effect, and downgrade to a safe version (1.14.0 or 0.30.3). The malicious versions, as well as "plain-crypto-js," are no longer available for download from npm. With more than 83 million weekly downloads, Axios is one of the most widely used HTTP clients in the JavaScript ecosystem across frontend frameworks, backend services, and enterprise applications. "This was not opportunistic," Kurmi added. "The malicious dependency was staged 18 hours in advance. Three separate payloads were pre-built for three operating systems. Both release branches were hit within 39 minutes. Every trace was designed to self-destruct." The timeline of the attack is as follows - March 30, 2026, 05:57 UTC - A clean version of the package "[email protected]" is published. March 30, 2026, 23:59 UTC - A new version ("[email protected]") with the payload added is published. March 31, 2026, 00:21 UTC - A new version of Axios ("[email protected]") that injects "[email protected]" as a runtime dependency is published using the compromised "jasonsaayman" account. March 31, 2026, 01:00 UTC - A new version of Axios ("[email protected]") that injects "[email protected]" as a runtime dependency is published using the compromised "jasonsaayman" account. According to StepSecurity, the threat actor behind the campaign is said to have compromised the npm account of "jasonsaayman" and changed its registered email address to a Proton Mail address under their control ("[email protected]"). The "plain-crypto-js" was published by an npm user named "nrwise" with the email address "[email protected]." It's believed that the attacker obtained a long-lived classic npm access token for the account to take control and directly publish poisoned versions of Axios to the registry. The embedded malware, for its part, is launched via an obfuscated Node.js dropper ("setup.js") and is designed to branch into one of three attack paths based on the operating system - On macOS, it runs an AppleScript payload to fetch a trojan binary from an external server ("sfrclak.com:8000"), save it as "/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond," change its permissions to make it executable, and launch it in the background via /bin/zsh. The AppleScript file is deleted after execution to cover up the tracks. On Windows, it locates the PowerShell binary path, copies it to the "%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe" (disguising it as the Windows Terminal app), and writes a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) to the temp directory and executes it. The VBScript contacts the same server to fetch a PowerShell RAT script and execute it. The downloaded file is then deleted. On other platforms (e.g., Linux), the dropper runs a shell command via Node.js’s execSync to fetch a Python RAT script from the same server, save it to "/tmp/ld.py," and execute it in the background using the nohup command. "Each platform sends a distinct POST body to the same C2 URL — packages.npm.org/product0 (macOS), packages.npm.org/product1 (Windows), packages.npm.org/product2 (Linux)," StepSecurity said. "This allows the C2 server to serve a platform-appropriate payload in response to a single endpoint." The downloaded second-stage binary for macOS is a C++ RAT that fingerprints the system and beacons to a remote server every 60 seconds to retrieve commands for subsequent execution. It supports capabilities to run additional payloads, execute shell commands, enumerate the file system, and terminate the RAT. SafeDep's analysis of the Linux RAT has revealed that it supports the same commands as its macOS counterpart. The absence of a persistence mechanism means that the malware does not survive across reboots. This indicates that the attack is either geared towards quick data exfiltration or leverages the RAT's ability to run binaries and shell commands to deploy persistence. "The attack is notable for its restraint. No Axios source files were modified, making traditional diff-based code review less likely to catch it," SafeDep said. "The malicious behavior lives entirely in a transitive dependency, triggered automatically by npm's postinstall lifecycle." The PowerShell RAT targeting Windows is no different in that it also facilitates the same functionality to execute arbitrary DLLs in memory, run PowerShell commands, list directories with file metadata, and gracefully kill itself. Unlike the macOS and Linux variants, the RAT creates "%PROGRAMDATA%\system.bat" with a download cradle that re-fetches the malware from the server on every login and adds a Registry Run key pointing to the batch script. "On every compromised host, the RAT performed immediate system reconnaissance: enumerating user directories, filesystem drive roots, and running processes, and transmitted this data to the C2," Huntress researcher John Hammond said. "The RAT maintained a 60-second beacon loop, ready to accept further commands including arbitrary script execution and in-memory binary injection." As Elastic Security Labs pointed out, the attack makes use of three parallel implementations of the same RAT – PowerShell for Windows, compiled C++ for macOS, Python for Linux – that shares an identical C2 protocol, command set, message format, and operational behavior. "The consistency strongly indicates a single developer or tightly coordinated team working from a shared design document," the company said. Once the main payload is launched, the Node.js malware also takes steps to perform three forensic cleanup steps by removing the postinstall script from the installed package directory, deleting the "package.json" the references the postinstall hook to launch the dropper, and renaming "package.md" to "package.json." It's worth noting that the "package.md" file is included in "plain-crypto-js" and is a clean "package.json" manifest without the postinstall hook that triggers the entire attack. In switching the package manifests, the idea is to avoid raising any red flags during post-infection inspection of the package. "Neither malicious version contains a single line of malicious code inside Axios itself," StepSecurity said. "Instead, both inject a fake dependency, [email protected], a package that is never imported anywhere in the Axios source, whose only purpose is to run a postinstall script that deploys a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT)." It's currently not known who is behind the supply chain compromise, but Elastic said the macOS Mach-O binary delivered by the "plain-crypto-js" postinstall hook exhibits significant overlap with WAVESHAPER, a C++ backdoor tracked by Google-owned Mandiant last month and attributed to a North Korean threat actor known as UNC1069. Users are advised to perform the following actions to ascertain compromise - Check for the malicious Axios versions. Check for RAT artifacts: "/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond" (macOS), "%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe" (Windows), and "/tmp/ld.py" (Linux). Downgrade to Axios versions 1.14.0 or 0.30.3. Remove "plain-crypto-js" from the "node_modules" directory. If RAT artifacts are detected, assume compromise and rotate all credentials on the system. Audit CI/CD pipelines for runs that installed the affected versions. Block egress traffic to the command-and-control domain ("sfrclak[.]com") Socket, in its own analysis of the attack, said identified two additional packages distributing the same malware through vendored dependencies - @shadanai/openclaw (versions 2026.3.28-2, 2026.3.28-3, 2026.3.31-1, and 2026.3.31-2) @qqbrowser/openclaw-qbot (version 0.0.130) In the case of "@shadanai/openclaw," the package vendors the malicious "plain-crypto-js" payload directly (e.g., @shadanai/openclaw/files/2026.3.31-1/dist/extensions/slack/node_modules/plain-crypto-js/setup.js). On the other hand, "@qqbrowser/[email protected]," ships a tampered "[email protected]" in its "node_modules/" folder with "plain-crypto-js" injected as a dependency. "The real axios has only three dependencies (follow-redirects, form-data, proxy-from-env)," the supply chain security company said. "The addition of plain-crypto-js is unambiguous tampering. When npm processes this vendored axios, it installs plain-crypto-js and triggers the same malicious postinstall chain."
thehackernews.comMar 31, 2026extracted