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104.64.211.22

Type
IP
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News extraction
First seen
Aug 24, 2026
Last seen
Aug 24, 2026
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Operation QUICSILVER Targets Myanmar Government and IT with QUICAgent Backdoor
The FBI on Wednesday said it disrupted a botnet and seized two platforms that Chinese-government cyberoperatives used to hack NASA, the US Senate, the Department of Energy, and several other government agencies and critical networks. The Federal Reserve, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Institutes of Health were also among those victimized by the two now-seized hacking tools: a vulnerability scanning and exploitation malware named QScan, and an obfuscation network named QTRouter. The FBI says a People’s Republic (PRC) of China-backed group called QTFY created and operated the two platforms, plus botnets of compromised IoT devices. The Bureau says QTFY’s hackers work for a private PRC company called Nanjing Xinjiuwei. “Payments from the PRC's Ministry of State Security (MSS) to Nanjing Xinjiuwei, for example, indicate that the company conducts malicious cyber activities on behalf of the PRC Government,” according to court documents. “QTFY actors include former members of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA), and they use their PLA relationships to obtain contracts and subcontracts supporting offensive cyber operations,” the documents state. How to build a botnet QScan scans and automatically infects thousands of IoT devices worldwide, and then adds them to the QTRouter network of QTFY-controlled devices. The QTRouter botnet – consisting of these compromised IoT devices, plus commercial proxy service devices, and leased virtual private servers – then serves as an obfuscation network, allowing QTFY and other criminals who pay for the service to conceal the origin of their digital intrusion activities, making these communications appear to originate from local computers. On Monday, a US federal court granted seizure warrants for three domains linked to QTFY: qtproxy.xyz, qt-proxy.org, and qt-team.com. All three domains were hardcoded into both the QScan and QTRouter malware, and the court-authorized seizures made both hacking services inoperable, the Justice Department said. Hacking critical networks since 2018 (at least) The hacking services and malware have been in use since at least 2018, and as recently as this year when QTFY infrastructure compromised the US Senate, according to court documents. The FBI investigated an attempted computer intrusion at NASA in August 2019, during which the Chinese government snoops tried to exploit CVE-2019-11510, a critical vulnerability in Ivanti’s Pulse Secure VPN that allowed attackers to learn legitimate users' usernames and passwords, effectively granting them unauthorized access to protected networks. Ivanti patched the flaw in April 2019. As The Register previously reported, China also abused this bug as a zero-day to break into dozens of defense companies, government agencies, and financial organizations in America and abroad. QTFY later exploited this same CVE in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic to attack a medical center in Ohio, according to court documents. Other victims in 2019 and 2020 include unnamed financial groups in Michigan and South Korea, and a Missouri insurance agency. The insurance agency attack abused a different vulnerability: CVE-2019-19781, a critical flaw in Citrix VPN products that allowed arbitrary code execution with no account credentials. Years later, in 2024, QTFY hackers also broke into computers at three DOE National Laboratories, NIH, and a US security device manufacturer. “These entities were victims of a zero-day attack against Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance,” the court documents say. The FBI did not respond to The Register’s inquiries, including how many computers QTFY compromised, and whether the crew has ties to any of China’s "Typhoon" groups. PRC goon squad whac-a-mole This latest disruption follows a series of court-ordered seizures intended to hamstring China’s hacking activities over the last few years. In 2025, the FBI removed PlugX surveillance malware from more than 4,000 US computers that had been infected by the PRC-sponsored group Mustang Panda. A year earlier, in 2024, China’s Flax Typhoon burned down their own botnet consisting of hundreds of thousands of infected internet-of-things devices when confronted by the feds. And in late 2023, the FBI disrupted a botnet used by yet another Chinese government attack crew, Volt Typhoon, to attack US and foreign critical infrastructure. In June, however, Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs reported a “significant resurgence” of a botnet linked to Volt Typhoon, with this cluster of injected machines surging to 1,500 compromised routers and IoT devices.®
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Aug 27, 2026
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Operation QUICSILVER Targets Myanmar Government and IT with QUICAgent Backdoor
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a cyber espionage campaign targeting Myanmar that uses graduation ceremony invitation lures to deliver a Go backdoor called QUICAgent. The campaign, codenamed Operation QUICSILVER, has been found to target government and information technology sectors, per Seqrite Labs. The activity is assessed to be the work of a China-nexus threat actor with moderate confidence. It was first observed in April 2026, when the attack was observed delivering a file named "HolidayNotice.pdf.exe" along with a lure that was a fabricated Belgian–Myanmar public holiday calendar. Two subsequent artifacts, each detected in June and July 2026, make use of a Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) file that activates the infection chain. Present within the VHD file is a Windows Shortcut (LNK) that mimics a PDF document. Opening the document displays a decoy PDF to the victim, an official graduation ceremony invitation that's written in Burmese and purports to be from the Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD), which operates under Myanmar's Ministry of Transport and Communications. The "announcement" serves as a distraction while the shortcut file stealthily launches "ftp.exe," a legitimate Microsoft-signed Windows binary, and abuses its "-s" option to run commands stored in a local script file. "While the decoy is presented on the victim's screen, the script searches for two document files, header.doc and body.doc, stored inside the hidden _rels directory," security researchers Priya Patel and Kartik Jivani said. "It then combines these two files using the native Windows copy /b command to reconstruct the next-stage payload." The payload is a Golang-based implant dubbed QUICAgent that performs sandbox evasion techniques before connecting to a command-and-control (C2) server. Specifically, it incorporates a random delay of 100-600 milliseconds and executes 1,000 iterations of SHA-256 hashing operations to exhaust automated sandbox execution time limits. The backend C2 server address is retrieved dynamically by sending an HTTP GET request to two Cloudflare Workers domains. Once the C2 address is obtained ("104.64.211[.]22"), it suffixes port 443 to the domain and constructs the final destination. The malware uses QUIC over UDP port 443 to communicate with the C2 server. The initial beacon to the server also includes basic information about the compromised host. The beacon is transmitted every five seconds, with each infected machine assigned a unique X-Agent-ID to identify the victim. QUICAgent is fairly basic in that it supports five commands to execute commands, transfer files, browse directories, and modify the beacon interval. Persistence is achieved by setting up an LNK file in the current user's Windows Startup folder so that it's automatically executed the next time the user logs in to the system. "The campaign uses a multi-stage infection chain that begins with a malicious LNK file, abuses ftp.exe as a LOLBAS to execute the next stage, reconstructs the payload from two fake document files, and finally deploys a custom Go-based backdoor that we have named QUICAgent," the Indian cybersecurity company said. The disclosure comes as the China-linked Mustang Panda actor has been observed using an updated version of a known backdoor called COOLCLIENT that can deploy a signed kernel-mode driver ("Msagent.sys"), similar to the kernel-mode enhancements identified in TONESHELL. The backdoor is assessed to be deployed via PlugX using DLL sideloading, a technique extensively abused by the hacking group. COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions. It was first detected in the wild in 2022. "The driver enhances the malware's stealth by hiding the COOLCLIENT process, protecting related files and registry entries, and preventing them from being inspected or modified," Kaspersky said, adding it detected the updated variant and its accompanying driver in intrusions across Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia. "While the overall execution flow remains consistent with previously documented COOLCLIENT variants, this sample introduces a previously undocumented kernel-mode driver that significantly expands the malware's stealth capabilities."
thehackernews.comAug 24, 2026extracted